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Comparative analyses, based on recent  
World Values Survey data**

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**Africa on the maps of global values. Comparative analyses, based on recent  
World Values Survey data**

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## **Abstract**

This paper attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on African economic development: the place of Africa on the maps of global economic, political and social values. We develop new comparable indices of global value development from the latest set of *World Values Survey* data and determine Africa's place on a new factor analytical index of Global Civil Society.

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIV), available at many academic research centers around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix. The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called promax rotation of factors, which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.

Our analysis of the *World Values Survey* data derived the following factor analytical scales, well compatible with a large social scientific literature:

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society
2. Democracy movement
3. Climate of personal non-violence
4. Trust in institutions
5. Happiness, good health
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism
7. Accepting the market
8. Feminism
9. Involvement in politics
10. Optimism and engagement
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics

The spread in the performance of African countries with complete data is really amazing. While we are especially hopeful about the development of future democracy in Ghana, our article suggests pessimistic tendencies for Egypt and Algeria, and especially for Africa's leading economy, South Africa. High Human Inequality, as measured by the UNDP's Human Development Report's Index of Human Inequality, further impairs the development of Human Security.

One can maintain that the certain recent optimism, corresponding to economic and human rights data, emerging from Africa, is reflected also in our Index of the Development of Civil Society. There is at least some hope for Africa, on this front, too.

JEL Classification Numbers: C43, F5, Z12, D73

Keywords: C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation; F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy; Z12 – Religion; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption



## Introduction

This paper attempts to close a gap in the recent literature on African economic development: the place of Africa on the maps of global economic, political and social values.

International literature on comparative global economic, social and political values already developed comparative frameworks possibly to be applied to new emerging cross-national data, now covering a number of African countries (Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Davidov et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). This essay is within this literature tradition and develops a new comparable index of global value development from the latest set of *World Values Survey* data and determines Africa's place on a new measurement scale of Global Civil Society. Debates about these phenomena have gathered in pace in recent literature, especially in the framework of Inglehart's new theory of global cultural evolution (Inglehart, 2018).

In this paper, we debate the theoretical background, present an overview of the methods and data, and then portray the most important empirical results. We then present the conclusions from our findings and allow the specialists an insight into our empirical materials in the Appendix.


### *The new optimism regarding African development*

In his new and very encompassing analysis, Inglehart (2018) maintains that that people's values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which survival is secure; it was precarious for most of history, which encouraged heavy emphasis on group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and obedience to strong leaders. High levels of existential security encourage openness to change, diversity, and new ideas. The unprecedented global prosperity and security of the postwar era brought cultural change, the environmentalist movement, and the spread of democracy. But, Inglehart maintains, in recent decades, diminishing job security and rising inequality have led to an authoritarian reaction in the developed countries. Inglehart maintains that people's motivations and behavior reflect the extent to which they take survival for granted - and that modernization changes them in roughly predictable ways. What is the place of Africa in such a macro-sociological comparison?

In the framework of debates about international values, it should be recalled that recent literature on global economic development also highlighted the importance of the factor “*trust*” for economic development (Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). Gallup data made available in UNDP HDR (Human Development Report), 2014, projected onto a choropleth map, highlight the deficits of trust in most African countries (Map 1). The global empirical evidence seems to suggest the deficit of trust in several African countries indeed is a problem, if we understand economic growth in the framework of Alesina’s approach, but that this lack of trust is not unique to Africa and can also be found in large regions of Southern and Southeastern Europe, just to mention a few.

## Map 1: Gallup/UNDP HDR 2014 data about trust in other people

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In our paper, we attempt nothing more and nothing less than to develop an Index of Civil society in the framework of the larger necessary debates about Inglehart’s approach (2018), which works with the following scales and data:

- Attitudes on democracy
- Attitudes on gender equality
- Background data like age, gender, state of health, feeling of happiness, feeling of security
- Confidence in economic and political institutions
- Global citizenship
- Interest in politics
- Positions on the market economy, like competition, inequality, private enterprise
- What is important in life
- What is justifiable and what is not justifiable
- Work ethics
- Xenophobia

The results of our empirical survey show that on this front, there is room for optimism and hope for the coming decades for Africa. African economic development in some countries has decidedly shifted away from the “*lost*

*continent*” image and the debate has increasingly featured such factors as good governance as decisive for Africa’s future trajectory in world society (Noman, 2012; Pieper, Mkandawire and van der Hoeven, 2016). Figures and maps that several countries in Africa are rapidly moving forward in economic and also in human rights terms now abound; it suffices here to mention the data work of Freedom House (2018).

**Table 1: The advance of Freedom in Africa, 2013-2018**

<b>Country/Territory</b>	<b>Freedom Score 2018</b>	<b>Freedom Score 2013</b>	<b>Increase/decrease of Freedom (Freedom Development, 2013-2018)</b>	<b>Global percentile performance, 2018</b>	<b>Global percentile performance Freedom development, 2013-2018</b>
Cape Verde	90	90	0	19,62	5,74
Mauritius	89	90	-1	22,01	13,40
Ghana	83	84	-1	29,19	14,83
Sao Tome and Principe	82	81	1	31,10	30,62
Benin	82	82	0	30,14	6,70
South Africa	78	81	-3	35,41	33,49
Namibia	77	76	1	37,32	32,06
Senegal	75	75	0	37,80	7,66
Seychelles	71	67	4	41,63	12,92
Tunisia	70	59	11	42,58	3,35
Sierra Leone	66	70	-4	45,45	38,76
Lesotho	64	72	-8	47,37	55,98
Malawi	63	60	3	48,33	18,66
Liberia	62	60	2	49,28	24,40
Burkina Faso	60	53	7	51,67	7,18
Madagascar	56	35	21	54,55	0,96
Zambia	55	62	-7	57,42	51,20
Comoros	55	55	0	55,98	8,61
Tanzania	52	66	-14	59,33	61,24


Mozambique	52	59	-7	58,37	51,67
Cote d'Ivoire	51	34	17	59,81	2,39
Nigeria	50	46	4	60,29	14,83
Niger	49	56	-7	61,24	52,15
Kenya	48	55	-7	61,72	52,63
Togo	47	43	4	62,20	15,31
Somaliland	44	46	-2	65,55	28,71
Mali	44	24	20	64,59	1,44
The Gambia	41	23	18	68,90	1,91
Guinea-Bissau	41	30	11	67,94	3,83
Guinea	41	39	2	67,46	24,88
Morocco	39	43	-4	69,38	39,71
Uganda	37	40	-3	70,81	34,93
Maldives	35	46	-11	72,25	57,89
Algeria	35	35	0	71,77	10,05
Zimbabwe	30	25	5	76,08	11,00
Mauritania	30	34	-4	75,12	40,19
Egypt	26	41	-15	79,43	61,72
Djibouti	26	29	-3	78,95	35,41
Angola	26	30	-4	78,47	40,67
Rwanda	23	24	-1	82,30	19,62
Gabon	23	34	-11	81,34	58,37
Cameroon	22	23	-1	82,78	20,10
Congo (Brazzaville)	21	29	-8	84,21	56,94
Chad	18	21	-3	86,12	36,36
Congo (Kinshasa)	17	20	-3	87,08	36,84
Swaziland	16	21	-5	88,04	46,89

Ethiopia	12	18	-6	90,91	48,80
Libya	9	43	-34	94,26	65,07
Central African Republic	9	35	-26	93,30	63,64
Sudan	8	7	1	94,74	34,93
Somalia	7	2	5	96,17	11,96
Equatorial Guinea	7	8	-1	95,22	20,57
Eritrea	3	3	0	98,09	10,53
South Sudan	2	31	-29	99,04	64,59

In 2018, Cape Verde and Mauritius, the best placed African countries on the scale of global freedom, developed by Freedom House (2018), ranked as well as France, Slovakia, and Italy, and were even ahead of Latvia and the United States. Ghana now outperforms the European Union countries Bulgaria and Hungary and was ahead of several European Union membership candidate countries.


Not only freedom made big strides in Africa in recent years, also the economy of several countries gives room for hope. The following two maps which we include here dramatically highlight such more optimistic tendencies in a nutshell: the improvements of several African countries in the global ranks of the UNDP Human Development Index after the global economic crisis of 2008, and UNDP Human Development growth since 2000. For Inglehart, 2018, there is a clear connection between the level of Human Development, existential security, and what he calls “*cultural evolution*” (Inglehart, 2018), but which we rather prefer to call here the evolution of a civil society:

**Map 2: UNDP HDI (Human Development Index), 2013, combining education, income and longevity**






### Map 3: Improvements in the ranks of African countries on the scales of the UNDP Human Development Index, 2008-2013



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>


## Map 4: average annual UNDP Human Development Growth, 2000-2013

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The rhythm of Human Development and “*cultural evolution*”, Inglehart argues, is also conditioned by inequality (Inglehart, 2018), while other global value research has also shown the overriding importance of life satisfaction (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). Map 5 captures the UNDP HDR/Gallup data on overall life satisfaction in 2013.

### Map 5: Overall life satisfaction – Gallup Poll/UNDP HDR 2014




The Coefficient of Human Inequality, introduced in the 2014 UNDP HDR as an experimental measure, is a simple average of inequalities in health, education and income. The average is calculated by an unweighted arithmetic mean of estimated inequalities in these dimensions. The UNDP emphasizes that when all inequalities are of a similar magnitude, the coefficient of human inequality and the loss in HDI differ negligibly, but when inequalities differ in magnitude, the loss in HDI tends to be higher than the coefficient of human inequality.<sup>1</sup> As far as the available data allow conclusions, it must be maintained that in most African countries the performance is very deficient, suggesting that Africa today is the real global focus of Human Inequality, and that only in some countries of West Asia and South Asia, and in some Latin American nations, similar high rates of Human Inequality are to be encountered. Thus, inequality must be regarded as one of the main blockades against the spread of Human Security, so vital in Inglehart’s theory of the evolution of human values (Inglehart, 2018).

<sup>1</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-does-coefficient-human-inequality-measure>

## Map 6: The UNDP HDR 2014 Coefficient of Human Inequality by international comparison

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The world, which emerges out of the global economic crisis of 2008, in a way was predicted by Frank (1998) with his theory of a global shift of economic growth away from the Euro-Atlantic arena towards China and India, with economic dynamism now extending not only to the rim countries of the Pacific, but the Indian Ocean as well. In this paper, we attempt to contribute new empirical data on African economic, social and political values in the framework of this realistic and at the same time partially optimistic approach.

### **Theoretical Background**

To begin with, most earlier studies on African values were centered around Hofstede's approach to global value studies (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, & Roth, 2017), for which there are only few comparable cross-national value data available for Africa. In one recent comprehensive survey (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), it could be shown that the original Hofstede data can be only extracted for Morocco, so that the application of Hofstede's approach, which received priority in the literature, hitherto written on "*African values*" in economics, would first of all have to overcome the problem of missing original survey data, measuring Hofstede's theory.

According to Hofstede and his school, which still might be very relevant to explain African value development at least in theory, there are four to six basic clusters of international value systems, and they are all defined along the scales of how different national societies handle ways of coping with inequality, ways of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or as a boy. Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as

- Power Distance
- Individualism vs. Collectivism
- Masculinity versus Femininity
- Uncertainty Avoidance Index
- Long-Term Orientation
- Indulgence versus Restraint

Some of the empirical factors, developed from the new cross-national data of the *World Values Survey*, integrating a sufficient number of representative surveys of African publics, bear resemblance to the Hofstede factors, highlighted above.

So, how different or similar is Africa from the rest of the world in its values in the light of new cross-national perspectives and data? The systematic social scientific study of global values and opinions, used in this essay, has of course a long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Such studies are made possible by the availability of systematic and comparative opinion surveys over time under the auspices of leading representatives of the social science research community, featuring the global population with a fairly constant questionnaire for several decades now. The original data are made freely available to the global scientific publics and render themselves for systematic, multivariate analysis of opinion structures on the basis of the original anonymous interview data.<sup>2</sup> Our data are from such reliable and regularly repeated global opinion surveys: The *World Values Survey (WVS)*.

The *World Values Survey (WVS)*, which was started in 1981, consists of nationally representative surveys using a common questionnaire conducted in approximately 100 countries, which make up some 90 percent of the world's population. Africa is now much better presented than ever before in these surveys. The WVS has become the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever conducted. As of the time of writing this article, it includes interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. The countries included in the WVS project comprise practically all of the world's major cultural zones.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp> and <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

As already highlighted above, for a number of years now, also some leading economists became interested in studying global comparative opinion data from the *World Values Survey* (Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). The interest of the economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth certainly was a factor contributing to the rise of the present methodological approach, also employed in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006).

In the present article, we feature on African values in the framework of the “*civic culture*” of the respective African societies (Almond and Verba, 2015). The analysis of our comparative data makes the rethinking of the entire tradition of empirical comparative value research in the direction of the classical political science research on the “*civic culture*” of countries and even entire global cultures necessary and useful. Here, one encounters the full legacy of twentieth-century modern political scientist Gabriel Abraham Almond (1911–2002): with his deep understanding of the normative aspects of human society he perhaps came closest to capturing the dilemmas of Western and non-Western, non-Muslim and Muslim contemporary societies of today, as they emerge from the empirical data. He did so especially by pointing out the many adverse trends in the civic culture in leading Western democracies themselves, brought about by the current contemporary erosion of social capital, a declining civic engagement, and civic trust (Almond, 1996). As causes of this contemporary decline in civic engagement, Almond cites in reference to the work of the political scientist Robert D. Putnam the weakening of the family (Putnam, 1993). A second major factor that Almond cites is the transformation of leisure by the electronic media. This tidal wave of value decay has begun to affect communities in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania as well.

The civic culture approach presupposes that a political culture congruent with a stable democracy involves a high degree of consensus concerning the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the content of public policy (for a survey of the relevant literature, see Tausch, 2016).

Inglehart by contrast developed an interpretation of global value change that rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change (Inglehart, 2018). It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to some 20 key *World Values Survey* variables. The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the traditional/secular-rational dimension and (2) the survival/self-expression dimension. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. For Inglehart and Baker, 2000, all of the preindustrial societies show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority,

and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; and most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014).

Inglehart, therefore, predicted a more or less generalized global increase in human security in parallel with the gradual waning of the religious phenomenon in the majority of countries across the globe. Inglehart spells out what tendencies are brought about by the waning of the religious element in advanced Western democracies: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life, etc. When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't "*enough to go around*," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable - indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may even be positively valued because it is seen as interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisines; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening.

Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal opinion survey data from the *World Values Survey* have discovered that there are pretty constant and long-term patterns of change in the direction of secularization (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). For Inglehart, such phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the state to get government benefits for which one wouldn't be entitled, but also the countervailing healthy activism of citizens in volunteer organizations, already described by Etzioni, 1998, hardly exist, while the rich database of the *World Values Survey* provides ample evidence about these phenomena and their occurrence in world societies. The economics profession, that is, mathematical, quantitative economics, already began to make large-scale use of the *World Values Survey* data, integrating the WVS country level results into international economic growth accounting (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2006). Thus, the art of "*growth accounting*" received a new and important input (Barro, 1991, 1998, 2004; 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1993; Guiso et al., 2003). Following Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard work - which brings success-, competition, which is the essence of a free market economy together with the private ownership of business, play an overwhelming role in twenty-first century capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical global value research.

### *Data and methods for our comparisons*

So, this essay firmly shares the established methodology of *World Values Survey* - based comparative opinion research (Davidov et al., 2008; Inglehart, 2006; Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). We should re-iterate that our methodological approach is within a more general framework to study African values with the methodology of comparative and opinion-survey based political science (Basanez and Inglehart, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2015).

We are of course well aware of many past valuable attempts to arrive at theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons of global values. However, our methodology of evaluating the opinions of global publics from the *World Values Survey* data is based on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). Such studies are based on existing comparative opinion survey data, which allow to project the underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.

Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIII),<sup>3</sup> available at many academic research centers around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called *promax* rotation of factors (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.<sup>4</sup> Since both our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available open data and should be able to reproduce the same results as we did.

In each comparison, based on the national factor scores for each of the factors, resulting from our research (for surveys of the factor analytical method see Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014) we evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population of the respective African and non-African countries.

The roll-out of the data, freely downloaded from the WVS website, was:  
*G:\Analyses 2016\WVS\_Longitudinal\_1981\_2014\_spss\_v2015\_04\_18.sav*. We

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/>

<sup>4</sup> Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union attitudes.



took great care in assuring that the variable names reflect the highest numerical values in the questionnaire and thus they might differ from the original variable label in the WVS. In the following, we shortly present our main research results.

### **Results: The global evidence based on the World Values Survey**

Our analysis of the *World Values Survey* data derived the following factor analytical scales of a Democratic Civil Society, well compatible with a large social scientific literature:

1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999)
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993)
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993)
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995)
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005)
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000)
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; Hayek, 2012)
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009)
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959)
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999)
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and Marsh, 1990)

The 39 *World Values Survey* variables, used in the analysis, are the following:

1. not important in life: Family
2. not important in life: Friends
3. not important in life: Leisure time
4. not important in life: Politics
5. not important in life: Work
6. not important in life: Religion
7. Feeling of unhappiness
8. State of health (bad) (subjective)
9. Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
10. Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language
11. Reject: men make better political leaders than women do
12. University is not more important for a boy than for a girl
13. No interest in politics
14. Supporting larger income differences
15. [Private vs] state ownership of business
16. Competition [good or] harmful
17. Hard work does not bring success
18. No confidence: The Press

- 19.No confidence: The Police
- 20.No confidence: The Government
- 21.No confidence: The United Nations
- 22.Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.
- 23.Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.
- 24.Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.
- 25.Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
- 26.Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.
- 27.Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal
- 28.Importance of democracy
- 29.Justifiable: claiming government benefits
- 30.Justifiable: Stealing property
- 31.Justifiable: Parents beating children
- 32.Justifiable: Violence against other people
- 33.Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
- 34.Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
- 35.Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife
- 36.I don’t see myself as a world citizen
- 37.Insecurity in neighborhood
- 38.Gender (female)
- 39.Age

We mention here briefly the salient factor loadings, explaining 10% or more of a variable:

### **The violent and lawless society**

- 0,796 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
- 0,765 Justifiable: Stealing property
- 0,760 Justifiable: claiming government benefits
- 0,732 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
- 0,560 Justifiable: Violence against other people
- 0,451 Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife

### **Democracy movement**

- Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. 0,753
- Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,738
- Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,704
- Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 0,493
- Importance of democracy 0,493
- Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,448

## **Climate of personal violence**

Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,846  
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,795  
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,786  
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,604  
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,587

## **Lack of trust in institutions**

No confidence: The Government 0,776  
No confidence: The Police 0,717  
No confidence: The Press 0,715  
No confidence: The United Nations 0,637

## **Unhappiness, poor health**

State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,771  
Feeling of unhappiness 0,716  
Age 0,440  
I don't see myself as a world citizen 0,405  
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,364

## **Redistributive religious fundamentalism**

Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,687  
not important in life: Religion -0,596  
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,460  
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0,389

## **Rejecting the market economy**

Competition [good or] harmful 0,760  
Hard work does not bring success 0,733  
[Private vs] state ownership of business 0,353

## **Feminism**

Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717  
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682  
Gender (female) 0,555

## **Distance to politics**

No interest in politics 0,849  
not important in life: Politics 0,837

## **Nihilism**

not important in life: Friends 0,690  
not important in life: Leisure time 0,669  
not important in life: Work 0,495  
not important in life: Family 0,478

## **Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics**

Supporting larger income differences -0,677  
not important in life: Work 0,467  
not important in life: Religion 0,400  
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,395


Our Index construction was based on the following weighting of our factor scores by the *Eigenvalues* of the model

- |  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1. The non-violent and law-abiding society<br>lawless society -4,263]  | [The violent and        |
| 2. Democracy movement  | 2,574                   |
| 3. Climate of personal non-violence<br>violence -2,260]  | [Climate of personal    |
| 4. Trust in institutions<br>institutions -1,929]   | [Lack of trust in       |
| 5. Happiness, good health<br>health -1,864]  | [Unhappiness, poor      |
| 6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism<br>religious fundamentalism -1,554]  | [Redistributive         |
| 7. Accepting the market economy<br>economy -1,434]   | [Rejecting the market   |
| 8. Feminism  | 1,245                   |
| 9. Involvement in politics<br>1,197]   | [Distance to politics - |
| 10. Optimism and engagement  | [Nihilism -1,141]       |
| 11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics<br>mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics -1,075] | [Welfare                |

This yielded Map 7, based on the factor scores, weighted by their Eigenvalues, documented in our statistical appendix:

## Map 7: Overall Civil Society Index

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source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Trinidad and Tobago; Australia; Japan; Netherlands  
Worst: India; South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Russia

In Table 2, we summarize the results of our study in a Table.

**Table 2: The ranks and percentile performances of African countries on our scale of the Development of Civil Society**

	<b>Overall Civil Society Index</b>	<b>Global Rank</b>	<b>Percentile Performance</b>
Sweden	7,047	1	1,695
Trinidad and Tobago	5,751	2	3,390
Australia	5,487	3	5,085
Japan	5,466	4	6,780
Netherlands	5,216	5	8,475
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>4,760</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10,169</b>
Germany	4,274	7	11,864
Uzbekistan	4,250	8	13,559
Qatar	3,749	9	15,254
Cyprus	3,500	10	16,949
Uruguay	3,496	11	18,644
Spain	3,197	12	20,339
United States	3,197	13	22,034
Romania	2,920	14	23,729
Poland	2,802	15	25,424
Taiwan	2,745	16	27,119
Georgia	2,562	17	28,814
Thailand	2,523	18	30,508
Turkey	2,121	19	32,203
South Korea	1,906	20	33,898
Armenia	1,852	21	35,593
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	<b>1,789</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37,288</b>
Brazil	1,752	23	38,983
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>1,656</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>40,678</b>
China	1,514	25	42,373
Chile	1,312	26	44,068
Estonia	1,157	27	45,763
Malaysia	1,029	28	47,458
Ecuador	0,945	29	49,153
Slovenia	0,730	30	50,847
Colombia	0,631	31	52,542
<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>0,402</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>54,237</b>
Argentina	0,342	33	55,932
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>0,249</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>57,627</b>
Jordan	0,199	35	59,322
<b>Libya</b>	<b>0,079</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>61,017</b>
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>0,042</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>62,712</b>
Yemen	-0,205	38	64,407
Azerbaijan	-0,301	39	66,102
Kazakhstan	-0,367	40	67,797
Kuwait	-0,840	41	69,492

Peru	-0,931	42	71,186
Mexico	-0,947	43	72,881
Kyrgyzstan	-0,958	44	74,576
Pakistan	-1,223	45	76,271
Singapore	-1,482	46	77,966
Hong Kong	-1,876	47	79,661
Belarus	-2,711	48	81,356
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,997	49	83,051
Ukraine	-3,060	50	84,746
Iraq	-3,306	51	86,441
Egypt	-3,878	52	88,136
Algeria	-4,422	53	89,831
Bahrain	-4,426	54	91,525
Russia	-4,609	55	93,220
Lebanon	-5,183	56	94,915
Philippines	-5,774	57	96,610
South Africa	-9,691	58	98,305
India	-10,498	59	100,000

The spread in the performance of African countries with complete data is really amazing. While we are especially hopeful about the development of future democracy in Ghana, our Table suggests on the other hand unfortunately pessimistic tendencies for Egypt and Algeria, and especially for Africa’s leading economy, South Africa.

### **Conclusions and policy perspectives**

Our investigation based on reliable new global value surveys has shown a great diversity of “*African values*”. Our main results were already shown above; our Choropleth maps in our appendix suggest the very wide diversity of performances also for the different components of our Index:

#### **African countries among the global top performers in value development**

- **Involvement in politics:** Egypt
- **Optimism and engagement:** Libya; Nigeria
- **No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics:** Ghana; Zimbabwe



**African countries among the global top performers and among the global bottom league performers in value development**

- **The non-violent and law-abiding society:** among the global top performers: Tunisia; among the global bottom league performers: South Africa; Algeria
- **Happiness, good health:** among the global top performers: Nigeria; Ghana; Rwanda; among the global bottom league performers: Egypt
- **Accepting the market economy:** among the global top performers: Ghana; Tunisia; Libya; among the global bottom league performers: South Africa

**African countries among the global bottom league performers in value development**

- **Climate of personal non-violence:** Rwanda; South Africa
- **Trust in institutions:** Tunisia; Egypt; Libya
- **No redistributive religious fundamentalism:** Egypt
- **Feminism:** Libya

On an overall basis, one can maintain that the certain optimism, corresponding to the economic and human rights data, emerging from Africa, is reflected also in our Index of the Development of Civil Society. There is some hope for Africa, and a more egalitarian development and a decisive step away from the hitherto existing high indices of Human Inequality would accelerate this positive scenario.

**Appendix Table 1: The global frame of reference based on the *World Values Survey*: Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance**

	<b>Factor</b>	<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>% of Variance explained</b>	<b>Cumulative %</b>
The violent and lawless society	1,000	4,263	10,931	10,931
Democracy movement	2,000	2,574	6,601	17,532
Climate of personal violence	3,000	2,260	5,794	23,326
Lack of trust in institutions	4,000	1,929	4,947	28,273
Unhappiness, poor health	5,000	1,864	4,779	33,052
Redistributive religious fundamentalism	6,000	1,554	3,986	37,037
Rejecting the market economy	7,000	1,434	3,676	40,714
Feminism	8,000	1,245	3,193	43,907
Distance to politics	9,000	1,197	3,070	46,977
Nihilism	10,000	1,141	2,926	49,904
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics	11,000	1,075	2,756	52,660
The tolerance and security of the elderly	12,000	1,049	2,690	<b>55,350</b>

**Appendix Table 2: The global model – factor loadings**

	<b>The violent and lawless society</b>	<b>Democracy movement</b>	<b>Climate of personal violence</b>	<b>Lack of trust in institutions</b>	<b>Unhappiness, poor health</b>	<b>Redistributive religious fundamentalism</b>	<b>Rejecting the market economy</b>
not important in life: Family	0,096	-0,031	0,057	-0,002	0,000	-0,287	0,245
not important in life: Friends	0,105	-0,056	-0,029	0,085	0,128	-0,023	0,034
not important in life: Leisure time	-0,021	-0,079	0,091	0,024	0,154	0,088	0,025
not important in life: Politics	-0,015	0,009	-0,049	0,148	0,035	-0,088	0,067
not important in life: Work	-0,023	-0,038	0,065	-0,001	0,165	-0,191	0,314
not important in life: Religion	0,051	0,199	-0,094	0,007	0,034	<b>-0,596</b>	0,265
Feeling of unhappiness	-0,029	0,045	0,038	0,153	<b>0,716</b>	0,000	0,043
State of health (bad) (subjective)	0,049	0,000	-0,086	0,043	<b>0,771</b>	0,033	0,093
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0,014	0,075	-0,113	0,013	0,057	-0,009	-0,120
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language	0,153	-0,179	-0,009	0,015	0,026	0,175	0,011
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	0,043	0,105	-0,156	0,047	-0,054	-0,302	0,046
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl	-0,129	0,195	-0,147	0,077	0,014	-0,219	-0,114
No interest in politics	0,018	-0,042	-0,051	0,108	0,043	0,019	0,027
Supporting larger income differences	0,003	-0,084	0,066	-0,026	-0,119	0,010	-0,023
[Private vs] state ownership of business	0,070	0,073	-0,056	-0,047	0,181	0,281	0,353
Competition [good or] harmful	0,200	-0,134	0,095	-0,047	-0,006	0,060	<b>0,760</b>
Hard work does not bring success	0,133	-0,068	0,072	0,027	0,026	-0,066	<b>0,733</b>
No confidence: The Press	-0,046	0,047	-0,038	<b>0,715</b>	0,082	-0,100	-0,035
No confidence: The Police	0,081	0,000	-0,035	<b>0,717</b>	0,093	-0,009	0,019
No confidence: The Government	0,030	0,030	-0,060	<b>0,776</b>	0,101	-0,095	-0,031
No confidence: The United Nations	-0,089	-0,061	0,095	<b>0,637</b>	0,140	0,090	0,007
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	0,028	0,493	-0,094	-0,018	0,085	0,389	0,178
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.	0,146	-0,002	0,139	-0,037	-0,030	<b>0,687</b>	0,093

Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.	-0,189	<b>0,738</b>	-0,139	0,040	0,053	-0,020	-0,155
Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	-0,128	<b>0,753</b>	-0,106	0,020	0,035	0,026	-0,045
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.	-0,075	<b>0,704</b>	-0,211	-0,036	-0,029	-0,055	-0,044
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal	0,088	0,448	-0,036	-0,061	0,068	0,460	0,197
Importance of democracy	-0,153	0,493	-0,186	-0,060	-0,010	-0,091	-0,208
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	<b>0,760</b>	-0,101	0,229	-0,019	-0,014	0,083	0,143
Justifiable: Stealing property	<b>0,765</b>	-0,209	<b>0,587</b>	-0,036	-0,055	0,096	0,228
Justifiable: Parents beating children	0,212	-0,112	<b>0,795</b>	-0,011	-0,051	0,111	-0,003
Justifiable: Violence against other people	<b>0,560</b>	-0,181	<b>0,786</b>	-0,006	-0,048	0,023	0,179
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	<b>0,796</b>	-0,097	0,300	0,022	-0,024	0,039	0,166
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	<b>0,732</b>	-0,195	<b>0,604</b>	-0,027	-0,056	0,068	0,211
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	0,451	-0,172	<b>0,846</b>	-0,019	-0,023	0,111	0,134
I don't see myself as a world citizen	-0,106	0,016	0,104	0,178	0,405	-0,150	0,059
Insecurity in neighborhood	0,150	-0,047	-0,047	0,161	0,364	0,080	-0,052
Gender (female)	-0,040	-0,097	-0,017	-0,062	0,095	0,303	0,061
Age	-0,113	0,062	-0,146	-0,071	0,440	-0,069	0,080

**Appendix Table 2 (continued)**

	<b>Feminism</b>	<b>Distance to politics</b>	<b>Nihilism</b>	<b>Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics</b>
not important in life: Family	-0,147	-0,028	0,478	0,212
not important in life: Friends	0,047	0,129	<b>0,690</b>	-0,025
not important in life: Leisure time	-0,091	0,080	<b>0,669</b>	0,068
not important in life: Politics	0,065	<b>0,837</b>	0,236	0,125
not important in life: Work	0,005	0,092	0,495	<i>0,467</i>
not important in life: Religion	0,072	0,155	0,216	<i>0,400</i>
Feeling of unhappiness	-0,082	0,044	0,139	0,084
State of health (bad) (subjective)	0,074	0,005	0,201	0,135
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0,146	0,052	-0,080	-0,127
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language	-0,250	-0,024	0,136	0,070
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do	<b>0,717</b>	0,039	0,023	0,079
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl	<b>0,682</b>	0,055	-0,085	-0,071
No interest in politics	0,103	<b>0,849</b>	0,019	0,021
Supporting larger income differences	-0,045	-0,029	-0,001	<b>-0,677</b>
[Private vs] state ownership of business	-0,006	0,014	0,024	-0,309
Competition [good or] harmful	-0,002	0,011	0,118	0,102
Hard work does not bring success	-0,037	0,034	0,053	0,084
No confidence: The Press	0,069	0,133	0,038	-0,012
No confidence: The Police	0,062	0,105	0,042	-0,020
No confidence: The Government	0,074	0,129	0,014	0,018
No confidence: The United Nations	-0,127	0,072	0,033	0,041
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	-0,125	0,057	0,027	0,235
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws.	-0,215	-0,001	0,039	0,034
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections.	0,071	-0,004	-0,102	-0,040

Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	0,024	-0,006	-0,073	0,080
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men.	0,255	0,014	-0,060	0,093
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal	-0,138	0,089	0,006	0,395
Importance of democracy	0,143	-0,145	-0,142	-0,269
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	-0,069	0,023	0,061	0,034
Justifiable: Stealing property	-0,100	-0,062	0,102	0,082
Justifiable: Parents beating children	-0,108	-0,020	0,002	-0,057
Justifiable: Violence against other people	-0,118	-0,068	0,087	0,066
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	-0,031	0,023	0,057	0,069
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	-0,104	-0,044	0,102	0,078
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife	-0,189	-0,079	0,064	0,057
I don't see myself as a world citizen	-0,123	0,174	0,041	0,128
Insecurity in neighborhood	0,120	0,034	0,074	-0,045
Gender (female)	<b>0,555</b>	0,160	0,051	0,078
Age	0,087	-0,208	0,218	0,193

**Appendix Table 3: Correlation matrix of components at the global level. Correlations greater than or equal to +/-0.100**

Component	The violent and lawless society	democracy movement	climate of personal violence	lack of trust in institutions	unhappiness, poor health	redistributive religious fundamentalism	rejecting the market economy	feminism	distance to politics	nihilism
democracy movement	-0,139									
climate of personal violence	0,405	-0,225								
lack of trust in institutions										
unhappiness, poor health				0,138						
redistributive religious fundamentalism										
rejecting the market economy	0,236		0,125							
feminism			-0,201			-0,120				
distance to politics				0,161						
nihilism	0,105				0,198	-0,100	0,261		0,101	
welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics		0,120			0,103		0,324	-0,101	0,108	0,295

**Appendix Table 4: The overall development of civil society on a global scale – factor scores**

	<b>Overall Civil Society Index</b>	<b>The non-violent and law-abiding society</b>	<b>Democracy movement</b>	<b>Climate of personal non-violence</b>	<b>Trust in institutions</b>	<b>Happiness, good health</b>	<b>No redistributive religious fundamentalism</b>	<b>Accepting the market economy</b>
Sweden	7,047	0,163	1,741	0,704	0,457	0,429	2,001	-0,080
Trinidad and Tobago	5,751	1,802	-0,199	0,166	-0,559	0,524	0,568	1,169
Australia	5,487	1,104	0,908	0,872	-0,121	0,304	1,810	0,158
Japan	5,466	1,479	0,383	1,245	0,403	-0,443	1,689	-0,032
Netherlands	5,216	1,878	1,219	0,839	-0,075	-0,109	1,860	-0,726
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>4,760</b>	<b>1,918</b>	<b>-0,586</b>	<b>-0,476</b>	<b>0,724</b>	<b>1,094</b>	<b>-0,271</b>	<b>1,041</b>
Germany	4,274	1,583	1,551	0,504	0,286	-0,108	1,480	-0,535
Uzbekistan	4,250	0,561	1,106	-0,059	3,009	0,681	-0,698	0,388
Qatar	3,749	1,775	-1,095	-0,149	1,738	1,267	-1,121	0,032
Cyprus	3,500	1,295	0,493	0,929	-0,419	0,080	0,528	0,014
Uruguay	3,496	0,632	0,712	1,024	0,140	0,017	1,016	-0,578
Spain	3,197	0,606	1,545	1,217	-0,415	0,049	0,917	-0,357
United States	3,197	0,837	-0,105	0,292	-0,490	0,110	1,300	0,418
Romania	2,920	1,685	1,026	1,081	-0,757	-0,714	0,263	0,464
Poland	2,802	0,574	1,012	1,086	-0,622	-0,084	0,485	-0,458
Taiwan	2,745	0,446	1,552	-0,269	-0,151	0,295	0,759	0,229
Georgia	2,562	2,544	-0,350	0,876	-0,768	-1,114	0,153	0,337
Thailand	2,523	0,490	0,310	0,989	0,298	0,388	-0,519	-0,240
Turkey	2,121	1,819	0,692	1,001	0,367	-0,004	-0,920	-0,280
South Korea	1,906	-0,190	0,175	1,222	0,377	-0,328	0,484	-0,074
Armenia	1,852	1,377	0,607	0,984	-0,657	-0,579	-0,246	0,288
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	<b>1,789</b>	<b>0,554</b>	<b>-0,284</b>	<b>-1,172</b>	<b>0,094</b>	<b>0,393</b>	<b>0,021</b>	<b>0,782</b>



Brazil	1,752	0,314	0,110	0,389	-0,734	0,119	0,356	0,382
Tunisia	1,656	2,181	0,369	-0,134	-1,449	0,033	-0,538	0,893
China	1,514	-0,177	1,264	-0,442	1,632	0,047	1,001	-0,452
Chile	1,312	-0,335	1,179	1,587	0,006	-0,556	0,168	-0,332
Estonia	1,157	-0,197	1,538	1,077	0,398	-0,952	0,707	-0,498
Malaysia	1,029	-0,709	0,043	0,082	1,027	0,793	-1,104	0,352
Ecuador	0,945	-0,890	-0,625	1,127	-0,153	0,597	-0,466	0,410
Slovenia	0,730	0,545	1,027	0,745	-1,054	-0,206	1,237	-0,405
Colombia	0,631	-0,538	-0,506	0,740	-0,345	0,587	0,092	0,091
Rwanda	0,402	2,179	-0,507	-2,507	0,456	1,056	-0,172	0,109
Argentina	0,342	-0,406	0,576	0,945	-0,793	-0,174	0,564	-0,350
Morocco	0,249	1,168	1,003	0,032	-0,332	0,423	-1,076	0,071
Jordan	0,199	2,463	-0,761	0,156	-0,202	-0,132	-1,047	0,233
Libya	0,079	1,138	-0,607	-0,363	-1,206	0,518	-0,896	0,862
Nigeria	0,042	0,616	-1,068	-0,853	-0,177	1,123	-0,707	0,325
Yemen	-0,205	2,300	0,585	-1,019	-1,615	-0,148	-1,357	1,130
Azerbaijan	-0,301	2,801	-0,338	0,331	0,231	-0,627	0,007	-0,814
Kazakhstan	-0,367	-0,669	0,948	0,254	0,697	-0,458	-0,025	-0,704
Kuwait	-0,840	-0,423	-0,956	-0,264	0,223	0,861	-0,730	0,199
Peru	-0,931	-1,640	-0,185	0,980	-0,990	-0,359	0,198	0,416
Mexico	-0,947	-3,110	-0,442	1,012	-0,796	0,656	-0,037	0,538
Kyrgyzstan	-0,958	-1,065	-0,963	0,594	0,499	0,070	-0,269	0,016
Pakistan	-1,223	1,273	0,302	0,654	-1,108	0,613	-1,738	-0,149
Singapore	-1,482	-0,266	-1,019	-1,241	1,140	0,267	0,195	-0,383
Hong Kong	-1,876	-2,016	0,031	0,181	0,643	-0,467	0,807	-0,351
Belarus	-2,711	-0,558	-0,006	0,536	-0,023	-1,414	0,551	-0,361
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,997	0,724	-1,245	-0,618	-0,962	-0,611	-0,736	0,589
Ukraine	-3,060	-0,630	1,269	0,733	-0,653	-1,526	-0,159	-0,730

Iraq	-3,306	1,105	-0,373	-0,728	-0,794	-0,934	-1,119	0,543
Egypt	-3,878	1,458	0,809	-1,111	-1,273	-3,046	-1,525	0,836
Algeria	-4,422	-2,077	-0,133	-0,866	-0,705	-0,202	-0,413	0,261
Bahrain	-4,426	0,912	-3,032	-0,221	0,989	-0,143	0,405	-1,580
Russia	-4,609	-1,455	0,750	0,676	-0,658	-1,301	0,188	-0,804
Lebanon	-5,183	-1,664	-1,416	-0,551	-1,107	-0,171	0,111	-0,172
Philippines	-5,774	-4,228	-0,695	-1,229	0,965	0,182	-1,184	0,109
South Africa	-9,691	-5,075	-0,757	-2,445	0,186	0,438	-0,961	-0,826
India	-10,498	-4,656	-2,702	-1,989	0,798	0,404	-0,093	-0,489


Appendix Table 4: (continued)

	Overall Civil Society Index	Feminism	Involvement in politics	Optimism and engagement	No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics
Sweden	7,047	0,958	0,503	0,309	-0,138
Trinidad and Tobago	5,751	1,070	0,004	0,190	1,015
Australia	5,487	0,708	0,053	0,060	-0,368
Japan	5,466	0,155	0,824	0,002	-0,240
Netherlands	5,216	0,669	0,381	-0,252	-0,467
Ghana	4,760	-0,155	0,033	0,408	1,031
Germany	4,274	0,350	0,273	-0,290	-0,819
Uzbekistan	4,250	-0,542	0,006	0,130	-0,332
Qatar	3,749	-0,526	0,505	0,643	0,681
Cyprus	3,500	0,528	-0,131	0,467	-0,283
Uruguay	3,496	0,862	-0,373	0,139	-0,094
Spain	3,197	0,514	-0,594	0,168	-0,453
United States	3,197	0,668	0,342	0,002	-0,177
Romania	2,920	0,329	-0,437	-0,257	0,236
Poland	2,802	0,396	-0,111	0,140	0,386
Taiwan	2,745	0,312	-0,553	0,157	-0,031

Georgia	2,562	0,120	-0,114	0,476	0,403
Thailand	2,523	0,050	0,879	-0,231	0,110
Turkey	2,121	-0,380	0,086	0,192	-0,453
South Korea	1,906	0,114	0,016	0,040	0,071
Armenia	1,852	0,023	-0,321	0,096	0,280
Zimbabwe	1,789	0,242	0,012	0,263	0,885
Brazil	1,752	0,701	-0,173	0,074	0,214
Tunisia	1,656	-0,585	-0,127	0,467	0,547
China	1,514	-0,202	0,006	-0,304	-0,858
Chile	1,312	0,484	-0,659	0,141	-0,370
Estonia	1,157	0,248	-0,381	-0,015	-0,767
Malaysia	1,029	-0,328	0,147	0,253	0,473
Ecuador	0,945	0,546	-0,101	0,140	0,362
Slovenia	0,730	0,509	-0,658	-0,075	-0,935
Colombia	0,631	0,715	-0,582	0,015	0,363
Rwanda	0,402	-0,100	0,257	0,238	-0,610
Argentina	0,342	0,523	-0,295	-0,086	-0,162
Morocco	0,249	-0,322	-0,463	-0,182	-0,072
Jordan	0,199	-0,816	-0,390	0,131	0,565
Libya	0,079	-0,768	0,237	0,538	0,625
Nigeria	0,042	-0,455	0,181	0,533	0,523
Yemen	-0,205	-0,904	0,076	0,074	0,673
Azerbaijan	-0,301	-0,597	-0,808	-0,286	-0,201
Kazakhstan	-0,367	-0,074	-0,143	0,007	-0,201
Kuwait	-0,840	-0,945	0,521	0,215	0,461
Peru	-0,931	0,789	-0,285	-0,333	0,480
Mexico	-0,947	0,691	-0,235	0,285	0,491
Kyrgyzstan	-0,958	-0,082	0,332	-0,242	0,151
Pakistan	-1,223	-0,697	-0,233	-0,349	0,209
Singapore	-1,482	0,088	-0,057	0,036	-0,241

Hong Kong	-1,876	0,122	-0,211	-0,268	-0,345
Belarus	-2,711	-0,098	-0,363	-0,319	-0,657
Palestinian Occupied Territories	-2,997	-0,726	0,144	0,065	0,381
Ukraine	-3,060	0,104	-0,465	-0,203	-0,799
Iraq	-3,306	-0,727	-0,204	-0,134	0,061
Egypt	-3,878	-0,644	0,569	0,027	0,022
Algeria	-4,422	-0,691	-0,139	0,069	0,474
Bahrain	-4,426	-0,868	0,655	-1,284	-0,258
Russia	-4,609	-0,159	-0,515	-0,416	-0,916
Lebanon	-5,183	-0,211	0,216	-0,169	-0,048
Philippines	-5,774	-0,198	0,506	-0,344	0,341
South Africa	-9,691	-0,137	0,158	-0,188	-0,084
India	-10,498	-0,759	0,283	-0,940	-0,354

Appendix Map 1: The non-violent and law-abiding society




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Azerbaijan; Georgia; Jordan; Yemen; Tunisia  
Worst: South Africa; India; Philippines; Mexico; Algeria

**Appendix Map 2: Democracy movement**


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source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Taiwan; Germany; Spain; Estonia  
Worst: Bahrain; India; Lebanon; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Qatar


Appendix Map 3: Climate of personal non-violence



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Chile; Japan; Korea, South; Spain; Ecuador  
Worst: Rwanda; South Africa; India; Singapore; Philippines

Appendix Map 4: Trust in institutions




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Uzbekistan; Qatar; China; Singapore; Malaysia  
Worst: Yemen; Tunisia; Egypt; Libya; Pakistan



Appendix Map 5: Happiness, good health




source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Qatar; Nigeria; Ghana; Rwanda; Kuwait  
Worst: Egypt; Ukraine; Belarus; Russia; Georgia

## Appendix Map 6: no redistributive religious fundamentalism

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


source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Sweden; Netherlands; Australia; Japan; Germany  
Worst: Pakistan; **Egypt**; Yemen; Philippines; Qatar

## Appendix Map 7: Accepting the market economy

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


source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Yemen; **Ghana; Tunisia; Libya**  
Worst: Bahrain; **South Africa**; Azerbaijan; Russia; Ukraine

## Appendix Map 8: Feminism


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source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Sweden; Uruguay; Peru; Colombia  
Worst: Kuwait; Yemen; Bahrain; Jordan; **Libya**


Appendix Map 9: Involvement in politics



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Thailand; Japan; Bahrain; **Egypt**; Kuwait  
Worst: Azerbaijan; Chile; Slovenia; Spain; Colombia


Appendix Map 10: Optimism and engagement



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Qatar; **Libya; Nigeria**; Georgia; Cyprus  
Worst: Bahrain; India; Russia; Pakistan; Philippines

**Appendix Map 11: No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics**



source: our own calculations and <http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/>

Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Qatar; Yemen  
Worst: Slovenia; Russia; China; Germany; Ukraine

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