

# The Enslavement of War Captives by the Romans to 146 BC

---

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of  
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by:

Jason Paul Wickham

May 2014

To L.W.

# Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	i
List of Figures.....	iii
Abstract.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Abbreviations.....	vi
Introduction.....	1
Methodology.....	6
Chapter 1 <i>Capture, Captives and Commanders</i> .....	11
Terminology for Captives and Capture.....	11
Capture and Enslavement – Legality and Morality.....	14
Ownership of Captives.....	19
Laws Governing the Taking of Captives.....	22
The Commander’s Decision.....	28
Chapter 2 <i>Release and Execution</i> .....	31
Hostages.....	32
Release.....	34
Execution.....	39
Chapter 3 <i>Ransom</i> .....	44
Terms for Ransom.....	45
Ransom in the Greek World and the Roman Attitude Towards Ransom.....	49
Ransom by Private Persons.....	53
Ransom of non-Roman Captives.....	54
Ransom Prices.....	58
The Process of Ransom.....	65
Chapter 4 <i>Enslavements before the Punic Wars</i> .....	74
Terms for Enslavement.....	74
Enslavements in Early Rome up to the Sack of Veii.....	79
Nexum.....	85
The Fourth Century.....	88
The Third Samnite War and the Misinterpretation of Livy.....	91

## Table of Contents

Enslavements up to the First Punic War .....	110
Chapter 5 <i>Enslavements during the Punic Wars</i> .....	115
First Punic War .....	115
Between the First and Second Punic Wars .....	128
Second Punic War.....	130
Chapter 6 <i>Enslavements after the Punic Wars</i> .....	148
The Macedonian Wars .....	149
From the War with Antiochus to the Destruction of Corinth .....	160
Wars in Northern Italy and Spain .....	167
Sardinia and the Destruction of Carthage .....	174
Chapter 7 <i>Markets, Merchants and Transports</i> .....	178
Markets .....	179
Slave Traders .....	183
Trade and Transport.....	187
Conclusion <i>The War Captive Contribution to the Slave Supply</i> .....	196
Appendix <i>References to Captives</i> .....	210
Bibliography .....	218

## List of Figures

I. GREEK RANSOM PRICES .....	60
II. ROMAN RANSOM PRICES .....	63
III. SHIP AND GUARD REQUIREMENTS FOR SEA TRANSPORT .....	193
IV. CAPTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SLAVE SUPPLY .....	202

## Abstract

War captives are generally thought to have comprised the main portion of the Roman slave supply during the Republic. Likewise, the result of mass enslavement through continuous war has been interpreted as a principle factor in the agricultural evolution in Italy from the second century BC which saw a significant increase in large plantation style farming (*latifundia*). The misconception of a male bias in agricultural labour has put a heavy influence on the need for an external supply of slaves rather than through reproduction. However, an analysis of documentary evidence suggests that wartime enslavement was more limited. Problems in supervising, transporting, and trading large numbers of slaves, as well as competing markets elsewhere in the Mediterranean, made immediate absorption of captives as slaves into the central Italian economy problematic. Furthermore, the vast majority of wartime enslavements occurred following the capture of cities, where larger numbers of civilian prisoners were taken, mostly comprising women, children and slaves.

Ancient sources frequently exaggerated the number of war captives and often neglected to elaborate on the fate of those taken in war. Many modern historians have been far too quick to assume that prisoners were enslaved, which has given a disproportionate view of the importance of the contribution of war captives to the slave supply and their effect upon the growing slave population at Rome during the Republic. Such assumptions have left critical analysis wanting and, as a result, war captives have been largely neglected by Roman historians. This study attempts to address the gap in our analysis of these crucial practices in antiquity and to offer an explanation of how the taking of war captives was impacted by Rome's changing socio-political and economic structures during the Republic.

## Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of my supervisors. I wish to thank Dr. Colin Adams who oversaw my research from its genesis to its current state, our discussions, not always relating to Roman history, have been immeasurably helpful in getting me this far. I also wish to thank Dr. Graham Oliver, whose pastoral guidance and reassurance was helpful in the frightful beginning of this study. I extend my heartfelt gratitude also to Dr. Jan Haywood and Dr. David Griffiths whose camaraderie helped me in so many ways, along with their gracious time in editing - I am forever grateful. Dr. Phil Freeman was also kind enough to read over a chapter and provided valuable feedback. Of course, the remaining errors and deficiencies are my own. I have been incredibly lucky to have shared an office with Anne Landborg, whose company for the best part of four years has been much appreciated. A special thanks must go out to all of my PhD colleagues, whose friendship and support made this project considerably less Sisyphean and often more bibulous.

The pursuit of this degree would not have been possible without the love and support of my family. I thank my parents, whose support allowed me to pursue further education in the first place, and whose encouragement has maintained me throughout. A special thank you must be reserved for Prof. Daniela Montaldi, without whom my pursuit of a doctorate degree would simply be impossible. I have benefited immeasurably from her care and generosity. I am also grateful for Marco and Mica who have made Liverpool all the more my home. My deepest gratitude goes to Faye, who has suffered in the way all partners of PhD students do, and was crazy enough to stick by me. Her love and support was more than anyone could ever ask for.

I am forever in debt to you all!

J.P.W.  
Liverpool  
October 2013

## Abbreviations

All references to classical texts, inscriptions and papyri given in this work follow those used in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Journal and modern bibliographic abbreviations follow those used in *L'Année Philologique*. For all other abbreviations used, the full titles should be discernible without difficulty in the text and bibliography. For more obscure titles I have refrained from using abbreviations.

<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>AnTard</i>	<i>Antiquité Tardive</i>
<i>ArchCl</i>	<i>Archeologia Classica</i>
<i>BASP</i>	<i>Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists</i>
<i>BMC</i>	<i>British Museum Catalogue</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>CAH<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.)</i>
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
<i>CISem</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	<i>Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, F. Jacoby (ed.)</i>
<i>GDI</i>	<i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialektinschriften, H. Collitz (ed.)</i>
<i>GIREA</i>	<i>Groupe International de Recherche sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité</i>
<i>GR</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>HtHR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IGLS</i>	<i>Les inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie</i>
<i>ILLRP</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic studies</i>
<i>JRA</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Archeology</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>



<i>LSJ</i>	<i>Liddell-Scott Greek-English Lexicon</i> , H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones (edd.)
<i>MAAR</i>	<i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i>
<i>MDAI(R)</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des kaiserlichen deutschen archaeologischen Instituts (Römische Abteilung)</i>
<i>MEFRA</i>	<i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Antiquité</i>
<i>MHR</i>	<i>Mediterranean Historical Review</i>
<i>OCD</i>	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i>
<i>OGIS</i>	<i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i>
<i>ORF</i>	<i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> , H. Malcovati (ed.)
<i>PBSR</i>	<i>Papers of the British School in Rome</i>
<i>P.Oxy</i>	<i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i>
<i>RE</i>	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (edd.)
<i>RIDA</i>	<i>Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité</i>
<i>RIL</i>	<i>Rendiconti / Istituto Lombardo</i>
<i>Riv. Stor. Ant.</i>	<i>Rivista storica dell'antichità</i>
<i>SCO</i>	<i>Studi classici e orientali</i>
<i>SdA</i>	<i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> , H.H. Schmitt (ed.)
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SIG</i>	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , W. Dittenberger (ed.)
<i>TAPhA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>TGF</i>	<i>Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i> , A. Nauck (ed.)
<i>TLL</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift Für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>
<i>ZRG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung)</i>

# Introduction

In his important sociological study on the institution of slavery, Orlando Patterson noted that it has often been too easy to exaggerate the role of warfare as a source of slaves.<sup>1</sup> This emphasis stems largely from the fact that many slave populations are thought to have originated from enslaved captives. It may be recalled that the Helots of Messenia had been subjugated through war by the Spartans, and though Roman *vernae* were born into slavery, their ancestors had at one time been enslaved.<sup>2</sup> To Roman jurists, the definitive explanation for the existence of slavery as a universally accepted practice in contrast with ‘natural law,’ was that it stemmed from warfare, also a universal practice. Etymologically, slavery suggests that capture in war was of paramount significance. *Servus* and *mancipia*, according to the Roman jurists, stem from *servare* ‘to save’ and *manu capiuntur* ‘to take in hand,’ both of which demonstrate the origination of servile status through war.<sup>3</sup> It is worth noting that in English as well as many other European languages, ‘slave’ stems from ‘Slav’ in recognition of the fact that many Slavs were enslaved during their uprising against the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century.<sup>4</sup>

With such an entrenched conceptual foundation, it is easy to conclude that most slaves originated from capture in war, and more importantly, that most war captives were enslaved. This deduction has certainly been the case of Roman history, where the taking of captives has generally been synonymous with their enslavement, despite a lack of evidence to suggest that it was *in fact* the case. The problem lies initially with a disinterest in the fate of captives by Roman sources, and secondly with the conclusion, void of empirical evidence, of modern historians, that most captives were enslaved. Roman history is not alone in this dilemma. Historians of Near Eastern civilizations have often asserted that war was the major source of slaves, and similarly historians of Han dynasty China (a contemporary of Rome and common comparison) have encountered a disinterest in the fate of captives by their sources, and many have come to the same conclusion as Roman historians. More recently these views have been

---

<sup>1</sup> Patterson 1982, 106.

<sup>2</sup> See Hornblower 1983, 120-2; Garland 1987, 11. There was even a tradition circulated amongst the Greeks as late as the first century that the Romans were descended from slaves settled at Rome, Dion. Hal. 1.4.2.

<sup>3</sup> *Dig.* 1.5.4 (Florentinus *Institutes* 9.2); *Inst. Ius.* 1.3.3. For an extended discussion of this etymology see Chapter 1.

<sup>4</sup> Klein 1966 *s.v.* ‘slave.’

## Introduction

called into question.<sup>5</sup> For chattel slavery in Rome there still remains a general consensus that, during the expansive years of the Roman Republic, war captives constituted the most significant source and supply of slaves; only to be replaced by other means of acquisition, once rapid expansion ceased from the establishment of the *Pax Romana* under Augustus, when the taking of captives in wars of expansion was no longer commonplace. The premise of this study is to analyse the process of enslavement through war, to interpret Rome's evolving policies in taking slaves during its formative years of the early and mid-Republic, and to re-evaluate the interpretation of war captives as having been commonly enslaved.

The prevailing view of Roman slavery, as having derived from the enslavement of enemies, has clouded our understanding of the relevance of studying Roman slavery. Jefferson was the author of the original draft of *The Declaration of Independence* and penned the words “that all men are created equal,” yet Jefferson was himself a slave owner, and though he held considerable reservations concerning slavery, he perceived a clear superiority of white Europeans over Africans, which ‘naturally justified’ the enslavement of the later by the former.<sup>6</sup> Supremacism had ‘solved’ for New World slave owners what Aristotle had struggled with, namely the identification of a *natural* slave by physical differentiation. Aristotle had identified what he thought to be the characteristics of a natural slave, and he accepted that some people fell naturally into this category whereas others were naturally masters, but this was not readily apparent by physical features, only through their mental aptitude.<sup>7</sup> In expressing the natural superiority of white Europeans, Jefferson also identified a

---

<sup>5</sup> For the view of mass enslavement in Mesopotamia as the major source of slaves see Diakanoff 1976, 45-78; and likewise for Neo-Sumeria, see Siegel 1947, 11; Snell 2011, 6-8. This traditional view was rejected by Gelb 1973, 70-98 and Oded 1979, 74. For the orthodox view of slave acquisition in Han China see Chou ku-Cheng 1956, 61-7. For scepticism of this widespread interpretation of enslaved captives see Ch'u T'ung-tsu 1972, 135-41; Pulleyblank 1958, 201-5; Wilbur 1943, 96. In fact the replacement of the ‘well field’ system by large land owners utilising slave labour is remarkably reminiscent of the Hopkins model (see below). For an overview of the Han period agrarian model see Feng 2013, 291f.; Sadao 1986, 256-9. For a general discussion of the misinterpretation of the significance of war captives in many slave systems with extensive bibliography (including many of the selected citations above) see Patterson 1982, 106-15.

<sup>6</sup> The contrast between natural, innate freedom and practical servitude was explored by Rousseau in his treatise *Du Contrat Social, ou principes du droit politique* (1762). This was, of course, significantly influential to Jefferson. Rousseau's views concerning ‘social contract’ between subject and ruling factors were heavily influenced by Aristotle. The assertion by Rousseau that “man was born free, but everywhere he is in chains” reflects the exploitation at the hands of ‘the sovereign’ state rather than the fault of individuals, a point missed by Jefferson and a correction of Aristotle who Rousseau felt mistook the effect of slavery for its cause, see Williams 2014, 40.

<sup>7</sup> For Aristotle's concept of natural slavery see *Pol.* 1254a-b. Aristotle remarked on the difficulty of recognising non-physical characteristics *Pol.* 154b39-40 “beauty of the soul is not as easy to see as beauty of the body.” See further Brunt 1993, 343-88; Garnsey 1996, 107-10. Aristotle believed non-Greeks were naturally suitable as slaves *Pol.* 1252b5-9; 1255a28-b2; 1285a19-21, for an analysis of Aristotle's view of ‘natural slavery’ with regards to ‘reason’ see Heath 2008, 243-70; Fisher 1993, 86f.

## Introduction

critical problem of ancient slavery: the enslavement of people who were 'equal' to their owners.

In the fourteenth query of his treatise *Notes on the State of Virginia*, Jefferson provided an apologia for American slave ownership by demonstrating the harshness of the Roman slave system, and the improved treatment of slaves under the American system. He observed the harsh separation of men and women which Cato, ever the miser, extracted money from his male slaves for such pauses in separation, and the terrible punishments suffered by Roman slaves at the hands of their owners.<sup>8</sup> Jefferson noted that despite the brutality of Roman slavery, slaves could be renowned scholars, such as Terence, Epictetus and Phaedrus, whereas he maintained African slaves were incapable of advanced thought. To Jefferson, slavery was a 'white man's burden,' as an institution it had 'progressed' from the Roman system which stole liberty unnaturally. To modern students of history, the lack of racial differentiation, despite being exhibited in the reprehensible exploitation of people as slaves, illustrates how the course of human history is not necessarily progressive.

Roman slavery is viewed as unique in the manner and the extent that it acquired slaves, at least until the limitation of expansive warfare under the empire. Such a theory portrays remoteness to all other slave systems, and has blinded us to the ubiquitous conditions of slavery.<sup>9</sup> It is now believed, despite universal legislation against slavery, that there are more slaves living in the world today than any previous time in history, the majority of these are trafficked from poor countries and from the most vulnerable levels of western societies.<sup>10</sup> In dispelling the notion that Rome was reliant upon the direct acquisition of war captives through their military efforts, it is possible to demonstrate that the history of human exploitation has remained relatively unchanged.

---

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 21.2. Jefferson cites the incident of Vedius Pollio who is prevented by the emperor Augustus from feeding a slave to his eels for breaking a jug (Cass. Dio 54.23.1-6; Plin. *HN* 9.39; Sen. *Clem.* 1.18.9; *Dial.* 3.40.2).

<sup>9</sup> See for example the denial of enslavement from war by Machiavelli *Art of War* (book 2) as he compares warfare in his day to that of the classical world where captives "remained slaves in perpetuity." Enslavement was common in wars between Christians and Muslims into the 19<sup>th</sup> century, see for example the account of John Smith 1630 *The true travels, adventures, and observations, of Captain John Smith, into Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, from ann. dom. 1593-1629* (reprinted 1704, 378) who was enslaved after capture by Ottomans in 1602. For the Enslavement of Europeans (particularly British) in this period see Colley 2002.

<sup>10</sup> According to a 2012 survey conducted by the United Nations Labour Organisation over 21 million people worldwide are estimated to be living as slaves (ILO Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour Summary of the 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour), in the US alone nearly 15,000 people are trafficked each year (2005 US Department of State Publication 11252). The issue of modern slavery has only recently garnered significant study, see Scarpa 2008, 3-40.

## Introduction

The topic of warfare enslavement has characteristically been considered within wider studies of slavery; often serving as a means of introducing readers, unacquainted with slavery, to the raw and brutal nature of the ancient world's most odious form of exploitation. Early studies on slavery, such as those of Henri Wallon and William Blair portrayed war captives as the primary source of slaves, and the main drive behind the growing dependence upon slave labour in the Republic.<sup>11</sup> Eventually, Blair's inflated concept of the slave population and the extent of war captive acquisition was superseded by Beloch's monumental demographic study of the Graeco-Roman world, in which he significantly reduced the plausible number of slaves and the number of captives that could be contributed to such a supply.<sup>12</sup> The study of slavery in the ancient world gained significant momentum in the twentieth century with considerable contribution by Marxist scholars, a redoubled interest in Anglophone scholarship and importantly by the establishment of two major research groups at Besançon and Mainz.<sup>13</sup>

William Westermann was the first to extensively analyse incidents of mass enslavement during warfare. In his 1955 publication derived from his *Pauly Encyclopädie* entry 'sklaverei,' Westermann concluded that the enslavement of war captives was integral to the maintenance of the Roman labour supply, particularly during the absence of free males performing extended military service.<sup>14</sup> Keith Hopkins would later expound upon this concept and developed a model of the Roman economy which hinged on the eventual replacement of yeomen agriculture through slave labour, supplied in part by the warfare that made the small farmers absent from their lands.<sup>15</sup> Hans Volkmann was the first to study wartime enslavements as a specific topic. His study was, however, limited and represents an extended survey rather than an in-depth analysis, and his organisation of the material, geographically instead of chronologically, has prevented identifying any patterns in the enslavement process, particularly with regards to the evolving political situation in Rome. Volkmann's study was republished in 1990 by Gerhard Horsmann with an extended bibliography and corrigenda, but little additional analysis was offered. To date, the 1973 dissertation of Wayne Boese remains the only book-length study of the Roman slave trade,

---

<sup>11</sup> Wallon, 1847 II, 17f; Blair 1833, 16f.

<sup>12</sup> Beloch 1926, 415-18.

<sup>13</sup> For a brief historiographical analysis of Marxist scholarship concerning Roman slavery see McKeown 2007, 52-96. The research groups: *Groupe Internationale de Recherche sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité* and *Forschungen zur Antiken Sklaverei*.

<sup>14</sup> Westermann 1955, 57-69.

<sup>15</sup> Hopkins 1978, 1-98. Reasserted by Katsari 2008, 27.

## Introduction

but his discussion regarding the enslavement of war captives was largely derived from Westermann, and he generally accepted the fact that the capture of war prisoners constituted the principle means of supply for slaves during the Republic. This principle has been the orthodox view and has remained relatively unchallenged.<sup>16</sup>

It has not been until the recent demographic studies that the significance of the war captive contribution has been questioned. In 1980 William Harris first paved the way for understanding the logistics behind the slave numbers in his article on the Roman slave trade.<sup>17</sup> Then, using modern demographic techniques, Scheidel also identified the considerable need for an annual influx of slaves that far exceeded what could be sought through warfare.<sup>18</sup> Whilst Harris and Scheidel have disagreed over the valuation of individual sources of supply, they have both agreed that warfare, at least by the end of the Republic, no longer supported the need for slaves, albeit with the caveat that the sources of the Empire are less explicit in the matter of warfare capture.<sup>19</sup> For the mid-Republic and earlier, the slave supply has largely been ignored and so it has, by default, been accepted that war captives were the chief source of supply for slaves; eventually replaced by alternative means, only when the slave population grew to an exceptionally large size and when warfare ceased to be expansionistic.

To date, there has been only one specific study upon the enslavement of war captives by the Romans by Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, whose analysis of the Punic Wars is typically critical of enslavement figures, and questions the validity of many interpretations that war captives were enslaved.<sup>20</sup> However, Welwei's analysis is confined primarily to the third century BC with limited inclusion of post and prior material. The topic of war-time enslavements has been

---

<sup>16</sup> Bradley, 1984, 7-8; 1987, 43-4; 1994, 13, 32-3; 2004, 299; Brunt 1958, 166; 1971, 707; Hopkins 1978 8-15; Nicolet 1976, 214; Ste. Croix 1981, 228-36; White 1970, 368-70. Finley 1980, 82-6 rejected the notion that growing wartime enslavements brought about Rome's slave society, arguing instead that there was already a significant population of slaves in Rome, stating "logically, the demand for slaves precedes the supply" (1980, 86). Westermann 1955, 70 noted that the limited evidence for Roman slave holding prior to the second century has clouded our understanding of its rise. This has also led to an interpretation that captures in war diminished significantly by comparison in Late Antiquity, however there are numerous examples which suggest this was not the case particularly from the third century AD onwards, see Lenski 2011a, 193f.; Harper 2011, 67f.

<sup>17</sup> Harris 1980.

<sup>18</sup> Scheidel 1997, 2005, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Harris 1980, 121-2; 1999, 73. Scheidel 1997, 156-7; 2011, 295-7. See also Bradley 1987, 42; Temin 2004, 530; Thompson 2003, 6-7. This paradigmatic shift was overemphasised as a deliberate strategy by Luttwak 1976, particularly 1-13. For imperial enslavements see Boese 1973, 104-42; Gonzalez 2002, 65-82. For the continuation of warfare beyond the Republic as a contribution to the slave supply see Bradley 1994, 40-1; 2004, 302f.; Woolf 1993, 181-2.

<sup>20</sup> Welwei 2000.

## Introduction

better addressed by Greek historians, and our understanding of Roman enslavement practices can be enhanced by their works, such as Pierre Ducrey's monograph on prisoners of war, Andreas Panagopoulos' work investigating capture during the Peloponnesian War and William Pritchett's extensive study on Greek warfare.<sup>21</sup> These studies considered the ransom, release and execution of captives along with enslavement as variant outcomes of the same process of handling captives. Such a wider consideration has been lacking in Roman studies on the topic.

This study seeks to establish that the enslavement of war captives occurred less often than has been generally perceived, that large-scale enslavements did not occur with any regularity until the end of the third century BC, after the slave system of the Romans had been well established, and that capture often led to other outcomes apart from slavery. Furthermore, it will become apparent that most large scale captures included civilian populations, and accordingly women and children represented the majority of those captured. The implication of these observations is that Roman slavery was more heavily reliant upon alternative supplies of slaves and that there was no consistent strategy by the Romans to fight wars *directly* for the acquisition of slaves.<sup>22</sup>

## Methodology

In order to demonstrate the process of enslavement and the development of the practice through warfare, it is necessary to discuss the topic from an early stage in Roman history, and thus this study covers examples of enslavement from the monarchy. Evidence for large scale enslavements begins to taper off from the second century BC, in part due to the prevalence of civil rather than foreign wars which did not accrue slaves and partly because of the nature of our sources. The narratives of Livy and Polybius, which provide the backbone of the history of Roman enslavement, end in the second half of the century. Thus this study naturally concludes with the significant year 146 BC, in which Corinth and Carthage were sacked by the Romans. Whilst the narrative portion of this study ceases in 146 BC, there is extensive consideration of later evidence, chiefly to illustrate overarching themes in the Roman practice of reduction in warfare.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ducrey 1999; Panagopoulos 1978; Pritchett 1991. See also Garland 1987, 9.

<sup>22</sup> Warfare also indirectly affected the slave supply, as result of famine and displacement many slaves may have been made. See Garnsey 2003 and Katsari 2008, 37-38 on the lasting deprivation of Macedon.

## Introduction

Whilst the historical scope of this study is limited to the Roman Republic to 146 BC, considerable use is made of textual evidence from the archaic to early medieval periods. Most of the major sources concerning the period covered in this study were not current with the events considered in their histories and biographies; Livy, Dionysius, Dio Cassius, Diodorus and Plutarch were all born later than 146 BC. Only Polybius was current with some of the events described in his *Histories*, however, his work becomes increasingly fragmented for the period he experienced.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the sources whose accounts give the greatest details concerning the process of capture and enslavement, such as Caesar, Sallust and Josephus were written during and concerned events of the final century of the Republic and the imperial periods. It must be accepted that first-hand accounts of wartime captures and enslavements for the early and middle Republican periods are not available to the modern historian, at least not preserved *litera scripta manet*.

The *Histories* of Polybius and the *Annals* of Livy, which provide the most substantial evidence for Roman enslavement practices during the Republic, drew upon a plethora of earlier writers. Polybius wrote in the later second century BC, as a former hostage of Rome and a client and close friend of Scipio Aemilianus his work must be read with an understanding of the context in which it was produced. Nevertheless, Polybius was a careful and critical historian, he had the advantage of reading both Latin and Greek works and, with assistance, consulted Carthaginian sources as well. The objective of Polybius' history was clear, it was an explanation, aimed at a Greek audience, to explain how the Romans rose to power and he was often critical of his sources when they proved insufficient for his task. It is often in his criticism of his sources that we learn who he was consulting. Livy's work was an extended annalistic history of Rome following in the tradition of most of his sources. Livy had the benefit of drawing upon Polybius and he praised the value of Polybius' work.<sup>24</sup> For early Roman history both Livy and Polybius utilised the early Roman historians and annalists.<sup>25</sup> Livy also drew on later annalists, and Polybius drew on a number of relevant

---

<sup>23</sup> Polybius was born c. 200 BC, his *Histories* end with the year 146 BC and the destruction of Carthage which he was present for as an associate of Scipio Aemilianus. The *Histories* are increasingly fragmentary from book 7 and particularly so from book 22.

<sup>24</sup> Liv. 30.45.5; 33.10.10. Livy was also critical of Polybius 36.19.11 (concerning figures) and 39.52.1 (dating).

<sup>25</sup> Most notably Quintus Fabius Pictor and Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi (Censorinus). Although Fabius Pictor has been traditionally regarded as an annalist, the surviving portion of his work suggests a different style. His scope and subject, however, were very much in the vein of annals. Fabius Pictor wrote in Greek (*SEG* 26. 1122) and Livy may have consulted later Latin translations, see Northwood 2007, 97-4; s.v. "Fabius Pictor" *OCD*. Less is known of Calpurnius' *Annales*, the only extant fragment of his work is preserved in Aul. Gel. 7. 9 who praised his archaic Latin prose in a passage concerning an aedile in 303 BC.



## Introduction

Greek historians.<sup>26</sup> Both Livy and Polybius were critical of their sources, but in relation to wartime capture and enslavements their disagreement with their sources typically hinged upon numbers and nothing more.<sup>27</sup>

Livy and Polybius were not unique in their historiographical approaches; virtually all of the works cited in this thesis drew their information from prior written accounts, some of these sources known to us and some unknown. Dio Cassius, whose history mirrors that of Livy's and other historians from the Second Punic War onwards is remarkably dissimilar for events prior,<sup>28</sup> and regardless of the originality of the entirety of his work, he maintained an independent opinion regarding the truth of his sources.<sup>29</sup> While most of the ancient writers considered within this study were removed from the time they wrote about, their works were supported by what they believed were credible sources and what has been preserved is their critical analysis of those sources. Of course historical study of this period faces the patchwork of source material, but it is evident that there is a consistent trend in the ambivalence towards wartime enslavement, passed from historical account to history and from the ancient to the modern historian.

Throughout this study there is a significant amount of earlier Greek material which serves to fill the gaps in our understanding of Roman capture, enslavement and ransom practices. With regards to geography and time, ancient Greece provides the best comparative evidence for Republican Rome. Pre-Hellenistic Greek literature is of further significant importance as it provides the basis of style for later Greek writers during the Hellenistic and Roman periods and heavily influenced Latin writers. For the earlier periods covered in this study a significant amount of information can be gained through the tradition infused in the language concerning slavery and enslavement. As noted above, the etymology of enslavement terms can speak volumes to how slavery was perceived and communicated in early Greece and Rome.

This study will begin with a philological inquiry of key terms followed by an analysis of the process of capture, the legal status of captives and their ownership (Chapter 1). From this analysis it will emerge that the principle of the right of the victor over those they have

---

<sup>26</sup> Livy made use of Quintus Valerius Antias, Gaius Licinius Macer and Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius and for the Punic Wars Lucius Coelius Antipater who was not a contemporary of Polybius. Polybius' named sources included Phylarchus, Philinus, Theopompus, Timaeus and Aristaenus.

<sup>27</sup> For example Liv. 22.7.4 preferred the figures given by Fabius Pictor, regarding them as more believable given Fabius' presence at the battle of Trasimene. See also various examples with figure discrepancies in the appendix section.

<sup>28</sup> Libourel 1974, 383-93.

<sup>29</sup> Dio explicitly remarks on his relating of source material unaltered whilst maintaining his opinion at 53.19.6. Zonaras used Dio as his chief source and his history in places simply mirrors that of Dio's.

## Introduction

vanquished was universally accepted in antiquity, and so the right of the victor to ransom, execute, or enslave their captives was never questioned. However, some conventions did restrict the manner in which this was done and many factors, physical as well as moral, limited the execution and enslavement of captives. The legal position of captives was essentially tied to their ownership as a form of booty, and decisions taken over their 'disposal' was entirely in the hands of the commanders in the field who were responsible with dispensing the state's property.<sup>30</sup>

One of the principle aims of this thesis is to demonstrate the variance in the fate of captives, and it has been necessary to review instances of release, massacre and ransom (Chapters 2,3). These have been treated individually at length, and it was important to explain the process of ransom since the Roman practice under the Republic has not been fully treated before.<sup>31</sup> The negative Roman attitude towards ransom is well testified in the sources, but a thorough review shows that this was essentially state policy, whereas in the private sphere ransom was accepted, and even considered a matter of civic duty and a source of pride. Prisoner exchanges, too, play a significant role in the consequences of capture, and there is considerable evidence for large scale exchanges during the First and Second Punic Wars. Surprisingly, and contrary to what at first seemed logical, the price of ransom in both the Greek and Roman world was actually lower than the average price for slaves. If the largest amount of profit was the goal of the military and traders, then it would have made sense to set a price of ransom higher than what could be acquired through the sale of a captive as a slave. This observation suggests that ransom was a more common outcome than has previously been believed.

Following on from the analysis of alternative outcomes of capture, the enslavement of war captives will be investigated (Chapters 4,5,6). These chapters analyse the practice of enslavement through a chronological narrative, extending from Romulus to the fall of Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC. This section serves as a commentary for the taking of war prisoners by the Romans within the context of the evolving socio-political landscape of the

---

<sup>30</sup> See Chapter 2, where it is argued that the money derived from the sale of captives was generally reserved for the state, although a commander could distribute the money to his troops presumably without risk of *crimen peculatis*, see Vogel 1948, 404; Shatzman 1976, 189-95; s.v. '*manubiae*' *RE*. For his conclusive remarks on the autonomous power of the general in the field see Eckstein 1987, 319. Eckstein, also concludes that there was a degree of variance in the Senate exercising control from region to region.

<sup>31</sup> For both Greek and Roman ransom examples cf. Pritchett 1991, 245-97, (particularly examples in Livy) 283-4. The topic has only been approached from a legal point of view, cf. Zeigler 1986, 381-93, with particular regards to *postliminium*, see Buckland 1908, 292-304, see Chapter 3. For ransom in Greek historiography with bibliography see Ducrey 1999, 239f; Lammert *RE* s.v. 'λύτρον.'

## Introduction

early and middle Republic. The narrative style of the chapters concerning enslavements has been intentional in order to demonstrate that there was no clear political agenda or strategy in the talking of captives by the Roman state.

The study continues with an analysis of the potential trade in war captives (Chapter 7), focusing on the markets, traders and transport of enslaved war captives. Both written and material evidence for the slave trade is sparse, and it is furthermore difficult to differentiate between the presence of captives and slaves derived from other means of supply.<sup>32</sup> The study concludes (Epilogue) with an examination of the overall contribution of war captives to the Roman slave supply and will suggest a significant reduction in the interpreted reliance upon the war captives for the perpetuance and maintenance of the slave supply.

---

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Thompson 2003, 37-46 for the limited archaeological evidence in the trade of slaves and war captives. For 'shackling' see 217-40.

# Chapter 1

## *Capture, Captives and Commanders*

Greek and Roman historians were generally unconcerned with the processes of enslavement and with the means by which people were ransomed or released. Examined broadly across the corpus of written evidence, ancient writers were seemingly unconcerned with the minutiae of capture, captivity and disposal (i.e. release, execution, ransom, enslavement). This neglect has contributed heavily to the disinterest of modern historians, who have, as a consequence, concerned themselves with the events and mechanics of warfare and its ramifications, such as imperialism or slavery. This has been to the disadvantage of the subject of capture, specifically the legal questions regarding a captive's status and their 'ownership.' This chapter attempts to define the captive in Roman law and consider the justification of enslavement with regards to Roman morality.

### Terminology for Captives and Capture

Considering the brevity of most passages relating to the capture of war captives, it is important to examine the terminology, which lends a more nuanced understanding of Roman war captures. In Latin, a captive taken in war was always referred to as *captivus* or *captus*<sup>1</sup> and the state of captivity as *captivitas*.<sup>2</sup> In English, a captive may be synonymous with a prisoner of war, but in Latin a clearer distinction is present, as a prisoner or *reus* was essentially reserved for civilian restraint; someone held for a crime or subject to punishment (*poena*) with an emphasis upon their crime,<sup>3</sup> whereas captives are clearly identified by their

---

<sup>1</sup> A feminine form (*captiva*) was also used, but this always referred to the stock character of the attractive captive girl, Hor. *Carm.* 2.4.6; Liv. 30.12.18; Plaut. *Epid.* 107; Prop. 2.8.37; Verg. *Aen.* 12.63, with a single exception of *Dig.* 38.16.1.1, which may simply be an error of copying.

<sup>2</sup> Such as Flor. 1.18.114; Tac. *Ann.* 4.25; *Ger.* 8.1; Sen. *Ben.* 6.35.5; *Q Nat.* 6.2.2.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. a culprit, s.v. '*reus*' *TLL*. *Poenus* in the literature concerning the period covered within this study always referred to Phoenicians/Carthaginians. *Servi poeni*, people reduced to slavery as punishment, is late phraseology found only in the *Digesta*. (e.g. *Dig.* 16.7pr; 29.2.5.3; 36.1.18.6), see Buckland 1908, 277-8.

capture *capio/capto*.<sup>4</sup> Similarly in Greek those taken in battle were regularly referred to as ‘taken by the spear’ δοριάλωτος<sup>5</sup> or δορυάλωτος<sup>6</sup> from δόρυ (spear shaft) and αἰχμάλωτος from αἰχμή (spear), the latter being the most common.<sup>7</sup> To ‘take’ from the enemy was commonly ἀναιρέω, and could be used for the action of taking prisoners.<sup>8</sup> Ἀλίσκομαι referred to the act of *being* taken prisoner or to fall into the enemy’s hands.<sup>9</sup> Αἰχμαλωτίζω denoted the action of ‘taking prisoner,’ but was uncommon in the context of war captives.<sup>10</sup> Another commonly used term for captives was ἀνδροπόδον, but this will be discussed later in a more pertinent context.<sup>11</sup>

The majority of captures by the Romans followed the fall of cities. In Latin, to sack (*rapio* or *diripio*)<sup>12</sup> was synonymous with plundering or pillaging. In English, the sack of a city carries the same connotations of violent capture and destruction, with an emphasis on looting from which the term derives from the ‘implement’ of burglary.<sup>13</sup> Likewise, capture does not

Similarly *poenali* referred to prisoners punished for crimes rather than held as war captives, Gai. *Inst.* 4.94; 4.112; *Dig.* 2.3.1pr; 2.4.11.pr.

<sup>4</sup> *Capio* is very common in relation to captives taken in war e.g. Cic. *Att.* 9.6.2; *Orat.* 1.226; *Verr.* 5.122; Liv. 9.3.3; 21.60.7; 26.47.1; Plin. *Ep.* 644.

<sup>5</sup> For example Hdt. 8.74; 9.4; Eur. *Tr.* 518; Isoc. *Paneg.* 4.177; Polyb. 23.10.6. Soph. *Aj.* 211 uses δοριάλωτος.

<sup>6</sup> As in Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.35; *IG* 14.1293.57. Often used by Procop. *Goth.* 2.5.28; 2.21.29; 3.23.21. The term δμῶς also referred to captives, but is strictly Homeric (e.g. *Od.* 1.398; *Il.* 6.323; 19.333), it is a common term for slaves in later works, particularly in Euripedes, see Ducrey 1999, 12-14; s.v. ‘δμῶς’ *LSJ*.

<sup>7</sup> For δόρυ and αἰχμή derivatives see Ducrey 1999, 16-21.

<sup>8</sup> The *LSJ* gives the definition “to seize or carry off.” Examples relative to this study, that pertain specifically to the taking of captives: αἰχμάλωτος (App. *Syr.* 60; Diod. *Sic.* 17.70.5; 19.85.3; Dion. *Hal.* 5.31.1; 11.48.2; Joseph. *BJ* 3.305; Plut. *Brut.* 45.4; *Marc.* 13.6; *Pomp.* 48.6). People could be taken, without expressly stating that they were captives (Diod. *Sic.* 20.26.3; 35.4; 90.4; Polyb. 1.81.3; Zon. 8.1. Cf. *Il.* 2.374 Pl. *Cri.* 43c; *Rep.* 468a, and less common δορυάλωτος Cass. Dio 72.9.1; 79.20.1; Joseph. *AJ.* 9.147). Similarly ἄλωσις referred to ‘catch,’ in the sense of hunting (Aesch. *Ag.* 589; Hdt. 1.5; 3.156; Pind. *Od.* 10.11.42) and ἀγρέω ‘seize,’ but was less common (Aesch. *Ag.* 126; *IG* 12. 6.33; Sappho 2.14), see Ducrey 1999, 16-20.

<sup>9</sup> App. *BC* 4.16.129; Cass. Dio 45.42.5; *Il.* 2.374; Joseph. *AJ* 10.106; Pl. *Rep.* 468a; *Cri.* 43c. Often the fall of cities into the hands of the enemy (e.g. Diod. *Sic.* 8.13.2; Dion. *Hal. Ant. Rom.* 8.21.3; 9.6.7).

<sup>10</sup> Diod. *Sic.* 14.37.3; 24.11.1; 26.18.1; Joseph. *BJ* 4.448. Commonly used in ecclesiastic texts in reference to spiritual captivity (ex. *Romans* 7:23; *Corinthians* 2 10:5).

<sup>11</sup> With regards to terms for enslavement, see Chapter 4.

<sup>12</sup> Also the verbal noun *direptio* (e.g. Caes. *B Civ.* 2.11.4; Cic. *Ver.* 2.3.58; Liv. 5.20.6). Spelling variants include *derepio* (Apul. *Met.* 9.40.29) and the verbal noun *dereptio*, which more commonly referred to the stripping of something: as in the stripping of a pledge (Hor. *Od.* 1.9.23), bark (Ov. *Amor.* 1.14.12), lion pelt, (Ov. *Met.* 3.52), foliage (Ov. *Met.* 3.724) goatskin (Ov. *Met.* 15.304), necklace (Val. Flacc. 6.688) clothes (Tac. *Ann.* 13.57). Or the taking of something from someone such as: standards (Hor. *Od.* 3.5.21; 4.15.7; Tac. *Hist.* 1.41; 3.33) spoils (Curt. 7.5.24; Verg. *Aen.* 11.193), stripping of the *equites*’ horses (Val. Max. 2.9.8) or the pulling of someone from something as in: from the saddle (Verg. *Aen.* 11.743. Cf. Liv. 23.45.8) or a wagon (Val. Flacc. 2.160), see Ziolkowski 1993, 71-4.

<sup>13</sup> From ‘mettre à sac’ (to put in a bag).

## Chapter 1

necessarily indicate a violent affair in English or in Latin.<sup>14</sup> Typically Latin writers chose to describe the taking of cities not as capture, but rather as *diripio* or *rapio*. These two terms, given the range of their definitions, imply a violent search for loot and often captives. Further explanation of the soldiers' actions, such as the specification of 'pillaging' (*expilo/expilato*) or 'removing the populace' (*vasto* or *depopulo*),<sup>15</sup> was not necessary since the audience was well aware of the implications of a city being taken *direpta*. In his analysis of the term *diripio*, Adam Ziolkowski emphasised the brutality implied within the semantics of the word. Furthermore, he identified that with *diripio*, the freedom of the troops to rape and pillage was generally implied by the writer.<sup>16</sup> Cicero, in his defamation of Sextus Clodius, grouped *diripio* with famine, fire and bloodshed. All of which was a result of the terrible treatment of the Roman allies by the defendant Clodius.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, in describing the actions of the Roman governor in Syria, Cicero lumps highway-robbery and murder alongside *diripio*.<sup>18</sup> The free-for-all nature of a sack is further implied on a few occasions, as *diripio* is used to describe a sort of grab-bag affair in which goods were presented to be snatched up.<sup>19</sup>

People could be the object of *diripio*, in so much as they were subject to abuse in the process of plundering,<sup>20</sup> but they were never explicitly the *objects* of plunder.<sup>21</sup> Pillaging was an order carried out by soldiers, who stole what they could – or more to the point – what they could get away with. Captives, along with raw and coined precious metals and sometimes works of art, were the property of the state, which the general oversaw.<sup>22</sup> In only one instance is the act of capture implied by *diripio*: as Caesar states during the siege of Alesia, the Gauls apparently pleaded with Vercingetorix not to be plundered.<sup>23</sup> After a battle captives were

---

<sup>14</sup> In the capture of Orongis in 207 BC the soldiers refrained from slaughter and pillage, Liv. 28.3.14; 28.4.4; Zon. 9.8; conversely, soldiers sometimes abstained from plunder because they were focused on slaughter in revenge, Liv. 28.20.6.

<sup>15</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 2.16 "even protected countries were plundered and emptied by the fleet." *Direptos vastatosque classe etiam quos cohortes alaeque protegerent. Diripio* and burning are always two different actions, cf. Ziolkowski 1993, 72 n. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Ziolkowski 1993, 70-74, limits his examples to instances of *diripio* within Livy and Tacitus and two occasions in which *diripio* is used by Cato (*de sumptu suo* =ORF fr. 203; Justin. *Epit.* 26. 1. 7). Interestingly there is only one sexual reference to plunder associated with *diripio* (Juv. 6.404). The maidens in Tac. *Hist.* 3.33 were "pulled-to pieces" rather than raped.

<sup>17</sup> Cic. *Dom.* 25.

<sup>18</sup> Cic. *Prov. cons.* 9 *Igitur in Syria imperatore illo nihil aliud unquam actum est nisi pactiones pecuniarum cum tyrannis, decisiones, direptiones, latrocinia, caedes.*

<sup>19</sup> Money was laid out on the shore by Perseus for Cretan soldiers to plunder Liv. 44.45.13. In another instance the possessions of Tarquinius Superbus were given to the plebeians Flor. 1.3.1; Liv. 2.5.2; 2.6.3.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. the abuse of farmers in Sicily under Verres, Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.32; 2.3.66.

<sup>21</sup> The sole exception being the 'snatching up' of Thaos and Euneus' own mother, Stat. *Theb.* 5.722.

<sup>22</sup> See below.

<sup>23</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 7.8.4.

sometimes given to the soldiers, who probably divided them in a free-for-all fashion.<sup>24</sup> In a similar manner, *rapio* also implied the use of brutality in its insinuation of rape or abduction following capture. In describing the abduction of the Sabine women Livy states “At a given signal the young Romans darted about to seize (*rapio*) the maidens.”<sup>25</sup>

The verb διαρπάζω, the closest term to *diripio/rapio*, referred to ‘tearing into pieces,’ with a secondary definition of ‘plundering.’<sup>26</sup> Free persons were not the object of διαρπάζω, however slaves could be, and thus Polybius states both the city of Agrigentum and the slaves were plundered διαρπάζω.<sup>27</sup> In Greek the term for ‘sack’ was πορθέω, with the distinction of destroying a city utterly as ἐκπέρθω or διαπέρθω.<sup>28</sup> However, unlike Latin, terms denoting a similar process, the physical abuse of free inhabitants, is not implied within the semantic field of these terms, as the objects of these were generally inanimate.<sup>29</sup> Typically πορθέω implied the devastation or pillaging of property, especially land, with some poetic exceptions regarding the ruin of an individual.<sup>30</sup> The sacking of a city or the devastation of property did not imply that captives were taken in either Greek or Latin, and thus authors made a distinction where captives were known to have been taken.<sup>31</sup>

### Capture and Enslavement – Legality and Morality

The institution of slavery was considered part of the *ius Gentium* (law of nations), and thus an institution common to all mankind. Notably, it is the only institution of the *ius Gentium* which was said to be contrary to the *ius Naturale* (laws of nature).<sup>32</sup> Slavery and the presence of slaves predated the codification of Roman laws and, apart from the acknowledgement of

<sup>24</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 7.89.5.

<sup>25</sup> Liv. 1.9.10 *signoque dato iuventus Romana ad rapiendas virgines discurrit*. Similarly Cic. *Planc.* 30; Sall. *Cat.* 51.9.

<sup>26</sup> App. *Pun.* 55. cf. Xen. *Cyn.* 6.2 and specifically the act of plundering in Hdt. 1.88.

<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 1.19.15.

<sup>28</sup> Πέρθω was an earlier variant of πορθέω, s.v. ‘πέρθω’ *LSJ*. Similarly ἐξἄλλ᾽πάζω was commonly used by Homer, but with the exception of Diod. Sic. 4.32.2; 4.49.7 (directly quoting Homer) this term was obsolete for later Greek writers.

<sup>29</sup> Most often πορθέω was performed on enemy territory (χώρα) and the plundering of objects was implied. An exception is possibly Diod. Sic. 12.65.1, where allies, with no further clarification, were considered to have been ‘ravished.’

<sup>30</sup> Aes. *Cho.* 691; *Sept.* 194; 583; Ar. *Ach.* 164; Eur. *Andr.* 633; *Phoen.* 565.

<sup>31</sup> The distinction between the ‘devastation’ (πορθέω) of the land and the enslavement of the populace is clear in Cass. Dio 48.19.1 54.34.6-7; Dem. Ep. 3; Diod. Sic. 11.88.5; 13.31.1; 14.35.7; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 72; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.34.2.

<sup>32</sup> *Inst. Ius.* 1.2.1; *Dig.* 1.5.4 (Florentinus *Institutes* 9.1). See further Buckland 1908, 1-2; Watson 1987, 7.

## Chapter 1

this by later jurists, we find no legal justification for the institution itself which was atypical of Roman jurists. Both slavery and capture in war were considered entirely within the provenance of the *ius Gentium*, rather than civil (i.e. Roman) law.<sup>33</sup>

Fundamentally the justification of slavery came from the universally recognised ‘laws of war’ which essentially gave the victor the right to do as pleased with those they conquered. In the struggles between nations throughout human history this principle has always been held; so we see it advanced in the ancient world, for example, in the Athenian response to the Melians’ plea for clemency: “you know as well as we do that justice, as a matter of human reckoning, is in question only between equals in power, while those who are more powerful do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.”<sup>34</sup> So too by the Romans’ answer to a Volscinian embassy: “it is for the conquered to accept terms, not to make them.”<sup>35</sup> Both the Greeks and the Romans observed that it was the right of the victor to take from the enemy whatever was desired.<sup>36</sup>

The inferiority of the conquered to the superiority of the conqueror is akin to the relationship of slave and master. Every slave owning society held the master as superior to the slave in some manner,<sup>37</sup> typically in regards to a perceived superiority in intelligence,<sup>38</sup> thus ‘naturally justifying’ the position of a master.<sup>39</sup> Likewise the taking of captives through war was seen as a natural product of conflict between strong and weak.<sup>40</sup> Aristotle explained this theory: “the

---

<sup>33</sup> *Inst. Ius.* 1.5.pr; *Dig.* 1.1.4; 1.5.4. See Buckland 1908, 1-2.

<sup>34</sup> Loeb trans. Thuc. 5.89 τὰ δυνατὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότης ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχοροῦσιν. Cf. the comments of Bosworth 1993, 39-40. At 5.105.2 Thucydides goes even further stating ‘by the law of nature, men rule wherever they can.’

<sup>35</sup> Liv. 4.10.2 *victis conditions accipiendas esse, non ferendas respondit.*

<sup>36</sup> Liv. 9.1.5; 33.13.8; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.73. With regards to inanimate booty, this was commonly accepted as a standard rule in warfare by European jurists in the Enlightenment, e.g. Hugo Grotius, Christian Wolff, Emerich de Vattel, Henry Wheaton. For precise references to the right of possessing the enemy’s property by these see Burn 1903, 370-81.

<sup>37</sup> See Davis 1984, 23f.

<sup>38</sup> So the position of the European over the African was reaffirmed by the technological and perceived religious superiority, but in consideration of the African’s tolerance for working in the sun, black skin was thought superior for labouring, yet was believed to be a replication of the ‘curse of Ham’ (*Gen.* 9:20–27), see Vaughan & Vaughan 1997, 25-26.

<sup>39</sup> This relates to every mode of acquisition, the debtor is financially inferior, the criminal morally so, the person who sells themselves or a parasite, and with regards to captives the physical superiority of masters is asserted by their being captured by them, see Arist. *Pol.* 1.1254b. Heath 2008, 251 refers to a perceived ‘impairment’ of ‘natural slaves.’ I also direct the reader to more modern examples of reinforced racial superiority (as in the note above) in justifying African slavery in the Americas, or religious superiority in justifying the enslavement of non-Muslim Africans and Europeans in the Arab slave trade. Cf. Patterson’s concept of ‘social death’ 1982, 38-45.

<sup>40</sup> See Garnsey 1997, 113-4; Nyquist 2013, 25-6; Tuck 2001, 66.



## Chapter 1

art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.”<sup>41</sup> Capture in war serves logically as the starting point for interpreting the circumstance of slavery, as it is essentially the most rudimentary and fundamental means of enslavement. In the *Digesta* an etymological definition of slavery followed Florentinus’ statement that *servi* were so called because they were *servare* (preserved) by the commander, and likewise *mancipia* was derived from being captured by the enemy’s hand (*manu capiuntur*).<sup>42</sup> As Alan Watson has suggested, the position of this text serves as a moral justification, slavery being a concession to someone whose life would have otherwise been ended.<sup>43</sup> Capture in war was not the only means of enslavement,<sup>44</sup> but as the victims were outsiders, it was clearly the easiest method to justify, morally, as well as legally, and so it is often used as a foundation for the explanation of slavery.<sup>45</sup>

The legal position of captives (if any position at all) is difficult to ascertain, as their status was never defined or referred to by the jurists. In Roman law the distinction between the statuses of slave and free was clear, and subsequently any transition from freedom to servitude was considered immediate for legal purposes, despite the reality of a less immediate transition. The section in the *Digesta* concerning war captives is largely devoted to the legal problems in the absence of a captured Roman citizen, and it is asserted that at the moment of capture, the captive, for all legal intents and purposes, was considered to have perished.<sup>46</sup> As a result, the captive, whose fate was not yet determined, was in a state of limbo; neither

---

<sup>41</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 1256b20-5. This passage is often interpreted as a justification for slave raiding; note Albert the Great’s interpretation of this passage in his commentary on the *Politica* (*Opera* 4.2.29), see Tuck 2001, 66-7. We may compare here Arist. *Pol.* 1254a30-2, particularly his distinction of natural slavery between ruling and subject factors. Aristotle is even forced to admit that in war naturally free men were captured, see Garnsey 1997, 126-127. Cf. Sen. *Ira.* 3.29, see Fitzgerald 2000, 89-90.

<sup>42</sup> *Dig.* 1.5.4 (Florentinus *institutes* 9.2). *Imperatores captives vendere ac per hoc servare nec occidere solent... mancipia ab hostibus manu capiuntur*. Likewise in *Inst. Ius.* 1.3.3.

<sup>43</sup> Watson 1987, 8.

<sup>44</sup> Other means of enslavement were through: Birth (Gaius *Inst.* 1.32; *Inst. Ius.* 1.3.4; *Dig.* 50.2.9.pr; *Cod. Ius.* 3.32.12; 7.14.9). Child exposure (*liberi expositi*), although these were free in classical law should their origin be discovered (Suet. *de Gramm.* 7.21; Plin. *Tra.* 65.66), they were nonetheless reared as slaves, and in later law were considered slaves from the outset (*Cod. Th.* 5.9.1.2; *Cod. Ius.* 8.51.1). The change was likely made after Diocletian (*Cod. Ius.* 5.4.16; Buckland 1908, 402 n. 8). Debtors could also be sold into slavery (Gell. *NA* 20.1.47). Self-sale into slavery (*Inst. Ius.* 1.3.2). A *liber homo* could not profit from his own sale, see Buckland 1908, 428 n. 1; Glancy 2002, 80-85. Lastly, people could be convicted and sentenced to slavery as an alternative to *capitis deminutio maxima* (various offences that amounted to capital punishment, but not all were punishable by slavery, see Buckland 1908, 403-5).

<sup>45</sup> Patterson 1982, 106f.

<sup>46</sup> *Dig.* 49.15.1. Though there were doubts with regards to Roman captives, for example Gaius *Inst.* 1.129, see Buckland 1908, 292, see further Chapter 4.

## Chapter 1

defined as free or slave.<sup>47</sup> Although their legal position was indeterminate according to the rigidity of the law, the captive was no better off than a slave until their liberty was assured by ransom or release.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, in Roman law a captive was assumed a slave by default,<sup>49</sup> having no legal position, and having been acquired in the same manner as other booty (*praeda*). Like booty, a slave was essentially *res* (a thing), able to be destroyed, sold or given away either to others or to themselves (i.e. freed).<sup>50</sup> That captives were considered booty is proven by Cicero's charge against Verres for the abuse of the Sicilians: that he "considered every man's property as [his] own booty... [such that] no man's estate could be safe, no man's house closed, no man's life protected, nor woman's chastity fortified against [his] cupidity and audacity."<sup>51</sup> The abuse against the life and chastity of the individuals was considered by Cicero to be equateable with *praeda*, which Verres had tried to justify under the pretext of waging a war against the remnants of the slave rebellions in Sicily and during the crisis of the Spartacus revolt.<sup>52</sup>

In Roman law the property of the defeated enemy became the property of the victor,<sup>53</sup> and it was acknowledged that free men could be taken in the same way.<sup>54</sup> Precisely at the moment

---

<sup>47</sup> Those destined to be slaves were considered as such (Ulp. 40.7.9.3). Buckland 1908, 291 argued (based on *Dig.* 49.15.5.1) that captives maintained their liberty until they passed permanently into the hands of the enemy or into their territory. However, this applied to Roman captives who were not considered to have lost their rights until they were removed to enemy soil i.e. outside of the *imperium* (albeit *postliminium* reserved their rights should they return). Captives taken by the Romans were considered within the general's area of operation and so need not pass into Roman *imperium* proper, but simply pass into their hands.

<sup>48</sup> *Ins. Ius.* 1.3.4. In any case, so long as the captive was intended to be sold as a slave, he or she was considered a *servus* (Ulp. 40.7.9.3). The actual act of enslavement *sub corona* or *sub hasta* or sale into slavery either *cessio in iure* or *mancipatio* only confirmed this fact. In the case of a Samnite woman who was purchased as a slave (probably during the Social War), she was freed upon Cluentius learning that she was in fact a free woman and thus abducted rather than captured (Cic. *Clu.* 59.162). Abducted persons and those taken by pirates or in civil wars were considered free (*Cod. Iust.* 7.14.4). Within the empire free persons were sometimes abducted and forced to work in *ergastula*, checks against this malpractice were carried out under Augustus (Suet. *Aug.* 32), see Capozza 1966, 145; Étienne 1974, 259-60. The workhouse were eventually abolished under Hadrian (SHA *Hadr.* 18.10), see Bauman 2000, 120; Fuhrmann 2012, 102 n. 45.

<sup>49</sup> *Ins. Ius.* 1.3.4.

<sup>50</sup> This creates a legal paradox; if a captive was an object then they could no more be released or given over to themselves as much as an apple. The same legal paradox applied to slaves in many different cases, see Buckland 1908, 2f. The slave was in many ways in a similar position to that of a son under a father. Roman law is full of contrasting rights concerning subservient individuals, see Watson 1987, 46-7. It is important to note that captives or slaves would not have been considered *spolia*, as this referred to captured enemy weapons, armour or clothing, either from the dead (Liv. 1.10.4; 7.26.6; Stat. *Theb.* 11.562) or defeated (Liv. 23.12.14; Tac. *Agr.* 15.3).

<sup>51</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.39 *ut omnium bona praedam tuam duceres, ut nullius res tuta, nullius domus clausa, nullius vita saepta, nullius pudicitia munita contra tuam cupiditatem et audaciam posset esse.*

<sup>52</sup> Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.39 *in qua tu te ita gessisti ut, omnibus cum tenere rebus, ad bellum fugitivorum confugas.* For the slave rebellions see Bradley 1989; Urbainczyk 2004; 2008.

<sup>53</sup> *Dig.* 41.1.5; 41.2.1; *Inst. Ius.* 2.1.17; Gaius *Inst.* 4.16. So too in Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.73.

<sup>54</sup> *Dig.* 41.1.7; *Inst. Ius.* 2.1.17.

## Chapter 1

of capture, captives may have been regarded as *res nullii* (objects without an owner),<sup>55</sup> the captive's ownership over their own *libertas* being nullified by their capture, much in the way that the enemy's property in Roman territory was considered *res nullius*. Thus captives could be seized, and hence possessed, through the process of *occupatio*.<sup>56</sup> Since the acquisition of slaves through conflict was considered a legitimate practice by the universally accepted conventions of war, it is logical that their attainment was considered legally in a similar fashion to that of any other natural means of acquisition, like fruit from trees, or fish and game from the sea and forest.<sup>57</sup> Captives were 'ripe' for the taking, and so they became the property of the possessor to deal with as desired.

Captives had other practical purposes beyond their financial and political value as they could be utilised for strategic purposes as well.<sup>58</sup> Often the first captives likely to be taken by the Romans were opposing scouts or hapless locals. For example, during Trajan's first campaign against the Dacians, the first captive depicted in the frieze progression of Trajan's Column is shown being led by two auxiliary troops. At the point in the campaign in which the frieze depicts the captive, the Roman army had yet to engage the Dacians, except for skirmishes between the scouts.<sup>59</sup> Prisoners, such as the Dacian captive, caught at the start of a campaign, were particularly useful as a means of initial intelligence and to act as scouts or interpreters. Early in the war against the Gauls, Caesar selected some of his Nervii captives to act as guides; through them, along with the information he gathered from the rest of the prisoners, he was able to locate the enemy camp hiding women and children in the forest.<sup>60</sup> If no enemy turncoats were at hand, either of free will or in custody, then prisoners could be specifically sought after in order to provide these services. Such was the case when the emperor Julian

---

<sup>55</sup> Perhaps considered *res nullius humani iuris* (object without a legal owner) as described by Gai. *Inst.* 2.66.67.

<sup>56</sup> *Praeda* became the property of the person who took it (*Dig.* 41.1.5.7; 41.2.1.1; 41.2.3.21; Gai. *Inst.* 2.69.1; *Inst. Iust.* 2.1.17). There is only one reference to *occupatio* pertaining to enemy property on Roman soil at the outset of hostilities passing into the hands of an individual (*Dig.* 41.1.51.1). All other references are not expressed in concrete terms, see Bona 1959: 364; Watson 1968: 64. Captives possessed strictly by seizure rather than by a new period of uninterrupted possession (*usucapio*), which generally required two years of uninterrupted possession for moveable property (Gai. *Inst.* 2.41.1). For *occupatio* as legal seizure see Cic. *Dom.* 5; *Off.* 1.121. For the modes of acquisition for slaves see Varro *Rust.* 2.10.4.

<sup>57</sup> For the *res nullius* as pertaining to the fruits of nature see Percy 1925, 718-9.

<sup>58</sup> Evidence of the use of captives for intelligence is scant prior to the campaign of Caesar in Gaul, but the nature of warfare did not differ in the second century BC to preclude the use of prisoners in this way. See Austin & Rankov 1995, 67-73 for a more thorough analysis.

<sup>59</sup> Cichorius Pl. XVIII.11. Cf. Lepper and Frere 1988, plate 18; Rossi 1971, 138. From what little we can gather from the surrounding friezes and the reconstructed account of Trajan's first campaign in Dacia by Cass. Dio 68.6f.

<sup>60</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 2.16.1-4. Caesar used captives for intelligence prior to his invasion of Britain *B Gall.* 5.18.4; 7.18.1; 72.1 and also from slaves of the enemy ps-Caes. *B Hisp.* 27.2.

ordered the capture of an Alamann to serve as a guide in his campaign against the Germans.<sup>61</sup> Captives, employed as guides, could be useful for the entire course of a campaign; however, there was always a risk of treachery.<sup>62</sup>

## Ownership of Captives

With regards to the ownership of war captives, it has generally been considered that they became the property of the state,<sup>63</sup> as suggested by repeated reference to their sale by the quaestors, who were in charge of state finances on campaign.<sup>64</sup> The proceeds from their sale, along with the precious metals, usually gold and silver (coined or otherwise), were deposited in the treasury.<sup>65</sup> Some captives were retained as slaves by the state and used for particular works or as servants to the state (*i.e. servi populi publici Romani*).<sup>66</sup> For the most part, captives are mentioned as being taken from the enemy *separately* from the booty, because the capture of free persons was conspicuous amongst the booty taken from the enemy.<sup>67</sup> Captured

---

<sup>61</sup> Amm. Marc. 17.10.5. Ammianus was aware of the value of prisoners as a source of intelligence (16.11.9; 12.19).

<sup>62</sup> Captured Samnites tricked the Romans into entering the Caudine Pass (Liv. 9.31.7.). Gallus, a prefect of Egypt, was misled by his captured guides into trekking through the Arabian Peninsula for six months (Strabo 16.4.24). The captured Alamann mentioned by Amm. Marc. 17.10.5 agreed to cooperate on the preservation of his life.

<sup>63</sup> According to the *Lex Iulia* (Dig. 48.13.15. Liv. 5.20.5) which seems to suggest this in the argument attributed to Appius Claudius against distributing booty to the people, so too after the fall of New Carthage (Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6). This has been generally accepted in earlier scholarship with no recent re-evaluation, Mommsen 1879 II, 443; Marquardt 1888, 358; Girard 1906, 281; Buckland 1908, 292.

<sup>64</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 1.2.110; Liv. 27.18.2,8; 34.21.5; Val. Max. 5.1.7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.63.2; 10.21.6 (refers to the quartermaster as ταμίης likewise at 5.34.4 cf. Plut. *Publ.* 12.3. In Greek ταμίης often referred to the paymaster in an army (Hdt. 2.121.1; Xen. *Hel.* 3.1.27). The office of *quaestor*, as it came to be known for the Republican period, dated very early to c. 447 BC (Tac. *Ann.* 11.22) the origin of the office dates even earlier to the *Quaestores parricidii* of the monarchy, s.v. 'quaestor' *OCD*.

<sup>65</sup> Typically deposited in the state treasury (*aerarium*) controlled by the Senate. Under the monarchy and early republic the spoils may have been deposited in the *aerarium sanctis*, which was later used to store the proceeds from manumissions after 357 BC, see Chapter 4. Under the empire the proceeds from war were deposited in the treasury controlled by the emperor, the *fiscus*. For instances of precious metals being sold by the quaestors see Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.18; Liv. 4.53.10; 26.47.8, and for the sale of enemy territory see Liv. 28.46.5. That it was both coined as well as crude gold and silver is evident in Liv. 45.43.8.

<sup>66</sup> Buckland 1908, 292 n. 6; Halkin 1872, 17-18. The most obvious example being at New Carthage in 209 BC (Liv. 26.47.2-3; Polyb. 10. 17.9). Eutrop. 2.27 refers to prisoners being held *publica custodia*. and Cass. Dio 34.109.5fr. states that Sulla had Italian captives gathered at the *villa publica*. That all captives acquired by the state were considered *servi publici* (δημόσιος) is unlikely, some may have been utilised as labourers on public works, as for example the captives taken during the First Punic War which were held in either prisons (*carceri*) or quarries (*lautumiae*), located northeast of Rome (Liv. 32.26.2). Jewish prisoners taken at Taricheae were sent to dig a canal near Corinth (Joseph. *BJ* 3. 540) and after the sack of Jerusalem young men were sent to work mines in Egypt (Joseph. *BJ* 6.418).

<sup>67</sup> For example Flor. 1.18.21; Liv. 1.37.5; 8.39.13, 15; 10.17.4; 23.37.13; 27.19.2; 27.32.9; 30.9.10; 33.11.2; 35.40.4; 38.27.77; 39.4.7; Sall. *Iug.* 81.2; Tac. *Ann.* 1.68.

## Chapter 1

free persons were not viewed as regular spoils, and so when their sale or disposal was similar to that of the regular booty it warranted comment,<sup>68</sup> whereas there was no question that slaves were reckoned as normal items amongst the captured booty.<sup>69</sup> We might also consider how the Romans regarded the captives in relation to other booty, from the manner in which captives were presented in a triumph. The captured leaders were always kept as a special spectacle apart from the rest, but it is unclear whether regular captives were marched along with captured slaves, and if either slaves or free captives were separated from the rest of the paraded booty.<sup>70</sup>

Of all the booty taken from the city two categories can be observed; the first and lower category was the loot of generally lesser value which the soldiers personally took during the sack of a city, or (should the army be exceptionally disciplined) shared amongst each other following a siege.<sup>71</sup> The booty of this category was the property of the soldier, from the moment it entered his hand or was distributed to him when the booty was pooled. The second and higher class of booty consisted of more valuable items such as slaves, livestock, enslaved captives, precious metals, coined money (gold or silver coins) and the money derived from the auction of booty.<sup>72</sup> This second class of booty, if not captured coin and precious metals, usually constituted proceeds from the auctions and was typically deposited with the state.<sup>73</sup> That the state's coffers were increased by such spoils suggests that all the booty taken in a

---

<sup>68</sup> *Captivi* disposed as *praeda* (Dig. 49.15.21.1; Diod. Sic. 16.53.3; 23.18.5; Flor. 2.30; Liv. 21.15.2; 24.20.5; 31.30.3. Caes. *B Gall.* 7.89.5) distributed captives one per soldier like booty: *ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singular praeda nomine distribuit*. Liv. 7.27.8 explicitly states that those captured were not included within the spoils, but were instead reserved for the triumph.

<sup>69</sup> For example, slaves taken after the revolt of Falerii in 241 BC (Zon. 8.18), the slaves of the Macedonian ambassadors are sold in 215 BC (Liv. 23.38.7), slaves taken at Syracuse – inherent in the statement that the free were spared (Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2), the 30,000 slaves taken at Tarentum in 209 BC (Liv. 27.16.7), slaves taken with the booty at Pelium in 199 BC (Liv. 31.27.4) slaves taken and sold at Asculum in 89 BC (Oros. 5.18.26) and from Athens in 86 BC by Sulla (App. *Mith.* 38).

<sup>70</sup> See Auliard 2001, 62. For general studies regarding Roman triumphs see Künzl, 1988; Versnel 1970; Beard, 2007, for the *fasti triumphales* see Degraasi 1954.

<sup>71</sup> Ziolkowski 1993, 74-6, 80 regards this as entirely an invention of Polybius to try to describe a Roman standard in taking cities and distributing the booty. This contrasts with Polybius' general depiction of Roman soldiers as avaricious, see Erskine 1996, 2f. Equal distribution seems ultimately rare with regards to the general loot taken by the soldiers, more common was the command to allow the troops to plunder the city at the same time so as to give them an equal chance Ziolkowski 1993, 79-81 identifies several instances of this: at Anxur in 406 BC (Liv. 4.59.8); at Veii in 393 BC (Liv. 5.20.8-10); at Syracuse in 211 BC (Liv. 25.25.5) at Mount Olympos in 189 BC (Liv. 38.23.2-4).

<sup>72</sup> Auctions specifically sold (*vendere*) *sub corona* Caes. *B Gall.* 3.16.4; Var. *RR* 2.10.4; Tac. *Ann.* 13.39, *sub hasta* Liv. 4.29.4. Typically the booty is just said to be sold Cic. *Off.* 2.27; Sall. *Iug.* 44.5; Liv. 4.53.10; 10.20.16; 25.14.12; 26.40.13; 29.31.11; 38.23.10; 45.34.6; Plin. *HN* 35.24; Flor. 2.30. Also valuable artwork e.g. Liv. 38.9.13; Frontin *Str.* 4.3.15; Vitruvius *De arch.* 5.5.8 and land e.g. Liv. 2.17.6, however the sale of land could not be immediate.

<sup>73</sup> Veyne 1976, 434-436. For the distribution of the wealth derived from booty reserved for the state see Hopkins 1978, 38f.

city of significant value was considered the property of the state. However, Roman generals exercised complete control over the dispensation of the booty, often rewarding their troops or reserving large portions of the spoils for celebrating their triumphs.<sup>74</sup> Since captives were sold and the proceeds deposited in the treasury, as well as (on rare occasions) given directly to the troops<sup>75</sup> as a reward, they may be classified as booty belonging to the state (*manubiae*), which raises the question of whether generals acted *legally* in distributing captives to their troops.

The general's authority over booty, and the significance of *manubiae* as pertaining to a classification of booty is not definitively clear. Even by the second century AD, *manubiae* had become synonymous with *praeda*, so that it required a lengthy explanation by the orator Philinus, drawing on two examples from Cicero, to demonstrate that they once had separate meanings.<sup>76</sup> Philinus' interpretation was that the *manubiae* referred to proceeds derived from the sale of booty, whereas *praeda* was the booty itself; accordingly, many historians have held this to be the case.<sup>77</sup> But, the fact that *manubiae* also pertained to money (i.e. looted coins), renders this definition impossible.<sup>78</sup> Instead, *manubiae* seems to be the booty, inclusive of proceeds, that belonged to the state over which the general held the authority to use as he saw fit, so long as he did not profit directly from it.<sup>79</sup> The precise legal powers of the general are impossible to ascertain, and while generals were rarely if ever<sup>80</sup> convicted of embezzling the state's money (*pecuniae residua*) under a charge of *crimen peculatus*, they were, at times, brought to trial for 'misappropriation'.<sup>81</sup> Often *manubiae* was reserved for the

---

<sup>74</sup> This led both Shatzman 1972, 188 and Bona 1960, 149 to suggest that *manubiae* was allotted to the general *after* the triumph, c.f. Churchill 1999, 86. Pressure from troops to share in the victory probably compelled the general to give captives *directly* to the troops or to give them the proceeds from their sale. Equal distribution was to be expected, Polyb. 3.76.13 see Auliard, 2001, 53.

<sup>75</sup> At Fidenae in 426 BC (Liv. 4.34.4), after the sack of Alesia by Caesar in 52 BC (Caes. *B Gall.* 7.89.5). Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.24.2 states that the Romans during the monarchy came into the possession of slaves by either purchasing those taken in war at auction or receiving them as a reward for service from the general.

<sup>76</sup> Gell. *NA* 13.25.3-4. Cic. *Agr.* 1.12; 2.59. See s.v. '*manubiae*' *TLL*; Shatzman 1972 177f.

<sup>77</sup> Mommsen 1887 I, 241; 1879 II, 443; Vogel 1948, 408. Both Shatzman 1972, 177 and Bona 1960, 124-5 believed the *manubiae* to be the General's personal share.

<sup>78</sup> See Bona 1960, 149-50; Shatzman 1972, 179-80; Churchill 1999, 86.

<sup>79</sup> See the argument of Churchill 1999, 93-101. A clear example that supports this, which surprisingly is omitted by Churchill, is a case in Liv. 38.23.10; after defeating the Galatians near Mt. Olympus in 189 BC Cn. Manlius Vulso burned the enemy weapons and then sold the booty of which Livy says it was his duty to bring back for public use and distribute the rest amongst his troops evenly. *consul armis hostium [in] uno concrematis cumulo ceteram praedam conferre omnis iussit, et aut uendidit, quod eius in publicum redigendum erat, aut cum cura, ut quam aequissima esset, permilites diuisit.*

<sup>80</sup> Shatzman 1972, 177. In the case of L. Scipio, the charge was for misappropriation rather than embezzlement, Cass. Dio fr.63; Zon. 9.20. Cf. Shatzman 1972, 194.

<sup>81</sup> Vogel 1948, 404 (cf. s.v. '*manubiae*' *RE*) argued that *crimen peculatus* could not be brought against a general for misusing the booty. Cato tried to bring a case against Glabrio and Scipio to return booty that they had

triumph and so captives that marched in the triumph, and subsequently sold were technically owned by the state, with the proceeds from their sale going into the state treasury.<sup>82</sup>

## Laws Governing the Taking of Captives

Often ancient writers referred to the laws of war when the victor chose to exercise his rights as conqueror over the vanquished. This has been alluded to above, as essentially the exercise of power by the harshest of means. It is certainly true that the victor held the power of life or death over those they captured,<sup>83</sup> but this must be measured against the harshness of the Romans in disciplining their own troops,<sup>84</sup> over whom the general also held the power of life and death. The ‘laws of war’ were internationally recognised as they were matters of convention amongst all belligerents.<sup>85</sup> In general, those that surrendered (*deditio*) were spared and often retained their liberty, whereas those that submitted (*subducco*) after blows had been struck could expect harsher punishment,<sup>86</sup> through loss of possession, loss of liberty or even loss of life. It was customary to parley before coming to blows, and the Romans would typically offer the enemy an opportunity to submit to them.<sup>87</sup> Caesar drew a clear line as to when the enemy moved from the former phase to the latter: “in accordance with his custom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender themselves

---

personally kept. In general, Cato tried to reform the commander’s control over booty and limit their ability to profit indirectly from the booty (Priscianus *Gramm. Lat.* 2.367 = *ORF* 8 fr. 98; Polyb. 23.14.7; Val Max. 3.6.1; Gell. *NA* 4.18.7-8), see Watson 1968, 74 n. 1. It seems the *lex Iulia* later contained clauses that restricted the use of booty by generals (see the discussion on the charge of *peculatis* in *Dig.* 48.13.15). For other individual cases against generals see Shatzman 1972, 189-95. The legal texts are of little use in this since the legal dynamic completely changed with the *Principate* and the establishment of the *fiscus*.

<sup>82</sup> Liv. 5.22.1; 7.27.8; 10.46.5; Plut. *Fab.* 22.4. See Nicolet 1976, 159-436; Auliard 2001, 53. Servilius specifically neglects to pay the funds derived from the sale of captives into the treasury and instead distributes the money amongst the troops, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.29.4.

<sup>83</sup> The right to execute captives stated by Caes. *B Gall.* 7.41.

<sup>84</sup> The infamous decimation, for example. Rules of war also applied to the exercise of discipline amongst troops, Caes. *B Afr.* 54.2.

<sup>85</sup> The Athenians accepted the depravation of their fields and the plundering of their goods and people by the Macedonians as the sufferings expected under the rules of war (Liv. 31.30.2; Polyb. 5.11.3). The pillaging of land was seen as another allowance under the rules of war (Joseph. *BJ* 3.62). The general acceptance of the enslavement of captives as simply pertaining to the rules of war can be seen in Greek Tragedy, see Andreau & Descat 2011, 55; Dué 2006, 163-4. Similarly in Roman comedy, especially Plautus, see Harsh 1955, 135-42.

<sup>86</sup> Auliard 2001, 52-3, s.v. ‘War, Rules of’ *OCD*. Those that submitted *deditio* were still completely in the power of the conqueror, however, often *deditio* was also accompanied with *fides* and so the Roman general was obligated to protect them. Any violence or further reductions committed against those who submitted *deditio* was considered exceptionally harsh by ancient writers – see s.v. ‘*deditio*’ *RE*; Westington 1938, 69; Heuss 1933, 62.

<sup>87</sup> Cic. *Off.* 1.34.7; Liv. 24.33.1.

## Chapter 1

before the battering-ram should touch the wall.”<sup>88</sup> A refusal of terms meant that the Romans could treat their captives with as much severity as imaginable,<sup>89</sup> and often anything less than death was expressed as the victor *choosing* not to exercise, to the fullest extent, their rights as conqueror.<sup>90</sup> Though the right of life and death over the vanquished extended to all those captured, it was generally reserved only for those resisting or capable of bearing arms (i.e. men of military age); women and children were most often spared execution, though they would often, in the absence of the men, be enslaved.<sup>91</sup>

The authority and interaction of the Senate and the general in handling captured cities is best expressed in the accounts of the Syracusan and Capuan delegations to the Senate after their capture in 211 BC. In the case of Syracuse their petition was mainly against the confiscation of their property and their charge was levied personally against the consul Marcellus who had taken the city. According to Plutarch, in order for this charge to take place, Marcellus stepped down from his curule chair and allowed the Senate to hear the case against him as a *private* citizen.<sup>92</sup> Though Livy omits this detail, it is clear from all the relevant sources that the Senate was willing to hear the Syracusans out, eventually reducing their deprivation by instructing the consul assigned to Sicily to restore what property he could to the Syracusans.<sup>93</sup> Whether or not the Senate heard the case of the Syracusans against the consul as a magistrate, or as a private citizen, does not negate the fact that captives tried to find recourse in the Senate for their treatment at the hands of a commander. In the case of the Capuans, their appeal was a different matter, since they petitioned on the basis that they were Roman citizens.<sup>94</sup> In response, Flaccus, who had taken the city, allowed a delegation to join the Roman magistrate Laevinus who was passing *en route* to Rome, in order for them to be heard by the Senate. Presumably, as Roman citizens, it was a legal right for their punishment, as handed to the entire *civitas*, to be ratified by the people; and this is confirmed by the advice

---

<sup>88</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 2.32.

<sup>89</sup> Resistance was always met with violence (Cic. *Phil.* 5.25), see Garland 1975, 57f; Westington 1938, *passim*. August. *De Civ.* 1.5 mentions a number of illustrative examples.

<sup>90</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 6.354; Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.

<sup>91</sup> For the delineation of sparing and slaughtering see Liv. 5.27.6; 28.23.1. For examples of Roman temperance towards the defeated see Westington 1938, 68-9 n. 5. The execution of women and children was rare, often these were killed in the chaos immediately following the siege of a city, but not as a matter of course in dealing with them as captives, see Chapter 2.

<sup>92</sup> Plut. *Marc.* 23.2. For the most part the senators stood behind Marcellus in the accusations made against him by the Syracusans and other Sicilians, Liv. 26.32.1, see Lazenby 1978, 169.

<sup>93</sup> Liv. 26.32.6; Val. Max. 4.1.7; Plut. *Marc.* 23f.; Zon. 8.6. Plutarch emphasises the acquiescence of Marcellus that led to the lenience shown whilst Livy seems to suggest the Senate acted independently. For the insincerity of the appeal by the Syracusans in Plutarch and Livy see Pelling 1989, 204-5.

<sup>94</sup> They had previously been granted *civitas sine suffragio* (Liv. 8.11.16; 14.10).



## Chapter 1

of M. Atilius Regulus, who cited a precedent in the example of the Satricans, for whom a tribune named Marcus Antistius introduced a bill that was passed by the people allowing the Senate to pronounce judgments upon the defeated Satricans.<sup>95</sup> Accordingly, a similar bill was proposed by a tribune, and a resolution was passed, which granted the Senate the necessary judicial powers to pass judgment over the captured Capuans, as well as the Atellani, Calatini, Sabatini, and the right to seize their respective properties.<sup>96</sup> In the end, the punishment of the Capuans was reaffirmed by the Senate and more draconian measures were meted out. The Capuan aristocracy were tried on a family by family basis, with some enslaved and others imprisoned. The common people were resettled in Etruria, but presumably some of the populace were allowed to stay in the city remained, since Capua continued to exist as a major city.<sup>97</sup> Both of these examples show the Senate supporting the commanders by not finding them guilty of maltreatment or contravening the terms of a treaty. However, the Senate appears to have held the final say regarding captives, so that the vanquished could find recourse if they had been treated exceptionally poorly with regards to their ‘crime.’ Such was the case after the sale of Lusitanian captives in Gaul (c. 151 BC); a bill was raised in the Senate by a tribune and backed by the elder Cato to redeem them from their captivity, based on the heavy-handedness of Sulpicius Galba when he was praetor in Spain.<sup>98</sup>

Under the Republic the Senate was the ultimate authority in governing Roman foreign policy.<sup>99</sup> It has always been the orthodox view that the Senate was foremost and central in

---

<sup>95</sup> Liv. 26.33.10. Also a law enacted by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus *Lex Sempronia, de capite civium Romanorum* (mentioned by Vell.Pat. 2.7.4 Liv. *Per.* 61). It is questionable whether it was the Senate that tried the Satricans or the consul Papirus Cursor that carried out the sentence, as Liv. 9.16.9-11 fails to point this out at the time. See Welwei 2000, 98; von Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 111f.

<sup>96</sup> Liv. 26.33.12-14.

<sup>97</sup> There was a previous decision regarding the Capuans, Liv. 26.15.6-17.1. I agree here with Briscoe’s assertion that two separate decrees are given by the Senate regarding the Capuans rather than a doublet as others have interpreted, De Sanctis 1968, 330-1; Frederiksen 1984, 244-6. Levene 2010, 374-5 cites Livy’s choice to put the Capuan and Syracusan episodes together as a deliberate choice by the historian to illustrate how the Romans acted in a balance between mercy and harshness towards defeated enemies remarking that Livy made use of multiple versions of the same story to allow for more than one debate regarding the balance of Roman morality.

<sup>98</sup> Liv. *Per.* 49. According to Livy the depositions of both Galba and Cato survived in his day. The commander Lucius Cornelius Cethegus admitted to the treacherous slaughter of Lusitanians during a truce and it is probable that the survivors of this clash were those enslaved in Gaul.

<sup>99</sup> Under the monarchy the *fetial* priests were responsible for declaring war, and the Senate served as advisors in foreign policy to the king (Liv. 1.32f.; Festus, Lindsay 1913, 424-26), see Penella 1987, 223-37. By the Republic the *fetiales* carried out declarations in a strictly ceremonial capacity (Harris 1979, 171; Rich 1976, 56f.; Walbank 1949, 17-19). They were replaced by *Legati* who issued declarations of war to the enemy, cf. Walbank 1941, 82-93 *contra* Bickerman 1945, 138-9. Though it is surprising that no formal procedure is mentioned in the outbreak of the First Punic War despite a plethora of sources, see Eckstein 1987, 85-6. Mommsen 1887 III, 1157-8 maintained that the authority of the Senate in the secular-political functions of foreign policy remained paramount throughout the Republic.

dictating foreign policy.<sup>100</sup> Eckstein's study, however, has shown that the commanders in the field often exercised a great deal of autonomy, their suggestions likely influencing senatorial decision rather than the other way around.<sup>101</sup> As the empire expanded, and so too the distance between Senate and general, the Senate's ability to micromanage campaigns was significantly reduced. According to Livy, in 314 BC the Lucerians betrayed the Roman garrison to the Samnites, but were then quickly retaken by a Roman army, after which the Senate debated whether to raze the city or not.<sup>102</sup> By the end of the second century Laevinus, following the sack of Agrigentum in Sicily, had the leaders of the city beheaded and then handed out penalties and rewards with no indication that the Senate had any involvement.<sup>103</sup> Despite the freedom exhibited by the generals in the field outside Italy, the major decisions of foreign policy such as wars and treaties ultimately required authorization by the Senate for proposals to then be submitted to the people's assembly for ratification.<sup>104</sup> Generals could present peace terms, but ultimately these would have to be submitted to the Senate, and then presented to the people as a *senatus consultum* to be ratified. Sometimes the Senate would send a delegation to work out the articles of a prospective treaty.<sup>105</sup> During the campaign commanders would have kept in contact with the Senate;<sup>106</sup> the Senate in turn would have been able to issue *senatus consulta* to the general, which would have directed him to act according to their wishes, as was the case with the Capuan captives.<sup>107</sup> This communication maintained a shared doctrine between state and army, so that when a general proposed a

---

<sup>100</sup> Mommsen 1887 III, 1157-8; s.v. 'Senatus' *OCD*.

<sup>101</sup> Eckstein 1987, xi- xiii, 323-4, *passim*.

<sup>102</sup> Liv. 9.26.3.

<sup>103</sup> Liv. 26.40.13-15.

<sup>104</sup> The powers of the Senate in foreign policy are described as incorporative by Polyb. 6.13.5. The Senate's approval was required in all declarations of war and peace, see Mommsen, 1887 III, 1167. For war votes see Rich 1976, 13-17, specifically a list of dates and references on p. 14. Ratification of treaties by the people e.g. treaty with Hiero (Polyb. 1.17.1), First Punic War (Polyb. 1.63.3), Second Punic War (App. *Lib.* 65; Liv. 30.42.20) and the Second Macedonian War (Liv. 33.25.6; Polyb. 18.42.3-4).

<sup>105</sup> A commission of ten was sent out to assess the treaty presented by Lutatius to Hamilcar and only the indemnity was increased (Polyb. 1.62.3) The commission may have been a reconciliation to the people by the Senate who favoured continuing the war, see Walbank 1957 I, 127; Schleussner 1978, 9-23; Eckstein 1987, 133 n. 128. A commission of ten was sent to Greece in 196 BC and in conjunction with Flamininus issued the Isthmian Declaration (Polyb. 18.45f.), see Eckstein 1987, 297. In the case of the agreement between the Samnites and the consuls following the Caudine disaster the treaty negotiated by the consuls was rejected specifically by the *fetiales* (Liv. 9.10f.), see Wiedemann 1986, 489-90.

<sup>106</sup> Agrippa neglected to send reports back to the Senate during the Cantabrian War (Cass. Dio 54.11.6). Eckstein 1987, xix doubts the permanence of this stating that generals only dictated their *acta* to the Senate at the end of their office, and no record was kept. Eckstein's further charge against the disorganisation of Roman record keeping prior to Caesar's reform (Suet. *Iul.* 20.1) cannot discount that records were in fact kept.

<sup>107</sup> Liv. 26.16.6-13 the Senate had issued an order to punish the Capuans, perhaps this was exceptional given the fact that the Capuans were technically Roman citizens, see Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 81-2.

treaty or dealt with captured cities and captives, he was essentially adhering to a collective strategy.<sup>108</sup>

The role of the Senate ensured that the Roman generals acted in accordance with standard practice towards the defeated populaces; ‘rules of war’ which the Romans carried out in the harshest form against those that resisted, and with leniency towards those that submitted. On only rare occasions were commanders censured by the Senate for acting too harshly towards captured enemies. In 205 BC a commander named Fleminius left in charge of Locri was tried by the Senate and executed for his abuse of the Locrians.<sup>109</sup> In Liguria the Statellati had remained loyal to Rome, but M. Popilius still sacked their city in 173 BC. When the Senate heard the news they immediately sent an order demanding that the consul seek out the Statellati and return their liberty and the money from the sale of the booty.<sup>110</sup> Popilius refused the orders of the Senate, and a resolution was passed to send the praetors C. Licinius and Cn. Sicinius to force the resettlement of the Ligurians in the Po Valley. Popilius escaped punishment through the postponement of his trial beyond the current terms of office.<sup>111</sup> In 170 BC a Roman commander named Hortensius placed a large tax and grain levy upon the city of Abdera in Thrace. When the Abderans asked to send a delegation to the consul Hostilius to reduce or rescind the indemnity, the praetor no sooner let the delegation go, when he sacked the city, killed the leaders and sold the rest of the inhabitants.<sup>112</sup> The Senate, upon hearing this, put a motion to the assembly and sent two commissioners to ensure that the Abderans were restored and Hortensius was ordered to locate and restore as many Abderans as possible. Livy remarks that the same proclamation had been made regarding the Coroneians in the previous year.<sup>113</sup> In these cases the sentiment of the Senate had gone against the consuls and praetors serving in Greece because their actions were regarded as exceedingly oppressive.<sup>114</sup> Likewise, P. Licinius Crassus enslaved a number of Greek cities allied to Phillip; the Senate fined Crassus and passed a resolution for the captives to be

---

<sup>108</sup> For the Senate’s role in directing military campaigns see Eckstein 1987, *passim*. The *senatus consulta* were preserved at Rome, and we know that Cicero was able to draw upon archives from the early second century (Cic. *Att.* 13.33.3).

<sup>109</sup> Liv.28.19.4-6.

<sup>110</sup> Liv. 42.8.7.

<sup>111</sup> Liv. 42.22.5-8. Cf. Westington 1938, 80.

<sup>112</sup> Liv. 43.4.11-13.

<sup>113</sup> Liv. 43.4.11-13. For Coroneia see *SEG* 19.374. The proclamation regarding Coroneia was etched on a stele now held in the Museum at Thebes. Sherk 1969, 33 suggested that the decree granted the return of possessions and the right to reoccupy the citadel as bestowed on the pro-Roman faction, which had been driven out by the pro-Macedonian faction prior to its capture.

<sup>114</sup> Liv. 43.4.6-7; Zon. 9.22.

bought back from their owners.<sup>115</sup> At times generals found it necessary to check the harshness of their men. Scipio Africanus could not prevent the indiscriminate slaughter of women and children by his troops at Lochra in 203 BC, and so punished the troops by not allowing the guilty companies to share in the plunder and put to death three officers responsible.<sup>116</sup>

Senatorial involvement in the punishment of captives was limited to the early period of Roman expansion in Italy and was reserved largely for those that rebelled against Rome, in which political ties and sometimes citizenship made punishment by a general a legal problem that required approval from the *comitia centuriata*.<sup>117</sup> Apart from the occasional interference of the Senate in the general's affairs in Italy and in Greece up to the mid-second century, it was rare for the Senate to intervene on behalf of captured cities against their own generals. In part this must have been due to the difficulty of prosecuting politically well-connected figures; the obstinacy of Popilius, for example, was only possible because of his powerful allies within the Senate.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, the Senate lacked the authority to pass resolutions against generals without the support of the *comitia centuriata*. Such measures would have been difficult to pass through the popular assembly if the proceeds from captured cities and maltreated populaces paid for popular events and public building. Inevitably the Senate was reluctant to censure generals because brutality brought profit and reparation after the event was inevitably complicated.

In deciding the fate of captives the Roman commanders also had to consider the long-term objectives of civil administration and future military action. All judgements, in this case, had to be weighed out by the commander, in order to achieve the overall aims of Rome; the decisions were of more than just immediate logistical and financial concern. The commander's decision over the captives had wider ramifications, and the political concerns of Rome's *maius bonum* had to be considered. As such, harsh punishment was meted out to deter further rebellion or to weaken the enemy's resolve so that others were encouraged to submit. In other cases lenience was used as a political tool to undermine the enemy's control over cities in resisting Rome.<sup>119</sup> Despite the complexity of the dynamic between the Senate

---

<sup>115</sup> Liv. 43.6-7; Zon. 9.22.

<sup>116</sup> These were drawn by lot, App. *Pun.* 15.

<sup>117</sup> As in the case of Capua, see Chapter 5.

<sup>118</sup> Liv. 42.21-22.

<sup>119</sup> Discussed in later chapters. The strategies of Brutus and Cassius serve as a prime example in how the strategies of lenience and austerity were used to produce the same result (support against Antony and Octavian), Cassius preferred severity and forced the city of Tarsus to contribute to his army so that they were forced to sell themselves into slavery (App. *BC* 4.63-4; Cass. Dio 47.31.1-4). Whereas Brutus, preferred

and general, on the whole it ran smoothly, as the two were rarely at odds over the decisions carried out regarding captives. This cooperation regarding the decisions over captives supports Eckstein's belief that the Roman general, in practice, held pre-eminence when it came to foreign policy, rather than the Senate.<sup>120</sup> The inhumane treatment and victimisation of captured people was not specifically Roman, as discussed above, it was a ubiquitous feature of the ancient world that the power of the strong justified their position over the weak. The reduction of captives to slavery (or their execution or ransom) was nothing more than a strict adherence to the conventions of war.

### The Commander's Decision

In most instances of capture the sources only give an outcome for captives *en masse*. The lack of specificity and acknowledgement of varying outcomes is misleading and there can be no doubt that the wholesale enslavement and slaughter of communities was at times exaggerated, particularly in cases where the communities continued to exist, suggesting that the entire population did not suffer the same fate. In the case of New Carthage Scipio Africanus held a court in which he passed various decrees regarding the captives all gathered in a single place.<sup>121</sup> Polybius' account of the aftermath at New Carthage, which is the most significant of our sources regarding the action at New Carthage, indicates that Scipio himself passed these judgements while the tribunes were occupied with the distribution of the booty.<sup>122</sup> It is important to emphasise that the decision regarding the fate of captives was always made by the commander and never by his subordinates, although the gathering up and sorting of individuals for punishment was certainly conducted by these.<sup>123</sup>

In cases of surrender commanders personally heard the deputations and negotiated the preliminary peace, as explained above. Cases of commanders passing judgement over

---

lenience and spared the Lycians (Plut. *Brut.* 30.4; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6), later he sold some citizens in front of Patara, but found that this did not sway the enemy and so he desisted from further sales (Cass. Dio 4.34.4).

<sup>120</sup> Eckstein 1987, *passim*, even more so in campaigns outside of Italy. The Senate's ultimate control over the commanders came in their ability to both grant and deny honours, for example the denial of a triumph for Marcellus on the basis that he entered into diplomatic talks with Hiero at Syracuse and avoided a siege (Zon 8.9), cf. the comments of Eckstein 1987, 344.

<sup>121</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6. These were then divided into groups of citizens and Spaniards and then the citizens were further divided into working men and strong youths.

<sup>122</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6 also mentions that the booty was handed over to the quaestors, which Walbank 1967a II, 219 remarks was inaccurate, as there was only one quaestor present (C. Flaminius, Liv. 26.47.8).

<sup>123</sup> At least during the Republican period. Titus delegated the task of trying individual prisoners to one of his freedmen and his Lieutenant Fronto following the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70 (Joseph. *BJ* 6.414-19).

## Chapter 1

captives were more common for the imperial period, but these indicate that the role of the military commander in hearing captives was similar to the same function in civil matters, so that these scenes often reflect *iustitia* in domestic courts. The visual evidence depicts a stark juxtaposition between the captor, who is portrayed with little emotion, and the captives, who are portrayed as pleading in a suppliant manner or as accepting of a decision, with downward glances in resignation or upturned with a hint of defiance.<sup>124</sup> A general's involvement in trying or hearing individual captives was probably limited to the cases of the wealthy and powerful, exceptional cases and those claiming to be Roman citizens - thus holding the right to be tried at Rome, as explained earlier. Captive leaders were commonly separated from the rest of the prisoners and often reserved for the general's triumph, as key parts of the general's spectacle - he may have wished to inspect them personally.<sup>125</sup>

In most cases, the sorting criteria for the captives were immediately obvious, based on gender, age, physical build or other superficial disparities.<sup>126</sup> However, in terms of wealth, political affiliation, culpability, or any other defining characteristics, the process of sorting was obviously a more difficult affair. Josephus informs us that in the case of the Jews, the criminals and robbers were impeached by one another,<sup>127</sup> indicating that there was a diligent process and period of interrogation and hearings. On occasion members of other communities were sought out from amongst the captives, either for separate punishment or to be released.<sup>128</sup> In these cases, we might infer that some investigation into the claims of someone's origin was made in order to seek verification, particularly in instances where ethnicity or language was not readily apparent. In other cases it is likely that the Romans

---

<sup>124</sup> E.g. The lower left figures on the Gemma Augustea (Ferris 2000, Plate 8) and a representation of a bound captive in a triumph frieze (Ferris 2000, Plate 7, for the presentation of captives on floats or biers see Beard 2007, 124-5). Scene of *clementia* on a sarcophagus in the Vatican Museums, Rome (Ferris 2000 Plate. 25, see further Kleiner 2007, 224-7); scenes on Trajan's Column (Cichorius Pl. 61, 75, 118, 141), see also the North and South Attic Panels on the Arch of Constantine which were probably taken from an arch commemorating the victories of Marcus Aurelius as well as the four statues of Dacian captives which date to Trajan, all of these representations of captives depict the expressions described above, see Carlson 2010, 163-176 and Varner 2004, 143-4.

<sup>125</sup> Beard 2007, 119-22. Many were executed (commonly by strangulation), but not all; Perseus, after the triumph of Aemilius, was spared for example (Diod Sic. 31.8.12; Cic. *Tusc.* 3.22).

<sup>126</sup> Vespasian sent the strong young captive Jews to work the canal being dug at Corinth (Joseph. *BJ* 3.540). The tallest and most handsome Jews from Jerusalem were separated from the others to be sent to Rome for the triumph (Joseph. *BJ* 6.418). Likewise, the strong of the captives from New Carthage were sent to row the newly acquired ships (Polyb. 10.16.12).

<sup>127</sup> Joseph. *BJ* 6.417.

<sup>128</sup> 319 BC Pro Samnites at Satricum (Liv. 9.16.9; Oros. 3.15.9-10), 308 BC Samnite Allies at Allifae (Liv. 9.42.7-8), 209 BC Spaniards at New Carthage (Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6), AD 67 Non Greeks from Taricheae (Joseph. *BJ* 3.338-9). Other likely cases include: The Volscian freedmen in 265 BC (Flor. 16.1; Plin. *HN* 31.31; Zon. 8.7), 212 BC Turdetani at Saguntum (Liv. 24.42.11; Zon. 9.3) and in 211 BC slaves at Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2).

## Chapter 1

sought out individuals to meet military or civil purposes, as at New Carthage.<sup>129</sup> Similarly, after the siege of Corinth, Mummius took a survey of all the freeborn children presumably to identify their levels of literacy.<sup>130</sup> Plutarch does not say why, but it is obviously to assess the ability of children for work involving such skills. Indeed Plutarch recounts how one boy quoted a poignant line from the *Odyssey*, which moved Mummius to tears and so he freed the boy, indicating that the rest were kept as slaves.<sup>131</sup> The retention of some captive boys for military service was likely during the Republic, as the presence of young foreign slaves acting as personal servants (*calones*) is commonly attested during the Empire.<sup>132</sup>

For the vast majority of instances in which captives were said to have been taken, nothing more was said beyond the action of their capture, despite the fact that the procedure of reduction was typically not a straightforward matter. There were guidelines to enslaving and the process itself could be cumbersome at times. Furthermore, enslavement was not a foregone conclusion of capture as will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapters.

---

<sup>129</sup> For New Carthage see Chapter 6. The artisans of Haliartus captured in 171 BC were sent to Calchis (Liv. 42.63.11). According to Josephus prisoners were sent to the mines in Egypt (*BJ* 6.414-419) and to build a canal (*BJ* 3.539, likely at Corinth (Suet. *Nero* 19).

<sup>130</sup> Plut. *Quest. conv.* 9.1.

<sup>131</sup> Plut. *Quest. conv.* 9.1.

<sup>132</sup> For example a second century AD gravestone (Speidel 1992 II, 353-122) associated with the the well documented *equites singulares Augusti* commemorates two boys serving as grooms to a cavalryman one of which was born on the northern shore of the Black Sea and there is no reason that captive boys could not fill such a role.

## Chapter 2

### *Release and Execution*

After a battle it was the commander's choice in how to deal with captives. As explained in the previous chapter, the commander was only compelled by law and practice to *dispense* the booty so that gold and silver (either captured or derived from the auction of booty including captives) was paid into the public treasury or the booty (on occasion captives) was distributed to the troops. Ultimately, the political climate necessitated particular treatment for the captives and the results of capture in war could vary, as Dio explained what befell those captured by the Romans:

“Prisoners captured in a just war which had been formally proclaimed by due ceremony were legitimately enslaved, if they hadn't been massacred. The Romans had no doubts that any war they engaged in was just, and the captives their property: if they could not arrange to be ransomed, they had to face slavery.”<sup>1</sup>

As Dio indicated, the result of capture could lead to massacre during the sack of a city or a rout, ransom, or enslavement, to which can be added the possibility of execution after capture or release without ransom. Ultimately Roman commanders were politicians, and defeated enemies became their *de facto* clients.<sup>2</sup> A central component of Roman military doctrine was to conquer and move on, this meant that once a city was defeated it was to be treated so that it would not take up arms again. In many cases this meant systematic brutalisation, and sometimes resulted in the enslavement or execution of entire populaces, but this was done so that the majority would fear the example of one city and submit to Rome. In contrast, particular lenience and benevolence shown to a defeated enemy could gain similar results. We find in many cases that the Romans wished to lead with the open hand, only using the closed fist when the first option was rejected. Cities that took up arms a second time were treated as rebels, the initial lenience had meant Rome desired an allied city and so the

---

<sup>1</sup> Cass. Dio 23.18.3.

<sup>2</sup> According to Eilers 2002, 34-5 clientship between a general and defeated city was a phenomenon of early Roman history, perhaps only ever used as a rhetorical emphasis upon the sparing of a populace.



populace were typically spared, but the ruling elites would be executed and replaced with men sympathetic to Rome.

### Hostages

Although hostages (*dediticii*) were taken from the enemy, they were not captives in the same sense that prisoners of war were, and thus only a brief overview of hostages is necessary.<sup>3</sup> The detention of individuals as hostages served the primary function of securing a peace settlement and as collateral for the accepted obedience of foreign states to Rome.<sup>4</sup> In most cases where hostages were taken, the enemy still possessed some means of continued military resistance and captives provided the guarantee that the enemy would not take up arms again.<sup>5</sup> Any hostility on the part of the surrendering party, after giving hostages, was viewed as a senseless obstruction to peace.<sup>6</sup> As instruments of diplomacy, hostages were not viewed by the Romans as regular captives; their value was political rather than financial, and the taking of them and their maintenance perpetuated peace. Although hostages were not representative of military victory in the same sense as captives, they served as proof of a general's more permanent subjugation of the enemy.<sup>7</sup>

Legally hostages were similar to other captives, in that they were not *cives* of Rome; instead they were considered citizens of another state (*peregrini*) and therefore were, by default, considered the property of the state.<sup>8</sup> Further evidence that they were the property of the state comes from the fact that any property they held in captivity was, in fact, owned by the state.<sup>9</sup>

The captivity, particularly of young nobles, could be used as a means of manipulating the hearts and minds of the people of foreign states.<sup>10</sup> Polybius for example was himself a

---

<sup>3</sup> For studies on hostages at Rome see Allen 2006; Walker 1980.

<sup>4</sup> For example: Numidians (Sall. *Iug.* 54.6), Cantabrians (Flor. 2.33.52), Judeans (Joseph. *BJ* 6.356), various tribes of Britain (Strab. 4.5.3), Macedonians at Agassae (Liv. 44.7.5), Histrians (Liv. 41.11.9), Ligurians, who were forced to give hostages to the Massalians (Polyb. 33.10.13).

<sup>5</sup> The failure to secure hostages could lead the enemy to betrayal (Liv. 43.10.2).

<sup>6</sup> Notably at Samnium in 189 BC (Liv. 38.28.8), also the Gauls (Caes. *B Gall.* 3.10) and later the Sicambri (Strab. 7.1.4).

<sup>7</sup> Liv. 33.22.9 states that Q. Minucius Rufus' failure to secure hostages was a basis for his denial of a triumph over the Ligurians as he did not have any enemy combatants to corroborate his victory claims. See Allen 2006, 99. For criteria of attaining triumphs see Richardson 1975, 60-62; Gruen 1990, 129-33; 1995, 63; Versnel 1970, 168-9; Mommsen 1887 I, 126-36. For a summary of these arguments see Beard 2007, 206-9.

<sup>8</sup> Gai. *Inst.* 1.25; Ulp. *Dig.* 20.14.

<sup>9</sup> *Dig.* 49.14.31-2. Interestingly, the passage also cites an imperial rescript which stated that the heirs of captives that sufficiently 'Romanised' themselves should inherit their property after death in the same manner as normal circumstances would allow.

<sup>10</sup> Albeit this required the eventual return of the hostage to their native land. This process is clearly evident in imperial and later sources (e.g. Tac. *Agr.* 20f; Plut. *Sert.* 14; Amm. Marc. 16.12.25), see Allen 2006, 149f.

hostage from 167 BC, and his acquaintance with well to do Romans certainly made his time as a hostage more comfortable. He became a close friend and client of Scipio Aemilianus and his *Histories* was undoubtedly partial where Scipio was concerned.<sup>11</sup> Though hostages were valuable politically, and as a result fairly well treated, they were ultimately the cut-string should the submissive nation break from their obligations. Hostages were punished and sometimes executed as a result of their motherland's transgressions.<sup>12</sup> At least some hostages were considered prisoners whilst in the hands of Rome, their captivity representing a punishment rather than a guarantee.<sup>13</sup> During the early Republic the *carcer* at Alba Fucens served as a notorious holding pen of political prisoners and from the second century BC prisoners were typically held in the *carcer* in Rome itself.<sup>14</sup> The Romans were not particularly fond of long-term incarceration as a punishment, and the imprisonment of hostages was uncommon. What distinguished the hostages from captives was that, so long as the peace was maintained, they were not enslaved or executed. The Roman's prided themselves on their fair treatment and respect for hostages, and the killing of hostages was considered treasonous.<sup>15</sup> In cases where indemnities were concerned it is likely that hostages were discharged once the payments were complete.<sup>16</sup> Hostages were also given when a state of war did not exist between Rome and the submitting nation, thus it is hard to imagine why,

---

<sup>11</sup> See Astin 1967, 3f; Walbank 1957 I, 1-26.

<sup>12</sup> Execution (Liv. 2.16.9; 25.7.11-14; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.25.1-3; 6.30.1; Plut. *Sert.* 10.3). The execution was legal, *contra* Westington 1938, 31; Moscovich 1980, 126-7. For many examples of the breaking of hostage agreements largely in regards to the violation of the captivity itself see Walker 1980, 166-204, who notes (p. 182) that in most cases the execution of hostages only hardened the enemy's resolve against Rome. Execution of innocent hostages was viewed with disdain (Liv. 28.34.7-10; Plut. *Sert.* 25.4).

<sup>13</sup> Hostages of the Nergobriges were imprisoned for breaking the terms of peace (App. *Hisp.* 42), see Walker 1980, 179.

<sup>14</sup> Braund 1984, 167. Specifically held at Alba Fucens: Perseus and his sons Alexander and Philip (Liv. 45.42.4; Plut. *Aem.* 37; Diod. Sic. 31.9f.), Syphax (Polyb. 16.23.6) and a chief of the Arverni Bituitus (Val. Max. 9.6.3; Liv. *Per.* 61). The *carcer* in Rome (*carcer Tullianus/Mamertinus*) dates to the monarchy and served as a temporary holding pen for prisoners awaiting trial or execution (Liv. 1.33.8). An underground extension was soon added (Var. *DLL.* 5.151; Fest. Lindsay 1913, 356 cf. Cadoux 2008, 202-3) and it was still in use in the first century AD when it was repaired (*CIL* 6. 31674; s.v. 'Tullianum' *OCD*). Prisoners held in the *carcer* at Rome possibly included Aristobulus (Joseph. *BJ* 1.174; *AJ.* 14.97), Jugurtha (Plut. *Mar.* 12.4, Livy *Per.* 67, Eutrop. 4.27.6) and Vercingetorix (Caes. *B Gall.* 7.89.4; Plut. *Caes.* 27.10). Not all prisoners were detained in prison, in 61 BC Tigranes was kept in chains in the custody of a friend of Pompey's named L. Flavius, presumably in his private home (Dio. Cass. 38.30.1-2).

<sup>15</sup> Murder of hostages made a capital crime according to the *lex Iulia, Dig.* 48.4.1. The respectful treatment of captives was valued by the Romans (Liv. 34.52.9; 37.25.12; Polyb. 21.3.3; 21.11.10), and Liv. 34.22.11-12 scorned the maltreatment of hostages by Nabis of Sparta, see Allen 2006, 91-119.

<sup>16</sup> See Allen 2006, 41-2. Examples worth noting include the release of the son of Philip V of Macedon once his tribute was forgiven (Polyb. 21.3.3; 21.11.9; Diod. Sic. 28.15.1; App. *Mac.* 5). The Aetolian tribute in 189 (Polyb. 21.32.10; Liv. 38.11.6-7). Possibly also Ocilis in 152 BC (App. *Hisp.* 48) and hostages given by Antiochus III, see Moscovich 1974, 420-1.

## Chapter 2

when the Romans prided themselves in the civility of their hostage system, that these would have been treated in the manner of prisoners.<sup>17</sup>

### Release

Roman foreign policy in Italy was directed towards the incorporation of defeated enemies, in order to achieve this, their defeated neighbours had to be *willing* to join the folds of Rome's political hegemony. As will be shown,<sup>18</sup> this was achieved with varying levels of success. The determination of the Samnites against Roman expansion was particularly trying, but Rome, relatively early in the Republic, managed to establish supremacy over its Latin neighbours forging a path of continual outward expansion. Since Roman policy favoured the incorporation of the defeated through ties of alliance, they often chose to be lenient towards the vanquished, hoping to gain political advantage through benevolent, rather than castigatory *foedera* (treaties).<sup>19</sup> Roman ambition in establishing a network of alliances, rather than building an empire based on direct political and territorial control can be seen in their choice to release captives after successful battles.<sup>20</sup> This leniency was displayed for example after the sack of Tarentum, in which Epirote mercenaries were captured along with Tarentines. Rather than exact violent retribution, the Romans chose to allow the majority of the population to remain free, and according to Frontinus, the Roman general Papirius offered Milo the opportunity to return to Epirus with his soldiers free of ransom. Only the principle leaders of the Tarrentines defection were punished with execution.<sup>21</sup> The choice to release these captives, when there was no risk of retribution for harsher treatment, exhibits the Roman desire to portray themselves as judicious and munificent.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Some of these hostages were gestures of a diplomatic nature rather than submissive, Germans from across the Rhine sent hostages as a sign of alliance to Caesar after his *tour de force* across the Rhine (Caes. *B Gall.* 4.18). Much like the submission of hostages by the Parthians (Joseph. *BJ* 2.379), Tiridates I, king of Armenia and brother of the king of Parthia, paid homage to Nero in AD 63 by sending his daughter to Rome as a hostage (Tac. *Ann.* 15.29).

<sup>18</sup> See Chapter 4.

<sup>19</sup> Pritchett 1991, 290 cites political advantage as the typical reason behind releasing captives in Greece.

<sup>20</sup> Early examples include the Volscians spared at Ardea 443 BC (Liv. 4.10.4); Volscian senators spared in 431 BC (Liv. 4.29.4); Samnites spared at Luceria in 320 BC (Liv. 9.15.6-9).

<sup>21</sup> Frontin. *Str.* 3.3.1. Both Liv. *Per.* 15 and Zon. 8.6 state that the Tarrentines were forced to pay a tribute and demolish their walls, implying that they were allowed to remain. Oros. 4.3.4 suggests that the city was taken by the Romans, but does not mention the fate of the captives, *praedam sibi omnem atque ipsum oppidum uindicauit*.

<sup>22</sup> For the continued Roman belief in themselves as conciliatory to defeated enemies, see Chapter 6.

## Chapter 2

There was a general sentiment amongst the Italians prior to Roman supremacy not to impose unnecessary bloodshed on other Italians.<sup>23</sup> In Italy the Roman strategy was incorporation after defeat and so warfare served to display force and ensure submission. This submission required an act of humiliation, which in the early Republic meant they would be ‘sent under the yoke.’ The practice, as applied to defeated enemies, has no definite beginning other than the earliest instance mentioned by Livy, in which the Aequi were made to pass underneath a spear acting as a yoke by the Roman commander Cincinnatus in 457 BC.<sup>24</sup> Festus explained that in the field spears were used to form a door and the captives stripped and disarmed and passed through it, and Trogus alludes to the practice being universally a custom of the Italians.<sup>25</sup> There is no explanation as to why this practice was carried out or as to when it was implemented in the release of captives. In Roman legend the practice of passing beneath the yoke was first implemented by the elder Horatius in the wake of his son Horatius’ acquittal for an act of soricide.<sup>26</sup> According to Festus a beam was placed over top of two posts and Horatius was made to pass beneath it so as to absolve him of the crime to the satisfaction of the augurs.<sup>27</sup> In this manner the yoke constituted a purification rite which allowed the guilty or tabooed to re-join the rest.<sup>28</sup> There were similar parallels in Greek practices where murderers re-entering the *polis* were required to undergo rituals of purification.<sup>29</sup> William Fowler identified a similar need for purification for Roman soldiers re-entering the city, these were made to pass beneath the *porta triumphalis* in the *campus Martius*, which Fowler believed to be a purification process.<sup>30</sup> Both Fowler and the notable anthropologist James Frazer argued that this need for purification extended to the defeated enemies, who were guilty of taking up arms against the enemy and so by passing under the yoke they left one state of being belligerent to Rome and entered another as submissive to Rome.

---

<sup>23</sup> As exemplified by Pontius’ rejection of the idea to execute the Roman captives, Liv. 9.3f., see Fowler 1913, 48; Phillipson 1911, 253f.

<sup>24</sup> Liv. 3.28.10; 67.6. Cf. Flor. 1.5.13 Val. Max. 2.7.7. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.24.7-8 also mentions the victory, but excludes the yoke scene.

<sup>25</sup> Festus Lindsay 1913, 297; Trogus *Historiae Philippicae* 38.152f.

<sup>26</sup> Having been the sole survivor of the battle between the triplets, Horatius arrived to see his sister weep for one of the fallen Curiatii, he killed her for this and was spared execution when his father came to his defence. The judges took pity upon the man who only had Horatius left amongst his children, see Liv. 1.24-26.

<sup>27</sup> Festus Lindsay 1913, 297. This portal was known as the *tigilium sorarium*.

<sup>28</sup> Thus Fowler 1913, 48-51; Frazer 1936 III, 157-165, 166-186; Halliday 1924, 93-95.

<sup>29</sup> Plat. *Laws* 9 and many other equivalent rituals cited by Frazer 1936, 157-165.

<sup>30</sup> Fowler 1913, 49. That the *porta triumphalis* was located in the *campus Martius* is based on a statement of Joseph. *BJ* 7.5.4.

## Chapter 2

By the time most of the references to passing under the yoke occurred, the ritual and purification aspect of the practice was entirely replaced by one of humiliation.<sup>31</sup> But, purification and humiliation do not have to be completely divorced from one another; both acts allow for acceptance, in the case of purification by the unsullied, and in the case of humiliation by the victor. To allow the release of captives without any restriction would *completely* neglect the soldiers' (and likely the Roman public's) desire for adequate vengeance. So after the defeat of the Volscians at Ardea in 443 BC, the Roman commander responded to a Volscian envoy requesting terms: "the vanquished had to accept terms, not to dictate them; and as the Volscians came at their own discretion to attack the allies of the Roman people, they should not go off in the same way."<sup>32</sup> The yoke itself is highly symbolic in a number of ways, not the least of which is its representation of burden and subjugation - an English derivative of the same process (*sub iugum*).<sup>33</sup> As a means of humiliation it was commonly used in Italy by the Romans,<sup>34</sup> famously against the Romans by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks in 321 BC<sup>35</sup> and by the Tusculans against the Aequi.<sup>36</sup> The fact that the Romans never used the practice against non-Italian enemies and that people outside Italy used the yoke as a means of humiliation upon the Romans,<sup>37</sup> suggests that it only held meaning to Italians. The humiliation of the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks left an indelible mark upon Roman history and so the emotive action of passing under the yoke was often used to convey a sense of entering submission or experiencing humiliation, much as the

---

<sup>31</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.22.7 remarks that the ritual was last used by Horatius. The humiliation of the process is emphasised by Liv. 9.3.2. Following the Caudine disaster the peace with the Samnites was rejected on the basis that the surrender was particularly shameful (Liv. 9.8.3-9).

<sup>32</sup> Liv. 4.10.2. *...victis condiciones accipiendas esse, non ferendas respondit, neque ut venerint ad oppugnandos socios populi Romani suo arbitrio, ita abituros Volscos esse.*

<sup>33</sup> Numerous examples and too many to list fully, for a range of the symbolic use by just one author see: Sen. *Dial.* 1.4.6; 2.14.3; 21.6; 3.16.1; *De Clem.* 1.16.5. Examples for the yoke *symbolising* slavery (literal or figurative) include: Cic. *Orat.* 1.6; *Rep.* 2.46; Liv. 3.15.9; Sen. *Herc. Fur.* 432; *Troad.* 747; *Dial.* 4.14.4; *SHA Aurel.* 41.8; *Stat. Silv.* 3.4.34; *Tac. Agr.* 31; *Val. Max.* 8.9.2. Similar examples in Greek: *Hdt.* 7.8; *Aes. Th.* 75. See Fitzgerald 2000, 71f.

<sup>34</sup> The Aequi outside Corbio in 457 BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.20.7; 24.6-8; Liv. 3.28.10; 67.6; Flor. 1.5.13 *Val. Max.* 2.7.7); at Ardea in 443 BC (Liv. 4.10.4; 10.7); The Samnites at Luceria in 320 BC (Ampel. 18.7; 20.10; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 16.12; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9); after a victory at Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.7-8); Interamma in 294 BC (Liv. 10.36.14) and Duronia in 293 BC (Eutrop. 2.9. Liv.10.39.4).

<sup>35</sup> App. *Sam.* 6; Aug. *De Civ.* 3.17; Aul. *Gel.* 17.21.36; Aur. *Vict.* 30.1; Cic. *Off.* 30.109; Cass. Dio 8.36.10; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 16.1.4; Eutrop. 2.9.1; Flor. 1.11.11; Liv. 9.4.3; 6.1; 6.3; 15.4; 23.42.7; 25.6.12; *Per.* 9; Oros. 3.15.5; *Val. Max.* 7.2.17; *Zon.* 9.26.

<sup>36</sup> Liv. 3.23.5.

<sup>37</sup> By the Carthaginian commander Hannibal in the First Punic War (Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.19), Jugurtha forced the Roman troops under Aulus to pass under the yoke (Sall. *Iug.* 38.9; 49.2), the Tigurini allowed the Romans to escape after passing under the yoke in 107 BC (Caes. *B Gall.* 1.7.4; 12.5.7; alluded to by Cic. *Rhet Her.* 1.25; Liv. *Per.* 65; Oros. 5.15.24) and in Armenia a legion was forced to surrender and pass under the yoke (Suet. *Nero* 39.1; *Tac. Ann.* 15.15.4).

## Chapter 2

yoke itself symbolised submission or humiliation.<sup>38</sup> This expression of humility is only explained from the Roman point of view, but the fact the Romans forced their Italian enemies to undergo the ordeal implies that they were equally affected by it.

Livy is particular in noting that the release of captives often resulted in the loss of all their goods and so upon their release they departed with only a single garment apiece.<sup>39</sup> No other Latin author suggests that this stipulation occurred. This was not confined to Roman practice, but generally accompanied the practice of passing under the yoke.<sup>40</sup> When the Carthaginians released captives they often made this stipulation as well, and later Philip proposed that the Rhodians and Attalus' men could quit Abydus with a single garment each.<sup>41</sup> By noting the departure of captives with a single garment apiece, Livy emphasises the point that their property was taken as booty.

Humiliation was not always necessary, as mentioned above; political expedience sometimes dictated a release of captives. In Illyria the city of Pharos was razed to the ground, but if we are to believe the account of Appian, the captives were released without ransom at the behest of Pinnes, the boy king of Illyria, who had been deposed by Demetrius of Pharos. As Pinnes was to be reinstated, agreeing to his request ensured renewed friendship, though it would be short-lived as Pinnes suddenly died.<sup>42</sup> In the war against Phillip, Roman policy was initially against excessive force. At Pelium in 199 BC, and at Carystus in the following year the citizens were spared; at Carystus the Macedonian garrison was even allowed to be ransomed and sent into Boeotia.<sup>43</sup> Likewise, Hannibal had tried to win the Italians over to his side by releasing them without ransom. In 202 BC three Carthaginian spies were caught by the Romans and instead of punishing them, as was expected, Scipio showed them around the camps and released them. When they reported to Hannibal, he decided to meet with Scipio and so the celebrated parley of the two generals occurred before the battle of Zama. Although the sources vary as to why Hannibal wished to talk (he had to this point been reluctant to meet with Scipio) they all agree that the release of the spies was the impetus behind the

---

<sup>38</sup> There are a number of visual similarities in the humility experienced by the Romans following the Caudine Forks as described by Liv. 9.5.12-6.3 and the humility suffered by the sixteenth legion in Tac. *Ann.* 4.62. See Ash 1998, 31-33.

<sup>39</sup> Liv. 4.10.4; 6.3.3; 9.4.3 (cf. 9.5.12); 9.15.6; 9.42.7; 21.12.5; 22.6.11; 22.52.3; 23.15.3; 31.17.4; 31.45.6.

<sup>40</sup> Liv. 9.42.7; 9.15.6; 4.10.4.

<sup>41</sup> Carthaginians (Liv. 22.6.11; 22.52.3; 23.15.3), Philip (Liv. 31.17.4).

<sup>42</sup> App. *Ill.* 8. Polyb. 3.19.12 does not mention the taking of captives nor even Pinnes, but we know at least some captives were taken and brought back to Rome as implied by the fact that Aemilius celebrated a triumph.

<sup>43</sup> Pelium (Liv. 31.40.5) Carystus (Liv. 32.17.2).

## Chapter 2

initiative.<sup>44</sup> Internal politics also forced the general to release captives in favour of expedience. In 151 BC the consul Marcellus was anxious to wrap up his campaign in Spain before his rival Lucullus arrived to finish up the campaign, thus stealing the glory. This inclined Marcellus to be lenient towards the Celtiberians and he dismissed a number of hostages and, as he marched on Numantia, the city submitted and a few hostages were taken to guarantee their submission; as a result the Belli, Titthi and Arevaci submitted without a fight.<sup>45</sup>

Of course political necessity was not the only reason behind sparing the defeated; the Romans on occasion chose to spare the defeated on ‘compassionate’ grounds. When the city of Locha was overrun by Roman troops, contrary to Scipio’s orders, the surviving Lochrians were allowed to go free without ransom.<sup>46</sup> In taking Syracuse, Marcellus stipulated that free persons should not be harmed or enslaved. In Livy’s account of the fall of Syracuse, Marcellus is portrayed as acting sternly towards the Syracusans, their former alliance with Rome under Hiero II being the only thing that allowed the concession of granting them their lives and freedom.<sup>47</sup> In contrast, Valerius depicts Marcellus as feeling remorse for the pillaging of the city,<sup>48</sup> and Plutarch suggests that Marcellus was unable to prevent the plundering of the city because the long siege necessitated recompense for his soldiers through booty, but he made specific provisions for the protection of free people against enslavement and harm, and furthermore for the protection of the property of the Syracusans that had been loyal to Rome.<sup>49</sup> Regardless of the account, the close alliance between Rome and Hiero II compelled the Romans to show leniency towards the people of the city even after their defection.

---

<sup>44</sup> Polyb. 15.5.4-7 suggests this had intrigued Hannibal. Liv. 30.29.1-3 remarks that the spies revealed Roman superiority and so Hannibal desired to negotiate rather than give battle, and Val. Max. 3.7.1 cites the show of Scipio’s confidence being a similar reason for doubt on Hannibal’s part, cf. Polyæn. 8.16.8; App. *Pun.* 39; Zon. 9.14. Eutrop. 3.22.2 also suggests that the spies were actually ambassadors, so too in the Suda s.v. ‘Ἀννιβίας’ 2425.

<sup>45</sup> App. *Iber.* 50, cf. Liv. *Per.* 48.

<sup>46</sup> App. *Pun.* 15.

<sup>47</sup> Liv. 25.31.3-7. In his response to the Syracusans, Marcellus lays the blame of the city’s sacking on the Syracusans themselves who allowed the defection to the Carthaginians, citing the Syracusans who came to Rome for protection rather than remain in the city.

<sup>48</sup> Val. Max. 5.1.4. The destruction of an opulent city is the focus of Sil. It. 14.623f. The removal of goods and wealth along with the death of Archimedes was the focus of Dio’s epitimists Tzetz. *Chil.* 2, 136-49 and Zon. 9.5. Polyb. 9.10f. reproaches Rome’s heavy handedness in stripping such a magnificent city. Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2 relates that this deprivation, though not reducing the citizens to slavery nonetheless forced them into slavery.

<sup>49</sup> *Marc.* 19.2. cf. Cic. *Ver.* 2.2.4.

## Chapter 2

Overall Roman leniency towards captives lessened as wars extended beyond Italy, generally once captives were taken the Romans tried to extract profit from them whether through the sale of their bodies as slaves or as ransom. Often there is no indication what became of captives, and where there is no specific information relating to their sale or ransom it is possible that they may have been released; this was more likely to have occurred during Rome's period of expansion in Italy.<sup>50</sup>

### Execution

Wholesale execution of captives after a city was taken was rare and generally limited to cities which rebelled; when large numbers of civilians were killed it usually occurred during the sacking of a city. In cases where no distinction was made between the age and sex of the victims the killing was essentially an unrestrained slaughter. The bloodlust of soldiers often continued after the enemy forces had been routed or annihilated.<sup>51</sup> When a city was sacked many of the defenders would have been killed in the process, the remainder, those that posed a physical threat (adult men in the Roman eye),<sup>52</sup> were all that stood between soldiers and the booty, in such cases the slaughter was usually limited to the men, and often the general issued specific instructions for the soldiers to seek out and kill the men.<sup>53</sup> Josephus, in his account of

---

<sup>50</sup> I argue specifically that the Romans refrained from enslavement during the Third Samnite War and that they also refrained from taking slaves from Veii, both events are generally cited as examples of mass enslavement, see Chapter 4.

<sup>51</sup> For example: Velitrae in 494 BC (Liv. 2.30.15), Anxur in 405 BC (Liv. 4.59.6-7), Veii in 396 BC (Liv. 5.21.13), Saepinum in 293 BC (Liv. 10.45.11-14), New Carthage in 209 BC (Polyb. 10.15.4; Liv. 26.46.10), Locha in 203 BC (App. *Pun.* 15), see Westington 1938, 70-86. When the Gauls sacked Rome also they killed civilians without compunction (Liv. 5.41.9-10, Diod. Sic. 14.115.1).

<sup>52</sup> In trophy representations female captives are often left unrestrained whereas the male captives are always bound. E.g. the arch at Glanum, see McGoweb 2010, 20-21. On the Augustan monument at La Turbie, see Ferris 2000, plate 9. A relief sculpture from the temple of Apollo Sosianus (Museo del Palazzo dei Conservatori, Rome), see Bradley 2004, plate 1; Ferris 2000, plate 7. Two victory monument statues depicting a male and female pair from the Sebasteion in Aphrodisias, for a plausible reconstruction of the trophies see Boube 1996, 24-25. The depiction of a trophy with captives is common on coins, as on the obverse of a brass *sestertius* (AD 85) *BMC* 143, see Kent 1978, 290, plate 69.243. Obverse of another brass *sestertius* (AD 105) *BMC* 294, see Kent 1978, 291, plate 72.249. Other examples of just male bound captives include a relief from the Arcus Novus (Boboli Gardens, Florence) depicted with a trophy and Victory, Ferris 2000, plate 31; two captives chained at the neck (Landesmuseum, Mainz), Bradley 2004, plate 5 and Ferris 2000, plate 38. Of female captives alone: obverse of an *aureus* minted by Vespasian (AD 70) *BMC* 32, see Kent 1978, 288, plate 64.224; obverse of a brass *sestertius* minted under Titus (AD 81) *BMC* 164, see Kent 1978, 290, plate 69.238. Compare also two juxtaposing reliefs from Sabasteion in Aphrodisias, one depicting a single male captive and the other a female, Bradley 2004, 298-318, plates 14 and 16. For a brief overview of slave representation in art see George 2011, 399-403.

<sup>53</sup> Cluviae 311 in BC (Liv. 9.31.3), Senones in 284 BC (App. *Sam.* 6. = *Gall.* 11), Antipatrea in 200 BC (Liv. 31.27.4), Cauca in 151 BC (App. *Hisp.* 52), Corinth in 146 BC (Cass. Dio 21.72fr.) and Capsa in 107 BC (Sall. *Iug.* 91.6).



the Jewish war, gives numerous examples of the Romans slaying men once cities were taken.<sup>54</sup>

The total slaughter of captives was not easy, large numbers of people suddenly faced with death could prove difficult to control and the executions were arduous to carry out with rudimentary weaponry.<sup>55</sup> The disarmament and containment of captives was essential in carrying out the slaughter. Sometimes this *deposer les armes* required deceit on the part of the Romans as occurred at Henna in 213 BC. The Sicilian city wished to expel the Roman garrison and demanded the return of the city key. The Roman commander requested he be allowed to address the citizens in the central plaza the next day, and when all assembled his soldiers rushed in to kill the principle men of the city and then fanned out to massacre the rest of the population.<sup>56</sup> Of all the theatres Rome's military operated in treachery was particularly common in Spain. At Cauca<sup>57</sup> in 151 BC a small Roman garrison was admitted who then in turn opened the gates for the entire army to slaughter the populace.<sup>58</sup> In 144 BC the consul Sulpicius Galba tricked the Lusitanians into dividing themselves into three groups and occupying separate camps already laid out with deep ditches by the Romans. Once inside the camps, the soldiers went from one to the next killing everyone inside.<sup>59</sup> Similarly at Colenda in 98 BC the general Didus offered to resettle the citizens and requested that the men enter the camp so that he might parcel out the land to them individually, the camp served as a trap and the soldiers slaughtered them, enslaving the remaining women and children.<sup>60</sup> Roman treachery continued into the imperial period, in order to deal with the large number of non-Greek captives at Terichaea, Vespasian ordered them to follow a single route lined by soldiers to Tiberias where roughly 42,000 of the prisoners were corralled into the stadium where they were divided up and executed, deported, or sold.<sup>61</sup> In these examples it is evident

---

<sup>54</sup> Gadara in AD 67 (Joseph. *BJ* 3.132), Japha in AD 67 (Joseph. *BJ* 3.304-6), Jotapata in AD 67 (Joseph. *BJ* 3.338-339) and Hebron AD 67 (Joseph. *BJ* 4.553).

<sup>55</sup> Pritchett 1991, 208.

<sup>56</sup> Frontin. *Str.* 4.7.22; Polyæn. 8.21; Liv. 24.39f. The booty was given over to the soldiers, as recorded in an inscription (*CIL* 1.608).

<sup>57</sup> Cauca or Coca is near modern Segovia, specifically 'north of the Tagus' as App. *Hisp.* 52 mentions *περάσας δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν καλούμενον Τάγον*.

<sup>58</sup> App. *Hisp.* 52. Men were the targets of the massacre, some of the Caucaei managed to escape by climbing over the walls to get out.

<sup>59</sup> App. *Hisp.* 60. A few managed to escape the slaughter including Viriathus, who would go on to be an important leader against the Romans in Lusitania. Galba is portrayed by Appian as a particularly avaricious fraudster and so this episode is in keeping with his immorality.

<sup>60</sup> App. *Hisp.* 100.

<sup>61</sup> Joseph. *BJ* 3.532-542. Similarly during the Nika revolt in AD 532 at Byzantium 30,000 rioters were executed in the hippodrome by soldiers and guards thus quelling the revolt, Procop. *Wars* 1.24.54.

## Chapter 2

that the victims were tricked because their execution by conventional slaughter would have otherwise been costly to the Romans in terms of manpower and time.

Executions and slaughter were also carried out as punitive measures. On two occasions the killing of civilians was in response to the death of Roman ambassadors.<sup>62</sup> As a punishment, executions clearly gave teeth to the threat of Roman retribution. In 314 BC the Lucerians betrayed the Roman garrison to the Samnites, when the Romans re-conquered the city they did not give any quarter to the Lucerians or the Samnites inside. The Senate debated razing the city altogether, but eventually decided to allow it to stand with a Roman garrison. By the fact that the city required a garrison, it is likely some of the Lucerians who managed to evade the slaughter were allowed to remain in the city.<sup>63</sup> In cases of rebellion executions were generally reserved for the community leaders and the principle fomenters of the revolt. After Pyrrhus departed Italy a group of Samnites turned to banditry; when their location was found the Romans took possession of the booty and executed all the rebel leaders.<sup>64</sup> The style of execution was characteristic of anyone deemed enemies of the state: the prisoners were first beaten with rods or scourged and then beheaded.<sup>65</sup> In Italy these executions were sometimes carried out in Rome,<sup>66</sup> in other cases the execution was dealt with summarily on the spot. Of course Roman citizens who had not committed a clear act of treason could appeal for a trial, as at Capua,<sup>67</sup> however, during the period of this study such appeals were exceptional and, as warfare extended beyond peninsular Italy, military encounters with communities awarded the citizenship no longer occurred.

---

<sup>62</sup> Senones had killed the Roman Ambassadors in 284 BC and the Consul marched into their territory killing the men and enslaving women and children (Polyb. 2.19.9; Liv. *Per.* 12; App. *Sam.* 6 = *Gall.* 11; Oros. 3.22.12-13). In 229 BC a Roman senator was killed by the Illyrians and as a consequence the Romans executed a number of principal men (Flor. 1.21.1-3. Other accounts (Polyb. 2.8.4-12; App. *Ill.* 7) of this later episode vary, see Walbank 1957 I, 153; Petzold 1971, 199-223, Errington 85-87.1989.

<sup>63</sup> Liv. 9.26.3-5. The city had previously been conquered and installed a garrison, Liv. 9.16.12.

<sup>64</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.17.1-2; Zon. 8.7 gives a more thorough account of the event, but does not mention the execution of captives.

<sup>65</sup> Pometia in 495 BC (Liv. 2.17.2; 2.25.5; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.29.5), Antium in 459 BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.21.6), Satricum in 319 BC (Liv. 9.16.9-11), Rhegium in 270 BC (App. *Sam.* 9.5; Polyb. 1.7.11-12; Liv. 28.28.3; *Per.* 15; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.5.5; Frontin. *Str.* 4.1.38), the Illyrians (Flor. 1.21.4) and Hirpini (Liv. 23.37.13). This gruesome style of execution is depicted on the Column of Marcus Aurelius, Ferris 2000, plate 21 and Bradley 2004, plate 5. The beheading of enemy captives has been interpreted by Goldsworthy 1996, 271-6 as a seemingly barbarian enterprise used by Roman auxiliaries. As indicated above, this practice was used to punish rebels and traitors during the Republic and there are a few notable instances where enemy captives not considered rebels were decapitated after death (ps-Caes. *Hisp.* 32; Liv. 24.15.3-5). See also Coulston 2003, 404-5 on the depiction of decapitation by Roman soldiers on Trajan's Column.

<sup>66</sup> Satricum in 319 BC (Liv. 9.16.9-11), Fregellae in 314 BC (Diod. Sic. 19.101.3), some Capuans and Carthaginians in 211 BC (Liv. 26.16.4-6; App. *Hann.* 43) and Rhegium (as above).

<sup>67</sup> See Chapter 5.

## Chapter 2

Enemy combatants were not the only captives to be executed. Roman soldiers that defected to the enemy (*transfugae*) were considered enemies of the state (*hostes publici*) and could be killed on sight.<sup>68</sup> Roman commanders typically executed turncoats,<sup>69</sup> and often in the terms of surrender they demanded that Roman deserters be turned over.<sup>70</sup> The mutinous legion at Rhegium seems to have provided the legal precedence for the execution of deserters, as they were sent back to Rome and convicted by a vote in the assembly.<sup>71</sup> In future instances Roman deserters were sent to Rome to be executed, but trials were unnecessary or at least not worthy of mention by the sources; in most cases the defectors were probably executed on the spot.<sup>72</sup> In executing deserters the commander was operating under his martial authority in punishing subordinates rather than as a magistrate punishing captives.<sup>73</sup>

The execution of captives was effective in removing the seditious elements of a community, but as a general deterrence of rebellious movements it was less successful. The execution of the Lusitanians in 144 BC by Galba only served to strengthen the anti-Roman resolve. Viriathus managed to escape from the slaughter and went on to lead a significant Lusitanian resistance.<sup>74</sup> A number of Capuan youths angry at the maltreatment of their fathers started a fire in Rome.<sup>75</sup> Five years after the execution of the pro-Samnite faction in Satricum, the citizens of Luceria betrayed their Roman garrison.<sup>76</sup> The repeated executions in Spain did little to quell their recalcitrance and the executions during the Jewish rebellion did little to break the resolve of the rebels until they were essentially annihilated at Jerusalem, with the remaining defectors at Masada choosing to die by their own hands.<sup>77</sup>

The brutal manner of execution and the possibility of torture or slavery struck fear into the hearts of the enemy, so that some preferred death to capture, on occasion destroying their

---

<sup>68</sup> *Dig.* 49.16.5.3; Quint. *Decl. Min.* 315, see Phang 2008, 121; Van Hoof 1990, 84.

<sup>69</sup> After the Battle of Zama in 202 BC Val. Max. 2.7.12; Liv. 30.43.13. See other examples below. See Kyle 1994, 49.

<sup>70</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 1.28, App. *Pun.* 130.

<sup>71</sup> Polyb. 1.7.12; 1.10.4; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.16.2; Liv. 28.28.3, see Harris 1979, 188.

<sup>72</sup> Romans deserters caught in Italy were sent back to Rome and executed during the Second Punic War (Liv. 24.20.6); allied deserters were sent to Rome to be killed by beasts (Val. Max. 2.7.13) and after the sack of Carthage in 146 BC deserters were trampled by elephants (Val. Max. 2.7.14), see Phang 2008, 120.

<sup>73</sup> The discouragement of desertion was necessary for discipline, consequently strict discipline contributed to higher levels of desertion, see Campbell 1984, 303-14; Goldsworthy 1996, 30; 251. Roman desertion was particularly problematic during the Jugurthine War (Sall. *Iug.* 44; 103), see Messer 1920, 170-1.

<sup>74</sup> App. *Hisp.* 60.

<sup>75</sup> Liv 26.26.10-27; Ov. *Fast.* 6.625-6.

<sup>76</sup> Liv. 9.16.9; 9.26.3. cf. Oros. 3.15.9-10.

<sup>77</sup> Repeated executions/massacres in Spain (Liv. 28.19.7; App. *Hisp.* 52; 100) and during Jewish revolt (Joseph. *BJ.* 3.132; 304-6; 338-9; 4.553), particularly Jerusalem (Joseph. *BJ.* 6.414-419) and Masada (Joseph. *BJ.* 7.389-406).

## Chapter 2

valuables along with themselves to deny the Romans booty.<sup>78</sup> During the siege of Jerusalem the people that tried to escape the city were crucified and, after this proved too time-consuming, the Romans resorted to simply cutting off their hands.<sup>79</sup> Men could expect physical and possibly sexual violence; for women rape was almost a certainty. Rome's enemies were well aware of the consequences of capture to their wives and daughters.<sup>80</sup> Visual representation of captive women betrays the continued abuse at the hands of the Romans.<sup>81</sup> Brutality is of course expected in war, and without an equivalent of the Geneva Convention, societies in the ancient world often treated their enemies with brutality; perhaps the most vivid description of the brutal treatment of war captives is that made by Dio in describing the torture of Roman women by the Iceni during the rebellion of Boudicca.<sup>82</sup>

Overall the trend in the treatment or 'disposal' of captives shows a greater inclination towards release in earlier Roman history in Italy and more executions in later periods, as the Romans encountered more distant and often refractory enemies. This stark contrast between release and execution demonstrates the varying manners in which captives were treated by Roman forces. As shown above, the political exigencies surrounding each case dictated the manner in which a defeated populace was treated by the Roman commander, and often enslavement was the middle ground. As portrayed in many of the examples above, and furthermore, in many examples discussed in regards to enslavement below, the outcome of capture varied; not only from case to case, but within groups of captives taken after single engagements.

---

<sup>78</sup> Cantabrians (Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3), Xanthians (App. *BC* 4.80), In 146 BC the wife of Hasdrubal killed herself in the fire of Carthage (reminiscent of Dido, Virg. *Aen.* 4.664f.) and the Roman deserters chose to die rather than be caught (App. *Lib.* 133; Polyb. 38.20.8-9; Liv. *Per.* 51; Flor. 1.31.15-16; Zon. 9.30). The people of Astapa burned their goods and committed mass suicide (App. *Iber.* 33; Livy 28.22.2-23.2). Callimachus set fire to Amisus (Plut. *Luc.*19). For numerous examples in Greece see Pritchett 1991, 219-23. See also the comments of Erskine 1996, 3 regarding the different portrayal of Greek and Carthaginian armies in similar circumstances, for references see Erskine 1996, 3 n. 9.

<sup>79</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 5.455-456. Likewise the Romans cut the hands off of the Thracian prisoners, a practice that the Thracians were known for using, Flor. 1.39.7.

<sup>80</sup> Speech of Eleazar at Masada, Joseph. *BJ.* 7.323-325; A Jewish text recalled the reality faced by women caught by Roman soldiers, Babylonian Talmud, *Tractate Gittin* 58a.

<sup>81</sup> Often appearing dishevelled and forlorn, for example: the lower left female captive figure on the Gemma Augustina, see Ferris 2000, plate 8; also common on trophy scenes on coins *BMC* 32; 143;164; 294. Women are also shown being dragged by their hair by soldiers: for example the lower right figure on the Gemma Augustea, see Ferris 2000, plate 8 and a frieze from the Column of Marcus Aurelius, see Ferris 2000, plate 22.

<sup>82</sup> Cass. Dio 62.7.2.

## Chapter 3

### *Ransom*

Cases of wholesale ransom were relatively rare during the Republican period, or at least our sources are less inclined to mention cases in which entire populations of a fallen city or the entirety of an enemy force were allowed to be ransomed.<sup>1</sup> Generally ransom was conducted privately rather than at state level, but the state did, at times, play a minor role in negotiating ransom prices or ransoming back soldiers in prisoner exchanges; ransom could also be conducted through the guise of a self-purchase.<sup>2</sup> As a method for the disposal of captives, ransom was considered a lenient punishment and it achieved similar political aims with that of releasing the captives, whilst producing a financial gain. In some cases ransom was simply an alternative to slavery, the victor requesting a fee for release that, if not met, led to the captives being handed over to the traders following the army. Perhaps the most salient aspect of ransom in both Greece and Rome is that it could occur well into the period of an individual's captivity as a slave. This chapter discusses the ransom process and shows that ransom and enslavement were sometimes synonymous in the eyes of the conqueror.

An overview of the evidence for ransoming in the Greco-Roman world reveals far more examples of ransom occurring in pre-Roman Greece (i.e. pre 197 BC). In particular, ransoming was most often carried out between fellow Greek *poleis*, for which historical texts and inscriptions provide numerous examples.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence works concerned with ransom, both ancient and modern, have overwhelmingly focussed on Greek practices. Even at Rome itself, the subject of ransom in popular culture was largely centred upon Greece. All of Plautus' plays concerning captives (for example: the *Asinaria*, *Captivi*, *Epidicus*, *Menaechmi*, *Mercator* and *Miles Gloriosus*) were set in Greece, with the only exception being the *Poenulus* set in Carthage. The choice to set the plays outside of Rome was perhaps taken to maintain the setting of New Greek Comedy which they were most certainly based upon.<sup>4</sup> At

---

<sup>1</sup> For ransom in Late Antiquity see Lenski 2011a, 188-91, particularly the ransom practices of the early Christian church, Lenski 2011b, 257-8; Osiek 1981, 365-86.

<sup>2</sup> Suet. *De Gramm.* 13.1, a grammarian named Staberius Eros was purchased with his own savings.

<sup>3</sup> See Garland 1987, 15-18.

<sup>4</sup> See Gomme 1937, 287; Harsh 1955, 135 n.1; Stace 1968, 64f.

the time of Plautus' writing (late 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC) the Romans would have been familiar with the exchanges of prisoners and the ransom of soldiers, as the practice is clearly evident in both the First and Second Punic Wars.<sup>5</sup> With regards to Rome modern historians have principally focused on the issues associated with captive Romans, such as their resumption of civic rights or capture through piracy.<sup>6</sup> Yet despite the prevalence of Greek evidence, much can be said of the Roman process of ransom by garnering facts from Greek history that may similarly apply to the Roman system of captive disposal.

The evidence for ransoming in the Greek world has been excellently collected by Pritchett.<sup>7</sup> Examples date to Homer; in the *Iliad* scenes of ransoming play an important role throughout the poem, with the ransom of Hector's body being the best example, exercising a profound and continued influence upon Greek art and drama.<sup>8</sup> The *Iliad*, as an iconic war epic, has influenced accounts of conflict both fictional and non-fictional alike, and reflects the traditional Greek nature of ransom as an integral part of war, and thus a means of illustrating the level of animosity between combatants. Achilles' response to Hector's proposal to ransom his corpse after their duel is one of the most poignant scenes demonstrating the anger of the Greek hero.<sup>9</sup> Roman tradition lacks such a strong heritage of ransom and so classical scenes of ransom are inevitably linked with the *Iliad* because of its unique omnipresence in ancient, as well as, modern historiography.

### Terms for Ransom

The terms used for ransom in Greek and Latin hint at a variance in ransom practices between the Greeks and Romans. For example, in the *Iliad*, where ransoms were carried out on a

---

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter 5.

<sup>6</sup> Recent publications concerning Greek captives and ransom include Bielman 1994; Fisher 1992; Gaca 2010. Ducrey 1969 (1999) and Panagopoulos 1978 still remain important and valid. More recently Lenski 2011a, 2011b has investigated the subject of ransom in Late Antiquity. There still remains, as far as I am aware, a clear gap in our knowledge of ransom practices of the Roman Republic and early Imperial periods.

<sup>7</sup> Pritchett 1991, 245-297. His data consists of evidence for ransoming from the Trojan War to the end of the Second Punic War.

<sup>8</sup> Examples include *Il.* 1.4; 6.425; 11.106, 131; 16.559, 751; 18.540; 21.40, 102; 22.45; 23.21; 24:15. Not all attempts at ransom were successful, see Wilson, 2002 13-53; 109-133. Specifically, the ransom of Hector's body (*Il.* 24.228ff), which became a common motif in classical art, particularly in vase-painting and tragedy, such as the tragedy attributed to Aeschylus entitled 'Φρύγες ἢ Ἐκτορος λύτρα,' see Radt 1985; *TGF* 3, 364-370 and a play attributed to Dionysius of Syracuse entitled *Ἐκτορος λύτρα*, see Radt, 1985 *TGF* 3, 794. Note the term *λύτρα* in both titles. For vase paintings see Johansen, 1967, 127-138; De Roton 1950, 257-261; Graham 1958, 313-319; Brownlee 1989, 3ff; Tuna-Nörthing 1999, 418-420.

<sup>9</sup> *Il.* 22.351, see Pritchett 1991, 246 and Ducrey 1999, 238-246.

personal level, and those ransomed were individual captives rather than a group of captives, Homer uses the term and its verb form ἀποινάσθαι on several occasions.<sup>10</sup> Eventually ἄποινα fell from use so that by the fifth century Herodotus was one of the last to use the term.<sup>11</sup> In the three instances of ransom in Herodotus, ἄποινα is used twice and in both instances it refers specifically to the ransom of an individual.<sup>12</sup> Since ἄποινα appeared frequently in the *Iliad* it continued to be used in its original Homeric context in later commentaries of the work and by lexiconographers, and it would have been well known to readers of Homer.<sup>13</sup> During the Archaic period ἄποινα was also used in referring to compensation or even a reward.<sup>14</sup> The multiple meanings of ἄποινα all indicate that it generally referred to a payment of some kind in which the receiver of the money had some sort of entitlement.<sup>15</sup> Ἄποινα in reference to ransom was replaced by λύτρον with the verb form λύτρόω and this change in terminology seems to reflect a conscious disassociation with ἄποινα and its strong Homeric connotations.

Λύτρον referred primarily to ransom rather than any secondary meaning. Herodotus makes a clear distinction between the ransom of individuals in using ἄποινα and the ransom of hundreds of Boeotians and Chalcidians in using λύτρων.<sup>16</sup> However, apart from Herodotus there was no variation in terminology in relation to the number of people being ransomed. Other terms that may refer to ransom only do so within the specific context of captives being released for payment, such as the verbs διασῶζω (to preserve) and ἀνασῶζω (to restore). Λύτρον as conveyed by Greek sources generally refers to a payment that re-established an individual's freedom. The use of λύτρον in referring to the money paid for manumission in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus illustrates this concept, but stretches the definition in extending it to a case of manumission.<sup>17</sup> In the Greek sources relevant to this study λύτρον and λύτρόω were primarily used in reference to ransom, rather than any other form of payment.

<sup>10</sup> *Il.* 1.13; 20; 23; 95; 111; 372; 377; 2.230; 6.46; 427; 9.120; 11.131; 134; 19.138 (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 460e); 21.99; 22.349; 24.137; 139; 276; 502; 555; 579; 594; 686.

<sup>11</sup> See Pritchett 1991, 245-246 and Rüter 1092-1094 (s.v. 'ἄποινα' *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*). Also another appearance contemporary with Herodotus is in Eur. *Rh.* 164. There were, of course, some exceptions, see below.

<sup>12</sup> Individual fugitives (*Hdt.* 6.79), a man and his son (*Hdt.* 9.120).

<sup>13</sup> Ἄποινα appearing in Plato *Rep.* 393 is a Homeric passage as opposed to λύτρον at *Rep.* 393d, and Oppian *Cynegetica* 2.368 is specifically emulating Homeric style in the passage.

<sup>14</sup> Compensation (*Hom. Hymn Aphr.* 140; 210; Aesch. *Pers.* 807; Ag. 1420; Pind. *Isthm.* 3.7; 8.4) Reward (Pind. *Ol.* 7.16; *IG* 14.1389i10; *Pyth.* 2.14; *Nem.* 7.16).

<sup>15</sup> For example Joseph. *AJ.* 18.334 uses ἄποινα to refer to recompense for an injury sustained at the hands of an enemy (cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 48).

<sup>16</sup> *Hdt.* 5.77.3 καὶ τῶν λύτρων τὴν δεκάτην ἀνέθηκαν ποιησάμενοι τέθριππον χάλκεον.

<sup>17</sup> *P.Oxy.* 48.6.

In Latin the terms specifically concerning ransom are *redemptio* and *redimo*, while *pretium* referred to a payment that was not specifically a ransom. *Redemptio* indicated a form of contract, whereas *redimo* referred to a purchase, with *redemptor* referring to the redeemer and *redemptus* to the redeemed. Outside of the specific context of ransom in war, *redemptio* could apply to any contract and thus a *redemptor* referred more generally to anyone one who undertook a thing by way of contract.<sup>18</sup> This later meaning was more often the one implied, particularly in inscriptions which identify the individual as a contractor rather than a redeemer.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, *redemptio* could refer to a tie or bond as Caesar states in relation to his policy of borrowing from his officers to pay his soldiers: it ‘bound the officers to him by the obligation of interest and the soldier by a ‘tie’ of gratitude.’<sup>20</sup> The meanings of *redemptio* seems to indicate that as an etymological root they all entail a form of agreement in which one party pays for services to be rendered *ipso facto* a contract. In most instances in which ransom is discussed by Roman sources the contractual nature of the ransom is often implied. Many of the instances of *redemptio* as referring to ransom occur in legal texts and so the contractual character of ransom is an obvious feature of the definition.

*Pretium*, as noted above, denoted the payment, so that it could refer as much to a bribe as a ransom. However, more often in relation to a ransom ‘*pretium*’ was used as a term for the fees waived in releasing the captives. There are eight cases in Livy alone which refer to the release of captives *sine pretio* (without a price).<sup>21</sup> The qualification that prisoners were released without a price indicates that standard release practices may have included a payment of some kind. This philological inquiry into the Greek and Latin terms for ransom highlights a distinction that in Greek *λύτρον* and *λύτρόω* imply an act of ransom with a focus on the redemption of an individual or a group with an emphasis upon the captive, whereas *redemptio* implied a release for payment with the emphasis on the money there derived or the contract for the repayment of ransom.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, the discharge of captives *sine pretio*

---

<sup>18</sup> For example Cato *De Agr.* 144.3; 145; 3 refers to contractors as *redemptori* - and the section titles within the agricultural manual sometimes refer to contracts with the same vernacular Cato *De Agr.* 145; 146, although these may be later insertions. See also Cic. *Att.* 4.2.5; *Inv.* 2.96; *Verr.* 3.37; Liv. 34.9.12; Tac. *Hist.* 1.27; Vitruv. 7.5.8.

<sup>19</sup> *CIL* 6.1265; 9034; 9852a; 9854; 14.3530 refer to contractors.

<sup>20</sup> Loeb trans. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.39.3-4, ...*has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit, et largitione militum voluntates redemit.*

<sup>21</sup> Liv. 22.7.5; 22.58.2; 22.59.18; 27.19.2; 30.43.8; 31.40.4; 37.36.2; 38.51.2.b, cf. Joseph. *Vit.* 420-421.

<sup>22</sup> As is often illustrated in Roman legal texts. For the Greek perception of Roman avarice in war, see Erskine 1996, *passim*.



implies that captives had an obligation to pay for their release, but the typical price of release was waived and therefore noteworthy as such.

The legal texts of the empire preserved in the law corpora of the Byzantine emperor Justinian provide us with an excellent, albeit chronologically removed, source of information regarding the practice of ransom; particularly a unique insight into the relationship between the *redemptus* and the *redemptor*. However, the legal texts are solely concerned with cases of Roman *redempti* rather than foreign captives, and so any interpretation of how redemption within the civil context was reflected in the redemption of foreign captives is a matter of supposition.<sup>23</sup> Since our only source of information surrounding the process of ransom concerns the Greek and Roman point of view it is ultimately impossible to identify any unique barbarian perspectives on the topic and so we must try and piece together common threads of practice that passed between the Greeks and Romans indicating that the approach was universal, at least during the Greco-Roman periods.

In both the Greek and Roman world the act of ransoming was seen as a virtuous deed and a matter of civic duty.<sup>24</sup> Epigraphic evidence for this is extensive in Greece up to the period of Roman conquest. A prominent example is an Attic inscription which lauded the general Epichares in his negotiation for the ransom of his fellow Athenian citizens during the Chremonidean War.<sup>25</sup> Many inscriptions extol the ransoming of prisoners by outside individuals who were then rewarded for their service, sometimes granted citizenship or *προξενία* by the captives' polis. These actions were certainly deemed worthy of commemoration; Pritchett gathered no less than forty separate examples of ransoming of this kind in Greek inscriptions dating from the fifth to the early second century BC.<sup>26</sup> Inscriptions for ransoming drop off by the mid second century BC in Greece and there are no Roman inscription examples which venerate the act of ransoming.

---

<sup>23</sup> *Dig.* 49.15 titled: *De Captivus et de Postliminio et Redemptis ab Hostibus*. Particularly relevant are *Dig.* 49.15.12.8 ; 12.16 ; 15.pr ; 20.2, cf. 49.16.8.pr.

<sup>24</sup> *Cic. Off.* 2.56 ; 63. *Sen. Ben.* 6.13.3-14.2. Cf. *Plut. Mor.* 1097c, discussed below.

<sup>25</sup> *SEG* 24.154: 30.95 dated to 264/3 BC, see Austin 1981, n. 50.

<sup>26</sup> Pritchett 1991, 272-282. A few notable examples include: a Salamite voted a crown for ransoming captives in Sicily c. 365/5 BC (*IG* 2.283), Eurylochos of Kydonia noted for ransoming Athenians in Crete in 320/19 BC (*IG* 2.399), an Athenian named Androtion awarded *proxenia* for ransoming Arcesian prisoners (*IG* 1.275), an unknown man granted Athenian citizenship for ransoming Athenian sailors in the Lamian War in 323 BC (*IG* 2.398) and Lykiskos was praised for ransoming Athenian sailors in an inscription dated to the late 4th century BC (*SEG* 16.60),. See also Bielman 1994 *passim*.

### Ransom in the Greek World and the Roman Attitude Towards Ransom

There are a number of examples of ransom in written accounts concerning Greek warfare, and it was a conventional enough matter for Aristotle to remark that it was standard for a prisoner to be ransomed for a *mina*, just as a sacrifice consisted of a single goat.<sup>27</sup> Ransom is mentioned frequently by Greek sources but not consistently throughout accounts of war. While instances of ransom occur regularly in Thucydides and Diodorus Siculus, there are only four instances of ransom mentioned by Xenophon.<sup>28</sup> In both the accounts of Diodorus and Thucydides the ransom concerned Greek captives, likewise three of the four instances of ransom in Xenophon, with the fourth being notable for the size of ransom (said to be large enough to pay the troops wages for months). It is clear that the Greek authors and their audience, and their Roman counterparts, were concerned mainly with the plight of captives from their homelands; any further description of barbarian captives was superfluous unless it was extraordinary.

Ransom as an expression of humanity is refuted by Pritchett, who only sees it as another form of financial opportunism.<sup>29</sup> However, when compared with other possible outcomes of capture it must be viewed as calculated and extended by the victor to the vanquished as opposed to release, execution or sale into slavery, and that it was likely a decision made in consideration of humanitarian factors. This is not to say, however, that ransom was not primarily motivated by money. Indeed from the victor's perspective there may have been little difference between ransom and sale into slavery, so long as a profit was realised.

After the fall of Aegina to the Romans in 207 BC, Polybius states that the commander Publius Sulpicius<sup>30</sup> had first denied a request by the captured Aeginetans to send for ransom from their kinsmen. However, the next day he had a change of heart and allowed them to do so, saying "it was for the sake of the rest of the Greeks that he would allow for ambassadors to be sent for ransom, as it was the custom of their country."<sup>31</sup> Sulpicius' remark was certainly an invention of Polybius, but considering that one of the author's arching themes in

---

<sup>27</sup> Arist. *NE*. 5.7.1.1134B.

<sup>28</sup> Xen. *Hel.* 4.8.21; 6.2.36; 7.2.16. Xen. *Anab.* 7.8.23 possibly refers to ransom in the capture of Aidates and his family. In each instance Xenophon was in desperate need of funds and was able to acquire the shortfall through proceeds derived from ransom.

<sup>29</sup> Pritchett 1991, 245.

<sup>30</sup> Publius Sulpicius Galba Maximus listed as consul in 211 BC.

<sup>31</sup> Polyb. 9.42.8 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα συγχωρεῖν ἔφη πρεσβεύειν περὶ τῶν λύτρων, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐστίν. See Garlan 1987, 13-15 regarding this 'antidote' to enslavement.

his work was to explain Roman military and diplomatic practices to a Greek audience, it is not without factual basis.<sup>32</sup>

It is clear that the concession allowing the Aeginetans to send for their ransom was not a typical Roman practice. As Welwei has suggested, the decision of Sulpicius was probably one of financial and strategic opportunity,<sup>33</sup> as it allowed him to increase his war chest quickly and continue to exert pressure upon the allies of Philip. However, the speech alludes to an ingrained Roman mentality in which ransoming was a foreign concept. This disdain was deeply rooted in Roman history. After the sack of Rome in 390/387 BC<sup>34</sup> the Romans paid a ransom to the Gauls in order to redeem the city from them. The events of the actual Gallic sack and the ransom are unclear,<sup>35</sup> and it is as much a mythical tradition as an historical fact. But the reconstruction of the events by later writers left its mark on the Roman attitude towards ransom. Earlier traditions<sup>36</sup> put the return of Rome down to the intervention of the Etruscan city of Caere and the general Lucius Albinus,<sup>37</sup> who accordingly saved the Vestal Virgins and returned the ransom to the Romans after defeating the Gauls.<sup>38</sup>

The disgrace associated with the sack of Rome and subsequent ransom reverberated in Roman historiography.<sup>39</sup> Regardless of whether the sack *actually* resulted in ransom, as related by our sources, it is undoubtedly a feature of the traditional Roman character (at least a rhetorical notion) to have an aversion towards ransom. Of course this aversion was wrapped up with military loss and was expressed only from the perspective of Romans ransoming themselves. There is no evidence that this distaste for ransom extended to foreign captives. A prime example of this disregard for the ransom of their own captives came in the wake of the battle of Cannae in 216 BC, as related by Livy.<sup>40</sup> After the crushing defeat the remaining

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Ziolkowski 1993, 74; Walbank 1967b, 216.

<sup>33</sup> Welwei 2000, 120.

<sup>34</sup> The exact date varies between sources.

<sup>35</sup> It is impossible identify the definitive account of the sack, we have the first century historians (Diod Sic. 14.113-116; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 13.6-9; Liv. 5.39-48, followed later by Gell. *NA* 5.17), see Beloch 1926, 311f; Williams 2001, 140-84.

<sup>36</sup> According to Plutarch *Cam.* 22.3, and as related by Arist. *Fr.* 568 (Rose); Theopompus *FGrH* 115.317 and Pliny *HN*.3.57.

<sup>37</sup> The importance of the Roman-Caere relationship and the historical context of Gallic and Syracusan involvement in central Italy was argued by Sordi 1960, 62-72.

<sup>38</sup> Strabo 5.2.3, see Venning & Drinkwater 2011, 58-9.

<sup>39</sup> Traditional viewpoint of derision towards captives is expressed in Seneca *Controv.* 5.7; Plut. *Fab. Max.* 7.4.5.

<sup>40</sup> Liv. 22.50-61. An alternative narrative of the captive envoy is acknowledged by Liv 22.61.5. This seems to follow the narrative preserved in App. *Hann.* 28. The main difference is the envoys were numbered at three rather than ten. Appian's narrative is less detailed and he is perhaps using Gaius Acilius for his *Hannibalic War*, who wrote during the mid second century in Greek, as a source (Cic. *Off.* 3.115), see Foster 1929, 411

Romans retreated to two separate camps. Rather than break through the Carthaginian lines in the night the smaller of the two camps surrendered to Hannibal the next morning in the hopes of being ransomed. Hannibal selected ten representatives from the captives to bring the proposal of ransom to the Senate. It is in the speech of the envoy and the scathing response by Titus Manlius Torquatus that we find all angles of sentiment associated with ransoming.<sup>41</sup> Both the captive's envoy and Torquatus reaffirm that ransom was traditionally held in low regards by the Roman state. In the opening remark to the Senate, the envoy states, "None of us is unaware that no state ever held prisoners of war in less esteem than ours."<sup>42</sup> Likewise in addressing the Senate in the debate Torquatus remarks, "For what else need I have done than warn you to hold fast to the tradition of our fathers and teach a lesson necessary for military discipline?"<sup>43</sup> The expression of the traditional value against ransom is expected of Torquatus by the audience since he was of a patrician *gens* with a distinguished history and he embodied the conservative element of the Senate.<sup>44</sup> The traditional sentiment towards ransom is reaffirmed in Livy as acknowledged in the opening address of the envoy. Both capture and ransom are associated with cowardice, therefore the envoy endeavoured to argue against the charge of cowardice to persuade for ransom.<sup>45</sup> To deny the charge of cowardice the envoy stated that the captured Romans *did* fight well, instead of escaping or running they had stood and fought the enemy. He further affirmed that, if ransomed, they would fight again, and should they be denied ransom it would not be on the basis of financial concern, but rather due to a charge of cowardice that would forever mark them with dishonour.<sup>46</sup> To try and persuade the Senate the envoy also reminded them that a ransom had been paid by Rome before, when the city had been captured by the Gauls and when captives were redeemed after the battle of Heraclea.<sup>47</sup> The purpose of this comparison was to emphasise that their actions were not cowardly when compared to earlier defeats that resulted in ransom. The speaker of the

---

n.3. Livy's narrative is perhaps derived from Fabius Pictor, who was a contemporary of the events, but likely away from Rome at the time of the debate having been sent by the Senate to consult the oracle at Delphi, Liv. 22.57.4.

<sup>41</sup> Speech of envoy (Liv. 22.59f.). Response of Torquatus (Liv. 22.60.6-27).

<sup>42</sup> Liv. 22.59.1 Loeb trans. *nostrum ignorat nulli unquam civitati viliores fuisse captivos quam nostrae*.

<sup>43</sup> Liv. 22.60.7 Loeb trans. *Quid enim aliud quam admonendi essetis ut morem traditum a patribus neccessario ad rem militarem exemplo servaretis?*

<sup>44</sup> Torquatus descended from the early 4<sup>th</sup> century consul Marcus Manlius Capitolinus and Titus Manlius Torquatus who was thrice consul and thrice dictator in the mid fourth century. Torquatus was himself consul in 235 and 224 BC and censor in 231 BC, but he abdicated the censorship due to a flaw in his election. He was also a *pontifex*, but was unsuccessful in an election for *Pontifex Maximus* in 212 BC.

<sup>45</sup> Envoy's argument in Liv. 22.59.1-19.

<sup>46</sup> Specifically in the points made Liv. 22.59.2-6, 9-10, 11.

<sup>47</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.13.1.

embassy related that in the comparative examples the Romans had taken to flight, whereas they had stayed put. Conversely, it is exactly this point that Torquatus argues against, believing that the Cannae captives acted as cowards; rather than attempt an escape they chose to be captured trusting in the safer option rather than what he deemed the only valiant option.<sup>48</sup>

The Senate was divided over the issue of ransoming the Cannae captives. Livy listed the different positions held by the Senate which may be used to identify the range of possibilities in ransoming captives.<sup>49</sup> Apart from the point of view of Torquatus, some wished to ransom the captives at state expense, others that they should be ransomed at private expense, and others still that the ransom should be conducted privately, but allowing the treasury to be used for loans provided there was collateral.<sup>50</sup> The suggestion of such options shows that the Romans could, if the circumstances were severe enough, carry out large scale ransom at the state level. Despite the serious predicament the Romans found themselves in after the battle of Cannae, which depleted their military strength and brought Hannibal to their doorstep, they still refused to ransom the soldiers and so the refusal has continued to stand as a testament to traditional Roman honour and virtue. The rejection of the ransom proposal was made despite the fact that a similar number of slaves were armed at an equal expense to the ransom price.<sup>51</sup> The Senate's reply was based on the fact that they did not wish to diminish their treasury whilst simultaneously increasing Hannibal's purse.<sup>52</sup> Polybius explains the strategy behind Hannibal's decision to offer the Roman captives for ransom as to diminish the Roman soldiers' resolve for fighting through the hope of redemption after surrender.<sup>53</sup> Likewise, the Senate had previously denied a ransom to the 247 extra prisoners in the exchange of captives with the Carthaginians after the Battle of Trasimene in 217 BC on the grounds that they did not wish to expend money on soldiers they deemed unworthy.<sup>54</sup> According to the *Digesta*, in an excerpt attributed to the unknown author Macer, soldiers who 'went into slavery' were to be capitally punished. This rule probably applied to soldiers who

---

<sup>48</sup> Liv. 22.60.9-27.

<sup>49</sup> Liv. 22.60.3-4, cf. Polyb. 6.58; App. *Hann.* 28.

<sup>50</sup> Liv. 22.60.3-4; see also App. *Hann.* 28.

<sup>51</sup> Liv. 22.57.12. As stated by the envoy (Liv. 22.59.12. See also Sen. *Controv.* 5.7; Cic. *Off.* 3.114; Macrob. *Sat.* 1.11.31; Isid. *Etym.* 9.3). Perhaps the slaves had already been purchased and outfitted.

<sup>52</sup> Liv. 22.61.2. Although as Foster 1929 (Loeb.), 406 n. 1 observed the Senate could not prevent Hannibal from profiting from his prisoners, as they were sold as slaves, some of whom were eventually recovered in Greece in 198 BC by Flamininus (Liv. 34.1.6; Polyb. 18.44.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6). The freed captives marched in Flamininus' triumph with shaved heads (Liv. 34.52.12; Plut. *T. Flam.* 13.6).

<sup>53</sup> Polyb. 6.58.9.

<sup>54</sup> Liv. 22.23.7; Plut. *Fab. Max.* 7.4.

sold themselves into slavery, but it is symptomatic of the Roman response towards soldiers falling into slavery.<sup>55</sup>

Contrary to the prevailing sentiment against ransom, the Romans did allow for exchanges and even lauded, to some extent, private ransom. Livy states that Hannibal and Fabius followed the custom of the First Punic War in which prisoners were exchanged and if the numbers were unequal a ransom would be paid to cover the discrepancy.<sup>56</sup> Earlier a prisoner exchange was voted upon in the Senate and an envoy was sent to bring about an exchange with Pyrrhus in 279 BC, and failing an exchange a ransom was to be offered.<sup>57</sup> Unlike ransom, prisoner exchanges did not receive the same hostile response from the conservative elements of Roman politics. On several occasions an exchange was allowed for<sup>58</sup> which hints at a more widespread practice of retaining captives for the purpose of arranging an exchange. The captives who had been exchanged seemed to have been spared the disdain that soldiers who surrendered normally suffered, as had happened after Cannae. Soldiers were, as a matter of course, expected to be victorious or die.<sup>59</sup>

### **Ransom by Private Persons**

On a more personal level the act of ransoming, on the part of the *redemptor*, was seen as virtuous. Both Cicero and Seneca agreed that the act of ransoming should be considered a generous deed, regardless of whether the *redemptor* profited by the ransom or not.<sup>60</sup> To ransom a fellow citizen (as implied by Seneca and Cicero) was a good deed, but to do so without expectation of repayment was an exceptional act of liberality.<sup>61</sup> The Ransom of a member of one's *familia*, on the other hand, was to be expected and it was done without the complications of indebtedness associated with the redemption of strangers. The responsibility of a *pater familias* for the welfare of his *familia* included ransoming them from the enemy, as a master replies positively in a play of Plautus to the question posed by his slave, "suppose I

---

<sup>55</sup> Macer's date of writing is unknown, but probably later than the first century AD. He also wrote on provincial law (*Dig.* 48.19.14.*pr.*). Likewise soldiers who took part in plays as actors were to be punished with death.

<sup>56</sup> Liv. 22.23.7.

<sup>57</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.13.1. In the end Pyrrhus gave the prisoners back without a ransom in consideration of the envoy Fabricius' outstanding character.

<sup>58</sup> During the first Punic War, Liv. *Per.* 19b; Zon. 8.16f.

<sup>59</sup> Cic. *Off.* 3.114. App. *Hann.* 28.

<sup>60</sup> Cic. *Off.* 2.56; 2.63; Sen. *Ben.* 6.13.3-14.2. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 1097c.

<sup>61</sup> Fabius Maximus' ransom of his soldiers, Liv 22.23.6-8, Plut. *Fab. Max.* 7.4.5.

fall into an ambush, would you redeem me, if enemies caught me?"<sup>62</sup> Outside of the traditional family we find that 'close' relations were still the most common *redempti* as shown by courtesans and prostitutes being frequently ransomed.<sup>63</sup>

In another play of Plautus, the *Captivi*, the plot develops from a scene in which a father is buying up newly acquired captives in the hopes of acquiring his son.<sup>64</sup> The play, though fictitious and set in Greece, is telling in the manner of how the elderly man attempted to find his son. The captives were already slaves, purchased abroad and brought back to Aetolia. This implies that an agent was purchasing the slaves abroad in the hope that one of them would be his client's son, but was unaware of the identity of the captives he bought. In Rome captives purchased as 'slaves' should they have been an *ingenuus homo liber* (free man with legal rights over himself) prior to capture could be redeemed by their *redemptor* through *postliminium* (the resumption of civic rights after a period of suspension) rather than manumission. Enslavement it seems was not always an end result; there was hope of redemption even after being sold as a slave.

### **Ransom of non-Roman Captives**

Instances of non-Roman captives being ransomed are, on a whole, rarer than instances of *Roman* captives, and detailed examples of non-Roman ransom are even rarer still, but there are enough examples to indicate a similar trend in ransom to that of Roman domestic practices.<sup>65</sup> Livy relates an episode in which Locrian artisans were captured by Roman soldiers and brought to Rhegium where they were recognised by fellow Locrians and ransomed by them. In this case the resident Locrians were able to convince Scipio to allow them to ransom their compatriots in order to hatch a plan of subterfuge against the Carthaginians in Locri.<sup>66</sup> The Locrians, having seen fellow countrymen in captivity may have felt a sense of duty to ransom them; unfortunately any liberality is masked by the motive of regaining their city from the Carthaginians. When the Romans seized Panormus in 254 BC, a

---

<sup>62</sup> Plaut. *Asin.* 106 *Si forte in insidias devenero, tun redimes me, si me hostes interceperint? Redimam.*

<sup>63</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 5b.

<sup>64</sup> Plaut. *Capt.* 1.30f.

<sup>65</sup> For the ransom of barbarian captives in the Later Empire see Lenski 2011a, 188-91.

<sup>66</sup> Liv. 29.6.4-9.

### Chapter 3

ransom was set at two minas per person; this ransom must have been produced by friends or relatives of the Panormans since the Romans had taken possession of all their goods.<sup>67</sup>

In the case of a Gallic woman named Chimora we find textual evidence that ransom on a personal level occurred, perhaps even being arranged individually between a specific captor and *redemptor*. Chimora was given to a Roman centurion as a reward for his bravery in the battle at Mt. Olympus in 189 BC. The centurion kept the woman for personal entertainment, but once confronted with the opportunity of financial gain from a ransom offered by her husband, he agreed to a deal. However, during the exchange the redeemers slew the centurion at the behest of the captive woman because he had violated her.<sup>68</sup> Livy states that the centurion was of a disreputable character and agreed to the ransom for the sake of greed, suggesting that it was against his better judgement or perhaps contrary to the rules or regulations of individual prisoner exchange. Tacitus states that the heads of Galba's consular colleague Vinius and his heir Piso were ransomed, from those who took them, by the relatives of the beheaded conspirators.<sup>69</sup> That some form of permission by the commander was necessary in redeeming prisoners is expressed in Josephus. After the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70, Josephus was granted permission by Titus to go amongst the captives and select those he personally knew for release. Josephus states that he "took no ransom for their release and restored them to their former fortune."<sup>70</sup> In the same year Josephus encountered three men he knew who were crucified. He petitioned Titus to have them released, and though two died a third apparently survived. It is not clear if the man was freed or if Josephus requested a ransom from him for his release.<sup>71</sup> In the two examples of Josephus permission needed to be granted before a release could be secured; of course Josephus was not a Roman soldier, and was himself a prisoner. Yet it seems most likely that a prisoner's ransom required either the approval of a commander or specific ownership as in the case of captives granted specifically to troops as booty.<sup>72</sup>

Those enslaved could be ransomed *en masse* after a conflict, either being recovered by their own forces or by friendly nations. Following the sack of Dyme in 199 BC the Romans sold

---

<sup>67</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.18.5.

<sup>68</sup> Flor. 1.27.6; Liv. 38.24.2-9; Plut. *Virtuous Deeds of Women* 22; Polyb. 22.21; Val. Max. 6.1.2. Polybius states that he personally met the woman in her old age.

<sup>69</sup> L. Calpurnius Piso (Frugi Licinianus the son of M. Licinius Crassus Frugi) was the initial heir of Galba, Titus Vinius Galba's consular colleague Tac. *Hist.* 1.47.

<sup>70</sup> Loeb trans. καὶ οὐδὲ λύτρα καταθεμένους ἀπέλυσα συγχωρήσας αὐτοὺς τῇ προτέρᾳ τύχῃ. Joseph. *Vit.* 419.

<sup>71</sup> Joseph. *Vit.* 420-421.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapter 2.



the captives as slaves. However Philip V was later able to recover many of the captives by ordering that they be ransomed from their owners and restored to their homes.<sup>73</sup> Antiochus III, after gaining control of Lysimacheia, noticed that it was nearly deserted because most of its inhabitants had been captured and sold as slaves by the Thracians. He thus set about rebuilding the city and ransoming the Lysimacheans who had been sold as slaves in the area.<sup>74</sup> Likewise, Sulla restored the citizens of Rhodes and a number of Anatolian cities after recovering them from Mithridates VI.<sup>75</sup> The Romans on several occasions made explicit attempts to recover captive soldiers,<sup>76</sup> and their outward expansion and victories in all major conflicts allowed them to do so. From the examples above it is evident that large scale recovery of captives was mostly limited to the benevolence of third parties or lulls in conflict whilst the opponent of Rome could still draw upon resources to attempt a large recovery, either financially or militarily.

The statement by ancient authors that a ransom was not requested in releasing captives hints at a widespread practice by the Romans of gaining a ransom in releasing prisoners or whole communities from captivity. Livy states that after the sack of New Carthage Scipio sent away the Spanish natives that were captured there without ransom.<sup>77</sup> Likewise, the free citizens of Pelium were similarly dismissed by the Romans,<sup>78</sup> and Brutus freed the captives of many Lycian strongholds without ransom.<sup>79</sup> In these instances, though the Roman commander pursued an alternative course of action, he was within his right to demand a ransom. In some instances the lack of ransom may have been a conscious political device. In the aforementioned cases of Scipio, Caesar and Brutus gaining the support of those shown leniency was certainly behind their decisions. Likewise, Hannibal tried to win over Rome's Italian allies by showing them clemency when captured.<sup>80</sup>

The opportunity to be ransomed was, at times, presented by the captors to the captives, as seen by the Romans after the sack of Perusia, Panormus, Casilinum, Aigina and Carystus, and

---

<sup>73</sup> Liv. 32.22.10.

<sup>74</sup> Polyb. 18.51.7.

<sup>75</sup> App. *Mith.* 61. We might also compare the case of the Roman captives recovered by Flamininus in 197 BC, Liv. 34.1.6; Polyb. 18.44.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6. Plut. *Flam.* 13.6.

<sup>76</sup> See below.

<sup>77</sup> Liv. 27.19.2.

<sup>78</sup> Liv. 31.40.5.

<sup>79</sup> Plut. *Brut.* 30.4; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6.

<sup>80</sup> Polyb. 3.77.7; 85.3. Lower ransom prices to allies in Liv. 22.58.4. Hannibal's leniency gained him several allies during his time in Italy, App. *Hann.* 59; 61.

by the Carthaginians after Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae.<sup>81</sup> In these cases the captives were either able to send envoys to neighbouring cities or their respective governments in order to secure the city's entire release, and in some cases a neighbouring city came to their aid.<sup>82</sup> More common was an agreement for remuneration following release; in these cases the capture of a town was not necessary. During the civil war that followed Caesar's assassination, we find two examples which contrasted each other in Brutus' actions in Lycia and Cassius' actions in Rhodes. Brutus invested the cities of Patara and Xanthus, and following their capture he was able to gain the surrender of the Lycians for the sum of 150 talents, whereas Cassius simply strong armed the Rhodians into giving up all of their gold and silver without sacking any cities.<sup>83</sup> Wholesale ransom was little different than an indemnity in that both were a remittance for what the victor could otherwise take. This can be seen in the example of Cercina (also known as Menix - modern Djerba) in which the inhabitants paid a ransom of ten talents to prevent the Romans from further ravaging their island.<sup>84</sup> Both ransoms and indemnities served to enrich the victor whilst preserving the liberty of the vanquished. Ransom was a negotiation in which the victorious held the upper hand and the defeated always had the threat of slavery should the victor choose not to accede to a ransom.

In other cases the ransom of captives seems to have been arranged on a personal basis, as with the Gallic woman Chimora. The manner of effecting a ransom reflected the practice of pirates, who made a point of informing the captive's possible *redemptor*.<sup>85</sup> It was of course necessary for a *redemptor* to be informed of someone's captivity as well as the terms of the ransom, especially the price. It seems that individuals could arrange their own ransom, possibly even after being sold. An analogy for the perspective of one being ransomed is depicted in a play of Terence, in which advice is given to a love-struck young man, "Ransom yourself from captivity as cheaply as you can; if you are unable to do it for a small price, then

<sup>81</sup> Perugia in 295 BC (Liv. 10.31.3), Panormus in 254 BC (Diod. Sic. 23.18.5), Casilinum in 216 BC (Liv. 23.19.5), Aigina in 210 BC (Polyb. 9.42.5), Carystus in 198 BC (Liv. 32.17.2), Trebia in 218 BC (Polyb. 3.77.7), Trasimene in 217 BC (Polyb. 3.85.3) and Cannae in 216 BC (Liv. 22.58.4). Lazenby 1978, 83 estimated that as many as 19,300 captives were taken after Cannae (from Liv. 22.49.18; 22.49.13; 29.50.11; 29.52.3-4).

<sup>82</sup> As in the case of the Selinuntians, whom the Syracusans offered to ransom from Hannibal, their envoy was unsuccessful (Diod. Sic. 13.59.1-4).

<sup>83</sup> Plut. *Brut.* 32.1-4.

<sup>84</sup> The Romans *accessit* (accepting) the payment of ten talents from the islanders: *Cercinam, ne et ipsorum ureretur diripereturque ager, decem talentis argenti acceptis ad litora Africae accessit copiasque exposuit.* (Liv. 22.31.2). The islanders 'ἀπηλλάγη' (wishing to be delivered from) the ravages of the Romans: Κερκινητῶν νήσον καὶ λαβῶν παρ' αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν ἀπηλλάγη. (Polyb. 3.96.12).

<sup>85</sup> Strab. 11.2.12; 14.6.6.

strike the best deal you can and stop worrying yourself.”<sup>86</sup> The analogy highlights the predicament a captive was in regarding their own ransom, which was ultimately determined by the captor; there may have been at least some leeway. After all a ransom that was impossible to reach was not going to be successful. There must have been some valuation, over which the captive themselves could exert a limited influence. In the case of Julius Caesar he increased his own ransom amount, but Caesar was not alone in captivity, several of his attendants captured with him were sent off to raise the exorbitant ransom.<sup>87</sup>

The value of individuals could identify them as better targets of ransom rather than enslavement. Likewise, high value captives were held in the hopes of regaining important captives from the enemy. During the First Punic War, the Roman commander Atilius Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians. Dio states that the Carthaginians sent him as an envoy with the hopes of establishing a peace, and if not to at least ransom many Carthaginian troops with him since he was of consular rank.<sup>88</sup> But the Romans famously refused the terms and so Regulus was returned to the Carthaginians to be executed.<sup>89</sup>

A universally recognised standard of ransom is evident in the process of prisoner exchanges. The highly valued Carthaginian captive Hanno was swapped for Massinissa’s mother.<sup>90</sup> In general a fighting man of one nation was worth that of another, the exception being cavalry for which an equal exchange was probably sought.<sup>91</sup> The value of prisoners was best expressed by the price of their ransom, of course being weighed against the possibility of their meeting the demand, and accordingly, in both Greece and Rome, a standard ransom price seems to have emerged for captives.

### Ransom Prices

There are a number of specific examples of ransom prices for common soldiers in Greece, again collected by Pritchett.<sup>92</sup> At the end of the sixth century the Athenians captured a

---

<sup>86</sup> Ter. *Eun.* 74 *redimas captum quam queas minimo; si nequeas paullulo, at quanti queas; et ne te adflictes.*

<sup>87</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 1.4 – 2.3; Suet. *Iul.* 4. Freeman 2008, 39.

<sup>88</sup> Cass. Dio 11.22. Cf. Zon. 8.15.

<sup>89</sup> Gell. *NA* 7.4; Hor. *Carm.* 3.5. See also App. *Lib.* 63; August. *De Civ. D.* 1.15; Aur. Vict. *De vir.ill* 40; Tertulian *Martyrs* 4; (Pomponius) *Dig.*49.15.5.3.

<sup>90</sup> App. *Hann.* 14.

<sup>91</sup> As with Hannibal’s valuation of Roman cavalrymen’s ransom at a higher rate than infantrymen (Liv. 22.58.4).

<sup>92</sup> Pritchett 1991, 247-255.

number of Chalcidian and Boeotian soldiers who were then ransomed at 2 *minae* apiece, roughly 200 Athenian *drachmae* at the exchange of 100 *drachmae* per *mina*.<sup>93</sup> This price corresponded with a later statement by Herodotus that two *minae* was the standard price of ransom amongst the Peloponnesians at the time.<sup>94</sup> A century later, the Spartans organised a prisoner exchange with the Athenians, with the excess individuals ransomed for a single *mina* apiece.<sup>95</sup> In 390 BC 1,000 Thurians escaped from a battle lost to the Lucanians by swimming to Syracusan ships. The Syracusan commander Leptines negotiated a ransom of one *mina* (100 *drachmae*) per Thurian and even offered himself as surety.<sup>96</sup> Four years later Leptines' brother Dionysius I allowed for a ransom of a *mina* (100 *drachmae*) per Rhegian captive, those unable to meet the ransom were sold into slavery.<sup>97</sup> In the middle of the fourth century Athenian captives who were captured at Olynthus by Philip II were out on bail (ἐγγύη) at Pella and wished to borrow their ransom money which ranged from 3-5 *minae* (300-500 *drachmae*).<sup>98</sup> Another century on, in 264/3 BC, the Athenian general Epichares arranged a ransom of prisoners set at 120 *drachmae*, and he was able to further stipulate that those unable to pay the ransom were not to be sold abroad and their slaves were not to be killed.<sup>99</sup>

Due to the relative stability of the Attic *drachma* from the end of the sixth to the third century a reasonable average can be formed from the examples in which specific figures for ransom are given.<sup>100</sup> The average (mean) thus derived during the Peloponnesian War was 164 *drachmae*, which sits nicely between Aristotle's reference to the average price of a *mina* (100 *drachmae*) and Herodotus' statement that 2 *minae* secured ransom during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>101</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> Hdt. 5.77.3.

<sup>94</sup> Hdt. 6.79.1.

<sup>95</sup> *FGrH* 324.44.

<sup>96</sup> Diod. Sic. 14.102.2.

<sup>97</sup> Diod. Sic. 14.111.4.

<sup>98</sup> Dem. 19.169.

<sup>99</sup> *SEG*. 24.154. C.f. Robert, 1968 456-460, n. 247.

<sup>100</sup> From the introduction of the *tetradrachm* c. 525 BC the silver content and weight of coins remained steady. The Attic-Euboic standard, as it is known, was based upon the *tetradrachm* which was approximately 17.28g of silver, and equal to four *drachmae* of approximately 4.32g, Van Alfen 2012, 89-90, see also Elsen 2002: 1-32.

<sup>101</sup> Arist. *NE*. 5.7.1.1134B; Hdt. 6.79.1.

## I. Greek Ransom Prices

Reference	Date	Detail	Price (pp <i>drachmae</i> )
Hdt. 5.77	505 BC	Ransom	200
Thuc 7.83.2	413 BC	As collateral	6,000 <sup>102</sup>
<i>FGrH</i> 324	408/7 BC	Ransom	100
Demosthenes 19		Bail	300-500
Aischines 2 <i>Embassy</i> 100		Ransom	6,000*
Diod. Sic. 14.102.2	390 BC	Ransom	100
Diod. Sic. 14.111.4	386 BC	Ransom	100
<i>SEG</i> 24.154; 30.95	264/3 BC	Ransom	120

\*Outlier not considered in calculating the average.

High ransom prices were of course remarkable and so we find a number of examples of payments that seem incredibly high. At the end of the fourth century the Rhodians captured a number of ships off their shore belonging to Antigonos I, the crews were brought into the city and those who could pay a ransom were held rather than enslaved, since an arrangement with Antigonos' son Demetrius had been made in which free captives would be ransomed for 1,000 *drachmae* each and slaves for half as much.<sup>103</sup> In most cases high ransom prices for large numbers of captives corresponded with a need to secure a diplomatic deal. Thus Nikias suggested that a single Athenian captive should be given as hostage for each talent to be paid to the Syracusans. Earlier in 427 BC the Corinthians had allowed 250 Corcyrans to be released on bail upon the payment of 800 talents, which equates to roughly three talents per captive.<sup>104</sup> Similarly the ransom of notable individuals fetched a far higher price, and it is for these reasons that exceptionally high ransoms should be ignored in relation to typical ransom prices for ordinary captives. When Nikostratos, for example, was seized and sold as a slave his ransom was arranged at over four talents by his brother.<sup>105</sup> Likewise, after Diopieithes had

<sup>102</sup> Hostages suggested to be given at a rate of 1 man per talent. An Athenian talent was worth 60 *minae* and a *minae* was worth 100 *drachmae*.

<sup>103</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.84.6. See also Paus. 1.6.6.

<sup>104</sup> Thuc. 3.70.1.

<sup>105</sup> Dem. 53 *Against Nikostratos* 6-10. See Pritchett 1991, 248-9.

seized several towns in Thrace and took a number of captives, an ambassador named Amphilochus was sent to negotiate their release, but Diopieithes seized the ambassador and was able to settle a ransom of nine talents for his release.<sup>106</sup> Ransoms of important individuals could easily exceed a talent, as Aeschines relates, regarding the amount carried by Demosthenes to ransom any unfortunates, “a single talent could ransom many captives but it was only sufficient to ransom a single known man and not one of any note.”<sup>107</sup>

In Rome an average price for ransom during any period is more difficult to determine, as there are no statements hinting at a relative standard like that of Herodotus or Aristotle. The examples of ransom in which a specific sum for ransom is known are few in number. When coupled with the price of ransom set by the Carthaginians in the First and Second Punic Wars there is, at least, an indication that ransom prices were close enough that an acceptable and pertinent average can be made.

The earliest price for the ransom of common soldiers occurs during the Third Samnite War, following a battle near Clusium, where 1,740 prisoners were ransomed for 310 *asses* per person.<sup>108</sup> The figure is surprisingly low, only equating to 31 *denarii* of the second century BC standard.<sup>109</sup> In 254 BC the citizens of Panormus were ransomed at 2 *minae* apiece, with only half the population capable of meeting the demands.<sup>110</sup> It seems that there was no effort to pool the community’s resources and so the un-ransomed were sold to traders. The difference between the two prices is remarkable given the relatively short passage of time between them; the citizens of Panormus were ransomed at almost seven times the price of the captured Samnites. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from only two episodes, but it may be that financial gain was not the primary motive behind the Samnite ransom. Perhaps humiliation, as seen in the process of passing under the yoke, was intended.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> Dem. 12 *Philip* 3.

<sup>107</sup> Loeb trans. Aeschin. 2.100 πολλῶν δ’ ἡτυχηκότων τάλαντον φέρων, ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, οὐδὲ τούτου λίαν εὐπόρου, ἱκανὰ λύτρα.

<sup>108</sup> Liv. 10.31.3 Clusium was a city of the Etruscan Perusini.

<sup>109</sup> The *as* was the standard coin of the Republic probably until the Second Punic War, see Woytek 2012, 315-316. Although mint production of silver coins occurred early on, beginning in the early third century, the precise date of the introduction of the denarius as a standard is debatable; the earliest date for the transition to the silver standard is in the 260’s BC made by Ronchi 1998 46; 51-52. Pliny *HN*. 33.44 sets the reform at 269 BC. The latest date for the reform was 189 BC favoured by Mattingly & Robinson 1932, 211-66. However, most scholars favour a date in the midst of the Second Punic war with little agreement on the exact year, see Crawford 1974, 28-35; 1998, 121; Hollstein 2008, 42-44; Loomis 1996, 347; Woytek 2012, 316.

<sup>110</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.18.5. Cf. Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 1.38.9-10.

<sup>111</sup> See Chapter 2.

### Chapter 3

During the Second Punic War Livy informs us that in keeping with the custom of the First Punic war Carthage and Rome agreed to an equal exchange of prisoners with the excess being ransomed at a price of 2.5 lbs of silver (210 *denarii*).<sup>112</sup> In cases where a previous arrangement did not apply, or there was perhaps the opportunity for leverage, the price of ransom could rise significantly. After Cannae, Hannibal offered the Romans the opportunity to ransom back their soldiers at a rate of 500 chariot pieces (*quadrigati*, roughly 750 *denarii*) for cavalrymen, 300 (450 *denarii*) for foot soldiers and, 200 (300 *denarii*) for allied soldiers.<sup>113</sup> The price was almost double that of the going rate which was agreed during the exchange. Likewise the garrison at Casilinum were ransomed at 7/12 lb of gold per man (approximately 580 *denarii* each).<sup>114</sup> It seems these two examples represent the high end, since only the year before Fabius was able to arrange for Roman captives captured at Trebia to be exchanged at a rate of 250 *drachmae* each.<sup>115</sup> During the Second Macedonian War the Romans allowed for the Macedonian garrison at Carystus to be ransomed at a rate of 300 *nummi* per head.<sup>116</sup> With such a variance in denominations and the scope of figures it is hard to establish an average, which in any case would be of little use. But it may be noted that the high price of the ransom after Cannae, as indicated by the Senate's deliberation over the money, suggests lower figures of around 200 and 300 *denarii* were closer to any perceived standard or average.

---

<sup>112</sup> 84 *denarii* per lb of silver up to at least 50 BC, Suet. *Iul.* 54. The denarius was nominally set at 96 *denarii* per lb of silver during the empire (first century AD onwards), Plin. *HN.* 33.46; Celsus 5.17.1.

<sup>113</sup> Liv. 22.58.4. Silver was not standardised until the denarius was introduced in 211 BC (for the 3rd century BC Frank 1933 I, 101 gives an estimate of 1.5 denarius per quadrigatus. Cf. Polyb. 6.58.5 who says the Roman captives were offered at an exchange of 3 *minae* each (450 *denarii*).

<sup>114</sup> Liv. 23.19.15-16. A pound of gold was worth 1,000 *denarii* based on the principle that an *aureus* was equivalent to 25 *denarii* and weighed approximately 1/40 of a pound when it was standardised by Julius Caesar, see Buttrey 1961, 40 n. 5.

<sup>115</sup> Plut. *Fab. Max.* 7.4; Liv 22.23.6, Cf. Del Mar 2000, 31.

<sup>116</sup> Liv. 32.17.2.

## II. Roman Ransom Prices

Reference	Date	Detail	Price (pp <i>denarii</i> )
Liv. 10.31.3	295 BC	Ransom	31 <sup>117</sup>
Diod. Sic. 23.18.5	254 BC	Ransom	240 <sup>118</sup>
Liv. 22.23.6	217 BC	Ransom	210
Plut. <i>Fab. Max.</i> 7.4;	217 BC	Ransom	300
Liv. 22.58.4	216 BC	Ransom – Cavalryman	750
		– Foot Soldier	450
		– Allied Soldier	300
Polyb. 6.58.5		Roman Soldiers	450 <sup>119</sup>
Liv. 23.19.16	216 BC	Ransom	583
Liv. 32.17.2	198 BC	Ransom	300 <sup>120</sup>
Liv. 34.50.6	194 BC	Buy Back	500

When prices for ransom are compared with rough estimates of average contemporary slave prices we find that ransom prices were lower. Though slave prices varied considerably, for unskilled workers a range, and thus, an average can be identified. A.H.M Jones suggested an average price for a slave miner at Athens in the early fourth century BC based on a passage in Xenophon, in which he recommended for the state to get into the business of buying and

<sup>117</sup> 295 BC is earlier than the earliest estimate of when the *denarius* was introduced and so it is hard to approximate its valuation. Until the coinage reform of 133 the *as* was set at 1/10 of a *denarius* and after the reform to 1/16. I chose the earlier, since the 1/16 rate would only further emphasise the low figure of ransom.

<sup>118</sup> The *drachma* and *denarius* were based on silver and so a talent which was equivalent to 100 lbs of silver equated to 6,000 *drachmae* and 8,400 *denarii* (up to 50 BC) respectively. I've adjusted the *denarius* to *drachma* exchange to 1.5, see Meadows & Williams 2001, 37f.

<sup>119</sup> Three *minae* per soldier.

<sup>120</sup> A *nummus* before 190 BC refers to the silver *didrachma* of southern Italy and post 190 BC to the Roman *denarius*. Here I take it as referring to the *denarius* of Livy's day so that the *nummus* was just an interchangeable denomination in his text. *Nummus* may also refer to money as in the denomination value of a coin, for example *denarius nummus* Pliny *HN* 33.3, see Milne 1933, 215-17.



leasing slaves to work the silver mines.<sup>121</sup> He calculated that with an initial corps of 1,200 slaves the profits from their labour (increasing annually with additional slaves), if put solely into the purchase of new slaves, would allow for the state to accumulate 6,000 slaves in five or six years (not allowing for amortisation). Jones calculated, based on the profit realised, that these slaves were estimated to cost in the region of 125-150 *drachmae*. Jones estimated that skilled labourers could fetch far higher prices - between 300 and 500 *drachmae* based on the average price found from the Delphic manumission records, where 72% list a sale between 3 – 5 *minae* (58% 3-4 *minae*). We have several references which suggest that a similar average price was recognised. This figure agrees with other estimates, Demosthenes states that in the fourth century BC a slave could sell for between 2 and 2.5 *minae*<sup>122</sup> (200-250 *drachmae*). The difference in price between those mentioned by Xenophon and Demosthenes is that Xenophon referred to miners and Demosthenes probably to agricultural workers; Jones has suggested that miners would have fetched a lower price than farmers. A good example of how the ransom was below that of the market slave price is the case of the Roman captives bought back from their Greek captors in 194 BC at the orders of Flamininus for a price of 500 *denarii* each, presumably to compensate the owners of the Roman captives.<sup>123</sup> In the case of the Cannae captives, the envoy had argued that it would have been less costly to ransom the captives than purchasing and arming slaves to replace them.<sup>124</sup>

While market prices for slaves may have been higher than ransom prices, the wholesale price of captives enslaved and sold to the traders following the army must have been lower. For example in 414/13 BC 16 slaves were confiscated and auctioned at an average of 160 drachmas each,<sup>125</sup> a price much lower than that suggested for skilled labourers in the Delphic inscriptions. Indeed Jones remarked “slave merchants could hardly have made a profit unless they acquired their wares for nothing or next to nothing and sold them very rapidly.”<sup>126</sup> Josephus remarks on the overabundance of slaves and the low prices caused by mass enslavements in the Jewish war.<sup>127</sup> Likewise, the surfeit of Sardinian captives may have led to the phrase *Sardi venales* (Sardinians for sale) in reference to anything that was overabundant

---

<sup>121</sup> Jones 1956, 188-9, based on Xen. *Vect.* 4.23 See also the comments of Jones regarding average slave prices in Rome, 1960, 9-10. Cf. Hopkins 1978, 110 n. 23.

<sup>122</sup> Dem. 41.8; 53.1.

<sup>123</sup> Liv. 34.50.6.

<sup>124</sup> Liv. 22.57.12; stated by the envoy 22.59.12. See also Sen. *Controv.* 5.7; Cic. *Off.* 3.114; Macrob. *Sat.* 1.11.31; Isid. *De vir. ill.* 9.3.

<sup>125</sup> Todd 1948, 79.

<sup>126</sup> Jones 1960, 7.

<sup>127</sup> Joseph. *BJ* 6.386.

in the market and low in price, a trader might entice a buyer with the phrase ‘cheap as a Sardinian.’<sup>128</sup> Either outcome, ransom or sale into slavery, meant the Romans could acquire a large amount of money through the capture of cities. Frank estimated that the proceeds from wars occurring between 264-220 BC equated to approximately 8,000 talents of silver (40 million *denarii*) 5.8% of this came from the ransom of Panormus alone and we can assume that less than that came from the 13,000 sold into slavery from Palermo so that between 6 and 10% of the silver gained in fifty years came from a single siege.<sup>129</sup> Such a large figure, though heavily rounded, indicates that the ransom of captives made significant contribution to the Roman purse.

Despite the overwhelming examples of Roman conquest few clear instances of ransom can be found. Though this indicates a lack of interest on the part of the Roman military in initiating ransom it does not exclude the fact that ransom could be carried out on a more personal level, most likely between the slavers and advocates for the captives. As seen in the case of pirates, slavery and ransom can go hand in hand. The low prices created by mass enslavement allowed slavers to purchase their wares at little cost and so ransoms may have been sought later when the dust of conquest had settled. Inevitably a trader could see a gain from his purchase, for if a ransom demand fell through, sale into slavery was always an option.

### **The Process of Ransom**

As with the majority of sources concerning ransom, the focus is entirely upon Romans made captive, which makes the construction of the legal circumstances and status regarding foreign captives conditional upon the Romans regarding foreign captives in the same manner as they regarded their own, at least in law. So far, much has been said about the Roman opinion of ransom and the practice behind it according to Roman law, with the intention of forming a basic picture of how it applied to foreign captives. But there is an obvious point to be made here: that it was possible for Roman citizens to be captured in war and returned within the confines of the empire, not as free men through *postliminium*, but rather as slaves or as *redempti*, and so it seems practical to treat both instances within a single section.

It is not clear whether Romans could be enslaved during civil wars during the Republic, but it is evident from later jurists that, by at least the second century AD, Romans *could not* be

---

<sup>128</sup> Aur. Vict. *De vir. ill.* 65, cf. Festus Lindsay 1913, 322. See Chapter 6.

<sup>129</sup> Frank 1933 I, 74-75. Diod. Sic. 23.18f.

enslaved as a result of Roman military action; reduction in civil war was considered an act of piracy or brigandage.<sup>130</sup> An instance recorded in Tacitus is problematic in this regard because it is clear that Roman citizens were taken with the intention of being sold. After the second battle of Bedriacum in AD 69, in which Vespasian's lieutenant Antonius defeated Vitellian troops, Antonius' troops sacked the neighbouring city of Cremona. There a number of the citizens were taken prisoner and a proclamation was soon made by Antonius banning the detention (*detineo*) of the prisoners. The proclamation was in agreement with Italian doctrine as Tacitus goes on to say, because Italy "despised the buying of such purchases."<sup>131</sup> The soldiers, frustrated by the inability to sell their captives, began to slaughter the enemy, which resulted in the friends and relatives of the captives secretly ransoming them.<sup>132</sup> Tacitus suggests that the action of the soldiers to sell Roman citizens as slaves or to ransom them was not sanctioned by Roman law; however the realities of war, particularly with mortal threats, could bend the rules in the victor's favour.<sup>133</sup> The enslavement of Roman citizens upon Roman soil had always been a contentious issue. In some cases of punishment a freedman could be reduced to a slave (*servus poenae*),<sup>134</sup> or a free man could sell himself into slavery.<sup>135</sup> Slavery for debt brought about complex legal issues and the status of an individual in debt bondage was not quite that of a slave. During the fifth and fourth centuries BC a form of quasi servitude known as *nexum* arose in which the debtor entered a contract in which they pledged their labour to the creditor, but this was later abolished because of the abuses suffered by the *nexi*.<sup>136</sup> Likewise, captives who were ransomed became indebted to their *redemptor*, but were not necessarily considered slaves, as these had to be 'purchased.'<sup>137</sup> The legal controversies surrounding the enslavement of fellow Romans can be traced to the Twelve Tables in which Romans enslaved for debts were to be sold outside Rome (*trans*

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Buckland 1908, 292. *Cod. Iust.* 7.14.4; *Dig.* 49.15.19.2; 21.1; 24.

<sup>131</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.34 *emptionem talium mancipiorum aspernantis*.

<sup>132</sup> Tac. *Hist.* 3.34.

<sup>133</sup> It should be noted that sometimes in civil war the regional background of the troops, in this case Danube based legions, could influence the fighting and thus the treatment of prisoners was more akin to a war fought with foreign enemies. This is not to say that civil wars were any less violent, as some of the bitterest fighting in history has been in episodes of civil war, but rather the treatment of the enemy in such conflicts was more inclined towards re-enfranchisement rather than outright subjection.

<sup>134</sup> *Dig.* 28.3.6.7-8; 48.19.2. Punishment was essentially *capitis deminutio maxima*. Cf. Buckland 1908, 403-7.

<sup>135</sup> See Buckland 1908, 427-33. The majority of discussion by jurists on self-sale concerns fraudulent attempts to evade debts. *Dig.* 40.12.40; 40.13.3; Ulp. 40.13.1.

<sup>136</sup> *Nexum* appears as early as 495 BC (Liv. 2.27.1). It was abolished by the *lex Poetelia* according to Liv. 8.28f. in 326 BC or in 313 according to Varro *Ling.* 7.105 (See also Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 16.5). Brunt 1958, 168 suggests that the *lex Poetelia* put an end to *nexum* as a form of labour contract, but ultimately debt bondage continued. Cf. the argument of Behrends 1974, 137-184.

<sup>137</sup> See below.

*tiberum*).<sup>138</sup> In all these cases the enslavement and indenture of Roman citizens was in accordance with civil law rather than *ius gentium* and so required a trial or contract.

In wars fought with foreign enemies Roman soldiers could be captured and enslaved. This became increasingly common as Roman territorial expansion halted and the chance of recovering captives, other than through diplomacy, was effectively eliminated.<sup>139</sup> Since Rome was such a large consumer in every respect, particularly in slaves, Romans could very well find themselves brought back within the confines of the empire as slaves or sold to a Roman citizen who purchased them from outside the *imperium*. What is most telling of the Roman attitude towards the preservation of the institution of slavery is that legally the recognition of the captive as a *servus* was paramount to the liberation of a *civis Romanus*. That Roman citizens who left the empire as free men and returned as slaves were not immediately freed upon entry via the process of *postliminium* rested upon a single legal principle: that enslavement in war was a universally recognised means of acquiring slaves (*ius gentium*) and, therefore, Roman law needed to be in accordance with this principle.<sup>140</sup> Avoiding any discussion of the justification of slavery (moral, philosophical, legal or practical), the law is clear that those taken by the enemy (*ab hostibus manu capiuntur*) became the property of their captor.<sup>141</sup> This law is reflected in earlier sources where the right of the victor over the vanquished was always advocated.<sup>142</sup> A captive captured in war and enslaved, though a free man prior to capture with the right of *postliminium*, should he return, remained a slave upon entry to the empire as he was no longer considered a *civis*. As a slave he was considered *res*, like any other *spolia*, subject to *uscapio* and without rights over his person. Buckland states, “so far as doings of the *captivus* during his captivity are concerned there is nothing to be said: he remained a slave and the ordinary rules of slavery applied to him: the possibility of *postliminium* does not affect the matter, any more than the possibility of manumission does in other cases.”<sup>143</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Table 3.9. Echoed in the language of Gai. *Inst.* 3.189 and *Dig.* 49.16.4.10.

<sup>139</sup> For example Roman captives sold across the Danube during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (Cass. Dio 71.13.2). Approximately 150,000 Roman captives were returned by the Quadi and the Iazyges indicating that large numbers of Romans were made captives during the Marcomannic Wars (Cass. Dio 71.13.4; 71.16.2).

<sup>140</sup> The contradiction between slavery and nature and the inadequate legal justification of enslavement has already been discussed, see Chapter 1, see also Bradley 1994, 23-4.

<sup>141</sup> *Inst. Inst.* 1.2.2; 3.4.

<sup>142</sup> Flor. 2.33.52; Joseph. *BJ.* 3.62; 6.354; Liv. 4.10.2; 21.23.1; 31.30.2; Polyb. 2.58.9-10. See also the emphatic language used by Greek historians (Thuc. 5.89; Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.45; 4.2.26; 7.5.73).

<sup>143</sup> Buckland 1908, 292.

*Postliminium* applied from the moment captivity ceased, as it applied to those who re-entered the *imperium Romanum*. For Romans who surrendered to the enemy, *postliminium* did not apply,<sup>144</sup> echoing the general sentiment felt by the Romans towards those who failed in war. The only difference with a *captivus* reduced to a *servus* was that his captivity was considered to have ended upon manumission, at which point he regained his former status and rights as a *civis Romanus* without any of the legal restrictions of a freedman. This is evident in the complex legislation pertaining to the ownership of a captive's property whilst he was in the service of another, and thus holding no legal right over his property; a slave could neither own property nor form a will which would allow another to attain *uscapio* over his property.<sup>145</sup> Neither did the property of the captive pass into the hands of his owner when purchased; instead the property remained in a state of abeyance (i.e. it was kept from the slave owner as much as it was kept from the slave).<sup>146</sup> The property could theoretically remain in abeyance until the captive died, after which it passed into the hands of his heir (*heres suus*) or it passed back into the hands of the captive once he was manumitted by right of *postliminium*.<sup>147</sup> That the rights of *postliminium* outweighed the right of an owner over his former slave is again interesting and in contrast with the initial law enforcing the servitude.<sup>148</sup> The resumption of former civil rights after manumission shows the variance in the law regarding Romans made captive and enslaved foreigners. It seems that the preservation of liberty was of higher importance than the right of a patron over his freedman. However, as suggested above, the preservation of liberty was less important than the preservation of the right to acquire slaves, particularly the right to acquire them through war.

Intriguingly a foetus was considered to have been conceived when the mother was free and subsequently born within the confines of the empire to a mother returning as a slave was

---

<sup>144</sup> *Dig.* 49.15.4. The extent to which this was applied in civil cases cannot be known. It certainly would have been a critical point in assessing the legality of a manumitted slave recovering his former status as an *ingenuus* rather than *libertus*.

<sup>145</sup> *Dig.* 3.5.18.5; 9.2.43. With the exception of wives, who were the property of their husbands, a woman whose husband was taken captive could remarry in classical law (under Justinian if he was positively dead or after a period of five years) and in that case were unrecoverable by their former husbands who returned by *postliminium* (*Dig.* 49.15.8), see Buckland 1908, 67.

<sup>146</sup> *Dig.* 41.2.23.1, a captive's property may have been protected under the *lex Hostilia* which allowed for legal actions to be made on behalf of an absent person. The existence of the law is questionable and the date unknown, see Buckland 1908, 293. Cicero *Orat.* 1.57 listed a few cases which may have concerned the *lex Hostilia*.

<sup>147</sup> There were, of course, a number of loopholes in which the property could be usufruct, such as appointing an executor (*curatio*), the captive allowing his property to be considered *peculiaris* thus becoming an allowance to the slave under the direction of the owner, see Buckland 1908, 294-296.

<sup>148</sup> Chiefly the rights of a patron over his freedmen were *obsequium operae* and the right of succession by the patron in his freedman's will, cf. Watson 1987, 35-45.

considered to be have been born free.<sup>149</sup> In contrast, a child conceived and born outside the limits of the empire to captive parents was considered to be a slave should the mother return to the empire as a slave, in following the standard law that a child born to a slave mother gains her legal status.<sup>150</sup> Children were, of course, recoverable under *postliminium* so long as they were un-owned or manumitted.<sup>151</sup>

From a legal standpoint the only person whose property raised a question of ownership and *uscipio* was a *pater familias*; in the case of women, children and young men with fathers, their property could be usufruct by a *pater familias* who was not in captivity as he held all power over his family and their possessions.<sup>152</sup> Any captive regardless of status<sup>153</sup> regained their former position and rights (if any) through *postliminium* when their captivity ended, either being freely returned to the empire or manumitted within.

In the case of Romans ransomed from the enemy from the third century AD onwards it is clear that they entered a form of servitude under which they were kept until they could discharge the lien imposed by their redeemer. During the time period covered in this study, it is difficult to ascertain the actual status of the *redemptus* or the relationship between the *redemptus* and the *redemptor*. The *captivus redemptus* was bound by *ius pignoris*<sup>154</sup> (security for debt) to the *redemptor*. Although the application of this is hard to understand as *pignoris* applied to property secured for debt including chattels,<sup>155</sup> it was never explained by the jurists as to how it might apply to the debtor himself. As a *legis actio*, *ius pignoris* typically applied to debts incurred from religious or government (the two need not be exclusive) related

---

<sup>149</sup> *Dig.* 1.5.7; 26. The practical responsibilities of upbringing is ignored by Paul and it is unlikely that the true status of the child would be recognised or accepted, nor could it be proven since the slave mother could not bring a case against her owner.

<sup>150</sup> *Inst. Iust.* 1.3.4. This was to prevent the problem of succession that would have followed if a *dominus* fathered children with a slave. Again this is a case of the law supporting a practical function in society, where children of a legal marriage were protected from claims by other natural siblings, not to mention the difficulty in establishing a father in an age before paternity tests. Certainly some *vernae* were the offspring of *domini*.

<sup>151</sup> *Dig.* 49.15.25, if the father died in captivity according to a rescript of Severus the child was considered a bastard.

<sup>152</sup> *Dig.* 50.60.195.2, see Frier *et al.* 2004, 19.

<sup>153</sup> I.e. free, slave, freedman. The former status always applied following *postliminium* to the point that a slave who was previously a *servus* without the possibility of manumission such as a *servus poenae*, once manumitted from the servitude that interrupted the previous condition returned to the former status of *servus poenae*. This was the case of a woman condemned to the salt works, who was taken captive and then recovered by a centurion, although her capture was the result of brigandage rather than capture by an enemy force (*Dig.* 49.15.6).

<sup>154</sup> Mentxaka 1985, 273f.

<sup>155</sup> *Gai. Inst.* 4.26.

expenditure and many were based on issues of *mores* rather than law.<sup>156</sup> Thus, if the legal texts related to *ius pignoris* are anything to go by, the debt from ransom and the system of repayment were a matter of custom rather than law, and for this reason they have no clear footprint in Roman law like that of *postliminium*. The origin of *ius redemptus* is early; it is mentioned in the Twelve Tables in connection with security against a debt for an animal purchased for sacrifice.<sup>157</sup> The obligation of an individual to ransom members of his *familia*, client or patron from the enemy had been established early as well and this was based upon the moral obligation imposed by religious custom (*ius sacrum*).<sup>158</sup> This continued to be viewed as a moral practice in the obligation of a *redemptus* towards their captor, as Seneca observed in the first century AD.<sup>159</sup>

Until the Second Punic War ransom was essentially a private affair, the state's involvement extended only to arranging periods for conducting ransom negotiations<sup>160</sup> or in granting permission to ransom captives.<sup>161</sup> After the battle of Cannae, Livy relates a debate in the Senate in which there was a suggestion to allow for private ransoms,<sup>162</sup> whereas the account of Appian ignored this option, suggesting that the only courses open to the Senate were to ransom the soldiers from the state coffers or to let them linger in captivity.<sup>163</sup> The latter is supported by the sentiment towards ransom expressed by the Roman general Publius Sulpicius after the battle of Aegina, as interpreted by Polybius.<sup>164</sup> In the year preceding Cannae Fabius Maximus arranged with Hannibal to ransom the Roman captives taken at the Battle of Lake Trasimene. But the Senate dallied over approving state money to be sent for the ransom of the Roman captives in excess of the exchange. In the end Fabius sold his farm to pay for the soldiers' ransom.<sup>165</sup> It seems that up to the first century AD ransom was

---

<sup>156</sup> See Buckland 1908, 623-624.

<sup>157</sup> Table 6.1c.

<sup>158</sup> Examples include a patron to be ransomed by his client (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.10.1), a son (Plaut. *Capt.* 330f.), a brother (Plaut. *Pers.* 695f.) and a slave (Plaut. *Asin.* 106f.), though the examples in Plautus are placed within Greek settings.

<sup>159</sup> Sen. *Ben.* 2.21.1-2; 6.13.3-14.3. The fickle nature of human life made enslavement through war possible to anyone who practiced it, Sen. *Ep.* 47.10, cf. the comments of Fitzgerald 2000, 90-91.

<sup>160</sup> In the First Punic War (Liv. 22.23.6; Cass. Dio 57.15f.; 57.35f.; Plut. Fab. Max. 1.3-8; Val. Max. 3.8.2; 4.8.1; Zon. 8.26), see Welwei 2000, 89-91.

<sup>161</sup> A prisoner exchange in the First Punic War (Liv. 22.23.6) Permission to ransom captives at Tarentum (Liv. 22.59.7). Cf. Mommsen 1887 III, 1121 who maintained that this was always the case.

<sup>162</sup> Liv. 22.60.3-4. The opinion expressed even went so far as to suggest that interest free loans be made available to those without the money. Levy 1943, 161 states that the *redempti* would have served surety for the loan.

<sup>163</sup> App. *Hann.* 28.

<sup>164</sup> Polyb. 9.42.4-8.

<sup>165</sup> App. *Fab.* 7.4.5; Liv. 22.23.6-8.

allowed for by the Senate, and captives could be ransomed privately or by the state. However, the state had to approve ransoms, or at least those made in bulk or in matters of state (i.e. treaties). The main determinant of whether or not a Roman soldier could be ransomed was a charge of cowardice. It was clear that soldiers who surrendered could not receive *postliminium* and it was upon this basis that the Cannae captives were refused ransom. Likewise, for soldiers captured in the wake of the Varian disaster in AD 9 their relatives were permitted to ransom them back, with the exception that they could not return to Italy.<sup>166</sup> This act, and the peculiarity of the restriction, implies that their capture was at least, in part, considered cowardice. The families seem to have acted without senatorial approval and so the act was intended as a stop gap measure to avoid a trial that would have brought more grief and worry to the Roman heartland still reeling from the *clades Variana*.

In raising money for a ransom Wyse suggested that in Athens friends of a captive would come together to put up the ransom.<sup>167</sup> Within the Roman military there was the means to provide a ransom for fellow soldiers. Since ransom was largely frowned upon by the state, the obligatory savings of each soldier, untouchable until retirement, would normally be unavailable to ransom the soldier or anyone acting on his behalf.<sup>168</sup> However, the army took a relaxed approach to a *collegia tenuiorum* amongst the legions which acted as a burial club. For the most part soldiers were prohibited from forming clubs,<sup>169</sup> and of those formed only officers could participate, but the burial club was open to all soldiers as it posed little political threat because no meetings were held. The burial club acted as a collective charitable society supported by donations from its members.<sup>170</sup> Strictly speaking, the burial club operated only to provide appropriate burial for its members, but in practice it assisted its members and their heirs in many other ways by paying out *anularium* (payments upon discontinuation of membership) and *viaticum* (assistance). The only examples of the burial club come from inscriptions at Lambaesis where the *III Augusta* was stationed during the Severan period.<sup>171</sup>

---

<sup>166</sup> Cass. Dio 56.22.1-4.

<sup>167</sup> Wyse 1904, 556. states that such a group was similar to an ἑρᾶνος, where everyone paid a share (Antipho 2.2.9; Thphr.Char. 22.9).

<sup>168</sup> Half of all bonuses and donations made to a soldier during his career were deposited with his century's savings, the century's *signifier* was in charge of keeping the accounts. A soldier could only draw upon his savings when he was discharged from the army. There is no legal evidence that a soldier's savings could be drawn upon in the event of capture, and it seems the regular rules of *postliminium* applied in this case. A soldier's savings were inheritable (*Dig.* 48.17.2; 20), see Ginsburg 1940, 151.

<sup>169</sup> By AD 136 the restrictions on the formation of clubs was relaxed, *CIL* 9.2112.

<sup>170</sup> The precursors to later Christian charitable organisations of which some, notably in Christian Spain during the 10<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> centuries, were devoted to the redemption of war captives, see Brodman 1986.

<sup>171</sup> *CIL* 8.2551-7, see Ginsburg 1940, 154-5.



No policy concerning payments for ransom is present, but the structure was at hand as the death or absence of the member soldier resulted in payment to his heir, who was then responsible for the payment of the soldiers' burial. Though it is impossible to state that burial club payments were, in fact, used to pay a ransom, given the private administration of the club, it was possible for them to do so.

In regards to the status of the *redemptus*, Mommsen and his adherents maintained that the Roman captives ransomed from the enemy became the property of their *redemptor* throughout Roman history.<sup>172</sup> However, Levy has argued that in all the early cases of ransom (at least pre Nero)<sup>173</sup> there is no evidence that the captive became the property of his redeemer.<sup>174</sup> For example Fabius turned down an offer by the soldiers to repay him for the ransom prices, and there was no indication in the debate in the Senate over the Cannae captives that they would be slaves.<sup>175</sup> Furthermore, Levy suggests that the ransom by the mid first century could be recovered by the *redemptor* via *actio certae creditae pecuniae* or *negotiorum gestorum*, but the captive remained under no obligation of servitude.<sup>176</sup> Levy is correct in doubting the ownership of the *redemptus* by the *redemptor*, as it is not until the third century AD that we can be sure that the *redemptus* became the property of the *redemptor* as seen in the examples of Diocletian's rescripts.<sup>177</sup> It seems that according to the legal texts the change occurred to reflect a difference in custom or practice wherein redemption was no longer considered or controlled at state level, save for rare examples. Throughout the Roman period, ransom was carried out by family members or benevolent members of society neither of whom would have expected the *redemptus* to repay them,

<sup>172</sup> Mommsen 1907, 8f; Voigt 1899 (1963) II, 465; Girard 1911, 129; and Krüger 1931, 204 (s.v. 'Captivus redemptus'). Cf. Levy 1949, 159-60.

<sup>173</sup> As evident by the concept of ransom depicted by Sen. *Ben* 6.13.3-14.2; 21.1-2, see Levy 1943, 161.

<sup>174</sup> Levy 1943, 161. I reject here the association of *nexum* with ransoming as put forward by Mitchell 1995, 210. In the case cited by Mitchell, a boy is reduced to *nexum* as a result of a debt incurred in burying his father, who had been impoverished, but not indebted after paying his own ransom (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 16.5; Liv. 8.28; Val. Max. 6.1.9). The *nexum* in this case was a result of a debt independent of ransom.

<sup>175</sup> Liv. 22.23.6-8; App. *Fab. Max.* 7.4.

<sup>176</sup> Levy 1943, 162. *Dig.* 3.5.18.5; Ulp. *Dig.* 3.5.19. The *actio certae creditae pecuniae* permitted a creditor to seek repayment of a loan that was granted *mutuum* (transfer of ownership of money). A *negotiorum gestorum* was an act committed by an agent (*gestor*) in the absence of the individual the act was being carried out for. In this case, if an agent (here a *redemptor*) acted on the benefit of an individual in his absence, the agent could seek reimbursement. This is evident in the examples laid out in *Dig.* 3.5.10; 11.7.

<sup>177</sup> Outlined in the *Corpus Iuris Civile Iustiniani* (*Cod. Iust.* 8.50). Levy 1943, 164-167 identified this with constitution, stating that it must concern all *redempti* rather than just *servi redempti*, contra Krüger 1931, 215 and Buckland 1908, 315f. Since Tryphoninus referred to a *free* man in considering a *redemptus* that had previously been deported – a punishment only inflicted upon free individuals. Furthermore, he posits a date of the change in the constitution to between AD 161 and 198, in which any *redemptus* exchanged their captor for their *redemptor* as their *dominus*.

### Chapter 3

during the Republican period the repayment of a ransom was only considered in accordance with *mores* and thus never required a legal regulation.<sup>178</sup> By the first century AD some form of remuneration was guaranteed in the same manner as other debts might be repaid. However, by the third century, perhaps as a consequence of more Romans being captured and subsequently fewer having the means to repay, a change in system occurred that encouraged redemption, but protected the expense laid out by the redeemer.

Overall the contribution of Roman captives to the slave supply was limited. The legal question regarding the enslavement of Roman citizens is what caused extensive inquiry by jurists and thus the complex laws surrounding cases in which *postliminium* may have applied. This inquiry into the process of Roman ransom shows that even in a society like Rome, where ransom was traditionally scorned, there were still means of carrying it out. As the institution of *postliminium* and the plots of Plautine Comedy suggest, ransom could be carried out after a captive entered a period of servitude. It is possible that many captives sold into slavery were still recovered by their friends or families, if any were left, and barring their existence, it was possible that they could be recovered by their community through a system of redemption like that of Rome.

---

<sup>178</sup> Cf. Millar 1984, 10 and Katsari 2005, 29 who both suggest that captives may have been purchased by their family or friends.

## Chapter 4

### *Enslavements before the Punic Wars*

#### Terms for Enslavement

At the end of the sixth century BC the first instance of ‘sale under the crown’ by the Romans appears.<sup>1</sup> According to Livy, after the capitulation of Pometia the Romans marched against Auruncus, the principle city of the Aurunci, whose citizens promptly surrendered, hoping for similar lenience to be shown to them, as had been shown to Pometia. Instead, the Romans beheaded the foremost men and “sent the other farmers under the crown.”<sup>2</sup> The significance of the crown is difficult to ascertain. Aulus Gellius provides two possible etymological explanations.<sup>3</sup> Firstly, that garlands were placed on the heads of captives to be sold as slaves, in a similar fashion to the caps placed on slaves, whose origins were unknown, and thus could not be guaranteed by the seller, the cap signified *caveat emptor*.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, that the captives were surrounded by a ring of soldiers, with the ring referred to as a *corona*. Gellius was of the opinion that the former explanation was true, and supports this with a statement made by the Elder Cato, in which he proclaims that the victorious were crowned so that they could perform sacrifices and the defeated were crowned to mark them for sale;<sup>5</sup> this explanation is also offered by Festus.<sup>6</sup> The symbolic significance of the crown is not certain, and by the first century BC, when our earliest use of the term in reference to sale occurs,<sup>7</sup> its actual meaning seems to have been forgotten, or at least considered irrelevant.<sup>8</sup>

After a battle near Fidenae in 426 BC centurions and cavalrymen were each given a captive as a slave, and those who displayed gallantry were honoured with a second; the remaining

---

<sup>1</sup> This is not the earliest reference to the phrase in regards to the date of the written word, see below.

<sup>2</sup> Liv. 2.17.6 *sub corona venierunt coloni alii*.

<sup>3</sup> Gell. *NA* 6.4.1-4.

<sup>4</sup> Gellius cites the jurist Caelius Sabinus, who wrote a work on the aedile edict *Ad Edictum Aedilium Curulium* (Gell. *NA* 2.5.4). The original work of Sabinus only survives in fragments, but was largely preserved as a basis by the jurists Ulpian, Pomponius and Paul, and is quoted in the *Dig.* 21.1. Cf. Huschke 1908, 2. The cap was known as a *pilleus* (Phrygian cap) and the seller must declare a slave’s nationality; some nationalities were thought preferable to others as slaves (*Dig.* 21.1.31.21). The *pilleus* was also a symbol of manumission (Liv. 24.16.18; 33.23.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6; Petron. *Sat.* 40.3).

<sup>5</sup> The full text of Cato’s *de re Militari* (On Military Science) does not survive, cf. Jordan 1860, 80 Fr. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Festus Lindsay 1913, 306.38.

<sup>7</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 3.16.4.

<sup>8</sup> Welwei 2000, 12-14; Scheidel 2011, 294.

captives were put up for sale under the crown.<sup>9</sup> Livy seems to suggest that the crown marked the captives as public property, rather than the property of individual soldiers.<sup>10</sup> That sale *sub corona* profited the exchequer, rather than the individual soldier, is reaffirmed in the next instance in Livy, when the sale *sub corona* of free men from Veii in 393 BC, was the only money paid into the treasury from that engagement.<sup>11</sup> Throughout his work, Livy used *sub corona* to denote both captives and booty sold at auction, with the proceeds going to the public treasury.<sup>12</sup> The phrase *sub corona*, in regards to the sale of captives is first used by Caesar, who sold (*vendere*) captives into slavery as a punishment for the maltreatment of ambassadors.<sup>13</sup> Varro, a contemporary of Caesar, also used *sub corona* within the context of goods bought at public auction.<sup>14</sup> Though the etymological significance of *sub corona* seems to have disappeared by the first century, it eventually became synonymous with sale at public auction, as shown by later uses of the phrase.<sup>15</sup> In all instances of *sub corona* involving captives, they are said to have either been ‘sold’ or to have ‘come’ (*venire*)<sup>16</sup> under the crown. The use of *venire* emphasises the movement of the captives independent of their captors, and the loss of liberty would hence be associated with the vanquished, as the obligation of the defeated, rather than a form of subjection by the conqueror. *Sub corona* denoted the sale of property, whilst in the case of captives it also indicated their *reduction* to servitude.

---

<sup>9</sup> Liv. 4.34.4 *aliis sub corona venumdati*.

<sup>10</sup> Further, compare the significance of military rings to crowns (Diod. Sic. 25.19.1). We might also compare the rings (δακτύλιοι) worn by Greek soldiers (Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.27).

<sup>11</sup> Liv. 5.22.1 *Postero die libera corpora dictator sub corona uendit, ea sola pecunia in publicum redigitur*. Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.93.2, Diodorus uses the terms ἐξανδραποδίζω ‘to reduce to slavery’ and λαφυροπωλέω ‘sale of war booty’ in describing the fate of the Veii captives.

<sup>12</sup> Sale of captives *sub corona* at Suessa Aurunca in 502 BC (Liv. 2.17.6), Fidenae in 426 BC (Liv. 4.34.3); Veii 393 in BC (Liv. 5.22.1), Pollian tribe voted in favour of enslaving the Tusculan women and children in 323 BC (Liv. 8.37.11), Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.8), Malta in 218 BC (Liv. 21.51.2), Turditanians at Saguntum in 212 BC (Liv. 24.42.11), Bergistani in 193 BC (Liv. 34.16.10), Same in 189 BC (Liv. 38.29.11), Istrians in 177 BC (Liv. 41.11.8), Haliartus in 171 BC (Liv. 42.63.11), Abdera in 170 BC (Liv. 43.4.11) and Allies of Philip in 170 BC (Liv. *Per.* 43.5). Livy also refers to Aetolian refugees being sold by the Achaeans as slaves using the phrase sent under the crown. The property of the citizens of Haliartus was sold at public auction in 170 BC (Liv. 42.63.12).

<sup>13</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 3.16.4.

<sup>14</sup> Varro *RR* 2.14.4. Varro composed his agricultural manual in his eightieth year (Varro *RR* 1.1.1) and so his manual was a quarter century after Caesar’s commentaries of his Gallic campaigns.

<sup>15</sup> Liv. 7.89.5; Tac. *Hist.* 1.68; *Ann.* 113.39; Val. Max. 9.10.1; Curt. 9.8.15; Licinianus *Ann.* 35.24.

<sup>16</sup> *Vendere* (Aul. Gel. *NA* 6.4.4; Caes. *B Gall.* 3.16.4; Flor. 2.33; Fronto *Parthico* 7.7; Liv. 4.34.4; 5.22.1; 24.42.11; 42.63.12; *SHA* 7.2). *Venire* (Aul. Gel. *NA* 6.4.1-4; Curt. Ruf. 9.8.15; Festus 306.38; Licinianus *Ann.* 35.69; Liv. 2.17.6; 8.37.11; 9.42.8; 21.51.2; 34.16.10; 35.36.10; 38.29.11; 41.11.8; 42.63.11; 43.4.11; *Per.* 43; Val. Max. 9.10.1; Varro *Rust.* 2.10.4).

Another means of reducing captives to slaves was their sale *sub hasta* (under the spear). Save for a few instances,<sup>17</sup> the captives were always referred to as having been ‘sold’ under the spear.<sup>18</sup> Though the majority of these occurrences refer to sale, the inclusion of *sub hasta* placed an emphasis upon the military subjugation of the vanquished, which resulted in the sale of captives or booty. The spear as a weapon was evocative of force, and was an important symbol of power beyond that of forcible acquisition;<sup>19</sup> indeed Festus remarked that the spear symbolised Roman *imperium*.<sup>20</sup> This echoes similar terms in Greek, *δοριάλωτος/δορυάλωτος* or *αιχμάλωτος*, where the spear was also integral to the expression of someone taken by force.<sup>21</sup>

Sale *sub hasta* was similar to an early legal form of ownership, known as *iure quiritorium* (law of the Quirites or law of the Roman people),<sup>22</sup> which required the purchaser to strike the object with a piece of bronze.<sup>23</sup> In cases of disputed ownership, the plaintiff was required to touch the object with a *festuca*, perhaps also made of bronze.<sup>24</sup> In explaining the *iure quiritorium*, Gaius used an example of a dispute over the ownership of a slave in which both parties touch the disputed ‘property’ with a *festuca*.<sup>25</sup> Juvenal remarked that those who intended to make a living in Rome had to be willing to perform uncivilised work, or even “offer their own head for sale *sub hasta*.”<sup>26</sup> The expression of ‘*sub hasta*’ in the context of free men at Rome indicates that such a sale was not exclusive to post battle auctions; but in the case of captives, it was certainly an auction, rather than any other form of sale, as indicated by the presence of *quaestors* by Livy.<sup>27</sup> Captives were not the only items to be sold *sub hasta*; in two instances booty, not including captives, was also ‘sold’ or ‘sent’ *sub hasta*.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Liv. 5.16.7; 23.37.13; Flor. 2.9.1 the verb *venire* under the spear.

<sup>18</sup> Liv. 4.29.4; 4.53.10; 6.4.2; 23.32.15; 23.38.7; Juv. 3.33; Val. Max. 6.5.1.

<sup>19</sup> As a symbol of office, such as *primus pilus* or *praetor hastarius* (Quint. *Inst.* 5.2.1; Plin. *Ep.* 5.9.1-2), as a symbol of political power, such as the *hastae iudicium* (Val. Max. 7.8.1; 4) or as military *signa*. See Domaszewski 1885, 50 and Alföldi 1959, 12-13, Töpfer 2011, 18-34.

<sup>20</sup> Festus Lindsay 1913, 55.

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>22</sup> For example as expressed in Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.31; *pro Cael.* 96; *Mur.* 26; Sen. *Q Nat.* 3.pr.16. As an expression of full Roman civic rights, see Gai. *Inst.* 1.17.

<sup>23</sup> Gai. *Inst.* 1.54. Cf. Gai. *Inst.* 1.119 in the case of manumission or the purchase of liberty.

<sup>24</sup> Gai. *Inst.* 4.16. The rod may have been of straw or of wood see Alföldi 1959, 8 n. 78; Nisbet 1918, 1.

<sup>25</sup> Gai. *Inst.* 4.16. Cf. Hopkins 1978, 82; Joshel 2010, 85. The *festuca* was also a symbol of manumission Plaut. *Mil.* 4.1.15; *Pers.* 5.175, see Nisbet 1918, 1-14.

<sup>26</sup> Juv. 3.33.

<sup>27</sup> Liv. 4.53.10.

<sup>28</sup> Liv. 4.29.4; 5.16.7. On both occasions the booty was unclaimed property recovered by the Roman forces.

Contrary to *sub corona* and *sub hasta*, the term *sub iugum* does not reflect a process of enslavement, but rather a form of humiliation, in which the captives were sent (*missio*) with verb accompanying the phrase typically *mitto* (to send).<sup>29</sup> As a practice in Italy, chiefly amongst the Romans and Samnites, the ritual of sending enemies under a yoke did not accompany enslavement.<sup>30</sup>

The enslavement of captives is typically expressed by their sale. In Latin *vendere*, in most cases the type of sale, either *sub corona* or *sub hasta*, is specified, but in some instances the captives are simply said to have been sold.<sup>31</sup> In Greek the reduction of captives could also be inferred by the terms for sale, simply *πωλέω*<sup>32</sup> or more precisely moved from a site to be sold (i.e. exported *ἐπρᾶθησαν* or *πιπράσκω*).<sup>33</sup> In many instances the passage from freedom to slavery is expressed as entering slavery ‘*in servitatem*,’ with the action indicating a forced transition in which a second party is responsible for the change,<sup>34</sup> which include: to carry off (*abduco*),<sup>35</sup> tear or drag away (*abripio/abstrao*),<sup>36</sup> lead/lead away (*duco/deduco*)<sup>37</sup> or reduce (*redigo*), the last of which was commonly used in the *Digesta* as a general term for someone of free status who became a slave in reference to their regression in status.<sup>38</sup> The selling of free people did not require the specification ‘*in servitatem*,’ there was no doubt that sale implied slavery, but enslavement did not always require a transaction; slaves were simply made (*facio*) from free people or given to someone as a slave.<sup>39</sup> In contrast, those entering slavery were also expressed as doing so on their own: to surrender or deliver (*trado*), fall

<sup>29</sup> The exceptions being: *abeo* (‘to go,’ Liv. 3.28.10), *do* (‘give,’ 4.26.10) and *subigo* (‘to bring under,’ Fronto 4.2.30). This is not to say that the reduction to slavery was not emphasised through slavery in other ways, see Bradley 1994, 23-4.

<sup>30</sup> See Chapter 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Dig.* 1.5.4.2; 50.16.239.1; *Hyg. Fab.* 15.5; Liv. 39.42.1; 43.20.3; *Quint. Dec. Mai.* 3.16; *Sen. Controv.* 10.5.pr; *Val. Max.* 5.1.7; *Vell. Pat.* 2.42.3.

<sup>32</sup> *Diod. Sic.* 23.9.5; *P. Oxy.* 1477.3.

<sup>33</sup> *Il.* 21.102; 21.40; *Od.* 14.297; *Zon.* 8.10.

<sup>34</sup> Note, the verb *assero* is often associated with *in servitatem*, but refers to the action of claiming either as a slave or most often as a freedman in the process of manumission.

<sup>35</sup> *Caes. B Gall.* 1.11.3; *Cic. Pis.* 84; *Frontin. Str.* 1.11.6; *Vitr.* 1.1.5. Also *rapio* ‘carry off rapidly’ (*Cic. Rhet. Her.* 4.51).

<sup>36</sup> *Abripio* (*Caes. B Afr.* 26.5; Liv. 43.5.2), *abstrabo* (*Caes. B Gall.* 7.14.10; 7.42.4).

<sup>37</sup> *Duco* (Liv. 6.14.4; *Hyg. Fab.* 111.1), *deduco* (*Dig.* 41.1.7.pr.).

<sup>38</sup> *Caes. B Gall.* 2.14.2; *Dig.* 4.1.6.pr; 4.2.21.1; 23.5.2; 26.1.14.1; 26.4.3.5; 28.6.43.3; 38.2.32.pr; 38.17.2.3; 40.5.24.3; 49.16.4.10; *Plaut. Aul.* 169.

<sup>39</sup> *Made Slaves* (Liv. 35.16.12; 45.22.6). *Varro Ling.* 7.105 remarks that free persons owing money were ‘bound’ (*debeo*) *in servitatem*. Given as slaves (*Cic. Ep. ad Oct.* 10; *Hyg. Fab.* 34.4; 79.4; Liv. 3.56.4; 3.57.5; 41.6.11; *Quint. Dec. Min.* 339.13. *Ter.* 653).

(*cado/elabor*), or sink (*subeo*).<sup>40</sup> Similar to the process of *sub corona*, free persons were sometimes said to *go* into slavery, implying the action rested upon their shoulders rather than that of the captors or slavers, although the decision to do so was obviously made under duress.<sup>41</sup> While many of the above examples include instances outside of capture, such as the selling of one's self or illegal seizure, the actions used in expressing someone's entrance into slavery can be illuminating. The fact that people are said to enter slavery by their own action, as well as being forced, is indicative of a society that accepted slavery as a result of natural order; placing the victor and the strong above the vanquished and the weak. Slavery was an alternative to death, a *choice* that, prior to capture, was in the hands of the soon to be vanquished; it is because of this that the captor's *choice* to spare the defeated was viewed as an act of clemency.<sup>42</sup>

In Greek, the verb ἀνδραποδίζω<sup>43</sup> has been interpreted as referring to a process of enslaving. Etymologically ἀνδραποδίζω comprises two parts, a man and hoof, so that an ἀνδράποδον referred to someone essentially rendered a human pack animal.<sup>44</sup> The traditional definition given by the *LSJ* is “to enslave, or sell the free men of a city into slavery.” However, Kathy Gaca has argued that the mercantile aspect of ἀνδραποδίζω is incorrect, and is based on a fallacious etymology stemming from ἀποδίδοσθαι (to sell), as explained in the *scholia* on Aristophanes' play *Plutus*.<sup>45</sup> For many Greek writers, ἀνδράποδον was a term for both a captive and a slave.<sup>46</sup> The definition in the *LSJ* has been interpreted as being too male centric by Gaca, who argues the act of ἀνδραποδίζω was typically only carried out upon the women and children of a defeated city, the men, at least those of fighting age, were normally eliminated during battle.<sup>47</sup> A poignant remark by a captured Spartan soldier emphasised the

<sup>40</sup> *Trado* (Caes. *B Gall.* 1.51.3; Cic. *Prov. cons.* 10; Liv. 37.54.8; Gell. *NA.* 20.1.7), *Cado* (Sen. *Ep.* 95.71; *Phoen.* 598), *Elabor* (Liv. 3.37.3) and *Subeo* (Sen. *Dial.* 529.1).

<sup>41</sup> *Dig.* 4.4.9.4; 48.19.14.pr.; Aul. *Gel. NA.* 2.18.9; Sen. *Q Nat.* 6.1.14; Liv. 42.21.5; 43.8.7.

<sup>42</sup> For the etymology of *servus* in relation to their preservation and the clemency of captors see Chapter 1.

<sup>43</sup> Within this semantic field we may add the verbs ἐξανδραποδίζεσθαι and ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι and the verbal nouns ἐξανδραπόδισις and ἀνδραποδισμός.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Gaca 2010, 121; Chantraine 1999, 295.

<sup>45</sup> Gaca 2010, 126, based on Schol. Ar. *Plut.* 521d (ed. Chantry).

<sup>46</sup> Thucydides uses the term ἀνδράποδον for both captives enslaved and ransomed 6.62.3-4. Diodorus repeatedly uses ἀνδράποδον in referring to slaves rather than captives, ex. sale of Plato 15.7.1. There is a single exception where Diodorus refers to those taken from a fortress as ἀνδράποδοι, 23.9.4. Plutarch also uses ἀνδράποδον for slave in *Mor.* 100C and 174E before giving an example (*Mor.* 234C) of how it may also be interpreted as a war captive, though the use is questioned by the subject.

<sup>47</sup> Killing and ἀνδραποδίζω are expressed as two different actions first expressed by Hdt. 3.140.5; 3.147.1, see Gaca 2010, 121. Numerous examples of men being killed and the others ‘andrapodised’ (App. *Celt.* 11.3; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.49.3; 10.26.3; Joseph. *BJ* 3.62-3; Procop. *Goth.* 7.11.15; 8.18.25). The biggest

distinction between an ἀνδράποδον and a war captive (αἰχμάλωτον). When the auctioneer stated that he had an ἀνδράποδον for sale, the Spartan was quick to state that he was actually an αἰχμάλωτον.<sup>48</sup> From the Spartan's response, it seems that those taken by the spear were more honourably reduced to slavery than those taken ἀνδραποδίζω. Gaca also states that ἀνδραποδίζω implied a brutality beyond simply 'enslaving,' and any complete definition should incorporate an element of abuse that was experienced by non-combatants at the hands of enemy soldiers.<sup>49</sup> An ἀνδράποδον was distinguishable from an αἰχμάλωτον; whereas a soldier was taken in the fighting and thus 'by spear,' the captive (ἀνδράποδον) was seized after the fighting, and herded like an animal.

### **Enslavements in Early Rome up to the Sack of Veii**

In the ancient world success in war brought economic gains for the victor.<sup>50</sup> The wealth acquired from military victories was foremost generated from booty acquired from the defeated. Sometimes this included the sale of captives. The right of the victor to take from his defeated enemies anything, including the enemy themselves as slaves, is well attested in Greek and Roman history.<sup>51</sup> Roman politico-economic growth and military expansion went hand in hand from the very beginning. The absorption of geographically close neighbours within the Roman community and the acquisition of spoils were the predominant source of economic and population growth in early Rome. However, I argue that the sale of captives as slaves did not occur with any regularity until the end of the third century BC.

The earliest clear case of mass enslavement comes during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus in the sixth century.<sup>52</sup> Tarquinius had to deal with a Latin uprising, which came as a result of their rejection of a treaty made with Rome under his predecessor. He used a combination of force and leniency to re-establish peace and to reassert Roman hegemony over the Latins, beginning with the destruction of Apiolanum and the enslavement of the surviving men,

---

argument against this interpretation is the ἀνδραποδίζω of the Epirotes in 167 BC, including men, women and children, see Chapter 7.

<sup>48</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 234C.

<sup>49</sup> Gaca 2010, 122f.

<sup>50</sup> See Garlan, 1972, 200; Harris 1979; 56f.

<sup>51</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>52</sup> Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, fifth Roman king 616-579 BC.



women and children.<sup>53</sup> Afterward, the cities of Crustumerium, Nomentam, Ficulea, and Cameria were spared without penalty when they surrendered to Tarquinius,<sup>54</sup> but the citizens of Collatia met the Romans in battle and were defeated; they too were spared enslavement, but forced to accept Tarquinius' nephew as a ruler and to pay a hefty indemnity.<sup>55</sup> Finally, a combined force of Latins, Tyrrhenians and Sabines were defeated in a field engagement and the survivors sold as slaves, with the booty going directly to the soldiers and the proceeds from the sale of prisoners to Tarquinius.<sup>56</sup> This set an example of the typical division of booty, in which the state took control of the prisoners and profited from their sale, and the soldiers were allowed the other booty. It has been suggested by Siber that Tarquinius' treatment of conquered cities was a discernible shift in more forceful foreign policy by the Etruscan kings.<sup>57</sup> However, this was rejected by Volkmann, who sees the change as nothing more than the use of several *topoi* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in describing the reign of Tarquinius and his successors.<sup>58</sup>

The son of Tarquinius, Tarquinius Superbus, was noted for his reorganisation of the Latin League into a permanent military alliance.<sup>59</sup> This reorganisation was remarkably similar to that of his father; indeed, the actions of both kings mirror one another to such a degree that it is difficult to attribute certain episodes to the reign of one in particular.<sup>60</sup> For instance, Tarquinius Superbus' sack of Pometia strikingly echoes his father's sack of Apiolanum.<sup>61</sup> In 502 BC the two consuls made forays against the cities of Cures and Cameria.<sup>62</sup> The fate of the 4,000 captives at Cures is unknown, but the sources agree, that after the city had been

<sup>53</sup> Apiolanum according to Strab. 5.231 was in the territory of the Volscini. The exact site is unknown, see Ogilvie 1965, 149. For the enslavement see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.49.3, remaining soldiers were 'sold' (πῆράσκω) the women and children were ἀνδραποδίζω. Cities taken by storm were to be ἀνδραποδίζω, whereas those that capitulated were only obliged to submit obedience to the Romans ('*deditio in fidem*,' Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.51.1. Cf. Liv. 1.35.7) does not mention enslavement, but states that the booty allowed for exquisite games to be held and for the perimeter of the Circus Maximus to be first laid out. Liv. 8.20.1 states that the first permanent structure of the Circus was dated to 329 BC.

<sup>54</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.49.4-51.2.

<sup>55</sup> Liv. 1.38.1-3.

<sup>56</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.53.5.

<sup>57</sup> Siber in s.v. 'Tarquinius Superbus' *RE*.

<sup>58</sup> Volkmann 1990, 36. Cf. Gaida 1934, 26.

<sup>59</sup> Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, 'Tarquin the Proud,' seventh King of Rome (535-509 BC). The son of Tarquinius by tradition, s.v. 'Tarquinius Superbus' *RE*.

<sup>60</sup> Both Tarquins are noted as being victorious over Latin cities and are credited with beginning the work on the circus and the Capitoline temple. Cf. Ogilvie 1965, 145. Indeed, the whole succession of the Roman kings is specious, but this should not preclude that events of early, at times mythic, Rome are not reflective of wider social and political shifts; in particular the inter-state relations of Rome and central Italian city-states.

<sup>61</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.50.4.

<sup>62</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.49.1.

pillaged by the troops, the leaders were beheaded and the remaining Camerians were enslaved.<sup>63</sup> However, Valerius adds that these were later restored by citizens, who sought out the Camerians and redeemed them, eventually settling them on the Aventine.<sup>64</sup> During the fledgling Republic Tarquinius Superbus, with the aid of allies amongst the Latin League, tried to reclaim the throne, but he was defeated in 498 BC.<sup>65</sup> Livy does not mention the capture of any captives in his account of the battle, but later relates that the Latins revealed a plot of the Voscinians and Hernici to go to war with Rome, and were rewarded for their loyalty with the release of 6,000 captives held by the Romans.<sup>66</sup> These were likely hostages, but a significant enough number that they may have been kept from amongst the captives taken.<sup>67</sup> In 495 BC<sup>68</sup> the Romans sacked the city of Pometia who had sided against Rome in their war with the Volscians. There the ringleaders were killed, and the remaining survivors were sold into slavery.<sup>69</sup> This marks the first enslavement of captives under the Republic and it is notable as an act of punishment, a stern response to Pometia switching allegiance.<sup>70</sup>

All the accounts of capture during the first few years of the Republic share a common theme of a Roman victory over rebellious neighbours. In all instances, the sacked cities were caught up in an uprising against Rome (particularly the Latin cities), either reneging on treaties or testing Rome's position as the leader amongst 'equals.' As such, Rome's response is expressed as harsh. At Pometia, for example, despite the defender's surrender to the Romans, the city was sacked and the inhabitants enslaved as though they had been taken by storm.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.49.5 ἀγχαλόττοι; Val. Max. 6.5.1c *Sub hasta vendere*; Zon. 7.13. For problems associated with this episode see Brennan 2001, 929 n. 498. We must of course be sceptical of numbers, particularly rounded figures. Whilst 4,000 is a relatively small figure by later comparisons, it should nonetheless be treated with caution; the addition of 10,000 slaves after the capture of Veii a century later has raised significant doubt by historians over the ability of the Roman economy to absorb such a number, see below.

<sup>64</sup> Val. Max. 6.5.1c.

<sup>65</sup> For problems with this date see Cornell 1995, 216.

<sup>66</sup> Liv. 2.19.1f.

<sup>67</sup> Liv. 2.22.5. According to Foster (loeb n.) Livy was following a different authority than in his account of Lake Regilus, perhaps even following Valerius of Antium, who he later criticises for exaggerating numbers (Liv. 33.10.8).

<sup>68</sup> I choose this date, which contrasts with Livy's first claim that the sack occurred under the consulship of Opiter Verginius and Spurius Cassius in 502 BC, as it fits more clearly within the wider narrative in Livy and corresponds with Dionysius' account, see below.

<sup>69</sup> Liv. 2.17.6; 2.25.5. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* There is much confusion regarding this episode. Livy duplicates the story first in 2.22.17 and next in 2.25.5. Ogilvie 1965, 276 notes that in Livy's first episode of the Aurunci is wrongly brought into the history since they could not have interfered at this time, their inclusion is likely an attempt to link Pometia with Suessa (Sezza) as a duplicate names for the same city (ex. Liv. 2.25.5; Dion. Hal. 6.29.4). Cf. s.v. 'Aurunci' *RE*.

<sup>70</sup> Liv. 2.16.25. See s.v. 'Aurunci' *RE*.

<sup>71</sup> Liv. 2.17.6. *Quam si capta foret*.

Similarly, the Volscian city of Antium was captured in 467 BC, its leaders were beheaded and its citizens sold.<sup>72</sup> As in previous engagements, the booty was given to the soldiers, but the captives along with the precious metals were reserved for the public treasury.<sup>73</sup> Conversely, a different tactic was used following the seizure of a Volscian camp in which all the captured soldiers were sold except the senators.<sup>74</sup> In 459 BC the Aequians decided to seize the opportunity afforded them by Rome's military engagements with the Volscians and occupied the Roman allied city of Tusculum. In response, the Romans sent the famed Cincinnatus, who defeated the Aequians, compelling them to undergo the humiliation of passing under the yoke in surrendering, and furthermore to submit to the Romans the city of Corbio to be sacked as they had done to Tusculum. A provision was made in which the free inhabitants of Tusculum were exchanged for the free inhabitants of Corbio.<sup>75</sup>

The beheading of leaders and enslavement of the populace, along with the execution of hostages were all brutal actions,<sup>76</sup> but it proved effective in convincing other cities that were either rebelling or contemplating taking up arms against Rome into making peace or staying loyal.<sup>77</sup> Roman treatment of disaffected neighbours resembled that of quashed rebellions, the leaders were sought and punishment was meted *ad exemplum*, with the ultimate goal of returning the majority of the rebellious into the status quo of the Roman fold. Ultimately, enslavements during this time were rare, certainly by later comparison. The capture and retention of captives as slaves or hostages was not even listed in the grievances that Coriolanus suggested the Volscians ask the Romans to recompense.<sup>78</sup> It seems more likely that enslavements were limited, and used only as a trope of later conflicts to describe the violence of nearly fraternal strife amongst the cities of central Italy at this time.<sup>79</sup> It is hard to

<sup>72</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.21.7. The city seems to be sacked twice according to Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.56.5; 10.21.6 and Liv 2.65.6; 3.1.1. If the two sacks are actually one and the same, then according to Dionysius' history, the captives of Antium were not publicly sold until eight years later, as Volkman 1990, 36 seems to suggest. Plut. *Cor.* 9.1 mentions the capture of some captives in an initial engagement, and later at Antium many captives were taken along with a great deal of booty (Plut. *Cor.* 13.4).

<sup>73</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.56.9. Here however, Coriolanus was rewarded for conspicuous valour and presented with ten captives, he declined accepting only a single captive who was a friend of his along with a horse (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.94.2).

<sup>74</sup> 431 BC. Strictly *venum* rather than *sub corona* (Liv. 4.29.4).

<sup>75</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.24.7-8.

<sup>76</sup> As at Pometia (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.30.1).

<sup>77</sup> After Lake Regillus (Liv. 2.25.6) at Pometia (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.29.5).

<sup>78</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.8.3, only the return of cities indicates a return of humans taken, not specifically captives. Πέμπετε οὖν πρέσβεις ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντες ἅς κατέχουσιν ὑμῶν πόλεις.

<sup>79</sup> The Romans were not alone in taking cities and subjecting the inhabitants to violence and slavery. Cf. the actions of Coriolanus against cities allied to Rome, specifically Tolerium, Lavicum, Pedum, and later Bola, (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.17.6-18; Plut. *Cor.* 28.3). The sack of Tusculum and Ortona by the Aequians in 459

imagine that the enslaved captives, still remaining in Latium from their capture by the Volscians under Coriolanus, were not eventually restored.

Rome had profited from the wars with their neighbours at the end of the monarchy as the booty from conflict was used in constructing the first temple to Jupiter and the Circus Maximus.<sup>80</sup> During the fifth century Rome entered a period of decline as evinced by the reduction and lack of growth in census figures.<sup>81</sup> There is little explanation for this lack of growth, but Roman expansion seems to have slowed significantly, perhaps as a result of internal class struggle between the plebeian and patrician orders,<sup>82</sup> or external competition with Veii, which resulted in a series of engagements and culminated in the destruction of that city, and the supposed enslavement of many of its inhabitants in 396 BC.<sup>83</sup>

The sack of Veii has been interpreted as the watershed moment in Roman enslavement practices by many historians. In Harris' view the Roman economy of the early fourth century was not developed enough to accommodate the introduction of over 10,000 slaves, and considerable enslavements were not a feature until later in the century because of Rome's military weakness following the Gallic sack of the city.<sup>84</sup> Eder comments that the procurement of a considerable amount of land precipitated a need to feed the Veians who were enslaved, and so the acquisition of land went hand in hand with the acquisition of workers to till it.<sup>85</sup> Eder seems to be following the conclusions of Ogilvie, in which he believes that early Rome was not able to support large slave numbers,<sup>86</sup> but after the sack of Veii the sale of several thousand captives was possible because the large addition to the *ager Romanus* facilitated their use as labourers.<sup>87</sup> However, Cornell believes only a few Veians

---

BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.20.3; 26.3). The Tusculans were exchanged, but no such release was negotiated for the citizens of Ortona, see Volkmann 1990, 38-9. Also the Samnites seized the city of Cumae in 421 and sold the survivors according to Diod. Sic. 12.76.5 (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 15.6; Liv. 4.44.12; Strab. 5.243).

<sup>80</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.69.1; Liv. 1.38.7; 55.1. It is interesting that the temple of Jupiter would later be associated with the slave market and manumitted slaves in several inscriptions (*CIL* 6.396; 397a; 397b; 398; 399).

<sup>81</sup> 150,000 in 498 BC, according to Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.75.3 and would not return to 150,000 again until 393 BC when Plin. *HN* 23.16 states that the 152,573 were recorded in the census, there is little evidence to suggest that Rome suffered any major military losses that would result in a reduction of territory or manpower, see Thomsen 1980, 118-21; Cornell 1995, 207-8. Brunt 1971, 23f was highly sceptical of any census figure prior to 225 BC.

<sup>82</sup> Liv. 3.9-57; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.1-60.

<sup>83</sup> Diod. Sic. 14.93.2 ἐξανδραπόδοισμένοι; Liv. 5.22.1 *sub corona vendere*.

<sup>84</sup> Harris 1984, 23-24; 1971, 41; 1979, 59.

<sup>85</sup> Eder 1990, 546f.

<sup>86</sup> Ogilvie 1965, 677 suggests that the references in Livy to slaves in early Rome are anachronistic colourings that reflect how Romans of the first century viewed their early history and the composition of its population.

<sup>87</sup> Ogilvie 1965, 678.

were actually enslaved and that in fact most of the inhabitants of the city were given Roman citizenship, thereby eliminating their threat through enfranchisement.<sup>88</sup> Livy suggests that at least some of the Veians were granted citizenship,<sup>89</sup> but what is clear, is soon after the acquisition of the *ager Veientanus*, four full tribes were added at Rome.<sup>90</sup> The addition of these four tribes must have represented a considerable addition to the citizen rolls, perhaps making the sharp increase in the census record for 393 BC more likely.<sup>91</sup> A similar addition was made to the citizen rolls following the defeat of the Hernici in 358 BC with the district situated on Hernician soil.<sup>92</sup> The addition of citizens after the fall of Veii and the general hesitation in enslaving enemies prior and well after the siege seems to suggest that Cornell's view is the more probable.

To add weight to the argument, Welwei has highlighted a number of potential problems with the theory that the Romans enslaved all the Veians. In his view it was unlikely that slave traders would have been willing to purchase over ten thousand slaves, especially when most Romans were not in the position to buy slaves at all, and in the absence of buyers little profit could have been realised in selling the captives. Furthermore, Welwei believes the farms would have to have been fitted for the use of slave labour, and the labourers themselves would require substantial rehabilitation after the malnourishment stemming from the starvation always accompanying a siege.<sup>93</sup> Welwei, agreeing with Harris, suggests that the acquisition of land was the real factor in changing Rome's ability to acquire slaves, but acknowledges that the slaves of the Veians could also have been taken, and that they may have represented a considerable number.<sup>94</sup> This is improbable, as it is highly doubtful that the Romans were incapable of maintaining large numbers of slaves whilst their Veian neighbours could, and in any case, the hypothetical acquisition of twice as many slaves would have little impact on the city's demographics as slaves represented only a small minority of the population at this time.

---

<sup>88</sup> Cornell 1995, 320.

<sup>89</sup> Liv. 6.4.4. As these were granted citizenship for a reward of loyalty to Rome it is possible they were made citizens immediately after the fall of Veii and therefore rewarded with land in the same manner as other Roman citizens.

<sup>90</sup> Liv. 6.5.8. The Arniensis, Stellatina, Sabatina and Tromentina c. 387 BC, see Taylor 1960, 48-9. Oakley 1997 I, 440-1 suggests that the Tromentina tribe were established from the site of Veii, as it was the municipal tribe of the Veians under Augustus, see further Taylor 1960, 46f.

<sup>91</sup> From 117,319 in 459 BC (Liv. 3.24.10 ; Eutrop. 1.16) to 152,573 (Plin. *HN* 33.16), see Brunt 1971, 13.

<sup>92</sup> Liv. 7.15.9.

<sup>93</sup> Such a change in the villa structure did not occur until much later in the Republican period, see Carandini 1985; Rathbone 1983, 162.

<sup>94</sup> Welwei 2000, 34-35; Harris 1990, 499.

Rome's sudden acquisition of the *ager Veientanus*, nearly doubling the *ager Romanus*, was an impressive victory, but it was shortly eclipsed by the sack of the city by the Gauls.<sup>95</sup> The later writers, Livy, Dionysius, Plutarch and Dio Cassius, all give an account of a rapid recovery by Rome in which Camillus won a series of stunning victories over the Gauls.<sup>96</sup> Such a recovery as portrayed by these writers is questionable, in particular Livy, whose narrative offers the fullest account.<sup>97</sup> The validity of the different narratives need not be discussed here as it has little bearing on capture by the Romans, since few human captures are mentioned at all. It seems that the reassertion of Rome's supremacy over the Latin allies was not through enslavement, but through a *tour de force*. Camillus' military triumph may have resulted in the enslavement of a few captives reserved for the celebration, but this could hardly have been the case for all the enemy captives, who at one time or another, came into Camillus' possession.<sup>98</sup> In general, narrative histories and biographies concerning Rome during the fourth century concentrate on the internal conflicts, centred largely on the class struggle within Rome. The sudden acquisition of large tracts of land, the monopoly on free land use by the rich and the subsequent debt crisis which led to the formation of the system of *nexum* dominate the social history of the century.

### Nexum

Internally, problems arose over land distribution and debt exemplified by the system of *nexum*. The problems of the late fifth and fourth centuries seem to provide a precursor to the economic model put forward by Hopkins regarding the rise of the slave economy at Rome in the second century.<sup>99</sup> Hopkins' model still represents the most concise formulation of the socio-economic theory that can be considered orthodox; with the notion of slaves, stemming from an influx of captives thereby replacing the free work force. This has remained the cornerstone of most interpretations of societal and economic models of the time. Imperial expansion benefited the rich, while neglecting to adequately enrich the poor in light of their service, leaving the latter open for exploitation by the former. In the case of the second

---

<sup>95</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>96</sup> Liv. 5.1f Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.74.4-75.3; Plut. *Cam.* 31f; Cass. Dio 7.28f.

<sup>97</sup> On the validity of accounts of Livy *et al.* here and a general summary of Rome's military expansion post 390 BC see Cornell 1989, 309-323 and Homo 1929, 554-5. Cornell's chapter in *CAH*<sup>2</sup> is exceptionally useful for this under-published period of Roman history.

<sup>98</sup> Prisoners sold after triumph, Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. *Cam.* 35.1-36.1.

<sup>99</sup> Hopkins 1978, 8f, particularly the diagram on p. 12.

century, according to Hopkins' model, this resulted in the replacement of the small land owner with large slave estates, forcing the poor into urban and largely dependant forms of work.<sup>100</sup> Exploitation, in this manner, was the direct utilisation of the poor for dependant labour predominantly in agriculture as indentured workers. The victims of such exploitation shared a common characteristic of humble loss to opulent oppressors,<sup>101</sup> in the case of *nexum* it was the soldier, whose absence from his home led to his demise, losing his land to enemy raids and falling victim to cruel usury at the hands of his creditors.<sup>102</sup> In Hopkins' model the soldier who is kept on a long, often distant, campaign sees his farm fall into neglect,<sup>103</sup> to be purchased by ruthless robber barons in an ancient equivalent of a today's cash for gold schemes.<sup>104</sup> The returning soldier was landless and dependant on benefactors for casual work or continued military service. At different times many of these landless citizens were given land outside of Italy in colonies, where they were taxed, rather than directly exploited for their labour.

*Nexum* as an institution was not slavery, since the *nexi* crucially retained their civic rights.<sup>105</sup> The treatment of *nexi* had the trappings of slavery, notably their chaining by the lender.<sup>106</sup> Presumably *nexum* was much like serfdom, as it is hard to imagine that once their labour was fully taken the *nexus* could ever earn enough to pay the debt. Most historians have focused on the exploitation of the *nexus* by the lender. The impoverished veteran cuts a sorry scene, but it is hard to imagine that *nexum* was ever proportionate to slavery. The debts were paid to the various parties owed on behalf of the debtor, and the lender gained the labour (*sua opera*) of

<sup>100</sup> The emergence of villas which fit Varro's (*Rust.* 1.194) concept of *villa perfecta* do not appear until the first century BC, with the famous villa at Settefinestre only becoming so after a second phase of building in the first century AD, see Carandini and Filippi 1985. That Roman farms were beginning to employ slave labour (at least in southern Italy) from the second century BC as testified by Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 8 (cf. App. *B. Civ.* 1.1.7-9). For the great estate *latifundia* of the Imperial period see Kuzișcin 1984, see also Rathbone 1983, 162-3.

<sup>101</sup> The impoverished soldier is a popular theme, as it contrasts the humble farmer soldier of honour, with the decadence of the later Roman elite. For this reason, figures who shunned opulence, such as Cincinnatus and Cato the Elder were held in high regard.

<sup>102</sup> This story is repeated by Cic. *Rep.* 2.58; Liv. 2.23; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.26, see Cornell 1995, 265-6.

<sup>103</sup> Citizens were required to serve for up to sixteen years, with cavalrymen afforded a reduction in required service to ten years. Soldiers were kept from home for long periods of time during the Second Punic War, Liv. 40.36.10 remarked that it took 6 years before a soldier was considered overdue for a return home (cf. App. *Hisp.* 78), see also Brunt 1962, 80. The length of service increased in the first century BC with the professionalism introduced by Marius, see Smith 1958, 22f.

<sup>104</sup> Hopkins 1978, 35-36. Hopkins assumes that recruitment generally occurred in the countryside, following the observation made by Brunt 1962 69f.

<sup>105</sup> Liv. 2.24.6; 2.28.4; Val. Max. 6.1.9.

<sup>106</sup> According to Ogilvie 1965, the presence of *nexi liberatio* (Festus Lindsay 1913, 165) suggests the slave was actually chained, whereas *solutio per aes et libram* Gai. *Inst.* 3.174, suggests that the chaining was symbolic as it is hard to imagine why, someone, who could perform a transaction to free themselves, would have been treated in the same manner as a common slave.

their newfound bondsman, and nothing more. As the harsh rules of debt permitted *actual* enslavement, it is unreasonable to assume that *nexum* was *de facto* slavery, by the nature of it being an alternative to servitude.<sup>107</sup> Similarly *nexum* was unlikely to have affected the property of the *nexus*, as he would have surely allowed the goods standing as surety to have been seized or sold in order to pay his debts; *nexum* was again an alternative to this. In all likelihood the majority of *nexi* maintained their small landholdings, passing their profits to their creditors. The story in Livy of a centurion made to work in an *ergastulum* seems to portray an anachronistic impression of how *nexum* worked.<sup>108</sup> It is hard to believe a free man would submit to a condition that was no different to enslavement, unless there were some advantages, and likewise difficult to understand why a creditor would need to detain a free man who *willingly* submitted his labour in the same fashion as an unmanageable slave.<sup>109</sup> Livy seems to be applying a feature of the first century BC to this early period, where there is no evidence that even slaves on estates were housed in such a way.

It is held that the abuses suffered by the debtors at the hands of the lenders eventually led to the system being abolished. The story of the abuse of a handsome youth at the hands of his father's creditor because he was a *nexus* is contrary to the principle that *nexum* expunged the bondsman's debts.<sup>110</sup> Of course removing the bondsman's ability to profit from his own labour probably plunged his family into perpetual reliance upon the creditor for their basic needs, forcing them into a form of serfdom in which they were legally free, but also legally forced into perpetual bondsmanship. It is the likeness to slavery that forced the strict reform of *nexum* through the resolution of the Senate under the *Lex Poetelia*,<sup>111</sup> Livy remarked, with

---

<sup>107</sup> *Stipulatio* was another means of contracting debt against one's self, if a suit was brought against the borrower in absence of repayment, he could be found immediately liable for the debt *manus iniectio*, which gave him 60 days in which the creditor had to maintain the debtor at his own expense (Gai. *Inst.* 4.17a). If unable to pay the debt, the debtor (*addictus/iudicatus*) could be sold abroad (*trans Tiberum*) or even killed (Gell. *NA* 20.1.47).

<sup>108</sup> Liv. 2.23.6. The *ergastulum* could be either a workhouse/factory (Isid. *Orig.* 15.6.1) or an underground prison (Apul. *Apol.* 47; Columella *Rust.* 1.6.3; 1.8.16; Liv. 2.23.6), or a combination of the two. Cf. Étienne 1974, 250 – 221; Marzanno 2004, 323-325.

<sup>109</sup> Columella *Rust.* 1.8.16 seems to suggest the *ergastulum* was a place of punishment, and Apul. *Apol.* 47 emphasised it being a place of confinement and torture.

<sup>110</sup> Liv. 8.28.7-9. Cf. Varr. *LL.* 7.105; Cic. *Rep.* 2.59; Dion. Hal. 16.5.1-3; Val. Max. 6.1.9. See further for the legal procedure of *nexum* in Jolowicz & Nicholas 1972, 164-6; Watson 1975, 111-24.

<sup>111</sup> *Lex Poetelia* was dated to 326 BC by Liv. 8.28.7-9 under the consulship of G. Poetelius Libo Visolus, Varro *Ling.* 7.105, attributes it to the dictatorship of the same Poetelius in 313 BC. The *lex Poetelia de ambitu* of 358 BC (Liv. 7.15.12) was probably introduced by Poetelius when he was a tribune. Neither date has any more or less an impact upon this study. *Nexum* was an obscure and obsolete debt solution to Livy (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 16.5), see also Jolowicz 1972, 164; Ogilvie 1965, 296-299; Oakley 1998, 689-94. It is unlikely that the *Lex Poetelia* put an end to debt bondage, defaulters were still subject to quasi-servitude or even outright slavery under the old debt laws, see Brunt 1971, 168; Oakley 1998, 690-1.



regards to debt, that “as for money lent, the debtor's goods, not his person, should be distrainable.”<sup>112</sup>

Since *nexum* did not produce a form of dependant labour akin to slavery, and was reformed once it began to be utilised like slavery, its removal could not have left a demand for chattel slavery, as it was not a like for like replacement. The Rome that emerged in the second half of the fourth century was a politically stronger, more cohesive Rome, capable of fielding a large army levied from an increased citizen body and strongly bound allies. Both the ending of *nexum* by the *lex Poetelia* at the end of the fourth century and the rapid expansion of Rome beyond *Latium* in Italy from the end of the fourth century, have made it easy to place the rise of the slave economy in Rome to this point in history and, in particular, to the Third Samnite War.<sup>113</sup>

### The Fourth Century

Externally, Rome’s military expansion during the fourth century was a quest to gain ever increasing political dominance over her Italic neighbours. There was a clear trend in Italy from at least the sixth century for cities to form into regional confederacies and leagues. The Romans were only peculiar in their rapid ascendancy and success in expanding the league system beyond *Latium*. During the fourth century, the Roman-Latin relationship went from one based on a partnership between equals to one of Roman suzerainty.<sup>114</sup> Though the process of Roman domination within the League had apparent roots in the fifth century, it was effectively and symbolically sealed following the Latin War and the subsequent treaty in 338 BC, in which Rome was essentially affirmed as the driver of foreign affairs in the League. Rome slowly subjected the people of Italy into a web of alliances based on varying and often complex connections, which often included the award of Roman citizenship (*civitas* or *civitas sine suffragio*) and formal allied status, *socii* and *amici*.<sup>115</sup> It is hard to identify the

---

<sup>112</sup> Liv. 8.28.9 Loeb trans. *pecuniae creditae bona debitoris, non corpus obnoxium esset. ita nexi soluti, cautumque in posterum ne necterentur.*

<sup>113</sup> Argued by Cornell 1989, 388-389; Harris 1979, 59; Oakley 1993, 24-25. See below for Samnite War.

<sup>114</sup> The Latin League was created during the seventh century and the Romans became the head of the league under Tarquinius Superbus. The Republic was allied with the league through the Cassian treaty (*foedus Cassianum*) which was probably equivalent to a *foedus aequum* (a treaty amongst equals), see Sherwin-White 1973, 23-25.

<sup>115</sup> Exemplified by the admission of the new voting tribes: the Publilia and Pomptina in 358 BC, the Scaptia and Maecia in 332 BC, Oufentina and Falernia in 318 BC and the Aniensis and Terentina in 299 BC. The grant of citizenship without the vote began from the mid fourth century, with the admission of the Caerites in 353 BC (Gell. *NA* 16.13.7), see Taylor 1960, 79. It has been suggested by Sordi 1960, 78 that the Veliterni were also

motives of Roman expansion in any strict terms, but it is clear that as a result Rome gained considerable amounts of land, which came directly under the ownership and control of the state. Eventually these acquisitions would have a considerable impact on Roman politics in the second and first centuries, but it could hardly be seen as a primary motive for expansion at this time. The exertion of any direct control over newly acquired lands by the Romans was relatively limited as predominantly Latin colonies were established in the new acquisitions.<sup>116</sup> The total land taken from the defeated cities and devoted to the colonies was relatively small.<sup>117</sup> Apart from this initial contribution of land, Rome's only demand of the newly submitted allies was an annual contribution towards military levies.

Roman treatment of captives during this early period reflected the foreign policy geared towards the acquisition of favourable alliances, rather than territorial acquisition. From the fall of Veii until the Second Samnite War at the end of the century, there are only two noted instances of enslavement. After the capture of Sutrium in 388 BC, the remaining enemy soldiers were paraded in Camillus' triumph and then sold.<sup>118</sup> Then in 356 BC, following a victory over the Volscians, the remaining soldiers were paraded in the triumph and then sold.<sup>119</sup> During the Second Samnite War (326 – 304 BC) there is only one clear instance of captives being enslaved by the Romans. After the defeat of the Samnites and their allies near Allifae in 308 BC the Samnite soldiers were stripped and sent under the yoke as per an agreement (*deditio*) they made in surrendering.<sup>120</sup> The Samnite allies, however, were not

---

admitted *sine suffragio* around the same time. This may in fact have been a practice of limited incorporation employed by the Etruscans.

<sup>116</sup> Prior to the Third Samnite War, to the South of Rome, the Latin colonies of Circeii (393 BC), Setia (383 BC), Cales (334 BC), Fregellae (328 BC), Saticula (313 BC), Suessa Aurunca (313 BC) and Sora (303 BC); to the North, Sutrium (383 BC), Nepete (383 BC) and specifically in the *ager Veiianus* Alba Fucens (303 BC), Narnia (299 BC) and Carseoli (298 BC). Far to the East beyond the Apennines and the Samnite controlled lands the Latin colony of Luceria was established in 314 BC. The Roman colonies of the fourth century were concentrated on the coast of Latium and northern Campania at Antium (338 BC), Terracina (239 BC), Minturnae (295 BC), and Sinuessa (295 BC), see Cornell 1989, 391 fig. 48.

<sup>117</sup> Colonies in the fourth century were typically formed of 2,000 male citizens and according to Livy between two and seven *iugera* was allotted for each citizen (Liv. 5.24.4; 5.30.8; 6.15.12; 8.11.14 8.21.11. Ignoring the pitiful two-thirds suggested for the Privernate district). Diod. Sic. 14.102.4 suggested the colony at Veii received between 4 and 28 *plethra* per head (3-21 *iugera*). For the odd measurement of *plethora* see Carter 2006, 95-6; Pelgrom 2008, 128; Quilici 1994, 128. Varro *Rust.* 1.10.2 had a notion that two *iugera* was allotted per citizen. The survey of Gabba 1978, 250-8 suggests that the individual allotments of colonists were closer to Livy's figure of seven *iugera*. Based on *iugera* for a typical colony of 2,000, the land allotment would be approximately 38 km<sup>2</sup>. For colony populations in general see Brunt 1971, 56f; Salmon 1969, *passim*. For the land size of these colonies and usage by the colonists see Pelgrom 2008, 338.

<sup>118</sup> Mostly Etruscans soldiers who were garrisoning the city Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. *Cam.* 35.1-36.1.

<sup>119</sup> Liv. 7.27.8. Livy gives a figure of 4,000 captives, but it is unlikely that all of these were marched in the triumph. It is possible that the captives of an Etruscan camp in the same year were treated the same way (Liv. 2.17.9).

<sup>120</sup> Liv. 9.42.7.

protected by the same agreement and Livy states that 7,000 of these were sold as slaves.<sup>121</sup> Of the allies, the Hernici soldiers were sought out for it to be determined if they had been forcibly conscripted or had willingly joined the Samnites.<sup>122</sup> The matter was referred to the Senate to judge them. This angered several of the Hernician cities and they declared war on the Romans. The rebellion was ill conceived, and the dedication of a full consular army towards a war with the Hernici was enough to scare them into surrendering.<sup>123</sup> In the instance of Allifae, it is possible to infer that the captives of Talium and Silvium, as they are expressed by Diodorus, were taken as *αἰχμάλωτος*.<sup>124</sup>

Rome won several engagements with the Samnites and Etruscans during the Second Samnite War. On three occasions the defeated were spared execution or enslavement,<sup>125</sup> notably in 320 BC when the Roman commander Papirius was able to avenge the Roman defeat by the Samnites in the Caudine Pass, where the Romans had been trapped and forced to pass under the Yoke.<sup>126</sup> In response, Papirius ordered the 7,000 Samnites he captured to be sent under the yoke in the same fashion that the Romans had been humiliated.<sup>127</sup> In the case of the cities of Canusium and Teanum, Livy states that hostages were received by the Romans to ensure their future compliance.<sup>128</sup> Following the war with the Samnites, the Romans successfully defeated the Aequi, who were ‘subjugated’ according to Livy, and admitted as *cives Romani* according to Cicero.<sup>129</sup> Other cities fared far worse during the Second Samnite War. At Satricum the faction within the city that had chosen to support the Samnites were executed.<sup>130</sup> Likewise the chief magistrates of Nola were killed.<sup>131</sup> The city of Luceria had withdrawn their support and it was retaken by the Romans, after which the Lucerians and the Samnite garrison were executed.<sup>132</sup> At Cluviae, in response to the torture and murder of their Roman garrison, all the males of the city were massacred and it is not difficult to imagine that, in

<sup>121</sup> Liv. 9.42 *sub corona veniere*.

<sup>122</sup> They were allies (*foedus cassianum*) of the Romans since at least 389 BC (Liv. 6.2.2). They were subjugated under a Roman controlled treaty in 359 BC 7.15.9, see s.v. ‘Hernici’ *RE*.

<sup>123</sup> Liv. 9.42.8-43.7.

<sup>124</sup> Talium Diod. (Sic 20.26.3) Silvium (Diod. Sic. 20.80.2).

<sup>125</sup> Luceria 320 BC (Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; *FGrH* 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9), Canusium 318 BC (Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4) and Teanum 318 BC (Liv. 9.20.4).

<sup>126</sup> Liv. 9.31.7.

<sup>127</sup> Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; *FGrH* 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9.

<sup>128</sup> Canusium (Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4) Teanum (Liv. 9.20.4).

<sup>129</sup> Liv. 10.1.9 *Aequos subegit*; Cic. *Off.* 1.32, cf. Strab. 3.4.

<sup>130</sup> Liv. 9.16.9; 26.33.10; Oros. 3.15.9-10.

<sup>131</sup> Diod. Sic. 19.101.3, cf. Liv. 9.28.6.

<sup>132</sup> Liv. 9.26.3.

such an instance, many of the women and children would have been enslaved, although Livy is silent on the matter.<sup>133</sup>

### **The Third Samnite War and the Misinterpretation of Livy**

Competition is an integral aspect of a republican government, as competition for offices is the cornerstone to candidacy and the fundamental means of election. In Roman society this competition was grounded upon military participation; political office required a minimum service, and military success was often the basis on which many candidates were elected. Furthermore, only the highest political offices could command full armies, and victory in war frequently defined the measure of one's success once elected. Indeed, such competition, and the value placed upon military success were the driving points of Roman imperialism; underpinning the theory of Hopkins, as a necessary prerequisite to the aggressive expansion theory of Harris, and by extension, anyone trying to understand the exceptional bellicosity of Rome.<sup>134</sup> Political competition and martial tradition were omnipresent in Roman society, and as overarching factors in the expansion of the Republic they can never be discounted. However, the reasons for individual conflicts were often manifold, and it is in determining the factors which led to individual conflicts that a tremendous amount of argument should be concerned. Enslavement as a mechanism of imperialism through subjugation, suppression and exploitation, is often an important aspect of imperialist theory, and thus it is against these theories that the importance of particular instances of enslavement becomes apparent, and overall, the acquisition of slaves constitutes a substantially important contribution to the economic motivation behind war.

Harris argued that the Senate continually carried out a conscious policy of aggressive warfare for the enrichment of the state from at least the time of the Third Samnite War.<sup>135</sup> Warfare could be profitable, at least for those directly involved in successful ones. Harris believed that the Romans must have associated military success with material gain, and the evidence is clear in the construction of buildings, growth in individual wealth and that of the Roman

---

<sup>133</sup> Liv. 9.31.3.

<sup>134</sup> Harris 1979, 9-15; Hopkins 1978, 1-98. Cf. the review of North 1981, 1-9.

<sup>135</sup> Harris 1979, 54-58. The Senate has traditionally been viewed as the primary director in Roman policy, see Mommsen 1887 III, 1158; Momigliano (*s.v.* 'Senatus' *OCD*); Kunkel 1966, 19. More recently Eckstein 1987, *passim* has shown that as Roman wars were fought with increasing distance from Rome, the Roman general had more power in effecting foreign policy directly rather than under the supervision of the *senatus consultum*.

treasury; all enriched from the proceeds of war. Any theory concerning the Romans acting otherwise is simply dismissed as pertaining to the false tradition that early Rome was free of any form of *avaritia*.<sup>136</sup> According to Harris' theory, the acquisition of slaves through conflict was a part of the clear economic benefit of military action, and so mass enslavement became *ipso facto* a motive for war.

There were, however, motivations which support the 'defensive' or 'accidental' imperialism theory which contrasts with the ideas of Harris.<sup>137</sup> It is true that many of Rome's wars were profitable. But, they also fought numerous unprofitable conflicts, as well as wars in which they did not fully exploit their economic advantage.<sup>138</sup> Roman policy in dealing with their Italian neighbours suggests that they were concerned with preserving the Roman state through an extended region of buffer states, allied and subjected to Rome in increasingly secure and permanent alliances, resulting in the enfranchisement and amalgamation of the Italian states.<sup>139</sup> Under this theory of the motivation of Roman imperialism it is more difficult to accept the enslavement of captives from states that were quickly offered alliances and varying degrees of citizenship.

For the Third Samnite War we have the first consistent account of a Roman campaign in which battle figures are regularly given, along with enemy captured and killed, as well as the amount of gold, silver and bronze paid into the treasury from spoils. Given the importance of enslavement as a means of generating wealth from war, it is not a matter of coincidence that the presence of these figures has been interpreted as the beginning of Roman mass enslavements by many historians.<sup>140</sup>

In his tenth book, Livy breaks from the pace of his first nine, which cover the first four hundred years of Roman history, to describe the events of roughly ten years within a single

---

<sup>136</sup> Eckstein 1987, xiv.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Sherwin-White's criticism of Harris 1980, 177. For a more balanced view of the merits of both Harris' aggressive theory and the defensive theory, see North 1981, 1-9. See also Luttwak 1980, 606. It must be said Harris' focus is largely on the mid-late Republic, although he cites the Third Samnite War as an exemplum that the mechanisms for economic gains and motives in warfare were present in early Roman history.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Sherwin-White 1980, 179. On the limitations of profit from war see Veyne 1975, *passim*.

<sup>139</sup> Liska 1978 11-12 gives this as an explanation for many state's political objectives in controlling neighbours. Cf. the motives of Roman politics, see Eckstein 1987, xiv.

<sup>140</sup> Harris 1979, 59; Oakley 2005a IV, 193-194; Cornell 1989, 388-389; Scheidel 2011, 294. Finley 1980 suggests this occurred much later probably during the Second Punic War. Hopkins 1978, 8-15 does not specifically name captives as the source of slaves for the early period, Welwei 2000, *passim* is non-committal on a period and Salmon 1967 neglects to mention the captures in any significant way. Also the enslavement of captives during the Samnite Wars factored significantly into the estimates of the state revenue for the 290's in Frank 1933 I, 43 n3.

book, providing a consistent annual narrative for the final campaign against the Samnites and on-going fighting with Etruscans, Sabines, Umbrians and Gauls to the north. The series of captures recorded by Livy occur entirely in the second half of the book, which may indicate that Livy is working from a source directly involved with the events or records made during the 290's BC.<sup>141</sup> Whilst there are earlier examples of enemy casualties and captives, even in Livy, there are no earlier examples within Roman history in which consistent figures for enemy captured are given for an entire campaign. Since books 11 – 20 of Livy are lost it is impossible to conclude if the figures for the captures are an isolated instance in which the historian had the benefit of working with a first hand account or primary record. It is clear, however, that after Livy's narrative resumes with book 21 specific casualty numbers and battle figures are a more regular occurrence.

In the account of the Third Samnite War, Livy is highly methodical in recording the aftermath of battle, particularly in giving the details of the enemy figures killed or captured. In contrast, Roman casualties are rarely mentioned.<sup>142</sup> The preciseness of many figures, sometimes rounded to the nearest ten, suggests that Livy was working with documents that recorded the aftermath of battles. Typically the number of casualties was inflated by ancient historians, but in the case of the Third Samnite War Livy's figures seem to correspond with the losses that would be expected from the size of the armies involved. Despite the plausibility of the numbers, particularly the relatively conservative casualty numbers used by Livy, it is clear they are still presented with some degree of artifice, as the numbers are just as often rounded as they are specific.<sup>143</sup> During the Third Samnite War the Romans often fielded more than one army,<sup>144</sup> and as engagements were fought by multiple commanders over greater distances the need for communication between each army, including specific casualty figures, became necessary to fulfil a co-ordinated strategy. This information was also important in granting triumphs or ovations, since honours were awarded on the basis of the

---

<sup>141</sup> Oakley 2005a IV, 194. Oakley states that there were only three other instances of specific figures for enemy captives in early Roman history (Liv. 9.42.8; 9.44.7 and Diod. Sic. 20.80.2). However, there are numerous early examples, though most could be little more than traditional figures or fictitious numbers for the purpose of elaboration e.g. 4,000 in 502 BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.49.1); 6,000 ransomed after Lake Regullus in 498 BC (Liv. 2.22.5); 8,000 in 356 BC (Liv. 2.17.9); 7,000 Samnites sent under the yoke in 320 BC (Liv. 9.15.6, Oros. 3.15.9); and certainly the exaggerated figure of 60,000 at Perugia in 310 BC (Diod. Sic. 20.35.4; Liv. 9.37.11; 40.19).

<sup>142</sup> At the battle of Sentinum 8,700 Romans and allies (*socii*) were said to have fallen (Liv. 10.29.17).

<sup>143</sup> Welwei 2000, 42-43.

<sup>144</sup> For example in 295 BC there were two new consuls for that year, Fabius and Decius (Liv. 10.26.14), Volumnius operating as a proconsul (Liv. 10.27.1) and two pro-praetors Gnaeus Fulvius and Lucius Postumius Magellus (Liv. 10.26.15) each with their respective armies.

number of enemy killed or captured.<sup>145</sup> In all likelihood such communications between the commanders, or between the commanders and the Senate, were preserved and drawn upon by either Livy himself or his source.

Livy's neglect to consistently convey Roman battle casualties and his fickle reporting of the number of enemy killed or captured illustrates the lack of importance he attributed to casualty figures rather than their absence within the communications of commanders. Once Livy's books resume, it is clear that, he was generally unconcerned with the detailed outcome of battle. The focus of his history tends to skirt around the impact of losses upon the enemy, and often he omits the fate of captives all together. During the Third Samnite War in 295 BC, at a pivotal battle near Sentinum, the Romans defeated a combined Samnite and Gallic force with the loss of their consul Publius Decius Mus. Throughout the course of this battle the fighting is described in symbolically heroic detail.<sup>146</sup> The battle hangs in the balance with only a last minute reverse giving the Romans victory. Retrospectively this engagement was seen as a turning point in the war, and important and large enough for word to have spread to the Greek world.<sup>147</sup> Despite the significance of the battle, which is recounted in a large passage within the tenth book, very little of the narrative is devoted to the actual outcome in terms of human cost. Livy sums up the battle in a couple of lines, "twenty five thousand of the enemy were killed, eight thousand captured; nor was it a bloodless victory, for of the army of Publius Decius, seven thousand were slain and seventeen hundred of the army of Fabius."<sup>148</sup> Livy states that a search for Decius' body was made and its retrieval from underneath countless enemy dead was testament to his bravery. The rest of 295 BC is quickly summed up and the events of the year are concluded with a triumph celebrated by Fabius Rullianus and the son of Publius Decius.<sup>149</sup> In the narrative surrounding the Roman victory at Sentinum Livy only remarks in two lines the human cost for both sides. It serves only as a quick corroboration of the scale of the victory, 25,000 enemy killed (probably an exaggeration) coupled with the impressive 8,000 captured represents one of the most significant losses of a Roman enemy to date, and furthermore the loss of 8,700 Roman soldiers and allies was also remarkable on

---

<sup>145</sup> See Beard 2007, 206-9; Richardson 1975, 60-62.

<sup>146</sup> Liv. 10.27.-29. Prior to battle an omen of Roman victory was perceived by a wolf chasing a deer between the two armies (Liv. 10.27.8-9).

<sup>147</sup> Duris of Samos (early third century) commented upon the size of the battle in Diod. Sic. 21.6 (*FGh* 76.56).

<sup>148</sup> Liv. 10.29.17-18, *Caesa eo die hostium viginti quinque milia, octo capta. nec incruenta victoria fuit; nam ex P. Deci exercitu caesa septem milia, ex Fabi mille septingenti.*

<sup>149</sup> Liv. 10.30.8; cf. Degrassi 1954, 97.

their part.<sup>150</sup> Apart from illustrating the scale of victory these numbers hold little significance to Livy, other than illustrating that the battle was less decisive than it could have been.<sup>151</sup> With so few words devoted to the human cost in such a significant battle it is apparent that Livy is generally unconcerned with the fate of captives and this is clearly evident in his sparse phrasing of rarely anything more than *caeda* or *capta*.

Despite Livy's general disinterest in captives, there is enough detail in the narrative to analyse the effects of war and capture on both the Romans and the vanquished Samnites. The instances of actual capture are well known from the partial collection of Livian references by Frank and Volkmann, as well as the full list of Livy's references to enslavement by the Romans in Harris, and the gathering of these into a concise table by Cornell.<sup>152</sup> Apart from Volkmann, in which the references comprise a portion of a wider survey, the purpose of these was simply to highlight a wider phenomenon of a growing slave system in Rome and economic gain from war. To these brief surveys must be added the study of Welwei, who has been the only historian to analyse the Third Samnite War with regards to the practice of capture by the Romans in any depth.<sup>153</sup> As I wish to analyse the degree to which the Romans actually enslaved the captives of this war, it is necessary to provide a summary.

The Third Samnite War was fought primarily in Campania and Samnium, but there was also a dangerous second front to the north against a number of independent Etruscan cities and their mercenary Gauls. The strong cohesion of the Samnite league made the war upon them the primary focus of the Romans. In the years preceding the war, the Etruscans, under the pretence of protecting themselves from the Gauls, began amassing a large force that threatened Rome; this was exacerbated by the talks held between the Etruscans and the invading Gauls which led to the latter being bought off. The Romans reacted by sending the newly appointed Consul M. Valerius into Etruria in 299 BC.<sup>154</sup> Valerius, by Livy's account, pillaged the land about Southern Etruria, scorching farms and villages. Despite such provocation, the Etruscans did not put up any significant resistance, and the consul returned home. At the same time, to the south of Rome the Samnites began raiding their neighbours the Lucanians. As a result, the Lucanians entreated the Romans to pledge protection over

---

<sup>150</sup> Perhaps a loss of nearly a quarter of the force of roughly 40,000, if in fact there were four full legions of the day and an equal number of allies. On the size of legions at this time see Keppie 1984, 17-22.

<sup>151</sup> Levene 1993, 234.

<sup>152</sup> Frank 1933 I, 43 n3; Volkmann 1990, 40; Harris 1971, 59 n.4; Cornell 1989, 389.

<sup>153</sup> Welwei 2000, 42f.

<sup>154</sup> Liv. 10.11.1-6.



them in exchange for an alliance. When a Roman envoy was sent to the Samnites to urge them to desist from their aggression upon the Lucanians he was threatened, and so the Romans entered a war on a second front with the Samnites.<sup>155</sup>

An interregnum caused a rushed election for consuls in 298 BC, in which the Romans elected L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus and Gn. Fulvius. In 298 BC, according to Livy, Scipio was sent to Etruria. There, his scorched earth policy, unlike that of Valerius, enticed the Etruscans into a single engagement in which the Romans at last prevailed, earning a considerable amount of booty.<sup>156</sup> The other consul was sent into Samnium, capturing Bovianum and Aufidena,<sup>157</sup> and earning a triumph against the Samnites.<sup>158</sup> A second century epitaph for Scipio Barbatus commemorates his victories as consul in Samnium and is in direct contrast with Livy's account and the *fasti triumphalis*.<sup>159</sup> This variance illustrates the confusion of early Roman history in our sources and the evident variation in tradition.<sup>160</sup> After the campaigns of 298 BC both the Samnites and Etruscans realised the necessity of gathering larger and stronger forces to oppose the Romans. In response, in 297 BC the Roman centuries elected the reluctant Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus as consul. He had been a hero during previous conflicts and held the office of consul three times; as his colleague they elected the proven Publius Decius to his third consulship. Due to the respected stature of these two appointments the Etruscans held councils to consider peace with Rome, leaving the Samnites open to the full brunt of the Roman military. In a field engagement the army of Fabius defeated a Samnite force near the city of Tifernum, resulting in the death of 3,400 Samnites and the capture of 830 prisoners and 23 standards.<sup>161</sup> Meanwhile, the other consul Decius killed 2,000 Apulians allied to the Samnites at Beneventum.<sup>162</sup> Throughout 297 BC the two consuls pillaged the Liris Valley in hopes of disrupting Samnite agriculture for the following year. At some point

---

<sup>155</sup> Liv. 10.11.9- 12.3; Polyb. 2.19.1-2.

<sup>156</sup> Liv. 10.12.6-8.

<sup>157</sup> According to Salmon 1967, 261 the capture of Bovianum is likely a fictitious event, based on Livy's confusion with the earlier capture of that city when another Fulvius was consul, cf. Liv. 9.44.13 Diod. Sic. 20.90.4. On the other hand the capture of Aufidena is possible given the approach from Latium. Oakley 1995, 76 believes Castel di Sangro to be the most likely site.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Liv. 10.13.1 ; Degrassi 1954, 97.

<sup>159</sup> *ILLRP* 309.

<sup>160</sup> Cornell 1989, 377. Note the difference in tradition for the events of 296 BC that Liv. 10.17.11-12 admits.

<sup>161</sup> Liv. 10.14.21 *Tria milia et quadringenti caesi, capti octingenti ferme triginta, signa militaria capta tria et viginti.*

<sup>162</sup> Liv. 10.15.6.

in the year the only other notable engagement with enemy forces resulted in Fabius taking a place named Cimetra,<sup>163</sup> acquiring there 2,900 fighting men as captives, having slain 930.<sup>164</sup>

In 296 BC two new consuls were elected, Lucius Volumnius and Appius Claudius. However, Publius Decius Mus was tasked with continuing his scorched earth strategy throughout the elections and had his command prorogued. Likewise, Fabius' command was extended so that there were essentially four commanders in the field in a single year.<sup>165</sup> Decius then disengaged from the policy of laying waste to the land and led his army to Murgantia, there surrounding and capturing 2,100 Samnite soldiers, along with a large quantity of booty.<sup>166</sup> Welwei suggests that the numbers are plausible, but the large amount of booty seems to be an invention of Livy to lend credibility to Decius' abandoning his strategy of pillaging the countryside in favour of taking cities.<sup>167</sup> After Murgantia, Decius called upon the soldiers to alleviate themselves of their booty by selling it and in so doing to lure the traders on.<sup>168</sup> Over criticism of Livy's invention here needs to be avoided; if in fact Decius' strategy had been to ravage the countryside he was probably moving lightly with a limited baggage train, and therefore the idea that he had to encourage his troops to sell the booty in order to move quickly is a reasonable assertion. Decius immediately moved his army against the city of Romulea, where in a single day the siege was carried, with 2,100 enemies killed and 6,000 captured (a lot to off-load quickly), along with a very large quantity of booty which the soldiers were again obliged to sell.<sup>169</sup> From there Decius moved on to Ferentum, where the army encountered stiffer resistance, but gained yet more spoils.<sup>170</sup> Welwei's scepticism regarding Livy's account of Decius' actions is acceptable in regards to the numbers, which seem to be arbitrarily recorded with varying degrees of accuracy, and there is no clear method present in Livy's choice in reporting specific or rounded figures. However, it is difficult to disregard the episode with the troops selling their booty as it seems highly probable given the sudden change in Decius' strategy. That the actual shift in strategy occurred is in itself

<sup>163</sup> Cimetra is unknown, the name implies a Volscian city, but could also be Etruscan, see Salmon 1967, 262 n3.

<sup>164</sup> Liv. 10.15.6. *Fabius etiam urbem Cimetram cepit, ibi capta armatorum duo milia nongenti.*

<sup>165</sup> Cornell 1989, 377-8 suggests that the unorthodox extension of command and the number of commanders in a single year during much of the Third Samnite War was reflective of a transitional system of military office which had previously used the office of dictator in frequent engagements to orchestrate fighting across multiple fronts and multiple army groups. It must be said that there was particularly strained relations within the patrician elements of the Senate (Liv. 10.15.12).

<sup>166</sup> Liv. 10.17.4 *duo milia Samnitium et centum pugnantes circumventi captique, et alia praeda ingens capta est.*

<sup>167</sup> Welwei 2000, 43.

<sup>168</sup> Liv. 10.17.5-6.

<sup>169</sup> Liv. 10.17.8 *ad duo milia et trecenti occisi et sex milia hominum capta, et miles ingenti praeda potiusquam vendere, sicut priorem, coactus.*

<sup>170</sup> No mention of captives, Liv. 10.17.10.

questionable, but seems possible given the fact that a series of large victories that profited the soldiers would ensure success in the consular elections of the following year, elections in which Decius won office.<sup>171</sup>

Elsewhere in Samnium in 296 BC the newly elected consul Volumnius, with a particularly strong army,<sup>172</sup> took three fortresses in which 3,000 enemies were killed and half as many apparently taken prisoner.<sup>173</sup> From there he marched northwest to meet up with the army of Appius Claudius, and together they fought a battle in which the Samnites were driven into their camp, which was then taken. In the later engagement 7,800 of the enemy were killed and 2,120 captured, along with a vast amount of booty.<sup>174</sup> During this time the Samnites had made a foray into Campania in which they captured a number of prisoners, but on their return they were intercepted by the Romans under Volumnius. A battle was fought between the two armies in which the Campanian prisoners, seeing the opportunity afforded them by the fray, broke from their captors and seized the Samnite commander (Staius Minatius), conveying him to the Romans. The Samnites were easily defeated without their general and their losses amounted to 6,000 killed and 2,500 captured.<sup>175</sup> The recovery of the Campanians, along with their booty from the Samnite train, resulted in less loot for the Roman soldiers who, like those under Decius, were compelled to sell off the booty so as not to be overburdened during the campaign.<sup>176</sup> In this episode there is no mention of the sale of the captives by Livy, which is surprising given the perfect context provided in the reversal of fortunes of the Samnites. It is likely that the Samnites were either turned over to the Campanians or stripped of their arms and released, as it is doubtful that 2,500 Samnites even divided amongst traders could be guarded so close to their home territory. Any notion that these Samnites were carried to Rome is precluded by the fact the Romans wished to be unencumbered by loot, let alone by enemy soldiers who themselves had recently been the victims of a prisoner breakout.

The defeats suffered by the Samnites and the Etruscans in 296 BC induced them to enter into a pact with the hopes of overpowering the Romans with a joint force, also including

---

<sup>171</sup> 295 BC (Liv. 10.22.9).

<sup>172</sup> Comprising of two legions, *legio II* and *III*, and 15,000 allies, roughly 50% more than typical of a consular army at the time (Liv. 10.18.3).

<sup>173</sup> Liv. 10.18.8 *in Samnio tria castellan ceperat, in quibus ad tria milia hostium errant, dimidium fere eius captum.*

<sup>174</sup> Liv. 10.19.22 *Castra capta dereptaque; praeda ingens parta et militia concessa est. Septem milia octingenti hostium occisi, duo milia et centum viginti capti.*

<sup>175</sup> Liv. 10.20.11-15. Figures of 6-8,000 are common and seem to represent a typical army size of the Samnites.

<sup>176</sup> Liv. 10.20.16.

Umbrians and mercenary Gauls. The Samnite commander Gellius Egnatius was able to break through the Roman lines and join his forces with that of the Etruscans in Etruria.<sup>177</sup> Winter fell before the Roman and Etrusco-Samnite coalition could meet in battle, and so the elections of 295 BC were held against the backdrop of a looming decisive conflict. The experienced commanders P. Decius Mus and Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus were again elected consuls, with Volumnius' command prorogued as a pro-consul, along with three other previous consuls who were granted pro-praetorships. The number of forces committed to the war on each side was high,<sup>178</sup> and two full consular armies under Fabius Maximus Rullianus and Decius Mus were sent to meet the Etrusco-Samnite coalition. The ensuing battle fought near Sentinum resulted in the death of Decius and the Samnite commander Egnatius. The Romans suffered 8,800 casualties, but according to Livy 25,000 Samnites were killed, with 8,000 captured.<sup>179</sup> The can be viewed as a watershed in Roman history, the signifying moment in which Roman dominance over central Italy, and by extension, their eventual dominance of the entire peninsula and the greater Mediterranean, was ensured. Welwei notes that such an outcome was inevitable given that the tradition around the martyrdom of Decius required a "battle for the supremacy of Italy."<sup>180</sup> Regardless of the poetic hype associated with it, the battle proved a pivotal point in paving the way for the Roman conquest of Italy.<sup>181</sup> However, Sentinum, though effectively reducing the Samnites to the point that they could never overcome the Romans, failed to be the *coup de maître* intended; continuous fighting would continue for another four years.

From Sentinum Fabius marched his troops into Etruria, where he took Perugia; there 4,500 were killed and 1,740 prisoners were taken prisoner, to be ransomed at 310 *asses* each. Elsewhere the pro-consul Volumnius was said to have been involved in a battle, though Livy reports a number of different versions in which the opponents of the legions vary, as does the identity of the victors, either Volumnius or his enemy. One account held that Volumnius and his entire legion were destroyed by Gauls, another version that only some foragers had been killed by Umbrians. A third held Volumnius coming to the rescue of a young lieutenant and

<sup>177</sup> Liv. 10.22.5; Cass. Dio fr.36.28 Zon. 8.1. Cf. Salmon 1967, 263-4.

<sup>178</sup> Salmon 1967, 265 estimates at 100,000 corresponding with the number of Samnites killed in the campaign attributed to Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = *FGrH* 76.56) cf. Cic. *Att.* 6.1.18. Liv. 10.30.5 remarks on some of the absurd traditions that the enemy forces at Sentinum numbered as many as 650,000, see Cornell 1989, 379.

<sup>179</sup> Liv. 10.30.10. The numbers are more credible than the inflated figure of 100,000 enemy killed as often interpreted from Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = *FGrH* 76.56.).

<sup>180</sup> Welwei 2000, 44 "kampf um die vorherrschaft in Italien."

<sup>181</sup> Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = *FGrH* 76.56.) Cic. *Att.* 6.1.18; Flor. 1.12.5-7; 4.5.15; Oros. 3.21.6; Polyb. 2.19.6; Zon 8.1 cf. Frontin. 2.1.8; Juv. 8.254-8.

actually capturing a number of Umbrians with their booty.<sup>182</sup> According to Livy, Volumnius was not killed, as he is credited with joining his forces with Appius Claudius, who had assumed control of Decius' army; the two combined to defeat the Samnites in a battle where 16,300 Samnites fell and 2,700 were captured at the cost of 2,700 fallen Romans. The numbers are an obvious construction, as the Roman dead match the numbers of Samnites captured,<sup>183</sup> and the Samnite casualties adding up to a convenient four traditional legions.<sup>184</sup> This last battle of 295 BC was remarkably similar to the one fought at Sentinum, and is yet another example of how the events of the Samnite wars are saturated with repetition and muddled tradition.<sup>185</sup> Salmon questioned whether many of the battles attributed to the Second and Third Samnite War were actually other engagements placed in the wrong conflict, and further questioned if they should be accepted as real events at all, particularly given the repetitiveness.<sup>186</sup> Indeed, it is impossible to accept Livy's account of each battle when he himself expresses concern over the variation in his sources.<sup>187</sup>

In 294 BC Fabius and the deceased Decius were succeeded as consuls by Lucius Postumius Magellus and Marcus Atilius Rufus. Due to illness Magellus remained at Rome, whilst Atilius set off immediately into Samnium.<sup>188</sup> Rumours of Samnite movements, however, compelled Magellus to leave Rome with his army, proceeding into Samnium to take the city of Milonia. There 3,200 were slain and 7,400 Samnites were captured.<sup>189</sup> Here Livy makes an interesting statement in regards to the captives and booty, stating *capti quattuor milia septingenti praeter praedam aliam*.<sup>190</sup> At first glance it appears that the qualification "besides other booty" is implying that the captives were in fact considered *praeda* (booty). However, as soldiers are generally reckoned separate to booty, particularly in regards to their distribution as such, it seems more likely that *praeda* has been inserted as a synonym for *spolia*. In other words, the captives *too* were taken along with booty; both of the accusatives

<sup>182</sup> Liv. 10.26.12 *Umbros redintegrato proelio victos esse captivosque eis ac praedam ademptam*. Livy suggests the Gauls were more likely the enemies involved. Liv. 10.26.5f lists the variant accounts.

<sup>183</sup> A tit for tat cf. Welwei 2000, 44-45.

<sup>184</sup> Livy draws little distinction in the composition of the Samnite army from that of the Roman army, Liv. 8.30.11. Nor of the Lucanians or Brutians for that matter Liv. 8.24.2; Salmon 1967, 101-102.

<sup>185</sup> See Oakley 2005a, 199-200. Kraus 1998 264-83 defined repetitions within Livy as either 'good' in which the repetition was intended to draw comparison or purpose from an earlier instance or 'bad' in which the repetition served only to confound the reader; doublets and recurring figures certainly belong to the latter category.

<sup>186</sup> Salmon 1967, 267-8.

<sup>187</sup> Notably at 10.26.9-12; 10.30.5.

<sup>188</sup> Liv. 10.32.2-5.

<sup>189</sup> Liv. 10.34.3.

<sup>190</sup> Liv. 10.34.3.

sharing a similar action of capture, as in the result of victory, rather than a shared classification of booty subject to sale.

From Milonia Magellus marched to the city of Feritrum which he found entirely abandoned except for a few Samnites unable to flee.<sup>191</sup> Along with these few captives, the Romans also took with them the heavy (presumably valuable and worthwhile) objects left behind, which is in contrast to the years prior in which the speed of the baggage train was held more important than the possession of booty. From the sick and old left behind Postumius learned that the people in the city had fled at first light and it was agreed that a number of other communities would do the same, so Magellus was able to move unmolested to take a number of other abandoned cities. He then moved his army into Etruria where his pillaging forced the Etruscans to meet him in a pitched battle. 2,800 Etruscans were killed, but the remainder escaped into the nearby Volsinian city. Rather than laying siege, Magellus moved on the city of Rusellae, and there captured over 2,000 Etruscans, having killed somewhat fewer.<sup>192</sup> Magellus' victories and the crippling affect of the war with Rome to this point convinced three Etruscan cities to sue for peace; specifically the major centres of the Volsinii, Perugia and Arretium.<sup>193</sup> It was the large fortune amassed from the ransom of these cities that spurred Magellus to request a triumph, which, after much consideration by the Senate, he was awarded.

The other Roman consul Atilius suffered a setback when he met the Samnites near the Lucrine frontier. The Romans were driven back into their camp and, when morning broke, the consul found his army dispirited. He was eventually able to rally his troops by explaining that their only chance lay in a sally from the fort, whereas to remain within the walls they would surely be overwhelmed and face "certain death or slavery."<sup>194</sup> This was (of course) a piece of rhetorical drama, the threat of enslavement, though plausible, seems unlikely given the Roman handling of the captives after they won the battle. Livy wished to convey an overriding sense of low morale; the soldiers were exhausted and physically could not transport or oversee the Samnite captives who would have amounted to nearly the same size force of the Romans. Equally problematic was slaughtering the Samnites, and so Atilius here is portrayed as a shrewd decision maker. The Romans only wanted to beat a hasty retreat out

---

<sup>191</sup> Liv. 10.34.12. Those burdened by years and the sick (*graves aetate aut invalidos*).

<sup>192</sup> Liv 10.37.3. *capta amplius duo milia hominum, minus duo milia circa muros caesa.*

<sup>193</sup> Liv. 10.37.4-5. 500,000 bronze *asses* were assessed on each state amounting to 1.5 million *ases*.

<sup>194</sup> Liv. 10.35.10 *Armatīs ac dimicantibus dubiam victoriam; qui nudus atque inermis hostem maneat, ei aut mortem aut servitutem patiendam.*

of Samnite territory, but the low morale and the bad blood between the two nations dictated that the Samnites pass under the yoke. In this way Roman retribution was sated, the humiliation of the Samnites ensured and the retreat from Samnium was made possible.<sup>195</sup> The whole episode is rather inconsistent with the surrounding narrative, Livy states that Atilius was initially sent to prevent the Samnites from raiding the Liris valley so that his surprise in meeting the Samnites is unbelievable.<sup>196</sup> Of course Livy's choice in displaying the clemency shown by Atilius is highly impressionistic, the act serves as a basis for denying him a triumph in the Senate, not because he let the Samnites off without enslaving them, but because he did not adequately avenge Rome's losses by "sending the Samnites under the yoke without terms."<sup>197</sup>

In the following year the Samnites, realising the perilous state they were in, recruited all the able bodied men into an army with the most experienced being equipped to form an elite *legio linteata* (linen legion), and the whole force of approximately 40,000 was assembled at Aquilonia.<sup>198</sup> A showdown on par with Sentinum was imminent and the two consular armies moved towards Aquilonia. On the way Spurius Carvilius, with the veteran legions of Atilius, seized the city of Amiternum and there slew 2,800 of the enemy and captured 4,270.<sup>199</sup> The other consul, Papirius, after levying a new army, took the city of Duronia by storm and there "made fewer prisoners than his colleague but killed many more."<sup>200</sup> From both places Livy states a large amount of booty was acquired.

With Duronia and Amiternum taken, the Roman forces were able to swoop in for a decisive engagement with the Samnites, whose reinforcements were cut off by the army of Papirius. The engagement that ensued is described in the dramatic fashion required of a battle of such importance, and in the end, the Samnites were cut to pieces with the loss of 20,340 killed and 3,870 captured.<sup>201</sup> At Cominium, where Papirius was engaged with the other half of the Samnite force, 11,400 of the enemy threw down their arms and "cast themselves upon the

---

<sup>195</sup> Liv. 10.36.14.

<sup>196</sup> Welwei 2000, 46.

<sup>197</sup> Liv. 10.36.18 *quod captivos sine pactione sub iugum misisset.*

<sup>198</sup> Liv. 10.38.3f; Flor. 1.11.7. The Samnites performed a gruesome sacrifice inside a tent and demanded a pledge of allegiance from their compatriots one by one. Those who refused to swear the oath were beheaded. That armed priests were employed to ensure the Samnites fought to the end shows the perilous state and the low morale they were in. At any rate, the *legio linteata* was legendary (Pliny *HN*. 34.43; Festus Lindsay 1913, 102; Sil. 4.223), see Salmon 1967, 182-3; 270.

<sup>199</sup> Liv. 10.39.3 *caesa ibi milia hominum duo ferme atque octingenti, capta quattuor milia ducenti septuaginta.*

<sup>200</sup> Liv. 10.39.4 *minus quam collega cepit hominum, plus aliquanto occidit.*

<sup>201</sup> Liv. 10.42.5 *caesa illo die ad Aquiloniam Samnitium milia viginti trecenti quadraginta, capta tria milia octingenti et septuaginta.*

mercy of the commander.”<sup>202</sup> Welwei has rejected any notion that these captives were enslaved as they were not considered spoils.<sup>203</sup> It seems unlikely that these were enslaved given the statement that they had submitted (admittedly not formally *deditio*) to the commander. Had they been enslaved it would have required elaboration on the part of Livy as it would have contradicted the heroic image of Papirius; he was cast in the same light as Fabius Rullianus, who himself had shown clemency to the Samnites in avenging the Caudine Forks.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore the detail of the arms being “thrown down” is shared by Dionysius of Halicarnasus, although he attributes it to the fall of Venusia, later the site of a major Latin colony.<sup>205</sup> Salmon describes the battle of Aquilonia as the ‘Gettysburg’ of the Third Samnite War.<sup>206</sup> Indeed, the battle was the last throw of the dice by the Samnites and its loss broke the back of their resistance. The next two years of campaigning were essentially extended mop up operations where the Romans set out to extinguish the last of the Samnite strongholds.<sup>207</sup>

The consuls having fought what they thought to be the last pitched battle, set about the task of sacking cities, which they noted would bring more booty to their soldiers and further crush their enemy.<sup>208</sup> Carvilius sacked the cities of Velia, Palumbinum, and Herculaneum, and from these the Samnites suffered 10,000 casualties, with the captured slightly outnumbering the slain.<sup>209</sup> The other consul Papirius faced difficult foes, who on many occasions launched sorties dogging the Romans, but eventually Saepinum fell.<sup>210</sup> Livy qualifies the higher degree of deaths sustained by the Samnites at the hands of the Romans here, stating “with great rage they cut down those who came forward and captured the city.”<sup>211</sup> There 7,400 of the Samnites were killed, with less than 3,000 captured.<sup>212</sup> A considerable amount of booty was

<sup>202</sup> Liv. 10.43.8 Loeb trans. *abiectis armis ad undecim milia hominum et quadringenti in fidem consulis venerunt*. The combined actions at Aquilonia and at Cominium are regarded as a single connected Roman victory. Historically it was a major engagement, perhaps on par with Sentinum, as it effectively ended the Samnites ability to fight with manpower equal to Rome (Frontin. *Str.* 2.4.1; Oros. 3.22.4; Val. Max. 7.2.5; Zon. 8.1).

<sup>203</sup> Welwei 2000, 47 n78. Cf Prachner 1966, 97.

<sup>204</sup> In 320 BC, Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; *FGtH* 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9. Similarly at Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.7-8).

<sup>205</sup> Dion. Hal. 17/18.5.1 places the fall of Cominium and Venusia in the same year. According to Dionysius at Venusia 10,000 were killed and 6,200 handed over their weapons, ἐξακισχίλιοι δὲ καὶ διακόσιοι τὰ ὄπλα παρέδωσαν. Livy’s account is far more thorough and so his dating should be preferred to Dionysius’ here.

<sup>206</sup> Salmon 1967, 274.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Salmon 1967, 273-6; Welwei 2000, 48.

<sup>208</sup> Liv. 10.44.8.

<sup>209</sup> Liv. 10. 45.11 *capta aut caesa ad decem milia hominum, ita ut parvo admodum plures caperentur*.

<sup>210</sup> See Oakley 2005a, 385. On the possible location of Saepinum see Oakley 1995, 131.

<sup>211</sup> Liv. 10.45.14, *Itaque ab ira plus caedis editum capta urbe*.

<sup>212</sup> Liv. 10.45.14 *septem milia quadringenti caesi, capta minus tria milia hominum*.



also taken and handed over to the soldiers. With the campaigning season not yet over the consuls felt they had dealt enough of a blow and returned to Rome, where they both celebrated triumphs whilst still in office.<sup>213</sup>

It is with the close of the year 293 BC that Livy's tenth book ends and with it our main narrative. However, the Samnite war continued for another couple of years. During the remainder of the war, the Samnites were unable to field a large army. The Romans were able to split their forces and in 292 BC the consul Junius Brutus was sent into Etruria to prevent them from reneging on the peace. Whilst a plague raged in Rome the other consul, Q. Fabius Gurges, suffered a number of military setbacks and required the intervention of his father, Rullianus.<sup>214</sup> Eventually, Gurges, with the aid of his father, was able to crush the Caudini Samnites; according to Orosius, 20,000 Samnites were killed and 4,000 captured in this battle, a clear exaggeration.<sup>215</sup> Amongst those captured was the famous Samnite general Gaius Pontius, who was then marched in Gurges' triumph and beheaded.<sup>216</sup> The following year (291 BC) the situation in Etruria was stable enough to allow both consular armies to march on the last of the Samnites, the Pentri and Harpini. Gurges is recorded as having celebrated a triumph over the Pentri by capturing their stronghold Cominium, with no mention of captives.<sup>217</sup> In the following year both consuls ravaged Samnium to the point of submission, and the war was finally brought to an end.<sup>218</sup>

The interpretation of *capta* as resulting in enslavement within Livy's narrative of the Third Samnite War is presumptuous and contrary to Livy's antecedent phraseology. Prior to the events of the Third Samnite War in Livy's narrative his description of capture by Roman forces was typically ambiguous, particularly in accounting for the fate of those taken. For example, during the Second Samnite War the captives taken from Perugia,<sup>219</sup> Ocrinum<sup>220</sup>

---

<sup>213</sup> Liv 10.46.1-2.

<sup>214</sup> Salmon 1967, 274-5 suggests that the setbacks faced by Gurges were exaggerated by Livy so as to require the help of his father Rullianus in an effort to provide a foreshadow for the consul and *legatus* partnership which would be used by Fabius Maximus and his father Fabius Cunctator.

<sup>215</sup> The Samnites could not have mustered this many in a single region after their losses. Oros. 3.22.10. *caesa sunt in eo proelio Samnitium XX milia, capta autem III milia.*

<sup>216</sup> Cass. Dio 36.30; Liv. *Ep.* 11; Oros. 3.22.10; Plut. *Fab. Max.* 24.3; Zon. 8.1; Val. Max. 5.7.1.

<sup>217</sup> Degrassi 1954, 297.

<sup>218</sup> Cass. Dio Fr. 37; Eutrop. 2.9.3; Liv. *Per.* 11. Beloch 1926, 428; 450 argued that the war was brought to a conclusion a year earlier.

<sup>219</sup> Liv. 9.37.11 *caesa aut capta. Vixtor accessit – cepisset* (9.40.19)

<sup>220</sup> Liv. 9.41.19 *plus capitur hominum quam caeditur.*

and Bovianum<sup>221</sup> are only stated as having been captured (*capio*) with no further detail, apart from the fact that during the same battle some of the enemy may also have been killed. Livy is not alone in displaying ambiguity in the fate of captives for this period, as Diodorus is similarly non-committal in the outcome of battle.<sup>222</sup> This lack of clarity is in contrast to a few particular instances in which Livy is specific in stating that the captives were in fact sold as slaves.<sup>223</sup> Livy's choice to elaborate on the sale of captives in these instances is not for the purpose of highlighting an action that was out of character, and so was not an exceptional instance that required a comment or further explanation. With the exception of Veii, as rejected above as a credible incident, in each case the Roman choice to enslave the captives was for a greater, typically strategic or political, purpose. Once Livy's narrative resumes with the surviving books from 21-45 we find that he is still specific in stating when captives are sold as slaves.<sup>224</sup> In a few instances the 'sale' of the captives is not expressed, but we are told that they are sent back to Rome, implying that they were to be reserved for a triumph or sold.<sup>225</sup> Although Livy was still ambiguous at times, employing the *caeda – capta* formula for many post battle descriptions,<sup>226</sup> he no longer does so with the same consistency concerning a single conflict. It is by the virtue of a consistent ambiguity regarding captives that the Third Samnite War in Livy stands out.

Orosius, writing in the late fourth/early fifth century, follows Livy's ambiguity regarding captives in the Third Samnite War.<sup>227</sup> Orosius as an epitomist of Livy in all probability had access to the entirety of the *Ab Urbe Condita*.<sup>228</sup> If this is indeed the case, then it is clear Orosius is more confident in interpreting enslavements following capture from the later half of the third century onwards, likely a reflection of the books of Livy that do not survive.<sup>229</sup> Neither Livy nor Orosius explicitly state that Samnites were 'sold' during the Third Samnite

<sup>221</sup> Liv. 9.44.13 '*capta*.' Cf. Diod. Sic. 20.90.4 (Bovianum = Bola). On the possible location see Oakley 1995, 131.

<sup>222</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.35.4 Etruscans are describes as having been simply 'taken' (ἀναίρῶ); at Falernitis Diod. Sic. 20.90.4 'taken alive' (ζωγρέω) and at Bovianum 'taken alive' specifically τινὲς δὲ καὶ ζωντες συνελήφθησαν.

<sup>223</sup> Liv. 2.17.6; 25.5; 5.22.1; 6.4.2; 7.27.8; 9.42.8.

<sup>224</sup> Liv. 21.51.2; 23.38.7; 24.42.11; 26.16.6; 40.13; 32.22.10; 34.16.10; 38.29.11; 39.42.1; 41.11.8; 28.4; 42.8.3; 63.10; 43.4.10; *Per.* 43. It is also likely that the Hirpini, said to be 'sent' (venierunt) *sub hasta*, were sold as slaves (Liv. 23.37.13).

<sup>225</sup> Liv. 23.41.7; 24.19.10; 28.4.4 and Liv. 29.29.3 where the captives were sent to Sicily presumably to be sold at auction.

<sup>226</sup> Liv. 24.41.10; 25.14.11; 27.16.7; 28.2.11; 33.10.6; 36.38.6; 37.44.2; 37.57.10.

<sup>227</sup> Liv. 3.21.6; .22.4; 22.10. Also taken Sabines (Liv. 3.22.11).

<sup>228</sup> Rohrbacher 2002,138.

<sup>229</sup> Before 260 BC Oros. 3.12.16; 4.1.1. After 261 BC Oros. 4.7.6; 4.18.3; 4.18.6; 4.20.3; 4.20.28; 5.1.8; 5.3.6; 5.18.26; 7(b).37.16.

war, sale being the primary indication that a captive was enslaved.<sup>230</sup> Livy is also distinct in regarding the captives as generally separate from the rest of the booty.<sup>231</sup> In only two instances does Livy refer to the captives as booty or spoils in war, with the distinction that there was ‘other booty’ after listing the number of captives taken.<sup>232</sup> In both of these cases the captives were specifically mentioned as being captured, and booty is inserted to make the reader aware that the fruits of victory also included inanimate spoils.

There is generally a lack of a civilian presence in Livy’s account of the Third Samnite War. It is hard to imagine that the women and children of the communities that Rome sacked were all able to escape when their male compatriots were either killed or captured. Livy suggests, at least from the later half of the war, that many of the towns the Romans encountered were empty, the non-warrior inhabitants choosing to flee before their approach.<sup>233</sup> Most Samnite hill-forts, built upon prominent heights overlooking long valleys, were situated so that they could easily signal to their neighbours, thus allowing an early warning of Roman approaches.<sup>234</sup> The presence of walled cities and other fortifications makes it less likely that the Samnites were willing to flee at the sight of the Romans.<sup>235</sup> The wealth of booty recovered by the Romans from the Samnite cities suggests that the non-combatants remained in the citadels. In the case of the abandoned cities in 294 BC the villagers who fled the towns took everything that could be carried.<sup>236</sup> Presumably they had to run somewhere, and eventually the cities into which the majority of Samnites fled were sacked by the Romans.

Despite the obvious presence of civilians in the cities laid siege to by the Romans, there is not a single reference to the capture of women or children anywhere in Livy’s tenth book. In some cases this can be explained by the fact that the armies met in the field and fought pitched battles, but the conspicuous absence of women and children can only be explained if they were evacuated ahead of time, if they were not wanted by the Romans as captives, or if

---

<sup>230</sup> See above.

<sup>231</sup> Liv. 10.17.4; 17.8; 17.11; 19.22; 20.15; 26.12; 39.3-4; 45.14.

<sup>232</sup> Liv. 10.31.3; 34.3, see above.

<sup>233</sup> Liv. 10.34.12.

<sup>234</sup> Oakley 1995, 139.

<sup>235</sup> Samnite towns, though generally small in size, were often coupled with the formidable natural barriers. Consequently they could be very difficult to besiege. Polygonal walls first appear in Campania and seem to have spread first to Samnium and then to Latium. It is possible that contact with the Samnites spurred the Roman style of building walls- their style of fighting had certainly influenced that of the Roman’s (Prop. 4.4.13), see Colonna 1962, 83-4; Salmon 1953, 94f; 1967, 133-36. In Samnium farmers typically lived within towns and each day worked their plots. Similarly, shepherds kept their flocks close by during the excellent summer months, cf. White 1970, 71. On the defensive positioning of hillforts and the advantages they possessed see Oakley 1995, 131-4, 139-40.

<sup>236</sup> Liv. 10.34.12.

they were simply glossed over by Livy. As mentioned above, in some cases the civilians were indeed evacuated, but in the case of bigger cities it is improbable given the large amounts of booty, as it is unlikely the women and children would flee without any means of supporting themselves. Indeed, where could they retreat to apart from other allied Samnite cities?<sup>237</sup> During a siege the women and children could provide vital support to the men, in all capacities not necessarily limited to non-combatative support. Since sieges rarely lasted very long (none could have lasted more than a couple of months, as each consul or prorogued commander moved his armies in the spring) the extra mouths would have been more helpful in their capacity as support to the soldiers than a hindrance in their consumption of supplies. It seems all the more likely that women and children were present in the cities captured by the Romans.

The fact that Livy excluded women and children from his narrative is a typical omission of history, and particularly so within this context, given the predominantly military subject. But the omission of civilians within the account is highly suspect, even by the standards of historical misogyny. It is unlikely that non-warrior captives were included in casualty reports since this would be superfluous information regarding the strength of a city or in determining the scale of victory. From many later examples it is clear that women and children were in fact present during sieges, although their presence was marginalised by the military nature of the topic.<sup>238</sup> Women and children following a siege were often treated differently to the men, requiring a specific comment on their fate.<sup>239</sup>

It seems peculiar that the Romans would choose not to take the women and children as captives when their capture is regularly noted later on. If we are to believe that all of the captives taken during the Third Samnite War were sold as slaves than we must also accept the same numbers, if not more of women and children. The number of captives transferred into bondage becomes staggering, at perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 individuals who would constitute roughly half of the men registered as citizens in Rome following the war.<sup>240</sup> Such numbers at this time are hard to imagine, and so due to the practical improbability other alternative avenues for the captives would be more likely. As Finley noted “war... produced

<sup>237</sup> Particularly at Liv. 10.10.5; 12.6; 39.4; 45.11.

<sup>238</sup> The presence of Spanish women at New Carthage lead to a lengthy dialogue between Scipio and a maiden in Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6.

<sup>239</sup> For example, the enslavement of women and children after the slaughter or execution of all the men, cf. The Senones in 284 BC (App. *Sam.* 13; *Gall.* 9; Liv. *Per* 12; Oros. 3.22.12-15; Polyb. 2.19.11); at (Rhegium Cass. Dio 40.10-11; Liv. 31.31.6; *Per.* 12; Polyb. 1.7.8 and at Corinth Oros. 5.3.5; Paus. 7.16.8; Zon. 9.31).

<sup>240</sup> In 289/8 BC 272,000 citizens ( Liv. *Per.* 11), see Brunt 1971, 30 tbl. 2.

captives, not slaves; captives are transformed into slaves by the consumers, who obtain them through the agency of slave traders. In sum, war and conquest were no doubt important contributing factors to the establishment and preservation of a slave society; they were not a necessary condition (at least in a direct way) and certainly not a sufficient condition.”<sup>241</sup>

Following the Third Samnite War the Romans seem to have kept to their standard practice of enfranchisement of former enemies; as evinced by the growth in the census figures.<sup>242</sup> This increase was in spite of the losses that must have been suffered in the 290's. The Third Samnite War, notwithstanding repeated success on the part of Rome, must have cost a large number of Roman lives, all of whom were citizens, i.e. men of military age. We know of at least 18,200 casualties suffered by the Romans as mentioned by Livy.<sup>243</sup> Of course these represent the high end of casualties sustained in a single engagement, but as figures they may be more accurate than those of the Samnites given Livy and many Roman writers' propensity for exaggerating Roman victories and minimising losses. It is impossible to estimate, with any certainty, the number of Roman casualties during the whole Third Samnite War, but it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Roman casualties for the ten years of war could be double the few figures given by Livy. The loss of as many as 40,000 men was also exacerbated by the plague (probably malaria) that began in 295 BC.<sup>244</sup> Again, the number of deaths is impossible to estimate. It is safe to say that the increase in the number of citizens was almost entirely from the extension of citizenship to Samnite cities and a large number of Sabines, who were probably enfranchised *cives sine suffragio* in 289 BC, although the evidence for Dentatus' campaign against the Sabines is scant to say the least.<sup>245</sup> Again the contrast between enfranchisement and enslavement could not be further apart. On the whole Roman treatment of the defeated Samnites seems to be particularly lenient. Livy states that following the defeat of the Samnites, “the Samnites sought peace and renewed the treaty for a fourth time.”<sup>246</sup> It is difficult to imagine a treaty offering the same terms as before the war given the Roman military victory, particularly with regards to territory. Yet the Samnites had

---

<sup>241</sup> Finley 1980, 154.

<sup>242</sup> From 262,321 in 294 BC (Liv. 10.47.2) to 272,000 in 289 BC (Liv. *Per.* 11). Cf. Beloch 1926, 343; Brunt 1971, 30 tbl. 2.

<sup>243</sup> 7,700 (Liv. 10.29.7); 2,700 (Liv. 10.31.7); 7,800 (Liv. 10.36.15).

<sup>244</sup> Liv. 10.31.8; 47.6-7; *Per.* 11; Zon. 8.1; Oros. 3.22.6. The outbreak was probably malaria Asclepiades, *De Morbis acutis*, 2. 63-4; Galen, 7.435; 17A.121-2. For the Roman response to this outbreak see Ov. *Met.* 15.622f; Val. Max. 1.8.2; Plut. *Q. Rom.* 94, see Sallares 2007, 201.

<sup>245</sup> Limited to the statement that Dentatus celebrated two triumphs, one over the Samnites and another over the Sabines (Liv. *Per.* 11) and passing references to his fighting the Samnites in Eutrop. 2.9 and Pseudo-Aur. Vict. 33.1.

<sup>246</sup> Liv. *Per.* 11 *Pacem petentibus Samnitibus foedus quarto renovatum est.*

proved a recalcitrant foe three times up to this point, and would later turn their coats for both Pyrrhus and Hannibal. This perhaps indicates that a completely lopsided treaty would never have been accepted by them, nor could the Romans have hoped to keep such terms.<sup>247</sup>

Towards the end of the Third Samnite War the Romans established a Latin colony at the site of Venusia on the southern border of Samnium, presumably to prevent Samnite collusion with the Apulians.<sup>248</sup> The land assigned to the colonists was particularly large, perhaps as much as 800 km<sup>2</sup>, with 20,000 colonists.<sup>249</sup> Apart from the colony we know of no other mulcting of Samnite land. The circumvallation of Samnium by the establishment of colonies at aforementioned Venusia, coastal Campania and in the Volturnus valley, seem to have contented the Romans enough to readmit the Samnites into Rome's network of alliances. The Samnites were diminished by the war, and their league was fractured and weakened by the admission of Atina, Casinum and Venafrum as *praefecturae*.<sup>250</sup> Perhaps this reduction of Samnite power made it possible for the Romans to accept their offer of peace rather than push their already insurmountable advantage. The insertion of 6,000 Latin families into their territory was overall a rather insignificant burden upon the Samnites, as it was already thoroughly devastated and depopulated by the war.<sup>251</sup>

From the defeat of the Samnites Rome also gained a considerable amount of booty, particularly in the form of precious metal. In the triumph of Papirius in 293 BC Livy states that 2,533,000 lbs of bronze was placed in the *aerarium*.<sup>252</sup> He elaborates that the bronze was derived *redactum ex captivis dicebatur*.<sup>253</sup> The fact that Livy used *redigo* rather than the obvious *vendere* indicates that the transference of captives to bronze paid into the treasury was not via sale *ipso facto* enslavement, but more likely through ransom. The fact that the

---

<sup>247</sup> *Contra* Salmon 1967, 277.

<sup>248</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 17/18.5.2. They had established the colonies of Alba Fucens and Carseoli in north-eastern Latium to prevent the Samnites from having an unobstructed link with the Etruscans, Sabines and Umbrians. It is also possible that Aquilonia was made independent.

<sup>249</sup> Cf. Afzelius 1942, 83; 131.

<sup>250</sup> Cf. Salmon 1967, 277-8; 278 n1. Atina (Cic. *Planc.* 19, Plin. *HN.* 2.6.1); Cassinum (*CIL* 10.5139, 5194); Venafrum (Festus Lindsay 1913, 262).

<sup>251</sup> Cass. Dio. 9.40.27. Pyrrhus remarked upon the devastation of the land of his Italian allies. Livy records the death of over 80,000 Samnites, not to mention the number of Samnites killed in the final three years of the war, and the significant number that died outside of combat with the Romans was due to starvation, disease or injury.

<sup>252</sup> The *aerarium* was located within the temple of Saturn at the base of the Capitoline hill in the *forum Romanum*. It served as the city treasury, particularly the vault, in which state booty was kept (*aerarium sanctius*). The *aerarium* was also supplemented by a manumission tax of 5% from the *lex manila* in 357 BC cf. Liv. 7.16.7.

<sup>253</sup> Liv. 10.46.5.

bronze was *gravis* is anachronistic, but the uniformity in regards to the type of metal from the proceeds indicates that the bronze was in fact from ransom. In 294 BC Fabius had captured 1,740 Perusians and ransomed each for 310 *asses*, equating to over 500,000 *asses*.<sup>254</sup> During the campaign season of 293 BC around 30,000 captives are recorded, no less than a third of which were captured by Papirius.<sup>255</sup> At the rate of ransom received by Fabius this would yield to Papirius roughly 3.5 million *asses*. However, according to the amount paid into the treasury the price per captive of ransom or otherwise would amount to roughly 250 *asses*.<sup>256</sup> A further 380,000 lbs of bronze was also added to the treasury in 293 by the other consul Carvilius.<sup>257</sup> The acquisition of such considerable amounts of bronze made the large issue of the *aes grave* possible, and there is considerable evidence in coin finds to suggest that the new bronze coinage was also adopted by or issued to most of central Italy.<sup>258</sup>

### Enslavements up to the First Punic War

At the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century BC transalpine incursions by Northern Gauls into the Po valley forced the Boii and Senones to advance southward, and the latter set upon the city of Arretium. The Arretines sent to Rome for help and a relief force under the praetor L. Caecilius was sent. The Romans met the Gauls and were soundly defeated. According to Polybius the Romans sent ambassadors to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, but they were coldly executed.<sup>259</sup> Appian, however, suggests that the ambassadors were sent to request that the Senones cease providing soldiers as mercenaries to the Etruscans.<sup>260</sup> Regardless of the motive of the ambassadors, Appian and Polybius agree that a severe breach of diplomacy was carried out by the Senones and a swift Roman reprisal resulted in the devastation of much of southern Cisalpine Gaul. Appian states that a punitive expedition was carried out, with the men massacred and the women sold into slavery.<sup>261</sup> The son of a Senone chieftain was also specifically reserved for torture and execution in

---

<sup>254</sup> Liv. 10.31.3.

<sup>255</sup> Less than 4,270 at Duronia (Liv. 10.39.4), 3,870 at Aquilonia (Liv. 10.42.5) fewer than 3,000 at Saepinum (Liv. 10.45.14). Total = c.11,140.

<sup>256</sup> With a round figure of 10,000 used to compensate for the approximations above.

<sup>257</sup> Again of *aes grave* (Liv. 10.46.14).

<sup>258</sup> The *aes grave* is easily identified by the prominent head of Janus on the obverse, cf. Thomsen 1961, 259f.

<sup>259</sup> Polyb. 2.19.7-9.

<sup>260</sup> App. *Sam.* 13.

<sup>261</sup> App. *Sam.* 13 καὶ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδιά ἠνδραποδίετο (cf. App. *Gall.* 9).

Dolabella's triumph.<sup>262</sup> The other Cisalpine Gauls (Boii, Insubri and the warrior Gaesatae) with the remaining Senones and the Etruscans met the Romans again and were soundly defeated near Lake Vadimon in 283 BC, with the result that the Senones and the Gaesatae ceased to exist.<sup>263</sup> The depopulation conveyed by the sources could not have been strictly through enslavement, they were instead reduced to refugees, perhaps joining with the Boii, who remained steadfast in northern Italy. Volkmann suggests that the captives may have been transported to the newly established colony at Sena to be sold;<sup>264</sup> but there is no evidence to suggest that the Romans acted any differently than before, and most likely the captives were purchased by merchants and sold in more affluent areas rather than a newly settled colony - comprising the poorer individuals of Roman society.<sup>265</sup>

With the Samnites and the Etruscans subdued and the Cisalpine Gauls held in check, Rome was clearly the dominant and controlling power in the Italian peninsula. Rome's ambitions and commercial interests at this time clearly extended beyond central Italy with almost a manifest entitlement of suzerainty to the entire peninsula.<sup>266</sup> Roman foreign policy at this time, which would become increasingly common, favoured the rule of an oligarchy which could be easily incorporated into the Roman political framework as clientele of the elite.<sup>267</sup> Of course Rome was not the only power who wished to establish hegemony over their neighbouring states: Carthage and Syracuse in Sicily, Tarentum in Southern Italy, and Rhodes over the maritime trade routes of the southern Adriatic, were also extending their

<sup>262</sup> App. *Sam.* 14; *Gall.* 9; Britomeris was taken by the spear *αἰχμάλωτον*.

<sup>263</sup> App. *Sam.* 14; Eutrop. 2.10.1; Flor. 1.8.21; Liv. *Per* 12; Oros. 3.22.14; Strab. 5.1.6. However the Senones are said to have again fought the Romans in 282 BC (Polyb. 2.20.3). See Walbank 1957 I, 190; Salmon 1935, 24, Welwei 2000, 63.

<sup>264</sup> Volkmann 1990, 41 n1.

<sup>265</sup> Sena was perhaps settled after the battle of Lake Vidimon in 283 BC and so would not have existed for the sale of the women and children, see Cornell 1989, 391.

<sup>266</sup> As exemplified by Rome's repeated treaties with Carthage. In the first treaty of 509 BC the boundaries of Rome's recognised sovereignty was limited to Latium (Polyb. 3.22.4-13). In 378 BC the limit was extended to Mastia, the exact location of which is unknown (Polyb. 3.24.4), see Walbank 1957 I, 347. Liv. 7.27.1-2 and Diod. Sic. 16.69.1 place a treaty in 348 BC, in which Rome's Latin and northern Campanian coastline were off limits to Carthaginian warships. This could have been a response to the pirates who may have been allied to Carthage that plagued the Romans at this time, see De Souza 1995, 187-8. In 306 BC Rome's limits were extended to include all of Peninsular Italy (Polyb. 3.26.3-7). Polybius rejects the legitimacy of the treaty citing the bias of the Carthaginian historian Philinus, who was his only source for the treaty, see Serrati 2006, 120-121. Some historians have rejected this treaty citing the limited extent of Rome's borders at the end of the fourth century, see Badian 1958a 31; Walbank 1957 I, 354. A fourth treaty, according to Polybius, was an alliance in which Rome's sphere for military operations extended throughout southern Italy, with the aid of the Carthaginian navy if needed (Polyb. 3.25.1-5). The final treaty of 226 BC, seems to have established the border of Roman expansion westwards along the northern Mediterranean coast to the Ebro (Polyb. 3.29.3). For an extensive chronology of Roman-Carthaginian treaties see Oakley 1998 II, 252-62.

<sup>267</sup> See De Sanctis 1969, 94-5; 109-10; Frank 1914, 201-3; Errington 1971, 202; Katsari 2008, 23. Rome's intervention in Tarentum in 282 BC may have been an attempt to establish an oligarchy in the city.



political control beyond their individual borders.<sup>268</sup> The political trend in the western Mediterranean at this time was one of rapid imperial expansion, where slowly the lesser and peripheral city-states were united under the predominant power of Carthage and the rapidly emerging power of Rome.<sup>269</sup> Rome's treaties with foreign powers well beyond their borders tended to establish a limitation upon territorial expansion and military operations within each other's perceived region of control. As Rome exerted itself further and further from its traditional domain of the greater Latium, and in a broader context central Italy, its military operations came to surpass previously established borders. Conflict was inevitable.<sup>270</sup> During these power struggles between larger nations it was the lesser city-states that suffered the brunt of conflict. In Italy this resulted less often in enslavement, but as military expansions operated further from the Italian homeland, mass enslavements increased.

In 282 BC Rome sent ten warships to Tarentum, in violation of a previously established treaty.<sup>271</sup> Despite the supposed peaceful intention of the Romans the Tarrentines attacked the Roman ships and then marched northward to Thurii, where they ousted the pro-Roman aristocracy along with the Roman garrison.<sup>272</sup> After a failed embassy the Romans sent a consular army to invade Tarrentine territory.<sup>273</sup> In desperation the Tarrentines implored Pyrrhus for help, who intervened on their behalf with an ambition to expand his empire over Italy and Sicily.<sup>274</sup> However, Pyrrhus would be unable to match the manpower of the Romans, despite repeated success on the battlefield. He was eventually forced to abandon his expedition due to the repeated depletion of his manpower and resources. During this conflict few if any enslavements were made, or at least none are mentioned by the sources. From Pyrrhus' point of view it is likely that the expeditionary nature of the conflict and its ultimate

---

<sup>268</sup> Eastern Sicily despite Carthaginian ambition remained independent with Syracuse the dominant city-state (Diod. Sic. 16.69.1; Liv. 7.27.2). Rhodes reached a political agreement with Rome establishing a trade agreement and alliance c. 310 BC (Polyb. 30.5.6), see Walbank 1979 III, 423-426.

<sup>269</sup> Examples include, Tarentum, Syracuse and Massalia, whose enterprises extended to neighbouring *poleis* with Pyrrhus as the Molossian king and head of the Epirote league, Rhodian merchant enterprises reached Peninsular Italy, but there client states of Rhodes were unlikely.

<sup>270</sup> Richardson 1979, 1-11, Serrati 2006, 121-122, n. 30; Walbank 1972, 163.

<sup>271</sup> The treaty was likely drafted in 332 BC (Liv. 8.17.10; Justin 12.2.12). Compare Diod. Sic. 20.104, who suggests the Romans and Tarentines fought a war. For a clear argument in support of a treaty in the 330's BC see Cary 1920, 165-170. Cf. Mommsen 1875 II, 41-2 who suggested the treaty was drafted at the same time as Rome's treaty with Carthage in 348 BC and De Sanctis 1969 II, 347 who believed a treaty came from Tarentine intervention in the Second Samnite War.

<sup>272</sup> App. *Sam.* 7.1-6; Zon. 8.2.1-2.

<sup>273</sup> App. *Sam.* 7.1-6; Cass. Dio 39.6.9; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.4.2-5.5; Oros. 4.1.2; Polyb. 1.6.5; Zon. 8.2.1-2.

<sup>274</sup> App. *Sam.* 7.7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.7.2; Liv. *Per.* 12; Oros. 4.1.3-4; Zon. 8.2. Specifically the ambition of Pyrrhus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 14.3-5). The Romans and Carthaginians established an alliance in response to Pyrrhus' ambition (Liv. *Per.* 13; Polyb. 3.25.1-5; Val. Max. 3.7.10).

abandonment prevented the taking of many prisoners, whilst on the Roman side repeated reversals and the defensive nature of the fighting resulted in few captures as well. Rome was defeated repeatedly by Pyrrhus,<sup>275</sup> but was more fortunate against the Samnites, Lucanians and Brutii that had joined him.<sup>276</sup>

Following the first major defeat of the Romans by Pyrrhus at Heracleia in 280 BC a number of Roman prisoners were taken. Pyrrhus, wishing to win popular support, released the prisoners without ransom,<sup>277</sup> and in the following year there is no mention of captives taken after the battle of Asculum.<sup>278</sup> Throughout the accounts of the 270's Pyrrhus' actions take centre stage in the accounts - the war fought between his Southern Italian allies and Rome was decidedly one sided given Rome's repeated successes. Despite such victories, there is no mention of any enslavements, but we are made aware of the presence of prisoners on both sides. In 277 BC a Roman army was defeated by the Samnites in the Cranita hills and many were taken prisoner.<sup>279</sup> In the same year the Romans were able to capture the city of Croton through the treachery of a prisoner, whom they induced with a large bribe to convince the Crotoniates that the Romans were departing, and so to send away their allies.<sup>280</sup> Presumably the only large intake of prisoners by the Romans followed the defeat of Pyrrhus at Beneventum, after which captives of more exotic origin than the Italian prisoners up to this point were marched in the triumph.<sup>281</sup> Of course the presence of the first elephants in Rome warranted far more treatment by the sources and so there is no elaboration on the fate of the prisoners.<sup>282</sup> The Battle of Beneventum forced Pyrrhus to leave Italy and so he left his lieutenant Milo in charge of the city of Tarentum. In 272 BC the Romans laid siege to the city

<sup>275</sup> Principally at the battles of Heracleia in 280 BC (App. *Sam.* 10.1; Diod Sic. 22.6.1-2 Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.11.1-12.6; Oros. 4.1.8-18; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 16.6-18.2; Zon. 8.3) and at Ausculum in 279 BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.1.1-3.7; Eutrop. 2.13.4; Flor. 1.13.9-10; Liv. *Per.* 13; Oros. 4.1.19-22; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21.7-15; Zon. 8.5).

<sup>276</sup> Triumphs were celebrated by Roman commanders in 280 BC over the Samnites, Tarentines and Sallentini; in 278 BC over Lucanians, Brutti, Tarentines and Samnites (cf. *CIL* 6.37045; Eutrop. 2.14.3) in 276 BC over Lucani and Bruttii, in 275 BC Over the Samnites as well as Pyrrhus, in 274 BC over the Samnites and Lucani, in 273 BC over the Lucanians, Samnites and Bruttii, and in 272 BC over the Samnites, Lucani, Bruttii and Tarentines, Degrassi 1954, 98-99.

<sup>277</sup> App. *Sam.* 10.15-16; *CIL* 6.37048; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.6.1-3; Eutrop. 2.12.2-13.2; Flor. 1.13.15; Liv. *Per.* 13; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20.10-11.

<sup>278</sup> App. *Sam.* 10.15-16; *CIL* 6.37048; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.6.1-3; Eutrop. 2.12.2-13.2; Flor. 1.13.15; Liv. *Per.* 13; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 20.10-11. For the battle of Asculum see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.1.1-3.7; Eutrop. 2.13.4; Flor. 1.13.9-10; Oros. 4.1.19-22; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21.7-15; Zon. 8.6.

<sup>279</sup> Zon. 8.6.

<sup>280</sup> Frontin. *Str.* 3.6.4; Zon. 8.6.

<sup>281</sup> 275 BC. Only Oros. 4.2.6 mentions the capture of 33,000 prisoners.

<sup>282</sup> Captives present in triumph Cic. *Mur.* 31; Flor. 1.13.27. Elephants in Rome, Eutrop. 2.14.4; Flor. 1.13.27; Plin. *HN* 8.16; Plut. *Mor.* 30.7.b. The lavishness of the triumph was in contrast with the austere character of Manlius Curius, Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 2.2; *Mor.* 194f; Sen. 55-56; Val. Max. 4.3.5.

and, with the death of Pyrrhus in Argos, Milo was able to come to an agreement independent of the radical Tarentines, allowing him to leave the city with his army and return to Epirus.<sup>283</sup> The allies of Pyrrhus were treated leniently by the Romans. Tarentum was made to pay an indemnity, but allowed to remain independent from Rome, and admitted among the *socii navales*.<sup>284</sup> Prior to the departure of Milo, the city of Heraclea had been granted a favourable treaty with Rome that allowed them to maintain their autonomy until the Social War.<sup>285</sup>

Whilst formal states in Italy were treated with surprising leniency, the actions of what Rome considered brigands were dealt with swiftly and harshly. The obvious example being the punishment of its own rogue unit at Rhegium. In 278 BC the Rhegians requested a Roman garrison, which was duly dispatched. However, the Mamertine mercenaries sent to Rhegium chose to take the city for themselves, killing or expelling the men of the city and seizing their wives.<sup>286</sup> After the threat of Pyrrhus was removed the Romans marched on Rhegium and, after some difficulty, managed to capture it. They then returned the city to the survivors and marched the Mamertine criminals to Rome, where they were all beheaded.<sup>287</sup> In the following year a last Samnite stronghold, which had been forced into desperate brigandage following the defeat of Pyrrhus, was sacked. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus the authors of the revolt, including the Samnite leader Lollius, were tortured and killed, with the survivors sold as booty.<sup>288</sup> The slaves in a Volscian city overthrew their masters and Roman intervention was requested by the ousted citizens, the rebellion was quashed with difficulty and all the slaves were eventually tortured to death and the city destroyed. The free Volscians were then settled at a new site.<sup>289</sup>

---

<sup>283</sup> Frontin. *Str.* 3.3.1; Liv. *Per.* 15; Zon. 8.6.

<sup>284</sup> Liv. 35.16.3; Frontin. *Str.* 3.3.1; Zon 8.6, cf. Schmidt 1969, 128 (*SdA*.III 475).

<sup>285</sup> Cic. *Balbo* 21, see Nicolet 1978, 42.

<sup>286</sup> Cass. Dio 40.10-11; Diod Sic. 22.1.2; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4.6-7; Liv. 31.31.6; *Per.* 12; Polyb. 1.7.8.

<sup>287</sup> Either the 300 survivors or more likely the principle leaders of the rebellion, App. *Sam.* 21; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.16; Liv. *Per.* 12; Polyb. 1.7.12; Val. Max. 2.7.15.

<sup>288</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.17.2 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐλαφυροπόλησαν. Zon. 8.7 mentions the defeat of the Samnites and the seizure of a second city, but does not recount the capture of any captives. That this was a recovery of rebellious territory is attested to the fact that neither consul received a triumph, cf. Salmon 1967, 288 n.3.

<sup>289</sup> Flor. 16.1; Liv. *Per.* 16; Plin. *HN* 31.31; Zon. 8.7.

## Chapter 5

### *Enslavements during the Punic Wars*

#### First Punic War

The First Punic War was the first conflict in which the Romans fought large battles upon the waves and also the first war that took place outside peninsular Italy, with the battlegrounds in Sicily and North Africa. Warfare outside of Italy and upon the seas meant that captives taken could not be brought directly over land to Rome.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the capture of enemy vessels raised the dilemma of whether to remove and replace the hundreds of rowers upon which each prize ship relied or to retain them on board in Roman service.<sup>2</sup> In this way the sea posed the greatest limiting factor in removing captives to Rome. While the Roman navy was manned by the proletariat of Rome and her allies, the Carthaginians were forced to rely upon mercenaries for their navy and army in Sicily.<sup>3</sup> The presence of mercenaries rather than Carthaginian sailors suggests that the Romans would not have had the same difficulty in utilizing the rowing crews as they may have had with more patriotic rowers.

Overall, enslavements are rarer in the First Punic War than in the Second. Only at Agrigentum, outside Agris and at Panormus do we hear of civilian populations being enslaved.<sup>4</sup> The large numbers of captives derived from sea battles were undoubtedly mostly military men, and it is questionable (as will be shown) whether these were actually enslaved, beyond temporary impressments. Furthermore, we are made aware of the taking of captives

---

<sup>1</sup> Until this point, Rome had fought on the fringes of already conquered territory, and lines between Rome and the fronts passed through continuous territory; with only the temporary interruption of such a line in the war with Pyrrhus when the Samnites, siding with Pyrrhus, blocked the Apennine route north.

<sup>2</sup> See below.

<sup>3</sup> The presence of mercenaries in the Carthaginian army of the Second Punic War and navy is well known. Polyb. 6.52.3-10 compares the Carthaginian and Roman armies lauding the citizen soldier of the Italians over the mercenary of the Phoenicians (echoed by Machiavelli, *art of War book I*). The last overseas battle in which Carthaginian citizen soldiers were known to have served was the battle of Crimissus in Sicily in 340 BC. Following the heavy indemnity of the First Punic War, many of the Carthaginian mercenaries were left unpaid. This led to a major uprising, resulting in the loss of Sardinia, which the Romans later annexed, and a number of hard fought battles in North Africa (Polyb. 1.65-88), see Scullard 1989, 566-569. During the Second Punic War Carthaginian citizens only served as officers overseas. The use of mercenaries was not necessarily the cause of Carthage's defeat (see Bagnall 1990, 10-11; Lazenby 1996a, 12-14), but the use of mercenaries was a significant factor in their treatment once captured, see below.

<sup>4</sup> Agrigentum in 261 BC (Diod Sic. 23.9.1; Oros. 4.7.6; Polyb. 1.19.15; Zon. 8.10), Agris in 255 BC (Eutrop. 2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7; Zon. 8.14) and Panormus in 254 BC (Diod. Sic. 23.18.5; Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 1.38.9-10).

on both sides for the purpose of future exchanges. Carthage held its Roman captives in Africa, perhaps intending to use them as leverage in a settlement of the war.<sup>5</sup> The Romans, on the other hand, waged the war with different motives. There could only be one conclusion for them, and that was the imposition of terms from the Senate rather than a settlement.<sup>6</sup> In the eventual peace treaty it seems one of the only concessions awarded to the Carthaginians was that they be allowed to redeem their prisoners from the Romans.<sup>7</sup>

The first instance of capture by the Romans in the First Punic War occurred after their siege of Agrigentum.<sup>8</sup> The Carthaginians were encamped outside the city, where, after a two month siege, the Romans were finally able to bring them to battle and defeat them. The defeated army retreated to its camp and was able to abscond unseen during the night.<sup>9</sup> At dawn the Romans occupied the unguarded city, after which some 25,000 people were carried off, though it is not clear whether these constituted the citizens taken ‘as slaves’ or the slaves of the city. Walbank suggested that the citizens were enslaved;<sup>10</sup> however there is considerable evidence to suggest that it was the city’s slaves that were taken rather than the enslavement of the free inhabitants.<sup>11</sup> Agrigentum had been an affluent city prior to the war, with a sizeable population, therefore it is likely a large number of slaves were within.<sup>12</sup> Polybius, our primary account of the sack, states that the Romans “plundered the city and many of the slaves, and the Romans possessed themselves of many slaves and further came into possession of a great assortment of things.”<sup>13</sup> Polybius used the word σῶμα which may refer to ‘body’ or ‘slave’ to denote those being plundered (διαρπάζω). In a later passage Polybius uses σῶμα to indicate what could only be a personal slave, and so by the argument of consistency the insertion of

<sup>5</sup> As shown by the negotiation for the exchange of captives by the Carthaginians in Africa, see below.

<sup>6</sup> Notably Regulus’ failed peace (App. *Pun.* 4; Aug. *De Civ.* 3.15; Flor. 1.18.24; Polyb. 1.35.1-4; Zon. 8.13), see Eckstein 1987, 132. On the feigned negotiation of Lutatius’ peace see Lazenby 1996a, 168.

<sup>7</sup> Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5, see below.

<sup>8</sup> The city is also referred to as Acragas by Polyb. 1.17f.; Zon. 8.14; Diod. Sic. 23.7f., and is possibly identified as ‘grgnt’ in a Punic inscription from Carthage from the late fifth century *CISem* 1.5510; the association of ‘grgnt’ with Agrigentum/Arkagias was first argued by Krahmalkov 1974, 171-177; and has been more recently defended by Schmitz 1994, 1-13.

<sup>9</sup> In Zonaras’ account 8.10 the Carthaginians under Hannibal launch a night time attack on the Roman camp, but are repulsed, whereas the Carthaginians under Hanno steal away in the night.

<sup>10</sup> Walbank 1957 I, 72.

<sup>11</sup> See also Ducrey 1999, 28; Volkmann 1990, 95. Welwei 2000, 65 n. 6 is sceptical of the figure of 25,000, particularly given Diod. Sic. 23.9.1 exaggeration of the Romans sustaining a loss of 30,000 foot soldiers from a consular (4 legion) army with the addition of the *alae sociorum*.

<sup>12</sup> Diod. Sic. 13.84.1-5 surely exaggerated the size of the city, at not less than 200,000 adult males. The citizen body is a more believable number, which he puts at more than 20,000. The wealth of this city is noted as being considerable, thus the presence of a proportionally large number of slaves is a reasonable assertion.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 1.19.15 διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς.

slaves into the passage seems appropriate.<sup>14</sup> The distinction of slaves rather than ‘bodies’ agrees with Diodorus, who specifically states that the Romans took slaves (δούλοι).<sup>15</sup> The interpretation that the citizens were enslaved comes from the later historians. In Zonaras’ account the people of Agrigentum turned on the remaining Carthaginian garrison just before the city was captured, but were not rewarded for their volte-face and instead “all their property was plundered and everyone was sold abroad.”<sup>16</sup> Whereas Orosius simply states “all of the Agrigentines were under the crown.”<sup>17</sup> We should of course be hesitant to accept the accounts of Orosius and Zonaras over those of Polybius and Diodorus in this case. Zonaras’ narration, which follows Dio’s second century AD account, emphasised the fruitless attempt of the Agrigentines to ingratiate themselves with the attacking Romans, and so the result of their sale into captivity abroad (ἐπράθησαν) was all the more convincing. However, the city would once again become prosperous during the Second Punic War, and so it is hard to imagine that a city, whose entire population was enslaved, could quickly recover.<sup>18</sup>

The next engagement which resulted in enemies being captured came in the wake of Rome’s first major success at sea. In 261 BC the Romans, with a newly built fleet equipped with *corvi*, managed to defeat a Carthaginian fleet near Mylae. In the initial engagement with the forward squadrons the Romans were able to capture 30 ships along with their crews. By the end of the battle the Carthaginians had lost a total of 50 ships, roughly half their fleet, including their flagship.<sup>19</sup> According to Orosius this amounted to 7,000 captured Carthaginian sailors.<sup>20</sup> This figure is puzzling as it is difficult to understand what his basis or source for the number of captives is; perhaps from the lost portion of Livy, and so either directly or indirectly from Fabius Pictor or Philinus.<sup>21</sup> The figure 7,000 would yield roughly 225 men per captured ship and this corresponds with the possible crew size of typical Punic

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 12.16.5. He also refers to the slaves captured outside Aspis in 256 BC in the same way (1.29.7). Σῶμα clearly refers to a slave in an inscription, contemporary with Polybius, at Delphi *GDI* 2154.6. For earlier Greek writers σῶματα sometimes indicated people made into slaves (Dem. 20.77; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.19).

<sup>15</sup> 23.9.1. *Contra* Walbank 1957 I, 72.

<sup>16</sup> Zon. 8.10 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα σφῶν διηπάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπράθησαν ἅπαντες.

<sup>17</sup> Zon. Oros. 4.7.6 *Agrigentini sub corona omnes venditi sunt.*

<sup>18</sup> Frank 1933 I, 67; Volkman 1990, 55. Walbank 1957 I, 72 rejects the mitigation stating “it was common practice for the Romans to enslave entire populations,” he follows the same line of argument given by Beloch 1929, 653, n1.

<sup>19</sup> Polyb. 1.23.7 ἂ ναῦς αὐτάνδρουσ ἀπεβαλον Eutrop. 2.20.2 puts the figure at 31 ships ‘*capta*,’ Oros. 4.7.10 at 31 as well. Zon. 8.11 simply mentions that many ships were captured. An inscription upon the *columna rostra* *CIL* 6.25 gives a figure, but apart from the ‘X’ in the number the remaining digits are illegible. Cf. Walbank 1967 I, 79; Tarn 1907, 52.

<sup>20</sup> Oros. 4.7.10.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Welwei 2000, 65; Meister 1990, 143f.

vessels of the age, accepting some losses through casualties.<sup>22</sup> The majority of these captives were likely the rowing crews, who would have been necessary in allowing the Romans to capitalise on the prize ships taken in the battle. The training of new crews took a considerable amount of time and the manpower required to row the newly taken ships would have been difficult to acquire quickly enough to use them in battle. *Ad hoc* manning from amongst the current crews was possible, as occurred amongst the navies of the 16<sup>th</sup> - 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in taking prize ships. But unlike sailing ships, rowing ships could not manoeuvre sufficiently under skeleton crews. Many of those on the deck would have been killed during the boarding and seizure of the ship. Of the captives taken it is likely that, after good service in the navy, they would have been made free men, as occurred during the Second Punic War.<sup>23</sup> Contrary to popular belief, the Romans, like the Athenians, were loath to use slaves as rowers in their navies; and given the proclivity towards mercenaries, it is likely that the Carthaginians used hired rather than forced labour for rowers, along with their own citizens.<sup>24</sup>

In 259 BC the Romans sent the Consul L. Cornelius Scipio to subdue the islands of Corsica and Sardinia. The principle cities of Olbia in Sardinia and Aleria in Corsica were captured.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The ‘five’ or *quinquereme* (πεντήρης) was a favoured vessel of the Romans, which was based upon the Carthaginian model (cf. Polyb. 20.10f.). ‘Five’ likely refers to the number of rowers per oar or a combination between rowers and oar ports, see Morrison, Coates and Rankov 2000, 9-10. The heavier Roman version of the vessel-type probably required a slightly larger rowing crew, which Casson 1971, 101 n.41 puts at around 270 rowers. Meijer, 1984, 152 estimates that at least 300 rowers were needed. Lancel 1995, 126 estimates the same, but includes the onboard marines in the number. According to Polybius 1.26.7 the Roman fleet bound for Africa had 300 rowers per ship, with a complement of 120 marines, but this was an invasion force, thus containing more fighting men and requiring more rowers for the added weight. The Carthaginians also favoured a ‘five’ system during the Punic Wars, see Casson 1959, 162-165; Morrison and Coates 1996, 293; Morrison 1995, 68-9. Larger ships were becoming the general practice amongst Mediterranean navies from the late fourth century, cf. Casson 1969, 185-194.

<sup>23</sup> See below. After the fall of New Carthage, Scipio pressed the strong captives as rowers in the navy, promising them their freedom, should they prove zealous and loyal (Polyb. 10.17.15). Welwei 2000, 74 is less accepting of this for the case of captives taken at Ecnomus, but allows for the replacement of some Roman losses from amongst the Carthaginian crews.

<sup>24</sup> For Athens see Sargent 1927, 201-212; Amit 1962, 157-78; Casson 1971, 322-23. For Rome see Meijer 1986, 147f.; Höckmann 1985, 96f. On the general argument against slaves as rowers in antiquity see Westermann 1955, 15-16; Casson 1971, 322-328; 1994, 69-71. For a contrasting view see Thiel 1946, 196-198. Clear examples of this preference include: Athens freeing the slaves that were pressed into service in an emergency after the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24). During the Hellenistic period Greek navies often relied upon mercenary rowers (Dem. 50.7-13; 7.18; 51.6), cf. Glover 1917, 328-3; Casson 1971, 323-324. Augustus freed slaves before enrolling them in his navy to fight Sextus (Suet. *Aug.* 16). Likewise, Sextus Pompey used the service of freed slaves, but this was an exceptional circumstance (App. *Bel. Civ.* 2.103; Cass. Dio 49.1.5). The imperial fleet used free provincial rowers, see Starr 1960: 71-77. Only during the Second Punic War did the Romans use slaves, but these were then granted their freedom after decommission (Liv. 22. 57.11; 24. 14. 1-8; 18. 12; Zon. 9.2.3), cf. Libourel 1973, 116-119.

<sup>25</sup> Flor. 1.18.5; Eutrop. 2.20 and Oros. 4.7.11 mention Scipio’s operations in both islands, whereas Sil. 6.671-672 and Val. Max. 5.1.2 only mention Sardinia. An inscription commemorates Scipio’s capture of Aleria and a victory in Corsica (*CIL* 6.1287=37039c).

Eutropius states that several thousand captives were brought back for the triumph,<sup>26</sup> and Frontinus hints at a canny tactic which left the cities unguarded. Accordingly, Scipio invested the cities with half his force whilst keeping the other half hidden, he then feigned a retreat and, in giving pursuit, the enemy left the cities open for the other half of his force to enter unmolested.<sup>27</sup> If this is to be believed, it is likely the majority of captives taken from Olbia and Aleria were civilians.

Roman success in Sicily was initially limited. The Roman forces captured the fortress of Mazarin in 260 BC, and according to Diodorus the inhabitants therein were enslaved, though there could not have been many.<sup>28</sup> In 258 BC the Romans, on their third and final attempt, managed to capture the city of Mytistratus.<sup>29</sup> According to Diodorus, after the slaughter the remaining ‘bodies’ were sold as booty.<sup>30</sup> Here Diodorus’ use of *σῶμα*, which contrasts with its use in Polybius (above), emphasises the corporeal with regards to the body count of the survivors. Zonaras describes the capture of Mytistratus in far greater detail; according to him the Carthaginian garrison fled in the night, leaving the people of Mytistratus to fend for themselves.<sup>31</sup> As the men of the city took to the walls, the women persuaded them to surrender the city and so the gates were opened to the Romans. However, the Roman soldiers, probably exasperated by the staunch defence of the city that had cost them dearly up to this point, burst into the city and began ruthlessly slaughtering everyone. The consul Atilius Regulus, was only able to check his soldier’s bloodlust by promising to award all the captives taken to those that took them, and so the troops ceased their slaughter. The Roman intent at vengeance is clear in the decision to burn the city to the ground. The inhabitants were likely sold or ransomed on the spot, as the troops soon marched on the city of Camarina and took it by storm. Diodorus states that the inhabitants were all sold (*πωλέω*),<sup>32</sup> but doubts have been raised regarding their wholesale enslavement due to an inscription found on Cos, dated only 16 years later, which thanks the ‘citizens’ of Camara.<sup>33</sup> Regardless, the rough handling of

<sup>26</sup> Eutrop. 2.22 *multa milia inde captivorum adduxit triumphum egit*. For the Triumph see Degraasi 1954, 100.

<sup>27</sup> Frontin. 3.9.4; 3.10.2.

<sup>28</sup> Though Diod. Sic. 23.9.4 specifies that the captives were ‘enslaved’ specifically *εζηνδραποδισμένον*. The description of Mazarin (Mazara) as a ‘φρούριον’ suggests that there were not many captives to be taken, as it was only a citadel or hill fort in the ‘classical sense’ (eg. Thuc. 2.18.2; 3.18.4; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.4.16). For the baffling assertion by some modern historians that it was the Carthaginians who seized Mazarin see Lazenby 1996, 73 n. 22.

<sup>29</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.9.4; Zon. 8.11. Polyb. 1.24.10 only mentions the capture of the city.

<sup>30</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.9.4 *καὶ τὰ ὑπολειφέντα σώματα λαφυροπονωλήσαντες*, see Lazenby 1996, 75.

<sup>31</sup> Zon. 8.11.

<sup>32</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.9.5 *τὴν πόλιν εἴλε καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ πλείονα Καμαριναίων ἐπόλησεν*.

<sup>33</sup> *SEG.* 12.379, cf. Ducrey 1999, 110; Welwei 2000, 67.



these cities convinced many Sicilian communities to capitulate to the Romans.<sup>34</sup>

In 257 BC the Romans won another sea battle off Cape Tyndaris. According to Polybius 10 ships along with their crews were captured, however Zonaras states that the battle took place close to shore and that the Carthaginians abandoned the ships before the Romans seized them.<sup>35</sup> If Polybius' account is true, then the Romans would have captured approximately 1,400 sailors, if we accept the average derived from a later naval battle, or, without any casualties and full rowing crews for all the *quinquiremes*, as many as 3,000.<sup>36</sup> The minor sea battle off the Aegates Islands was a prelude to the significant naval victory in the following year. In 256 BC the Romans amassed a large fleet that would take an invasion force to Africa.<sup>37</sup> On their way they met the Carthaginians off the coast of Sicily near Encomus and won a major victory which resulted in the capture of 64 enemy ships.<sup>38</sup> Since the fleet was carrying an invasion force there was no shortage of guards to ensure the newly acquired rowing crews of the captured ships would submit to Roman orders. The shift of captives from the rowing benches to the transports is highly unlikely given the large invasion force.<sup>39</sup>

The battle of Encomus crushed the Carthaginian navy and left Africa open for the invasion force, which established a beachhead and laid siege to the city of Aspis (also known as Clupea).<sup>40</sup> In Zonaras' account the city was empty – the inhabitants having fled at the approach of the ships.<sup>41</sup> Whether captured by force or not, Aspis was subsequently used as a

<sup>34</sup> Zon. 8.12. Polyb. 1.24.12 gives an account of the capture of Enna, but neglects to mention prisoners, cf. Lazenby 1996, 75-6.

<sup>35</sup> Polyb. 1.25.4; Zon. 8.12. Other sources mention the battle without the details of ships or enemies captured (Aur. Vict. 39.2; Diod. Sic. 23.10.2; Polyæn 8.20.1).

<sup>36</sup> After the sea Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC Polybius 1.61.6 gives a figure of 70 captured ships amounting to 10,000 captives (a rough estimate to be sure), yielding an average of 142 per boat. We might just as well use the average of 225 as derived from Oros. 4.7.10, see above. 300 is the typical number in Polyb. 1.26.7. Larger figures cannot be excluded either, as survivors from sunken ships could also be taken (Diod. Sic. 24.11.3), cf. Lazenby 1996a, 153. For the Tyndaris engagement Welwei 2000, 70 estimates a high figure of between 4,000-5,000. Cf. Walbank 1957 I, 82.

<sup>37</sup> For estimations of the fleet size see Walbank 1957 I, 83; Thiel 1954, 84; Tipps 1985, 432; Lazenby 1996a, 81f. For scepticism of the numbers see Welwei 2000, 71 n.27.

<sup>38</sup> Polyb. 1.25.7. Aur. Vict. 40.1 puts the figure at 63 captured. Oros. 4.8.6 and Eutrop. 2.21.1 refer to the loss of 64 ships rather than capture and most sources focus on the victory ignoring the casualties (Diod. Sic. 23.11.1; St. Jerome (Hieronymus) 1757; Liv. *Per.* 17; Zon. 8.12).

<sup>39</sup> Welwei suggests the Roman foot soldiers were distributed amongst the *quinquiremes* with only the cavalry carried on the transports. It stands to reason that Roman shipbuilding was stretched enough to make use of as many warships as possible for the purpose of transports. For a discussion of the number of Carthaginian ships refitted for use by the Romans see Welwei 2000, 72-3; Walbank 1957 I, 83f. These estimations hinge on the overall size of the fleet in 255 BC (350 according to Polyb. 1.36.10). For the limitations of space aboard warships see Rankov 1996, 51.

<sup>40</sup> Eutrop. 2.21; Polyb. 1.29.5; Vell. Pat. 2.32.2. App. *Pun.* 3 and Flor. 1.18.19 mention the capture of Clipea along with the capture of 200 or 300 towns/fortresses respectively, see Lazenby 1996, 96.

<sup>41</sup> Zon. 8.12.

base of operations for the Roman Army. Polybius states that the Romans moved outward and “plundered the countryside,” capturing 20,000 slaves (again σῶματα).<sup>42</sup> The raiding and capture of people from the area around Aspis is also alluded to by Livy,<sup>43</sup> and the seizure of many other towns and fortresses in the area seems to support Florus’ statement that Regulus held a large number of enemy troops as prisoners.<sup>44</sup> According to Eutropius 27,000 captives had been amassed and brought back to Rome by L. Manlius Vulso, Regulus’ consular colleague.<sup>45</sup> Orosius puts the figure at 20,000 but does not state that they were brought back to Rome.<sup>46</sup> Of these, it is hard to imagine they were all enemy combatants, the Carthaginians having systematically withdrawn their troops before the Roman advance to block a path to Carthage. Furthermore, Polybius referred to those captured as slaves, for the most part field hands, having been taken along with cattle. Interestingly Zonaras notes the recovery also of Roman prisoners suggesting that the Carthaginians had removed their Roman captives to Africa, though at this point there could not have been very many.<sup>47</sup> Once the area about Aspis had been thoroughly devastated the Senate requested the fleet be returned to Rome; the aforementioned L. Manlius, according to Polybius, loaded the captives (now under Roman control referred to as αἰχμάλωτοι) and a large quantity of booty into the ships and sailed for home.<sup>48</sup>

The transport of between 20,000 and 27,000 captives back to Rome is possible given the number of troops and cavalry left behind.<sup>49</sup> Volkmann misinterpreted the number of captives to be 270,000 and seemed to believe that these were all brought back to Rome; an impossibility given that the number of captives would have drastically exceeded the transport

---

<sup>42</sup> Polyb. 1.29.7.

<sup>43</sup> Liv. 29.28.5.

<sup>44</sup> Flor. 1.18.21. In Africa Regulus was said to have captured 300 *castella* (Flor 1.18.19; Oros. 4.8.7) or 200 πόλεις (App. *Lib.* 3).

<sup>45</sup> Eutrop. 2.21.

<sup>46</sup> Oros. 4.8.9.

<sup>47</sup> The Roman losses to this point were high. As many as 30,000 died in taking Agrigentum alone (Diod. 23.9.1). But overall, Roman success ensured only a few fell in to the hands of the Carthaginians up to this point. That the Carthaginians *maintained* captives is evident in their wish to later exchange prisoners, using the captured general Regulus as the agent for negotiation (App. *Pun.* 4; Aug. *De Civ.* 3.15; Flor. 1.18.24; Polyb. 1.35.1-4; Zon. 8.13).

<sup>48</sup> Polyb. 1.29.10. Since there was no supplies of food available around Aspis, they were forced to sail back to Italy late in the season, cf. Caven 1980 35-36.

<sup>49</sup> Lazenby 1996, 98 noted that the forces left behind in Africa were indeed meagre implying there was plenty of room aboard the returning ships, but the initial cavalry force was particularly small and thus it was unlikely many ships were needed for horse transport.

capabilities of the Roman fleet.<sup>50</sup> It is difficult to understand the Roman's motives for acquiring such large numbers of captives in the first place if they intended to transport them all the way to Rome. Large numbers of slaves had been incited to revolt by the Samnites, angry at their forced service in the navy, only two years earlier.<sup>51</sup> In the wake of the rebellion, the addition of 20,000 slaves with the prospect of increasing the navy and supplementing the legions out of the pool of citizens seems ludicrous. If the captives (slave or free) from Agrigentum were sold abroad, which being situated in Sicily would imply the use of ships for their transport, it was unlikely their conveyance to the markets was carried out by the Roman navy, who simply could not commit the necessary vessels at the time. If the Romans in fact had captives to be sold it is likely that they would have been offloaded in Agrigentum, where the Romans had established themselves and which had already been the site of a major auction.<sup>52</sup> The fleet returning from Rome therefore probably carried only a few captives, either as hostages to ensure the loyalty of many of the communities that went over to the Romans when they invaded Africa or as objects for the triumph celebrated by L. Manlius Vulso in the following year.<sup>53</sup>

Eventually the Carthaginians, under the leadership of the Spartan Xanthipus, defeated Regulus' army in a battle on flat open ground, taking many captives, including the consul.<sup>54</sup> A few lucky Romans made it back to the original beachhead of Aspis and there remained hard pressed by the Carthaginians. The Roman fleet that set out in the spring of 255 BC had originally been intended as a blockading armada, but now was tasked with the recovery of the survivors of Regulus' army. *En route* this fleet encountered a Carthaginian force off the Hermaeum promontory on the Southern coast of Sicily. The Carthaginians were thoroughly defeated and either 114, 30 or 24 ships were captured depending on the account, the lower figures seeming more probable.<sup>55</sup> The number of Carthaginians captured here could have

---

<sup>50</sup> Volkman 1990, 57. Even if the fleet had carried two consular armies with supplies the number of captives that could be crammed on board the vessels with no guards or supplies could not exceed 60,000 only less than a quarter of the number suggested by Volkman. Horsmann (Volkman 1990, 149) suggests this was only a clerical error, but Volkman tried to justify the high number in relation to 200,000 taken from 200 cities in *Aur. Vict. De vir ill.* 40.2.

<sup>51</sup> *Oros.* 4.7.12; *Zon.* 8.11.

<sup>52</sup> See above.

<sup>53</sup> Cities submitted to Rome when they landed in Africa (*Zon.* 8.12). For the triumph see Degrassi 1954, 100.

<sup>54</sup> The Carthaginians were able to make effective use of their elephants and cavalry, *Frontin.* 2.2.11; 3.10. Regulus and many troops captured, *Ampel.* 14.9; *App. Pun.* 3; *Oros.* 4.9.3-10.1; *Polyb.* 1.34.12; *Liv. Per.* 18; *Sil.* 2.340-343; *Zon.* 8.13.

<sup>55</sup> *Polyb.* 1.36.11 gives 114 ships captured. *Eutrop.* 2.22.1 and *Oros.* 4.9.5 put the figure at 30 and *Diod. Sic.* 23.18.1 at only 24. Welwei 2000, 77 favours Orosius' figure (c. 5,000 captives); De Sanctis 1969 I, 157 n. 25 favours Diodorus' figure; Walbank 1957 I, 95 favours Polybius' figure on the basis that a triumph was

totalled as many as 34,200 or as few as 3,400; given the vagaries of the sources it is, as so often, impossible to be certain.<sup>56</sup> Once the Romans reached their beleaguered colleagues in Aspis they were able to again strike out against the Carthaginians. In a land battle, only mentioned by the annalists, as many as 15,000 Carthaginians were captured.<sup>57</sup> According to Zonaras the Carthaginians prisoners were spared their lives because Regulus and many Roman captives were still in Carthaginian custody.<sup>58</sup> The Romans, having loaded their ships with captives and their recovered troops, set sail for Sicily, but were soon caught in a terrible storm that resulted in the near obliteration of their navy. Of several hundred ships, only a fraction survived and were recovered by Hiero at Syracuse.<sup>59</sup>

In 254 BC the Roman legions in Sicily laid siege to the city of Panormus, which was essentially formed from two cities, one older than the other. The Romans broke through the new city, but before breaching the old city the Panormitans surrendered.<sup>60</sup> The city's citizens were set a ransom price of 2 *minae* each and those that could pay it were allowed to go free; "those remaining, to the sum of 13,000, were sold along with the plunder as booty."<sup>61</sup> Subsequently the Roman ships likely carrying the ransom monies and captives to Rome after the sack of Panormus were intercepted and most captured by a Carthaginian fleet, with only a few managing to escape.<sup>62</sup>

In 252 BC the Romans defeated the Carthaginians near Himera and were able to capture a large number of elephants, along with many enemy prisoners.<sup>63</sup> The incident is not mentioned

---

awarded. However naval triumphs had been awarded for the capture of 64 ships after Encomus and for the capture of 30 ships after Mylae. The addition of 30 ships off of Aspis, if Orosius' and Eutropius' accounts are accurate, also makes the higher figure unnecessary.

<sup>56</sup> Again the number of captives per ship is impossible to know it could exceed or fall below these numbers. For the sake of argument I give the low average at 142 as previously and the high at 300, neglecting any onboard fighters who would mostly have been killed in boarding. This yields a range of 3,408 – 7,200 for 24 captured ships, 4,260 – 9,000 for 30 ships and 16,188 – 34,200 for 114 ships.

<sup>57</sup> Eutrop. 2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7. Zon. 8.14 does not give an exact figure, but states that 'many' were captured. Polybius does not mention this land battle, and so the accuracy, or legitimacy, of this event should be treated with caution.

<sup>58</sup> Zon. 8.14.

<sup>59</sup> For the debate on possible fleet figures see Walbank 1957 I, 95. As few as 80 ships survived, Cf. Diod. Sic. 23.18.1; Eutrop. 2.22.2; Oros. 9.4.8; Polyb. 1.37.2; Zon 8.14.

<sup>60</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.18.5. Polyb. 1.38.9-10 does not mention captives. Florus 1.18.12 eludes to the expulsion of a garrison and Aur. Vict. 39.2 simply states that the city was captured. Zon. 8.14 puts the surrender of the old city down to starvation.

<sup>61</sup> Diod. Sic. 23.18.5 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς, μυρίους τρισχιλίους ὄντας, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀποσκευὴν ἐλαφυροπώλησαν. Volkman 1990, 56; Welwei 2000, 77. For the significance of the ransom see Chapter 3, cf. the note of Horsmann (Volkman 1990, 112-3).

<sup>62</sup> Cass. Dio 43.29fr.; Zon. 8.14.

<sup>63</sup> Zon. 8.14 says 120 elephants were captured; Diod. Sic. 23.21.1 gives 60. Enemy prisoners are mentioned by Zonaras as αἰχμαλιτοί.

by Polybius, but Zonaras goes to great length to describe the ordeal of getting the elephants across the straits of Messina in which the animals panicked but were eventually calmed by their mahouts. The pachyderms were the centrepiece of C. Aurelius Cotta's triumph along with 13 enemy leaders.<sup>64</sup>

Rome's initial success in the First Punic War soon dried up with repeated disasters at sea and renewed vigour on the part of the Carthaginians in Sicily. From 252 BC to the very end of the war more than a decade later, there are no notable examples of enslavements by the Romans. In fact the Romans on several occasions are the victims of capture, with their defeat at Eryx perhaps the greatest loss. According to Diodorus (probably following Philinus), as many as 35,000 Romans were taken prisoner in the sea battle.<sup>65</sup> The Carthaginians were perhaps amassing these prisoners in the hopes of bringing the Romans to the table, either for peace or for a prisoner exchange. That prisoner exchanges were at least considered by both parties is indicated by the settlement following the war.<sup>66</sup> By 242 BC the Romans had retaken Eryx and Hamilcar requested a truce to collect the dead from the consul Fundanius. The consul's response was that Hamilcar should request a truce to recover the living rather than the dead. In a twist of fate, when Fundanius was defeated by Hamilcar, he found himself begging the exact same request; Hamilcar consented and smartly replied that he had already come to terms with the dead.<sup>67</sup>

Overall, Rome's allies were loyal partners in the conflict. On only two occasions do we hear of any resistance to Roman demands; the previously mentioned incident with the Samnites, whose dissent probably rested with military service in the navy, and the Faliscans just after the conclusion of the war. The latter rebelled but were quickly quashed by the consul Manlius Torquatus. As punishment the Faliscans were forced to give up their arms, horses and property, including their slaves, whilst half of their territory was taken as *ager Romanus*.<sup>68</sup> Considering the typical treatment of rebels, the Faliscans were handled with leniency, and it is probable that the Romans were bearing in mind the opinion of their other allies.

Eventually the Romans plucked up enough courage to venture again on the sea and, having

<sup>64</sup> The mahouts were rewarded with freedom (Zon. 8.14. Cf. Liv. *Per.* 19), see Degrassi 1954, 100.

<sup>65</sup> Diod. Sic. 24.1.11, this does not correspond with Polybius or any other account, and is hard to place within a collective narrative or indeed accept as a stand alone event.

<sup>66</sup> Polyb. 1.62.9; 3.27.5; App. *Sic.* 2.5; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5; Zon. 8.17.

<sup>67</sup> Diod. Sic. 24.9.1-3.

<sup>68</sup> Zon. 8.18; Polyb. 1.65.2; Eutrop. 2.28.1; Oros. 4.11.10. Val. Max. 6.5.1 alludes to the slaves taken as *pueri vinctum*. The colony of Spoleto was established within the on the *ager Romanus*, Liv. *Per.* 20. Cf. Volkmann 1990, 41; Welwei 2000, 80-1.

scraped the barrel of the recruitment pool, they sailed under the consul Q. Lutatius Cerco to the Aegates Islands in 241 BC. There they met the Carthaginians in the final clash of the war, winning a great victory and capturing large numbers of enemy ships with their crews. According to Polybius 70 ships were taken, yielding nearly 10,000 prisoners.<sup>69</sup> Diodorus, as earlier, gives a far more conservative figure of 20 ships taken.<sup>70</sup> No two sources agree on the exact figures, but the estimates tend to favour Polybius' number as it is highly unlikely all the captured ships were 'fives' and that they were captured with the full compliment of their rowers, crew and marines.<sup>71</sup> Following the battle Lutatius made port at the formerly Carthaginian held city of Lilybaeum. There Polybius told us he "occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men," a business, he tells us, of considerable magnitude given the large number of captives.<sup>72</sup> Polybius here indicates that 10,000 men was a considerable number, and likely the ships captured were not to be included within the Roman fleet, or at least they were not yet fit for regular duty - ramming was a destructive means of incapacitating a ship and the *corvus* was a damaging instrument as well.

This final sea battle meant Rome now ruled the waves and so Carthage was effectively sealed off from Sicily. Hamilcar, now denied any possibility of reinforcement, was forced to come to terms. Lutatius as consul was empowered by the Senate to negotiate with the Carthaginian commander, and it is evident that the Carthaginian Senate had also granted Hamilcar similar autonomy in negotiating terms. Lutatius opted for moderate terms, given the circumstances and Hamilcar's likely willingness to prolong the war in Sicily<sup>73</sup>. Polybius several times refers

---

<sup>69</sup> Polyb. 1.61.6.

<sup>70</sup> Diod. Sic. 24.11.2 states that Philinus gave a figure of 6,000 Carthaginians captured, but others only 4,040. De Sanctis 1969 I, 235 believed this to be corruption of later copying, and as a result, Philinus' figure should be read as: 6,000 Carthaginians and 4,040 'others' captured, equalling a total of 10,040. This conveniently corresponds with Polybius' number of men captured. Welwei 2000, 79 rejects this as mere convenience. When averaged against the number of ships captured the number of crew aboard each ship is far too high, but Diodorus states that many captives were also plucked from the sea, presumably from the sunk ships, and this could bust the acceptable total. Cf. Lazenby 1996a, 153-4; Walbank 1957 I, 127. The total number of captives and the composition with regards to their roles as sailors and marines was attempted by Prachner, this is summarised in Welwei 2000, 79 n. 54.

<sup>71</sup> Oros. 4.10.7 lists 63 ships sunk and Eutrop. 2.27.2 gives 73. Both put the number of captives taken at 32,000. For problems with these figures see Tarn 1907, 56-57. Tusa and Royal 2012, 42 noted that if all 70 ships, as mentioned by Polybius, taken were quinquiremes then the number of captives (ignoring casualties) would have been closer to 30,000 as suggested by Orosius and Eutropius. However, it is likely that the fleet consisted of a combination of vessel types and many of the ships would have been smaller biremes and triremes, thus the lower figure given by Polybius appears more accurate.

<sup>72</sup> Polyb. 1.61.8.

<sup>73</sup> As evident in his famous hatred of the Romans that he passed on to his sons (Nepos 22.4.3; 23.3.1; Val. Max. 9.3.2; Zon. 8.21).

to the treaty, and its terms are well known as they appear in several different sources.<sup>74</sup> Importantly there is a provision in the treaty that the Roman prisoners and traitors were to be returned without ransom.<sup>75</sup> Hamilcar agreed to the terms; given the position he was in it was difficult for him to negotiate, Sicily being firmly in Roman hands, but he was able to win the concession that he would not be made personally to pass under the yoke.<sup>76</sup> Of the remaining Carthaginian forces in Sicily that surrendered they were allowed to go without ransom, the release of Hamilcar without further humiliation probably symbolic of his entire force. 20,000 of these soldiers were returned to Africa and there began the Mercenary War. Had they been ransomed it would have certainly amounted to a large enough sum to provoke comment. The initial terms agreed by the two generals were not approved by the *comitia centuriata*, of which every *foedus* required a vote of approval. In response, the Senate sent a commission of ten to oversee further negotiations.<sup>77</sup> In the end the indemnity was increased by a thousand talents, with the repayment period cut in half. Furthermore, the Carthaginians were also forced to vacate the islands lying between Sicily and Africa.

It is also evident that there were other negotiations on smaller points taking place, as the Carthaginians also requested that their prisoners be returned. The prisoners whose release was requested were probably Carthaginians and perhaps those of their close allies of Phoenician decent, such as Utica and Hippo Regius, rather than all their forces inclusive of mercenaries.<sup>78</sup> Zonaras states that it was eventually decided that the Carthaginians should be granted this concession, but that they should be required to pay a ransom.<sup>79</sup> Eutropius is far more detailed on this matter;<sup>80</sup> it was decided by the Senate that the Carthaginian prisoners held as state prisoners, perhaps even as *servi publici populi Romani*,<sup>81</sup> were to be returned

<sup>74</sup> Polyb. 1.62.4-9; 3.21.2-5; 27.1-6; 29.2-10; App. *Sic.* 2.4-6; Cat. *Orig.* 4.9; Diod. *Sic.* 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5; Liv. 21.18; *Per.* 19; Nepos 22.1.4; Oros. 4.11.1-4; Zon. 8.17.

<sup>75</sup> Specifically Polyb. 1.62.9; 3.27.5; App. *Sic.* 2.5; Diod. *Sic.* 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5; Zon. 8.17.

<sup>76</sup> Zon. 8.17. This is likely an invention of Zonaras as only Italians were made to pass under the yoke, see Chapter 2.

<sup>77</sup> Similar to the case of a commission of ten (*decemviri*) being sent from Rome to Flaminius in order to advise in the Isthmian peace in 196 BC (App. *Mac.* 9.3; Polyb. 18.44.1-45.12; Liv. 33.30.1f.; Plut. *Flam.* 10.1-3, Zon. 9.16).

<sup>78</sup> These two cities had remained loyal at the outset of the Mercenary War due to their historical ties, and it is hard to imagine that they would have sided with Carthage against the Libyans, had their interests not also been protected in the Carthaginian treaty with Rome. The cities were eventually captured by the rebels, but were quickly retaken by Hamilcar and Hanno in 238 or 237 BC.

<sup>79</sup> Zon. 8.17.

<sup>80</sup> Eutrop. 2.27.4-5.

<sup>81</sup> As property of the state (*Dig.* 48.13.5). Buckland 1908, 292 notes that these do not always become distinguished *servi populi publici Romani*. If a captive owned by the state was to be sold at auction to private buyers it was unlikely that these would be given the distinction of *servi publici*. On the other hand slaves

without ransom; however, those held by private citizens were to be ransomed, and it was stipulated that these should be redeemed from the Carthaginian state treasury and explicitly not by individuals. Many captive Carthaginian nobles were housed with Roman citizens; despite their care being entrusted to individual citizens, they were property of the state since the state alone had the right to release them. The evidence of this arrangement is found in the case of two captives tortured by the wife of Regulus, who according to Zonaras and Aulus Gellius were turned over to the sons of the consul by the Senate, implying that they were under the ownership of the state. Diodorus states that the Senate intervened when they found out the prisoners were being maltreated; that they could do so indicates the captives were not property of Regulus' wife. It is clear that the preservation of the Carthaginian captives were maintained for the occasion of peace.<sup>82</sup>

On the whole, there cannot have been many Carthaginians captured, since most of their army comprised of mercenaries.<sup>83</sup> The ransom of all the Carthaginian prisoners at state expense implied that they were all to be removed back to Africa and these would have been predominantly captured officers. Of all the captives taken, it is likely that only a fraction of them were in fact enslaved, since most captures took place at sea and the rowing crews may well have been freed upon the completion of the war. There were, of course, still the citizens of many of the cities taken who may have fallen into captivity, but there had been a system in place in Sicily in which captives were either redeemed or sold, presumably to both foreign and domestic markets, and there is no reason to believe that it would be any different during the Punic War.<sup>84</sup>

---

could also be bought at auction by the state or acquired in lieu of default to the state, c.f. Halkin, 1872, 17f.; Mommsen 1887 I, 241; 1891, 275, Eder 1980, 9f. The more recent publications concerning *servi publici* (Eder 1980 and Weiss 2004) have not expanded upon this aspect of acquisition. For a treatment of *servi publici* in the late Empire see Lenski 2006.

<sup>82</sup> Cass. Dio 11.26fr.; Diod. Sic. 24.9.1-3.

<sup>83</sup> With the exception of 256-255 BC and the final battle of the Aegates in which perhaps 6,000 were captured, cf. Lazenby 1996a, 164.

<sup>84</sup> In 483 BC Gelon the Tyrant of Gela and Syracuse had captured Megara and sold the common folk abroad (Hdt. 7.156). Dionysius I enslaved the inhabitants of Motya in 397 BC and sold the inhabitants into slavery (Diod. Sic. 14.53.2-4). Leptines, the brother of Dionysius I, ransomed Greek sailors from Italy (Diod. Sic. 14.102.2) and Dionysius I also freed slaves to man ships (Diod. Sic. 14.58.1), Cf. Boese 1973, 26-27. There is little evidence for markets in Sicily, and overall references to slave markets seem to date only from the first century BC, see Trümper 2009, 20f.; Bodel, 2005, 184-185. Cf. Chapter 7.



## Between the First and Second Punic Wars

In the interlude between the First and Second Punic War Rome fought intermittently with the Cisalpine Gauls. In 238 BC the Consul Valerius marched against the Gauls; he was at first defeated in a skirmish, but on giving battle a second time the Gauls were defeated with 14,000 killed and 2,000 captured. The figures, given only by Orosius, are realistic.<sup>85</sup> In 225 BC the Insubres, Boii and Gaesatae united to march upon Roman territory. The force was large enough to spur the Romans into taking account of their military strength, which they assessed at around 800,000 Romans and allies capable of bearing arms.<sup>86</sup> Both consuls set out from Rome and met the Gauls near Arretium. Similar to the previous fight with the Gauls, the Romans were initially defeated and their enemies took several Romans as prisoners, the survivors taking refuge upon a hill.<sup>87</sup> The camp of the Gauls was filled with booty including captured slaves;<sup>88</sup> but these were soon recovered by the Romans and probably returned to their owners, since they were taken from the Rome's allies.<sup>89</sup> Subsequently, the Gauls were defeated in a battle in which the consul Atilius was killed, and so L. Aemilius Papus triumphed alone. Polybius puts the number of Gauls captured at over 10,000, whereas Diodorus grossly overestimates the number of Gauls present, inflating the number to 200,000, with 40,000 killed. Both figures seem inflated given the number of captives taken two years later in a battle that was not fought against an invading force.<sup>90</sup> Zonaras gives a detailed account of Papus' triumph, during which the Gauls were made to wear full military dress, mocking what the Romans considered their foolishness in going into battle naked.<sup>91</sup> In

<sup>85</sup> Oros. 4.12.1 *duo milia capta sunt*. Valerius was denied a triumph because of the initial defeat he suffered.

<sup>86</sup> This is a well-known census remarked upon by most sources, perhaps because it provides the best indicator of Roman strength prior to the Second Punic War (Polyb. 2.23.4- 24.17; Diod. Sic. 2.5.7; Liv. *Per.* 20; Plin. *HN* 3.138. Plut. *Marc.* 3.3-5; App. *Ill.* 8; Eutrop. 3.5.1; Oros. 4.13.5-7). Cf. Brunt 1971, 44-47.

<sup>87</sup> Polyb. 2.25.11. The prisoners were interrogated and revealed that the Roman relief force was approaching from the rear of the Gauls position (Polyb. 2.27.7).

<sup>88</sup> Polyb. 2.26.5 describes the booty ἦν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἧς εἶχον, ἀμύθητον.

<sup>89</sup> Polyb. 2.31.3.

<sup>90</sup> Polyb. 2.31.1-6; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1.

<sup>91</sup> Zon. 8.20. cf. Degrassi 1954, 101. Eutropius 3.5.1 notes that Fabius Pictor was present, and his account of the battle was presumably used by Livy (Livy's book concerning this is lost). The figure of 40,000 killed agrees with Diodorus 24.13.1, but the number of captives is not mentioned by Eutropius. Later depictions of Gauls and Germans by the Romans were generally without armour and this may have been a trope harkening to this early triumph of the disciplined and heavily armoured Roman infantryman over the barbarous and unarmoured Gaul.

224 BC, with the Boii thoroughly defeated, the Romans crossed the Po and attacked the Insubres. Orosius states that the battle resulted in 5,000 Gauls captured.<sup>92</sup>

The Romans also made incursions outside of Italy in the interim between the First and Second Punic Wars. In Sardinia in 238 BC the Romans intervened with the mercenary rebellion. When Carthage protested, Rome threatened a war, which the Carthaginians were indisposed to wage. Carthage submitted without a fight to the Roman's demand, and were forced to relinquish the island and pay a further 1,200 talents as recompense.<sup>93</sup> In consolidating their newly acquired province the Romans seized half the land as *ager Romanus*. They then proceeded to strip the Sardinians of their weapons and valuables, and carried off the slaves, of which there cannot have been many given the poverty of the island.<sup>94</sup> The Romans also seized Corsica, and though the two islands proved difficult to bring under control they were eventually administered as a province under a Praetor.<sup>95</sup> In Corsica the last of the rebels held out in caves and the Romans used dogs to hunt the soldiers out.<sup>96</sup> In the late 230's BC the Illyrians began to make extensive raids upon their southern Greek neighbours. The newly formed federal Epirote republic was particularly victimised by these raids, and when one of their chief cities was sacked by the Illyrians a number of Italian merchants were captured, leading to Roman intervention in Illyria.<sup>97</sup> The War was quickly dealt with by the two consuls in 228 BC and a peace concluded.<sup>98</sup> Of war captives nothing is

<sup>92</sup> Oros. 4.13.11 *quorum interfecta sunt viginti tria milia, quinque milia capta sunt*. Cf. Zon. 8.20, Polyb. 2.32.1-3. Orosius places the battle in 224 BC giving the consuls as Manlius Torquatus and Fulvius Flaccus, Polybius, however, puts it a year later under the consuls Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius. Polybius' account is more likely as it matches up with the *fasti triumphales* which gives a triumph in the following year 222 BC for Furius and Flaminius [Philus], Degraasi 1954, 101.

<sup>93</sup> App. *Hisp.* 4; *Pun.* 5; Polyb. 1.88.8-12; Eutrop. 3.2.1.

<sup>94</sup> Zon. 8.18 states specifically slaves (δουλεῖον) 'taken away' ἀφαιρέω. The capture of Sardinia, as mentioned by others but not the taking of slaves (Liv 23.34.15; Sil. Ital. 12.342; Eutrop 3.3.1; Oros 4.12.2). Vel. Pat. 2.38.2 states that the island was subjected to the imperial yoke by the consul. *consulis certum recepit imperi iugum*.

<sup>95</sup> Liv. *Per.* 20; Zon. 8.18. Scullard, 1961, 166-167.

<sup>96</sup> Strab. 5.224. Volkmann 1990, 54.

<sup>97</sup> The First Illyrian War (Cass. Dio 12fr.; Polyb. 11.2-12; App. *Ill.* 7-8; Flor. 1.21; Oros. 4.13.1-4; Zon. 8.19) The accounts of Polybius and Appian are the most extant of these sources, however neither agree on the causation of the war. Whilst Polybius' account is the more detailed, there is merit to the argument that Appian was the more informed historian on this matter, cf. Petzold 1971, 199-223; Derow 1973, 118-134; Walbank 1957 I, 153-167.

<sup>98</sup> Polyb. 2.12.3-71; App. *Ill.* 8; Liv. *Per.* 20. The Illyrians again took up piratical raiding and were quickly defeated by the Romans in the conflict regarded as the Second Illyrian War (App. *Ill.* 8; Cass. Dio 12fr.; Polyb. 3.16.18-19; Zon. 8.20). After the capture of the chief cities of Dimallum (also known as Dimale, Polyb. 3.18.1-7; Zon. 8.20) and Pharos (also spelled Pharos, Polyb. 3.18.8-19.12; Liv. 22.33.3; App. *Ill.* 8; Zon. 8.20) the war was concluded in 219 BC with no mention of captives. In the following year some remaining pirates were subdued at Issa (Eutrop. 3.7.1).

mentioned, save the beheading of a number of the Illyrian chiefs.<sup>99</sup> According to Polybius and Zonaras, the Romans were able to capture 20 ships laden with booty plundered from the Greeks, and it is possible the crews of these were taken captive, whilst a number of towns had been seized.<sup>100</sup> Orosius suggests that the towns were destroyed.<sup>101</sup> Overall Rome was most successful in mounting marine operations on coastal cities, and the proconsul Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, serving as admiral, celebrated a triumph in for the year 228 BC.<sup>102</sup> The consuls, however, were not awarded a triumph, and so it is unlikely any large-scale enslavements resulted from the First Illyrian War. Nor is it likely that any occurred in the Second Illyrian War, save for the sack of Pharos, which may have produced captives, and thus slaves.<sup>103</sup>

### Second Punic War

Much of the Second Punic War was fought on Italian soil and Hannibal's lengthy stay there resulted in a great deal of fighting against fellow Italians for the Romans. The treatment of such communities was similar to previous rebellions, where we find a reluctance on the part of the Romans to enslave fellow Italians. In Sicily the treatment of Agrigentum was severe, but it served to scare many other cities into capitulating.<sup>104</sup> Volkamnn noted that the Romans refrained from mass destruction in Sicily, preferring to preserve the cities and, for the most part, the populations too; this pattern continued into the first century with the treatment of the Sicilian communities in the fight against Sextus Pompey.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, in Spain the magnanimity of Scipio Africanus was lauded, and proved an effective strategy at winning over the Iberians instead of hardening them as Carthaginian allies against Rome.<sup>106</sup> With regards to Carthaginian prisoners, the Romans were inclined to preserve them,<sup>107</sup> and on

<sup>99</sup> Flor. 1.21.4.

<sup>100</sup> Polyb. 2.11.13. Ships Polyb. 2.11.14; Zon. 8.19.

<sup>101</sup> Oros. 4.13.2 *Deleo*. These could not have been any towns of major significance.

<sup>102</sup> Degrassi 1954, 101.

<sup>103</sup> The consul L. Aemilius Paullus celebrated a triumph after the Second Illyrian War, ps-Aur. Vict. *De vir. ill.* 50.1; Polyb. 3.19.12, but this was probably awarded for the sack of Dimallum and Pharos (Pharos) rather than for large scale enslavements. Polybius notes that Pharos was levelled by Aemilius. Αἰμίλιος τὴν μὲν Φάρον εὐθέως ἐξ ἐφόδου παραλαβὼν κατέσκαψε if the city was utterly destroyed then enslavements were likely to have taken place.

<sup>104</sup> Discussed below. For a thorough account of captures during the Second Punic War see Welwei 2000, 88-132, who consistently argues that the figures presented in the sources should be significantly reduced.

<sup>105</sup> Volkmann 1990, 56. Eg. Octavian intervened when Lepidus began to burn Messana, Cass. Dio 49.11.2.

<sup>106</sup> Knapp 1977, 54.

<sup>107</sup> E.g. spared at Arpi in 213 BC (Liv. 24.47.10; cf. Frontin. *Str.* 3.9.2) *contra* App. *Hann.* 31, who says the Carthaginians were executed. Possibly enslaved, but not executed at Baecula in 208 BC (Eutrop. 3.15; Polyb.10.40.1; Oros. 4.18.7), likewise at Grumentum and Metaurus in the following year (Liv. 27.42.7;

occasion they were also allowed to be ransomed.<sup>108</sup> On the whole Roman enslavement was reactionary, and punishment *ad exemplum*, with no indication of a motive for acquiring slaves.

Specific figures concerning casualties and enslavements for the Second Punic War need to be treated with a great deal of caution, particularly in Livy. His primary source for the war is the first century BC historian Valerius Antias, whose tendency to exaggerate was even commented on by the Augustan historian.<sup>109</sup> Roland Laroche suggested that Valerius' figures probably derived from family histories which tended to reflect 'mystical' numbers (basic multiples of the same number).<sup>110</sup> Several of the figures given by Livy appear to be arbitrarily given; the figure of 10,000 is a particularly common one, which seems to indicate that a significant battle had occurred, and the rounded figures, also observed above, suggest the numbers are largely estimations.<sup>111</sup> This has led Welwei to largely criticise the figures as pure invention, and as constructs of the author to convey a particular message – the Romans did well, the Romans did poorly.<sup>112</sup> However, the figures are tempered, at least to some degree. Livy and Polybius both display caution in presenting numbers above 10,000.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, we cannot immediately discredit the figures given, but as Welwei has thoroughly done, they may be tempered to more realistic numbers.<sup>114</sup>

The first instance of capture by the Romans in the Second Punic War occurred in 218 BC when Rome's navy met a Carthaginian fleet off the coast of Sicily near Lilybaeum (Marsala). With the superior presence of marines, the Romans quickly routed the Carthaginians and managed to capture seven ships with a total of 1,700 captives, including three noblemen.<sup>115</sup> In the same year the Roman forces operating in Spain managed to defeat Hanno near the city of

---

27.49.6; Oros. 4.18.14; Polyb. 11.3.1-3). Following the capture of Orongis in 207 BC Hanno and other Carthaginian prisoners were brought back to Rome, but not executed (Liv. 28.4.4; Zon. 9.8). Carthaginian ship excused as carrying envoys by Scipio Africanus in 204 BC (Cass. Dio 17.57.70). Spies released by him in 202 BC (App. Pun. 39; Eutrop. 3.33; Polyæn. 8.16.8; Polyb. 15.5.1-7; Zon. 9.14).

<sup>108</sup> After Casilinum in 216 BC (Liv. 23.19.5) and eventually 200 were released without ransom after the war (Liv. 34.43.8).

<sup>109</sup> Liv. 26.49.1; 33.10.1; 36.19.12; 39.41.6.

<sup>110</sup> Laroche 1977, 359-60.

<sup>111</sup> The number 10,000 appears 51 times in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*. Similarly 2,000, 7,000 and 20,000 occur with significant frequency.

<sup>112</sup> Welwei 2000, 88f.

<sup>113</sup> Both Polybius and Livy are sceptical of their sources particularly in relating the large figures given by them (Polyb. 2.56.f. Liv. 26.49.3; 33.10.8).

<sup>114</sup> Welwei 2000, *passim*.

<sup>115</sup> Liv. 21.50.5f. 1,700 captives from 7 ships yields an average of 242 per ship, this corresponds with the Roman equivalent minus a marine contingent.

Cissa and took his camp, resulting in the capture of 2,000 Carthaginians.<sup>116</sup> Cissa was also taken by assault and the booty of the town, including slaves of little value, was given over to the soldiers,<sup>117</sup> the Carthaginian camp, however, yielded a huge amount of booty since Hannibal's army was *en route* to Italy and had left all the unnecessary baggage behind. Both Hanno and Andobales, the general of his Iberian allies, were taken prisoner,<sup>118</sup> but neither were brought back to Rome as the fleet was attacked, forcing the consuls to return to Spain and winter at Tarraco.<sup>119</sup> Elsewhere in 218 BC the Carthaginian garrison, along with their commander Hamilcar (son of Gisgo), were compelled to surrender (*trado*) on Melita to the Romans, probably because any relief by sea was denied when a nearby Carthaginian fleet was defeated with the capture of 10 ships.<sup>120</sup>

The Roman defeat at Cannae in 216 BC led to a large number of defections in Italy; in particular, the Samnites and Bruttians, as well as some cities in Campania and Apulia – the chief of these being Capua and Tarentum respectively.<sup>121</sup> In Sicily too the faithful ally Hiero died and his grandson switched his banners to Carthage. With so many defections the war in Italy was waged as much in the manner of suppressing a revolt as it was in meeting an invading army. Conversely the acquisition of new allies required Hannibal to defend them, so that the invading Carthaginian force was often fighting to defend cities and break sieges.<sup>122</sup> The Roman punishment of these Italian communities reflected their previous method of treating them moderately rather than ruthlessly.<sup>123</sup> The Carthaginian soldiers seem to have been treated in a similar manner to the first Punic War; they were incarcerated, perhaps because so many Romans had been taken, and exchanges were being considered.

Signs of discontent and opportunity had occurred prior to Cannae. In 217 BC a collection of Campanians decided to try their luck in attacking Cumae during an annual ritual that took place nearby in Hamae. The plan was to move large numbers of troops close to the city under the guise of guards for the festival. The Cumaeans caught wind of the treachery and informed the Roman commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who marched by night and seized the

---

<sup>116</sup> Liv. 21.60.7.

<sup>117</sup> Liv. 21.60.8 *supellex barbarica ac vilium mancipiorum*.

<sup>118</sup> Polyb. 3.76.6 ζῶγρία – taking alive.

<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 3.76.10-12.

<sup>120</sup> Melita – modern Malta. (Liv. 21.51.2). Ships captured (Liv.21.51.7).

<sup>121</sup> On all of these in particular see the events contained in this Chapter below. Liv. 22.61.10 remarks on the loss of many allies by the Romans following Cannae.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. Dorey & Dudley 1971, 70.

<sup>123</sup> See examples above.

Campanian camp, killing 2,000 soldiers, including the commander Marius Alfius, and capturing a large number.<sup>124</sup> In 215 BC the Hirpini had likewise taken the opportunity afforded by Hannibal's presence to break from their obligations to Rome, but the retreat of Hanno into Bruttium gave the Romans an opportunity to retake the towns of Vercellium, Vescellium and Sicilinum.<sup>125</sup> The leaders were beheaded and more than 5,000 captives were sent under the spear. Since Livy states these were 'sent' under the spear it may suggest they were released in the fashion of passing under the yoke.<sup>126</sup>

In 215 BC the Romans crossed the Ebro and defeated a large Carthaginian force under Hasdrubal, the enemy camp near Ibera was taken and plundered and as many as 10,000 soldiers were made prisoner.<sup>127</sup> Welwei regards this number as 'phantaseizahlen,' as the number seems grossly out of proportion.<sup>128</sup> From Ibera the Roman army marched to Saguntum where they took the town and destroyed it selling all those within. The city was then restored to its original inhabitants, which is puzzling given Zonaras and Livy's assertions that it had been destroyed.<sup>129</sup> In Sardinia the Romans defeated the Carthaginian forces and took between 1,500 and 3,700 captives.<sup>130</sup> Following the battle, the praetor Titus Manlius sacked the nearby city of Cornus, in which many of the Carthaginians and Sardinian rebels had taken refuge, compelling most of the disloyal cities to submit to the Romans. All parties surrendered to Manlius, and both the Carthaginians and Sardinians provided hostages. Once affairs were settled in Sardinia, Livy states "he [Manlius] turned over the tribute to the

<sup>124</sup> Liv. 23.35.19, the exact number is unknown due to a lacuna, but it probably is in the thousands given (contra Loeb notes Roberts 1912, 127 n. 6) the initial figure of 16,000 Campanians. Thirty four standards taken, on the Roman model of 60 per century, would put the number captured at 2,040, but the number is pointless as the capture of a standard could not have required the complete capture or death of the unit, cf. Welwei 2000, 91 n. 14.

<sup>125</sup> Liv. 23.37.11 The Romans had defeated Hanno in Luceria and captured 280 soldiers and 41 standards.

<sup>126</sup> Liv. 23.37.13 *supra quinque milia captivorum sub hasta venierunt*. It could be that these were stripped of their possessions rather than punished. 5,000 captives is not a large number from three towns, but Livy refers to them as *oppida* and so the populations may not have been very large. Furthermore, it may only be the principle participants of the rebellion that were punished. The location of these sites is unknown. The Hirpini inhabited the foothills on the border of Samnium and Campania. Vescellium is also mentioned by Pliny *HN*. 3.103, Vercellium could be a duplication of Vescellium by Livy or a later copyist, Sicilinum is likely in Campania given the name.

<sup>127</sup> Eutrop. 3.11.2 *Perdit in pugna XXXV milia hominum; ex his capiuntur X milia, occiduntur XXV milia*. Oros. 4.16.13 puts the total at 35,000 either killed or captured and Liv. 23.29.15 only mentions the plundering of the camp.

<sup>128</sup> Welwei 200, 108, certainly the number 10,000, which is often repeated, should make us wary to accept it as an accurate figure.

<sup>129</sup> Liv. 24.42.11 *sub corona vendiderunt urbemque deleverunt*; Zon. 9.3 πόλισμα κατέσκαψαν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπώλησαν. Cf. Volkmann 1990, 47.

<sup>130</sup> Liv. 23.40.12 estimates 3,700. Eutrop. 3.13.2 gives 1,500.

quaestors, the grain to the aediles, the captives to Quintus Fulvius, the praetor.”<sup>131</sup> It is most likely that these captives were in fact the hostages, mentioned earlier rather than those taken in the engagement with Hasdrubal. The Romans later succeeded in defeating the Carthaginians in a battle near Ilurgeia, capturing less than 3,000.<sup>132</sup>

The city of Cumae was soon besieged by the Carthaginians, and during the siege the defenders were able to kidnap a total of 59 sentries, coupled with the killing of 1,300 soldiers. The Cumaeans proved staunch defenders. A Roman relief force eventually arrived and compelled the Carthaginians to break off the siege; we do not know what became of the prisoners there.<sup>133</sup> At the same time, Tiberius Sempronius Longus captured 280 Carthaginians, along with a disproportionately high 41 standards, in a battle near Grumentum.<sup>134</sup> Whilst remaining at the city, a suspicious ship passed near Cumae and was intercepted by a couple of Roman vessels despatched from the coast. Macedonian and Carthaginian ambassadors were discovered on board, and a further search revealed a treaty outlining an alliance between Hannibal and Philip; this discovery sparked the first Macedonian War.<sup>135</sup> The ambassadors and the incriminating evidence were quickly sent to Rome, where the consul ordered that the ambassadors be imprisoned and their attendants ‘sold’ *sub hasta*.<sup>136</sup>

In 214 BC, an army, largely made up of slave volunteers, under the commander Longus marched into Campania, where they met the Carthaginians in battle.<sup>137</sup> As a motivation Longus offered freedom to all those who brought back an enemy head. During the battle the Carthaginians shouted abuse towards the Romans, calling them nothing more than ex-prisoners and slaves cleared from the *ergastula*. The Romans beat the Carthaginians back into

---

<sup>131</sup> Liv. 23.41.7. Titus Manlius was acting as praetor in place of Quintus Mucius who was delayed in taking Sardinia as his province due to illness. Manlius was selected as his substitute because of prior success against the Sardinians over whom he triumphed, see Degraasi 1954, 101.

<sup>132</sup> Liv. 23.49.10. Perhaps a duplication of another instance ‘Iliturgi’ (Liv. 24.41.10), see Welwei 2000, 109.

<sup>133</sup> Liv. 23.37.6-10.

<sup>134</sup> 215 BC Liv. 23.37.11.

<sup>135</sup> For a list of citations regarding the treaty see Schmitt 1969, 245-50 (*SdA*. III 528). For modern discussions see Austin & Rankov 1995, 35; Dorey & Dudley 1971, 120-1; Eckstein 2010, 231; Errington 1990 192-6.; Lazenby 1978, 159; Marsha 1999, 59; Walbank 1957 I, 42-44; 1967, 70; 1981, 84-5. For the arming of slaves in classical Greek conflicts see Hunt 2006, 14-39.

<sup>136</sup> Liv. 23.38.7 *comitibusque eorum sub hasta venditis*. The treaty is quoted by Polyb. 7.9f. According to Liv. 23.33.5; 34.4 Xenophanus, Philip’s ambassador, had been captured before, but was released. This has been rejected as an invention of Livy by most historians, see Bogurth 1892, 5; Walbank 1967b, 42.

<sup>137</sup> These were largely recruited in the wake of Cannae, Liv. 22.57. Slaves were often given their freedom just before they entered service or as a reward after their service (Val. Max. 5.6.8 *C. Th.* 7.13.6). Cf. Buckland 1908, 73; Halkin 1872, 45; Welwei 1988, 5f.; 2000, 88.

their camp, and there the prisoners of the Carthaginians broke out and attacked their gaolers from behind. The battle was conspicuously bloody, and less than 2,000 Carthaginians, mainly cavalry, escaped – the remainder were either killed or captured.<sup>138</sup> Following the battle the booty, except for the captives, was given to the soldiers. Cattle were exempted as well and the owners given 30 days to claim them back. Some of the slave-soldiers had held back during the fighting and took refuge upon a hill in fear of reprisals. Longus, however, still granted their freedom, but stipulated that for the remainder of their service they take their meals standing, and so in the ensuing feast many soldiers wearing the *pilleus* or *lana alba* (hats worn as symbols of freedmen) could be seen eating whilst seated and others whilst standing.<sup>139</sup>

The city of Casilinum was retaken in 214 BC; it had been captured the year before despite a valiant effort by the Roman garrison. As the Romans burst into the city they slaughtered a great number of the Campanian populace who had taken refuge within the walls. Many of the Campanians had thought of throwing themselves upon the mercy of the consul, and so were exiting the gate at the time of the city's fall. In the end only fifty made it to the consul and these were permitted to go to Capua. Livy remarked that the Campanians, along with Hannibal's soldiers, were sent to Rome to be imprisoned. The remaining populace was distributed amongst neighbouring communities to be guarded.<sup>140</sup> The incarceration of the captives suggests that the Carthaginians were held for a ransom, as the case with many others detained in Rome.<sup>141</sup> The rebel Campanians likely faced trials, as would be the case with their compatriots at Capua.<sup>142</sup> In the following year the city of Arpi turned out its Carthaginian garrison and re-joined the Roman side. The Arpini leader Dasius Altinius had switched his allegiance to Hannibal after Cannae and now, believing the Romans the more probable victors in the conflict, sought to re-join the winning side.<sup>143</sup> Appian and Livy differ in their accounts of how the city was turned over to the Romans, but both agree on the vacillated nature of Dasius. Appian suggests that once the city was turned over to the Romans the Carthaginians were sought out and executed.<sup>144</sup> Livy however, who gives a more detailed

---

<sup>138</sup> Liv. 24.15.7-24.16.5. Zon. 9.4 gives only a passing reference to the battle.

<sup>139</sup> Liv. 24.16.18.

<sup>140</sup> Liv. 24.19.11 *captivique Campanorum quive Hannibalis militum erant Romam missi atque ibi in carcere inclusi sunt; oppidanorum turba per finitimos populos in custodiam divisa.*

<sup>141</sup> Liv. 24.19.10, *contra* Welwei 2000, 94.

<sup>142</sup> See below.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Fonda 2010, 65.

<sup>144</sup> App. *Hann.* 31.



account, says that the Spanish mercenaries in the city offered to bring over their standards on the condition that the Carthaginians be allowed to leave. This was accepted and the Carthaginians re-joined Hannibal in Apulia.<sup>145</sup>

In 212 BC a number of major cities were captured by the Romans. The Romans first laid siege to Capua, and because of the presence of both Roman and Carthaginian armies the Campanians had very pitiful food stores. While the Romans were dug in at Capua, Hannibal was called away to Lucania. The Campanians meanwhile had sent a convoy containing many women and children to Lucania to bring back food.<sup>146</sup> The Romans besieging Capua took the opportunity in Hannibal's absence, to seize both the camp he left behind and the convoy. Livy does not detail the composition of the captives, but states that above 7,000 of the enemy were killed, and that of the convoy more the 6,000 were captured, but their fate was not specified.<sup>147</sup> In Spain, Saguntum was retaken in 212 BC and restored to the remaining Saguntines whilst the Turdetani, who had been installed at Saguntum by Hannibal, and were supposedly responsible for the conflict that would spark the war, were sold as slaves and their city utterly destroyed.<sup>148</sup>

In Sicily the Romans finally captured Syracuse.<sup>149</sup> The city had been a steadfast ally under Hiero II until his death in 215 BC, but his grandson successor Hieronymus broke his alliance with Rome following the disaster of Cannae. The Roman response was to lay siege to the city immediately, but because of its remarkable breastworks and the brilliance of Archimedes the city held out for three years.<sup>150</sup> At one point a pro-Roman faction emerged within Syracuse and murdered the mercenary commanders, and a peace was proposed which would have preserved the city and its inhabitants along with their property. But the mercenaries and the Roman deserters feared reprisals should Syracuse be surrendered and executed the leaders of the pro-Roman faction within the city. From this point the sacking of the city was inevitable,

---

<sup>145</sup> Liv. 24.47.4-10. Frontin. *Str.* 3.9.2 seems to agree with Livy's account of the capture of the city, but does not mention the captives.

<sup>146</sup> Diod. Sic. 26.12.14; App. *Hann.* 36.

<sup>147</sup> Liv. 25.14.11 *supra sex milia hostium occisa, supra septem milia captum cum frumentatoribus Campanis omnique plaustorum et iumentorum apparatus capta.*

<sup>148</sup> Liv. 24.42.11 *sub corona vendere.* Zon. 9.3 *τε πόλισμα κατέσκαψαν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπόλησαν καὶ τὴν Ζάκυνθον μετὰ τοῦτο κομισάμενοι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολίταις ἀπέδοσαν.*

<sup>149</sup> I place it in 212 BC, but it is possible that it was sacked in early spring of 211 BC.

<sup>150</sup> Syracuse protected by three rings of walls and could be supplied from the harbour. Archimedes had a number of famous defences, including a crane which could lift Roman ships and his famous mirrors that directed sunlight to light ships on fire (Lucian *Hippias* 2; Zon. 9.5; Tzetz. *Chil.* 2.109-123).

and the Romans were able to take the city quarter by quarter.<sup>151</sup> The sack was a violent affair noted for the killing of Archimedes.<sup>152</sup> The freeborn of the city were explicitly *not* enslaved, and this specificity suggests that the city's slaves were.<sup>153</sup> However, Diodorus continues that the deprivation of the siege and the plundering of all the property by the Romans forced the Syracusans to sell themselves into slavery in order to eat.<sup>154</sup> The plundering of the city was particularly noteworthy for both the harshness of it upon the populace, who had been allies for so long (this was also the reason why they were spared a harsher treatment following the capture of the city),<sup>155</sup> and for the richness of the haul.<sup>156</sup> Not all Syracusans were treated this way, and the pro-Roman inhabitants of Syracuse were spared from the plunder as Marcellus posted guards to ensure that their property was not pillaged, and their country estates were left intact.<sup>157</sup> The other Syracusan elite's property was seized, as made clear by their later petition against Marcellus.<sup>158</sup>

In 211 BC the city of Antikyra was captured by the Romans and the Aetolians, and in accordance with a treaty concerning the division of spoils<sup>159</sup> the city and territory went to the Aetolians and the booty (including captives) to the Romans. Polybius tells us that the captives

<sup>151</sup> The City was also weakened by an outbreak of plague App. *Sic.* 4; Liv. 25.26.1-15; Sil. 14.580-526.

<sup>152</sup> Diod. *Sic.* 26.20.1-2; Liv. 25.28.1-31; Plin. *HN* 7.125; Plut. *Marc.* 19.7-12; Zon. 9.5.

<sup>153</sup> Diod. *Sic.* 26.20.1, Marcellus ordered that the freeborn (ἐλευθερῶν) inhabitants of the city were to be allowed to go free τῶν μὲν ἐλευθερῶν ἐρη σωματῶν φεισέσθαι. Slaves were therefore reckoned as part of the 'property' taken by the Romans as booty (διαπραζῶ).

<sup>154</sup> Diod. *Sic.* 26.20.2. Liv. 26.30.9 also notes the deplorable state of hunger of the Syracusans. Diodorus and Livy must be referring to the poorer population since the city continued to thrive, albeit not as before.

<sup>155</sup> Polybius 9.10.2f. censures the Romans for taking all of the Roman possessions and Flor. 1.22 states that the only advantage conferred to the Syracusans was *ut pulchritudini victae urbis parceretur*, the beauty referred to was the preservation of the buildings and the city was not burned.

<sup>156</sup> Apparently equal to that taken from Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War (Liv. 25.31.11; Plut. *Marc.* 19.3; Eutrop. 3.14.3). Marcellus was praised for his modesty in accepting only the planetarium of Archimedes from the spoils, offering a sharp contrast with the first century BC governor Verres (Cic. *Rep.* 1.21, *Verr.* 2.4; 4.115-116; 4.120-123; 4.131), see Walbank 1967a II, 134. Interestingly Marcellus is contrasted with Fabius Cunctator who spared the despoliation of Tarentum's temples (Liv. 27.16.7).

<sup>157</sup> Liv. 26.21.11.

<sup>158</sup> Liv. 26.30.5-10. The rural estates may have become Roman property (*de facto Ager Romanus*) as suggested by Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.67-114, who does not list Syracuse amongst the *civitates decumanae* which were cities that paid a tithe on agricultural goods. This suggests that it was, in fact, a *civitates censoria* i.e. land that was taken by the Roman state and then leased back to the owners as a rent or a form of tax. Cf. Pritchard 1975, 34 n.4; Holm 1898, 87. Eckstein 1987, 164-165 believes that this is not the case and that by Cicero's day Syracuse, like the rest of Sicily, was a *civitates decumana*, Cicero's neglect to discuss Syracuse as such was in favour of describing the city's plight at the hands of Verres in a separate, independent section, see also 'Syracuse' in *OCD*, Woodhead suggests that Syracuse became a *civitates decumana*.

<sup>159</sup> Polyb. 11.5.5; 18.38.7; Liv. 26.24.7. The treaty has been partially preserved on an inscription, Bagnall and Derow 2003, see Chapter 6. Antikyra was beyond the operational provision of the treaty according to Livy 26.24.15, however Walbank 1967a II, 179 believed the treaty to have been intended to extend to all Aetolian border regions and so Livy's qualification of a limit of physical application of the treaty's terms is inaccurate. For all the related passages in Livy and Polybius see Schmitt 1969, 258-66 (*SdA.* III 536),

were enslaved,<sup>160</sup> noting “the Romans are carrying off the women and children to suffer, of course, what those must suffer who fall into the hands of aliens.”<sup>161</sup> The suffering here of course is being sold outside of Greece, contrary to Greek custom, hence Polybius’ reaction towards Greeks being made captives of barbarians.<sup>162</sup>

Like many other Italian cities, Capua sided with Hannibal after the disaster at Cannae.<sup>163</sup> Prior to their shift in allegiance, Capua had tried to extort from the Romans, in their state of weakness, a consulship to be continuously held by a Capuan; but this was emphatically rejected.<sup>164</sup> As Hannibal’s army quartered in Capua they indulged themselves in the famously luxuriant city, which most ancient sources cite as a major contributor to the downfall of Hannibal’s venture in Italy.<sup>165</sup> In 212 BC, with the Campanians defeated in a series of previous engagements and Hannibal occupied to the south of Campania, the opportunity was ripe for Rome to exact its revenge upon the rebellious city. The siege lasted for a full year and in that time Hannibal tried unsuccessfully to dislodge the Romans, at one point marching towards Rome before famously turning from a siege.<sup>166</sup> As Capua starved under the siege its people sent a last ditch appeal to Hannibal for aid, but the envoys were caught by the Romans and their hands cut off;<sup>167</sup> with the failure of the envoy all hope was lost, some senators killed themselves and the city was surrendered along with the Carthaginian garrison to the Romans. The Carthaginian garrison was placed under guard and perhaps redeemed by Hannibal. Appian’s account is ambiguous on this matter, and Livy gives little help, stating only that the Carthaginians were “bound together and put under guard” and the commanders Hanno and Bostar were sent to Rome.<sup>168</sup>

The Capuans, being rebels were treated accordingly, but the importance of the city prevented its destruction, and its size and proximity to Rome precluded the enslavement of the entire populace. Many of the Capuan senators were executed, having been ultimately responsible for the city’s defection to Hannibal.<sup>169</sup> Livy gives an interesting account of how this was

<sup>160</sup> Polyb. 9.39.2 the citizens were enslaved ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι.

<sup>161</sup> Polyb. 9.39.3 πεισόμενα δῆλον [ὅτι] ἄπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας. Cf. Polybius 11.5.8 again.

<sup>162</sup> Cf. Badian 1958a, 293-294 n. I from page 57 (endnotes).

<sup>163</sup> Polyb. 7.1.1-2; Diod. Sic. 26.10.1; Liv. 23.10f.; Val. Max. 3.7.6; Zon. 9.2.

<sup>164</sup> Liv. 23.6.6-7.

<sup>165</sup> Polyb. 7.1.1-2; Diod. Sic. 26.10.1; Liv. 23.4.2-3; Cic. Agr. Leg. 1.20.

<sup>166</sup> Polyb. 9.3.1-5.6; Liv. 26.4.1-6.17; Frontin. *Str.* 4.7.29; App. *Hann.* 38.

<sup>167</sup> Zon. 9.6; App. *Hann.* 43.

<sup>168</sup> App. *Hann.* 43-44. Liv. 26.14.7 *praesilium Punicum comprehendit.*

<sup>169</sup> Oros. 4.17.12; Zon. 9.6; Liv. 26.14.7-14; 26.16.6.

carried out: once the gates were open the city was put under guard by a legion, who posted sentries about the walls and gates. The Capuan senators were put under arrest and their wealth seized. Twenty-five of the senators were sent to Cales and twenty-six to Teanum. The two consuls had not agreed on the course of punishment, with Fulvius in favour of severe punishment and Claudius in favour of lenience.<sup>170</sup> Fulvius decided to take matters into his own hands, and so in the middle of the night he sped to Teanum where he had the Capuans scourged to death and beheaded. He then made for Cales where he was met by a messenger bearing a directive from the Senate. He ignored the message, knowing it contained instructions to preserve the Capuan senators, and executed the Capuans at Cales. Only once the executions were carried out did he open the directive.<sup>171</sup>

The Capuan masses were largely spared,<sup>172</sup> and the city itself preserved, as mentioned above, perhaps because of its opulence, but as Cicero and Livy suggest, and considering the blow it struck to the supplies of Hannibal, also because of its importance as a grain producer.<sup>173</sup> The city was then stripped of its government and put under a Roman magistrate.<sup>174</sup> The loss of political autonomy and the execution of many of the principle men lead to some Campanian youths starting a large fire in Rome.<sup>175</sup>

In 210 BC the Romans took the city of Agrigentum, which was being used as the Carthaginian headquarters in Sicily. The Carthaginian commander Hanno had recently dismissed his cavalry lieutenant Mutines out of jealousy, and this proved a fatal move, as the latter betrayed the city to the Romans.<sup>176</sup> In the assault Hanno was captured.<sup>177</sup> According to Livy the principle men responsible for the city's defection to the Carthaginians were

---

<sup>170</sup> Zon. 9.6 puts Claudius' death before the fall of the city, Livy is specific *post captam*.

<sup>171</sup> Liv. 26.14.7-14. Livy gives the total cost of the Capuan rebellion at 70 senators executed (19 more than at Cales and Teanum) and 300 more incarcerated. Many of these Capuan citizens were distributed amongst the Latin allies and incarcerated in various homes *variis casibus interierunt* and others were sold. Liv. 26.16.4 states that there were other versions of the story in which the Senate put the decision upon Fulvius and only to refer it to them if he was unsure of how to handle the situation. This was the customary practice according to Liv. 22.33.9; 25.41.9.

<sup>172</sup> Zon. 9.6, *contra* Welwei 2000, 97. Von Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 81f suggests that citizens only comprised a small portion of the Capuan populace.

<sup>173</sup> Cic. Agr. 2.88; Liv. 26.16.7. Campania was the most fertile land in peninsular Italy south of the Po Valley and ideal for growing grains but most of all famed for its wine and oil production (Strab. 5.4.3), see White 1970, 72-73; Welwei 2000, 97.

<sup>174</sup> Liv. 26.16.9-10; Zon. 9.6.

<sup>175</sup> The arsonists were found and put to death (Liv. 26.16.5-10; Ov. *Fast.* 6.625-626). Liv. 27.3.4-8 offers an almost duplicate story of an attempt to burn the Roman camp outside of Capua. Fulvius was reproached over this by Taurea Vibellius, a Capuan senator, who was not executed (Liv. 26.15.11-15).

<sup>176</sup> Zon. 9.7; Liv. 26.40.6.

<sup>177</sup> Eutrop. 3.14.4; Oros. 4.18.2; Zon. 9.7.

scourged and beheaded, as occurred at Capua. This was quickly becoming the Roman custom of dealing with revolts and uprisings. Others, who were implicated but not deemed necessary to punish with execution, were sold with the booty, and the money was sent to Rome.<sup>178</sup> Not all of the Agrigentines could have been sold as slaves, since it continued to be a principle city in Sicily.<sup>179</sup> The reaction of the remainder of Sicily is also commensurate with a typical punishment of the elite and preservation of the populace – no less than 40 cities switched allegiance to Rome, and 20 more either expelled or killed their Carthaginian garrisons. Only 6 cities of little note remained loyal to Carthage, and these were all captured by the proconsul Laevinus.<sup>180</sup>

In 209 BC Scipio Africanus captured the city of New Carthage. It had been the base of Carthaginian operations in Spain and was a reasonably large city containing a significant amount of supplies and plunder, as well as Carthage's Spanish hostages.<sup>181</sup> The fall of New Carthage is used by Polybius as an example of how the Romans sacked cities, distributed the booty and dealt with captives; he breaks with the narrative of events to describe in detail how the Romans carried out these particulars.<sup>182</sup> The leniency shown to the captives here, and even their sheer survival, is in stark contrast with his description of the sack, which was particularly brutal.<sup>183</sup> Polybius reports that on the day following the siege 10,000 captives were assembled so that they may be divided and addressed by Scipio, though Livy later notes that accounts varied and the number could have been as high as 25,000.<sup>184</sup> The captives were then separated so that two distinct groups were formed, one comprising of citizens or statesmen (πολιτικούς ἄνδρας) and their families and the other the artisans (χειροτέχνας). The citizens and their families were allowed to return to their homes by Scipio and so were spared any further punishment than that which had been visited upon them during the siege. This

---

<sup>178</sup> Liv. 26.40.14 *ceteros praedamque vendidit* The fact that the money was sent to Rome suggests that the money came from the sale of prisoners.

<sup>179</sup> The Agrigentines were eventually given Roman citizenship after the death of Caesar in 44 BC when Antony issued a decree found amongst Caesar's papers granting citizenship to Sicily. Later indicated by the distinction *urbes et civitate* (Plin. *HN*. 3.8.88), cf. Pritchard 1975, 39 n. 28.

<sup>180</sup> Liv. 26.40.13-14. Laevinus also spared 4,000 brigands who along with the Rhegians were transported to Brutium to carry out their devastation there (Liv. 26.40.16-18. Polyb. 9.42.5- 8).

<sup>181</sup> App. *Hisp.* 23; Liv. 26.49.2; Polyb. 10.15.5; 17.6.

<sup>182</sup> Polyb. 10.15.1-10.18.2 The sack of cities and the distribution is discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>183</sup> Polyb. 10.15.5 dogs cut in half, captives put to the sword etc. Volkmann 1990, 199 notes that Scipio's lenience was an exceptional case compared to the wider practice of mass enslavement and execution thus far exhibited by the Romans in the Second Punic War.

<sup>184</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6; Liv. 26.49.2. Liv. 26.49.3 illustrates the variance of his sources giving an example of the number of artillery scorpions taken with a low number of 60 according to Silenus and a ridiculously high estimate of 6,000 by Valerius Antias. Welwei 200, 110-11 is sceptical of the figure for captives, again 10,000 should raise questions.

was of course a decision of purely political design, the *clementia* shown to the Spanish winning Scipio valuable allies and undermining Carthaginian support, particularly after the loss of their principle centre of operations in Spain.<sup>185</sup> The artisans were told by Scipio that they were now considered property of the Roman people (*servi populi publici Romani*).<sup>186</sup> However, he promised that should they perform their duties, which were mostly in manufacture and support of the army, then they would be granted their freedom once the Carthaginians were defeated. Scipio placed Roman overseers, one for every thirty, over the artisans, who numbered as many as 2,000.<sup>187</sup> These were eventually freed, as an inscription indicates that the Punic community continued to inhabit New Carthage.<sup>188</sup>

From the remainder, which supposes that the citizens did not number much more than the artisans, were selected the strongest, and these were assigned to the ships.<sup>189</sup> In the harbour the Romans had seized 18 vessels,<sup>190</sup> and Scipio used the captives both to man these and to supplement his own ships as well. Polybius states that the crews were all nearly doubled, and this would have required a large number of men to have made up the difference. This large number almost certainly indicates that the 10,000 gathered only constituted men, as Polybius' later figures cannot have been inclusive of women and children. When combined with the number required to man the ships, as explained by Polybius, the number of captives must have exceeded 10,000. Therefore Polybius must have confused or exaggerated the manning of the ships.<sup>191</sup> It is hard to see how a ship with already cramped conditions could accommodate a double sized crew. The rowing benches could not be improved by more hands, although they could benefit from shifts, but even this would slow down the ships performance with the increased weight from additional bodies. Alternatively the addition of rowers could have freed the Roman oarsmen to serve in other capacities, but this again seems

---

<sup>185</sup> Eckstein 1987, 211. Volkmann 1990, 47 notes that this was clearly a surprise to the Spanish who on a later occasion at Astapa killed themselves in anticipation of falling into the hands of the Romans (cf. App. *Hisp.* 33).

<sup>186</sup> They were bidden to enrol themselves with the *quaestor* (ταμίαν), who was responsible for receiving and recording booty intended for the state.

<sup>187</sup> Polyb. 10.17.6-10.

<sup>188</sup> *CIL* 2.3048, see Eckstein 1987, 211.

<sup>189</sup> Lazenby 1978, 139 remarked that many of the captives taken may have been the city's slaves.

<sup>190</sup> Or 33 warships according to App. *Hisp.* 23.

<sup>191</sup> 10,000 minus 2,000 artisans and as many again for citizens would put the figure at 6,000 strong hands. However, the manning of the ships, as Polybius suggests, would require at least 200 for the captured ships and perhaps another 50-100 hundred for the Roman ships, so that only the rowing crew is used on the former and a minimal supplement is added to the later, requiring a total of 7,100. A more robust manning of the ships, as Polybius indicates occurred, would have required significantly more men. If the ships rowing crews were doubled to 400, then it would have required as many as 14,000 men to be supplied. These figures are for comparative purposes only.

counterintuitive, as the replacement of skilled oarsmen by novices would not have been beneficial. Overall the fact that these recruits were ‘selected’ indicates that the total number of those captured was in fact more. Of the eventual freedom of these captives we cannot be sure,<sup>192</sup> but their hope of freedom and the promise of Scipio would have warranted comment by our sources if they were not granted their freedom.

In the same year, 209 BC, Q. Fabius Maximus Cuncator led his legion into Apulia and took the city of Manduria by storm, capturing 3,000 people along with some booty.<sup>193</sup> He then moved his camp to outside Tarentum. Tarentum had been persuaded by Hannibal to rebel against Rome, though the Roman garrison under the command of M. Livius Macatus was able to hold the citadel throughout the Carthaginian occupation of the city.<sup>194</sup> Fabius was able to lure Hannibal out of Tarentum through the treachery of an inside man,<sup>195</sup> he then quickly seized the city by storm, from both land and sea, before Hannibal could turn back. Fabius is famed for preserving the temple riches in the city despite their being exceptionally rich in paintings and tapestries.<sup>196</sup> In the city Livy states that 30,000 slaves were captured, the distinction of slaves and the huge number were likely a construction of Livy to illustrate the richness of Tarentum, which he compares to that of Syracuse.<sup>197</sup> Plutarch simply refers to the captives as ‘Tarentines,’ who Welwei has suggested were comprised of all classes, since the sack of the city was particularly unorganised and frantic, and distinction between slave and free was unlikely. Historians have typically favoured the account of Plutarch regarding this, citing Livy’s distinction of slaves as deliberately playing down Roman maltreatment of free Greeks.<sup>198</sup> However, this ignores the fact that Livy was portraying the city as exceedingly rich to further enhance the effect of Fabius’ frugality.

In Spain Scipio’s forces were able to capture 12,000 Carthaginian soldiers at Baecula in 208 BC, following which Polybius states that Scipio “occupied himself with their transition.”<sup>199</sup>

---

<sup>192</sup> Walbank 1967a II, 216.

<sup>193</sup> Liv. 27.15.4 *cepit; ibi ad tria milia hominum capta et ceterae praedae aliquantum.*

<sup>194</sup> Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 72; *de Or.* 2.72; *Sen.* 11; Plut. *Fab. Max.* 23.3.

<sup>195</sup> Said to be a Bruttian captain whose sister had a Roman sweetheart (App. *Hann.* 49; Polyæn. 8.14.3; Zon. 9.9), or according to Livy 27.16.9 a Bruttian who was in love with a woman whose brother was in the Roman army.

<sup>196</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 195f.; August. *De Civ. D.* 1.6.c-d; Liv. 27.16.7.

<sup>197</sup> Liv. 27.16.7 *triginta milia servilium capitum dicuntur capta* Oros.4.18.5 and Eutrop. 3.16.1 only specify that captured people were sold *hominum captivorum venditit* 25,000 and 30,000 respectively. On the sacking of Tarentum see Lazenby 1978, 176-7.

<sup>198</sup> Brunt 1971, 51; Volkmann 1990, 43; Walbank 1971, 54f.; Welwei 2000, 100-1.

<sup>199</sup> Polyb. 10.40.1 ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τούτων οἰκονομίαν.

Scipio was perhaps sorting between the Carthaginian and Spanish troops as he had at New Carthage. Orosius noted that it was in principle Scipio's strategy to release without ransom the Spanish and to sell the Carthaginians as slaves.<sup>200</sup> In the following year the Romans defeated the Carthaginians near Grumentum, where 8,000 Carthaginians were slain and over 700 captured along with two elephants.<sup>201</sup> In the retreat to Orongis, the Carthaginian commander Hanno was captured along with his retainers.<sup>202</sup> The Romans then moved to the city of Orongis, took it by storm and returned to New Carthage, where they wintered. Lucius Scipio was sent back to Rome bringing Hanno and other distinguished prisoners to await his brother's triumph.<sup>203</sup> Off the coast of Sicily a Roman fleet under the proconsul Marcus Valerius Laevinus ran into a Carthaginian fleet and out of 70 enemy ships sunk four and captured 17.<sup>204</sup> In Greece the Romans laid siege to the city of Oreus and its citizens were prevented from any escape. Consequently when the city fell they were either killed or captured. Of the Macedonian garrison we know only that they made an indecisive stand near the citadel.<sup>205</sup>

Also in 207 BC Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal managed to cross the Alps with his forces and acquired a number of Gallic allies. Hasdrubal intended to join his forces with Hannibal in order to bring the Carthaginian army up to the strength necessary to turn the tide against the Romans in Italy. A messenger was despatched by Hasdrubal to Hannibal, but the messenger was captured and the Romans were able to intercept Hasdrubal near Metarus. In the pitched battle the Romans defeated the Carthaginians and their allies. In the *mêlée* Hasdrubal fell along with 56,000 of his men<sup>206</sup> and as many as 5,400 were captured.<sup>207</sup> After the battle the enemy camp was taken with a large amount of booty, as well as 4,000 Roman prisoners that had been captured en route from Spain.<sup>208</sup> Polybius suggests that the Carthaginian prisoners were sold, yielding an impressive 300 talents, which equates to approximately 330 *drachmae*

---

<sup>200</sup> Oros. 4.18.6.

<sup>201</sup> Liv. 27.42.7.

<sup>202</sup> Liv. 28.2.11; Zon. 9.8.

<sup>203</sup> Liv. 28.4.4.

<sup>204</sup> Liv. 28.4.6.

<sup>205</sup> Liv. 28.6.5 *cappio*. The spoils had been reserved for the Romans as per the treaty with the Aetolians.

<sup>206</sup> Liv. 27.49.6.

<sup>207</sup> Liv. 27.49.6; Oros.4.18.14. App. *Hann.* 52 notes that many were taken prisoner *πλείστους δ' αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβον*. Eutrop. 3.18.2 likewise explains that most were either destroyed or captured *ingentes eius copiae captae aut interfectae sunt*.

<sup>208</sup> Zon. 9.9. On the Roman actions to prevent Hannibal's and Hasdrubal's forces meeting see Lazenby 1978, 181-6.



per person.<sup>209</sup> This sum would be high in comparison to what we might expect from wholesale slave prices, but not from ransom prices. Polybius also noted that some Carthaginian nobles were taken, and so the high price per person could perhaps have been offset by their ransom. At least some captives were brought to Italy for the triumph of Scipio in the following year.<sup>210</sup>

In 205 BC Scipio raised an army in Sicily in order to bring the war again to Africa, but first he made a detour to the Italian mainland and attacked the city of Locri, which had admitted a Carthaginian garrison. The garrison was wiped out and the city put under the command of Pleminius. Pleminius, however, maltreated the populace and desecrated a temple, for which he and his followers were condemned to death by the Senate.<sup>211</sup> The Locrians were also compensated by the Roman Senate and their temples restored at Roman expense. Thus it stands to reason that they had originally not been enslaved.

In 204 BC Scipio's army in Africa captured a town north of Utica. According to Orosius 5,000 Carthaginians were captured.<sup>212</sup> Livy is more specific and states that "where, besides other things which were immediately put on board the transports and sent into Sicily, eight thousand free persons and slaves were captured."<sup>213</sup> These were put on ships and it is possible that they were sold as slaves, since Sicily had previously been used for the disposal of slaves from Africa.<sup>214</sup> But, they could also have been reserved for ransom or exchange, since the Romans were pushing to end the war at this point. Welwei suggested that the transport of captives from North Africa to Sicily would have been easily facilitated as there was a well-established network from the Tunisian beachheads to bases in Sicily.<sup>215</sup>

With the Romans operating in Africa Hannibal was forced to leave Italy, and so the Romans were able to exact their punishment on the rebellious cities that could no longer rely upon Carthaginian help. Overall the Romans treated the Italian communities who had defected to

---

<sup>209</sup> Liv. 28.38.5 gives a total of 14,342 lbs. of silver was paid into the treasury by Scipio, equating to 143 talents (at 100 lbs per talent) this would have been coined money and that derived from the sale/ransom of prisoners as well as any raw silver. Welwei 2000, 102 suggests an average of around 500 *drachmae*, cf. Walbank 1967 II, 273.

<sup>210</sup> App. *Hisp.* 38. The triumph was denied on the grounds that Scipio had not held a regular magistracy, Cass. Dio 17.57.56fr.

<sup>211</sup> App. *Hann.* 55; Diod. Sic. 27.4.5-7; Liv 29.8.6-9.12; Val. Max. 1.1.21.

<sup>212</sup> Oros. 4.18.19.

<sup>213</sup> Liv. 29.29.3 *octo milia liberorum servorumque capitum sunt capta.*

<sup>214</sup> See above.

<sup>215</sup> Welwei 2000, 123 'Geleitzugssystem,' cf. Liv. 29.35.1.

Hannibal leniently;<sup>216</sup> a few communities such as Capua were made an example, but by and large they were not stripped of their governments or enslaved. The Bruttians above everyone else had been the most steadfast in their support for Hannibal, and so the Romans treated them particularly harshly, but they were not removed from their territory. Thus ‘slavery’ in the strict sense was not what they endured; though Appian states that “they were no longer considered free.”<sup>217</sup> Their lack of ‘freedom’ referred to the loss of their political autonomy and the degradation they suffered, they were not allowed to bear arms and did not have a say in government, and were “made to attend the praetors and consuls when they were in Bruttium.”<sup>218</sup>

The armies of Scipio and Hannibal met on the plains of Zama in 202 BC and Roman victory here effectively ended the Second Punic War. Following the battle Hannibal managed to escape with a few men. According to Appian 8,500 Carthaginians were captured.<sup>219</sup> Livy and Polybius both put the figure higher at approximately 20,000.<sup>220</sup> Only Appian specifies that some of the distinguished captives were sent to Rome along with the gold, silver and ivory which were taken from Hannibal’s camp, and Scipio’s army was enriched by large stores of precious metals derived from Hannibal’s campaign in Italy.<sup>221</sup>

After Zama, the Carthaginians were sorely pressed, and so they acceded to the peace set out by Scipio and later ratified by the people. The treaty had a provision that all the Roman war captives be returned, however no such provision is mentioned for the Carthaginian prisoners. Furthermore, the Carthaginians were made to pay large reparations and give 100 hostages to ensure that they adhered to the treaty.<sup>222</sup> According to Nepos, the Carthaginians sent ambassadors to Rome whilst the treaty was being ratified by the assembly.<sup>223</sup> They requested that the hostages be kept at Fregellae and for the Carthaginian prisoners to be restored. The Romans granted the former request, but rejected the latter on the grounds that Hannibal was

<sup>216</sup> App. *Hann.* 61 the Senate agreed a general amnesty for the Italians.

<sup>217</sup> App. *Hann.* 61 οὐδ’ ἐλευθέροις οὖσιν.

<sup>218</sup> App. *Hann.* 61. Cf. Gell. *NA* 10.3.19, they “performed the duties of slaves” and “played the part of *lorarii*”- a demeaning role in the plays put on by the praetors.

<sup>219</sup> *Pun.* 48 αἰχμάλωτοι δ’ ἐλήφθησαν ὀκτακισχίλιοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι. Zon. 9.14 seems to agree with Appian’s ratio of killed to captured by stating that most of the Carthaginians were killed.

<sup>220</sup> Polyb. 5.14.9 τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ δισμυρίουσ, αἰχμάλωτοι δ’ ἐάλωσαν οὐ πολὺ τούτων ἐλάττους; Liv. 30.35.3 *Carthaginiensium sociorumque caesa eo die supra viginti milia; par ferme numerus captus.*

<sup>221</sup> App. *Pun.* 48 gives a figure of 10 talents of gold and 2,500 talents of silver. Eutrop. 3.23.3 puts the figure at twenty thousand pounds of silver, and eight hundred of gold.

<sup>222</sup> App. *Pun.* 59. Liv. 30.37f. Oros. 4.9.5; Polyb. 15.17.1-19.9; Plut. *Cato* 26.1; *Flam.* 21.2; *Mor.* 196d; Zon. 9.14.

<sup>223</sup> Nep. 23.7.

still under the protection of Carthage. Livy states that the ambassadors accomplished their aims and that 200 of the state prisoners held at Rome were released without ransom and sent back to Carthage with Scipio.<sup>224</sup> Of the many Carthaginian captives spread throughout Italy it is impossible to conclude how many were redeemed by Carthage, but there was no mention as in the previous treaty that ransom by private individuals be excluded.<sup>225</sup>

Towards the end of the third century the number of freedmen at Rome had increased significantly. This growth was substantial enough that in 220 BC the freedmen of Rome were registered into four different voting districts.<sup>226</sup> The presence of slaves had already been noteworthy enough for a manumission tax to have been levied in the mid fourth century.<sup>227</sup> In 209 BC this tax, which had been kept in special reserve in the *aerarium Sanctius*, was taken out and used to fund the Roman state. This was the first instance of the fund being used that we know of, and so could be the entire tax levied from 357 BC to 209 BC.<sup>228</sup> If so, the number of manumitted persons for the 152 year period may have been between 160,000 and 500,000.<sup>229</sup> The amount of inflation and the difference in the rate of manumission are impossible to pinpoint with any accuracy and so a clear estimate of the slave population based on these figures is not possible. Suffice it to say that the amount of gold generated from manumission from the 152 years prior to 209 BC was roughly equivalent to that for the 32 years prior to 49 BC, indicating a large presence of slaves in Rome in the third century BC.

Brunt estimated that just prior to the Second Punic War the number of slaves in Italy was as many as 500,000, although this figure is a high estimate and could easily be reduced to 200,000 on the conservative end of the scale.<sup>230</sup> With such a large presence of slaves in Italy it would have been impossible to have maintained these through a supply from war captives.

---

<sup>224</sup> Liv. 30.43.8 They were to be given over as soon as confirmation of Carthage's acceptance of the peace terms was received. These were held as state prisoners *capiti in publica custodia* (Liv. 30.43.5).

<sup>225</sup> As stipulated in the treaty following the First Punic War according to Eutrop. 2.27.4-5. See above.

<sup>226</sup> Liv. *Per.* 20. the Esquilina, Palatina, Subura and Collina.

<sup>227</sup> Discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>228</sup> The tax was kept in gold bars and in 209 BC totalled 4,000 lbs of gold. Many have doubted that this was the total amount for the 152 year period, cf. Frank 1933 I, 101-2; Brunt 1971, 549-50; Mouritsen 2011, 121.

<sup>229</sup> 160,000 estimated by Beloch 1886, 414 from a particularly high manumission price of 2,000 *denarii* (which does not equate, cf. Brunt 1971, 549). 500,000 is based on Frank's 1933 I, 360-3 figure for the number of manumissions required to amount to 4,135 lbs of gold in the treasury in 49 BC, as recorded by Oros. 6.15.5 (=15,000 *lateres* Plin. *HN* 33.55 roughly 12 million *denarii* by Frank's estimate). From when Sulla emptied the treasury in 82 BC to the figures for 49 BC, Frank estimated an annual manumission rate of 16,000, totalling 512,000 based on the typical manumission price of 400 *denarii*. Brunt 1971, 549 has cast serious doubt on these figures suggesting the number of manumissions was a mere 8,000 by Beloch's calculations. Cf. Mouritsen 2011, 121.

<sup>230</sup> Brunt, 1971, 67, cf. Scheidel 1999, 109 who uses Brunt's estimate as the high watermark for his estimates.

Accepting the highest figures given by the sources and assuming everyone taken was subsequently enslaved the number of slaves could only have amounted to approximately 200,000 for the 70 years previous.<sup>231</sup> If we factor in the deaths and manumissions of these captive slaves, the number of new slaves from reproduction or other means of supply (apart from captives) becomes the vast majority required to maintain the population. A rough figure for my (admittedly conservative) overview of enslavements resulting in servitude within Italy for this period would suppose a figure of no more than 50,000. This significant reduction in previously estimated figures for this period is based on the following observations:<sup>232</sup> that Carthaginians were ransomed at the end of the First Punic War, ancient historians had a tendency to exaggerate and Italy was not the only destination for enslaved captives. This would mean that even the low estimate of 200,000 slaves in Italy could not have been comprised of a majority of captives. Even doubling the figure for captives to 100,000 could only have supplied a fraction of the total population of 200,000 for 70 years. Identifying an exact figure would require extensive calculation based on conjectural figures and thus arriving at such a figure could only be speculative. Suffice it to say that 200,000 slaves would need to be replaced by at least as many again in 70 years, assuming that virtually all slaves of the initial corps would die by their 70<sup>th</sup> birthday. Since life-expectancy was far below 70 in ancient Rome and we can assume many, being slaves, would have died earlier than their 35<sup>th</sup> birthday or would have been manumitted, it would be far from excessive to say that 400,000 slaves would be needed for 70 years to maintain a population of 200,000.<sup>233</sup> Therefore 100,000 war captives could only have provided a quarter of the total need for slaves at the time. Whilst instances for the enslavement of war captives increased during the Second Punic War it was still not the principle source of slaves considering the infrequent pattern of enslavements and the overall low figure for slaves realistically acquired in war and brought to Rome.

---

<sup>231</sup> I derive this estimate from every instance of captives for which we have figures from the end of the Third Samnite War to the Second Punic War and round the numbers up. Welwei 2000, 65-85 estimates a figure of approximately 165,000 derived from the First Punic War and the Gallic War of the 220's. Cf. Scheidel 2011, 295.

<sup>232</sup> Scheidel 2011, 295 Table 14.2 gives a range between 311,000 and 351,000 enslavements, see Epilogue.

<sup>233</sup> According to Firier's life table over 35's only accounted for a third of the free population, see Parkin 1992, 144 tbl. 6. See further conclusion chapter.

## Chapter 6

### *Enslavements after the Punic Wars*

By the second century BC Rome emerged as the dominant power in the Western Mediterranean, having defeated its only contender the Carthaginians. In the East, the Macedonians would soon prove no match for Rome's ambition to expand her control into Greece. Roman policy in controlling conquered territory was significantly altered by this overseas expansion.<sup>1</sup> In Spain, the distance from Rome and the recalcitrance of the locals required a permanent garrison, essentially establishing a province through continuous Roman administration. This provincial system directed through the Senate and through the office of praetor governors was pioneered in Sicily in the previous century; but by the end of the Republic it would become common practice. Any analysis of the manner in which the Romans treated the conquered populaces from the second century BC must be accounted for within the context and framework of their burgeoning overseas empire. Diodorus explained that Rome's treatment of captured people changed significantly with their established dominance, citing the examples of Carthage, Numantia and Corinth, all of which were razed; he remarked upon the stark contradiction of their previous benevolent and enfranchising policy towards defeated foes.<sup>2</sup>

A clear caveat to any long-term analysis of enslavements in the second century must be the exiguous textual evidence. Polybius' *Histories* from Book 22 (c. 188 BC) becomes increasingly patchy, and his work concludes with the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC. Livy's narrative, which has proved the most consistent in relating captures in war, is lost from his 46<sup>th</sup> book, forcing reliance upon the *Periochae* of his work after 166 BC. For the purpose of continuity, this chapter concludes with the sack of Corinth in the East, effectively ending where Polybius, too, saw a natural conclusion.<sup>3</sup> In the West, although fighting continues intermittently in Spain, this chapter concludes with the destruction of Carthage in order to coincide with the East.

---

<sup>1</sup> For this concept (originally espoused by Arnold 1879) see Stevenson, 1939 and Brennan, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. Sic. 32.4.4. This lack of a significant rival was perceived as the cause of moral decline in the late Republic by later historians (Sall. *Iug.* 41.1-10; *Hist.* 1.10; Plin. *HN* 33.150; Plut. *Mor.* 88a).

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 1. 1.3.9; 39.8.6.

## The Macedonian Wars

Captures in war resulting in enslavement tapered off significantly in Greece during the third century BC.<sup>4</sup> The impropriety of enslaving Greeks over barbarians, held by Aristotle and Plato,<sup>5</sup> in part a response to the cases of Greek enslavements during the fourth century,<sup>6</sup> limited such a practice during the third. However, external powers continued to prey upon the Greeks, so that it was not devoid of the unpleasant practice. The Illyrians, in the late 230's BC, conducted a series of raids that resulted in the enslavement of a number of Aetolian captives.<sup>7</sup> Likewise, enslavements carried out by Greeks and Macedonians continued outside Greece in this period. Philip II raided Scythia and was there said to have captured 20,000 women and children in 339 BC.<sup>8</sup> Boese has suggested that the restraint of the Greeks in enslaving their countrymen changed irreparably after the sack of Mantinea in 223 BC.<sup>9</sup> But the fate of the Mantineans was not exactly a straightforward affair. Polybius used the episode as an example to launch a diatribe against the earlier historian Phylarchus, who gave a graphic account of the city's fall.<sup>10</sup> This episode has often been cited as an example of Polybius' view being coloured by his political convictions or his attack on literary-styles different to his own.<sup>11</sup> But to simply accuse Polybius of *parti pris* is to ignore his reasoned critique of Phylarchus, as John Marincola has shown, Polybius felt Phylarchus' history favoured the emotive at the expense of the factual ultimately preventing the historian from identifying the cause of events.<sup>12</sup> Whereas Phylarchus tried to rouse the sympathy of his

---

<sup>4</sup> Boese 1973, 71.

<sup>5</sup> Pl. *Rep.* 469-471; Arist. *NE* 1149a9-12. Cf. Philostr. *VA* 8.7, see Chapter 1.

<sup>6</sup> See Arist. *Pol.* 1333b38-1334a2 argument against warfare for the sake of acquiring slaves. Instances of enslavement amongst the Greeks were relatively common during Aristotle's time, for specific examples see Pritchett 1991, 229-31. Cf. Garnsey, 1996, 113 n. 8; Lloyd 1993, 145-7.

<sup>7</sup> Medion in 231 BC (Polyb. 2.3.7), Phoinice and Helikranon in 230 BC (Polyb. 2.5.8; 6.6).

<sup>8</sup> Justin. 9.1-2; Oros. 3.13.1-4. Finley 1962, 58 states that this probably stemmed from Theopompus.

<sup>9</sup> Boese 1973, 71-2. Volkmann 1990, 74-5 argued that the lenience shown to Greek cities was adopted by the Romans.

<sup>10</sup> Phylarchus' work is now lost, Polybius is likely referring to his *Histories*, mentioned in the *Suda s.v.* 'Phylarchus.'

<sup>11</sup> Most notably the accusation by Walbank 1962, 12 that Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus here was actually a defence of Aratus and Achaea.

<sup>12</sup> Marincola 2013, 73-90. Polyb. 2.56f. Similarly Polybius criticised Theopompus whom he charged with misrepresenting Philip as a philandering brute that enslaved cities (Polyb. 8.9f. specifically the enslaving of cities 8.9.3). According to Marincola 2013, 76 Polybius identified Phylarchus' style as tragic history by identifying four key aspects of tragedy: a reversal of fortune, emotive narration, detailed suffering and vivid description. However, the purpose and 'value' of tragic history according to Polybius was not the accurate depiction of events, but rather to benefit a reader enabling him to better cope with personal tragedy. Polybius therefore rejects Phylarchus' style rather than his politics (what Walbank termed Polybius' *bête noir*, see also

Greek readers for the Mantineans in what Polybius described as “debased and effeminate;”<sup>13</sup> Polybius gave an account of the entirety of the incident, in which he saw the fall of the Mantineans as a fitting punishment for their betrayal of the Achaean garrison.<sup>14</sup> Presumably, Phylarchus also believed all of the Mantineans to be enslaved as his treatise (according to Polybius) described men, women and children being carried off into slavery. Polybius took issue with this, stating that it could not have been, as it was not a fitting punishment as it punished the innocent along with the guilty.<sup>15</sup> He then contradicts this statement by remarking that the Mantineans’ property was plundered and the free enslaved,<sup>16</sup> the clarity being lost in the discrediting of the Phylarchus. With the addition of Plutarch’s account, the enslavement of the entire population is less likely, since he states that Mantinea was given by Antigonos to the Achaeans, and renamed Antigoneia after the man who “destroyed and took up [the city’s] citizens.”<sup>17</sup>

Of course Mantinea was an exceptional case in breaking with the regular code of conduct, and the enslavement was a matter of punishment.<sup>18</sup> Clemency towards captured enemies in Greece continued to be the normal practice amongst the Greek leagues, in stark contrast with the Peloponnesian War;<sup>19</sup> with only Philip, Rome and Antiochus displaying the ruthlessness of imperialist enslavement.<sup>20</sup> Although Pritchett has interpreted all the examples where captives are mentioned as examples of enslavement,<sup>21</sup> it is clear that Polybius was himself, not so committal in relating the fate of captives. Where he was elsewhere explicit in stating

---

Eckstein 2013, 327) For the purpose of writing a history which sought to identify causation see explicitly Polyb. 6.2.8.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 2.56.9 ἀγεννῆς καὶ γυναικῶδες.

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. 2.58.4. Polybius here following the *Memoirs* of Aratus of Sicyon, this choice would have surprised readers familiar with the histories pertaining to Mantinea as Phylarchus was considered a reliable source, Marincola 2013, 74.

<sup>15</sup> Polyb. 2.58.10 ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μηθὲν ἀσεβῆς ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοῦ τοῦ πολέμου νόμους ὑπόκειται παθεῖν.

<sup>16</sup> Polyb. 2.58.12 Walbank 1957 I, 265 reads τοὺς ἐλευθέρους as ‘the free citizens,’ whereas Paton *Loeb* translates as ‘male citizens.’ Polyb. 2.62.12 later states that Phylarchus believed all the booty and slaves taken from Mantinea equated to only 300 talents. Polybius rubbishes this figure as far too little.

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 45.6 ἀπολεσάντων καὶ ἀνελόντων τοὺς πολίτας. Nothing is said concerning the Mantineans in his other accounts (Cleom. 5.1. Paus. 2.8.6) of the episode.

<sup>18</sup> For a number of similar references to the concept of a recognised code of conduct between Greek states see Walbank 1957 I, 264.

<sup>19</sup> Pritchett 1991, 218 lists no less than 16 examples of the massacre of captives, and 17 examples of mass enslavements during the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>20</sup> The Rhodians pleaded with Philip to spare the people of Abydos (Polyb. 15.23.1-4). Attalus restored Gaurelum after it was turned over to him by the Romans (Liv. 31.45f), similarly Kios was restored by Prusias (Strab. 12.4).

<sup>21</sup> Pritchett 1991, 225.

that the inhabitants of captured cities were reduced to slavery (ἐξανδραποδίζω),<sup>22</sup> he more frequently chose to describe *only* the capture of prisoners, typically ‘taking alive’ (ζωγρία) in this later period.<sup>23</sup> Polybius continues to use σωματά as referring to captured slaves. For example, Polybius noted that an Achaean naval commander “brought *slaves* back.”<sup>24</sup> Similarly Livy’s word choice seems to suggest that the captives taken from Pyrgos in Elis were, in fact, slaves.<sup>25</sup>

The general leniency shown to defeated enemies was, of course, punctuated by incidents of severity so common in Greek and Roman warfare. We know that the Achaeans made slaves of some of their prisoners, as Polybius tells us they later released a captive without ransom in recognition of his *proxenia*, rather than being sold as a slave on the spot.<sup>26</sup> Likewise, the Aetolians enslaved the inhabitants of Laconia,<sup>27</sup> and Philip did the same at Phthiotic Thebes and Kios.<sup>28</sup> Where the enslavements or utter reductions of cities are mentioned by Polybius, in the conflicts of Greece at the end of the third century, they are used as invective examples in speeches rather than Polybius’ account of the events *in situ historiae*.<sup>29</sup> When the Romans entered the fray in Greece, they did so at first with a mind to refrain from any territorial acquisition and, although they were accused of carrying away Greeks as slaves, they seem to have largely abstained from doing so.

The treaty between Rome and the Aetolians in 211 BC has been the basis on which it is believed the Romans enslaved Greeks captured in the First Macedonian War.<sup>30</sup> The principle

<sup>22</sup> As at Polyb. 4.34.9; 5.100.8; 6.49.1; 8.93. We may also add here the kidnapping of undefended women and children at Lythus by the Cnosians in 219 BC (Polyb. 4.54.2).

<sup>23</sup> As at Polyb. 4.69.7; 5.69.10; 5.86.5; 5.94.5; 5.95.10.

<sup>24</sup> Polyb. 5.94.7 ἑκατὸν σωματῶν. To be read ‘slaves’ rather than ‘as slaves.’

<sup>25</sup> Liv. 27.32.9 states that the captives were *dividenti* along with the booty. The captured totalled 4,000 people (*hominum*) and that more than 20,000 cattle were included in the spoils. The capture of cattle as a significant form of booty seems to suggest that slaves were also taken since the two are commonly paired in Livy’s account, see Chapter 5. Had the captives been free persons it would have warranted the mention of their sale as shown in many previous examples of Livy, see Chapters 5-6.

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 5.95.12.

<sup>27</sup> Polyb. 4.34.9. ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο δὲ τὰς περιοίκους. Plut. *Cleom.* 18.3 mentions 50,000 taken in this incident ἀνδραποδῶν ἐμβάλοντας εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν Αἰτωλοῦς ἀπαγαγεῖν, although this may be an exaggeration to emphasise Cleomenes’ recovery of them.

<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 5.100.8. Although a charge that he enslaved the inhabitants of Phthiotic Thebes is not brought against him in the 205 BC Summit at Phoenice, as was the case with Kios (Polyb. 18.3.12). Small-scale naval actions may also have resulted in the enslavement or impressment of some crews (see Polyb. 4.6.1; 5.94.8) and the capture of slaves on board an Aetolian ship (Polyb. 5.94.7). Polyb. 5.94.5 also mentions the capture (ζωγρία) of 2,000 Eleians by the Achaeans in 217 BC.

<sup>29</sup> The invective against the Aetolians and Philip by Chlaeneas the Aetolian and Lyciscus the Acarnanian to the Spartans (Polyb. 9.28.3; 34.7; 38.9; 39.2).

<sup>30</sup> For a definitive argument in favour of this date see Badian 1958b, 197-8.



terms of the treaty are given by Livy and partially preserved in a fragmentary inscription.<sup>31</sup> The treaty established a formal cooperative alliance between the Aetolians and Rome, in which the Romans would provide naval and marine support and the Aetolian's land support. The division of booty, which is the germane point here, was designated so that the Aetolians received the cities and territory, and the Romans all *other* booty; as Livy states *alia omnis praeda populi Romani esset*. The inscription is more detailed, as it stipulates that cities taken by the Romans were to be turned over to the Aetolians, but the Romans would “take whatever else was captured beside the city and territory,”<sup>32</sup> and if a city was captured jointly, then the city and territory belonged to the Aetolians, and the moveable booty was to be shared. The last clause further stipulated that cities who surrendered were to be given over to the Aetolians, specifically the “people, cities and land.”<sup>33</sup> A lacuna corrupts the later portions of the inscription, but the appearance of *αὐτονόμων* suggests these cities were perhaps to remain autonomous, as in keeping their laws in accordance with the regular concession granted to cities that surrendered voluntarily.<sup>34</sup> It is generally assumed that the booty designated the Romans included captives,<sup>35</sup> but the inclusion of free persons with the booty was not the case, as it is hard to identify a logic behind the transference of ghost towns.

Polybius only refers to the treaty retrospectively.<sup>36</sup> The first instance for which he suggests the terms were put to use was the reduction of Antikyra, the first city taken jointly by the Romans and Aetolians. Livy states that the Aetolians received the city in accordance with the treaty and the Romans took the booty.<sup>37</sup> Polybius however, relates through a later envoy sent by Lyciscus, the Acarnanian envoy to the Spartans, that the city was ‘reduced to slavery’ (*ἐξάνδραποδίζω*). The enslavement of the inhabitants as narrated by Polybius through the mouth of the Acarnanian envoy verges on the hyperbolic. The exaggeration of

<sup>31</sup> Liv. 24.26. 11; for the inscription see *IG 9<sup>2</sup>.2.241* (*SEG 25.626*); McDonald 1956, 153-157), see also Bagnall & Derow 2003, 33; Austin 1981, 62.

<sup>32</sup> *SEG 25.626* [δ] δὲ κα παρές τᾶς πόλιος καὶ τᾶς χώρας Ῥωμα[ι]οὶ λάβωντι, Ῥωμαῖοι ἐχόντωσαν.

<sup>33</sup> *SEG 25.626* ...[ἀνθ]ρ[ώ]πους καὶ τᾶς πόλιας καὶ τᾶς χώρας.

<sup>34</sup> There is significant controversy regarding the later portion of this inscription. Cf. Sherk 1984, 2 n.4. McDonald 1956, 155 suggested that cities surrendering to the Aetolians probably joined the league, but were allowed to keep their laws (i.e. autonomy), and that cities who surrendered to the Romans (i.e. *deditio*) would become autonomous and could choose membership to the Aetolian league for themselves. This is supported by the later interpretation of the treaty by Flamininus (Polyb. 18.38.8-9). Badian 1958b, 204 however did not think a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of cities surrendering to the Romans was necessary and so rejected the interpretation of the fragmented section by McDonald.

<sup>35</sup> Sherk 1984, 2; Volkmann 1990, 20; Walbank 1967a II, 179; 1967b, 84 first suggests that the booty was inclusive of slaves, and later (pg. 87) that free persons were enslaved.

<sup>36</sup> Polyb. 9.39.1-3; 18.38.5-9; 21.20.3; 22.8.10.

<sup>37</sup> Liv. 29.1.26 *Itaque intra paucos dies recepta urbs per deditioem Aetolis traditur, praeda ex pacto Romanis cessit.*

ἐξανδραποδίζω was a key facet of his portrayal of the Aetolians as inviting the destruction of fellow Greeks by barbarians.<sup>38</sup> The enslavement of Greeks by non-Greeks was clearly thought to be a compelling enough argument to reserve it for the penultimate point in the speech persuading the Spartans against joining the Aetolians. It was, of course, a lamentable scene depicting women and children carried off by the Romans, who were barbarians and had no concern over whether the enslaved should remain in Greece or not.<sup>39</sup> Polybius' repetitive charges of greed against the Aetolians eventually gave way to sympathy as they were essentially the sheep that brought the wolves to the flock.<sup>40</sup>

Polybius refers to the terms of the treaty in a later passage stating that of the enemies, "their bodies (or slaves) and property should belong to the Romans, and their cities and lands to the Aetolians."<sup>41</sup> Polybius uses the term σώματα again in identifying the living captives, but this does not necessarily indicate the 'bodies' of free persons, but the 'slaves' as Polybius has used the term previously.<sup>42</sup> Again, when Polybius mentions the distribution of the booty it is reiterated: "of that seized in war the moveable booty was to go to the Romans, the cities to the Aetolians." Here the term ἔπιπλα is used, which generally refers to inanimate moveable booty.<sup>43</sup> Overall, the only instance in which we may find the enslavement of some captives during the First Macedonian War comes after the capture of the island of Aegina where the inhabitants, unable to flee, were taken, but after a plea was made that they be permitted to ransom themselves, it was allowed in accordance with Greek custom.<sup>44</sup>

Aegina is a particularly pertinent example of how a single city and population could be repeatedly conquered despite repeated instances of enslavements.<sup>45</sup> Aegina had changed hands several times since the late classical period. As an island in the Saronic Gulf, it was constantly at the heart of Peloponnesian and Achaean conflict. The Aeginetans, after years of

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Gruen 1984 I, 322. The charge of inviting the Romans to take Greece is again used by the Macedonians to persuade the Aetolians to break with Rome, Polyb. 10.25.1-5 and likewise by a Rhodian mediator between Aetolia and Macedon, Polyb. 11.5.1-2. On the fictitious nature of the speech see Mørkholm 1974, 127-132, *contra* Walbank 1957 I, 13-14; 1965, 7-18.

<sup>39</sup> Polyb. 9.39.3 καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι.

<sup>40</sup> Aetolians brought Rome into Greek affairs, Polyb. 9.37.8. For Aetolian greed see Sacks 1975, 92-3. The inclusion of captives with booty is uniquely attributed to the Aetolians by Philip, Polyb. 18.5.1. Polybius was an Achaean and his view of the Aetolians is typically regarded as negative, see Champion 2010, 357-9.

<sup>41</sup> Polyb. 11.5.4 Κατὰ τούτων πεποίησθε τὰς συνθήκας ἐφ' ἧ τὰ μὲν σώματα καὶ τὰ ἔπιπλα Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλῶν.

<sup>42</sup> Discussed earlier, see Chapter 5.

<sup>43</sup> Xen. *Oec.* 9.6 lists household goods as ἔπιπλα.

<sup>44</sup> Polyb. 9.42.5. That they were in fact restored is reaffirmed later by Polyb. 22.11.9. cf. Volkmann 1990, 21 n.1.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Volkmann 1990, 105.

conflict with the Athenians, were forcibly enrolled in the Delian league in 458/7 BC. Then, after persuading the Spartans to enter the Peloponnesian War, the Aeginetans were forcibly evicted from the island in 431 BC.<sup>46</sup> The Aeginetan refugees settled on the Peloponnese at Thyrea, but were again conquered by the Athenians and brought to Athens in 424 BC where many were put to death.<sup>47</sup> Finally at the conclusion of the war in 405 BC the remaining Aeginetans were repatriated and restored under a Spartan governor on Aegina.<sup>48</sup> For the majority of the third century Aegina was under Macedonian control, before passing into the Achaean league in 229 BC.<sup>49</sup> Then again in 211 BC, during the First Macedonian War, Aegina was taken by the Romans who transferred it to the Aetolian league, who in turn, sold it the following year to Attalus II of Pergamum. It remained attached to the kingdom of Pergamum until the entire kingdom was annexed by Rome in 133 BC. Aegina's *repeated* misfortune could not have resulted in wholesale enslavements, as it continued to exist with a significant population.

When the Roman commander Sulpicius took Aegina it was transferred to the Aetolians in accordance with the treaty, as mentioned above. Polybius offers us a contradictory account of the result of the ransom: whilst it is clear that Sulpicius allowed the Aeginetans to send for their ransom,<sup>50</sup> their fate seems questionable in a speech made by a Rhodian envoy;<sup>51</sup> and they are later said to have all been sold into slavery by Sulpicius by an Aeginetan envoy.<sup>52</sup> The indication that it was the Romans who enslaved the inhabitants is expressed in the term συναθροισθέντες, meaning "having been assembled on the ships."<sup>53</sup> Despite later assertions by Polybius, the Romans could not have sold all the inhabitants, or even a large number, since, after being handed over to the Aetolians by the Romans, it was then sold to Attalus of

---

<sup>46</sup> Thuc. 2.27.

<sup>47</sup> Thuc. 4.57. Diod. Sic. 12.65.9 does not mention the execution of the Aeginetans at Athens. Cf. Pritchett 1991, 419.

<sup>48</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.9. That some of the original Aeginetans returned can be seen in the re-minting of old style coins, see Metcalf 2012, 109.

<sup>49</sup> Switched allegiance peaceably to the Achaeans, Plut. *Arat.* 34.7.

<sup>50</sup> At Polyb. 9.42.5. Eckstein 2012, 109 n. 123 notes that Galba soon recanted his initial decision to enslave the citizens of Aegina.

<sup>51</sup> Polyb. 11.5.8. Polybius does not state specifically that the envoy was Rhodian, but Livy mentions that Rhodian envoys were received at Heraclea in 207 BC, 28.7.13.

<sup>52</sup> The envoy was addressing the Achaean assembly. Polyb. 22.8.9 ὅτε Πόπλιος Σολπίκιος ἐπιπλεύσας τῷ στόλῳ πάντας ἐξηνδραποδίσασατο τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Αἰγινήτας. See Welwei 2000, 120. One must question the truth of 'all' or a literal interpretation of 'slavery' here since slaves could not send envoys.

<sup>53</sup> Walbank 1967a II, 186; Polyb. 22.8.9.

Pergamum.<sup>54</sup> Polybius remarked again that the people of Aegina were subjected to the horrors of being taken by foreigners, but this is found in a passage directed against the Aetolians.<sup>55</sup> The city was sold for the sum of thirty talents to Attalus II of Pergamum in the following year.<sup>56</sup> There is no mention of a resettlement of the site, which would be expected if it were, in fact, depleted by enslavement.

In 207 BC Oreus and Opus were taken within a short span of time by the Romans and the forces of Attalus. The Romans had taken all the booty from Oreus, and so the booty taken from Opus was allotted to Attalus.<sup>57</sup> There is no mention of the taking of captives at Oreus, but the enslavement of the populace is unlikely, given the short span of time between the respective falls of each city.<sup>58</sup> The Romans did not even stay around long enough after the fall of Opus to assist Attalus against Philip's reprisal. According to Livy, Philip caught Attalus at Oreus whilst he was disposing of the booty, specifically in "exacting money from leading citizens."<sup>59</sup> Roman support waned in Greece from 207 BC onwards and the Aetolians signed a peace treaty with Philip, contrary to the agreement of their alliance with Rome.<sup>60</sup> The Romans tried to re-enlist the Aetolians in the War with Philip, but they refused and Rome signed a peace treaty with Philip in 205 BC, the terms of which may have included the restoration of prisoners.<sup>61</sup>

The focus upon Philip's foreign policy has typically been on his treacherous severity, his rampant aggression and brutality shown at places such as Cius,<sup>62</sup> Thasos<sup>63</sup> and Abydos.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Polyb. 9.42.5; 11.5.8; 22.8.9-10, for the political link between Aetolia and Pergamum see Gruen 1984, 530 n. 3.

<sup>55</sup> Polyb. 11.5.8.

<sup>56</sup> Polyb. 22.8.10.

<sup>57</sup> Cass. Dio. 17.57fr.

<sup>58</sup> Zon. 9.9 states that Oreus was betrayed, cf. Liv. 28.6f.

<sup>59</sup> Liv. 28.6.5 *pecuniis a principibus exigendis*. Importantly not their sale.

<sup>60</sup> See Eckstein 2012, 104-5.

<sup>61</sup> Liv. 29.12.8-16 only lays out the terms regarding the cities of Illyria. The restoration of prisoners were repeatedly argued for in the conference held in the Melian Gulf between the parties involved in the Second Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.1.13-14; 2.2; 2.5; 6.1-2; 18.8.10). It stands to reason that a treaty conducted, on more equal grounds, may have included such provisions within its terms. In the treaty that concluded the Second Macedonian War, the restoration of prisoners was a distinct clause (Liv. 33.13.9-10).

<sup>62</sup> Capture of Kios in 202 BC, Polyb. 15.22.3 remarks that with the capture of Kios *σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου περιπεποιημένος*. And later an envoy from Kios states: *ἐξανδραποδισμόν τῶν Κιανῶν καὶ τὴν ὁμότητα τοῦ Φιλίππου* (Polyb. 15.23.3. cf. Strab. 12.4).

<sup>63</sup> Polyb. 15.24.1 *Θασίων πόλιν, καὶ ταύτην φιλίαν οὐσαν ἐξηνδραποδίσασατο*.

<sup>64</sup> Polyb. 16.32.5; Liv. 31.17.11. The people fought fiercely at Abydos and this may have led to harsher treatment, although Polybius seems to suggest their enslavement was Philip's motive from the start. The Roman envoy to the Achaean league also lists the cities of Aenus, Maronea, Thasos, Paros, Samos, Larisa and Messene as having claims against Philip for similar abuses (Liv. 31.31.4).

Polybius emphasised the treachery of Philip in taking both Kios and Thasos, who were presumably on good terms with the king.<sup>65</sup> Philip's abuse of friendly Greek cities, as well as his allies, is a common theme in Polybius;<sup>66</sup> much was made of Philip's ravishing of allied Thessaly in retreat from the Aous valley in 199 BC.<sup>67</sup> Philip's motives for enslavement in these cases appear to have been driven by a need for money. A Roman envoy to the Achaeans inadvertently showed how the maltreatment of captured cities could be skewed and hyperbolised in defending the charges levied by the Macedonian envoy against the Romans, specifically the reduction of Rhegium, Capua and Syracuse.<sup>68</sup> By the same token, the Macedonians could defend their actions. Greece was caught between two major powers with hegemonic designs, both of whom generated propaganda to try and lure individual states and leagues to their side.<sup>69</sup> Although the Achaeans snubbed Philip the second time around, he was not completely without friends amongst their league. In a meeting held amongst the members of the Achaean league, in which the league decided upon supporting the Romans, three member states walked out in respect of their friendship with Philip, including the Dymaei who had been ransomed and restored to their city by Philip.<sup>70</sup> Despite the harsh treatment at the hands of Philip, it seems Greek fraternity was enough to ensure that those who fell into slavery were recovered. In the case of Cius, the city was transferred over by Philip to Prusias who restored the Cians.<sup>71</sup> Abydos also was restored after the Peace of Phoenice, which settled the First Macedonian War.<sup>72</sup>

The Peace of Phoenice prevented westward expansion by Philip, particularly towards Illyria, which had brought about Roman intervention in the first place, and to the south the status quo returned; as a result Philip's attention turned eastward.<sup>73</sup> Philip focused his efforts on conquering independent states in the Northern Aegean, but some of the cities were allied to the Aetolians. Attalus, Ptolemy and the Rhodians were angered by Philip's brutality in taking free Greek cities, but this was bound to be, as they were allies of Rome. Roman intervention

---

<sup>65</sup> Polyb. 15.22.1 (Loeb trans.). "As though he had performed a glorious and honourable achievement." Thasos was taken by treachery (Polyb. 15.24.1).

<sup>66</sup> McGing 2010, 156.

<sup>67</sup> Liv. 32.13.6-7; Plut. *Flam.* 5.3.

<sup>68</sup> Liv. 31.31f.

<sup>69</sup> The fear of enslavement was used by Philip to strengthen his support in Thessaly (Plut. *Flam.* 5.5).

<sup>70</sup> Liv. 32.22.10. The city of Dyme was sacked by the Romans in 198 BC, see below.

<sup>71</sup> Strab. 12.4.

<sup>72</sup> For the terms of the treaty see Liv. 33.12.1-13.15; Polyb. 18.38.1-39.7; Zon. 9.16.

<sup>73</sup> For the grand strategy of Philip, particularly in regards to his directional expansion see Walbank 1967b, *passim*.

was pretty much assured and the Romans must not have placed much hope in a diplomatic resolution, for at the same time that the deputation was meeting with Philip, a Roman army was embarking in Illyria under the command of Sulpicius Galba.<sup>74</sup> Hence began the Second Macedonian War. Roman intention, as far as the dictates of the Senate were concerned, was to remove Philip's control over cities outside Macedon and so, according to Livy, war was declared by the Senate on Philip and the cities under him.<sup>75</sup> However, the first two consuls to execute the war failed to do so in a matter compatible with the political aims and the promulgated position of Rome 'freeing Greece,' to the extent that both consuls were reproached for waging war *too* ruthlessly against Philip's Greek allies.<sup>76</sup>

During the Second Macedonian War the Romans used a two-pronged attack, one force under the consul operated on land and another joint force with Attalus that operated from the sea.<sup>77</sup> Sulpicius marched towards Macedonia and sent his lieutenant Lucius Apustius to take the city of Antipatrea, there an attempt to persuade the city to submit failed and the Lieutenant took the city by storm massacring all the men within.<sup>78</sup> This action induced several other cities in the area to submit to Rome and Lucius Apustius returned to the main army, along with some captives taken during a skirmish.<sup>79</sup> The brutality of the Romans in this case was meant to scare Philip's allies into betraying him and, as a consequence, open the path for the Roman army into Macedon.

Sulpicius then marched with his main force into Eordaea, and there took the city of Celetrum (with no mention of captives), before moving on to sack the city of Pelium.<sup>80</sup> At Pelium, despite a resistance offered by the defenders, Sulpicius only took booty and the slaves; the citizens were allowed to remain on the condition they accept a Roman garrison.<sup>81</sup> We hear later, during a meeting of the Achaeans to decide on joining the Romans, that the citizens of Dyme were also enslaved by the Romans.<sup>82</sup> The later redemption of the Dymians by Philip suggests that they must have been sold locally in order for them to be recovered by Philip,

---

<sup>74</sup> Liv. 31.14.1-5; 32.3.3-4; Plut. *Flam.* 3.1; Flor. 1.23.6-7; App. *Mac.* 4.3; Paus. 7.7.8; Zon. 9.15.

<sup>75</sup> Liv. 31.6.1.

<sup>76</sup> See below.

<sup>77</sup> with the assistance of the Rhodians and Attalus, Rome was able to move about with impunity on the Aegean (Cass. Dio 58.4fr).

<sup>78</sup> Liv. 31.27.4.

<sup>79</sup> Liv. 31.24.7. No mention of the fate of these.

<sup>80</sup> Walbank 1967b, 144 suggests a site near modern Korça.

<sup>81</sup> Liv. 31.40.5.

<sup>82</sup> Liv. 32.22.10.

and it is possible that they were never enslaved at all.<sup>83</sup> As Livy relates, the Dymians were redeemed *ubicumque servirent*. While *servio* typically referred to slavery, it could here imply subservient service, and it is possible that the sale of their property (which was also restored to them) forced them into relying upon their neighbours in a servile fashion.

The other Roman force operating by sea, in conjunction with Attalus' forces, landed in northern Euboea and there took the city of Oreus. The city had surrendered to the Romans previously in 207 BC and so, fearing a reprisal by Philip if they surrendered again, put up a stiff resistance retreating first to one citadel and then to a second where they were finally beaten into submission. Unlike the arrangement for the division of spoils with the Aetolians in the previous war, Attalus' troops received the booty outright. Livy notes that the Romans received the prisoners, but he makes no further mention of their fate. It is probable that they were either ransomed or sold nearby, as the fleet was soon afterward involved in the capture of Gaurelum, which surrendered before a siege was laid and was subsequently turned over to Attalus. The inhabitants of Gaurelum were allowed to leave the city with a single garment each to Delium in Boeotia. However, Attalus wished the city to be inhabited, so he induced the inhabitants, including many that made the trip to Delium, to remain in the city under his protection.<sup>84</sup>

Titus Flamininus (consul for 198 BC) took charge of the army in Greece and immediately set out to meet Philip head on in the Aous valley, where Villius had hesitated.<sup>85</sup> But, a decisive battle could not be fought, and during the stalemate the Epirotes, who had arbitrated the first Peace of Phoenice, sought to settle the war again.<sup>86</sup> The terms proposed by Flamininus were in line with the position of protecting Greece from Macedonian imperialism.<sup>87</sup> Philip could not accept the terms and so the war continued. With the self-proclaimed position of liberator, Flamininus could not execute the war in the same manner as his predecessors, the ruthless destruction of cities and reduction of Greek populaces that were allied to Philip was not compatible with such a strategy.<sup>88</sup> We see the immediate change in this strategy at Carystus,

---

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Eckstein 1976, 138.

<sup>84</sup> Liv. 31.45f.

<sup>85</sup> Plut. *Flam.* 3.2.

<sup>86</sup> Liv. 32.10.1-8.

<sup>87</sup> See Frank 1914, 161; Walbank 1967b, 151-2.

<sup>88</sup> Paus. 7.7.9 suggested that the destruction of Hestiaea and Antikyra by Villius (Pausanias refers to him as "Otilius") was contrary to the *senatus consultum*, and so Flamininus was sent to replace him, because he was thought to be more inclined to levity. For the concept of 'Greek Freedom' perpetuated by Flamininus see Eckstein 2012, 289-97.

where the citizens surrendered and were allowed to remain in the city and the Macedonian garrison was released on a ransom of 300 *drachmae* per head.<sup>89</sup> Just before the surrender of Carystus, the city of Eretria, also in Euboea, was sacked; the townspeople and garrison surrendered from the citadel and, since no mention is made of what befell the captives, it is likely they too were dealt with in the same manner as Carystus.<sup>90</sup>

Flaminius' peace negotiations with Philip, also served the purpose of stalling the war until the prorogation of his command was confirmed.<sup>91</sup> Once this was confirmed, the untenable demand was made that Philip give up Thessaly which had been under Macedonian control since Philip II, and thus Philip was forced to decline.<sup>92</sup> Flaminius made sure to continue in the vein of liberator by keeping his troops from plundering the countryside.<sup>93</sup> Philip's weakening position and the amity of Flaminius caused most of Greece to flock to the Roman side. The Acarnanians put up a stiff resistance against the Romans, but were defeated and several captured without any mention of what became of them.<sup>94</sup> With the security of allies to his rear, Flaminius felt able to engage Philip head on and defeated him at the battle of Cynoscephalae, Polybius says no less than 5,000 were captured,<sup>95</sup> and Livy, who states that Polybius is the most trustworthy source in this, also lists 5,000 as captured.<sup>96</sup> The battle proved a *coup de grâce* for Philip and he was forced to surrender on Roman terms. Roman aims can be seen plainly in the result of this peace: Macedonia was restricted to its own borders and all of Philip's possessions were made autonomous.<sup>97</sup> An Aetolian request that they receive several cities was denied by the Romans, and it is clear from this rejection that

---

<sup>89</sup> Liv. 32.17.2. The actions on Euboea were conducted by Flaminius' brother in charge of the fleet.

<sup>90</sup> Liv. 32.16.16. Livy also states that the two cities fell within a few days of each other and we might infer that they did not linger at Eretria, which they would have, had they needed to dispose of captives. The Eretrians were also desirous of surrender, but a night assault forced them to abandon the town and take refuge in the citadel.

<sup>91</sup> Peace negotiations were off and on eventually culminating in a conference near Locris where Flaminius learns of the prorogation of his command (Zon. 9.16; Plut. *Flam.* 7.1-3; Polyb. 18.12.1).

<sup>92</sup> For the negotiations at Nicea, cf. Liv. 32.32.1-36.10; Plut. *Flam.* 5.6-8; App. *Mac.* 8.1; Zon. 9.16. At Locris, Diod. Sic. 28.11.1; Liv. 32.10.1-8; App. *Mac.* 5.1.

<sup>93</sup> Liv. 32.14.4-6; Plut. *Flam.* 2.5. This was particularly the case in Epirus where Flaminius gathered his supplies in preparation of invading Thessaly, see Walbank 1967b, 156.

<sup>94</sup> Liv. 33.17.14; Zon. 9.16.

<sup>95</sup> Polyb. 18.27.6 ζωγρία, with no mention of their fate.

<sup>96</sup> Polyb. 18.27.6 ζωγρία, with no mention of their fate. Liv. 33.10.8 *capta*. Livy notes that sources for the battle vary in their figures: Valerius Antias gives a realistic figure (in Livy's opinion) of 5,700 as captured, but a ridiculous 40,000 killed (Livy put it at 8,000); Claudius Quadrigarius put the figure at 4,300 captured and 32,000 killed. Cf. Oros. 4.20.6; Plut. *Flam.* 8.5.

<sup>97</sup> For the terms of the peace see Liv. 33.12.1-13.15; Polyb. 18.38.1-39.7; Zon. 9.16.



Rome's political aim was in limiting power in the East; they did not wish to replace the Macedonians with the Aetolians.<sup>98</sup>

During the Second Macedonian War Rome played the part of liberator, and as such they, with a few exceptions, refrained from enslaving. The propaganda against Philip and, what we can only assume, also against the Romans by Philip,<sup>99</sup> exaggerated the brutality of both sides in enslaving and slaughtering cities. Despite trying to keep up a guise of liberation, the Roman troops still took booty when taking cities. Even with the best intentions by the commanders, the soldiers were always motivated by the prospect of booty and a commander was essentially powerless to stop it, and generally unwilling to prevent it.<sup>100</sup> For soldiers, captives had no immediate use, and the frequency of citadels in Greek cities ensured that surrenders could be made which preserved the lives, and often the liberty, of the inhabitants. On the odd occasion that enslavements were made, they seem to have been conducted on the spot. Buyers appear to be from nearby states - as we often hear of the captive's later recovery. Roman captives were also recovered by Flamininus in Greece in 198 BC, and it can be inferred that a market for slaves, particularly of those taken in war, was present in Macedonia and Greece, both of which competed with Rome.<sup>101</sup>

### **From the War with Antiochus to the Destruction of Corinth**

After Macedon was defeated, the next power to be diminished by Rome was the Seleucid kingdom. Whilst Rome was occupied to the West with Carthage and later with Philip V, Antiochus III was busy re-conquering territory that had traditionally been part of the Selucid empire. The expansion of Antiochus concerned Rome and when his forces crossed the Hellespont to 'liberate' Greece from Rome their fear of westward Seleucid expansion was justified.<sup>102</sup> Unfortunately, books 20 and 21 of Polybius are highly fragmentary, and so the

---

<sup>98</sup> Walbank 1967b, 173-4 notes that Macedonian power was useful to Rome, in that, within the confines of its own borders, it served to maintain the status quo of power between the Balkans and the Greek leagues, and served as a bulwark against a possible invasion of Europe by Antiochus.

<sup>99</sup> We cannot know for sure. Polybius' information regarding Philip was likely compiled whilst he was a hostage at Rome, see Walbank 1967b, 279.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Ziolkowski 1993, 83f. For arguments on the actual rights of soldiers to plunder and commit violence see Vogel 1948, 394-422; Bona 1960, 106-113; Watson 1968, 762-74. I am of the opinion that booty, and thereby the right to commit violence in obtaining it, was only extended legally to the soldiers *through* the general, see Chapter 1.

<sup>101</sup> Recovery of Roman captives, Liv. 34.1.6; Polyb. 18.44.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6.

<sup>102</sup> Rome's fear of Eastern powers had an early gestation, but was curbed by the struggle with Carthage, see Eckstein 2012, 90-1; Holleaux 1935, 233f.

only complete narrative is that of Livy.<sup>103</sup> Though Livy drew upon the work of Polybius for this period, the taking of captives in his account is portrayed in his typical fashion; that is, battle casualties without much remark. When the taking of captives is mentioned in the war with Antiochus, it is characteristically only following an open engagement between armies, so that it is difficult to glean any details that could establish the fate of captives.

In Thessaly Philip, now ally of Rome, assisted the Romans in pushing back Antiochus. There the city of Limnaeum surrendered without a fight,<sup>104</sup> followed by Pellinaeum where again a surrender was made and Philip of Megalopolis was captured and sent ‘in chains’ to Rome.<sup>105</sup> Following the capture of these cities, several other Thessalian cities submitted without a fight, along with 4,000 allied and Seleucid troops garrisoned within them.<sup>106</sup> All of these submitted directly to Philip, who had used the captives from Pellinaeum to convince the other cities to capitulate.<sup>107</sup>

Antiochus then occupied the pass at Thermopylae with his main force where he was defeated in battle. Livy notes that many soldiers were captured, and Orosius gives a round figure of 5,000.<sup>108</sup> Meanwhile, the Roman navy under Gaius Livius in 190 BC conducted a raid upon Phocaea and there loaded up the ships with booty, which Livy remarks, included ‘*especially people*.’<sup>109</sup> In the following year, Livy notes the Phocaeans rebelled and the Romans laid siege to the city, a settlement was reached “on the same terms as were granted when they submitted to G. Livius before.”<sup>110</sup> Whilst not expressly clear on what these terms were, the events that follow indicate that they were not enslaved. After a failed plea to Antiochus to intervene, the gates were opened, but the soldiers were angered by the sparing of the Phocaeans who proved treacherous, and they pillaged the city against the general’s orders.

---

<sup>103</sup> Livy books 25-28. Appian’s *Syian Wars* is useful, but with the limitation of its brevity.

<sup>104</sup> Liv. 36.14.1.

<sup>105</sup> Liv. 36.14.5.

<sup>106</sup> Liv. 36.14.5. App. *Syr.* 17 gives a figure of 3,000. The pitiful sizes of these garrisons led to their surrender in sight of Philip’s superior numbers.

<sup>107</sup> Liv. 36.14.5-10 *Philippo tradita regi est*, Philip gained all of Athamania. The cities of Pharsalus and Scotusa and Pherae also surrendered and, save a thousand that volunteered to join Philip, the population was sent ‘unarmed’ (*inermis*) to Demetrias (Liv. 36.14.11).

<sup>108</sup> Liv. 36.19.6. Oros. 4.20.20. The battle is cited by many without mention of captives (App. *Syr.* 18-20; Frontin *Str.* 2.4.4; Plut. *Cat. Mai* 13.1-14.2; Flor. 1.24.11; Eutrop. 4.3.2; Zon. 9.19). In a speech put in the mouth of the Roman commander by Liv. 36.17. 2-16, Manius Acilius Glabrio belittles the value of Antiochus’ forces calling Syrians and Asiatic Greeks ‘born for slavery,’ the intention was to inspire the allied troops in meeting Antiochus head on at the *Gates*.

<sup>109</sup> Liv. 37.12.6 *et praeda maxime hominum raptim in nave imposita tantum moratus*.

<sup>110</sup> Liv. 37.32.9 *potestatem iis dari eadem condicione, qua prius C. Livii in fidem venissent, se tradendi*. The city was opened on the premise that *ne quid hostile paterentur* (Liv. 37.32.10).

Eventually, order was restored and the Phocaeans were restored to their homes and farms, but they had to suffer the presence of the navy in their harbour for the winter.<sup>111</sup> In 190 BC the consul L. Cornelius Scipio (with the added cognomen for his conquest Asiaticus) crossed the Hellespont and defeated Antiochus in the battle of Magnesia.<sup>112</sup> Livy and Appian both suggest that the forces of Antiochus totalled 70,000, of which Livy says more than 50,000 were killed and only 1,400 captured.<sup>113</sup> With the defeat of his navy at Myonnesus and his land forces at Magnesia, Antiochus was forced to sue for peace and accept Roman terms.<sup>114</sup>

With the war concluded against Antiochus, Gn. Manlius Vulso (Scipio's replacement) decided to lead the Romans into central Anatolia against the Galatians since they had supported Antiochus during the war. Up until this point very little booty had been derived from campaigning: the march from Greece to Asia Minor was conducted peacefully,<sup>115</sup> and the battle of Magnesia had been in the field rather than a city, where booty might have been taken. A tribe of the Galatians (the Tolistoboi) had taken refuge on the slopes of Mt. Olympus in Mysia, and there they were attacked and routed by the Roman army under Manlius. The number of captives taken was reported by Appian to be roughly 40,000, but the difficulty of the journey into Mysia, and in particular the track around Olympus, compelled the Romans to turn the captives over to neighbouring barbarians.<sup>116</sup> Livy gives a more detailed account in which Manlius ordered his troops to abstain from plundering the camp so that they might pursue the fleeing Gauls. But the relief column pillaged the Galatian camp and took the spoils that were not earned by them. Livy notes that his sources differ concerning the specific events around Olympus in 189 BC, particularly the precise number of

---

<sup>111</sup> Liv. 37.32.10-14.

<sup>112</sup> Crossed the Hellespont with 20,000 men and 16 elephants (Diod. Sic. 29.5.1; Liv. 37.33.1-7; App. Syr. 29; Zon. 9.20).

<sup>113</sup> Liv. 37.44.2; App. Syr. 36 suggests 50,000 casualties including the dead and prisoners. Of the size of the forces, those of Antiochus are likely exaggerated, the Roman forces seem to be reduced by Livy for a more dramatic victory. Grainger 2002, 314-21 suggests a more evenly sided battle of roughly 50,000 troops each, but this size seems high for the Roman army, given the lack of Greek or Asiatic allies in the land forces of Scipio, and the fact that Manlius was sent with 'significant' reinforcements in the following year in anticipation that the war would continue.

<sup>114</sup> Defeat at Myonnesus (Polyb. 21.12.1-13'.1; Liv. 37.26.1-30.10; Flor. 1.24.12-13; App. Syr. 27). The treaty of Apamea imposed a heavy indemnity on Antiochus and removed all Seleucid control over Greek cities in both Europe and Asia Minor. The cities of Asia Minor were then passed into control of either Pergamum or Rhodes, with Greek cities that had joined Rome prior to Magnesia retaining their autonomy. These cities were not enslaved, but rather passed into the hegemony of either Rhodes or Pergamum, which resulted in a long dispute.

<sup>115</sup> With the help of Philip, whose diplomacy ensured a safe route, the Romans, in turn, behaved themselves on the journey. The journey back, lacking Philip's assistance, was more difficult and the returning army was attacked in Thrace, the booty they were carrying perhaps enticed the raids upon their column (Liv. 38.40.1-41.15; 46.6-9; 49.7-12; App. Mac. 9.5; Syr. 43).

<sup>116</sup> App. Syr. 42.

engagements, but he felt confident enough in estimating that the number of Gauls captured amounted to roughly 40,000. This figure, he says, was inclusive of women and children.<sup>117</sup> Livy does not mention what became of the captives apart from the fact they were guarded under the direction of Manlius' tribunes.<sup>118</sup> A peculiar story concerning a Galatian queen hints at what may have happened. I have already related the story concerning Chimora.<sup>119</sup> Her ransom was recounted by Polybius, who spoke with her directly; though the ransom itself might have been invented, it was a likely enough tale for it to be asserted as an anecdote for greed on the part of the soldier, rather than as a peculiar tale.<sup>120</sup> Whilst her ransom is depicted as a private affair it is likely other captives were ransomed or sold to other Galatians, since Livy relates that the consul "ordered all his troops to bring in the rest of the booty and either sold that part of the booty which it was his duty to convert to public use or carefully distributed it to the soldiers so as to secure the greatest possible measure of equity."<sup>121</sup> As explained earlier,<sup>122</sup> the money converted from the ransom, or auction of captives, was reserved for the state, and it is unlikely that the Romans brought any captives with them across the Hellespont.

While Gn. Manlius was concerning himself with the Gauls, the other consul M. Fulvius was tidying things up in Greece. Having dealt with the mainland, he crossed to Cephalonia where the island's three major cities surrendered.<sup>123</sup> However, the city of Same recanted its surrender and was consequently taken by storm. At Same, Livy states that the inhabitants were sent *sub corona* and the city plundered, their sale into slavery being warranted by their volte-face.<sup>124</sup>

Roman heavy handedness towards Greek cities in the Third Macedonian War was at times censured by the Senate.<sup>125</sup> However, with the questionable support of Perseus, few Greek

---

<sup>117</sup> Liv. 38.23.9.

<sup>118</sup> An odd detail, had they been intended for sale we might expect this to be carried out by the quaestors.

<sup>119</sup> See Chapter 4.

<sup>120</sup> Polyb. 22.21.1. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 258e-f. Flor. 1.27.6 credits Chimora with escaping after beheading the centurion.

<sup>121</sup> Liv. 38.23.10. Loeb trans. *cumulo ceteram praedam conferre omnes iussit, et aut vendidit, quod eius in publicum redigendum erat, aut cum cura ut quam aequissima esset per milites divisit.*

<sup>122</sup> See Chapter 1.

<sup>123</sup> A fourth major city was also on the island, but not mentioned by Livy (cf. Thuc. 2.30. 2; Plin. *HN* 4.54).

<sup>124</sup> Liv. 38.29.11 *sub corona venierunt* (cf. Polyb. 21.40f.).

<sup>125</sup> See Chapter 2.

cities that sided with Macedon could expect a reprieve from the Senate.<sup>126</sup> The Boeotian city of Haliartus was sacked, and inside the soldiers killed all the men and boys they came across; since many of these were non-combatants the troops were evidently killed all males without distinction. At the citadel 2,500 combatants surrendered (*deditio*) and ‘went’ as opposed to being ‘sold’ under the crown.<sup>127</sup> In the same year Perseus’ forces were defeated at Phalana and Livy states 2,800 were captured, with no mention of their sale.<sup>128</sup> In the following year the city of Abdera was taken by Lucretius, there the leaders were beheaded and the rest sold at auction.<sup>129</sup> But the Abderans did not *all* remain in servitude for long, as the Senate ordered them to be recovered.<sup>130</sup> Zonaras suggests that those redeemed by order of the Senate were only recovered from within Italy, and it is unlikely captives sold elsewhere were freed.<sup>131</sup>

With the war against Perseus concluded, it was time for Rome to punish those that had sided against them, and the full extent of a Roman reprisal was felt by Epirus.<sup>132</sup> The example of Epirus in 167 BC is the pinnacle of Roman military enslavement, the figure of 150,000, though impossibly large is often cited as the high watermark of slave acquisition by the Roman armed forces.<sup>133</sup> A closer inspection of the event highlights the absurdity of such a large-scale enslavement. Modern historians have focused on the motivation behind such a singularly brutal act without ever questioning its plausibility.<sup>134</sup> The story is essentially the same in all the sources, who are largely based on the contemporary account of Polybius.

---

<sup>126</sup> Perseus’ success against the Romans in 169 BC led many of the Greeks to support his side. Polyb. 27.9.1-10.4 (particularly 27.10.1) viewed the support of Perseus as a rash decision. This led to the reduction of the Achaean league and Polybius being sent as hostage to Rome; it also served as a prerequisite for the punishment of the Molossians in Epirus, a year after the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War.

<sup>127</sup> Liv. 42.63.10 *sub corona venierunt* is odd. The city of Thisbe (Livy states Thebes, see Bagnall and Derow 2003, 40) was marched upon next, and surrendered, the city was given over to the pro-Roman faction that had been kicked out by supporters of Perseus (Liv. 42.63.12, preserved in a *senatus consultum SIG 646* = Bagnall & Derow 2003, 40), see Sherk 1984, 2. The surrender of the combatants at Haliartus may have led to their preservation with the loss of their property, but it is impossible to say for certain. The confusion of Thebes with Thisbe hints at a possible corruption and the same transcriber may have accidentally recorded *venierunt* instead of *vendiderunt*.

<sup>128</sup> Liv. 42.66.9 Other sources for the battle do not mention the capture of prisoners cf. Polyb. 27.11.1-7; App. *Mac.* 13.

<sup>129</sup> Liv. 43.4.10; Diod. Sic. 30.6f.

<sup>130</sup> See Chapter 2. Other Greek cities allied to Philip were captured and their inhabitants were at times enslaved, any estimate of their numbers is impossible, given the paucity of the sources. Polybius is fragmentary at best, and Livy’s book 43 is considerably briefer than book 42. Liv. *Per.* 43 suggests that more than just Abdera and Haliartus suffered at the hands of L. Crassus. See also Zon. 9.22 and Oros. 4.20.38, who both suggests that a Roman garrison was, in turn, captured in an Illyrian city and sent into Macedon.

<sup>131</sup> Zon. 9.20.

<sup>132</sup> For the political machinations of this see Scullard 1945, 59-64.

<sup>133</sup> Volkmann 1990, 142-3; Boese 1973, 76; Scheidel 2011, 294.

<sup>134</sup> See Oost 1954, 84-6; Scullard 1945, 58-64; Hammond 1967, 635f.; Gruen 1984, 298-9; Ziolkowski 1986, 69-80.

Unfortunately, Polybius' version, as we have it, is confined only to the scholiast's epitome, which simply states that 150,000 Epirotes were reduced to slavery ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι.<sup>135</sup> All the Greek sources that record the event follow Polybius' use of ἐξανδραποδίζω.<sup>136</sup> The manner in which the Epirotes were enslaved was a remarkable feat. On a single day, and within a single hour, 70 cities (chiefly of the Molossians) were duped into bringing their goods into their respective town centres, where they were enslaved by a contingent of soldiers sent to collect the booty in each city.<sup>137</sup> For modern historians, the repetition of this event in detail by many different sources validates it as real. However, the ability of the Roman forces to carry out such an action on the scale and the speed suggested in the sources makes this highly unlikely.<sup>138</sup> Paulus had at his command no more than two legions with allies,<sup>139</sup> at most 20,000 troops (probably closer to 12,000); this would have meant each contingent sent to a city comprised of only 285 men, who would have been responsible, on average, for collecting over 2,100 people together all at once. These figures stretch the limitations for the supervision of slaves, let alone the numbers in order to physically capture and compel so many to servitude. It may be that when Strabo later spoke of the desolation of Epirus, he was referring to the depopulation of the cities rather than from the land itself, the ruins he described suggest the collapse of infrastructure, caused by the removal of a comprehensive administration and the depletion of urban economies, rather than strictly the depletion of the populace.<sup>140</sup>

Not all the sources were adamant that the Epirotes were sold into slavery. Livy states that 150,000 were *abducentur*, as in led or carried away. This of course could mean that they were enslaved as in 'carried off into slavery,' but the fact that Livy strays from his usual

---

<sup>135</sup> Polyb. 30.15.1.

<sup>136</sup> Strab. 7.7.3; Plut. *Aem.* 29.3.

<sup>137</sup> A similar incident is said to have occurred in Spain, where Cato received the submission of all the Celtiberian towns through letters sent at the same time, tricking each city into believing that attack was imminent and so they quickly submitted, see below.

<sup>138</sup> Ignoring the political motivations, we might compare the concentrated violence at Epirus with *Kristallnacht* in November 1938, in which Jewish homes, businesses and Synagogues were targeted by rioters and storm troopers. Over the course of the infamous night and the following day 30,000 German and Austrian Jews were arrested. To get an idea of the scale of the enslavement of the Epirotes, a force significantly smaller than the Germans involved in *Kristallnacht* (Sturmabteilung and other civilian rioters may have exceeded 100,000), without automatic weapons, was apparently able to seize five times as many people, in roughly a tenth of the time.

<sup>139</sup> Brunt 1971, 427-8. I purposely inflate the figures here to illustrate my point; a reduction of the figure only serves to better prove my point.

<sup>140</sup> Strab 7.7.9. The decentralisation of Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire and the subsequent reduction in city sizes illustrates how the collapse of a cohesive political entity can radically alter urban composition across a landscape.

indication of enslavement by stating they were sold, suggests the Epirotes may have been forced to leave the cities and quite possibly emigrate, either to the countryside or outside Epirus.<sup>141</sup> The Elder Pliny remarks that seventy-two cities were plundered and sold, without specific mention of captives.<sup>142</sup> Appian too focuses on the destruction of the cities with no mention of the captives, and Dio cites Paullus' turning over of the Epirote possessions to the troops as a blemish on his character.<sup>143</sup> Livy at least provides a figure for the booty derived from the Epirus incident; he states that the booty was distributed to the soldiers with 400 *denarii* going to cavalrymen and 200 *denarii* to foot soldiers.<sup>144</sup> Roughly 4.8 million *denarii* for a force of 20,000.<sup>145</sup> Had 150,000 captives been sold a price of only 32 *denarii* would have been realised, a considerably small price at the time,<sup>146</sup> and this stipend to the troops was without counting the possessions and money taken from the Epirotes. Boese noted that Delos was made a free port at the same time suggesting the sale of the Epirotes prompted the distinction.<sup>147</sup> However, this was merely coincidence, rather than a response to large numbers of slaves. Many city-states had been re-organised by the Romans following the Macedonian war and the removal of the tax served only to hurt the Rhodians, who Rome grew ever more suspicious of.

Any semblance of true autonomy in Greece was crushed when Rome sent an embassy to arbitrate between Sparta and the Achaean league.<sup>148</sup> The Achaeans were given a choice between submitting to their demand (effectively removing the purpose of their league in collectively managing foreign affairs) or fighting to maintain their autonomy. The terms of the Roman embassy were rejected, and war was declared on Sparta by the Achaeans.<sup>149</sup> Rome, in turn, declared war on the Achaeans.<sup>150</sup> The Roman army crushed the Achaean forces at

<sup>141</sup> Liv. 45.34.5. So too his epitomist Eutrop. 4.8.1, who only mentions the capture of 70 cities. The depopulation of cities had been used before at Capua (see Chapter 6) and would be used in Spain, see below.

<sup>142</sup> Plin. *HN* 4.39 LXXII *urbes direptas vendidit*.

<sup>143</sup> App. *Ill.* 10 suggests the soldiers plundered the cities beyond what the Epirotes brought into their city centres. Cass. Dio 20.67.1. That this event was out of character for Paullus has led some to place the blame solely on the orders of the Senate, cf. Scullard 1945, 58-64; 1973, 213 *contra* Reiter 1988, 139-40.

<sup>144</sup> Liv. 45.34.5-6.

<sup>145</sup> I give 16,000 foot and 4,000 horse for a typical consular army of the time, with allied contingents and bolstered cavalry. This figure could easily be reduced to a more probable 12,000 (2,000 cavalry), but again this would only prove my point further.

<sup>146</sup> We might note that at Carystus the Macedonians were ransomed for 300 *drachmae* each (roughly 360 *denarii*), Liv. 32.17.2. See Ziolkowski 1986, 69-80.

<sup>147</sup> Boese 1973, 76.

<sup>148</sup> Embassy of Sex. Julius Caesar (Polyb. 38.10.1-13; Paus. 7.14.3-4).

<sup>149</sup> Polyb. 38.13.6.

<sup>150</sup> On the pretext of the maltreatment of the embassy under L. Orestes at Corinth Polyb 38.9.1-2; Paus. 7.14.2-3; Liv. *Per.* 51; Vell. Pat. 1.12.1; Flor. 1.32.2; Strab. 6.23; Cass. Dio 1.72.1; Eutrop. 4.14.1.

Scarpheia, and then under the command of L. Mummius, laid siege to the city of Corinth. Most of the inhabitants had fled,<sup>151</sup> but the few remaining were captured, and according to Orosius, these were sold as slaves.<sup>152</sup> Pausanias relates a typical case of the Romans killing those they came across once they broke into the city, before capturing and enslaving the remaining women and children.<sup>153</sup> Given the indication in the sources that the majority of the Corinthians fled the city before the Romans attacked, it is unlikely that those captured and enslaved amounted to more than a few thousand. Once the city was looted and emptied of inhabitants the Senate decreed that it should be demolished.<sup>154</sup>

The nature of Roman warfare in Greece in the first half of the second century BC was not particularly conducive to large-scale enslavements, as booty was shared between Rome and her allies. Furthermore, the political landscape of Greece was such that Rome needed to operate in a manner that would not harden the neutral Greek states against them. The carrying off of Greek slaves to Rome, on a large scale, would have only strengthened the position of Macedon as champions of a 'free Greece' against Rome; an image the Romans sought to produce themselves. For captives taken in war there was the added possibility of redemption, and this occurred on a more regular basis in Greece than anywhere else. The Eastern Mediterranean already contained an extensive slave trade network, whereby a sudden injection of thousands of captives on the market could be absorbed rather than transferred *en bloc* to Rome. Greece itself, though not on the scale of classical Athens, was still a large consumer of slaves. From the above survey and analysis it is evident that the practice of enslavement by the Romans did not increase significantly, either in regularity or quantity, during the first half of the second century BC.

### **Wars in Northern Italy and Spain**

Rome's fighting in the West during the second century BC was primarily directed against Spanish tribes and the Celts in Northern Italy. With a resounding victory over the Boii in 191

---

<sup>151</sup> Paus. 7.16.8; Flor. 1.32.5; Cass. Dio 21.72.2fr.

<sup>152</sup> Oros. 5.3.6 *reliqua sub corona uendita est*.

<sup>153</sup> Paus. 7.16.8.

<sup>154</sup> *CIL* 1.626; Diod. Sic. 32.27.1; Flor. 1.32.1; Paus. 7.16.8-10; Polyb. 39.3.3; Strab. 8.381; Zon. 9.31. See also Cic. *Agr.* 2.87; *CIL* 1.630; Oros. 5.3.1; Plin. *HN.* 34.6; Plut. *Mor.* 737a. Corinth was later the site of a Roman colony established by Caesar in 44 BC (Cass. Dio 43.50.3-5; Diod. Sic. 32.27.1; Paus. 2.1.1; Plin. *HN.* 4.10; Plut. *Caes.* 57.8; Strab. 8.379).



BC,<sup>155</sup> conflict in sub-Alpine Italy commonly took the form of rebellion, such as those of the Ligurians and Histrians. In these conflicts a number of captives were enslaved as punishment for their uprising. The first example of this punishment was in 185 BC, the consul Appius Claudius captured six Ingaunian towns and made a number of men prisoner, executing the ringleaders of the rebellion.<sup>156</sup> Four years later, Aemilius Paullus was sent against the Ligurians, whom he soundly defeated, capturing 2,500 of them and by this action compelled the Ingaunians to submit to Rome.<sup>157</sup> In 178 BC the Romans went to war with the Histrians, against whom the first major engagement was at Nesattium, where the consul Ti. Claudius Pulcher took the city. The Histrians struck down their own women and children to deny them from being taken by the enemy as an act of defiance, of the remainder Livy says they were captured with no further details.<sup>158</sup> From Nesattium the towns of Mutila and Faveria were decisively captured by Claudius Pulcher with 5,632 captives sold at auction and again the ringleaders were executed.<sup>159</sup> The precision of this figure hints at truth, or at least a concern for an exact figure in Livy's unknown source. These captives likely ended up in Rome, as their proximity would have allowed easy transport to markets there.<sup>160</sup> It is possible that this precise figure was that recorded in application for, or as the number present in, the triumph of Claudius Pulcher.<sup>161</sup> The fighting in the North of Italy was intense enough for two further triumphs to be gained after that of Pulcher's.<sup>162</sup> The Ligurians were finally subdued in 173 BC, when the consul M. Popilius defeated them in a land engagement killing over 10,000 and capturing 700 prisoners;<sup>163</sup> the remaining 10,000 surrendered in hope of being spared, but were sold by the consul.<sup>164</sup> The Senate, however, found Popilius had instigated the fight against a tribe (the Statellati) that had not taken up arms, and he was ordered to restore them along with their property.<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>155</sup> Liv. 36.38.6 3,400 *capta*, no mention of their fate.

<sup>156</sup> Liv. 39.32.4.

<sup>157</sup> Liv. 40.28.6 *capta*, no mention of the captive's fate.

<sup>158</sup> Liv. 41.11.7 *capta aut occisi*. We might compare the mass suicide with that of the Numantines in 133 BC, App. *Iber.* 97; Diod. Sic. 34.4.1; Liv. *Per.* 59; Val. Max. 3.2.7.

<sup>159</sup> Liv. 41.11.8 *sub corona vendere*. The towns were destroyed.

<sup>160</sup> Istria, south of modern Venice.

<sup>161</sup> Degrassi 1954, 103.

<sup>162</sup> Degrassi 1954, 104.

<sup>163</sup> Liv. 41.12.8.

<sup>164</sup> Liv. 42.8.3. cf. Polyb. 27.11.1-7; App. Mac. 13; Oros. 4.20.30-2. Again the round figure of 10,000 be doubted as it was only used to signify a large victory, see Chapter 5.

<sup>165</sup> Liv. 42.8.7, see Chapter 2. Imperial governments are often drawn into conflict by the overzealous actions of their agents in the field. Such was the case of French expansion in Africa, see Porch 1982; 2005.

The lack of clarity in regards to the fate of captives makes it impossible to make a reliable quantitative analysis of the slaves acquired through warfare in Northern Italy at this time. The numbers of captives taken were generally small. Apart from the 10,000 Ligurians (a questionable figure in the first place) who were ordered to be recovered, the largest figure given is the precise 5,632 captured by Pulcher. Although it is likely most of the captives that were sold as slaves ended up in Rome (considering its proximity to the theatre), their overall numbers could not have been as large and certainly only a fraction of later conflicts in the area.<sup>166</sup>

The fighting in Spain resembled that of suppression, as it did in Northern Italy, but it was accompanied by punitive aggression into the Iberian heartland and westwards into modern Portugal, resulting in a more consistent presence of Roman troops into the Meseta and a clearer and more pronounced assertion of authority over the Lusitanians and Celtiberians beyond the coastal provinces.<sup>167</sup> The areas on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, namely Andalucía, Murcia, Valencia and Catalonia had been transformed into a Roman province after their acquisition in the Second Punic War from Carthage.<sup>168</sup> In 199 BC Roman Spain was divided into two provinces with annual praetors as governors.<sup>169</sup> In contrast to the East, Roman military presence was continuous with typically four legions split between the provinces.<sup>170</sup> With the removal of Carthage the political situation in Spain shifted, from one of a divided allegiance between two foreign powers, in which Iberian tribes were autonomous allies, to sudden disarmament and the loss of their autonomy in controlling their own external affairs. At least this was how the Romans saw the relationship, but it is unlikely the Iberian tribes, particularly of the interior fully understood Rome's control over them. Most wars in Spain during the second century BC can be viewed in the context of imperial exertion on the part of the Romans and resistance on the part of the Iberians. This resulted in repeated

<sup>166</sup> Most notably the capture of defeated Teutones and Cimbri by Marius in 102 and 101 BC. 60-80,000 at Aquae Sextiae in 102 BC (Dio. Cass. 94.1; Eutrop. 5.1; Flor. 1.38.15; Liv. *Per.* 68; Oros. 5.16.20; Plut. *Mar.* 21.2; Polyæn. 8.10.3) also 8,000 are said to have been captured before the major engagement (Flor. 1.38.15; Oros. 5.16.12) and a further 60,000 at Vecellae in 101 BC (Eutrop. 5.2; Liv. *Per.* 68; Oros. 5.16.21; Plut. *Mar.* 27.3).

<sup>167</sup> For Wiseman 1956, 16 the expansion into these areas was a conscious decision by the Romans to reach the clear geographical boundaries for empire (i.e. the whole Iberian peninsula, the Elbe, the Tigris and Britain). Such a theory of a coherent 'grand-strategy' was forwarded by Luttwak 1976 *passim*, whose theory of a planned and consistent empire-wide expansion was rejected in favour of ad-hoc responses to regional demands by Mann 1979 *passim*, cf. Whittaker 1989 23-50; Fulford 1992, 294-305.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Curchin 1991, 28-9; Wiseman 1956, 17.

<sup>169</sup> Hispania Ulterior and Citerior. See Jashcmski 1950, 41 -7; McDonald 1953, 143-4. This was an important constitutional change in favour of administering a territorial empire by increasing the number of praetors from four to six.

<sup>170</sup> Both Afzelius 1944, 40-1 and Brunt 1971, 423 argued that this was reduced to two legions from 179 BC.

campaigns to subdue various Iberian tribes and repetitive insurrection once the Romans left. Even after regular military resistance was crushed by Rome, guerrilla warfare continued on the peninsula, as result, Spain was the first permanent posting of legions outside of Italy.<sup>171</sup> The constant fighting on the peninsula made it a particularly fertile ground for aspiring commanders and politicians.<sup>172</sup>

A presence following the Second Punic War was necessitated by a large uprising in 197 BC, which resulted in the defeat of the army in Hispania Ulterior and the death of the praetor C. Tuditanus.<sup>173</sup> As a response, two praetors were sent with a reinforcing legion each to strengthen the garrison in Hispania Citerior and to quell the rebellion in Hispania Ulterior.<sup>174</sup> During the rebellion, there is no mention of enslavements by the Romans, but the situation may have been too critical to employ an aggressive strategy that would have allowed for the capture of prisoners. By 195 BC the situation was deemed critical enough for the consul, the Elder Cato, to be assigned Spain.<sup>175</sup> Following his first defeat of the rebels near Emporiae,<sup>176</sup> Cato delivered a speech to his troops suggesting a manifest control beyond the traditional coastal areas, over which he would “compel this nation... to accept again the yoke which it had cast off.”<sup>177</sup> Despite the reference to the yoke, there is no mention of the enslavement of captives following Cato’s victory at Emporiae; Roman strategy in Spain was initially to gain submission through force of arms only, rather than punish through enslavement. Cato followed up his victory with an invasion of Celtiberia (comprising Modern Castilla La Mancha and Castilla y Leon), and there he received the submission of several tribes.<sup>178</sup> It is only after a second insurrection by the same people that they were punished with slavery; Livy relates that all of these were sent under the crown.<sup>179</sup> Cato campaigned rigorously in Spain up to 193 BC,<sup>180</sup> and he is said to have bragged that he captured more cities than he

<sup>171</sup> First emphasised by Mommsen 1887 III, 220-1.

<sup>172</sup> Cato the Elder, Tib. Gracchus (the elder), Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Nasica all held commands in Spain.

<sup>173</sup> Liv. 33.21.6-9; App. *Hisp.* 39. Defeat of Romans and the death of Tuditanus (Liv. 33.25.9; Val. Max. 3.7.1; Oros. 4.20.10). For the limitations of Livy regarding the scope of the rebellion see Briscoe 1973, 290.

<sup>174</sup> Liv. 33.26.1-4. The praetor Cn Cornelius Blasio was awarded an *ovatio*, (Degrassi 1954, 102. Liv. 33.27.1-5). Cf. Harris 1989, 122 *contra* Briscoe 1973, 299.

<sup>175</sup> Cato arrived at Emporiae in 195 BC (Liv. 34.9.1-13.3; Plin *HN.* 14.91; App. *Hisp.* 39-40; Zon. 9.17).

<sup>176</sup> App. *Hisp.* 40; Liv. 34.16.2-3; Zon. 9.17.

<sup>177</sup> Liv. 34.13.10 *temere quam constanter bellantemiugum quo se exuit accipere rursus cogatis.*

<sup>178</sup> Liv. 34.16.4-9.

<sup>179</sup> Liv. 34.16.10 *sub corona veniere omnes.* It seems less likely that many of these slaves would have entered Italy, as pointed out by Mommsen 1887 III, 220 the Romans had difficulty in transporting their troops, and this difficulty would have applied to traders as well. The trade in slaves could just as easily have been conducted in Gaul, Africa and Spain itself.

<sup>180</sup> For Cato’s own claims see *ORF* 40; 41.

spent days there.<sup>181</sup> Despite this, there is no further mention of captives being enslaved by him; this was likely due to the nature of the conflict which was geared towards suppression rather than territorial acquisition, but it could also be attributable to the deficiency in Livy who is concerned primarily with events in the East for this period.<sup>182</sup>

The effectiveness of Cato's command in Spain, though overstated by Cato himself and Livy, was enough for the Senate to hold off from sending another consul as replacement.<sup>183</sup> Since Cato's raid into Celtiberia was enough to end the threat in the Spanish interior, his replacement, the praetor P. Scipio Nasica waged a campaign in modern Portugal against the Lusitanians. This culminated in a large pitched battle near Ilipa in which Livy states 12,000 were killed and 5,400 captured, with no further mention of their fate.<sup>184</sup> The success of the Spanish guerrilla tactics forced Aemilius Paulus to gather an emergency force to meet the Lusitanians in 189 BC, where again Livy refrains from details other than stating that 2,300 were captured.<sup>185</sup>

In 184 BC the Romans eventually took the offensive and laid siege to Suessetarian Corbio. According to Livy the praetor Aulus Terentius captured (*expugno*) the city and sold the captives.<sup>186</sup> No sooner had the tribes of Hispania Ulterior been suppressed when the Celtiberians took up arms again and raided Roman territory in Hispania Citerior. As a response, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the praetor of Citerior, invaded the Celtiberian heartland.<sup>187</sup> There he captured and destroyed (*direpta*) the city of Urbicna, from which the booty was given to the troops.<sup>188</sup> Whilst there is no mention of captives, it is likely that this victory produced at least some slaves, since the city was destroyed and all the wealth carried off. The fact that the Roman army then retired to winter quarters suggests that they could deal with the reduction of any captives at their leisure, and many of the refugees from a destroyed city would have found slavery their only recourse for survival. In 181 BC Flaccus, whose

---

<sup>181</sup> Plut. *Cat. mai.* 10.3.

<sup>182</sup> Livy was following the history of Polybius in this focus. For Livy's sources concerning Spain, including Cato, see Astin 1978, 302-7; Briscoe 1981, 63-4.

<sup>183</sup> Cato celebrated a triumph for his achievements in Spain, see Degrassi 1954, 102. Trouble brewing in the North of Italy by the Boii also called for the attention of a consular army under Scipio Nasica (Liv. 36.39.3; Oros. 4.20.21; Zon. 9.19).

<sup>184</sup> Liv. 35.1.10 *capti*.

<sup>185</sup> Liv. 37.57.5 *capti*.

<sup>186</sup> Liv. 39.42.1 *captivos vendidit*.

<sup>187</sup> Harris 1989, 125 suggests that a raid was clearly the intent of the Senate at this point because Flaccus' army was strongly reinforced and two ex-praetors were assigned to it as military tribunes (cf. Liv. 40.1.7).

<sup>188</sup> Liv. 40.16.4-11.

command was prorogued for another year, fought a significant field engagement against the Celtiberians, capturing around 4,000.<sup>189</sup>

For the year 180 BC it was decided to send a consul to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was assigned the province. However, he was late in arriving and the praetor Flaccus met a Celtiberian army and defeated it with heavy losses, Livy reports 17,000 killed and 3,700, specifically ‘captured alive.’<sup>190</sup> After Gracchus assumed command of the army, the Roman camp was attacked by the Celtiberians, but these were so thoroughly repulsed that the Romans ended up seizing their camp, taking 320 captives.<sup>191</sup> After this the Romans perused and engaged the Celtiberians outside the city of Alce taking several more prisoner.<sup>192</sup> With all resistance crushed, the Romans took the city capturing several nobles, who sought refuge within its walls; this clarification suggests that these were taken as hostages or reserved for triumph.<sup>193</sup> Gracchus’ suppression of the Celtiberians culminated in the final year of his command in 178 BC at a major battle at Egravia where 22,000 of the enemy were killed and a paltry 300 captured, again these were likely reserved for the triumph.<sup>194</sup> Gracchus’ victories were enough to temporarily subdue the Celtiberians until they again rescinded and raided Roman territory in 175 BC. As a response, Ap. Claudius was sent against them, and he soundly defeated them in a major engagement in which 15,000 were either killed or captured.<sup>195</sup> With this last act of resistance quashed, Spain would remain quiet until a brief revolt by the Lusitanians and Celtiberians in the late 150’s BC.<sup>196</sup>

As in Northern Italy the number of prisoners captured was considerably smaller than those noted either in the East or especially in the engagements fought during the second Punic War. For the instances in which captives are said to have been taken, Livy was reluctant to state that they were sold *en masse*, and Cato’s campaigns, in particular, stand out as having produced very few slaves.<sup>197</sup> The number of troops Rome could (or was willing to) commit to

<sup>189</sup> 4,700 (Liv. 40.32.6); 4,000 (Oros. 4.20.31).

<sup>190</sup> Liv. 40.40.11 *vivi capti*.

<sup>191</sup> Liv. 40.48.7 *capti vivi*.

<sup>192</sup> Liv. 40.49.4 no specific figure.

<sup>193</sup> Liv. 40.49.4 *multi captivi nobiles*. Hostages were often marched in triumphs, see Allen 2012, 96-101.

<sup>194</sup> Liv. 40.50.4, see Degrassi 1954, 103.

<sup>195</sup> Liv. 41.26.5. This victory was enough to *quieti deinde paruerunt imperio*.

<sup>196</sup> Three instances of captures here resulting in the sparing of 5,000 Celtiberians (App. *Hisp.* 50), along with the infamous massacre of Lusitanians at Cauca (App. *Hisp.* 52), where Cato brought charges to impeach Galba, see Wiseman 1956, 18-9. Also the capture, and possibly the enslavement, of many Lusitanians encircled on a hill (App. *Hisp.* 59). For a history of Rome’s later military involvement in Spain see Simon 1962 and Keay 1988.

<sup>197</sup> Only at Liv. 34.16.10, see above.

Spain was not great enough to handle a full blown rebellion in concurrence with another major conflict. Even if we are to accept Livy's statement that the whole of Spain was rebellious as an exaggeration, it is clear that the situation was critical enough to require a consular army in order to significantly bolster their military presence.<sup>198</sup> Roman policy regarding the treatment of captives in Spain, was reactive and often lenient. In examples where we are not expressly told that the captives were enslaved we may infer that the Romans probably treated the defeated with some leniency, choosing to punish particular firebrands, so as to prevent a large scale popular uprising against them. Rome's hesitance in enslaving can also be seen in their choice to garrison often with small forces over a large and spread out area. As Robert Knapp showed, this garrison policy was implemented during the Second Punic War and certainly continued well into the second century.<sup>199</sup> Furthermore, a concern to spread out the burden of garrisons would be odd if they were equally uncaring of carpet punishments for whole populaces; a desire to reduce friction between the Roman army and the Iberian populace is clearly evident. Rome's desire to occupy Spain was clear in the foundation of an auxiliary colony at Luscutana (from slaves of the Hastenses) and in the first overseas colony founded by Tiberius Gracchus in 179 BC.<sup>200</sup>

The Senate and by extension the provincial governors were not concerned with the direct administration of financial exploitation. The spoils, including captives,<sup>201</sup> were a by-product of conquest, but beyond this the only financial extraction from Spain (at least not on a personal level) was fixed stipends.<sup>202</sup> The obvious wealth was of course through precious metal deposits, particularly in Andalusia, which had first attracted the Carthaginians to Spain. It has been an easy assertion that these mines were conveniently worked by the captives taken in Spain.<sup>203</sup> Diodorus' observation that Italian businessmen bought up slaves to work the mines does *not* indicate that the slaves were war captives.<sup>204</sup> Given the evidence, it is likely

---

<sup>198</sup> Liv. 34.11.6 see also App. *Hisp.* 40.

<sup>199</sup> For a detailed overview of these possible garrisons see Knapp 1977, 16-19.

<sup>200</sup> Liv *Per.* 41. Possibly another at Iliturgis, see Keay 1988, 32; Knapp 1977, 19.

<sup>201</sup> Curchin 2004, 137.

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Wisemann 1956, 18-9.

<sup>203</sup> Notably by Mangas 1971, 109 and Blázquez Martínez 1987, 556 who suggested the 40,000 slaves (according to Polybius preserved in Strab. 3.2.10) employed in the mines outside of Carthago Nova were war captives, see also Westermann 1955, 72. But, there is no actual evidence of this, see Haley 1991, 94 n. 295; Curchin 2004, 137. Strabo does not specify that the miners were slaves only ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>204</sup> Diod. Sic. 5.36.4, see Rickard 1928, 130-1. The mines were operated by *publican*, perhaps as early as 195 BC, when Cato the elder granted contracts to collect tax from the iron and silver mines (Liv. 34.21.7), cf. Gruen 1992, 300 n. 64 for further references to modern debates. Domergue 1990, 247 has argued that the mining operations in Spain were initially conducted privately and on a small scale, for an extensive analysis of the transference from private to public hands see Hirt 2010, 274-83.

that the mines were worked primarily by locals (free or slave) and by *damnati ad metallum*, rather than *servi publici*.<sup>205</sup> Leonard Curchin has suggested that many of the captives enslaved in Spain were transported to Italy, although he admits a lack in supporting evidence for this.<sup>206</sup> Curchin's belief is based on the understanding that the Roman countryside was devoid of workers and thus needed slaves; a need to identify a work force for the mines has also led scholars to leap to a similar conclusion.

### Sardinia and the Destruction of Carthage

Outside of Spain, Sardinia also suffered a renewed interest by Rome.<sup>207</sup> In 177 BC Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was sent to bring the island to heel.<sup>208</sup> According to Livy, after several actions, 15,000 of the enemy were killed and the island fully submitted.<sup>209</sup> Livy makes no mention of the enslavement of captives at this point, but concludes his forty-first book by recording an inscription set up in the temple of Mater Matuta by Gracchus commemorating his victory in Sardinia. In the inscription, Gracchus is credited with either killing or capturing 80,000 Sardinians.<sup>210</sup> The inscription does not explicitly indicate that these captives were enslaved and any such conclusion must be inferred from the (probably later) phrase *Sardi venales* literally Sardinian slaves,<sup>211</sup> but interpreted as the expression 'cheap as a Sardinian.' Plutarch gives an alternative meaning, stating that the phrase was popular during the Capitoline games and that somehow this was a throwback to when the Veians fought against Romulus, who were archaically known as Lydians with their city named Sardis rather than Veii.<sup>212</sup> Plutarch's theory for the origin of this phrase is discredited, in part because of his historical inaccuracy in attributing the sack of Veii by the Romans to Romulus' time.<sup>213</sup> The phrase may also be in reference to the later re-subjugation of Sardinia by the younger

<sup>205</sup> See Haley 1991, 294; Hirt 2010, 97-8. That the mines were worked by local slaves is argued by Domergue and Hérail, 1978 252; Haley 1991, 95. For further references see Haley 1991, 295 n. 296.

<sup>206</sup> Churchin 2004, 137.

<sup>207</sup> The Carthaginians had ceded the island to Rome in 238 BC under threat of renewed war, the island had mutinied under Carthage's unpaid mercenaries (App. *Hisp.* 4; *Pun.* 2-5; Polyb. 1.88.11-12; Liv. 21.1.5; Strab. 5,225; Zon. 8.18).

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Smith 1955, 59.

<sup>209</sup> Liv. 41.17.1-2.

<sup>210</sup> Liv. 41.21.8 *caesa aut capta supra octoginta milia*.

<sup>211</sup> Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 57; Cic. *Ad Fam.* 7.24; Fest. Lindsay 1913, 322 (=Sinnius Capito *Gramatica* 20fr.). The phrase is also used as a heading in the fragmentary *Menippean Satire* of Varro 449t.

<sup>212</sup> Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 53.

<sup>213</sup> Liv. 6.21-3 places the sack in 396 BC.

Tiberius Gracchus in 138 BC.<sup>214</sup> In either case, a low regard for the value of Sardinian slaves is poor evidence for the mass enslavement of the island.

The damage inflicted on Italian soil during the Second Punic War left an indelible mark upon the Roman psyche so that, even when the Carthaginians were weakened to the point that they would never recover beyond Africa, there was always a strong movement amongst the Romans to finish Carthage off. No one called for the destruction of Carthage more than the Elder Cato who personally visited Carthage as an ambassador and saw first hand what he believed to be significant militarisation.<sup>215</sup> Eventually, this doctrine of destruction won out and the Romans went to war for a third and final time with Carthage, and once Carthage was taken it was utterly destroyed by orders of the Senate.<sup>216</sup> As Nicholas Purcell has shown, the Corinth and especially Carthage symbolically evoked the paradigm of Troy, and the symmetrical destruction of these was as much *literally* inevitable given their preceding history as it was competition with Rome.<sup>217</sup> The Third Punic War was a brief and one-sided affair and there were only two major engagements, both of which resulted in the taking of captives. The Carthaginians under Hasdrubal met the Romans in a field battle outside the city of Nepharis in 147 BC. Appian, who is our only extant source for the battle, states that 70,000 of the Carthaginians were killed and a further 10,000 were taken captive.<sup>218</sup> Afterwards, the Romans took the enemy's camp along with the city of Nepharis, from which we may assume at least some captives were taken. The victory at Nepharis was strategically significant because it cut off all support for Carthage by land, and with the Roman navy blockading the two ports, Carthage was effectively sealed off from any would be aid. The isolation of Carthage compelled the other major cities in the area to submit. Often the submission of cities on their own accord was motivated by the treatment of a previously captured city; in this case Nepharis, where they were either released or enslaved. Given the lenient treatment of the Carthaginians in the following year, it is unlikely those at Nepharis

<sup>214</sup> Cf. *s.v. Ludi 'Capitolini'* Smith 1875.

<sup>215</sup> Cato supposedly called for the destruction of Carthage after every public speech *Carthago delenda est* (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27). The rise in Carthage's prosperity was enough for them to attempt to pay the indemnity (spread over 50 years) in advance after only a few years (Liv. 36.4.7), this was refused. In either 152 or 153 BC Cato was sent along with other Roman ambassadors to arbitrate between Carthage and their Numidian neighbours (App. *Lib.* 69; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 26). The ambassadors were struck by Carthage's prosperity and growth in their infrastructure to facilitate war, Liv. *Per.* 47. See further Lancel 1995, 410f.

<sup>216</sup> App. *Pun.* 135; Zon. 9.30; Vell. Pat. 1.12.5; Flor. 1.31.18. the sack of Carthage is also mentioned by Cic. *Agr.* 2.51; Polyb. 39.8.6; Dig. 7.4.21; Jerome *Hieron. Chron.* 1871.

<sup>217</sup> Purcell 1995, 133-48.

<sup>218</sup> App. *Pun.* 126. See also Zon. 9.30 and Liv. *Per.* 51.



were enslaved, and considering the lack of detail regarding their fate it is less likely that they were treated in any exceptional manner.

With the Carthaginian army defeated, Scipio Aemilianus went about laying siege to the city where Hasdrubal and a few nobles had fled from Nepharis. Appian provides the most consistent account of the siege, which can be summarised in three stages: the initial siege of the walls, the battle for entrance into the fortified district of Byrsa and the final act of defiance in the temple of Aesculapius by the last holdouts amongst the defenders.<sup>219</sup> It was after the gruesome taking of the district of Byrsa, and a brief siege of the citadel, that the majority of the Carthaginians surrendered to the Romans. According to Appian 50,000 men and women surrendered to the Romans and these were furnished with a guard.<sup>220</sup> Orosius states that first 25,000 wives (*mulieri*) submitted, followed by 35,000 men. Florus puts the figure at 36,000 but states that his sources believed these to have been led by Hasdrubal, a detail which he finds less than credible.<sup>221</sup> The fact that a guard was furnished for the surrendering civilians in Appian's account suggests they were released, and there is no indication in the other sources that these were sold.<sup>222</sup> Appian states that Scipio later gave up the city to be pillaged by the soldiers, with only the gold, silver and temple votives being reserved for deposit with the state. He importantly neglects to mention the sale of captives.<sup>223</sup> The amount of silver listed as being carried in the triumph was far too small had the captives been sold as slaves.<sup>224</sup> In fact, Zonaras is explicit in stating that only a few of the captured nobles were inevitably sold and some others died during their incarceration.<sup>225</sup>

Even in the dominant seat of empire, Rome by the mid second century BC had not yet developed a consistent strategy in asserting control over conquered areas. In Italy an incorporation of conquered communities into Rome's army ensured Roman suzerainty through shared interest in future conquest. Outside of Italy the aims of Rome were less clear, overseas expansion was distinctly *ad hoc* in design, as Roman foreign policy was reactive

<sup>219</sup> For the siege of Carthage up to its eventual destruction App. *Pun.* 126-135.

<sup>220</sup> App. *Pun.* 130.

<sup>221</sup> Flor. 1.31.16. Florus suggests this was unlikely given the tradition that Hasdrubal surrendered himself, while his wife chose to commit suicide along with their children, a few last defenders and the Roman deserters (App. *Pun.* 131. Liv. *Per.* 51. Flor. 1.31.17. Zon. 9.30).

<sup>222</sup> *Contra* Harris 1989, 160. When guards were furnished, it was only then by treachery that the populace was enslaved, e.g. Lucullus at Cauca (App. *Hisp.* 52) and the Jews marched from Tericheae to Tiberias (Joseph. *BJ.* 3.339-341). A Guard over captives was necessary to protect them from abuse by the common soldiers.

<sup>223</sup> App. *Pun.* 130 καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἐφυλάσσοντο.

<sup>224</sup> 4,370 lbs of silver (Plin. *HN* 33.141, cf. App. *Pun.* 135), see Astin 1967, 342.

<sup>225</sup> Zon. 9.30.

## Chapter 6

and piecemeal rather than the consequence of a predetermined strategy. One major result of this haphazard expansion was the lack of a clear motivation for the enslavement of captives. There is no evidence that the Romans enslaved captives with the intention to supply their economy with cheap labour.<sup>226</sup> Despite a disparate approach to imperialism across the various theatres, and throughout the wars of the mid Republic, there is a certain consistency in the enslavement of captives. Enslavements generally occurred in the early stages of major conflicts and when cities were particularly defiant, requiring a lengthy siege - or were rebellious. The desire for empire was displayed most in the destruction of political autonomy rather than the enslavement of individuals by the Romans. Most illustrative of this is the destruction of Carthage and Corinth, neither of which resulted in the enslavement of entire populations, but rather the annihilation of their existence as a political identity, and it has been put forward here that it was also the case for the Epirotes in 167 BC.

---

<sup>226</sup> Harris 1980, 124 only gives the example of a reduced tariff on slaves (*CIL* 8.4508) in support of a conscious effort on the part of the state to affect the slave supply. With regards to acquisition through warfare he questions the financial motives behind trans-Danube/Rhine conquests and the conquest of Britain along with occasional frontier raids.

## Chapter 7

### *Markets, Merchants and Transports*

Rome was not the only destination for slaves, as the theatres of war spread further from Rome the slaves thus acquired entered a more complex web of world markets. Several examples of large numbers of Romans being enslaved abroad testify to extensive slave systems outside of Italy.<sup>1</sup> This was especially so in the Eastern Mediterranean where the Roman demand for slaves competed with the already pre-existing markets of the Aegean, Syria and Anatolia.<sup>2</sup> Specific and permanent markets were certainly not the only means of processing captives, as the market patterns of Italy demonstrate, temporary and calendar markets operated throughout the Mediterranean,<sup>3</sup> and it is important to note that the transfer of slaves did not predicate markets *specific* to their sale. Larger urban centres may have had more permanent markets, and smaller towns and villages may have been visited by travelling merchants who at least carried some slaves.<sup>4</sup> Overall the archaeological evidence for the sale and transport of large numbers of captives is limited, this is in part due to the limited nature of the surviving material, but it may also indicate that large numbers of captives were not ‘disposed’ of in the manner typically suggested by the written sources and interpreted by modern historians. What follows is an analysis of the practical application of trade and transport as pertaining to the transmittance of war captives.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 3. Specifically in the East: 1,200 Romans recovered in Achaia in 194BC (Liv. 34.50.3-7); in Crete (Liv. 37.60.3); many held by Antiochus in Asia Minor (Polyb. 21.43.10; 38.38.7).

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of specific markets in these areas see Harris 1980, 126-30, see also Trumper 2009, 34-74. Most notable markets date to the late republic and the imperial periods.

<sup>3</sup> Market patterns see MacMullen 1970, 33-41; Gabba 1975, 141-63; Andraeu 1978, 104-26; De Ligt 1993, 61-71. Harris 1980, 126 n. 87 cites the example of Baetocaece in Syracuse which held a twice-monthly market *OGIS* 262= *IGLS* 4028. Garland 1988, 54 has suggested that a slave market was set up in the *agora* at Athens once a month, based on Arist. *Kn.* 43. Rihll 2012, 72 is sceptical of this interpretation.

<sup>4</sup> Harris 1980, 126; Scheidel 2011, 301-2.

## Markets

The existence of slave markets is irrefutable, but beyond this very little can be said with any certainty. Our evidence for slave markets is sparse and fleeting, as a topic of consideration it is virtually non-existent in narrative histories and we find only the setting of slave markets and the character of the dealer in comedies; the latter, although fictional, gives us a unique insight into the practice of slave dealing.<sup>5</sup> Even in encyclopaedic works such as Strabo's *Geographica* we find very little mention of slave markets apart from the extraordinary traffic in slaves at Delos.<sup>6</sup>

The thin evidence for slave markets makes it difficult for modern historians to come to any justifiable conclusions regarding the trade. Polybius states that Prusias I of Bithynia purchased the area around Byzantium so as to protect the slave trade from the Black Sea out of which an active trade of slaves entering Greece had taken place since the archaic period.<sup>7</sup> Onomastic evidence supports an extensive trade in near eastern slaves to Attica from the classical period and Herodotus identified Ephesus and Sardis as places where a eunuch dealer sold his slaves.<sup>8</sup> Varro's remark on the naming of slaves suggests that Ephesus continued to have a major slave market well into the first century BC.<sup>9</sup> Like Byzantium, Ephesus, Delos and even landlocked Sardis, the few places identified as focal points of the slave trade were key trading posts, making them ideally situated for *any* commodity, not just slaves.<sup>10</sup> Specific markets that have been identified through archaeology as purveying slaves typically date to later periods than this study. The first phase of building at the Agora of the Italians in Delos for example is the earliest major slave market that has been identified, and has been dated to the late second century BC.<sup>11</sup> Strabo is quite clear that its importance as a slave selling centre stemmed from the rampant piracy of the area rather than from warfare.<sup>12</sup> F. Hugh Thompson noted that after the sack of Delos by pirates in 88 and again in 69 BC, and the subsequent

<sup>5</sup> Typical in Plautus, cf. Stace 1968, 64-77. Lucian portrays the sale of philosophers by Zeus and Hermes in his *Vitarum auctio*, for how elements within this comedy may have reflected real life sales, see Bradley 1992, 125-38. Likewise a fictitious slave market is portrayed in a mural described by Petron. *Sat.* 29.

<sup>6</sup> Specifically the *σταταρίον* attributed to the Agora of the Italians (Strab. 14.5f.).

<sup>7</sup> Polyb. 4.50.2-3. For the slave trade from the Black Sea, see Finley 1962, 53; Braund and Tsetschladze 1989, 114-25. For references relating to other 'barbarian' regions connected with the Greek slave trade see Lewis 2011, 91-2.

<sup>8</sup> Hdt. 8.105. For the trade in slaves from the Near East see Lewis 2011, 91-113.

<sup>9</sup> Varro *Ling.* 8.21. Cf. Finley 1962, 55.

<sup>10</sup> Bruneau 1988, 41-52 highlights the centrality of Delos as the basis of its prominence in the slave trade and earlier in the trade of precious metals.

<sup>11</sup> Coarelli 2005, 210 suggests that the first building phase dates to the 120s BC. Cf. Trümper 2009, 37f.

<sup>12</sup> Strab. 14.5f.

suppression of the Cilician pirate's activities in the Aegean, the slave centres of Asia Minor filled the void.<sup>13</sup>

Archaeological excavations have also revealed the possible locations of slave markets at Magnesia-on-Menander and Phrygian Acmonia dating to the first century BC,<sup>14</sup> at Sardis based on a recycled dedication to the patrons of the slave-market (late first century AD)<sup>15</sup> and the *Serapeum* in Ephesus which was unlikely to have been earlier than the mid first century AD given a dedication of a *statarium* there.<sup>16</sup> Other possible markets identified in the West have been dated to the imperial period; the only dateable evidence found at Lepcis Magna suggests the first century AD,<sup>17</sup> likewise the *Tempio Rotondo* in Ostia has been identified by Elizabeth Fentress as an early first century AD market.<sup>18</sup> To these may be added the *Eumachia* at Pompeii,<sup>19</sup> the Basilica in Herculaneum,<sup>20</sup> and the Crypta Balbi in Rome,<sup>21</sup> as possible slave markets, all of which date no earlier than the first century BC. However, Fentress' identification of these sites as slave markets is based on limited and tenuous evidence, to which Monika Trümper has provided a clear refutation, and so a discerning historian must be wary of the identification of these sites as specifically slave markets.<sup>22</sup>

As Trümper has argued, most markets may have been relatively inconspicuous and the transfer of large numbers of slaves between buyer and seller did not require particularly large

---

<sup>13</sup> Thompson 2003, 42.

<sup>14</sup> Acmonia as a slave market is based on an inscription, see Varinlioglu 2006, 355-71. Cf. Bosworth 2002, 354-5; Thompson 2003, 42; Thoneman 2011, 105. For Magnesia-on-Menander see Braconi 2005, 213-19; Fentress 2005, 228-231; Trümper 2009, 68. For slave markets in the Asia Minor in general see Bussi 2001, 25-34.

<sup>15</sup> *SEG* 46.1996. Trümper 2009, 24 provides an interpretation and English translation.

<sup>16</sup> A dedication on a statue honours the construction of the *statarium* to Gaius Sallustius Crispus Passienus who was a two time consul under Tiberius and Claudius and a relative of Sallust (*I.Eph.* 3025-6). Cf. Bodel 2005, 183 n. 7; Trümper 2009, 21-22; Coarelli 1982, 137-8. Other possible eastern markets are based on evidence dating to the Imperial period and so need not be listed here, these are identified by Harris 1980 128, cf. Bussi 2001, 25-34; Thompson 2003, 42.

<sup>17</sup> The addition of a *chalcidicum*, which Braconi 2005, 217-9 identified as a slave market, was recorded in an inscription of c.AD 11-12, cf. Trümper 2009, 62-3. The association of a *chalcidicum* with a slave market is tenuous, and Braconi remains cautious in saying so. Festus Lindsay 1913, 45 simply states that it was a building of which the design originated from Chalcis. The *chalcidicum* resembled a chamber and so they have sometimes been identified as slave holding cells (particularly at the Agora of the Italians at Delos and the *Eumachia* at Pompeii *CIL* 10.811, Fentress 2005, 225-229), but these have also been identified as possible mints, naves and judge's chambers, cf. *s.v.* 'Chalcidicum.' Smith 1890.

<sup>18</sup> Fentress, 2005, 231 dates the market's construction to AD 6 based on Licordari 1984, 351 n. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Fentress 2005, 229.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 230.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 232.

<sup>22</sup> Trümper 2009, 31-34, 51-62, specifically the refutation of the *Eumachia* at Pompeii as a slave market. Westermann 1955, 37 noted that essentially any *agora* could suffice as a market for slaves.

markets or necessarily markets that were explicitly designed for the sale of slaves.<sup>23</sup> Searching for markets with the criteria of objects identifiable with slave sale, as attempted by Fentress, turns up only a few concrete examples.<sup>24</sup> Although holding cells (such as *vestibulae chalcidicae* or *cryptae*) and auction blocks (*catasatae*) can identify a possible slave market, they are not necessarily pre-requisites for one. Inscriptions reveal more slave markets, although the precise locations of these markets and their sizes are impossible to identify since none of these inscriptions have been found in a location that could be identified as a market.<sup>25</sup> A number of inscriptions dating to the second century AD suggest a slave market in Rome, although the dedication to the ‘*genius* of the slave market’ is problematic in that it refers to a guild of traders rather than a market *per se*.<sup>26</sup> A number of slave markets within Rome itself are also mentioned by Roman writers, most notably a market near the Temple of Castor and Pollux referred to by the younger Seneca.<sup>27</sup> Martial also mentions markets located on the *Campus Martius*, which included some catering to elevated patrons that were hidden away, and near the votaries of Serapis thousands of people were said to be kept in cages.<sup>28</sup> Boese also cites the island of Aesculapius as a possible mart, but the exposure of sick slaves on the island does not necessarily indicate a market was there.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Trümper 2009, *passim* who draws a clear comparison with the relatively small markets of the American south which handled similar numbers of slaves. Markets were not necessarily conspicuous even in operation, such as the hidden market frequented by Mamurra in Mart. *Ep.* 9.59.

<sup>24</sup> Fentress 2005, *passim*. Block platforms seem less common in the Arab slave market, but facilities certainly required the holding of slaves, cf. Trümper 2009, 3-12, pl. 4-5; Pucci 2005, 237-40. Evident in painted depictions of slave markets favoured by 19th century Orientalists. For example ‘Slave Market in Constantinople’ 1838 Sir William Allan (Scottish National Gallery, Edinburgh). This comparison can be seen from the Slave Market painting of Jean-Léon Gérôme 1861 (Clark Art Institute, Williamstown, MA), who favoured classical scenes – famously ‘Phryne before the Areopagus,’ 1861 (Kunsthalle, Hamburg). Likewise, cells were present at American markets, notoriously during the Civil War at Alexandria Virginia, see Library of Congress Collections LC-B811-2297-9, cf. Trümper 2009, 110 fig. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Trümper 2009, 27.

<sup>26</sup> *Genio venalicii* CIL 6.396; 397; 398; 399. Cf. Trümper 2009, 25-7; Harris 1980, 130; Joshel 2010, 95-6. The dedications begin with Jupiter Optimus, the only relevance of Jupiter to the slave market that I can see is perhaps an association of Jove with manumission notices as at Delphi, Liv. 7.3 states that this temple was used as a bulletin by dictators. Another inscription from Rome, CIL 6.22355a, mentions a slave market from which a slave met a life-long-friend whom he commemorates, cf. Joshel 2010, 109 for an interpretation and translation.

<sup>27</sup> Mart. *Ep.* 9.29; Sen. *Dial.* 2.13.4. There is no logical reason why a slave market would be specifically associated with the *dioscuri*, it seems the association is nothing more than proximity.

<sup>28</sup> Mart. *Ep.* 9.29 *non illam mille catasatae vincebant, nec quae turba Sarapin amat*. Serapis was worshiped in Iseum Campense in the sanctuary of Isis in the *Campus Martius*. Boese 1973, 149 also suggests slaves were sold on the *via Sacra* based on Mart. *Ep.* 2.63.

<sup>29</sup> Boese 1973, 149. Suet. *Claud.* 25; *Dig.* 40.8.2. Claudius banned owners who exposed sick slaves to die on the island of Aesculapius from reclaiming them.

Of the slaves traded in the markets there is little in particular that relates *specifically* to captives.<sup>30</sup> Newly imported slaves, and certainly newly acquired captives, were required to have their feet whitened to indicate that they were aliens and it was the law that the origin of a slave be known to the purchaser.<sup>31</sup> According to Gellius slaves whose origin was unknown and came without a guarantee for their service were sold with a felt cap (*pileatus*) to indicate to buyers that their origin was unknown,<sup>32</sup> but the donning of such a cap was more commonly recognised as a mark of manumission.<sup>33</sup> Ulpian informs us that the origin (*natio*) of a slave was important as some nations were of better repute than others.<sup>34</sup> Not all captives would have made ideal slaves; the Cantabrian captives sold into slavery in 22 BC notoriously killed their masters.<sup>35</sup> Newly acquired slaves and slaves whose origin and previous occupation were unknown posed a greater risk at not meeting the expectations of the purchaser and presumably this placed a lower value on them. No distinction was made between a slave captured in war and one brought into the empire by traders. Newly enslaved people who required constant supervision could not have been expected to perform highly skilled tasks right away and so the prices paid for these labourers were justifiably not as high.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> For practices used in the sale of slaves see Boese 1973, 149-50; Joshel 2010, 95-100; Thompson 2003, 43-6; Westermann 1955 98-99. For legal aspects of the sale see Buckland 1908, 39f.

<sup>31</sup> The ‘chalking’ of the feet (Plin. *HN* 35.199; Prop. 4.5.52; Tib. 11.41; Juv. *Sat.* 1.111; Ov. *Am.* 1.8.64) Information about slaves was usually displayed on the *tituli* worn about their necks. The indication of a slave’s *natio* or ἔθνικος was a legal requirement (*Dig.* 21.1.31.21). So too in Egypt (*BGU* 1. 316.13; 3.887.3, c.f. Westermann 1955, 96 n. 15). Onomastic analysis cannot be relied upon for the origin of slaves, the Romans tended to use stock names and the preservation of freedmen names are overwhelmingly of Greek origin, not necessarily because this was the main region of supply, but because Greek names were fashionable so that even non-Greek slaves were given Greek names cf. Bruce 1938, 44-5. Onomastics were the basis of the slave origin study first propounded by Bang 1910, 242-44 whose survey turned up an average of Italian based slaves over other origins. Likewise an analysis of the *magistri-magistrae* from Minturnae revealed a majority of Greek names, Johnson 1933, 106-113. See also Gordon 1924, 96-101 and the comments of Westermann 1955, 61-2 who attributes a greater proportion of the Roman slave trade from the East on the basis of onomastics.

<sup>32</sup> Gell. *NA* 6.4.1 states that this establishment was recorded by Sabinus, cf. Huschke; *De Manc.* fr. 19.

<sup>33</sup> Liv. 24.16.18; 33.23.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6; Petr. 40.3; Suet. *Nero* 57.1. Also *pilleus* Liv. 24.32.9; 30.45.5; Val. Max. 5.2.5; Mart. 2.68.4; Sen. *Ep.* 47.18; Suet. *Tib.* 4.2.

<sup>34</sup> *Dig.* 21.1.1.2.

<sup>35</sup> Cass. Dio 54.11.2.

<sup>36</sup> Frier and Kehoe 2007, 120 the deceitful practices of slave-dealers led to a ‘lemon market’ which brought down slave prices across the board.

## Slave Traders

Captives were generally purchased by traders nearer the site of battle rather than transported by the armed forces to markets.<sup>37</sup> That *mercatores* followed the army is clear,<sup>38</sup> and many of the traders following the Roman army during the Republic were Roman or Italian, but judging by the alacrity with which they travelled beyond the borders of the empire, it cannot be said that the slave wares would be solely reserved for Italian and Roman markets.<sup>39</sup> Merchants often intermingled with the soldiers<sup>40</sup> to the point that Sallust remarked that soldiers and merchants together pillaged the Numidian countryside.<sup>41</sup> Though the merchants followed closely with the army, even sharing some of their occupational hazards,<sup>42</sup> they were not controlled by the general. Publius Decius Mus suggested that his soldiers sell off their booty immediately (and presumably, in doing so, at prices favouring the traders) so that the traders might be induced to follow the army into Samnium.<sup>43</sup> In an exceptional case Caesar gave orders for the merchants following his army to take refuge within the ramparts, but this was only to ensure the safety of the merchants.<sup>44</sup> Whilst the general could issue orders to the merchants in his presence, he could not compel them under law to trade or to follow the army, with the exception of restricting the sale of captives; although it was rare to do so, restrictions were placed on the terms of the sale and where they could be sold.<sup>45</sup> The independence of merchants from the armies they followed can be seen in the example of the

---

<sup>37</sup> Merchants- *mercatores*, φορτηγός or variants of ἐμπολεὺς specifically slave traders or traders of other disreputable goods- *mangones*, σώματεμπόροι or ἀνδρόποδοκαπέλοι.

<sup>38</sup> Merchants were also contracted to supply the army, merchants of this type were known as *publicani* or classified as *socii*, see Badian 1972, 158-60; Roth 1999, 230-1. *Mercatores* and *negotiatores* are well attested for following the Roman army (App. *Pun.* 18.117; Caes. *B Gall.* 6.37; Liv. 10.17.6; 28.22.4. So too Greek armies ex. Xen. *Aes.* 1.21). It should be noted that *mercatores* were not necessarily the same as the sutlers (*lixae*) who followed the army and occupied a number of supplementary and auxiliary roles, see Vishnia 2002, 265-272. Cf. Le Bohec 1994, 226 who suggests the *lixae* differed from private merchants and camp followers in that they were recognised, and to a certain degree employed, by the army as 'licensed purveyors.' Although Tacitus generally associates *lixae* with servants (Tac. *Hist.* 1.49; 2.87; 3.20; 3.33 cf. Frontin *Str.* 2.4.8), they seem to be free men, though of lowly origin (Liv. 31.49.11; Sall. *Iug.* 44.5; Amm. Marc. 18.2.13; *Cod. Theod.* 7.1.10), see further Vishnia 2002, 267f.

<sup>39</sup> Caesar frequently remarked on the extensive travels of merchants (*B Gall.* 1.39.1; 3.1.2; 4.3.3; 4.5.2; 4.20.4).

<sup>40</sup> Feasted together Liv. 33.48.5; spectators of battle Liv.44.35.10.

<sup>41</sup> Sall. *Iug.* 44.5.7.

<sup>42</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 6.37.3; Liv. 28.22.4; 39.26.4.

<sup>43</sup> Liv. 10.17.6.

<sup>44</sup> Caes. *B. Gall.* 6.36.3.

<sup>45</sup> Augustus stipulated that captured Salassi males in 25 BC were to be sold, but they could not be liberated before 20 years (Cass. Dio 53.5.4; Suet. *Aug.* 21 gives 30; cf. Strab. 4.6.7). Captive Panonian males in AD 12 were to be sold outside Pannonia (Cass. Dio. 54.31.3).



Numidians during the Second Punic War who had to journey to the coast to sell off their Carthaginian booty.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the significant trade in slaves in antiquity there are only a few examples of actual slave traders. This is partly because of the disreputable nature of the trade and as a result people dealing in slaves tended not to advertise their profession.<sup>47</sup> Certainly the Romans, who only tolerated large scale traders, found the trade in slaves a seedy if not disgraceful profession.<sup>48</sup> The stigma attributed to the trade in slaves has rendered the evidence for the traders rather conspicuous. From the legal texts we know that traders sometimes operated in partnerships.<sup>49</sup> Many traders may have dealt in slaves, but refrained from identifying solely with the trade and so, despite a distinction between slaves and other goods, were able to retain the title of *mercator* as they did not deal exclusively in slaves.<sup>50</sup> As most merchants were independent and operated on a small-scale we may assume slave dealers too generally operated on a small-scale.<sup>51</sup>

Boese remarked that captives were “frequently given to the soldiers,” but this statement is uncorroborated, he cites only the cases of Fidenae in 425 BC and Caesar’s distribution of captives amongst his soldiers after the siege of Alesia.<sup>52</sup> In both cases the distribution of captives was an exceptional reward, beyond the regular gift of booty.<sup>53</sup> Of course many captives were reserved for triumphs, special works, and a few as slaves for individuals. The vast majority of the captives however, taken with the intent of being enslaved were sold to

---

<sup>46</sup> Liv. 29.31.11.

<sup>47</sup> With the exception of three inscriptions (*CIL*. 13.8348; *ILS* 4833; a votive tablet Walser 1984 78 no. 11). Cf. Boese 1973, 189 n. 12-13; George 2011, 394 n. 10. Surprisingly these inscriptions use the pejorative ‘*mango*’ rather than *venalicius*, it seems these traders displayed humour in adopting the nickname. The Greek trader A. Capreilius Timotheus clearly took pride in his profession as his gravestone commemorates not only him as a *σοματεμπορος*, but also has a relief of chained slaves being led to market, cf. Duchêne 1986, 513-30.

<sup>48</sup> See the comments of Bosworth 2002, 350-7 regarding the stigma placed on Vespasian who may have been involved in slave trading.

<sup>49</sup> *Dig.* 17.2.60.1.

<sup>50</sup> *Dig.* 14.4.1.1; 50.16.207. See Buckland 1908, 39 n. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Though shipping lanes by their inevitable destinations suggest shipping in the manner of *grand trafic maritime* the total of goods transportation in the Mediterranean must have been made up of vessels who operated on a smaller scale, see Heers 1958, 107-17; Braudel 1972, 296f. Horden & Purcell 2000, 140-1; Harris 2007, 533-5; Boese 1973, 170 also believed the majority of slave traders to be small scale. Though the number of slaves traded by individuals may have been small, their networks were certainly extensive, and the movement of slaves may have been from trader to trader, much like in the later trans-Atlantic system within Africa so that vast numbers could have been traded over great distances. See also the comments of Bradley 1994, 46. This movement from hand to hand over a long distance was also important in a captive/slave’s ‘natal alienation’ according to Patterson 1981, 111-2.

<sup>52</sup> Boese 1973, 146-7. Fidenae (Liv. 4.34.4; Caes. *B. Gall.* 7.89.5).

<sup>53</sup> For what the soldier’s might then have done with the captives see Boese 1973, 147.

traders on the spot. A sudden influx of slaves in a single area would have driven the price of slaves very low. The Sardinians captured in 238 BC notoriously fetched such a low price it became a quip *sardi venales*.<sup>54</sup> Josephus relates that after the fall of Jerusalem the sum received for slaves was pitiful due to the glut of captives and the scarcity of traders.<sup>55</sup> The dearth of traders was apparently due to their capacity for purchasing or transporting slaves being reached. Once in the hands of these traders, slaves could be sent a long way to various markets, thus the father trying to buy back his son in Plautus' *Captivi* had such a difficult time finding his son because he awaited the merchants carrying captives in dribs and drabs.<sup>56</sup>

The taking of captives has left no physical evidence. Certain articles of restraint such as shackles and chains could be preserved and such items for domestic use have been recovered by archaeological excavations.<sup>57</sup> Given the supposed preference for slaves in Roman agriculture, surprisingly few objects of restraint have been found in Italian excavations, by contrast more have been recovered in Greece than anywhere.<sup>58</sup> Fetters are one of the only distinguishing characteristics of a slave ship that may be preserved and thus far none have been recovered from Roman shipwrecks. From written sources we know that armies carried shackles with them to take captives away in, and both Spartan and Carthaginian armies are noted as doing so.<sup>59</sup> In Greece fetters were sometimes preserved as a memorial to victory.<sup>60</sup>

Josephus noted that Roman soldiers carried an implement known as an ἄλυσις essentially for chaining captives.<sup>61</sup> And Thompson has suggested that these were used to bind the captives to their captor so as to prevent escape.<sup>62</sup> Chains were often cited as the implement of restraint

---

<sup>54</sup> Aurel. Vict. 57.2 ; Cic. *Ad Fam.* 7.24; *s.v.* 'Sardi venales' Festus. There is an alternative version to the story mentioned by Festus that *sardi* (*Sardinia*) referred to the Veientes as they were thought to have originated from Lydian Sardes and so the 'cheapness' may have been a running joke for any recent enemy of Rome. See Chapter 6.

<sup>55</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 6.384.

<sup>56</sup> Plaut *Capt.* Prologue. 27-9.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Thompson 2003, 217-238. The types of chains and the means of restraining slaves is well attested in American slavery and the finds suggest that the basic principles of the articles had not evolved much since the Roman period.

<sup>58</sup> Thompson 2003, 220. A chain with an attached skeleton was discovered outside of Pompeii, this could be a slave or a prisoner, see Etani *et al.* 2003, 312-14; George 2011, 395 n. 12.

<sup>59</sup> Spartans 1.66.4, Carthaginians Diod. Sic. 20.13.1-2. Both examples proved poetic justice to those that carried them.

<sup>60</sup> Tegean victory over Spartans the fetters seen by Hdt. 1.66.4 and Paus. 8.45.3; Athenian victory over Chalcidians and Boeotians, fetters seen by Hdt. 5.77.3 at Athens.

<sup>61</sup> Joseph. *BJ.* 3.5.5. Thompson 2003, 41 fig. 10 identifies the chain used to hold a Parthian captive depicted on the arch of Septimius Severus as an ἄλυσις.

<sup>62</sup> Thompson 2003, 220-1, who bases this on the fact that the *halusis* had manacles at both ends of the chain.

for captives.<sup>63</sup> In Plautus, the captives purchased from the market were laden with chains during their transport, presumably to prevent them from running away,<sup>64</sup> and Ammianus tells us that an imperial notary of his time was nicknamed *Paulus Catena* because he so heavily burdened his prisoners with restraints when travelling.<sup>65</sup> There is ample visual evidence for the Romans restraining their captives and from these examples it appears that the Romans preferred neck-shackles in transporting captives.<sup>66</sup> A Roman captive taken by the Germans in AD 9 was able to kill himself with the weight of the chains binding him to other prisoners.<sup>67</sup> The tombstone of a slave dealer named Timotheus likewise depicts a troop of slaves chained at the neck.<sup>68</sup> Of course rope also served as an implement of restraint and we find many depictions of captives in both Greek and Roman contexts with their hands bound behind their backs.<sup>69</sup>

Once captured, prisoners may also have been enclosed within temporary pens as Diodorus suggests for the Carthaginian intentions concerning Greek captives in Sicily.<sup>70</sup> Stocks, presumably for the holding of slaves were discovered at the Boscotrecase Villa,<sup>71</sup> such implements could be used to contain large numbers of captives in the open, but there is no evidence that this was the case. For numerous captives it seems larger more permanent structures were favoured. The Athenians captured after their failed expedition to Sicily were kept in the stone quarries outside Syracuse.<sup>72</sup> In 144 BC the Roman commander Sulpicius Galba had his troops construct camps to contain the Lusitanians, in this instance it was for the purpose of slaughter, but it was a common enough practice for the Lusitanians not to be wary of it.<sup>73</sup> During the first Judean revolt (AD 66-70) the Terichaeon captives were marched to the

<sup>63</sup> Ov. *Ep.* 10.89; Sen. *Dial.* 6.20.2; *Ep.* 85.27; Sil. *Pun.* 17.169.

<sup>64</sup> Plaut. *Captiv.* 1.107.

<sup>65</sup> ‘Paul the Chain’ Amm. Marc. 15.3.4; 3.10, cf. Quint. 5.15.

<sup>66</sup> For plates relating to this visual evidence see Bradley 2004, plates 5 and 6; Joshel 2010, 85 fig. b. For a textual reference see Lucilius 854. Slave collars may have been used for more trusted captives, though none uncovered have revealed a captive was tagged in such a way, see Thurmond 1994, 459-93.

<sup>67</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.120.6 *complexus catenarum quibus uinctus erat seriem, ita illas illisit capiti suo, ut protinus pariter sanguinis cerebrique effluvio expiraret.*

<sup>68</sup> See Duchêne 1986, 517 fig. 3.

<sup>69</sup> For plates relating to visual evidence see Bradley 2004, plates 1,2,3,14,16. For numismatic examples see also references in Chapter 2.

<sup>70</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.13.1-2, the pens are referred to as *συνεργασία*. This seems also to refer to a workhouse of slaves as Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.36. later refers. The working aspect of a *συνεργασία* is also emphasised by its alternative use as referring to a company or guild see SIG 704H26. The closest Latin equivalent is an *ergastuum*, for which Columella’s description (*RR* 1.6.3) clearly indicates was a work house of a permanent build.

<sup>71</sup> *Not. Scav.* 1922, 459-67 fig. 3, see also George 2011, 395.

<sup>72</sup> Thuc. 7.86.

<sup>73</sup> App. *Hisp* 60, see Chapter 2.

arena in Tiberias where they were contained before being divided for various means of ‘disposal.’<sup>74</sup> It is unlikely that captives remained in the possession of the army for an extended period of time, their containment was simply to allow for ‘processing’ and once the slaves were auctioned it seems probable that they were then the sole burden of their purchasers.<sup>75</sup>

## Trade and Transport

Whilst metropolitan Rome may have been the largest consumer of slaves it was not the only consumer. Slavery was a ubiquitous institution in the ancient world, though no society current with Rome could be considered a ‘slave-society’ in the strict economic sense;<sup>76</sup> all required at least a limited supply of slaves to maintain their slave population. Slaves could be generated from the internal mechanics of a state whereby free people were reduced to slavery.<sup>77</sup> Where reproduction amongst the slave population could not meet the demand of maintaining (or growing) the slave population, criminals, orphans and debtors amongst the free population could serve to supplement the shortfall. One might consider the replacement of agricultural slaves with serfs in Europe as exemplifying the replacement of a dependant labour shortfall on a mass scale.<sup>78</sup> These practices were by no means limited to Rome. Furthermore, just because the Romans were the most successful imperialists should not imply that they were the only ones with imperial aspirations, nor were they the only producers of slaves as a by-product of successful war.<sup>79</sup> Slavery was so prevalent in ancient societies that Strabo remarked on the spectacular absence of slaves amongst the Sacae Scythians and the Indians.<sup>80</sup> The result was a wide range of markets for slaves where a sudden injection of

<sup>74</sup> Joseph. *BJ* 3.532-542, see Chapter 2.

<sup>75</sup> Vishnia 2002, 270 has suggested that the *lixae* operating as a paramilitary group may well have participated in the act of ‘captive-taking,’ in Greek ληστεία (see Gabrielsen 2003, 390). She further suggests that the *lixae* may also have been contracted to aid in the disposal of captives. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to substantiate these suggestions and so they remain hypothetical, but given the difficulty of supervision, maintenance and transport of large numbers of people, it is not unlikely that the Roman army turned to ‘contractors’ to facilitate the transfer of captives from the battlefield to the merchant. That the *lixae* operated closely with the legions is evident in epitaphs identifying an individual with both a *lixa* and a legion, *CIL* 16.35; *CIL* 13.8732; and possibly *CIL* 3.11259), see Speidel 1984 I, 203-5.

<sup>76</sup> A ‘slave society’ as defined by Hopkins 1978, 100-1.

<sup>77</sup> See conclusion chapter.

<sup>78</sup> See also the comment of Hopkins 1978, 100 n2 in pointing out the ‘Asiatic mode of production’ which allowed for an alternative means of dependant labour.

<sup>79</sup> Taylor 2001, 28. For slavery amongst the Iron Age Gauls see Daubigney 1979, 145-93; amongst the Germans see Grünert 1969, 501-15; and the Scythians see Taylor 2001, 36f.

<sup>80</sup> Strab. 7.3.9; 15.1.54.

captives into the economy could see a wide disbursement of chattels rather than a single flow from battlefield to Rome. According to Livy the Lusitanian captives taken in 151 BC were actually sold in Gaul,<sup>81</sup> and the Cantabrians captured by Gaius Furnius in the late 20s BC were presumably sold in Spain as they went on to kill their masters and re-join the rebellion there.<sup>82</sup> Roman traders were prolific by the end of the Republic and these cannot have capitalised solely on the trade between Rome and outlier regions.<sup>83</sup>

The state was never interested in controlling the slave trade beyond the protection of Roman consumers.<sup>84</sup> The only strict intervention by the state concerning any supply was that of the grain to Rome from North Africa and Sicily.<sup>85</sup> It seems to have been a natural market in which the demand enticed traders to bring slaves to Rome, but there was no reason that the basic principles of demand also led traders to go elsewhere. Evidence from the imperial period demonstrates that Syria and Asia Minor were particularly important suppliers of slaves because they had, supposedly, few qualms about selling their own kind into slavery,<sup>86</sup> and exposed children could be found throughout the ancient world.<sup>87</sup> Whilst specific slave routes are hard to pinpoint in the manner of later slave systems, we can determine that there was a general trend of importing from beyond the Mediterranean in exchange for luxuries such as oil and wine which could not be produced (at least not of the quality demanded) in the regions beyond the Mediterranean.<sup>88</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup> Liv. *Per.* 49.

<sup>82</sup> Cass. Dio 54.5.2 (enslaved); 54.11.2 (killed their masters).

<sup>83</sup> Mithridates ordered the execution of all Italians and Romans within his domain, Memnon fr. 22.9 (*FGrH* 434) puts the figure at 60,000 executed by Mithridates orders in Asia, inclusive of the families. These must have been merchants capitalising on the trade from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean thereby serving all the markets therein.

<sup>84</sup> Harris 1980, 124 suggested that the low tariff on slaves according to an inscription at Zraia in Numidia (*CIL* 8.4508) indicates that the state may have tried to improve the slave supply to Italy, but he admits (p.137, n. 81) this could also be reflective of a low price for slaves in the region.

<sup>85</sup> Andraeu 1994, 83-98. Harris 2007, 517 n. 20 remarked that heavy state involvement in the grain trade may be overestimated. Egypt was only a significant supplier during the Imperial period, see Garnsey 1983, 119-20.

<sup>86</sup> In Asia Minor, Philostr. *VA* 8.7.12. Selling of children in Asia Minor under the early empire, Plin. *Ep* 10.65-66, Bang 1910, 247, Westermann 1955, 97. The commonality of the East as a source of slaves is emphasised by Juv. *Sat.* 7.15. See Lewis 2011, 105-10 for an argument (*contra* the orthodox view set by Finley 1962, 51-9) concerning the importance of slavery in Near Eastern (Persian influenced) regions. A region does not need to be devoid of slavery to be a significant producer of slaves, most notably West Africa in the 17<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

<sup>87</sup> In Egypt as exemplified by wet-nursing contracts (*P.Mich* 121; 123; 238). Germans (*Tac. Ann.* 4.72) Asia Minor, (*Plut. Luc.* 20). In law (*Dig.* 3.5.10; 21.1.65; 39.4.16.3), see Alföldi 1972, 125f.; Harris 1980, 123-4; and especially 1994, 1-22; Scheidel 1997, 164-6; 2011, 298-9. So too in the Greek world, see Tarn 1952, 100-2; Cameron 1932, 105-14, *contra* Engels 1980, 112f.; Bennett 1923, 341-51. For exceptions to this practice see *Strab.* 17.2.5; *Tac. Hist.* 5.5.

<sup>88</sup> Evident in a number of examples from early on: to Chios (*FGrH* 572); to the Balearics (*Diod. Sic.* 5.17.2-3); Gallic slaves were traded at the rate of an *amphora* per slave (*Diod. Sic.* 5.26.3); the Frisians traded their

Land routes certainly comprised a large portion of the slave trade, inevitably all journeys of origin to sale required at least a limited journey to a sea or river before an alternative means of transport could be used, although this may not have been necessary.<sup>89</sup> Some strictly land trade routes are mentioned by our sources.<sup>90</sup> The relief depicting a troop of slaves on the *stèle* of Timotheus gives some indication of how slaves may have been transported over land. The men are depicted as chained at the neck, with the women and the children following and a single guard or trader leading the collared males along.<sup>91</sup> Although one must be careful in drawing conclusions from a single depiction, it is likely that a smaller slave to guard ratio was favoured.<sup>92</sup> The nature of overland travel also favoured multi-agent trading in which goods were passed between multiple merchants on the journey to the item's final destination. Bradley, in considering the movement of slaves from Britain to Italy, envisioned a similar process of the slaves being passed from trader to trader.<sup>93</sup> This sale from person to person and place to place served to alienate the slaves more and more from their homeland; furthermore, with each sale, the slave was less able to attribute their predicament to any one person.<sup>94</sup>

Once cargo reached the Mediterranean the easiest means of transport over long distances was via the sea.<sup>95</sup> The transport of large numbers of captives would have been a major logistical issue, demanding considerable resources in terms of manpower, ships and supplies for the functions of transportation and supervision. Despite the considerable need imposed on merchant vessels to transport slaves of the 1,189 examples in A.J. Parker's survey of ancient shipwrecks there is no evidence of a slave ship, nor is there any archaeological evidence for specifically transport ships; even though ships of this type were evidently used for overseas

---

children for wine Tac. *Hist* 5.5; Gallic slaves into Italy (Afrani *Gram. Lat.* 1.119; Cic. *Quinct.* 6.2); cf. Horden & Purcell 2000, 390-1; Nicolet 1978, 684-93; Tchernia 1983, 97-8; Goudineau 1983, n.7. In the case of Gauls this was often analogous to their penchant for wine and drunkenness. Strab. 4.5 listed slaves as a chief export of Britain.

<sup>89</sup> See below. Slaves in particular were well suited for land transport as they could move by their own propulsion and carry other goods and supplies. For injured, weak or difficult slaves a cart could also be used, perhaps with an affixed cage.

<sup>90</sup> From Gaul into Italy (Cic. *Quinct.* 24f.), from the modern day Czech Republic and Slovakia across the Danube and Alps into northern Italy (Strab. 5.214) and later under the empire across the Rhine from Germany into the Roman empire (Tac. *Agr.* 28.3), cf. Harris 1980, 124.

<sup>91</sup> Duchêne 1986, 513-30; Joshel 2010, 90-1.

<sup>92</sup> The ratio in the trans-Atlantic slave trade aboard ships was 10:1. The *stèle* of Timotheus shows 12 (8 males, 2 females, 2 adolescents):1, but this may be a focus on the trader and his wares with the exclusion of any help.

<sup>93</sup> Bradley 1994, 46.

<sup>94</sup> Joshel 2010, 94; Bradley 1994, 46-7. 'Natal alienation,' Patterson 1981, 11-2.

<sup>95</sup> The advantage of water transport was emphasised by earlier (primitivist) historians of the ancient economy such as Yeo 1946, 221-44; Finley 1973, 126-7; Duncan-Jones 1974, 1f). This has been challenged, notably by Hopkins 1978, 107 and more recently by Laurence 1998, 129-48 and Adams 2007, 1f. The slave trade, when carried out over significant distances, must have utilised sea transportation, but it cannot be said, one way or another, what means of conveyance slave traders preferred.

campaigns and in transporting people on heavily trafficked sea lanes such as from Brundisium to Dyrrachium.<sup>96</sup> However, it must be said, wrecks are typically identified only through their cargo with storage vessels (mostly *amphorae*) being the only material that survives, the ship timbers rarely survive. Large-scale transport of slaves over the Mediterranean cannot be excluded through a lack of material evidence, but it can be demonstrated that this was not the only means of moving captives by sea, nor the most logical.<sup>97</sup>

The typical means of travel by sea, with the exception of campaigning armies, was by merchant vessel. Such is the case in Petronius' *Satyricon* when Encolpius and Giton boarded a ship transporting passengers as well as trade goods.<sup>98</sup> The regular transport of grain from Egypt along the Levant and Turkish coast via Rhodes, Crete, the Peloponnese and Sicily made these ideal ferries for people wishing to travel between these destinations.<sup>99</sup> So we are informed that Paul journeyed on a grain ship along with 297 other passengers from Caesarea to Rome.<sup>100</sup> Since the hold of these ships was filled with grain, the passengers aboard these vessels seem to have spent the journey above the deck.<sup>101</sup> Likewise, when Josephus was first brought to Rome, he lived above deck with the crew, although this may have been a privilege rather than a necessity.<sup>102</sup>

There is no specific ship design which is preferable for the carrying of slaves. Despite a highly specialised trade in slaves with specific functional requirements, there was never any form of standardisation in the ships used in the Atlantic slave trade. Ship records of Guineamen sailing from Liverpool reveal that varying types of crafts were used and on average a Guineaman of the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries sailing from British ports was between 100-

---

<sup>96</sup> Rougé 1966, 76-77 notes that the Brundisium-Dyrrachium route is the only known route which used specifically passenger ships rather than making auxiliary transports out of multipurpose merchantmen.

<sup>97</sup> See below. The sporadic nature of largescale enslavements favoured the use of many small traders and a consortium of traders in other goods who could quickly disperse from the enslavement site to sell slaves many markets further away. The alternative of large scale transport to large market sites would not make sense economically for the traders as they could only command low prices through a flooded market.

<sup>98</sup> Petr. *Satyr.* 99f.

<sup>99</sup> Boese 1973, 169 -70 suggested that the grain ships were the most obvious means of transporting captives. He cites the possible financial backing of the *negotiatores* for large scale slave trade operations upon the sea. There is, however, no evidence to suggest this and it is far more likely that the involvement of the grain merchants was nothing more than allowing passage upon their ships without distinction between free and slave or dealers carrying slaves. That heavily trafficked sea-lanes were present is evident in the remark of Cic. *Prov. cons.* 12.31 that the *cursus maritimi* was freed up by Pompey's clearance of the pirates from the Mediterranean.

<sup>100</sup> *Paul* 27: 33-44.

<sup>101</sup> Hirschfeld 1990, 28-29.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph. *Vit.* 416.

250 tonnes.<sup>103</sup> Ancient ships were comparable in size to those of the great age of sail, the grain ship *Isis* described by Lucian was large even by modern standards and grain ships were regularly larger than 300 tonnes.<sup>104</sup> The *Syrakusia* as described by an otherwise unknown writer named Moschion (preserved through Athenaeus) is the largest known ship from the ancient world estimated at over 1,700 tonnes.<sup>105</sup> In his survey of ship wrecks Parker found that the most common vessels were under 75 tonnes and large vessels, those exceeding 250 tonnes, were considerably more rare and generally confined to the first centuries BC and AD.<sup>106</sup> Whilst the shipwright capabilities could produce large vessels, harbour limitations meant the largest freighters could not exceed 500 tonnes.<sup>107</sup>

Military transports are the only examples which can give any indication of the average number of passengers per ship: in 81 BC Pompey sent 7 legions from Sicily to Africa in 800 Transports.<sup>108</sup> In Caesar's first channel crossing he used 80 ships to transport two legions with an additional 18 ships to carry the cavalry,<sup>109</sup> and in his second crossing he used 800 ships to carry 5 legions with 2,000 additional horses.<sup>110</sup> Accepting a notional average of 6,000 men per legion (allowing for both the attrition of regular forces and the addition of support personnel) we find that the typical number of men per ship from these journeys is 80.<sup>111</sup> If the average ship size was 75 tonnes then the ratio of soldiers to tonnage was approximately 1:1.

---

<sup>103</sup> Derived from the Lord Liverpool Papers of 1798 which recorded the size of ships and the number of slaves that were to be carried upon departure from Africa. The specific average is 209 tonnes. MSS #384i6, items 300-30I British Library. An accessible table of the record was produced by Garland and Klein 1985, 244-246.

<sup>104</sup> Luc. *Nav.* 4-7. Estimates have always varied, see Casson 1950, 52-6 who gives an estimate of roughly 1,200 – 1,300 tonnes, equivalent to a medium sized frigate of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>105</sup> Athenaeus 206d-209e For the passage with a translation see Casson 1971, 191-99. The ship was built under Heiro II of Syracuse in the later the third century BC. For estimates of its size see Casson 1971: 184-186; Duncan-Jones 1977: 331-332; Torr 1964: 27. For a list of large ancient ships including the *Syracusia* see MacIntosh 1991, 106 table 1.

<sup>106</sup> Parker 1992, 26. For a brief overview of Parker's findings see Rauh 2003, 105-107. See also the comments of Patterson 1998, 152-3 on the interpretation of the economy through shipwrecks, particularly the difficulty in interpreting scale.

<sup>107</sup> Casson 1971, 171-173.

<sup>108</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 11.2.

<sup>109</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 4.22.

<sup>110</sup> Caes. *B Gall.* 5.8.

<sup>111</sup> 7 legions (42,000)/ 800 ships = 52.5 per ship; 2 legions (12,000 ignoring additional ships for cavalry)/ 80 = 150 per ship; 5 legions (30,000 + 2,000)/ 800 = 40 per ship. A mean of the averages = 81. Interestingly, the ratio of men to ship for Caesar's second crossing was similar to that of the invasion force of Normandy in 1944 when 160,000 troops were transported in approximately 5,000 ships yielding an average of 32 per craft, but the division of squads into platoons and the carrying of armoured vehicles pushed it to 40 per craft. Likewise Caesar's forces may have been divided along the lines of half centuries with a centurion or *optio* leading the men in each craft.



In the specialised trade of slaves across the Atlantic an average slave to crewman ratio of 10:1 was observed at the end of the 18th century.<sup>112</sup> Unfortunately, there is no surviving evidence from the ancient world (as far as I am aware) which could suggest such a ratio, but it can safely be asserted that it would have required at least as many crewman as the well-established trans-Atlantic slave trade which utilised firearms and transported slaves who were largely ignorant of large sailing vessels.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, the maintenance of passengers required food stores and water which took up considerable stowage space. The slave ships of the British slave trade generally had a ratio of 2.5 slaves per tonne which included both room for the slaves and stowage.<sup>114</sup> The long transatlantic voyage required more of the ship's hold to be devoted for the stowage of supplies, in contrast the coastal routes favoured in the Mediterranean allowed for more frequent revictualing and so more space could be spared for slaves. However, crew sizes were also larger, with galleys requiring far more men than vessels that relied primarily on sails; slim war galleys were therefore unsuitable for the transport of people, at least below deck.

Undoubtedly the transport of slaves by sea required a considerable amount of manpower and resources. As seen above, the ratio for supervision to captives requirement was at least 10:1, the typical slave to ship tonnage ratio was roughly 3:1 and the average ship was around 75 tonnes meaning the average capability for the transport of human cargo per ship was 225. These figures are certainly not exact, but they are conservatively favourable to the Romans ability to carry slaves across the sea. In the table below are examples of where Roman historians suggested captives were brought en masse across the sea and how many ships and guards would have been required based on the calculations above.

---

<sup>112</sup> Eltis 1999 # 90350.

<sup>113</sup> See the compelling recreation of an African's journey from the coast to a slave ship in the introduction of Rediker 2007, 1-4.

<sup>114</sup> Tonne is used here in regards to space within the hold, not the weight of supply. Tonnes are used to measure ship size; tonnage refers to the dead weight capacity of a ship. Measuring a ship's dead tonnage capacity is a difficult and by no means finite process, and it was not until the 19<sup>th</sup> century that accurate calculations could be made of existing ships. 3 slaves per tonne was not unheard of (see Clarkson 1786, 128) and legislation tried to bring the ratio down for humanitarian reasons, the Dolben Act of 1788 (Donnan 1930-1935, 582-589) reduced the ratio to 1.6 per tonne and a more precise limitation based on square footage in 1799 gave 8 ft<sup>2</sup> per slave, which equated to generally 2 per tonne (cf. Garland & Klein 1985: 239-240; Anstey 1975, 330-331).

Number of Slaves/Source	Reference	Ships	Guards
20,000 (Africa 256 BC)	Polyb. 1.29.7	89	2,000
8,000 (Africa 204 BC)	Liv. 29.29.3	36	800
c. 40,000 (Sardinia 177 BC)	Liv. 41.51.10 Zon. 8.20	178	4,000
50,000 (Carthage 146 BC)	App. <i>Pun</i> 130	222	5,000

### III. Ship and Guard Requirements for Sea Transport

What can be drawn from the few examples above is that the direct transport of large numbers of captives back to Rome required a considerable number of ships as well as substantial manpower. The preoccupation of the state in transporting and supplying its troops as well as bringing back the booty that would be deposited directly into the treasury, meant that the transport of captives would have been a noteworthy encumbrance to the already burdened logistical vessels of the navy; but there is no indication from the sources that the navy was ever over-burdened by captives, which would be expected if, indeed, all the captives mentioned in the sources were transported back to Italy by the navy. As explained above, the transport of captives, particularly in small quantities per ship was not limited to any specific type of merchant vessel, and so the transport of captives by sea for the purpose of sale as slaves was likely made by smaller merchant ships who, driven by market demand, visited many different markets before reaching Rome.

So far none of the 1,000 plus wrecks of the Greco-Roman period have revealed anything that would indicate they carried slaves.<sup>115</sup> The lack of evidence does not negate the fact that slaves were transported by sea as, according to the written sources, some clearly were.<sup>116</sup> This

<sup>115</sup> Only one wreck of the Roman period included chains: the well preserved wreck of *Madrague De Giens* of the mid first century BC. The chains of this wreck are thought to be part of the rigging, cf. Parker 1992, 249 #616. In contrast, for the trans-Atlantic slave trade fetters and chains have been discovered at the wreck off Florida which has been identified as the *Henrietta Marie*, a known slave ship, which sunk around the year 1700, see Palmer 2002, 77-99. The only other known shipwreck of the trans-Atlantic slave trading period is the Danish slaver *Fredensborg* which sunk in 1789, see Svalesen 2000, *passim*. For the difficulty of identifying slave ships of the trans-Atlantic trade see Webster 2005, 245-58.

<sup>116</sup> See examples in table above. Most wrecks are identified by the remains of *amphorae* rather than the remnants of the actual vessel. For the most part, organic material does not survive, and human beings, free or slave, were not likely to go down where the ship sank. As a result human remains are rare within ancient shipwrecks. Only a couple of wrecks actually contain human remains: Parker 1992, 263 #661; 451 #1230.

absence of evidence only indicates that the transportation of slaves upon the sea was unlikely to have been dependent upon specific slave ships. Merchants like Petronius' fictional Trimalchio probably dealt with a variety of goods including slaves rather than specialising.<sup>117</sup>

In the beginning of the Atlantic slave trade (roughly the 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries) slaves tended to be shipped via different agents from point to point so that a slave taken in West Africa may be sent to the Cape Verde Islands, then to the Canary Islands, then to Spain/Portugal, then to the Azores and then finally to the New World where a similar series of short haul journeys would conduct them to the interiors of South America.<sup>118</sup> Some factors made this method of transporting slaves along a staggered journey, calling at several ports (*cabotage*) advantageous over a long haul method. First, the technology for long sea voyages was less developed than later periods and the shorter the journey the better the condition of the ship before it could be repaired in port. Second, there were still many places that used slaves in Europe and the Atlantic islands where at this time important manufacturers of cash crops such as sugar, which used slave labour for farming these crops. Third, only certain people were permitted to trade in certain places such as the *Lançados* in Africa, Portuguese in the Cape Verde Islands or the Spanish in the Canary Islands. Eventually, advancements in long voyage seafaring; the establishment of British, French and Dutch colonies; and the decrease in slave consumption in Europe and the Atlantic islands meant single trading vessels were able, and willing, to undergo the notorious triangular trade route.<sup>119</sup> Like the slave traders of the 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, the mariners that traded between India and Egypt practiced a system of *cabotage*. According to the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* traders passed through several different ports trading slaves in both directions.<sup>120</sup> The common factor for the preference of the *cabotage* method of trading slaves was the existence of several different markets dotted along a single journey.

---

<sup>117</sup> Petr. *Satyr.* 76.6. Joshel 2010, 91-2. It is important to note that the shipwreck survey of Parker 1992, *passim* reveals that in roughly half the wrecks only a single commodity was identified, but this could be due to preservation. Wine, oil and, on occasion, other foodstuffs were kept in *amphorae* which are typically all that remains of wrecks, other items such as lentils, grains, livestock and slaves would not be preserved or necessarily sink with a deck-less ship.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Thomas 1997, 116f. For African conflicts contributing towards the supply of the trans-Atlantic slaves trade see Thornton 1999.

<sup>119</sup> Thomas 1997, 116f.

<sup>120</sup> For a translation and commentary of the text see Casson 1989. Ports that traded slaves included Malaô on which exported slaves on rare occasions (8.30); from Opônê better-quality slaves were exported mainly to Egypt (13.4); an island named Dioscuridês imported female slaves due to a shortage from India and the Greek traders operating in the region (30.23-4); Omana exported slaves to Arabia and Barygaza (36.11-2). Ozênê imported female slaves to serve as concubines for the king of Barygaza along with slave musicians (49.1).

Inevitably the lack of written and material evidence limits our current understanding of the Roman slave trade.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore it is difficult to differentiate between material evidence associated with the trafficking of captives and that of other sources of slaves. Slave merchants are also hard to identify, and it is likely that the vast majority of human traffickers were not specialists in human wares. The conditions following a mass enslavement favoured smaller traders who were used to trading small numbers of slaves in multiple markets. The sudden flood of slaves in one area may have compelled them to take on more slaves than they typically would have, but these would have been purchased for considerably less, and they could have fanned out from the area of capture to bring the slaves to markets more advantageous to the seller.<sup>122</sup> What is clear is that mass enslavements did not require large or permanent markets. Instead a number of buyers from a range of nationalities and a myriad of intended markets converged on the auction of captives creating a highly ramified market that spread throughout the Mediterranean with Rome as a central rather than a sole market.<sup>123</sup>

---

<sup>121</sup> Finley 1968, 231; George 2011, 391.

<sup>122</sup> It is also worth noting that slaves carried in fewer numbers were less likely to perish. In the editor's notes to the 18<sup>th</sup> century essay on the British slave trade of Thomas Clarkson 1786, 129 it was noted that slave mortality was generally believed to be one in five aboard English vessels, whereas French slave ships, which were typically larger, the mortality rate was far worse.

<sup>123</sup> So Braund 2011, 113 also summarises the Greek slave supply as a "much-ramified" market. I can see no reason why the Roman period would dry up the slave systems already in place apart from its superior draw upon the market.

## Conclusion

### *The War Captive Contribution to the Slave Supply*

The paucity in the sources relating to captures, specifically the lack of consistency in reporting the numbers taken, as well as the outcome of their capture, makes it difficult to assess the significance of this source of supply.<sup>1</sup> Given our inability to accurately estimate the number of slaves at any one time, we cannot, even if reliable evidence for enslavement numbers were available, equate (with any real accuracy) the contributing value of captives to the slave supply. However, if the figures are taken in total and can be significantly reduced (cut in half by my estimate), then something, albeit more algorithmic in style, can be said regarding the captive slave supply – it was considerably less important to the maintenance of slave numbers in Italy than most historians have believed.

Demographers have attempted to produce total figures for slaves in Italy and the Empire as a whole. Figures for the slave population in Italy have been developed comprehensively from a range of data, but for the Empire the total population has been speciously built on a mediation between the high numbers assumed in Italy and the low figures evidenced in Egypt, the only province outside Italy for which we have enough material evidence to construct a quantifiable slave population.<sup>2</sup> Demographic evidence outside of metropolitan Rome is very limited in the period covered in this study, and is generally restricted to later remarks on the findings of censuses from the Imperial period.<sup>3</sup> For modern demographers the analysis of the Roman population, and particularly of the slave population, has been confined to the first century BC and the early Imperial period, as there is a greater range of data concerning populations in the ancient sources from this time. Since the extent of Roman dominion was limited to peninsular Italy and Sicily for much of the Republican period to 146 BC, only the slave population for Italy, rather than the wider Empire figure, needs to be considered here. Fortunately, the work of Beloch and Brunt also included Sicily, the islands of Corsica and Sardinia and Cisalpine Gaul, and so a more accurate picture of the slave and free populations within Roman

---

<sup>1</sup> Noted by Scheidel 2011, 294-9.

<sup>2</sup> The slave population is calculated based on the slave presence in the census returns preserved at Oxyrhynchus, see Bagnall *et al.* 1997, 98; Bagnal & Frier 1994, 49-71.

<sup>3</sup> For references in the sources to these returns and a summation of their figures see Frank 1930, 313-24; Brunt 1971, 61-99.

## Conclusion

controlled territory up to the mid second century can be made. The demand for slaves in Sicily, which was well known to have utilised slave labour in agriculture, would greatly affect the demand for slaves during the period covered in this study.<sup>4</sup> For the later half of the second century BC assessing the demand for slaves within Roman territory is complicated by the acquisition of North Africa, which from the end of the second century, was also known for estate style farming.<sup>5</sup>

Unlike the free population, which can be determined (at least roughly) through the census data, there is no straightforward means of estimating the number of slaves. Overall slave numbers for Rome or Italy are never mentioned by written sources. Instead, the slave population must be determined by establishing the proportion of slaves in the total population. Establishing a *correct* proportionality is also difficult. Though we have at least some indication of the number of slaves in specific locations, it is difficult to establish the proportion for a wider region, inclusive of multiple rural and metropolitan populations. At least ancient writers give us some rough figures to work with. In the second century AD the physician Galen noted that the city of Pergamum contained 40,000 citizens and that if ‘women and slaves’ were added to the citizens, the total came to about 120,000.<sup>6</sup> This led Brunt to estimate that slaves comprised 1/3 of the Pergamene population, considering Pergamum’s wealth, it is likely they had a higher proportion of slaves than most Mediterranean cities; Brunt believed Rome to have an even higher total.<sup>7</sup> Dionysius had commented that in 493 BC the citizens of Rome amounted to 110,000 and represented around a quarter of the total population.<sup>8</sup> Brunt took this figure as supportive of an early presence of the 1/3 slave proportion. However in doing so, Brunt may have equally underestimated the size of the free ‘non-citizens’ (women and children).<sup>9</sup> Free males not counted as citizens would also imply a higher proportion of women and children within this undefined group so that the proportion of slaves may be significantly reduced in Dionysius’ observation.

---

<sup>4</sup> For farming methods in Sicily and the common use of slave labour see White 1967, 75; 1970, 75-6; Finley 1968, 131.

<sup>5</sup> For farming and slave use in North Africa (*circum* Carthage) see Diod. Sic. 20.8.3-4; Kehoe 1988, 24-7. A Carthaginian agronomist named Mago was known to have influenced Roman studies on the subject (Varro *Rust.* 1.1.10; 2.1.27), cf. White 1970, 18.

<sup>6</sup> Galen. 5.49. Ignoring children in this estimate (Mattern 2013, 125), the ratio is equal between citizens, women and slaves, see Brunt, 1971, 124; Westermann 1955, 87.

<sup>7</sup> Brunt 1971, 124.

<sup>8</sup> Dion. Hal. 6.96.4.

<sup>9</sup> Brunt 1971, 124 suggested that Dionysius was comparing fifth century Rome to equivalent Greek cities of his day.

## Conclusion

Evidence for an extensive slave population in the later Republic is supported by the size of Spartacus' army, which Beloch estimated at around 120,000 and Brunt at 150,000.<sup>10</sup> Surprisingly the sudden loss of so many slaves was never commented on in the sources and Brunt felt that the loss of such a large number of slaves would only pass comment if the total population was high enough that 150,000 represented only a minor fraction. Apart from these grandiose statements, smaller, and decidedly less boastful, examples of slave numbers contribute empirically to give us some indication of the overall slave population. This has been especially the case from papyrological evidence in Egypt, from which regional census for the purpose of tax collection recorded the number of slaves in households; this provides ample evidence for slave holding by individuals from the first century BC outside Italy.<sup>11</sup>

The total number of slaves has been calculated by estimating the number of citizens and then identifying a proportion of slaves in relation to this figure, this is usually equal to the number of citizens and is useless when accounting for widespread granting of citizenship as occurred from the first century onwards.<sup>12</sup> Another approach has been to analyse the subsistence capacity of Italy thereby calculating the number of people which could be supported, again with an assumed slave to free ratio. This second approach proposed by de la Mallé in 1870 was a significant check on Blair's *presumed* total of nearly 21 million slaves to 7 million free.<sup>13</sup> Based on the amount of food produced and imported to Italy and a tax imposed on slaves,<sup>14</sup> Beloch estimated that the slave population was approximately 2 million out of a total of 4.5 million inhabitants (excluding Gallia Cisalpina).<sup>15</sup> Brunt rejected this, but then tenuously and without supportive evidence suggested that the slave population was closer to 3 million out of a total of 7.5 million (including Gallia Cisalpina).<sup>16</sup> More recently Scheidel has calculated slave numbers through more aggregated methods and arrived at an estimate of between 1 and 1.5 million for Roman Italy.<sup>17</sup> The reduction of slave numbers from Brunt's estimate to Scheidel's is a result of a decreased allowance for the proportion of slaves in rural Italy. Traditionally it was argued that the majority of slaves were occupied in farming,

---

<sup>10</sup> Beloch 1886, 415-418; Brunt 1971, 122; 287-8.

<sup>11</sup> For examples see Westermann 1955, 887-89; Scheidel 2011, 291-2.

<sup>12</sup> Particularly the increase of 463,000 in 85 BC (Jerome 61.173.4) to 900,000 in 69 BC (Liv. *Per.* 98) and 4,063,000 in 28 BC (August. *Res Gest.* 2.2).

<sup>13</sup> Blair 1833, 15 n. B; de la Mallé 1840, 252. See also Scheidel 2001, 5; 2005, 64. The difficulty in this method is quantifying the efficiency and capacity of Roman farming methods.

<sup>14</sup> Tax on slaves (Cass. Dio 47.14.16), cf. Brunt 1971 123.

<sup>15</sup> Beloch 1886, 415-18; cf. Brunt 1971, 122-4.

<sup>16</sup> Brunt 1971, 124.

<sup>17</sup> Scheidel 2005, 77. Though Scheidel is more comfortable with an overall figure of roughly 10% of the empire's population.

## Conclusion

particularly in plantation style farming.<sup>18</sup> However, more recently the extent of slaves within the rural population, particularly in a disproportionate manner with the metropolitan Rome has been questioned by Jongman, who believes our interpretation of the Roman model has been too heavily influenced by American plantation systems.<sup>19</sup> Jongman points to the rich epigraphic evidence for slaves and freedmen over variant professions making them prevalent at all levels, not to mention the large staffs of Rome's elite and middle classes which could have accounted for the interpretation of such a significant population.<sup>20</sup>

Of course a figure of between 1 and 3 million slaves in Italy represents the high watermark of slaves in Italy.<sup>21</sup> Figures for the slave population earlier than the first century BC are highly conjectural, if we are to accept the slave to citizen ratio (evident in a 1/3 slave populace) then there were approximately 250,000 slaves in 323 BC (during the Second Samnite War)<sup>22</sup> and 270,000 in 234 BC. As a comparison with this method, Brunt estimated that the slave population around 225 BC was 500,000,<sup>23</sup> and Scheidel with more scientific deduction reasoned that the population was more likely to be around 300,000 in 225 BC.<sup>24</sup> Precision aside, all demographic studies indicate that the slave population increased substantially from a small population in early Rome to a very large population in the first century. Such a growth would see, at the lower end, 300,000 rise to 1 million over 200 years at a annual rate of 0.6%, and at the higher end, from 500,000 to 3 million at a rate of 0.9%.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Brunt 1971, 124-5; Harris 1999, 69; Hopkins 1978, 105f.; Rathbone 1983, 160-8. Martin 1972, 267-98. White 1970, 350f. Too much has perhaps been made of the pervasiveness of chained field hands (*compediti*) Cato *Agr.* 56 Columella *Rust.* 1.18.6; Plin *HN* 18.4, cf. Wiedemann 1981, 130. For a re-evaluation fo this see Launaro 2011. Likewise a reassessment of villa farming favourable to reproduction and the employment of women has been made by Roth 2007.

<sup>19</sup> Jongman 2003, 116. See also Launaro 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Jongman 2003, 116-119.

<sup>21</sup> Hin 2008, 187-238 and Lo Cascio 1994, 23-40 estimates of 1.5 and 1.8 million slaves in Italy also fall within this range. However, Lo Cascio importantly argued that Italy had a free population in the first century BC of nearly 12 million, making the proportion of slaves significantly lower than other estimates. Few have agreed with Lo Cascio's high estimate of the Italian population.

<sup>22</sup> Liv. 9.19.2. If we reverse the calculation below to show -0.6% then the population size in 323 BC would be approximately 167,000 slaves.

<sup>23</sup> This keeps with his favoured 40% proportion of slaves in the population. The free population is deduced from the census figure of 234 BC and the manpower of Rome and her allies in 225 BC according to Polyb. 2.24.1-17, see Beloch 1886, 413f.

<sup>24</sup> Scheidel 2005, 76, based on 7% of the population being slaves as evident in the census records for the population outside of Alexandria, deduced from *P. Oxy* 984, cf. Scheidel 2001, 149 n.2. For doubts over this figure and the use of Egypt as a rural model see Harris 1999, 64-5.

<sup>25</sup> The annual increase must take into account exponential growth, therefore the calculation I have used is the standard equation:  $P(t) = P_0 e^{rt}$ . End population = P (1 or 3 million), time expressed in years = t (200), Initial population =  $P_0$  (300,000 or 500,000), growth rate = r. But this is of course a steady growth rate and useful only as a hypothetical guide. We might compare the growth rate assumed for the slave population in Rome to the



## Conclusion

Boese believed that the large scale acquisition of war captives to be the impetus behind increasing the slave population, and the chief means of supply during the early to mid-Republic.<sup>26</sup> According to him, enslavement through capture in war amounted to 1.8 million slaves between 200 BC and 31 BC, nearly 2/3 his estimated total slave supply.<sup>27</sup> More recently Scheidel compiled a list of enslavements beginning with the Third Samnite War to illustrate how the Roman slave supply was conducted on a large scale from the beginning of the third century BC.<sup>28</sup> For the period spanning 297-167 BC he estimates that between 672,000 and 731,000 captives were enslaved.<sup>29</sup> Taken together the tallies of Boese and Scheidel suggest the enslavement of nearly 2.4 million captives.<sup>30</sup>

Boese's estimates favour the inflated figures given in the sources, his total takes into account one million enslaved in Gaul by Caesar<sup>31</sup> and 150,000 captured at Aquae Sextiae by Marius in 102 BC;<sup>32</sup> the figures given for Greece account for the enslavement of all persons captured, including those that were said to be recovered as well as the extraordinary figure of 150,000 enslaved at Epirus (which I have earlier cautioned against accepting).<sup>33</sup> It is difficult to establish how he derives the tally of 85,000 for Spain and 145,000 for Sardinia, Sicily and Africa without considerable inflation of the number of captives taken in the rare instances where figures were actually given by the sources.<sup>34</sup> In the previous chapters the interpretation that the Romans enslaved all the prisoners of war has been argued against, particularly the wholesale enslavement of captives during the Third Samnite War and the First and Second

---

staggering growth rate of the world's population at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (2000-5), which according to the CIA fact book of 2009, was roughly 1%.

<sup>26</sup> Boese 1973, 51-3.

<sup>27</sup> Boese 1973, 81 gives a breakdown of these figures (p.87-8): 225,000 from Illyria, Greece and Macedon; 200,000 from Asia minor; 75-150,000 in Northern Italy; 85,000 in Spain; 1 million from Gaul; 85-145,000 from Sardinia, Sicily and Africa.

<sup>28</sup> Scheidel 2011, 295.

<sup>29</sup> Scheidel 2011, 295 *estimates*: 58-77,000 Third Samnite War; 107-133,000 First Punic War; 32,000 Gallic War; 172-186,000 Second Punic War; 153,000 Wars in Spain, Macedon, Gaul and Asia; 150,000 from Epirus.

<sup>30</sup> 150,000 from Epirus and 153,000 from various wars cited by Scheidel 2011, 295. These overlap with Boese's totals.

<sup>31</sup> App. *Gall.* 2.

<sup>32</sup> 150,000 according to Liv. *Per.* 68; interestingly Eutrop. 5.1.4 only puts the figure at 80,000 *capta*, and Oros. 5.16.20 at 60,000; Plut. *Mar.* 21.2 gives a figure of over 100,000 either killed or captured. Westermann 1955, 62 was also sceptical of Livy's figures. We could add 8,000 captured in a prior skirmish, Flor. 1.38.15; Oros. 5.16.12.

<sup>33</sup> For my scepticism of this figure in general see chapt. 6.

<sup>34</sup> Boese 1973, 87 cites Beloch's population estimates for these regions as the basis for his calculations. This may be an exaggeration of the size of Spanish cities captured, as well as the number of Numidians taken during the war with them. Sallust is not forthcoming with figures. For captures in the Jugurthine war see Sall. *Iug.* 69.3; 74.2; 91.6; 101.11. For enslavements in Spain calculated by Boese, but not covered in this study, see App. *Hispan.* 68; 77; 98; 99; Plut. *Sert.* 3.5. The only raw figure we have for Spain is from Oros. 5.5.12 6,000 Lusitanians captured in 137 BC.

## Conclusion

Punic Wars. It has been put forward that only a small fraction of the captives taken by the Romans were, in fact, enslaved during these three conflicts. A tentative figure of 100,000 will be used to reflect this reduction (and I would be happy with a lower figure). Boese's estimates for eastern enslavements and those in Spain, Africa and Sardinia could also be reduced by as much as half. The figure of 150,000 enslaved Epirotes has been rejected as impossible and likewise the million enslaved Gauls, which has been questioned by others, should perhaps be reduced to 150,000.<sup>35</sup> In total, for a period approximately 300 – 100 BC, it is not unreasonable to believe that fewer than 1 million captives were actually enslaved with 500,000 serving as a conservative benchmark.

In order to understand the implication of this much reduced figure, it is necessary to understand what the slave demand was. A reduction in the slave population, *ipso facto* the minimum slave demand, was affected by two key factors: death and manumission. Mortality rates in the ancient world are not easy to identify, we know that they are low by modern comparison, but this is, in part, skewed by the high infant mortality rate.<sup>36</sup> Likewise class/wealth may have played a more significant role, particularly with regards to the servile class who may not have been as well-nourished as other classes.<sup>37</sup> The highest death rate in New World slavery was 15% amongst new arrivals to the West Indies during the eighteenth century, but generally the death rate was closer to 5%; death rates amongst slaves in the 'New World' were typically 1-3% higher than that of the free population.<sup>38</sup> It is unlikely that the mortality rate for slaves in Rome would fall below the 19<sup>th</sup> century average, and so it may serve as a base estimate (a higher mortality rate would increase the need for imports, only further proving the point to be made). Manumission rates are similarly difficult to establish, the rate of manumission and the affect upon slave reproduction have been frequently debated

---

<sup>35</sup> Westermann 1955, 62; Boese 1973, 84 is sceptical. For enslavements in Gaul: 53,000 Aduatuci sold (Caes. *B. Gall.* 2.33.7); Venetti sold into slavery (3.16.4); few escape capture at Genabum (7.11.8); and captives from Alesia given to soldiers (7.89.5). Also Ceasar ordered his troops to leave their slaves behind when leaving Italy to confront Pompey (Caes. *B. Civ.* 3.6), these were not necessarily acquired through war and cannot have amounted to enough to justify a million slaves, *contra* Boese 1973, 102 n.170. Cf. Volkmann 1990, 51-2.

<sup>36</sup> See Parkin 2013, 40-61; 1992, 93; Harlow & Laurence 2002, 7-8. In America in 1850, the only antebellum census for which infant mortality can be assessed, the infant mortality for the white population was 21.6 % and for the black population (mostly slaves) 34%, see Steckel 1986, 427-65.

<sup>37</sup> Harris 1980, 118; Schumacher 2001, 42, *contra* Scheidel 2005, 74.

<sup>38</sup> For slave mortality in the West Indies see Ward 1988, 127. Arriving at overall mortality rates is difficult given the reporting of deaths during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, see Pope 1992, 267-8. For 19<sup>th</sup> century population statistics see Klein 2004, *passim*. As a comparison the current death rate in the United Kingdom is 0.93% (9.33 deaths/1,000 population). Mortality rates may also have varied between urban and rural populations, see Scheidel 2005, 74.

## Conclusion

by scholars.<sup>39</sup> There was obviously variance in the rate of manumission from year to year,<sup>40</sup> which would have changed the annual shortfall of slaves, however a rough estimate still demonstrates the point being made, as it is *not* affected by a significant drop or increase in the *annual* need for slaves. For the purpose of moderation, Scheidel’s intermediate estimate for manumission is used, which suggests 10% of slaves were manumitted by the age of 25 with a further 10% every five years, is used.<sup>41</sup> Overall Scheidel used 0.57% for determining the annual manumission rate,<sup>42</sup> but for easier estimation, a figure of .5% is used. The manumission rate added to the mortality rate would produce an annual deficit of 5.5%. With the annual increase in the population added, we may hypothetically interpret the annual need for slaves during the first three centuries BC between 5-6%. With an initial population of 300,000 slaves, the annual need would have been 18,000 and a population of 1 million would have required approximately 60,000 per annum. The table below shows the annual slave demand and the contribution of war captives towards that demand over the period 299 – 50 BC.

### IV. Captive Contribution to the Slave Supply

Years	Slave Pop. (Median) <sup>43</sup>	Annual Need (6%)	War Captives per annum		Contribution %
			High	Low	
299-250 BC	262,000	15,720	5,000	2,500	31.8-15.9%
249-200 BC	354,000	21,240	6,000	3,500	28.3-16.5%
199-150 BC	478,000	28,680	7,000	3,000	24.4-10.5%
149-100 BC	645,000	38,700	8,000	4,000	20.7-10.3%
99-50 BC	870,000	52,200	22,000	8,000	42.2-15.3%
Total:			2.4 million	1.05 million	

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Wiedemann 1985, 162-175. Alföldi 1972, 114 suggested that almost all slaves could expect to be manumitted. See Harris 1999, 70.

<sup>40</sup> Restrictions placed on manumission by Augustus suggest a high rate of manumission at the end of the first century BC necessitating its regulation through the *Lex Fufia Caninia* in 2 BC (Gaius *Inst.* 1.42) and the *Lex Aelia Sentia* in AD 4 (Gaius *Inst.* 1.1.17).

<sup>41</sup> Scheidel 1997, 160.

<sup>42</sup> Scheidel 1997, 163 (5.7 per 1,000). He has since adjusted this to a higher manumission rate of 0.7% and 1.75% for the rural and urban populations respectively, see Scheidel 2005, 76.

<sup>43</sup> Assuming an end population of 1,000,000 in 50 BC and rounded to the nearest 1,000 using the equation  $P(t)=P_0e^{rt}$ , with intervals of 50 years.

## Conclusion

The table above illustrates the importance of alternative supplies of slaves apart from capture in war. Importantly this also shows that war captives, even by the highest estimates (ignoring the anomaly created by Caesar's million), only contributed at most a third of the necessary slaves, and by the lower estimate, favoured in this study, only about a sixth. Furthermore, the acquisition of war captives were not as well spread out as the above table implies. Warfare enslavements were sporadic, even from the third century, when there is ample evidence regarding warfare, there are still considerable gaps of time between enslavements.

Such gaps include: ten years elapsed between the enslavement of the women and children of the Senones in 284 BC and the possible enslavement of Pyrrhus' soldiers after Beneventum.<sup>44</sup> During the First Punic War over a decade elapses between the capture of Punic soldiers at Himera in 252 BC and the sea battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC.<sup>45</sup> During the second century twelve years elapsed between the supposed enslavement of Epirus in 167 and the capture of Delminium in 155 BC.<sup>46</sup> After the siege of Numantia in 133 BC it is more than a decade before the next possible enslavement at Vindalium in 121 BC.<sup>47</sup> The gaps between enslavements increase during the First century so that it is more than 20 years between the reduction of Mithridates followers in 86 BC and the possible enslavement of Jews at Jerusalem by Pompey in 63 BC,<sup>48</sup> likewise the enslavement of Lycians by Brutus in 42 BC is not repeated until the enslavement of the Salassi by the general Varro in 25 BC.<sup>49</sup> Minor raiding or unrecorded enslavements could have made up some shortfall, but these cannot have negated the fact that the demand for slaves was more steady than their acquisition through Roman war efforts.

This significant reduction in the supply of slaves through war captives increased the demand upon other sources of slaves, these included: self-sale, child exposure, enslavement for debt or as punishment, trade from outside the empire, kidnapping/piracy and reproduction.<sup>50</sup> It is

---

<sup>44</sup> Senones, App. *Sam.* 13; *Gall.* 9; Liv. *Per.* 12; Oros. 3.22.12-15; Polyb. 2.19.11; Beneventum Oros. 4.2.6.

<sup>45</sup> Himera Diod. 23.21.1; Zon 8.14. Aegates Islands Diod. 24.11.2; Eutrop. 2.27; Oros. 4.10.7; Polyb. 1.61.6-8.

<sup>46</sup> Epirus App. *Ill.* 29.4; Liv. 45.34.5; Polyb. 30.15; Strab. 7.7.3. Delminium Zon. 9.25.

<sup>47</sup> Numantia App. *Hisp.* 98. Vindalium Oros. 5.13.3.

<sup>48</sup> Followers of Mithridates App. *Mithr.* 61; Jerusalem Philo *legatio ad Gaium* 23.

<sup>49</sup> Lycian cities reduced by Brutus (App. *BC* 4.80; Plut. *Brut.* 31.6) similarly Cassius had reduced Tarsus to raise funds the year before (App. *BC* 4.63-4; Cass. Dio 47.31.1-4). The Salassi (Cass. Dio 53.5.4; Strab. 4.6.7; Suet. *Aug.* 21).

<sup>50</sup> Other sources of slaves: cf. Harris 1980, *passim* 1999, *passim* Scheidel 2011, 297-300 Boese 1973, 51-71; Harril 1995, 31-42. Dio Chrs. *Or.* 14-15 discusses the sources of slaves in his discourse on the stoic concept of freedom. August. *De Civ.* 1.4-6 emphasises the enslavement of war captives. Reproduction as the paramount source of slaves has been extensively argued by Shtaerman 1964, particularly 70, see further Shtaerman & Trofimova 1975, 17-24; Scheidel 1997, 2005. *Contra* De Martino 1979, 76-8, 263-91. Harris

## Conclusion

beyond the scope of this study to analyse the individual contributions of each of these. Indeed, Scheidel has recently noted that such studies “run the risk of circularity; yet in the absence of comparative contextualisation, they invite arbitrary implausibility; it may be hard if not impossible to link broad models to qualitative source references; and models may at best produce a range of competing probabilities instead of a single authoritative reconstruction.”<sup>51</sup>

Whilst enslavement directly through war was limited, the disruption caused by warfare would have rendered alternative sources more plausible. An increase in orphans, the destruction of property (particularly the destruction of food supplies) and opportunistic predation in the unsettled wake of a war would have made child abandonment, along with self-sale and kidnapping far more common than during normal conditions. At the same time, Rome would have been enriched by booty making it an ideal market for the traders capitalising on the aforementioned unfortunate people. Beyond the reduction of the overall contribution of war captives to the slave supply, another implication of this study is the widespread reduction of captured women and children, as compared to the adult men. In repeated examples detailed in the preceding chapters, the male population within enemy cities was systematically reduced through a siege and often slaughtered in the taking of cities. The enslavement of women and children was more common, and considering the biological trend of adult men representing 30% of any given population, it is difficult to see how the minority, further diminished by war, would somehow represent the majority of captives.<sup>52</sup> There is not a single reference to men being enslaved whilst the women and children were explicitly said not to have been.

Overall the idea that there was an imbalanced sex ratio amongst the slave population is based on the highly circumstantial prevalence of inscriptions commemorating male rather than female slaves.<sup>53</sup> Harris presumes a gender bias on the part of all slave owners so that a

---

1999, 62; 1994, 1-22 has suggested that child abandonment represented a considerable contribution to the supply (Scheidel 1997, 165 accused Harris of over emphasising these as a source of slaves. cf. Harris’ rebuttal 1999, 62f.). For imports see Kolendo 2001, 39-52. Some studies have emphasised the role played by pirates and kidnappers such as Boese 1973, 61-71; Avidov 1997, 5-55; De Souza 1999, 97-148. Alföldi 1972, 125 stresses the importance of self-sale as a major contribution to the supply, believing Dio Chrys. *Or.* 15.23.

<sup>51</sup> Scheidel 2011, 287.

<sup>52</sup> *Pace* Harris 1999, 70 who states that male war prisoners were likely more numerous without any evidence to support such a statement. Cf. Scheidel 2005, 72 n. 56. Scheidel draws a comparison to West African captor societies in which women were more prevalent amongst those taken (pg. 72 n. 58). Cf. Manning 1990, 41-6.

<sup>53</sup> Harris 1999, 69 n. 57, based on the commemoration of slaves from the household of Livia, the *servi publici* of the Statilii and Volussi (Treggiari 1975, 58f) and the *servi familia Caesaris* (Weaver 1972, 172). Harris 1999, 69 admits that the “slaves of the super-rich might be atypical,” but nonetheless he uses the gender imbalance in commemorations as the basis for his theory on a disproportionate sex ratio. At the same time he plays down the suggestion of *ste. Croix* 1981, 588 that Columella showed a balanced consideration for male and female

## Conclusion

preference towards male slaves is further factored by the exposure of more female slave infants than males, along with a predilection for the importation of men over women. If this prejudice is removed, it is more likely that a balanced gender ratio was present; if not, a ratio favourable towards women, which was surely augmented by occasional introduction of war captives of a female majority.<sup>54</sup>

Our interpretation of the Roman slave supply over the *Longue durée* is very similar to that of American slavery. In the American system the demand for slaves was filled primarily from African imports for the period preceding 1808, but with the closure of slave importations, a strict reliance upon natural reproduction became necessary.<sup>55</sup> Despite the closure of a major contribution to the supply, the slave population actually grew in America from roughly 890,000 in 1800 to 4 million in 1860. This striking statistic has been the most supportive example for theories regarding reproduction as the chief means of supply in maintaining the Roman slave population.<sup>56</sup>

Virtually all historians have accepted the idea that prior to the first century BC the demand was met through contributions of captives to the supply.<sup>57</sup> Whilst some historians have tried to demonstrate that war captives still represented a significant contribution to the slave supply in the late Republic and Principate,<sup>58</sup> it is generally agreed that, by the establishment of *pax Romana*, and through it the effective cessation of wars of conquest; the supply of captives dwindled, thereby forcing reliance upon other means of supply. The difficulty of this is that

---

labour on plantations. The comments of Bradley 1984, 73-6 regarding the bias of the agronomists towards traditional female activities seems pertinent here.

<sup>54</sup> Scheidel 2005, 71 has emphasised the fact that a natural balance between the sexes will inevitably occur sighting the example of the 18<sup>th</sup> century slave population of South Carolina. For the population data see Morgan 1998, 82.

<sup>55</sup> The United States Constitution (Article 1.9) protected the slave trade for 20 years (1776-1796) and was then prohibited by an act of congress (Congress 9.2.22) effective in 1808. Likewise the trade was banned by an act of Parliament in 1807 (47, George III Sess. 1 c.36) The treaty of Paris 1814 also held a provision banning French trade, followed by a ban for slave trading by the Spanish north of the equator in 1820. Various other countries banned the trade by their nationals in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century including Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands.

<sup>56</sup> On purpose by Scheidel 1997, 2005, 2011; and by circumstance Shtaerman & Trofimova 1975, 17-24. For slave numbers in America see *US Decennial Census Statistics* which recorded slave numbers in all states and recognised territories from 1790-1860 the last census prior to abolition. The rise in slaves was greatest between 1800 and 1810 at 38% (perhaps speculation over the impending ban on the trade, however the population rose on average by 26% every 10 years. This average is lower than the rise in the free population which was on average 36% every 10 years. This figure neglects to account for immigration. Between 1851 and 1860 over 2.5 million immigrants became naturalised citizens contributing a 13% increase in the population so that the reproduction rate of free persons was very close to that of the slave population (24.5% free versus 22.1% slave). For immigration see the *US Department of Homeland Security 2008 Yearbook of Immigration statistics*, 5 Table 1.

<sup>57</sup> Wallon 1847, 397-398; Westermann 1955, 84; Harris 1980 121-2; 1999 Scheidel 1997.

<sup>58</sup> Bradley, 2004, 298-318 (particularly his argument at pg. 299); Boese 1973, 104-42; Scheidel 2011 295-6.

## Conclusion

during the period of a steady reduction in captives the number of slaves steadily grew so that at the peak of slave population there was almost no supply from captives. The above analysis indicates that, even if the high figures for wartime enslavements are accepted, the supply of slaves needed to maintain (and grow) could have only been met fractionally through war captives. A reduction in the number of captives taken during the Republic, and a sex ratio tipped towards females of those enslaved, would suggest a greater reliance upon reproduction.

\* \* \*

In Conclusion, war captives were a less significant contribution to the slave supply of Rome than has been commonly believed by historians. As demonstrated in this study, captivity did not *always* result in enslavement. Repeated examples show that ransom, release and execution were alternative measures carried out by Roman captors. During the early Republic, the Romans often released captives, albeit with the humiliation of passing *sub iugum*, with an understanding that leniency to the defeated eased the transition of incorporation into their hegemony.<sup>59</sup> Leniency continued throughout the Republic to be an attribute the Romans wished to portray to other nations. According to Pausanias, the destruction of the Greek cities by P. Villius Tappulus in 199 BC was against the orders of the *senatus consultum*, and as a consequence Flamininus was sent to replace him.<sup>60</sup> Greek ‘freedom’ became the *casus belli* for Roman involvement in Greece after the First Macedonian War. On fifteen separate occasions the Romans released their captives without ransom before 146 BC.<sup>61</sup>

Ransom was also far more common in Roman warfare than is typically portrayed. Though there are only five clear-cut examples of wholesale ransom following the capture of prisoners prior to 146 BC, there is ample evidence that ransom took place more frequently below state level. Even in Rome, where ransom was looked down on, there was still a system of redemption, and thus a considerable amount of interest by Roman jurists in explaining it.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> For release see Chapter 2. For Roman policy in the treatment of captives in the early period see Chapter 5.

<sup>60</sup> Paus. 7.7.9. Flamininus proclaimed the ‘liberation’ of Greeks from Macedon, see Eckstein 2012, 289-97.

<sup>61</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>62</sup> *Dig.* 49.15 *Ius Postliminii*.

## Conclusion

Ransom was also authorized at the conclusion of treaties,<sup>63</sup> and the Romans were even willing to exchange prisoners with the enemy.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, instances of capture did not necessarily lead to the same wholesale disposal of all the captives. Many examples given above, indicate that captives were commonly sorted by the Roman forces, either in rooting out rebel leaders,<sup>65</sup> isolating political factions or nationalities, or often in separating men, women, children and slaves from each other. As clearly demonstrated at New Carthage in 209 BC, where P. Cornelius Scipio (soon Africanus) released, without ransom, the Spaniards and kept the strong Carthaginians to man the Roman fleet; the latter were promised, after good service, that they would be released.<sup>66</sup>

An important aspect of Roman warfare, during the period covered in this study, is that Roman military strategy which led to outward expansion was directed towards the capture of towns and cities. The frequency of sieges and battles near metropolitan centres, meant the Roman forces acquired civilian captives as often as they took enemy troops. Women and children were frequently enslaved where their male counterparts were killed or executed. The fear of the capture and abuse of women and children after the men were slaughtered, led some communities to take drastic measures to deny themselves to Romans the human booty through their mass suicide.<sup>67</sup> For the most part, as so often in history, the women and children were ignored by ancient writers, but in occurrences of enslavement, where women are neglected by the sources, it can be inferred that they were very likely enslaved.

The enslavement of women and children suggests that the slave population of Rome was more reliant on reproduction to maintain itself. Too much of our understanding of the slave population, and our understanding of the development of Roman plantation style farming, is based upon a large influx of slaves. However, as Welwei has shown, the number of enslaved captives given by the sources cannot be trusted, and the figures for captives, as well as for

---

<sup>63</sup> For example following the First Punic War (Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5) and with Hiero in 264 BC (Polyb. 1.16.9).

<sup>64</sup> Exchange with Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.13.1), First Punic War (Liv. 22.23.6; Cass. Dio 57.15f.; 57.35f.) and during the second Punic War (Liv.30.43.8; *Per.* 19b; Zon. 8.16).

<sup>65</sup> Commonly led to their execution, see Chapter 2.

<sup>66</sup> Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17f.

<sup>67</sup> The Cantabrians (Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3), Xanthians (App. *BC* 4.80), at Astapa the citizens burned their possessions before committing mass suicide (App. *Iber.* 33; Livy 28.22.2-23.2). Likewise at Amisus, Callimachus set fire to the city (Plut. *Luc.*19). Mass suicide to evade capture by the Romans was a common feature in the Jewish Revolt according to Joseph. ( *BJ*. 3.132; 304-6; 338-9; 4.553; 6.414-419, most notably at Masada: Joseph. *BJ* 7.389-406).



## Conclusion

other battle statistics, should be consistently reduced by modern historians.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, as this study has shown, the result of capture was not always enslavement, and even enslavements were not necessarily permanent or long enough for a captive to be effectively utilised in Italian production. Thus, the contribution of wartime enslavements towards the growth and eventual maintenance of slavery in Italy was significantly less than has been traditionally believed.<sup>69</sup>

This reduction in the number of enslaved also indicates that the Romans, throughout the Republican period, did not actively seek to acquire slaves. Therefore, the Veians captured in 393 BC were not enslaved simply for the sake of maintaining an early slave population labouring on plantations, and it has been argued above that none were actually enslaved.<sup>70</sup> Likewise, the removal of debt bondage (*nexum*) at the end of the fourth century did not predicate the enslavement of captives during the Third Samnite War in the beginning of the third century.<sup>71</sup> By the second century BC, when large scale farming, utilising slave labour, was prevalent on the Italian Peninsula, the Roman forces were less eager to possess captives as slaves, and more eager to display leniency through release and ransom. It is hard to justify why the Romans would continually forsake the chance to acquire large numbers of slaves if there was a strong and essential demand for them in Italy. Even those captives unfortunate enough to fall into slavery were not necessarily utilised in and around Rome. The ubiquitous use of slaves in ancient societies meant Rome was never the sole market for slaves. North Africa, Sicily and Greece were also significant consumers of slaves.<sup>72</sup> Once Rome's conquest pushed eastwards, they also entered a long standing slave trade network in which captives could be distributed throughout the Mediterranean and hinterlands, rather than directly to Rome.<sup>73</sup>

Instances of large scale enslavement were sporadic and could not be counted upon to consistently supply the demand for, and the maintenance of, the slave population. The detracting factors aforementioned indicate that war captives were less important in driving

---

<sup>68</sup> Welwei 2000, *passim*, cf. the review of Rich 2005, 242-3.

<sup>69</sup> Bradley, 1984, 7-8; 1987, 43-4; 2004, 299; Brunt 1958, 166; 1971, 707; Hopkins 1978 8-15; Nicolet 1976, 214; ste. Croix 1981, 228-36; White 1970, 368-70.

<sup>70</sup> *Contra* Harris 1979, 59; Eder, 1990, 546f.; Volkmann 1990, 38. Cf. Cornell 1995, 320; Ogilvie 1965, 677; Welwei 2000, 32-5, see Chapter 4.

<sup>71</sup> *Contra* Harris, 1979, 59f.; Cornell 1989, 389; Oakley 2005a IV, 194; Scheidel 2011, 294-5.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapter 7 and Epilogue. Carthaginian farming in North Africa (Diod. Sic. 20.8.3-4, see Kehoe 1988, 24-7), Sicily (see White 1967, 75; 1970, 75-6; Finley 1968, 131), Greece (Hdt. 6.23; Thuc. 3.73; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26), see Kyratas 2011, 96-100.

<sup>73</sup> Braund 2011, 112f., see Chapter 7.

## Conclusion

the demand for slaves and for maintaining the slave population. Thus it can be seen that it was never a clear policy of Rome to wage war for the purpose of acquiring slaves.

## Appendix

### *References to Captives*

Below is a list of instances of capture by the Roman forces as included in this study. Notable instances of capture beyond 146 BC are also included, some of which are discussed within the above work. No guesses have been made regarding the outcome of capture. Unless it was explicitly remarked by a source that the captives were enslaved, ransomed, massacred/executed or released, they are by default listed as captured. With regards to captive numbers, the pertaining reference is cited (but not indicated) under the far right column. Multiple outcomes are listed vertically under the same city. Some citations are listed which are not necessarily informative with regards to the number of captives or outcome of their capture, but are included for context and comparative purposes.

<b>Date --BC--</b>	<b>Place/ Opposition</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Relevant References</b>
502	Cures (Sabines)	Captured	4,000	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 5.49.1
502	Cameria	Enslaved	-	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 5.49.5; Val. Max. 6.5.1; Zon. 7.13
498	Lake Regilus	Ransomed	6,000	Liv. 2.22.5
495	Pometia	Enslaved	-	Liv. 2.17.6; 2.25.5; Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 6.29.5.
467	Antium	Enslaved	-	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 9.56.5; 10.21.6; Liv. 3.6.1
457	Corbio	Released	-	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 10.24.7-8; Liv. 3.28.10; Flor. 1.5.13.
443	Ardea (Volscians)	Spared	-	Liv. 4.10.4
431	Volscians	Captured	-	Liv. 4.29.4
426	Fidenae	Enslaved	All	Liv. 4.34.4
425	Aequi	Enslaved	-	Diod. Sic. 12.64.2
405	Auxur	Captured	2,500	Liv. 4.59.7
393	Veii	Enslaved	All	Diod. Sic. 14.93.2; Liv. 5.22.1
388	Sutrium	Enslaved	All	Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. <i>Cam.</i> 35.1-36.1.
356	Etruscans	Captured	8,000	Liv. 7.17.9
356	Volscians	Enslaved	c.4,000	Liv. 7.27.8
320	Luceria	Spared	7,000	Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9
319	Satricum	Executed	-	Liv. 9.16.9; 26.33.10; Oros. 3.15.9-10
318	Canusium	Spared	-	Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4

## Appendix

318	Teanum	Spared	-	Liv. 9.20.4
314	Luceria	Executed	all	Liv. 9.26.3
313	Nola	Executed	200	Diod. Sic. 19.101.3; Liv. 9.28.6.
311	Cluviae	Massacred		Liv. 9.31.3
311	Talium	Captured	2,200	Diod. Sic. 20.26.3
310	Etruscans	Captured	many	Diod Sic. 20.35. 4
310	Perusia	Killed/ Captured	60,000	Diod. Sic. 20.35.4; Liv. 9.37.11; 40.19
308	Oriculum	Captured	Captured > Slain	Liv. 9.41.19
308	Allifae	Enslaved	7,000	Liv. 9.42.7-8
306	Silvium	Captured	5,000	Diod. Sic. 20.80.2;
305	Falernitas	Captured	>2,000	Diod. Sic. 20.90.4
305	Bovianum/ Bola	Captured	-	Diod. Sic. 20.90.4; Liv. 9.44.13
302	Aequi	Spared	-	Cic. <i>Off.</i> 1.32; Liv. 10.1.9; Strab. 5.3.4
301	Marsi	Spared	-	Liv. 10.3.5
297	Samnites	Captured	830	Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 2.4.2; Liv. 10.14.21
296	Cimetra	Captured	2,900	Liv.10.15.6
296	Murgantia	Captured	2,100	Liv.10.17.4
296	Samnium	Captured	1,500	Liv. 10.18.8
296	Samnites	Captured	2,120	Liv. 10.19.22
296	Samnites	Captured	2,500	Liv. 10.20.15
295	Sentinum	Captured	8,000	Liv. 10.29.17; Diod. Sic. 21.6.1 ( <i>FGrH</i> 76 .56); Flor. 1.12.5-7; Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 2.1.8; 4.5.15; Juv. 8.254-8; Oros. 3.21.6; Polyb. 2.19.6; Zon 8.1
295	Perusia	Ransom	1,740	Liv. 10.31.3
295	Samnites (Caiatia)	Captured	2,700	Liv. 10.31.7
294	Samnites	Captured	4,700	Liv.10.34.3
294	Interamna	Spared	7,800	Liv. 10.36.14
293	Rusellae	Captured	2,000	Liv 10.37.3
293	Amiternum	Captured	4,270	Liv. 10.39.3
293	Duronia	Captured	4,270-7,000	Eutrop. 2.9. Liv.10.39.4
293	Aquilonia	Captured	3,870	Liv. 10.42.5 ; Val. Max. 7.2.5; Zon. 8.1
293	Cominium	Captured	3,000-11,400	Liv. 10.43.8; Oros. 3.22.4. Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 2.4.1; Zon. 8.1
293	Velia, Palumbinum & Herculaneum	Killed/ Captured	>5,000	Liv. 10.45.11
293	Saepinum	Captured	<3,000	Liv. 10.45.14
292	Samnites	Captured	4,000	Oros. 3.22.10; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 11 ; Plut. <i>Fab. Max.</i> 24.3; Cass. Dio 36.31;
291	Venusia	Captured	6,200	Dion. Hal. 18.5.1
284	Senones	Enslaved	Women & Children	App. <i>Sam.</i> 13; <i>Gall.</i> 9; Liv. <i>Per</i> 12; Oros. 3.22.12-15; Polyb. 2.19.11

## Appendix

		Massacred	Men	Dion. Hal. <i>Ant. Rom.</i> 19.3.1
-				
275	Beneventum	Captured	33,000	Flor. 1.13.7; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 14; Oros. 4.2.6; Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 25.5; Zon. 8.6
272	Tarentum	Spared	-	Frontin. 3.3.1; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 15; Zon. 8.6
270	Rhegium	Executed	300	App. <i>Sam.</i> 21; Dion. Hal. 20.16; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 12; Polyb. 1.7.12; Val. Max. 2.7.15
269	Samnites	Executed	All	Dion. Hal. 20.17.2; Zon. 8.7
265	Volsini	Executed	All	Flor. 16.1; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 16; Plin. <i>HN</i> 31.31; Zon. 8.7
261	Arcagas (Agrigentum)	Enslaved (Slaves?)	25,000	Diod. Sic. 23.9.1; Oros. 4.7.6; Polyb. 1.19.15; Zon. 8.10
260	Mylae	Captured	7,000	<i>CIL</i> 6.1300; Eutrop. 2.20.1-2; Oros. 4.7.10; Polyb. 1.23.7-10; Zon. 8.11
260	Mazarin	Enslaved	All	Diod. Sic. 23.9.4.
259	Corsica and Sardinia	Enslaved	-	<i>CIL</i> 6.1287; Flor. 1.18.16; Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 3.9.4; 10.2; Oros. 4.7.11; Zon. 8.11
258	Mytistratus	Enslaved	All	Diod. Sic. 23.9.4; Zon. 8.11
258	Camarina	Enslaved	Most	Diod. Sic. 23.9.5; Polyb. 1.24.12; Val. Max. 6.5.1; Zon. 8.12
257	Tyndaris	Captured	c.1,400	Polyb. 1.25.4; Zon. 8.12; Diod. Sic. 23.10.2; Polyae. 8.20.1.
256	Encomus	Captured	c.9,100	Polyb. 1.28.14 ; Aur. Vict. 63; Eutrop. 2.21.1; Oros. 4.8.6.
256	Countryside around Aspis/Clupea	Enslaved	20-27,000	Eutrop. 2.21; Oros. 4.8.9; Polyb. 1.29.7
255	Hermaeum	Captured	5,400 – 22,000	Polyb. 1.36.11; Diod. 23.18.1
255	Sea outside Aspis/Clupea	Captured	30 crews	Oros. 4.9.6; Zon. 8.14
255	Aspis/Clupea	Captured	15,000	Eutrop. 2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7; Zon. 8.14
254	Panormus	Enslaved	c. 13,000	Diod. Sic. 23.18.5; Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 1.38.9-10
		Ransom	-	Diod. Sic. 23.18.5.
252	Himera	Captured	-	Diod. Sic. 23.21.1; Zon. 8.14
-		Released (Elephant Keepers)	-	Zon. 8.14
241	Aegates Islands	Captured	4,040 – 32,000	Diod. Sic. 24.11.2; Eutrop. 2.27; Philinus ( <i>FGrH</i> 174); Nepos 22.1.4-5; Oros. 4.10. 7; Polyb. 1.61.6-8
241	Falerii	Captured	Slaves	Eutrop. 2.81; Liv. <i>Per.</i> 20; Polyb. 1.65.2; Zon. 8.18
238	Gauls	Captured	2,000	Oros. 4.12.1
229	Illyrians	Executed	-	Flor. 1.21.4
225	Rusellae/ Telamon	Enslaved	10,000	Diod. Sic. 25.13.1; Eutrop. 3.5.1; Polyb. 2.31.1-6; Zon. 8.20
224	Insubres	Captured	5,000	Oros. 4.13.11
219	Pharsus	Spared	-	App. <i>Ill.</i> 8; Polyb. 3.18.12
218	Istria	Captured	-	Eutrop. 3.7.1
218	Lilybaeum	Captured	1,740	Liv. 21.50.5
218	Cissa	Captured	>2000	Liv. 21.60.7; Polyb. 3.76.5-6

## Appendix

218	Malta	Enslaved	2,000	Liv. 21.51.2
217	Hamae	Captured	-	Liv. 23.35.19
215	Hirpini	Enslaved	>5,000	Liv. 23.37.13
215	Ibera	Captured	10,000	Eutrop. 3.11; Liv. 23.29.13-15; Oros. 4.16.13; Zon. 9.3
215	Macedonians and Carthaginians	Enslaved	-	Liv. 23.38.7
215	Sardinia	Enslaved	1,500	Eutrop. 3.13; Flor. 1.22.35; Liv. 23.41.7
215	Grumentum	Captured	280	Liv. 23.37.6-10
215	Intibili	Captured	> 2,000	Liv. 23.37.10; 12
215	Ilurgeia	Captured	>3,000	Liv. 23.49.10
214	Carthaginians	Captured	c.1,000	Liv 24.41.10
213	Arpi	Executed	-	App. <i>Hann.</i> 31
-		Spared	-	Liv. 24.47.10; Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 3.9.2
213	Henna	Massacred	-	<i>CIL</i> 6.1281; Frontin. <i>Str.</i> 4.7.22; Liv. 24.39.4-6; Polyaeus 8.21.
211	Engyium	Spared	-	Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 20.7
212	Beneventum	Captured	>7,000	Liv. 25.14.10; Val. Max. 3.2.20
212	Saguntum	Enslaved	-	Liv. 24.42.11; Zon. 9.3
211	Antikyra	Enslaved	All	Polyb. 9.39.2; Liv. 26.26.3.
211	Syracuse	Spared	-	August. <i>De Civ.</i> 1.6; Cic. <i>Ver.</i> 2.2.4; 4.116; 120; Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2; Liv. 25.31.8; Oros. 4.17.1; Plut. <i>Marc.</i> 21.4; Polyb. 9.10; Tzetz. <i>Chil.</i> 2.136-49; Val. Max. 5.1.4; 8.7.7; Zon. 9.5
		Enslaved	Slaves	
211	Capua	Enslaved	-	App. <i>Hann.</i> 43; Liv. 26.14.1-4; 16.6; 34.1-13; Oros. 4.17.12; Zon. 15.6
		Executed	-	
210	Salapia	Captured	50	Liv. 26.38.14; Zon. 9.7
210	Agrigentum	Enslaved	-	Eutrop. 3.14; Liv. 26.40.13; Oros. 4.18.2; Zon. 9.7
210	Aigina	Ransom	-	Polyb. 9.42.5
-		Enslaved	-	
209	New Carthage	Enslaved	10,000	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 23; Cass. Dio 16.57.42; Diod 26.21.1; Eutrop. 3.15; Flor. 1.22.37-40; Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6; 19.8; Oros. 4.18.1; Zon. 9.8
-		Released	-	
209	Manduria	-	3,000	Liv. 27.15.4
209	Tarentum	Enslaved	25-30,000	App. <i>Hann.</i> 49; Brut. 72; Diod. Sic. 26.21.1; Eutrop. 3.16; Liv. 27.16.7; Oros. 4.18. 5-6; Plut. <i>Fab. Max.</i> 22.4; <i>Mor.</i> 195f; Polyaeus 8.14.3; Zon. 9.8
208	Baecula	Captured	c. 10,000	Eutrop. 3.15; Polyb.10.40.1; Oros. 4.18.7
207	Oreus	Captured	-	Cass. Dio. 57.57; Liv. 28.6.5; Zon. 9.11

## Appendix

207	Grumentum	Captured	>700	Liv. 27.42.7
207	Spain	Captured	-	Liv. 28.2.11; Zon. 9.8
207	Orongis	Enslaved	Many	Liv. 28.4.4; Zon. 9.8
207	Metaurus	Captured	5,400	App. <i>Hann.</i> 52; Eutrop. 3.18; Flor. 1.22.50-52; Hor. <i>Od.</i> 4.4.37-48; Liv. 27.49.6; Oros. 4.18.14; Polyb. 11.3.1-3; Val. Max. 3.7.4; Zon 9.9
-		Massacred	-	
206	Ilipa	Captured	-	Liv. 28.16.6
205	Locri	Enslaved	-	App. <i>Hann.</i> 55; Liv. 28.19.4-6
204	Bruttium	Captured	<300	App. <i>Hann.</i> 56; Liv. 29.36.8;
204	North Africa	Enslaved	5-8,000	Liv. 29.29.3; Oros. 4.18.19; Zon 19.12
204	North Africa	Spared	-	Cass. Dio. 17.57.70
204	Locha	Spared	-	App. <i>Pun.</i> 15;
203	Cirta	Captured	-	Liv. 30.12.3; Oros. 4.18.21; Zon 9.13
203	Bruttians	Enslaved	All	App. <i>Hann.</i> 61
202	Zama	Captured	4,000	App. <i>Pun.</i> 36
202	Zama	Captured	8,500-20,000	App. <i>Pun.</i> 48; liv. 30.35.2; Polyb. 15.14.9;
200	Cremona	Captured	-	Liv. 31.21.16
200	Antipatrea	Massacred	All	Liv. 31.27.4
199	Pelium	Captured (Slaves)	-	
-		Spared	All	Liv. 31.40.5
199	Dyme	Enslaved	-	Liv. 32.22.10
198	Carystus	Ransom (Macedonians)	All	Liv. 32.17.2
		Spared (Citizens)	All	
197	Cynoscophale	Enslaved	5,000	Liv. 33.10.7; 11.2; Oros. 4.20.3-4; Plut. <i>T. Flam.</i> 8.5; Polyb. 18.27.6; 34.1
193	Bergistani	Enslaved	All	Liv. 34.16.10
193	Ilipa	Captured	540	Liv. 35.1.12
191	Thessaly	Captured	4,000	App. <i>Syr.</i> 17; Liv. 36.14.5
191	Thermopylae	Captured	>5,000	Liv. 36.19.6; Oros. 4.20.20
191	Boii	Captured	3,400	Liv. 36.38.6
190	Magnesia	Captured	1,400	App. <i>Syr.</i> 36; Liv. 37.44.2
189	Lusitanians	Captured	3,300	Liv. 37.57.10
189	Mt. Olympus	Captured	30-40,000	App. <i>Syr.</i> 42; Liv. 38.23.9; Plut. <i>Virtuous Deeds of Women</i> 22;
189	Mt Magaba	Captured	-	Liv. 38.27.7; App. <i>Syr.</i> 42; Polyb. 21.39.1-9
189	Same	Enslaved	All	Liv. 38.29.11

## Appendix

185	Liguria	Captured	-	Liv. 39.32.4
		Executed	40	
184	Corbio	Enslaved	All	Liv. 39.42.1
181	Liguria	Captured	2,500	Liv. 40.28.6
180	Celtiberians	Captured	4,000	Liv. 40.40.11
179	Alce	Captured	320	Liv. 40.48.7; Flor. 1.33.9; Strab. 3.163
179	Alce	Captured	Many	Liv. 40.49.4
179	Egravia	Captured	>300	Liv. 40.50.5
178	Istrians	Massacred	All	Liv. 41.4.7
177	Istrian Towns	Enslaved	5,632	Liv.41.11.8
177	Sardinia	Enslaved	80,000	Liv. 41.21.10 28.4; Zon. 8.20; Aur. Vict. <i>Caes.</i> 57; Liv. 41.28.4
177	Scultenna	Captured	700	Liv. 41.12.8
174	Caeltiberians	Captured	c. 7,500	Liv. 41.26.5
173	Liguria	Captured	700	Liv. 42.7.8
173	Liguria	Enslaved	10,000	Liv. 42.8.3
171	Haliartus	Enslaved	2,500	Liv. 42.63.11; Strab. 9.411
171	Phalanna	Captured	2,800	Liv. 42.66.9
170	Abdera	Enslaved	All	Liv. 43.4.10; Diod. Sic. 30.6
170	Greeks	Enslaved	-	Liv. <i>Per.</i> 43; Zon. 9.22
167	Epirus	Enslaved	150,000	App. <i>Ill.</i> 29.4; Liv. 45.34.5; Polyb 30.15; Strab. 7.7.3
155	Delminium	Enslaved	Many/ Most	Zon. 9.25
154	Aigitna	Enslaved	All	Polyb. 33.10.3
152	Nergobriges	Captured	-	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 48
151	Celtiberians	Spared	5,000	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 50
151	Cauca	Massacred	All	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 52
151	Lusitanians	Captured	Many	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 59
148	Macedonians	Enslaved	-	Ampel. 16.5; Flor. 1.30.5
147	Nepheris	Captured	10,000	App. <i>Pun.</i> 126;
146	Carthage	Captured	50-60,000	App. <i>Pun.</i> 130; Oros. 4.23.3; Zon. 9.30
146	Corinth	Enslaved	-	Oros. 5.3.5; Zon. 9.31; Paus. 7.16.8
		Massacred	Some	Paus. 7.16.8
146	Tezga	Captured	7,000	Oros, 4.22.8
144	Lusitanians	Executed	Most	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 60
143	Lusitanians	Enslaved	9,500	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 68
141	Sedatania	Captured	-	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 77
137	Lusitanians	Spared	-	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 71
137	Lusitanians	Captured	6000	Oros. 5.5.12



## Appendix

133	Numantia	Enslaved	-	<i>App. Hisp.</i> 98; <i>Eutrop.</i> 4.17; <i>Vell. Pat.</i> 2.4.2
121	Vindalium	Captured	3,000	<i>Oros.</i> 5.13.3
121	Arverni	Released		<i>Caes. B Gall.</i> 1.45.2
118	Styni	Enslaved	-	<i>Oros.</i> 5.14.6; <i>Liv. Per.</i> 62
109	Numidians	Massacred	-	<i>Sall. Jug.</i> 54.6
109	Numians	Enslaved	-	<i>Sal. Jug.</i> 69.3
108	Numidians	Captured	-	<i>Sall. Jug.</i> 74.2
107	Capsa	Massacred	Men	<i>Sall. Jug.</i> 91.6; <i>Flor.</i> 1.36.14
		Enslaved	Women & Children	
106	Cirta	Captured	-	<i>Sall. Jug.</i> 101.11; <i>Oros.</i> 5.15.8-9
102	Aquae Sextiae (I)	Captured	8,000	<i>Flor.</i> 1.38.15; <i>Oros.</i> 5.16.12
102	Aquae Sextiae (II)	Captured	60-80,000	<i>Cass. Dio</i> 94.1; <i>Eutrop.</i> 5.1; <i>Flor.</i> 1.38.15; <i>Liv. Per.</i> 68; <i>Oros.</i> 5.16.20; <i>Plut. Mar.</i> 21.2; <i>Polyaenus</i> 8.10.3
101	Vercellae	Captured	60,000	<i>Eutrop.</i> 5.2; <i>Liv. Per.</i> 68; <i>Oros.</i> 5.16.21; <i>Plut. Mar.</i> 27.3
98	Colenda	Enslaved	All	<i>App. Hisp.</i> 99
98	Celtiberians	Massacred	All	<i>App. Hisp.</i> 100
96	Castulo	Enslaved	All	<i>Plut. Sert.</i> 3.5;
89	Asculum	Enslaved (Slaves)	-	<i>Liv. Per.</i> 76; <i>Oros.</i> 5.18.26
86	Athens	Enslaved (Slaves)	-	<i>Liv. Per.</i> 81; <i>App. Mith.</i> 38
86	Cities in Asia Minor	Enslaved	-	<i>App. Mith.</i> 61
63	Jerusalem	Captured	-	<i>Philo Legatio ad Gaium</i> 23
57	Aeduatuci	Enslaved	53,000	<i>Caes. B. Gall.</i> 2.32.7
56	Venetti	Enslaved	All	<i>Caes. B. Gall.</i> 3.16.4
-		Executed		
53	Genabum	Captured	Few	<i>Caes. B. Gall.</i> 7.11.8
53	Taricheae	Enslaved	30,000	<i>Joseph. AJ.</i> 14.120; <i>BJ.</i> 1.180
52	Pindenissum	Enslaved	All	<i>Cic. Att.</i> 5.20.5; <i>Fam</i> 15.4.10
52	Alesia	Enslaved	-	<i>Caes. B. Gall.</i> 7.89.5 (1 million Gauls enslaved in total according to <i>Plut. Caes.</i> 15.3)
43	Tarsus	Enslaved	-	<i>App. B. Civ.</i> 4.63-4; <i>Cass. Dio.</i> 47.31.1-4
42	Lycians	Spared	-	<i>Plut. Brut.</i> 30.4; <i>Vell. Pat.</i> 2.69.6
42	Xanthus	Enslaved	-	<i>App. B. Civ.</i> 4.80; <i>Plut. Brut.</i> 31.6
42	Patara	Enslaved	-	<i>Cass. Dio.</i> 4.34.4
-		Spared		<i>App. B. Civ.</i> 4.81; <i>Plut. Brut.</i> 2.8; 32.1
42	Anriace	Spared	-	<i>App. B. Civ.</i> 4.82
25	Salassi	Enslaved	-	<i>Cass. Dio</i> 53.5.4; <i>Strab.</i> 4.6.7; <i>Suet. Aug.</i> 21

## Appendix

22	Astures and Cantabrians	Captured	-	Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3
12	Pannonians	Enslaved	All	Cass. Dio 54.31.3
11	Bessii	Enslaved	-	Cass. Dio 54.34.7
<b>--AD--</b>				
4	Sepphoris	Enslaved	-	Joseph. <i>AJ.</i> 17.288; <i>BJ.</i> 2.68
67	Gadara	Massacred	-	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 3.132
67	Gadaran villages	Enslaved	-	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 3.133
67	Japha	Enslaved (Women & Children)	2,130	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 3.304-306
-		Massacred (Men)	2,130	
67	Jotapata	Massacred	-	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 3.338-339; <i>Vit.</i> 414f
-		Enslaved	1,200	
67	Taricheae	Enslaved	30,000	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 3.339-341
67	Judean rebels	Captured	2,200	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 4.436
67	Betaris & Caphartobas	Enslaved	10,000	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 4.448
67	Garasa	Captured	-	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 4.488
67	Hebron	Massacred	-	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 4.553
70	Jerusalem	Enslaved (Non-Combatants)	97,000	Joseph. <i>BJ.</i> 6.414-419
		Executed (Combatants)	-	
102	Dacians	Captured	50,000	Cass. Dio 67.8.15; Ioannes Lydus, <i>De Magistratibus</i> 2.25 (FGrH 200.1)

## Bibliography

- Adams, C.E.P. (2007) *Land Transport in Roman Egypt: A Study of Economics and Administration in a Roman Province*, Oxford.
- Afzelius, A. (1944) *Die römische Kriegsmacht während der Auseinandersetzung mit den hellenistischen Grossmächten*, Copenhagen.
- Alföldi, A. (1972) 'Die Freilassung von Sklaven und die Struktur der Sklaverei in der römischen Kaiserzeit', *Riv. Stor. Ant.* 2: 97-129.
- (1959) 'Hasta - Summa Imperii: The Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in Rome', *AJA* 63.1: 1-27.
- Allen, J. (2006) *Hostages and Hostage Taking in the Roman Empire*, Cambridge.
- Amit, M (1962) 'The Sailors of the Athenian Fleet', *Athenaeum* 40: 57-78.
- Andreau, J., Descat, R. (2011) *The Slave in Greece and Rome*, M. Leopold (trans.), Madison.
- Andreau, J. (1994) 'La cité romaine dans ses rapports à l'échange et au monde de l'échange', in J. Andreau, P. Briant, R. Descat (edd.), *Economic Antique. Les échanges dans l'antiquité: le rôle de l'état*, Saint Bertrand-de-Comminges, 83-98.
- (1978) 'Pompéi: échères, foires et marchés', *Bulletin de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France*: 104-26.
- Anstey, R. (1975) *The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760- 1810*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ.
- Arnold, W.T. (1879) *The Roman System of Provincial Administration to the Accession of Constantine the Great*, London.
- Ash, R. (1998) 'Waving the White Flag: Surrender Scenes at Livy 9.5-6 and Tacitus, Histories 3.31 and 4.62', *GR* 45.1: 27-44.
- Astin, A.E. (1978) *Cato the Censor*, Oxford.
- (1967) *Scipio Aemelianus*, Oxford.
- Auliard, C. (2002) 'Les Esclaves dans les butins républicains des premiers siècles de la conquête', in M. Garrido-Hory (ed.) *Routes et Marchés d'Esclaves*, *GIREA*, vol. 26, Paris 51-64.
- Austin, M. M. (1981) *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of ancient sources in translation*, Cambridge.
- Austin, N.J., Rankov, N.B. (1995) *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, London.
- Avidov, A. (1997) 'Were the Cilicians a nation of Pirates?', *MHR* 12.1: 5-55.
- Badian E. (1972) *Publicans and Sinners*, Ithaca.
- (1958a) *Foreign Clientele 264-70 BC*, Oxford.
- (1958b) 'Aetolica', *Latomus* 17: 197-211.

## Bibliography

- Bagnall, N. (1990) *The Punic Wars*, London.
- Bagnall, R.S., Derow, P. (2003) *The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation*, London.
- Bagnall, R.S., Frier, B. (1994) *The Demography of Roman Egypt*, Cambridge.
- Bagnall, R.S., Frier, B., Rutherford, I. (1997) *The Census Register P.Oxy 984: The reverse of Pindar's Paeans*, Brussels.
- Bang, M. (1910) 'Die Herkunft der römischen Sklaven', *MDAI(R)* 25: 223-251.
- Bauman, R. (2000) *Human Rights in Ancient Rome*, London.
- Beard, M. (2007) *The Roman Triumph*, Cambridge, MA.
- Behrens, O. (1974) 'Das nexum im Manzipationsrecht oder die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Libraldarlehens', *RIDA* 3.21:137-84.
- Beloch, K.J. (1926) *Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der punischen Kriege*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Berlin.
- (1912) *Griechische Geschichte*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., (4 vols), Strassburg.
- (1886) *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, Leipzig.
- Bennett, H. (1932) 'The Exposure of Infants in Ancient Rome', *CJ* 18.6: 341-51.
- Bielman, A. (1994) *Retour à la liberté: libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne*, Lausanne.
- Blair, W. (1833) *An Inquiry into the State of Slavery Amongst the Romans; from the Earliest Period, Till the Establishment of the Lombards in Italy*, Edinburgh.
- Blázquez Martínez, J.M. (1987) 'Aspectos económicos', *Historia general de España y América*, 1.2: 529-67.
- Bodel, J. 2005, 'Caveat emptor: towards a study of Roman slave-traders', *JRA* 18: 181-195.
- Boese, W.E. (1973) *A Study of the Slave Trade and the Sources of Slaves in the Roman Republic and Early Empire*, University of Washington Diss.
- Bona, F. (1960) 'Sul Concetto Di 'Manubiae' E Sulla Responsabilita Del Magistrato in Ordine Alla Preda', *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris* 26: 106-113.
- Bosworth, A.B. (2002) 'Vespasian and the Slave Trade', *CQ* 52.1: 350-357.
- (1993) 'The Humanitarian Aspect of the Melian Dialogue', *JHS* 113: 30-44.
- Boube, E. (1996) *Le Trophée Augustéen*, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges.
- Braconi, P. (2005) 'Il 'Calcidico' di Lepcis Magna era un mercato di Schiavi?', *JRA* 18: 213-9.
- Bradley, K. R. (2004) 'On Captives under the Principate', *Phoenix* 58,3/4: 298-318.
- (1994) *Slavery and Society at Rome*, Cambridge.
- (1992) 'The Regular Daily Traffic in Slaves: A Roman Contemporary History', *CJ* 87.2: 125-138.
- (1989) *Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C.-70 B.C.*, Bloomington.
- (1990) 'Servus Onerosus: Roman Law and the Troublesome Slave', *Slavery and Abolition* 11: 135-57.

## Bibliography

- (1987) 'On the Roman Slave Supply and Slave Breeding', in M. Finley (ed.), *Classical Slavery*, London, 42-64.
- (1984) *Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control*, Brussels.
- Braund, D. (2011) 'The Slave Supply in Classical Greece', in K. Bradley, P. Cartledge (edd.) *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 112-33.
- (1984) *Rome and the Friendly King: The Character of the Client Kingship*, London.
- Braund D., Tsetskhladze, G.R. (1989) 'The export of slaves from Colchis', *CQ* 39: 114-25.
- Brennan, T.C. (2001) *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: 122 to 49 BC*, vol. 2, Oxford.
- Briscoe, J. (1981) *A commentary on Livy Books XXXIV-XXXVII*, Oxford.
- (1973) *A commentary on Livy Books XXXI-XXXIII*, Oxford.
- Brodman, J.W. (1986) *Ransoming captives in crusader Spain: the order of Merced on the Christian-Islamic frontier*, Philadelphia, PA.
- Brownlee, A.B. (1989) 'A Black-Figure Parody of the Ransom of Hector', *RA* 3-21.
- Bruce, F. (1938) 'Some Roman Slave-Names', *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical Society: Literary and Historical Section*, vol. 5.1, 44-60.
- Bruneau, P. (1988) 'L'esclavage à Délos', in M. Mactoux, E. Geny (edd.) *Mélanges Pierre Lévêque*, vol. 3., Paris, 41-52.
- Brunt, P.A. (1993) *Studies in Greek History and Thought*, Oxford.
- (1971) *Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14*, Oxford.
- (1962) 'The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution', *JRS* 52: 69-86.
- (1958) Review: W.L. Westermann *Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*, *JRS* 48.1/2: 164-70.
- Buckland, W. W. (1908) *The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian*, Cambridge.
- Burn, W.A. (1903) 'Capture of Rebels' Movable Property during Hostilities' *The South African Law Journal* 20: 370-381.
- Bussi, S. (2001) *Economia e demografia della schiavitù in Asia Minore ellenistico-romana*, Milan.
- Buttrey, T.V. (1961) 'Dio, Zonaras and the Value of the Roman Aureus', *JRS* 51: 40-45.
- Cadoux, T.J. (2008) 'The Roman Carcer and its Adjuncts', *GR* 55.2: 202 - 221.
- Cameron, A. (1932) 'The Exposure of Children in Greek Ethics', *CR* 46; 105-14.
- Campbell, J.B. (1984) *The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 BC - AD 235*, Oxford.
- Capozza, M. (1966) *Movimenti servili nel mondo romano in età repubblicana, Dal 501 al 184a Cr.*, vol. 1, Rome.
- Carandini, A. Filippi, M.R. (1985) *Settefinestre: una villa schiavistica nell'Etruria romana*, Modena.
- Carlson, J. (2010) 'Narrative Reliefs of the Arch of Constantine and the *Panegyrici Latini*', *New England Classical Journal* 37.3: 163-176.
- Carter, J.C. (2006) *Discovering the Greek Countryside at Metaponto*, Ann Arbor.

## Bibliography

- Cary, M. (1920) 'The Early Roman Treaties with Tarentum and Rhodes', *Journal of Philology* 35: 165-173.
- Casson, L. (1994) *Ships and Seafaring in Ancient Times*, London.
- (1991) *The Ancient Mariners*, Princeton.
- (1989) *The Periplus Maris Erythraei: Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*, Princeton.
- (1971) *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, Princeton.
- (1969) 'The Super-galleys of the Hellenistic Age', *Mariner's Mirror* 55: 185-194.
- (1959) *The Ancient Mariners*, New York.
- Caven, B. (1980) *The Punic Wars*, New York.
- Champion, C. (2010) 'Polybius and Aetolia: A Historiographical Approach', in J. Marincola, (ed.) *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, London, 356-62.
- Chantraine, P. (1999) *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Paris.
- Chou ku-Cheng (1956) 'On Chinese Slave Society', *Selected essays on Problems concerning Periodization of Slave System and feudal system in Chinese History*, Peking, 61-67.
- Churchill, J. B. (1999) 'Ex Qua Quod Vellent Facerent: Roman Magistrates' Authority over Praeda and Manubiae', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 129: 85-116.
- Ch'u T'ung-tsu (1972) *Han Social Structure*, J.L. Dull (ed.) Seattle, WA.
- Clarkson, T. (1786) *An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the African*. Translated from a Latin Dissertation, Which Was Honoured with the First Prize in the University of Cambridge for the Year 1785, with Additions, London.
- Coarelli, F. (2005) 'L' 'Agora des Italiens': lo Statarion di Delo?', *JRS* 18: 197-212.
- (1982) 'L' 'Agora des Italiens' a Delo: Il mercato degli schiavi?', F. Coarelli, D. Musti. H. Solin (edd.) *Delo e l'Italia: Raccolta di studi*, Roma, 188-224.
- Colley, L. (2002) *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850*, London.
- Colonna, G. (1962) 'Saepinum', *Archaeologica Classica*, 14: 80-107.
- Cornell, T.J. (1995) *The Beginnings of Rome, Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars 1,000 to 264 BC*, London.
- (1989) 'The Recovery of Rome' in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie (edd.) *CAH<sup>2</sup>* vol. 7.2 Cambridge, 243-319.
- Coulston, J.C.N. (2003) 'Overcoming the Barbarian. Depictions of Rome's Enemies in Trajanic Monumental Art', in L. De Blois, P. Erdkamp, O. Hekster, G. De Kleijn, S. Mols (edd.) *The Representation and Perception of Power: proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, c. 200 B.C. - A.D. 476)*, Amsterdam, 389-424.
- Crawford, M.H. (1974) *Roman Republican Coinage*, (2 vols.), Cambridge.
- Curchin, L. A. (2004) *The Romanization of Central Spain: Complexity, Diversity and Change in a Provincial Hinterland*, London.

## Bibliography

- (1991) *Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation*, London.
- Daubigney, A. (1979) 'Reconnaissance des formes de la dépendance Gauloise', *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 5: 145-93.
- Davis, D.B. (1984) *Slavery and Human Progress*, Oxford.
- Degrassi, A. (1954) *Fasti Capitolini*, Turin.
- De la Mallé, A.D. (1840) *Economie politique des Romains*, Paris.
- De Ligt, L. (1993) *Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire: Economic and Social Aspects of Periodic Trade in Pre-Industrial Society*, Amsterdam.
- Del Mar, A. (2000) *History of Monetary Systems*, Honolulu.
- De Martino, F. (1979) *Storia economica di Roma antica*, (2 vols.), Florence.
- De Roton, G. (1950) *Homère. L'Iliade Illustrée par la céramique grecque*, Bordeaux.
- Derow, P.S. (1973) 'Klemporos', *Phoenix* 27: 118-34.
- De Sanctis, G. (1969) *Storia dei Romani*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., (3 vols.), Turin.
- De Souza, P. (1999) *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge.
- Diakonoff, I.M. (1976) 'Slaves, Helots and Serfs in Early Antiquity' in J. Harmatta, G. Komoróczy (edd.) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im alten Vorderasien: Internat. Tagung d. Keilschriftforscher d. sozialist. Länder*, Budapest, 23. - 25. April, 1974, Budapest, 45-78.
- Domaszewski, A. (1885) 'Die Fahnen im römischen Heere', *Abhandlungen des Archäologisch-Epigraphischen Seminars der Universität Wien*, vol. 5. Vienna.
- Domergue C. (1990) *Les mines de la péninsule ibérique dans l'Antiquité romaine*, Rome.
- Domergue C., Hérail, G. (1978) *Mines d'or romaines d'Espagne Le district de la Valduerna*, Toulouse.
- Donnan, E. (1930-1935) *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America*, (4 vols.), Washington DC.
- Dorey, T.A., Dudley, D.R. (1971) *Rome Against Carthage*, London.
- Duchêne, H. (1986) 'Sur la stèle d'Aulus Caprius Timotheos Sômatemporos', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 110.1: 513-30.
- Ducrey, P. (1999) *Le Traitement De Prisonniers De Guerre Dans La Grèce Antique: Des Origines a La Conquete Romaine*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Paris.
- Duée, C (2006) *The Captive Woman's Lament in Greek Tragedy*, Austin.
- Duncan-Jones, R. (1974) *The Roman Economy: Quantitative Studies*, Cambridge.
- Eckstein, A.M. (2013) 'Polybius, Phylarchus, and Historiographical Criticism', *CPh* 108.4: 314-338.
- (2012) *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC*, Malden.
- (2010) 'Macedonia and Rome, 221-146 BC', in J. Roisman, I. Worthington (edd.) *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, London, 225-50.

## Bibliography

- (1987) *Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC*, Berkeley.
- (1976) 'T. Quinctius Flamininus and the Campaign against Philip in 198 BC', *Phoenix* 30.2: 119-42.
- Eder, W. (1990) *Staat und Staatlichkeit in Der Frühen Römischen Republik: Akten eines Symposiums, 12.-15. Juli 1988*, Stuttgart.
- (1980) *Servitus publica: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und Funktion der öffentlichen Sklaverei in Rom*, Weisbaden.
- Eilers, C. (2002) *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities*, Oxford.
- Elsen J. (2002) 'La stabilité du système pondéral et monétaire attique (Vie –IIe s. avant notre ère)', *Revue Belge de Numismatique et de Sigilliographie* 148:1–32.
- Eltis, D. (1999). *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on Cd-Rom*, Cambridge.
- Engels, D (1980) 'The Problem of Female Infanticide in the Greco-Roman World', *CPh* 75.2: 112-20.
- Errington, R. (1990) *A History of Macedonia*, Berkley.
- (1990) 'Rome and Greece to 205 B.C', in A.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie (edd.) *CAH<sup>2</sup>* vol. 8, Cambridge, 81-106.
- (1971) *The Dawn of an Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power*, London.
- Erskine, A. (1996) 'Money-Loving Romans', in F. Cairns, M. Heath (edd.) *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar: Roman Poetry and Prose, Greek Poetry, Etymology, Historiography* 9, Leeds, 1-11.
- Étienne, R. (1974) 'Recherches Sur L'Ergastule', in *Actes Du Colluque Sur L'Esclavage GIREA*, vol. 11, Paris, 249-66.
- Feng, L. (2013) *Early China: A Social and Cultural History*, Cambridge.
- Fentress E. (2005) 'On the Block: *Catastae*, *Chalchidica* and *Cryptae* in Early Imperial Italy', *JRS* 18: 220-234.
- Ferris, I. M. (2000) *Enemies of Rome*, Stroud.
- Finley, M. I. (1980) *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*. London.
- (1973) *The Ancient Economy*, Berkeley.
- (1972) 'Empire in the Greco-Roman World', *GR* 25.1: 1-15.
- (1968) *A history of Sicily: Ancient Sicily to the Arab Conquest*, London.
- (1962) 'The Black Sea and Danubian Regions and the Slave Trade in Antiquity', *Klio* 40: 51-59.
- Fisher, N.R.E. (1993) *Slavery in Classical Greece*, Bristol.
- (1992) *Hybris: a study in the values of honour and shame in Ancient Greece*, Warminster.
- Fitzgerald, W. (2000) *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination*, Cambridge.
- Florescu, F. B. (1965) *Tropaeum Traiani. Das Siegdenkmals von Adamklissi*, Bonn.
- Fonda, M.P. (2010) *Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy During the Second Punic War*, Cambridge.



## Bibliography

- Fowler, W. W. 1913, 'Passing under the Yoke', *CR* 27.2: 48-51.
- Frank, T. (1933) *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, vol 1, Baltimore.
- (1932) 'The Sacred Treasure and the Rate of Manumission', *AJPh* 53.4: 360-363.
- (1930) 'Roman Census Statistics from 508 to 225 B.C.', *AJPh* 54.4: 313-234.
- (1924) 'Roman Census Statistics from 225 to 28 B.C.', *CPh* 19.4: 329-341.
- (1914) *Roman Imperialism*, New York.
- Frazer, J.M. (1936) *The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religion*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., vol. 3, London.
- Frederiksen, M. (1984) *Campania*, Rome.
- Freeman, P. (2008) *Julius Caesar*, New York.
- Frier, B., McGinn, T., Lidov, J. (2004) *A Casebook on Roman Family Law*, Oxford.
- Frier, B., Kehoe, D. (2007) 'Law and Economic Institutions', in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, R. Saller (edd.) *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge, 113-43.
- Fuhrmann, C.J. (2012) *Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers, Administration, and Public Order*, Oxford.
- Fulford, M. (1992) 'Territorial Expansion and the Roman Empire', *World Archaeology* 23.3: 294-305.
- Gabba, E. (1978) 'Per la tradizione dell'*heredium* romuleo', *RIL* 112: 250-8.
- (1974) 'Mercati e fiere nell'Italia Romana', *SCO* 24:141-63.
- Gabrielsen, V. (2003) 'Piracy and the Slave-Trade', in A. Erskine (ed.) *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, London, 389-404.
- Gaca, K. L. (2010) 'The Andrapodizing of War Captives in Greek Historical Thought', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 140: 117-161.
- Gaida, E. (1934) *Die Schlacht Schilderungen in den antiquitates Romanae des Dionysius von Halicarnassus*, Diss.
- Garlan, Y. (1987) 'War, Piracy and Slavery in the Greek World', in M.I. Finley (ed.) *Classical Slavery*, London, 7-21.
- (1972) *Les Guerres dans l'antiquité*, Paris.
- Garland, C., Klein, Herbert S. (1985) 'The Allotment of Space for Slaves Aboard Eighteenth-Century British Slave Ships', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 42.2: 238-248.
- Garnsey, P. (1996) *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*, Cambridge.
- (1983) 'Grain for Rome', in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C. Whittaker (edd.) *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, London, 118-30.
- Gelb, I.J. (1973) 'Prisoners of War in Early Mesopotamia', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 32: 70-98.
- George, M. (2011) 'Slavery and Material Culture', in K. Bradley, P. Cartledge (edd.) *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 385-413.
- Ginsburg, M. (1940) 'Roman Military Clubs and Their Social Functions', *TAPhA* 71: 149-56.

## Bibliography

- Girard, P.F. (1906) *Manuel élémentaire de droit romain*, Paris.
- Glancy, J. (2002) *Slavery in Early Christianity*, Oxford.
- Glover, T.R. (1917) *From Pericles to Philip*, London.
- Goldsworthy, A. (1996) *The Roman Army at War 100 BC – AD 200*, Oxford.
- Gordon, M.L. (1924) ‘The Nationality of Slaves Under the Early Roman Empire’, *JRS* 14: 93-111.
- Gomme, A.W. (1937) *Essays in Greek History and Literature*, Oxford.
- Gonzalez, A. (2002) ‘Provenance des esclaves au Haut-Empire (*pax romana* et approvisionnement)’, in M. Garrido-Hory (ed.) *Routes et Marchés d’Esclaves, GIREA* vol. 26, Paris, 65-82.
- Goudineau, C. (1983) ‘Marseilles, Rome and Gaul from the third to the first century BC’, in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C.R. Whittaker (edd.) *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, London, 87-104.
- Graham, J.W. (1958) ‘The Ransom of Hector on a New Melian Relief’, *AJA* 62.3: 313-319.
- Grainger, J. (2002) *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great*, Leiden.
- Grünert, H. (1969) ‘Zu den Anfängen und zur Rolle der Sklaverei und des Sklavenhandels im ur- und frühgeschichtlichen Europa, speziell bei den germanischen Stämmen’, *Ethnographisch-archäologische Zeitschrift*, 10: 501-15.
- Grueber, H. (1970). *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, 2nd ed., 3 vols., London.
- Gruen, E.S. (1995) ‘The Fall of the Scipios’ in I. Malkin, Z. Rubinsohn, *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz*, Leiden, 59-90.
- (1990) *Studies in Greek culture and Roman policy*, Leiden.
- (1984) *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Berkley.
- Haley, E.W. (1991) *Migration and Economy in Roman Imperial Spain*, Barcelona.
- Halkin, L. (1897) *Les Esclaves Publics Chez Les Romains*, London.
- Hammond, N.G. (1967) *Epirus: the geography, the ancient remains, the history and topography of Epirus and adjacent areas*, Oxford.
- Harlow, M., Laurence, R. (2002) *Growing Up and Growing Old in Ancient Rome: A Life Course Approach*, London.
- Harper, K. (2011) *Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275-425*, Cambridge.
- Harril, J.A. (1995) *The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity*, Tübingen.
- Harris, W.V. (2007) ‘The Late Republic’, in W. Scheidel, I. Morris, R. Saller (edd.) *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge, 511-42.
- (1999) ‘Demography, Geography and the Sources of Roman Slaves’, *JRS* 89: 62-75.
- (1994) ‘Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire’, *JRS* 84: 1-22.
- (1990) ‘Roman Warfare in the Economic and Social Context of the 4th Century BC’, in W. Eder (ed.) *Staat und Staatlichkeit in Der Frühen Römischen Republik: Akten eines Symposiums, 12.-15. Juli 1988*, Stuttgart, 494-510.

## Bibliography

- (1989) 'Roman Expansion in the West', in A.E. Astin, F.W. Walbank, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie (edd.) *CAH*<sup>2</sup> vol. 8, Cambridge, 107-26.
- (1984) 'New Directions in the Study of Roman Imperialism' in Harris (ed.) *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome*, Rome.
- (1980) 'Towards a Study of the Slave Trade', *MAAR* 36: 117-40.
- (1979) *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford.
- (1971) *Rome in Etruria and Umbria*, Oxford.
- Harsh, P. (1955) 'The Intriguing Slave in Greek Comedy', *TAPhA* 86: 135-142.
- Heath, M. (2008) 'Aristotle on natural slavery,' *Phronesis* 53.3: 243 -270.
- Heers, J. (1958) 'Types de navire et spécialisation des trafics en Méditerranée à la fin du moyen âge', in M. Mollat (ed.) *Le navire et l'économie maritime du moyen âge au XVIIIe siècle, principalement en Méditerranée*, Actes du deuxième colloque international d'histoire maritime, Paris, 107-17.
- Heuss, A. (1933) *Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit*, Leipzig.
- Hin, S. (2008) 'Counting Romans', in L. de Ligt, S. Northwood (edd.) *People, Land and Politics*, Leiden: 187-238.
- Hirt, A. M. (2010) *Imperial Mines and Quarries in the Roman World: Organizational Aspects 27 BC – AD 235*, Oxford.
- Höckmann, O. (1985) *Antike Seefahrt*, Munich.
- Holleaux, M. (1935) *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au III<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C. (273-205)*, Paris.
- Hollstein, W. (2008) 'Die Dioskuren und die Einführung des Denars', *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* 58: 41-63.
- Holm, A. (1898) *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, I- III, Leipzig.
- Homo, L. (1929) 'The Gallic Wars of Rome' in S.S. Cook, F.E. Adcock, M.P. Charlesworth (edd.) *CAH* vol. 7, Cambridge, 554-79.
- Hopkins, K. (1978) *Conquerors and Slaves*, Cambridge.
- Horde, P., Purcell, N. (2000) *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*, London.
- Hornblower, S. (1983) *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, London.
- Hunt, P. (2006) 'Arming Slaves and Helots in Classical Greece', in C.L. Brown, P.D. Morgan (edd.) *Arming Slaves from Classical Times to the Modern Age*, New Haven, 14-39.
- Jashemski, W.F. (1950) *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Proprætorian Imperium to 27 BC*, University of Chicago Diss.
- Johansen, K.F. (1967) *The Iliad in Early Greek Art*, Copenhagen.
- Jolowicz, H., Nicholas, B. (1972) *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law*, Cambridge.

## Bibliography

- Jongman, W. (2003) 'Slavery and the growth of Rome: the transformation of Italy in the second and first century BCE', in G. Woolf and C. Edwards (edd.) *Rome the Cosmopolis*, Cambridge, 100-22.
- Jones, A. H. M. (1956) 'Slavery in the Ancient World', *The Economic History Review* 9.2: 185-199.
- (1960) 'Slavery in the Ancient World', in M. Finley (ed.) *Slavery in Classical Antiquity: Views and Controversies*, Cambridge, 1-15.
- Joshel, S. R. (2010) *Slavery in the Roman World*, Cambridge.
- Katsari, C. (2008) 'Enslavement and Death in the Third Macedonian War', in C. Katsari, E. Dal Lago (edd.) *From Captivity to Freedom: Themes in Ancient and Modern Slavery*, Bristol, 19-39.
- Keay, S. (1988) *Roman Spain*, London.
- Kehoe, D. (1988). *Economics of Agriculture on Roman Imperial Estates in North Africa*, Göttingen.
- Kent, J. P. C. (1978) *Roman Coins*, London.
- Keppie, L. (1984) *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, London.
- Klein, E. (1966) *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. Dealing with the origin of words and their sense development thus illustrating the history of civilization and culture*, Amsterdam.
- Klein, H. (2004) *A Population History of the United States*, Cambridge.
- Kleiner, F.S. (2007) *A History of Roman Art*, Victoria.
- Knapp, R.C. (1977) *Aspects of the Roman experience in Iberia, 206-100 B.C.*, Valladolid.
- Kolendo, J. (2001) 'L'importation des esclaves barbares dans l'empire romain', *Antiquitas* 25 : 39-53.
- Krahmalkov, C.F. (1974) 'A Carthaginian Report of the Battle of Agrigentum 406 B.C. (CIS I 5510.9- 11)', *Rivista di studifenici* 2: 171-177.
- Kraus, C.S. (1998) 'Repetition and Empire in the *Ab urbe condita*', in P. Knox, C. Foss (edd.) *Style and Tradition: Studies in Honor of Wendell Clausen*, Stuttgart, 264-83.
- Kunkel, W. (1966) *An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History*, Oxford.
- Künzl, E. (1988) *Der römische Triumph. Siegesfeiern im antiken Rom*, Munich.
- Kuzișcin, V. (1984) *La grande proprietà agraria nell'Italia romana*, Rome.
- Kyle, D. (1994) *Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome*, London.
- Lancel, S. (1995) *Carthage*, trans. A. Nevill, Oxford.
- Launaro, A. (2011) *Peasants and Slaves. The Rural Population of Roman Italy: 200 BC to AD 100*, Cambridge.
- Laurence, R. (1998) 'Land Transport in Roman Italy', in H. Parkins, C. Smith (edd.) *Trade, Traders and the Ancient City*, London, 129-48.
- La Roche, R. (1997) 'Valerius Antias and His Numerical Totals: A Reappraisal', *Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, 26.3: 358-368.
- Lazenby, J.F. (1996a) *The First Punic War*, London.

## Bibliography

- (1996b) 'Was Marharbal Right?', in T.J. Cornell *et al.* (edd.) *The Second Punic War a Re-appraisal*, London, 39-48.
- (1978) *Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War*, Warminster.
- Le Bohec, Y. (1994) *The Imperial Roman Army*, London.
- Lenski, N. (2011a) 'Captivity and Romano-Barbarian Interchange', in R. Mathisen, D. Shanzer (edd.) *Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural Interaction and the Creation of Identity in Late Antiquity*, Burlington, 185-98.
- (2011b) 'Captivity and Slavery Among the Saracens in Late Antiquity', *AnTard* 19: 237-66.
- (2006) 'Servi Publici in Late Antiquity', in J. Krause, C. Witschel (edd.) *Die Stadt in der Spätantike – Niedergang oder Wandel? Akten des internationalen Kolloquiums in München am 30 und 31 Mai 2003*, Stuttgart, 83-97.
- Lepper, F., Frere, S. (1988) *Trajan's Column: A New Edition of Cichorius Plates*, Oxford.
- Levene, D.S (2010) *Livy on the Hannibalic War*, Oxford.
- (1993) *Religion in Livy*, Mnemosyne 127, Leiden.
- Levy, E. (1943) 'Captivus Redemptus', *CPh* 38.3: 159-76.
- Lewis, D. (2011) 'Near Eastern Slaves in Classical Attica and the Slave Trade with Persian Territories', *CQ* 61.1: 91-113.
- Libourel, J.M. (1974) 'An Unusual Annalistic Source Used by Dio Cassius', *AJPh* 95.4: 383-93.
- (1973) 'Galley Slaves in the Second Punic War', *CPh* 68.2: 116-119.
- Licordari, L. (1984) 'In margine ai Fasti Ostienses', *ArchCl* 36: 347-55.
- Lloyd, G. (1993) L'idée de nature dans la *Politique* d'Aristote', in P. Aubenque (ed.) *Aristote Politique*, Paris, 135-59.
- Lo Cascio, E. (1994) 'The Size of the Roman Population: Beloch and the Meaning of the Augustan Census Figures', *JRS* 84: 23-40.
- Loomis, W. (1996) 'The Introduction of the Denarius', in R. Wallace, E. Harris (eds) *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360-146 BC, in honor of E. Badian*, Norman, 338-55.
- Luttwak, E.N. (1980) 'Review: W.V. Harris *War and Imperialism*', *AHR* 85.3: 606.
- (1976) *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*. Baltimore.
- Lindsay, W.M. (1913) *Sexti Pompei Festi De verborum significatu quae supersunt: Cum Pauli epitome*, Leipzig.
- MacIntosh, J. (1999) 'The Syracusia as a giant cargo vessel', *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology* 28.2: 105-125.
- MacMullen, R. (1970) 'Market Days in the Roman Empire', *Phoenix* 24: 333-41.
- Mangas, J.M. (1971) *Esclavos y libertos en la España romana*, Salamanca.
- Mann, J. C. (1979) 'Power, force and the frontiers of the Empire', *JRS* 69: 175-83.
- Manning, P. (1990) *Slavery and African life: occidental, oriental, and African slave trades*, Cambridge.

## Bibliography

- Marquardt, J.K. (1888) *De l'organisation financière chez les Romains*, Paris.
- Marsha, F. (1999) *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, Columbus, OH.
- Marzanno, A. (2004) 'Villas, Ergastula, and Modern Scholarship: The Contribution of Archaeology to Social History or Vice Versa?', in Mattusch, C., Donohue, A., and Brauer, A. (eds) *Common Ground: Archaeology, Art, Science, and Humanity. Proceedings of the XVIth International Congress of Classical Archaeology in Boston August 23-26 2003*, Oxford, 323-325.
- Martin, R. (1972) 'Familia Rustica: les esclaves chez les agronomes latins' in *Actes Du Colloque Sur L'Esclavage GIREA*, vol. 11, Paris 267-298.
- Mattern, S. (2013) *The Prince of Medicine: Galen in the Roman Empire*, Oxford.
- Mattingly, H., Robinson, E. (1932) 'The Date of the Roman Denarius and Other Important Landmarks in Early Roman Coinage', *PBA* 18: 211-266.
- McDonald, A. (1956) Review of G. 'Klaffenbach Der Römisch-Ätolische Bündnisvertrag vom Jahre 212 V. Chr', *JRS* 46: 153-7.
- McGing, B. (2010) *Polybius' Histories*, Oxford.
- McGowen, S. L. (2010) *Sacred Civic Stone Monuments of the Northwest Roman Provinces*, Oxford.
- McKeown, N. (2007) *The Invention of Ancient Slavery?*, London.
- Meadows, A., Williams, J. (2001) 'Moneta and the Monuments: Coinage and Politics in Republican Rome', *JRS* 91: 27-49.
- Meijer, F.J. (1986) *A History of Seafaring in the Ancient World*, London.
- Meister, K. (1990) *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung: Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Hellenismus*, Stuttgart.
- Mentxaka, R. (1985) *Sobre la existencia de un 'ius pignoris' del redentor sobre el cautivo redimido en el derecho romano clásico*, Brussels.
- Messer, W.S. (1920) 'Mutiny in the Roman Army. The Republic', *CPh* 15.2: 158-175.
- Metcalf, W. (2012) *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, Oxford.
- Millar, F. (1984) 'The Mediterranean and the Roman Revolution: Politics, War and the Economy', *Past and Present* 102: 3-24.
- Milne J.G. (1933) *Catalogue of Alexandrian Coins*, Oxford.
- Mitchell, R. (1995) 'Demands for Land Redistribution and Debt Reduction in the Roman Republic', in K.D. Irani and M. Silver, *Social Justice in the Ancient World*, London, 199-214.
- Mommsen, T. (1907) 'Juristische Schriften' in T. Mommsen *Gesammelte Schriften* (7 vols.), Berlin.
- (1891) *Le droit public romain*, tran. Paul Frédéric Girard, Paris.
- (1887) *Römisches Staatsrecht*, (3 vols.), Leipzig.
- (1879) *Römische Forschungen*, (2 vols.), Berlin.
- (1875) *Römische geschichte*, (5 vols.), Berlin.

## Bibliography

- Morgan, D (1998) *Slave Counterpoint: Black culture in the eighteenth-century Chesapeake and Lowcountry*, Chappel Hill.
- Mørkholm, O. (1974) 'The Speech of Agelaus Again', *Chiron* 4: 127-32.
- Morrison, J.S. (1995) 'Hellenistic Oared Warships 399-31 BC', in R. Gardiner (ed.) *The Age of The Galley*, London.
- Morrison, J.S., Coates, J.F. (1996) *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*, Oxford.
- Morrison, J.S., Coates, J.F., Rankov, N.B. (2000) *The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge.
- Moscovich, M. (1980) 'Odius traditis: Hostages in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*', *CJ* 75: 122-8.
- (1974) 'Hostage Regulations in the Treaty of Zama', *Historia* 23: 417-27.
- Mouritsen, H (2011) *The Freedman in the Roman World*, Cambridge.
- Nicolet, C. (1978) *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen, 246-27 avant J.C : La Structure de l'Italie romaine*, Paris.
- (1976) *Le métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine*, Paris.
- Nisbet, R. (1918) 'The Festuca and the Alapa of Manumission', *JRS* 8: 1-14.
- North, J.A. (1981) 'The Development of Roman Imperialism', *JRS* 71: 1-9.
- Northwood, S.J. (2007) 'Was Fabius Pictor an Annalist?', in N.V. Sekunda (ed.) *Corola Cosmo Rodewald*, Gdańsk, 97-114.
- Nyquist, M. (2013) *Arbitrary Rule: Slavery, Tyranny, and the Power of Life and Death*, Chicago.
- Oakley, S. (2005a) *A Commentary on Livy book X*, vol. 4, Oxford.
- (2005b) *A Commentary on Livy book IX*, vol. 3, Oxford.
- (1998) *A Commentary on Livy books VII-VIII*, vol. 2, Oxford.
- (1997) *A Commentary on Livy book VI*, vol 1, Oxford.
- (1995) *The Hill-forts of the Samnites*, London.
- (1993) 'The Roman Conquest of Italy', in J. Rich, G. Shipley (edd.) *War and Society in the Roman World*, London, 9-37.
- Oded, B. (1979) *Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire*, Wiesbaden.
- Ogilvie, R.M. (1965) *A Commentary on Livy Books I-V*, Oxford.
- Oost, S. (1954) *Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the Roman Conquest of Greece*, Dallas.
- Osiek, C. (1981) 'The Ransom of Captives: Evolution of a Tradition', *HtHR* 74: 365-86.
- Palmer, C. (2002) 'The Middle Passage' in B. Macmillan (ed.) *Captive passage: the transatlantic slave trade and the making of the Americas*, Washington DC, 77-99.
- Panella, R. (1987) 'War, Peace and the *ius fetiale* in Livy 1', *CPh* 82.3: 223-37.
- Panagopoulos, A. (1978) *Captives and hostages in the Peloponnesian War*, Athens.
- Parker, A. (1992) *Ancient Shipwrecks of the Mediterranean and the Roman Provinces*, Oxford.

## Bibliography

- Parkin, T. (2013) 'Infant and early childhood mortality in the ancient world.' In J. E. Gubbs and T. Parkin (edd.) *Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education in the Classical World*, Oxford, 40-61.
- (1992) *Demography and Roman Society*, Baltimore.
- Patterson, J. (1998) 'Trade and Traders in the Roman World', in H. Parkins, C. Smith (eds) *Trade, Traders and the Ancient City*, London, 149-67.
- Patterson, O. (1982) *Slavery and Social Death*, Cambridge, MA.
- Pelgrom, J. (2008) 'Settlement Organization and Land Distribution in Latin Colonies Before the Second Punic War', in L. de Ligt, S.J. Norwood (edd.) *People, Land and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy 300 BC – AD 14*, Leiden: 333-372.
- Pelling, C. (1989) 'Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture', in M. Griffin, J. Barnes (edd.) *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, Oxford, 199-232.
- Percy, T. (1925) 'Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea' *The American Journal of International Law* 19.4: 716-727.
- Petzold, K. (1971) 'Rom und Illyrien: Ein Beitrag zur römischen Aussenpolitik im 3. Jahrhundert', *Historia* 20: 199-223.
- Phang, S. (2008) *Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate*, Cambridge.
- Pope, C. (1992) 'Adult Mortality in America before 1900: A View from Family Histories', in C. Goldin and H. Rockof (edd.) *Strategic Factors in Nineteenth Century American Economic History: A Volume to Honor Robert W. Fogel*, Chicago, 267-296.
- Porch, D. (2005) *The Conquest of the Sahara*, New York.
- (1982) *The Conquest of Morocco*, London.
- Prachner, G. (1966) *Untersuchungen zu Überlieferungsproblemen der frührömischen Sklaverei und Schuldknechtschaft*, Universität Münster Diss.
- Pritchard, R.T. (1975) 'Perpaucae siciliae civitates': Notes on Verr. 2,3,6,13', *Historia* 24: 33-47.
- Pritchett, W.K. (1991) *The Greek State at War*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., vol 5, Berkeley.
- Pucci, G. (2005) 'detraxis vestimenta venalibus: Iconografia della vendita di shiavi nell'antichità Oltre', *JRS* 18: 235-40.
- Pulleyblank, E. (1958) 'The Origins and Nature of Chattel Slavery in China', *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1.2: 185-220.
- Purcell, N. (1995) 'On the Sacking of Carthage and Corinth', in D.C Hine, C.B.R. Pelling (edd.) *Ethics and Rhetoric. Classical Studies for Donald Russell on his Seventy-fifth Birthday*, Oxford, 133-48.
- Quilici, L. (1994) 'Centuriazione e paesaggio agrario nell'Italia centrale' in J. Carlsen, P. Ørsted, J.E. Skydsgaard (edd.) *Land Use in the Roman Empire*, Rome, 127-33.
- Radt, S. (1985) *Aeschylus, TGF* vol. 3., Göttingen.



## Bibliography

- Rankov, B. (1996) 'The Second Punic War at Sea', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, P. Sabin (edd.) *The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal*, London, 49-57.
- Rathbone, D. (1983) 'The Slave Mode of Production in Italy' *JRS* 73: 160-8.
- Rauh, N. K. (2003) *Merchants Sailors and Pirates in the Roman World*, Stroud.
- Rediker, M. (2007) *The Slave Ship: A Human History*, London.
- Reiter, W. (1988) *Aemilius Paullus Conqueror of Greece*, London.
- Rhill, T. (2010) 'Classical Athens', in K. Bradley, P. Cartledge (edd.) *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 48-73.
- Rich, J. (2005) Review: K.W. Welwei, *Sub Corona Vendere: Quellenkritische und Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft Sklaverei in Rom bis zum Ende of Hannibalkrieges*, *CR* 55.1: 242-3.
- (1986) *Declaring War in the Roman Republic*, Brussels.
- Richardson, J. (1979) 'Polybius' view of the Roman Empire', *PBSR* 47: 1-11.
- (1975) 'The triumph, the praetors and the Senate in the early second century BC', *JRS* 65: 50-63.
- Rickard, T. (1928) 'The Mining of the Romans in Spain', *JRS* 18: 129-143.
- Rohrbacher, D. (2002) *The Historians of Late Antiquity*, London.
- Ronchi, F. (1998) 'Il dibattito sulla data d'introduzione del denario nella moderna letteratura numismatica', *Rivista Italiana di Numismatica* 99: 39-88.
- Rossi, L. (1971) *Trajan's Column and the Dacian Wars*, trans. J. Toynbee, London.
- Roth, J. (1999) *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 264 BC – AD 235*, Leiden.
- Roth, U. (2007) *Thinking tools: agricultural slavery between evidence and models*, London.
- Rougé, J. (1981) *Ships and Fleets of the Ancient Mediterranean - La Marine dans l'antiquité*, trns. by S. Frazer, Middletown.
- Sacks, K. (1975) 'Polybius' Other View of Aetolia', *JHS* 95: 92-106.
- Sadao, N. (1986) 'The economic and social history of Former Han', in D. Twitchett, M. Loewe, *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 1., Cambridge, 545-607.
- Salmon, E.T. (1969) *Roman Colonization under the Republic*, London.
- (1967) *Samnium and the Samnites*, Cambridge.
- (1935) 'Rome's Battles with Etruscans and Gauls in 284-282 B.C', *CPh* 30.1: 23-31.
- Sallares, R. (2007) *Malaria and Rome: A History of Malaria in Ancient Italy*, Oxford.
- (1953) 'Rome and the Latins I', *Phoenix* 7: 93-104.
- Sargent, R. (1927) 'The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare' *CPh* 21.2: 201-212.
- Scarpa, S. (2008) *Trafficking in human beings :modern slavery*, Oxford.
- Schleusner, B. (1975) *Die Legaten der römischen Republik decem legati u. ständige Hilfsgesandt*, Universität Frankfurt am Main Diss.
- Scheidel, W. (2011) 'The Roman slave supply', in K. Bradley, P. Cartledge (edd.) *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 287-310.

## Bibliography

- (2005) 'Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population', *JRS* 95: 64-79.
- (2001) Review Bagnall, Roger S., B.W. Frier, and I.C. Rutherford (1997) *The Census Register P.Oxy 984: The Reverse of Pinder's Paeans* in *BASP* 38: 147-51
- (1997) 'Quantifying the Sources of Slaves in the Early Roman Empire', *JRS* 87: 156-169.
- Schmitt, H. (1969) *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, vol. 3: *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.*, Munich.
- Schmitz, P. (1994) 'The Name 'Agrigentum' in a Punic Inscription (CIS I 5510.10)' *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 53.1:1-13.
- Schumacher, L. (2001) *Sklaverei in der Antike: Alltag und Schicksal der Unfreien*, Munich.
- Scullard, H. (1989) 'Carthage and Rome' in F.W. Walbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, R.M. Ogilvie (edd.) *CAH<sup>2</sup>* vol. 7.2, Cambridge, 486-572.
- (1970) *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician*, London: Thames and Hudson.
- (1973) *Roman Politics: 220-150 BC*, Oxford.
- (1961) *History of the Roman World From 753 to 146 BC*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., London.
- (1945) 'Charops and Roman Policy in Epirus', *JRS* 35: 58-64.
- Serrati, J. (2006) 'Neptune's Altars: The treaties between Rome and Carthage (509-226 BC)', *CQ* 56.1 113-134.
- Shatzman, I. (1972) 'The Roman General's Authority over Booty', *Historia* 21.2: 177-205.
- Sherk, R. (1984) *Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus*, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 4, Cambridge.
- (1969) *Roman Documents from the Greek East*, Baltimore.
- Sherwin-White, A. (1973) *The Roman Citizenship*, Oxford.
- (1980) 'Rome the Aggressor?' Review W.V. Harris 1979, *JRS* 70: 177-181.
- Shtaerman E. (1964) *Die Krise der Sklavenhalterordnung im Westen des römischen Reiches*, Berlin.
- Shtaerman, E., Trofimova, M. (1975) *La schiavitù nell' Italia imperiale*. Rome.
- Siegel, B. (1947) *Slavery during the third dynasty of Ur*, Menasha.
- Simon, H. (1962) *Roms Kriege in Spanien, 154-133 c. Chr.*, Frankfurt.
- Snell, D. (2011) 'Slavery in the Ancient Near East', in K. Bradley, P. Cartledge (edd.) *The Cambridge World History of Slavery*, vol. 1, Cambridge, 4-21.
- Steckel, R.H. (1986) 'Birth weights and infant mortality among American slaves', *Explorations in Economic History* 23.2: 173-198
- Stevenson, G.H. (1939) *Roman Provincial Administration Till the Age of the Antonines*, Oxford.
- Stiehel, R. (1955) *Wissensch Zeitschr*, Leipzig.
- Smith, R.E. (1958) *Service in the Post-Marian Army*, Manchester.
- (1955) *The Failure of the Roman Republic*, Cambridge.
- Smith, W. (1890) *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, London.

## Bibliography

- Sordi, M. (1960) *I rapporti romano-gerici e le origini della civitas sine suffragio*, Rome.
- Speidel, M. (1992) *Roman Army Studies*, vol. 2, Stuttgart.
- (1984) *Roman Army Studies*, vol. 1, Amsterdam.
- Stace, C. (1968) 'The Slaves of Plautus', *GR*: 15.1: 64-77.
- Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de (1981) *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, London.
- Starr, C.G. (1960) *The Imperial Roman Navy 31 B.C.-A.D. 324*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Cambridge.
- Steckel, R. (1986) 'A Dreadful Childhood: The Excess Mortality of American Slaves', *Social Science History* 10.4: 427-465.
- Svalesen, L. (2000) *The Slave Ship Fredensborg*, Indianapolis.
- Tarn, W.W (1952) *Hellenistic Civilization*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. London.
- (1907) 'The Fleets of the First Punic War', *JHS* 27: 48-60.
- Taylor, L.R. (1960) *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic*, Papers and Monographs of the American Academy at Rome 20, Rome.
- Taylor, T (2001) 'Believing the ancients: quantitative and qualitative dimensions of slavery and the slave trade in later prehistoric Eurasia', *World Archaeology* 33.1: 27-43.
- Tchernia, A (1980) 'Italian Wine in Gaul at the end of the Republic', in P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, C. Whittaker (edd.) *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, London, 87-104.
- Temin, P. (2004) 'The Labor Market of the Early Roman Empire', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 34.4: 513-38.
- Thiel, J.H. (1946) *Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times*, Amsterdam.
- Thomas, H. (1997) *The Slave Trade. The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870*, New York.
- Thompson, F. (2003) *The Archaeology of Greek and Roman Slavery*, London.
- Thomsen, R. (1980) *King Servius Tullius: a Historical Synthesis*, Copenhagen.
- (1961) *Early Roman Coinage*, vol. 3, Copenhagen.
- Thonemann, P. (2011) *The Maeander Valley: a Historical Geography From Antiquity to Byzantium*, Cambridge.
- Thornton, J. (1999) *Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800*, London.
- Thurmond, D. (1994) 'Some Roman Slave Collars in *CIL*', *Athenaeum* 72: 459-93.
- Tipps, G. (1985) 'The battle of Ecnomus' *Historia* 34: 432-65.
- Todd, M. (1948) *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford.
- Töpfer, K.M. (2011) *Signa Militaria: Die römischen Feldzeichen in der Republik und im Prinzipat*, Mainz.
- Treggiari, S. (1975) 'Jobs in the Household of Livia', *PBSR* 43: 48-77.
- Trümper, M. 2009. *Graeco-Roman slave markets: fact or fiction?*, Oxford.

## Bibliography

- Tuck, R. (2001) *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant*, Oxford.
- Tuna-Nörling, Y. (1999) 'Hektor's ransom on a krater from Tekirdag', In: *Proceedings of the XVth international congress of classical archaeology. Classical archaeology towards the third millenium: reflections and perspectives*. Amsterdam, July 12 - 17, 1998. R.F Docter, E. M.Moormann (edd.) Amsterdam, 418-420.
- Ungern-Sternberg, J. (1975) *Capua im zweiten punischen Krieg: Untersuchungen zur römischen Annalistik*, Munich.
- Urbainczyk, T. (2008) *Slave Revolts in Antiquity*, Cambridge.
- (2004) *Spartacus*, London.
- Van Alfen, P. (2012) 'The Coinage of Athens, the Sixth to the First Century BC', in W. Metcalf (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, Oxford.
- Van Hoof, A. (1990) *From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical*, London.
- Varinlioglu, E. (2006) 'Five Inscriptions from Acmonia', *REA* 108: 355-71.
- Varner, E.R. (2004) *Mutilation and transformation: Damnatio Memoriae and Roman Imperial Portraiture*, Monumenta Graeca et Romana, Leiden.
- Vaughan, A., Vaughan., V (1997) 'Before Othello: Elizabethan Representations of Sub-Saharan Africans', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 54.1: 19-44.
- Venning & Drinkwater (2011) *A Chronology of the Roman Empire*, London.
- Versnel, H. (1970) *Triumphus, an inquiry into the origin, development and meaning of the Roman triumph*, Leiden.
- Veyne, P. (1976) *Le Pain et le Cirque*, Paris.
- (1975) 'Y a-t-il eu un impérialisme romain?', *MEFRA* 87: 793-855.
- Vishnia, R. F. (2002) 'The Shadow Army- the Lixae and Roman Legions', *ZPE* 139: 265-272.
- Vogel, K.H. (1948) 'Zur rechtlichen Behandlung der römischen Kriegsgewinne', *ZRG*, 66: 394-422.
- Voigt, M. (1963) *Römische Rechtsgeschichte* (3 vols.), Aalen.
- Volkman, H. (1990) *Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner eroberter Städte in der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit*, Revised edition with notes by G. Horsmann, Stuttgart.
- von Ungern-Sternberg, J. (1975) *Capua im Zweiten Punischen Krieg: Untersuchungen zur römischen Annalistik*, Munich.
- Walbank, F.W. (1981) *The Hellenistic World*, Cambridge.
- (1979) *Commentary on Polybius: Commentary on Books 19-40*, vol. 3 Oxford.
- (1972) *Polybius*, Berkeley.
- (1967a) *Commentary on Polybius: Commentary on Books 17-18*, vol. 2 Oxford.
- (1967b) *Philip V of Macedon*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge.
- (1965) *Speeches in Greek Historians*, Oxford.
- (1962) 'Polemic in Polybius', *JRS* 52.1: 1-12.
- (1957) *Commentary on Polybius: Commentary on Books 1-6*, vol. 1 Oxford.

## Bibliography

- (1949) 'Roman Declarations of War', *CPh* 44.1: 15-19.
- (1941) 'A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus, 172 B.C.', *JRS* 31: 82-93.
- Walker, C. (1980) *Hostages in Republican Rome*, University of North Carolina Diss.
- Wallon (1847) *Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*, (3 vols.), Paris.
- Walser, G. (1984) *Summus Poenius*, Wiesbaden.
- Ward J.R. (1988) *British West Indian slavery, 1750-1834: the process of amelioration*, Oxford.
- Watson, W.A.J (1987) *Roman Slave Law*, Baltimore.
- (1975) *Rome of the XII Tables*, Princeton.
- (1968) *The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic*, Oxford.
- Weaver, P.R.C. (1972) *Familia Caesaris: A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves*, Cambridge.
- Webster, J. (2005) 'Looking for the material culture of the middle passage', *Journal for Maritime Research* 7.1: 245-58.
- Weiss, A. (2004) *Sklave der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Sklaverei in den Städten des Römischen Reiches*, Stuttgart.
- Welwei, K.W. (2000) *Sub Corona Vendere: Quellenkritische und Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft Sklaverei in Rom bis zum Ende Hannibalkrieges*, Stuttgart.
- (1988) *Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst*, vol. 3, Wiesbaden.
- Westermann, W. L. (1955) *The slave systems of Greek and Roman antiquity*, Philadelphia.
- Westington, M. (1938) *Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 BC*, University of Chicago Diss.
- White, K.D. (1970) *Roman Farming*, Cornell.
- (1967) 'Latifundia: A critical review of the evidence on large estates in Italy and Sicily up to the end of the first century AD', *BICS* 14: 62-79.
- Whittaker, C. R. (1989) *Les frontières de l'Empire Romain*, Besançon.
- Wiedemann, T. (1986) 'The *Fetiales*: A Reconsideration', *CQ* 36.2: 478-490.
- (1985) 'The Regularity of Manumission at Rome', *CQ* 35.1: 162-175.
- (1981) *Greek and Roman Slavery*, Baltimore.
- Wilbur, C.M. (1943) 'Slavery in China During the Former Han Dynasty 206 BC – AD 25', *Journal of Economic History* 3.2: 231-233.
- Williams, D.L. (2014) *Rousseau's Social Contract: An Introduction*, Cambridge.
- Williams, J.H.C. (2001) *Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy*, Oxford.
- Wilson, D.F. (2002) *Ransom, Revenge and Heroic Identity in the Iliad*, Cambridge.
- Wiseman, F.J. (1956) *Roman Spain: an introduction to the Roman antiquities of Spain and Portugal*, London.
- Woytek, B. (2012) 'The Denarius Coinage of the Roman Republic', in W. Metcalf, *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, Oxford, 315-34.

## Bibliography

- Woolf, G. (1993) 'Roman Peace', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (ed) *War and Society in the Roman World*, London, 171-94.
- Yeo, C. (1943) 'Land and Sea Transportation in Imperial Italy', *TAPhA* 77: 221-44.
- Ziegler, K.H. (1986) 'Lösegold-Probleme im römischen Privatrecht', *Iuris Professio, Festgabe für Max Kaser*, 80: 381-90.
- (1991) 'Deditio und fides im römischen Völkerrecht', *ZRG*, 108: 279-285.
- Ziolkowski, A. (1993) '*Urbs direpta* or how the Romans sacked cities', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (ed) *War and Society in the Roman World*, London, 69-91.
- (1990) 'Credibility of Numbers of Battle Captives in Livy, Books XXI – XLV' *La Parola del Passato* 45.
- (1986) 'The Plundering of Epirus in 167 BC: Economic Considerations' *PBSR* 54: 69-80.

Qui mori didicit servire dedit.

- Sen. *Ep.* 26