

CAESAR AND HIS OFFICERS IN THE GALLIC WAR COMMENTARIES

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This paper explores Caesar's methods of presenting his high-ranking subordinates in the Gallic War commentaries. It must be said at the beginning that it is hard to assess the actual contribution of Caesar's legates when the commentaries are the only detailed information we have of the campaigns.¹ We can only guess at the extent to which Caesar has minimised or omitted real contributions. Yet, when we look at what we do have, we not only begin to assess the ways Caesar dealt with those most closely associated with him but we can perceive the very different concerns of individual books.² The argument will be based on Caesar's treatment of his officers in the *BG*, on the contrasting ways Caesar writes of himself, his centurions and tribunes and his Gallic enemies, and on omissions which can be demonstrated.

The purpose of the Gallic *Commentarii*

Caesar needed to maintain a place in the minds of the Romans during his long absence. It is very likely that the works were presented to the Roman public annually or, if not, in stages when enough material had been produced to make the desired impression. Caesar's decision not to write up the final campaigns against the Bellovaci, which later became part of Book 8, indicates that the advantages of self-advertisement had run out by the end of the decade. In the context of the debate over the terminal date of his command, publication was even a disadvantage. Caesar could not afford in 50 BC the frankness of Hirtius at 8.48 on the lack of activity in Gaul.³ There is no evidence that his interest in the work returned.

When Caesar chose to narrate his own story of the Gallic campaigns, he decided to do something which was unusual.⁴ It was his presentation of himself as the great Roman Emperor to the Roman people, in a manner befitting a literary stylist and major orator. Most importantly, it was his answer to the popularity and reputation of Pompey,⁵

perhaps especially as that reputation was given literary permanence by Cicero's speech of 66, *De Imperio Cn. Pompeii*.

As far as we can know, the Gallic War commentaries were different from previous examples of *res gestae*. The campaigns of Pompey and Lucullus had been written up by their respective 'court historians', Theophanes of Mytilene and Archias; Sulla's memoirs were written after he had supposedly left Rome to its own devices.⁶ Caesar did not wait for the 'end' of his career, nor did he entrust the final product to others. Cicero's work 'On his consulship' perhaps comes closest to someone writing up his own deeds very soon after they were performed and while he was still active as a politician. By composing his own accounts and producing them quickly he could outshine Pompey⁷ and, if these had bothered him, both Sulla and Lucullus as well. This should not surprise us in a man who organised the daily publication of the Senate's activities (Suet. *D. Iul.* 20.1), who encouraged shorthand writers to take down his speeches verbatim (Suet. *D. Iul.* 55) and who abandoned the account of Gallic campaigns when they became inconvenient.

If the function of the first commentary was to place Caesar's military achievements immediately before the Roman literate and listening public in polished literary form, he achieved excellent results. The impact of his adventures in Gaul was immediate. Sometime very soon after the expedition to Britain, Catullus used him as an image of romantic distance (*Carm.* 11). Cicero's *De Provinciis Consularibus*, delivered in 56, showed how much Caesar, the man who had made it unnecessary for Italy to defend the Alps, could capture the imagination of the Romans.⁸ The force of chapters 32–5 is perhaps easier to understand if Cicero and his listeners had already experienced the power of Book 1.⁹ We know that winters in Gaul were used for the production of works of literature. Caesar produced other works including a two volume work, *De Analogia* (Suet. *D. Iul.* 56.5), and innovative dispatches to the Senate which were meant not only for information but for preservation (Suet. *D. Iul.* 56.6). Some of his officers had similar literary aspirations: Quintus Cicero was prolific (*Q. Fr.* 3.5.[25]) and Lucius Cotta, killed in 54, had already produced a *Romana Politeia* which included a description of the British expedition of 55 (Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistai*, 6.273). P. Crassus had interests in literature and probably wrote of his adventures in Gaul.¹⁰ Hirtius states that Caesar's works were characterised by the speed with which they were written.¹¹ Everything we know of Caesar suggests that he would be ahead of his officers with his own account rather than behind

them, and that he would do his best to ensure that their literary efforts produced *ex castris* were influenced by his works rather than his by theirs.¹²

In Book 1, Caesar successfully created and then extended the picture of the Great Roman Emperor, champion of the Roman People. In this book, he truly does 'bestride the world like a colossus'.¹³ Having once begun the project, he did not (and perhaps could not) ignore his reading public. Yet if the books were produced *seriatim* his chances of falsification were fewer. He could not omit reports of certain situations which were well known in Rome and were too important to his political enemies to be passed over. There were other accounts, private and published, to counter any attempt at complete misrepresentation. Caesar appears to have met this difficulty by directing the focus of the work towards the success of his army, to a certain extent towards his centurions but most importantly towards himself and the interest generated in the Gauls and Germans. In this scheme, the legates have only a minimal role.

The conventions of Roman literature allowed this privilege to Caesar. A tradition existed in which individuals did not figure in descriptions of the military exploits of the Roman People. In addition, by virtue of Caesar's role as proconsul, the victories were technically his anyway and he was under no obligation to mention or credit others. Yet he mentions some names and gives acknowledgment on certain occasions and not others. Caesar was a politician in a very turbulent period of Roman politics. He increasingly needed men of the social standing of the legates as political as well as military supporters. As will be shown, Caesar does not often or consistently use the Gallic War commentaries to score political points or win immediate support from his peers, as he does the Civil War commentaries. When he does so, we become aware that the purpose of the works, as well as the time of composition, has subtly changed.

Caesar had to exercise tact in describing the activities of his senior command. Both the control and the literary presentations of legates had proved difficult for others. Lucius Lucullus had used his legates to account for defeat and to point to his own finer qualities, as Plutarch's *Life* reveals.¹⁴ It has been credibly argued¹⁵ that the political loyalty of Lucullus' legates was compromised by Archias' negative presentation of them in contrast to the encomiastic press awarded to their commanding officer.¹⁶ Yet a man such as Murena could, if he chose to, blame Archias the author for any misrepresentation. Caesar's officers had no third party between them, and any hypothetical resentment

caused at anything he wrote could not be deflected from the original source. Considerable care was needed if Caesar was to achieve a tactful representation while avoiding a situation where the legates shifted the focus away from the real hero.

Hirtius' choice, or how Caesar did not write about legates

As with many aspects, Book 8, produced by Hirtius in 44 but possibly written much earlier,¹⁷ demonstrates what Caesar might have done had he been a different person or the commentaries had a different purpose. Book 8 reveals proportionally more about legates than any other, apart from Book 3, which is an aberration on any level. Hirtius, while taking Caesar's greatness for granted (8.3), allows us to notice more of the structure of Caesar's style of command and the integral part the legates played in holding the operation together: the advance of Trebonius, not of Caesar, caused the Bellovaci to halt (8.14); Caninius Rebilus resisted the attacks of Dumnacus of the Andes without any need for Caesar to save him (8.26); Gaius Fabius oversaw the surrender of 'several tribes' (8.27) and went on to relieve the camp of Caninius. With the help of Q. Atius Varus and Caninius himself, he turned the tables and besieged Uxellodunum (26–39). Meanwhile, Caesar spent this time attempting to capture the elusive Ambiorix and is not mentioned for twelve chapters. Hirtius scores no political points against Labienus, the man who deserted Caesar in early 49 (8.23–4, 8.45). He actually approves of Labienus' decision to attempt to kill Commius of the Atrebatas in less than honourable circumstances because of the need to remove an enemy. There is a constant moving of legions, all of which had to be entrusted to the legates (for example, 8.6). The result is arguably the most boring book in the Caesarian corpus but it is possibly a more realistic description of the manoeuvres and difficulties of the Gallic campaigns and the role of the legates within that process.¹⁸

Hirtius was in Gaul from 55 acting, in our terms, as a staff officer for Caesar. Helping the great man to compose his works was part of his duty.¹⁹ It is possible he produced in some seasons something of the nature of Book 8 as a rough draft for Caesar to rework.²⁰ His hand might be noted in the increasing number of lists of legates commanding legions or in charge of winter quarters, the most lengthy of which is found at 7.90. Yet his purpose, which gave an account of what happened, was not Caesar's, which explained what happened and why and how he was successful, employing on occasion the highest form of literary art.

Caesar's compliments and who earns them: a study in virtues

A review of certain key words in Caesar's works reveals interesting patterns in how people are described. Particularly is this so of *virtus*, a key word in the military and moral context of the commentaries. There are over seventy references to *virtus* in Books 1–7 of the commentaries, most of which describe the Gauls or Germans who are about to be defeated or the Roman army's need for or display of it. It is applied to few individuals, and of these, fewer Romans. Volusenus, a military tribune, is *vir et consili magni et virtutis* at 3.5 (an epithet repeated by Hirtius at 8.48) and Cn. Pompeius' success is ascribed to *virtus* at 7.6. Labienus knows he must rely on *virtus* to overcome the Gauls (7.59) and exhorts his men to show it (7.62). Epithets such as *fortis* or *fortissimus* are reserved for centurions and junior officers. Among the *virii fortissimi* are the chief centurion P. Sextus Baculus (2.25), a Romanised Gaul Piso Aquitanus (4.12), T. Balventius and Q. Lucanius, both chief centurions (5.35), the aquilifer L. Petrosidius (5.37), T. Pullo and L. Vorenus, also chief centurions (5.44) and the unnamed centurions of 6.40. Q. Atius Varus, a military tribune, is *singularis animi et prudentiae* (3.37); Caesar (4.17), the Roman Army (7.66) and the Roman People (4.17) have *dignitas*, as do certain Gallic tribes, especially the Aedui (5.7, 6.12, 7.39, 7.54), but not specifically legates or officers. Caesar (1.31, 1.33, 7.32), the Roman army and Balventius (5.35), along with several Gauls in specific contexts, possess *auctoritas*. Caesar recognises the advantage of possessing *constantia* (1.40) but the word is otherwise applied to Gauls (3.25, 3.25, 7.77). To Diviciacus alone is ascribed *temperantia* (1.19) but he shares *iustitia* with the Volcae Tectosages (4.24) and Caesar himself (1.41). *Diligentia*, a virtue one might find more readily applied to legates than some others, occurs (with cognates) twenty-two times. Among those examples, it applies to Caesar himself (1.40, 2.28, 6.34, 7.32), to Vercingetorix (7.4, 7.29) and other Gauls, who either have it (5.35, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 7.65) or not (3.16, 3.18) and to the manner in which Caesar's commands are obeyed (2.5, 3.21, 6.34). Of his legates, Q. Cicero displays it for a time but lapses (6.36) and Labienus displays it and expects it in others (5.58). P. Crassus, a *praefectus equitum*, recognised when it was needed (3.20). Caesar applies *innocentia* only to himself (1.40).²¹ With the notable exceptions of Q. Labienus and Q. Cicero, who will be discussed below, Caesar does not describe any personal characteristics, especially virtues, of his legates. They are shown to display these qualities, but are not explicitly linked to them as others within the works are.

Another notable feature is Caesar's habit of describing in detail the personal courage and loyal speeches of his centurions and junior officers. Book 2 introduces a figure which we might call the 'faithful and brave centurion'. It is not a common device, but the examples stay in our memory. The first of these characters is P. Baculus, a centurion whom the Gauls try hard to kill on at least three occasions.²² His reputation as *vir fortissimus* is backed up by a description of his wounds and actions. Apart from Baculus, Balventius, Lucanius, Pullo and Vorenius add to the excitement of the narrative at important points; Petrosidius and an unnamed aquilifer (at 4.25) show exceptional courage in defending the standard or leading the charge; the centurions L. Fabius and M. Petronius die in the Battle of Gergovia after one has declared he will win the day for Caesar (7.47) and the other saves the men he admits to placing in such a dangerous situation (7.50). The centurions die recklessly and gloriously or they fight against all the odds to win the notice of their commander. The literary treatment of the Gallic chieftains and notables also contains information about emotions, characteristics and qualities. Rarely so the legates, who are on most occasions placed in charge of troops which then go on to perform their tasks (and so success is implied) but, again with notable exceptions, they are names on a page with little or no personality.

We cannot immediately assume that Caesar intentionally removed rhetorical colour from his account of his legates' activities in order to 'do them down'. These were people he knew and who were known by the majority of his readers and a bland yet positive record might have been regarded as a more suitable approach to social peers. Caesar, after all, does not directly ascribe *virtus* to himself, but he displays it constantly and graphically. The Gauls were interesting to the Romans and the centurions did die more frequently. Undoubtedly both were usually more dramatic subjects. We might compare the stock sergeant-major figure to the aristocratic lieutenant in the average story about World War I for a similar situation. Yet positive application of virtue is deliberate and the way Caesar employs it within the narrative fixes the focus on himself, the Gauls, on selected individuals and the army itself.²³

The development and the treatment of legates in the *BC*

The occurrence of named officers and the narrative space given to them in the seven Caesarian books of the Gallic Wars varies dramatically. In Book 1, Titus Labienus is the only legate named (1.10, 1.21–2, 1.54) though we know there was at least one for each legion (1.52) and that one of them was Publius Vatinius, who had done considerable

work to get Caesar into Gaul. Publius Crassus, a prefect of the cavalry, is commended for his actions (1.52). Publius Considius, a centurion,²⁴ is blamed for the failure of the plan for trapping the Helvetii (1.21). Caesar's desire to note the individual bravery of the soldiers at 1.52 does not extend to mentioning many individual efforts in his writings, whatever he might have said in dispatches to the Senate.

The campaigning season of 58 BC was very satisfying for Caesar. He had successfully provoked two big fights and had won them both. The majesty of Book 1, its simplicity and themes are never quite so apparent in the other books. It introduces Caesar the great conqueror, the avenger of the wrongs of the Roman people and of personal insult, the successor of his uncle by marriage, the great Marius, as the protector of Rome. This is a rhetorical piece in its own right and the legates have little or no role in its action. Neither do those co-stars of other books, the centurions, or, apart from the Tenth legion (1.40–2), the army. Even descriptions of battles are kept short and crisp. The longest single sections are the speeches of Diviciacus (1.31), Ariovistus (1.44) and Caesar (1.40). Book 1 of the Gallic War commentaries does not set out to win friends and influence a few people by giving them a good write-up but to impress upon the general reading public of Rome the overwhelming greatness of Caesar.²⁵

Book 2 is already different from Book 1. It is two thirds the length (35 chapters as opposed to 54) with the campaigns against the Belgae as its main subject. The season had been successful and relating its events was still advantageous. The climax is the Battle of the Sambre, where although Caesar was surprised, he managed to win an important victory (2.20–7). In these chapters, Caesar introduces the other entity with which he was to share glory on a consistent basis, the Roman army. He frankly acknowledged the experience of the army as the most important positive factor in achieving victory, not his own clever generalship (*ibid*). The legates are commended as a group for their contribution to the victory (2.20), which was possible because he had made sure they were in the right place. In the rest of the book, brief reference is made to the successes of four different legates²⁶ as well as the prefect Publius Crassus (2.34).²⁷

Book 3 is not merely different. It is unique.²⁸ It covers the events in Gaul during 56, a year in which the political pressure on Caesar was enormous. Caesar had to strengthen the alliance with Marcus Crassus and Pompey, then watch carefully the machinations involved in their eventual election to the consulship. Dio suggests that Caesar assisted Clodius in his political dealings (39.23.4) and there were probably

other issues in which Caesar felt the need to interest himself. The result of dealing with these pressures which possibly kept him absent from Gaul for most of the campaigning season allows us to observe Caesar's chosen methods of portraying his legates at more length. Book 3 is the shortest book by far of the *Commentarii*. Of 29 chapters, the actions of Servius Galba take up 3.1–6, Publius Crassus 3.7–11 and 20–7, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, the villain of Book 5, 3.17–19. Caesar's activities are restricted to assisting Crassus early in the book, watching his navy win a victory of which D. Brutus was the main architect (3.11–16) and leading a largely unproductive campaign against the Menapii and Morini, although in the process of felling a forest he displayed *incredibilis celeritas* (3.28).

We see one example of a youthful enthusiasm and two of excellent caution. The treatment of Publius Licinius Crassus, son of Marcus, Caesar's close political associate of many years, is one of the outstanding features of Book 3. The younger Crassus has gone down in history as a dashing cavalry officer.²⁹ In some part this is directly due to Caesar's descriptions of him. Crassus was not a legate. He served as *praefectus equitum* with considerable (and reported) distinction. Crassus is the only officer in Book 1 singled out and expressly commended for individual initiative (1.52). In Aquitania he urges his troops against the Sontiates and they respond: they wish to win *sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce* (3.21). By contrast, another young *praefectus*, Decimus Brutus, and his officers are said to be uncertain about what to do with his fleet, even though there is nothing uncertain or unsuccessful in their actions (3.14).³⁰ Their device appears at the critical moment and both audience and Gauls are surprised. The effect is good narrative, but credit for the successful stratagem is strangely diffuse.

Not all sources treat Crassus with the same respect. Dio presents us with a portrait of a stupid hothead who makes far worse his father's desperate situation (40.21–2). The source for an alternative view was possibly C. Cassius Longinus, who had to recover the pieces after Carrhae and was in a good position both to know of any folly and to write of it later. Plutarch's highly dramatised account is more in the Caesarian mould: Crassus is the young hero whose death gives his father the chance for a brave speech which is totally disregarded by his soldiers.³¹

The portrait of Crassus is the only one of its type before Book 5. Its closest parallel is the account of Labienus' success against the Parisii in Book 7, but where Labienus introduces the spectre of Caesar's gaze (7.62), Crassus' soldiers want the honour of winning without Caesar

and Caesar approves. Although a degree of personal affection for young Publius might have caused the distinction, one cannot help speculating whether Caesar develops the narrative as much to impress Crassus Pater as to recognise publicly his junior officer's outstanding talents. If it is, it is possibly the only place in the early books where such considerations have demonstrably affected the manner in which a legate is portrayed. Talent and style do not seem to have run in the family. Crassus' elder brother, Marcus, was Caesar's quaestor in 54, after he and his father had departed for Parthia. Marcus is given particularly colourless treatment in the midst of a very exciting part of Caesar's narrative (5.24, 46–7, 6.6).

Commended for quite different qualities are Quintus Titurius Sabinus (3.17–19) and Servius Galba (3.1–6). Both are praised for caution (3.6). In the case of Galba, successful initiative is attributed to the senior centurion, P. Baculus, still *Nervico proelio compluribus vulneribus confectus*, and the military tribune Gaius Volusenus, *vir et consili magni et virtutis* (3.5), but it was he who eventually oversaw the withdrawal of the troops.³² The caution of Q. Titurius Sabinus not only receives full commendation: it is part of a plan which leads directly to success (3.17). This section of Caesar's work shows a remarkable contrast to later events. Neither 54 nor Book 5 has happened. In 56, Sabinus is a resourceful, courageous officer who saves his troops by a mixture of subterfuge and style and in doing so puts down a massed revolt of the Venelli and their allies. His camp is sited in a place 'suitable for anything'; he resisted the taunts of the enemy but cleverly allowed them to think he was afraid (a trick ascribed to Labienus at 6.7). He nearly overplayed his hand because the Roman troops began to think he really was afraid but Sabinus, Caesar, and the audience, know better.³³ Caesar then makes a significant comment: Sabinus felt justified in his actions because 'a legate should not engage' (*legato non dimicandum*) in the absence of the Imperator. In the later Civil War commentaries, Caesar states clearly that a legate ought to remember his place and his relationship with his Imperator at all times.³⁴ Sabinus' actions are thus fully commendable. There is no hint in Caesar, although a very slight one in Dio (40.6.2), of the rash fool of Book 5. It is not quite the change of persona we find in descriptions of Labienus in the Civil War commentaries, but the portrait serves to alert us to the ways in which Caesar's narratives suit the needs of the moment and are not always internally consistent. It also serves to demonstrate that caution and obedience, not initiative, are a Caesarian legate's most important attributes.

The double portrait of Sabinus has posed a problem for those who argue the unitary production of Caesar's commentaries. Rambaud (1966, 301) and Collins (1952, 90) draw different conclusions on the significance of the two portraits of Sabinus but both believe that 3.17–19 was written in the light of the Sabinus of Book 5. Collins suggests that it is Caesar's way of defending himself for the later disaster ('I thought he was reliable!!'). If both pictures were presented to the public simultaneously, I cannot think they would have the effect which Collins suggests they would. Rather, they would come to the same conclusion Collins himself does a little later (1952, 95), that Caesar's description of Sabinus the Villain was thoroughly transparent. A distance of a year or two between the two accounts was the best way for the memory of both author and public to grow dim. In the case of Labienus, Caesar makes no attempt to reconcile the two personae, and can get away with it because of the different circumstances in which he is writing. The inconsistency in the case of Sabinus is so large that those who believe in the unitary nature of the work must assume an argument of this kind or they could not defend their position. Chapter 3.17–19 is therefore significant as a most important example of Caesar's attitude to his legates and as one of the clearest signs that each book was written close to the events it describes and not substantially revised.

The fate of Book 3 is relevant in assessing the impact of Caesar's work. Plutarch, who follows Caesar closely, ignores affairs in Gaul for 56 completely.³⁵ It is as though without the hero present there is nothing in the book worth relating. Its lack of length and polish led to an ultimate fate of being passed over.

Book 4 returns to the earlier pattern where references to the successes of legates have little accompanying description.³⁶ Caesar once again concentrates on his own exploits, on descriptions of the Germans and the first expedition to Britain where an aquilifer leads the charge to British soil (4.25).³⁷ The first half of Book 5, which covers most of the year, is also similar. Part of it (8–23) covers the trip to Britain, including a description of the country at 12–14. Of the legates, only Labienus and Trebonius are referred to before 5.24, when Caesar begins the description of the difficulties he faced at the end of the season. The campaign in Britain had left little time to put the troops in suitable winter quarters and to provide them with enough grain (5.24). Three winter camps (under Labienus, Sabinus and Q. Cicero) were placed in difficult territory. Sabinus' legion was composed mainly of newly enrolled soldiers, that is, raw recruits, and was in one of the worst positions.

To make a difficult situation worse, Caesar had caused the Treveri to hate him by awarding the leadership to Cingetorix instead of Indutiomarus. This made not a few of the tribes very nervous and receptive to the slighted chieftain's call for revolt. Caesar explains this with some degree of circumlocution (5.4). The situation culminated in the worst defeat for which Caesar could be held responsible. A scape-goat was necessary and the person chosen as such was the legate Q. Titurius Sabinus.

The resulting apologia (5.26–38) is longer than the description of the whole summer's campaigning in Britain. We have all the elements of Livy's later description of the Battle of Cannae,³⁸ including the 'good' legate, L. Aurunculeius Cotta who advises caution, obedience to Caesar's commands, but when the inevitable ambush occurs, harangues his troops and sets his battle lines (because he had seen ahead that this would happen) in the manner of an Imperator (5.33). He fights on for many chapters, is hit full in the face by a sling shot³⁹ and finally dies surrounded by brave centurions and junior officers. Cotta and the Roman army are absolved.

Not so Quintus Titurius Sabinus. He is blamed completely for the disaster by Caesar. This most excellent legate of Book 3 is characterised in Book 5 by *temeritas* (5.52),⁴⁰ perfidy, in abandoning his soldiers (5.34) and in approaching an armed enemy (5.36) and ultimately by stupidity, in believing Ambiorix's promises of safe passage (5.29), in not expecting an ambush, as did the provident Cotta (5.33) and in actually trusting the enemy Ambiorix a second time (5.37). He died as one would expect of a coward and a fool, surrounded slowly and killed while Ambiorix delayed discussion (5.37). Not one of his actions or decisions could have been worse thought out or executed.

Just how much Sabinus was really to blame is very hard to know. The real detail of what happened was lost and the information came from the few who escaped or prisoners.⁴¹ There are some clues, however. Sabinus made a choice he had rejected when fighting the Venelli. He is otherwise described as a sensible and effective legate. Between Caesar and Ambiorix, and furthermore, between Sabinus and Ambiorix, there were close ties of favour and personal friendship (5.27) and for this reason he had less reason to doubt Ambiorix's good faith than Caesar implies. Sabinus had raw recruits to work with and perhaps faced serious shortages of provisions. Winter quarters were a terrible problem in any year, but in 54 all three camps of Labienus, Cicero and Sabinus were seriously threatened. According to Caesar's own account, that of Q. Cicero, who 'did the right thing' and stayed within the

fortifications, escaped destruction only very narrowly. Yet Caesar allows no mitigating conditions at all to the account of Sabinus' stupidity and culpability. Sabinus is not even allowed an honourable death. Caesar could do so because both legates and the majority, if not all, of the senior command were dead. The demolition is complete when at 5.52 he exhorts the troops not to feel badly at the defeat which has been caused by the *culpa* and *temeritas* of a legate.⁴²

Caesar must end his account on a high note. He dramatically saves Quintus Cicero in a lengthy account (5.40–52),⁴³ again complete with colourful stories such as the thrilling tale of the rival centurions, Vorenus and Pullo, before he arrives to save the army. But sadly for this dramatic story, Ambiorix escapes, a miserable ending for any book. Caesar does something he does not do elsewhere. He continues his account through the winter, including a report of his vigilance and its effects. He finishes the story by relating the beginning of the next campaigning season, including Labienus' victory and the death of Indutiomarus, the chief of the Treveri and instigator of all the trouble (55–8).

It was not Caesar's habit to make scapegoats of his legates.⁴⁴ Sabinus' *damnatio* is the only case of Caesar blaming an individual for a disaster in the Gallic campaign. It was, as far as we know, the biggest defeat he had to explain to the public. Sabinus' fate should not be taken as a universal message informing us of Caesar's contempt for his officers and his reading public. The account is constructed to suit the magnitude of the disaster. Caesar had no other choice if he was not to share the blame. A review of the account in other sources demonstrates that, in the long term, Caesar was reasonably successful in deflecting damaging criticism. Other extant sources all rely principally on the commentaries, although some come to us via Livy. If blame is present, Caesar shares it, but in most cases, it does not figure. Dio attempts to excuse Sabinus by making his trust in Ambiorix seem understandable (40.6.1–2). He commends Caesar's judgement in not leaving the troops in Britain (40.4.1–2) and the disaster, told quickly, is attributed to misfortune rather than any culprit. If the relevant *periocha* (106) of Livy is any indication of what Livy actually said, he merely relates the story and attaches no blame. Orosius (6.10), as we would expect, does much the same.⁴⁵ Florus (1.45.14–18) is garbled.⁴⁶ Plutarch (*Caes.* 24) does exactly what Caesar would have wished by concentrating more on the rescue of Cicero than any other aspect. Appian (*BC* 2.29) mentions the incident only obliquely. He returns to it in his comparison of Caesar and Alexander (2.150) when the defeat diminishes Caesar's stature but does not ultimately affect an approving judgement. This

success reveals not the truth but perhaps the art. If Caesar had constantly, and small mindedly, used legates as scapegoats to explain his own flaws, as Archias might have done for Lucullus, he could not have sustained his image as the great Imperator. Neither would he have been as convincing when a scapegoat was really necessary.

The different treatment of legates in the final two books might reflect a new situation caused by Caesar's military disaster and then by the growing polarisation of politics. We should not discount the influence of Hirtius, now ensconced in Gaul as one of Caesar's most important aides. Perhaps for all three reasons, references to legates in both books are more frequent and the tendency to describe their actions more apparent. In the 44 chapters of Book 6, Caesar names seven legates and some of his other officers, commenting on the activities of three: Labienus' defeat of the Treveri, Q. Cicero's second rescue and L. Basilius' attempt to capture Ambiorix.⁴⁷ In the 90 chapters of Book 7, twelve legates are named, some on several occasions.⁴⁸ The result is not always extensive description but it is important acknowledgment. There are many more references of the type found at 7.83: *haec Gaius Antistius Reginus et Gaius Caninius Rebilus legati cum duabus legionibus obtinebant*. Mark Antony and Gaius Trebonius are commended for initiative beyond their orders in the siege of Alesia (7.81). Labienus' activities are described in detail and deserve careful attention.

Quintus Cicero's rescue in Book 6 is the major instance where scholarship has traced political considerations affecting the way in which the story is presented.⁴⁹ A count of the times Caesar 'saves' his officers suggests that this is another device carefully reserved for necessary occasions. Apart from the rescues of Cicero, Caesar saves only the military tribune Aristius (7.42–3) and news of his arrival scares the Treveri away from Labienus' camp (5.53). In the rescue of Cicero at 5.40–52, Cicero had displayed the caution so necessary in Caesar's legates and his role is presented as honourable and good. He punctuates the account with small but pathos-creating details: Cicero was not well (5.40); the camp is assailed with fire and hot bullets (5.43); Pullo and Vorenus have their wonderful *contentio virtutis* (5.44); Caesar's message of support was not found for two days (5.48). At the same time Caesar uses the rescue to re-establish his position as Defender of the Roman People by his role in the rescue. If Marcus Cicero was pleased with the account, the narrative achieved two objectives. Caesar is far more constrained in the following year when only luck saved the Romans from another massacre. In his narrative of this event he chose to be lenient with the brother of a man whose support he greatly

wanted. We know from a stray reference what Caesar thought of Q. Cicero's actions and can see by this how carefully he has constructed the text. Cicero had at first acted *summa diligentia* (6.36). He did lose faith in Caesar and fell prey to bad advice (6.36) but bad luck made the situation worse in that the departure of some from the camp coincided with the advent of a cavalry detachment of the enemy (6.37). The general gloom caused by the fact that the camp was located in the same vicinity as that of Sabinus and Cotta did not help (6.37). Before matters could get out of hand, however, Baculus has a return performance. Sick and having already gone without food for five days he led the charge of the centurions and inspired the rest to continue to fight (6.38). In the next three chapters, the army slowly gets the upper hand. The situation was largely resolved when Caesar and the army arrived to take charge (6.41) and the rebuke for Q. Cicero is very gentle (6.42). Caesar quickly moves on in the narrative to continue the search for Ambiorix. The book concludes with the death of Acco, who is blamed for the original uprising.

The portrayal of Labienus is similarly careful. At the end of Book 5, it was necessary to relate Labienus' victory to counter the criticism he undoubtedly expected. The account was a double-edged sword. Caesar's many enemies were not averse to his discomfort.⁵⁰ Labienus was a person who would attract attention. He had already had a prominent role in Roman politics and was known as a close adherent of Pompey as well as Caesar. Those who enjoyed the thought of Caesar's demise would be among the first to attribute the real success to Labienus and to look for any sign of dissension among the two men.⁵¹

What Caesar does is to separate the events in winter and early spring (54–53 BC). This is possibly another indication of the seriatim production of the works. Had they been produced as a whole, he could have allowed his readers to move to the next summer and new successes immediately in a new commentary. Instead, he ends Book 5 with the death of Indutiomarus and places Labienus' further success against the Treveri in the early chapters of Book 6. Splitting the episode into two books has the desirable effect of lessening the dramatic impact of Labienus' victory. It is more effective, I would argue, than Rambaud's suggested device (1966, 298) whereby Caesar downplays Labienus' contribution by attributing success to Fortune. Fortune, after all, was a good ally for an Emperor.⁵² Caesar certainly had excuse enough to delay the appearance in Rome of the account of events in this winter. Besides the need to settle the desperate situation in Gaul, he had suffered the tragedy of his daughter's death in August.⁵³ Not suppression

or small-minded appeals to Fortune but careful placement of descriptions and events allow Caesar to recount Labienus' exciting victories without losing his control over the focus of the narrative or giving any grist to his enemies in Rome.

Labienus is the only legate to be mentioned in all of the Gallic commentaries. The suggestion has been made that Labienus' *pro praetore imperium* is limited.⁵⁴ This is hard to establish and, in fact, some evidence contradicts it. In Books 1, 2 and 4, the brief descriptions of Labienus' duties, especially his command of forces in Gaul during Caesar's expeditions to Britain, are best explained by a special command. In Book 5, Caesar respects Labienus' decision although it entails inconvenience for himself (5.47). In Book 7, forces are split between Caesar and Labienus and the areas of operation are quite separate. Labienus might have had his own legate.⁵⁵ If so, the overwhelming indications are that Labienus' status began and ended as *legatus pro praetore*.

What does change is the type of description of Labienus' activities. In Book 1, Labienus is an important though small part of the story. Caesar does not build himself up at Labienus' expense nor cut Labienus down to size. Similarly in Book 2, Labienus' decision to bring up the Tenth Legion to assist the line saves the day for Caesar (2.26). This pattern of brief but significant acknowledgment continues until Book 5 where the first long description of Labienus' victories occurs (5.55–8).

In Book 5, as we have seen, Caesar utilises Labienus' success to mitigate a crisis. He removes himself from the action for this period, returning only to express relief at the situation (5.58). However, in Part 2 of the same story (6.5–8), Caesar places himself far more conspicuously in the narrative. His fruitless but necessary search for Ambiorix laces the account of Labienus' success (6.2, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7). He represents Labienus as exhorting the troops to remember their Imperator and fight as though he was watching, an exhortation repeated in Book 7.⁵⁶ Caesar's presence hangs over the account of Labienus' success as if to suggest complete unity of spirit between Imperator and Legatus *pro praetore*. The remaining reference to Labienus in this book, at 6.33, shows Caesar, Labienus and Trebonius acting together in the attempt to capture Ambiorix. Once again, Labienus' loyalty to Caesar receives emphasis.

We cannot assume from these narratives that Caesar had any inkling of Labienus' future disaffection. The chief legate continued to be trusted until the very end. Caesar is consciously demonstrating to his Roman audience the amount of co-operation and loyalty which existed

among the high command in Gaul. This perhaps is another indication in Book 6 that Caesar's narrative has been affected by affairs in the City. The very first chapter emphasises the continuing friendship between Caesar and Pompey (6.1) to any who might have thought the situation otherwise. Events in Rome, and perhaps reactions to the commentaries themselves, appear to have a greater though still subtle effect on the material produced.

In Book 7, Labienus is absent from the record until chapter 34 but, when he reappears, the narrative space devoted to his achievement is extensive (7.56–62). He is sent against the Senones and Parisii with four legions (compared with Caesar's six) in country where there can be no effective lines of communication. The account is the clearest expression of Labienus' real military talent. Yet again, however, hints of Labienus' loyalty to Caesar and Caesar's concern for Labienus are an important feature: Labienus reacts to rumours that Caesar has withdrawn to the Province (7.59); Caesar has not in fact done this because he is worried about Labienus (7.56). As soon as the army breaks out, it marches directly to Caesar (7.62). When the crunch comes, Labienus makes another extensive speech, again reminding the soldiers of their Emperor (7.62).

Again, the placement of the account is significant. Labienus' victory moves the narrative firmly away from events at Gergovia (7.36–53) and in the direction of Alesia (7.68–88). The description of Labienus at Alesia (7.86–7) returns to the familiar pattern of earlier books. Labienus takes six cohorts to reinforce the line and finds eleven more 'which happened to be available' (7.87).⁵⁷ In this description, Caesar moves the narrative quickly back to himself. He describes how he presented himself at this part of the line and the effect of his arrival (7.87). The narrative confirms the impression that Labienus is loyal, effective and commendable, but Caesar, in his scarlet military cloak, is the only Emperor.

Perhaps Rice Holmes⁵⁸ is right to say that Labienus is given full credit for his achievement in Gaul, but he is guessing. We do not know what else he did or did not do. Certainly, Caesar says nothing detrimental about his senior legate and much that is highly complimentary. His account answers those who would place credit at Labienus' door not by omitting description but by increasing it; in doing so, Caesar constructs his narrative so that we are left in no doubt of Caesar's superior contribution and overall control. Thus tact in dealing with Labienus is part of the craft employed in the commentaries. Correspondingly, it is probable that Caesar felt his generosity as an author as

well as his patronage as a general had been betrayed dreadfully when Labienus deserted him for Pompey in 49 and that this contributed to the virulent hatred and contempt reserved for Labienus in the *Bellum Civile* (1.15, 3.19, 3.71, 3.87).

Omissions in the Gallic War *Commentarii*?

The gaps in the reports of certain officers and agents in Caesar's *Commentarii* are as important to notice as his inclusions. Nowhere in either the reports of the Gallic or Civil Wars does Caesar mention men such as Aulus Hirtius, Lucius Cornelius Balbus and Gaius Oppius who were indispensable to the Gallic operations. These men were essential not only in maintaining political contacts and a flow of information, but also in practical matters such as supply lines and correspondence.⁵⁹ This is not surprising, given the nature of the genre. Descriptions of their activity would interest us but perhaps not Caesar's immediate audience. Caesar himself tells us nothing of men such as C. Trebatius, whose legal knowledge was perhaps not necessary for defeating the Gauls, but was of immense value in solving the constitutional difficulties he faced in the forties, or his friend C. Matius.⁶⁰ It is more surprising that there is little reference to P. Vatinius, Caesar's political ally from 59 who served as legate from late 58 and possibly remained for much of the decade.⁶¹ Caesar's only indication of his character and contribution occurs in the Civil War commentaries (3.19). By contrast, the author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* (*B.Alex.* 43–7) clearly attributes his success to personal *virtus* (*B.Alex.* 44) and chooses to recount his victories against Octavius with much dramatic effect.⁶² Further omissions are on a grander scale. We hear very little about Caesar's activities in Illyricum,⁶³ and, correspondingly, nothing of any of the officers who served there. From the bare references in the Gallic War commentaries, it would be impossible to judge the talents of those legates whom we know from other sources, including the *Bellum Civile*, such as Gaius Trebonius or Gaius Caninius Rebilus beyond the fact that they and their troops were successful in carrying out Caesar's orders.

Mention of legates whose names or reputations could have been used to highlight possible political allegiances or sympathies is kept to a minimum. There is praise of Marius, but little overt criticism of Sulla and Caesar's political enemies in the *Bellum Gallicum*. It is tempting to read such an implication into the criticism of P. Considius (1.22) who had been a soldier of Sulla (1.21). However, the reference to Crassus, Caesar's close political ally, as the other commander, suggests that he wished to emphasise the length of Considius' service (and therefore

Caesar's legitimate trust in him) rather than to denigrate his former commanders.⁶⁴ There is less notice of causes Caesar was known to support in the fifties. We do not hear from him of Quintus Numerius Rufus, the rowdy supporter of Clodius in 57, who served on his staff in 56–5.⁶⁵ Lucius Munatius Plancus was probably in Gaul in 52, when his brother, the Clodian tribune T. Plancus Bursa, fled to Caesar, but nowhere in Book 7 is he mentioned. Publius Sulpicius Rufus was a name closely associated with Marius and *popularis* politics. Caesar refers to him briefly at 4.22 and 7.90. The political victory of gaining the support of such politicians as Cn. Domitius Calvinus and the Clodian captains in 52 fails to register, although Caesar is careful to record his vigilant care for the city in the emergency following Clodius' death (6.1, 7.1, 6). He refers to Pompey, perhaps the person he watched most closely, only twice (6.1, 7.6), and in such terms that while some scholars trace praise, others read irony.⁶⁶

Caesar's commentaries are, understandably, principally about himself, his army and his enemies the Gauls. In Books 1, 2 and 4 this has the effect of leaving little space for descriptions of legates or their activities. Book 3, hastily written, short, and covering material from a year when we know Caesar had other pressing concerns, is uniquely about legates. The first half of Book 5 follows the predominant pattern but the second recounts a disaster and its aftermath where four legates are necessary to the narrative. Book 6 shows the changing concerns particularly with the impinging situation in the City. Following it, Book 7, the most carefully written and lengthy of the lot, is finally what we might have expected but do not previously get. It reflects an author in political as well as military turmoil, far more consciously naming and acknowledging the members of his own class. Yet the major concern remains fundamentally the same. Caesar's military excellence is placed before the Roman people as unparalleled and incontestable.

No legate, with the exception of the dead Sabinus, could complain about what Caesar says about him, although most would have stories and contributions which might have been included and were not. With Caesar's main aim in view, that is to publicise himself, omissions concerning legates are probably more often collateral damage than determined policy. Yet the effect is that the legates, with the exception possibly of Cotta in Book 5 and, more clearly, of Labienus in Books 5–7, are not in the end the really memorable heroes or characters who emerge from the pages of Caesar's commentaries. These roles are reserved for Caesar, his army and for certain of his Gallic enemies, especially Dumnorix, Ambiorix and Vercingetorix. The presentation

of the legates, when it occurs, is careful and tactful. However, the ultimate purpose of the commentaries left them a limited role. Caesar's later domination of Roman government, perhaps equally inadvertently, left his own class again in a similar position.

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Notes

¹ This is the problem with such an argument as that of Rice Holmes (1911, 230), who defends Caesar against charges that he minimised Labienus' contribution by saying 'Now Caesar gave all his lieutenants, and especially Labienus, full credit for their exploits.' As we really only know what Caesar tells us, we cannot possibly know how much credit he gave them and how they responded to it. Correspondingly it is hard to prove, though sceptics can guess at, Caesar's omissions and suppressions.

² The most important work on Caesar's literary treatment of his legates remains M. Rambaud, 1966, esp. 296–301. The work is an extensive thesis concerning Caesar's techniques of disinformation. Rambaud sees a crafted text by someone actively seeking to misrepresent what happened. I see different responses to changing circumstances where outright lying was not an option. Other works cited in this paper are listed in the bibliography. References to Shackleton-Bailey's numbering of Cicero's letters are given in square brackets.

³ This argument is based on a suggestion from Associate Professor G.R. Stanton of the University of New England, Australia.

⁴ See T.P. Wiseman, in this volume.

⁵ Issues explored by Goldsworthy in this volume.

⁶ Cicero's speech for Archias, Lucullus' 'historian' (*Pro Arch.* 21), describes the popularity of the account of Lucullus' adventures along with those of Pompey, written up by Theophanes of Mytilene (*Pro Arch.* 24). In Cicero's

description of Archias' work (no doubt tailored for his audience), he admires it for its praise not only of Lucullus but of the exploits of the Roman people. He omits any reference to such praise in Theophanes' work and one might assume a much larger role for the great general at the expense of the supporting stars. For Sulla's memoirs, Plut. *Sull.* 37. Sulla was possibly more generous to his legates than his younger associates. He dedicated the work to Lucullus (Plut. *Luc.* 4.4) and appears to have spent his vitriol and economy of truth on his enemies, such as Marius, rather than his subordinates.

⁷ Soon after the opening of Pompey's theatre in 55, Caesar put in motion the project for the rebuilding of the Saepta and the development of what became the Julian Forum (*Att.* 4.16.[89]8 from July 54). E. Rawson (*Cicero: a portrait*, London, 1975, 135) calls it 'Caesar's answer to Pompey's theatre'. See also, Collins, 1972, 941. The Saepta was certainly designed to be in close proximity to it.

⁸ *De Prov. Cons* 18–23; 29–39, and especially at ch. 22: *an ego possum huic esse inimicus, cuius litteris, fama, nuntiis celebrantur aures cotidie meae novis nominibus, gentium, nationum, locorum?* [But can I be an enemy of that man whose writings, reputation and heralds assail my ears daily with new names of peoples, races and places?]. See also the arguments of T.P. Wiseman in this volume.

⁹ Note especially Cicero's descriptions at chs. 32–3. The campaigns against the Bellovaci in 57 do not figure at all in Cicero's speech.

¹⁰ See the comments of B. Levick in this volume (p. 67) and S. Mitchell (1983) for references.

¹¹ Rambaud (1966, 57) sees the same significance in Hirtius' emphasis on Caesar's *celeritas* in writing (*Praef.* 6). Note also Caesar's *Iter*, a work composed in twenty-four days on the way to Spain (Suet. *D. Jul.* 56.5).

¹² See also the extensive discussion of Caesar's literary interests by L. Hall in this volume.

¹³ Collins 1954, 528.

¹⁴ Plut. *Luc.* 19.7, 33.1–2, 35.1.

¹⁵ Hillard, T.W. (1987) 19–48.

¹⁶ Compare *Pro Mur.* 20 with Plut. *Luc.* 19.7.

¹⁷ The most revealing piece of evidence that Hirtius was reworking a draft he had written earlier is the bland portrait in it of Labienus. There is certainly no hint of the vicious buffoon of the *Bellum Civile* (especially at 3.71 and 3.87).

¹⁸ J. Barlow drew my attention to the fact that when the legions were spread out in very rough country, some Gallic chieftains possibly never met Caesar but dealt instead with his representatives (see, for example, 5.27 where Q. Sabinus has his own ties of friendship with Ambiorix as well as those of Caesar and Ambiorix to consider).

¹⁹ Rambaud 1966, 57–8; Strack 1909, 139–58; Malitz 1987, 53–4; most recently, Hall 1996, 411–15.

²⁰ As he did perhaps for Caesar's later *Anticato* of 46 BC (*Att.* 12.41.[283]4).

²¹ Caesar's use of *innocentia* directly denies any charge of *avaritia*, that is, corruption. At 1.40, his long speech to his army in defence of his plan to deal with Ariovistus, he claims many of the qualities outlined by Cicero in *De Imperio Cn. Pompei* (chs. 27–48). Other qualities, especially *felicitas* and *celeritas*,

are claimed explicitly and implicitly throughout the work. Full study of the Gallic commentaries, and Book 1 in particular, as a direct (but subtle) answer to Cicero's speech is not the scope of this paper but it would, I suspect, bear much fruit.

²² 2.25: wounded seriously; 3.5: still injured but assists Ser. Galba to break out; 6.38: has not eaten for five days but breaks out of the camp with borrowed armour to fight the Germans; wounded and dragged to safety.

²³ Careful attribution of *virtus* is found in the Civil War commentaries. There are 18 references to Caesar's army, 2 to the Gauls, Raucillus and Egus, who betrayed Caesar's trust in them (3.59–60). It is attributed to Q. Fulginus, a centurion (1.46). C. Crastinus, the impressive *evocatus* who dies at the Battle of Pharsalus, has *excellētissima virtus* (3.91, 99); Antony, Curio and Caesar himself successfully exhort their men to display it. No Roman on the Pompeian side is so described but it is attributed to certain allies fighting for them, the Albici (1.57, 2.6) the Massilians (2.6) and Rhascypolis (3.4). In the mouth of Pompey who commends it, Caesar's description of the *virtus* and *constantia* of the Senate becomes ironic (1.6).

²⁴ 1.21: P. Considius, an expert in military matters who had served in the army of L. Sulla and later of M. Crassus. See also 1.22.

²⁵ This fact is recognised by scholars who on other aspects of the work differ completely. See Rice Holmes 1911, 228: 'book was not likely to win him many new adherents'; Rambaud 1966, *passim*; Collins 1972, 87 and most eloquently, 1974, 940–1. What is not always obvious is that, for the most part, the impression rests on Book 1 which is so different in its tone and its power from all the rest which are read later and in its light.

²⁶ T. Labienus (2.1, 11, 26); Q. Pedius, Caesar's relative (2.2, 2.11), L. Cotta (2.11); Q. Sabinus (2.5, 9, 10).

²⁷ Scholars have pointed to Caesar's device of using *nostri* and *milites* in order to avoid naming individuals (see esp. Rambaud 1966, 298 and below on D. Brutus). The question must be asked, however, whether Caesar was more conscious of a desire to be seen praising the Roman people than of a need to suppress achievements of his legates, especially in the light of *Pro Archia* 20.

²⁸ See Levick's discussion in this volume for further discussion of the nature of Book 3.

²⁹ Gelzer 1968, 126: 'the young Crassus did splendidly'; Gruen 1974, 114: 'high courage and leadership marked his service until he perished at Carrhae in 53'; Greenhalgh 1981, 88: 'Crassus' dashing son'. Meier (1996, 260) generalises from the picture of Crassus that Caesar was always as generous to his junior officers and encouraged independent thinking.

³⁰ Brutus commanded the fleet as *praefectus classis*. At 3.14, Caesar says of him, *neque satis Bruto...vel tribunis militum centurionibusque...constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae insisterent*. Tyrrell (1972, 429) describes the whole account as illogical. See also Rambaud 1966, 300. Gelzer (1968, 125) assesses Brutus' worth as equal to that of P. Crassus but this possibly derives from a wider knowledge rather than from Caesar's description of him in the *Bellum Gallicum*.

³¹ Plut. *Crass.* 25–6. This appears to be the more accepted version of

Crassus' end and Publius' talents than that of Dio, but see D.C. Braund (1993, 468–74) for a discussion of how especially unreliable this part of Plutarch's biography is.

³² Rambaud (1966, 299–300) and Tyrrell (1972, 428) suggest Caesar's description of Galba is unfavourable. Considering Caesar's approval of caution in his legates it is not, but the attribution of the really successful plan to others might be thought a backhanded compliment. One cannot rule out, however, the probability that the information about Baculus and Volusenus came from Galba himself.

³³ *ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptiōnem Sabinus veniret sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus nonnihil carperetur* [That soon Sabinus not only had to bear the contempt of the enemy but was carped at by the murmurs of our own men].

³⁴ Note Caesar's defence of P. Sulla at *Civil Wars* 3.51: *aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad praescriptum alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet* [There is one role for a legate, another for a general. The former ought to do everything according to orders; the latter should take measures freely to the greatest advantage] and his comments on Q. Cicero, who, unlike Q. Sabinus, had confined his troops and even the servants within the camp (6.36) and was only reprimanded when he doubted Caesar's word and allowed them out. See also Tyrrell (1972, 426).

³⁵ Rambaud (1966, 297) accuses Caesar of wishing merely to extend his account of the year. This is a distinct possibility but it has more relevance to an annual (or perhaps biennial) production of the books than to Rambaud's thesis whereby Caesar craftily constructed them as a whole at a much later date. In this case, there were many more desirable devices possible to cover up the fact that he had in reality been busy elsewhere, especially to one as skilful as Rambaud makes out.

³⁶ T. Labienus (4.38); L. Cotta (4.22, 38); Q. Sabinus (4.22, 38); P. Sulpicius Rufus (4.22).

³⁷ *'Desilite, milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus proderere: ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero'* ['Jump down, comrades, unless you want to betray the Eagle to the enemy. I at least shall have done my duty to my state and my commander'].

³⁸ Whether the Cannae story was already known in its Livian form to provide a model for Caesar or whether Sabinus and Cotta were prototypes for the literary presentation of M. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus we can sadly never know. We should not assume, as Collins did (1952, 101), that contemporary Romans would be as clearly reminded of the story of Cannae as we are.

³⁹ 5.35: *Lucius Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans in adversum os funda vulneratur* [Lucius Cotta, legate, while giving encouragement to all the cohorts and battlelines, was wounded full in the face by a sling-shot].

⁴⁰ There are ten references to *temeritas* or *temere* in the *BG*: 1.40 (Ariovistus); 4.20 (on travelling to Britain); 5.28 (non-*temeritas* in Cotta's advice); 5.52 (Sabinus); 6.7 (Labienus expects *temeritas* in the enemy); 7.37, 42 (Aeduans in revolt); 7.77 (Critognatus on Gallic defenders); 8.8 (Hirtius on the enemy) and 7.52, Caesar's only other application to Romans, the guilty army after

they have failed at Gergovia.

⁴¹ Collins argues (1952, 101) that the event cannot have happened as Caesar told it. The point is, we cannot know whether it did or not (see also Powell in this volume).

⁴² There is no hint in this speech, or elsewhere, that Caesar considered that he was himself in any way to blame, contra Tyrrell, 1972, 428.

⁴³ For Collins' discussion of the rescue of Q. Cicero, 1952, 101–3.

⁴⁴ Collins (1972, 940) lists four examples of Caesar blaming individual Romans: P. Considius (1.21); C. Fabius, whom, he argues, Caesar 'damns with faint praise' (5.47), but the mild 'damnation', if such it is, is mixed with approval; the centurion L. Fabius, who leads the rampage at Gergovia (7.47) and Sabinus. He clearly blames his army along with L. Fabius (7.52) for the disorder at Gergovia, and then only in a carefully controlled speech. Fabius himself is shown to be brave as well as foolhardy and his fellow centurion, M. Petronius, atones for his daring by dying a hero's death (7.52). Sabinus gets no such consideration.

⁴⁵ It is hard to know whether Orosius is using both Livy and Caesar here. He appears to have read Caesar, to the point of borrowing words and phrases and retaining Caesar's structure, whereas Livy breaks his account of the Gallic War to relate Crassus' disaster in Parthia.

⁴⁶ Florus confuses Labienus with Dolabella. Livy is probably present in some form though how much is hard to know. Rice Holmes' contempt for someone who can confuse Gergovia with Alesia (1911, 217) is justified, though his dismissal of all the other sources is somewhat arrogant (215–17).

⁴⁷ T. Labienus (6.5–8, 6.33); C. Fabius (6.6); C. Antistius (6.1); M. Silenus (6.1); L. Basilus (6.29–30); T. Sextius (6.1); C. Trebonius (6.33); Q. Cicero (6.32, 35–42). Broughton (*MRR* 2.231–2) also lists L. Plancus and P. Rufus as possibilities, as is P. Vatinius, but they are unattested. C. Volcacijs Tullus (*adolescens*, 6.29) may have been a prefect. M. Crassus (6.33) was still acting as his quaestor.

⁴⁸ Caesar names T. Labienus (7.34, 56–62, 86–7, 90); C. Fabius (7.40, 41, 87, 90); M. Antonius (7.81); C. Rebilus (7.83, 90); C. Trebonius (7.11, 81); T. Sextius (7.49, 51, 90); C. Antistius (7.83, 90); L. Caesar (7.65); L. Basilus (7.90); M. Sempronius Rutilus (7.90); P. Sulpicius Rufus (7.90); Q. Cicero (7.90). M. Rutilus might have been attached to Labienus (*MRR* 2.238–9) and L. Basilus might have been a prefect. L. Plancus and P. Vatinius were possibly also on Caesar's staff in this year, though there is no need to swell the numbers.

⁴⁹ The evidence is preserved in a fragment of a letter from Caesar to Cicero preserved by Charisius (Kiel, *Grammatici Latini*, 1.126: '*neque*' *inquit*, '*pro cauto ac diligente se castris continuit*' [he managed the camp with neither caution nor care]). See also Rambaud 1966, 299; Collins 1952, 10–13; 1972, 940.

⁵⁰ Caelius gives an evocative description of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus' reaction to Caesar's discomfords in 51 at *Fam.* 8.1.[77]4: *at Domitius cum manus ad os apposuit* [But Domitius holds his hands over his mouth].

⁵¹ The possibilities of this argument were first brought to my attention by my colleague, Martin Stone.

⁵² Cicero, *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 47.

⁵³ *Q.Fr.* 3.1.[21]17; *Plut. Caes.* 24.4. Contra (on this aspect, although not the argumentation which lead him to see Books 5 and 6 as different) T.P. Wiseman in this volume.

⁵⁴ Tyrrell 1972, 424–40.

⁵⁵ Broughton, *MRR* 2.239.

⁵⁶ 6.8, 7.62. Tyrrell (1972, 429) states that 6.8 is the only place where a legate is given a speech in *oratio recta*. The repetition is indeed suspicious but the statement is not correct: Sabinus also speaks directly in his defiant statement (5.30) which portends the great disaster.

⁵⁷ '11 cohorts' is more favoured as a reading than 40, a number some texts give.

⁵⁸ See note 2.

⁵⁹ *Fam.* 7.6–7[27–8]; *Q.Fr.* 3.1[21]9–18, especially 10: *quod omnia minima maxima ad Caesarem mitti sciebam* [I know everything concerning important and unimportant matters is sent to Caesar]. See also, Suet. *D.Iul.* 56.6–7.

⁶⁰ See R.A. Bauman 1985, 123–36; Matus in Gaul: *Fam.* 7.15.[39]2.

⁶¹ *Cic. Vat.* 55, *MRR* 2.205; Hirtius, 8.46.

⁶² Vatinius' later relationship with Caesar was chequered. He was made consul in 47, a reward for many years of service, but the consulship began only in September or October of that year after Caesar returned from Asia. Later in 45, Vatinius had to appeal to Cicero to assist him in the award of his supplication (*Fam.* 5.9–10 [255–9]) and then had to wait until 42 to celebrate a triumph (*MRR* 2.363).

⁶³ The most extensive reference is at 3.7.

⁶⁴ On a sketchy connection between Sabinus and the Sullani, see Collins 1952, 95–6, who properly dismisses it as far-fetched.

⁶⁵ Q. Numerius Rufus' term as legate is known from an inscription (*CIL* 1² 2.759). Cicero refers to his tribunate in 57 (*Sest.* 72, 82, 94; *Pis.* 35; *Mil.* 39). Broughton suggests 55 for his service in Illyricum (*MRR* 2.219). Other references to Illyricum appear at 2.35 and 5.1 when Caesar is either setting out for or leaving it.

⁶⁶ C. Hammond (1996) 234, 237; K. Welch (1997).

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