

**THE WEAPONISATION OF AFGHANISTAN
AND THE EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS AND
LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ON
CONFLICT DYNAMICS**

PHD THESIS



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REGISTRATION No. S&NS/PhD/S-09/001

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PAKISTAN

MARCH 2014

ABSTRACT

Afghanistan, home to one of the longest running conflicts in the modern era, is a land of extremes, from its history to the development of the largest segmented tribal society in the world, where the ethos of the warrior archetype continues to exist to the detriment of every single invader since the beginning of recorded history in the region. This study, cognizant of the dire insecurity inherent within the conflict environment of Afghanistan, sets out to provide a *holistic* narrative of the processes, methods, techniques, and resources used in the financing, acquisition, transportation, possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the country, while also analysing whether or not a correlation exists between the mass diffusion and availability of SALW and the direct and indirect effects of their possession and use on the dynamics of conflict. As such, this study hypothesises that *the mass diffusion of SALW assists the exacerbation of the conflict in Afghanistan*.

An analysis of the essential dynamics involved in the eruption and propagation of conflicts is also provided in *chapter two* through an appreciation of the escalation of conflicts to higher intensities of violence by introducing the concept of the *acceleration* of conflict, the rate of increase in intensity of the conflict, and how this may be contributed to by the introduction of SALW at significant points at which the conflict is susceptible to rising to a higher degree of conflict intensity. Furthermore, to amplify the understanding being imparted, *chapter three* illustrates the intrinsic historical evolution of the country's ethnic and cultural diversity, and how this has affected the development of the defensive structural organisation of Afghanistan's tribal societies through unrelenting invasions and conflicts by parties both external and indigenous to Afghanistan, and the consequential development of culturally reinforced regulatory structures in relation to the possession and use of SALW; which impact upon the way individuals and communities may perceive, behave, react and be affected by the possession and use of SALW.

The *weaponisation of Afghanistan* is a primary element of discussion and analysis in this study. Therefore, *chapters four to seven* provide a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the historical processes, mechanisms, techniques, and methods used in the development of an indigenous production capacity, trade, transportation, as well as the rationale for the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan from their first use and introduction into the region in 1526 until 11 September 2001. However, the specific processes, mechanisms and networks established by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arms pipeline through *Operation Cyclone*, which was operational throughout the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, is emphasised in *chapter six*. Moreover, the CIA arms pipeline's associated financial and logistical problems, and self-perpetuation of its networks, processes, and methods are analysed within the context of the geostrategic rationale behind the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan and how they continue to contribute to the intractability of the Afghan conflict.

In order to appreciate the central proposition of this study, *chapter eight* analyses the direct effects of the possession and use of SALW, through their physical and psychological impacts on individuals and collectives, and their resulting behaviour; while, *chapter nine* analyses their indirect effects through the *institutionalisation* and *militarisation* of the social environment and the *promotion* of violent alternatives to negotiation, the lowering of the *threshold of violence*, encouragement of criminal activities, amplification of social *insecurity*, increase in SALW possession through the *security dilemma*, emboldening of the disaffected, and the facilitation of the entrenchment of *cycles of violence* in the conflict environment.

In respect to the central proposition, this study finds that *there is an inherent difficulty in divorcing the specific individual impacts and effects of the proliferation of SALW from those impacts and effects of major conventional weapons* that are usually used in-sync with the former, as well as the macro-scale geostrategic, regional, national and local imperatives of the conflicting parties throughout the scope, depth, and chronological development of the Afghan conflict. The discussion, therefore, emphasises the complexity of the protraction of conflict through the inherent diversity in the contention of ideas, beliefs, values and interests that are confined within the geographical boundaries, and historical, socio-cultural and strategic contexts of Afghanistan. As such, this study finds that *an absolute correlation between the mass availability of SALW and the exacerbation of conflict may not be possible*; however, this study *recognises that the available evidence, as discussed here, does significantly support the essence of the central proposition*.

DEDICATION

You showed me what patience was. You showed me perseverance in the face of untold pain. Your will was a shining light, and it has always guided my path and my search for truth. You showed me wisdom, even though you faced incalculable challenges and suffering. Your love for all things small and large, and your compassion and kindness for every living being that crossed your path will always be my inspiration. I will always endeavour to show courage in the face of injustice and the prejudices of others while in the pursuit of the betterment of humanity and the fulfilment of the beneficence you bestowed upon me. I dedicate this to you, my mother, my mentor, my guiding light. May you forever cast your shadow on me and all those who will benefit from your benevolence through me, and may I rise to understand the dreams you had for me, in the hope that I may come to inspire all those that will cross my path with the same munificence, honesty and kindness that you constantly imparted to me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Dr. Zulfqar Khan, my research supervisor, for his patience and help in the finalisation of this thesis, especially during the last few months. He was always willing to provide time and assist me in accomplishing this endeavour. Further, it is gratifying to know that I had the full support of all my colleagues at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies. I would also like to thank all the students at SNS who put up with my tensions whilst accomplishing this project.

Sincere appreciation also goes to Professor Dr. Walter Andersen, Director of South Asia Studies, for the thoughtful and generous support he extended to me while I conducted research for this study in conjunction to my work as the 2013 Senior Fellow at the School of Advance International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. His engaging demeanor led to countless hours of discussion and insight, which significantly enhanced the quality of this study. Heartfelt thanks must also be given to all those who assisted me from the think-tank community in Washington DC.

I am extremely grateful to Lt. General Naseer Janjua for his assiduous support, and above all, his unrivalled kindness during difficult times. He was a constant source of inspiration and encouragement to me throughout his tenure as President NDU.

It would be highly unappreciative of me if I was not to also acknowledge all those people who assisted me in my field research. Many that were the most helpful passed on from this world while suffering the most indescribable horrors due to the ravages of war. May this study help prevent others from undergoing such suffering.

Last but by no means the least; I wish to thank my family for their unremitting support, patience and encouragement throughout my study. My children provided me with a constant source of motivation and inspiration, but my wife and life partner, Amber Malik provided the utmost respect and understanding, without which I could never have finished this study.

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GLOSSARY

- Al-Istakhbarah al-'Amah* – General Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia
- Arbab/khan* – Head of community or tribe
- Badal* – Reciprocity, an important principle within the Pushtun Code of Conduct, Pushtunwali
- Barras* – Markets in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania* – Madrassa situated in Akhora Khattak, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan
- Er Bu* – Military Intelligence Department, Chinese People's Liberation Army
- Ghair Ilaka* – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- Harakat-e Islami* – Movement of Islam, Afghanistan, Shia party led by Asif Mohseni
- Harakat-i-Inqilab-i Islami* – Movement of Islamic Revolution, Afghanistan
- Harakat ul-Ansar* – Movement of the Partisans, Pakistan
- Harakat ul-Mujahideen* – Movement of the Holy Warriors, Pakistan
- Hezb-e demōkrātik-e khalq-e Afghānistān* – People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, PDPA
- Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan* – Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, Shia resistance party founded by Abdul Ali Mazari in 1989
- Hizb-i Islami* – Party of Islam
- Hizb-i Watan* – Homeland Party, also known as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) before June 1990
- Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HuJI)* – Movement of Islamic Jihad, Pakistan
- Hawala* – A system of payment for goods or services received that circumvents official channels
- Ikhwaan-I Muslimeen* – Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt
- Ittihad-i-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan* – Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan led by Abdur Rasul Sayyaf's
- Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan* – Islamic Unity of Mujahideen of Afghanistan (IIMA), or the Seven-Party Alliance
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)* – Army of Mohammed
- Jamaat-e Islami* – Islamic Society, Pakistan
- Jamiat-i Islami* – Islamic Society, Afghanistan, led by Burhannuddin Rabbani
- Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islami (JUI)* – Society of Islamic Scholars, Pakistan, led by Fazal ur-Rahman
- Jebh-e-Nejat-e Melli* – National Liberation Front, led by Sibghatallah Mujaddidi
- Jihad* – Holy struggle
- Jumbish-i-Milli-yi-Afghanistan* – National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (commonly referred to as *Jumbishi*), led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum
- Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti* – the Soviet Union's 'Committee for State Security' (KGB)
- Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati* - State Intelligence Agency of Afghanistan (KhAD)
- Madrassa* Religious school or training academy
- Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan* – National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, led by Pir Sayyid Ahmed Gilani
- Melmastia* – Hospitality, an important principle within the Pushtun Code of Conduct, Pushtunwali
- Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del* - Ministry of Interior of the Soviet Union, and Russia (MVD)
- Mujahideen-i-Khalq* – People's Mujahideen, an Islamic-Marxist party in Afghanistan
- Mullah* – Religious leader
- Parchi* – A note used to confirm receipt of goods and/or their payment, or a form of authentication and/or permission from a higher authority
- Purdah* – The veil
- Pushtunistan* – Pushtun nationalist movement that aspires towards the unification of the Afghani and Pakistani Pushtun population and territory under one political entity
- Pushtunwali* – The Pushtun Code of Conduct
- Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami* – Muslim World League
- Sarandoy* – Defenders of the Revolution, a Democratic Republic of Afghanistan gendarme police force

Sauda Ghar – Smugglers and traders in contraband, firearms and narcotics
Sazman-e Nasr – Victory Organisation, Afghanistan, Shia party led by Abdul Ali Mazari
Setem-i-Meli – The Oppressed Nation Party, Afghanistan, Tajik group based in Badakhshan
Sharia – Islamic law
Sholah-e-Javed – Eternal Flame, a small Afghan resistance group with Maoist inclinations
Shura – Consultative council
Talib – Islamic student (singular of *Taliban*)
Tewu – Chinese Secret Service
Tudeh – Communist party, Afghanistan
Vezerat-e Aqwam wa Qabayel – Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, Afghanistan during the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan government
Waqf – Religious Endowments

ACRONYMS

AIG	Afghan Interim Government
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Programme
APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
ATT	Afghan Transit Trade agreement
BCCI	Bank of Credit and Commerce International
CC CPSU	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States, comprising many of the states that were part of the former Soviet Union
DCI	Director Central Intelligence, United States
DCRP	Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, UNIDIR
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG-ISI	Director General Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency, United States
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, Afghanistan
DO	Director of Operations, United States
DOD	Department of Defence, United States
DRA	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
EU	European Union
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
FIA	Federal Intelligence Agency, Pakistan
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IANSAs	International Action Network on Small Arms
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
IIMA	<i>Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan</i> – Islamic Unity of Mujahideen of Afghanistan, or the Seven-Party Alliance (based in Pakistan)
IMF	International military forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (to Afghanistan)
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan
KGB	<i>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti</i> , Committee for State Security, Soviet Union
KhAD	<i>Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati</i> , State Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam

MBRL	Multiple-Barrelled Rocket Launcher
MoD	Ministry of Defence, Pakistan
MODC	Ministry of Defence Constabulary, Pakistan
MoI	Ministry of Interior, Pakistan
MRB	Motorised Rifle Brigade, Soviet Union
MRD	Motor Rifle Division, Soviet Union
MVD	Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del, Ministry of Interior, Soviet Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NLC	National Logistics Cell, Pakistan
NSA	National Security Agency, United States
NSC	National Security Council, United States
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive, United States
NSPG	National Security Planning Group, United States
NWFP	North West Frontier Province, currently as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province, Pakistan
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PHSADC	Pakistan Hunting and Sporting Arms Development Company
PIPS	Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey, Geneva, Switzerland
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missiles
SBRL	Single-Barrelled Rocket Launcher
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative, United States
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, United States
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office of Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTO	United Tajik Opposition, Tajikistan
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART I

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

PART I

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INTRODUCTION

1 – Research Process

1:1 – Introduction to Thesis and Hypothesis

The central focus of this thesis deliberates upon the weaponisation of Afghanistan, specifically the large-scale diffusion of *Small Arms and Light Weapons* (SALW), with explicit reference to the protracted conflict in Afghanistan that began in April 1978 until present. In this respect, the central premise of the hypothesis of this study states that:

The mass proliferation of small arms and light weapons assists the exacerbation of the conflict in Afghanistan.

The issues that will be dealt with within this thesis as it progresses are related to its central theme and have an intrinsic bearing on our understanding of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan, their causes and especially their consequences. This study aims to identify:

- a) The dynamics of conflict, with specific reference to the concepts of escalation and its acceleration;
- b) The nature of violence within the structural organisation of Afghanistan's multicultural society;
- c) The structural mechanisms that have developed to consolidate a highly defensive capacity for Afghanistan, more specifically, the evolution of Pushtun tribal society's capacity to resist protracted external intervention and/or invasion;
- d) The significance of the possession of firearms in Afghan society and how it may be structurally legitimated through the development of the warrior archetype;
- e) The geostrategic causes of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan from the fall of the monarchy in 1973 until 2001;
- f) The processes, methods, and means employed for the weaponisation of Afghanistan from their first use and introduction into the region in April 1526 until 11 September 2001¹;
- g) The direct impacts of the mass proliferation of SALW on Afghan society; and,
- h) The indirect effects of the mass proliferation of SALW on the dynamics of conflict in Afghanistan.

1:1:1 – Explanation of the Hypothesis and Thesis

This study sets out to understand the dynamics of conflict and how they are affected by the mass diffusion of SALW, specifically in relation to Afghanistan. This study will further highlight the socio-structural characteristics of Afghanistan's dominant ethnicities; while discussing the formation of their social perceptions towards arms and conflict, which are imbued through their variegated cultural traits. As such, this study will discuss whether Afghan social structures have been able to withstand the pressures of conflict in their ability to regulate and channel conflict behaviour through socially defined and culturally ingrained

practices and traditions that may have evolved to act as regulatory structures in society, which, in turn, may be able to deal with, albeit, not originally for, the detrimental effects of the far ranging direct and indirect impacts of the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghan society as a whole. It is pertinent to note that there is an inherent difficulty in measuring the individual impacts specifically attributable to SALW proliferation which are impossible to divorce from the macro-scale geostrategic imperatives of the conflicting parties throughout the Afghan conflict

In understanding the socio-cultural regulatory mechanisms inbuilt within the Afghan society, this study also aims to understand the complex relationship between the mass proliferation of SALW and the multifarious macro and micro-scale dynamics of the Afghan conflict so as to facilitate an appreciation of the feasibility of positively utilising windows of opportunity for the encouragement of a concerted disarmament process; that is, how can the occurrence or presence of a window of opportunity be recognised to further encourage the deceleration of a conflict?

1:1:2 – Rationale behind the study

This study will provide an understanding of the geo-strategic circumstances that led to the large-scale proliferation of SALW, and how this has assisted the protraction, and/or re-eruption of conflicts through the direct physical (through human casualties) and indirect (socio-economic and cultural) impacts on society. In respect to the latter, the study of the indirect effects of SALW proliferation refers to the gradual reduction of the thresholds at which violence is used and its eventual institutionalisation through the creation of cultures of violence, militarisation of society, and the breakdown of social structures as the availability of firearms increases individual and collective empowerment, and hence, their increased capacity to pursue previously unachievable entrenched irreconcilable goals. Furthermore, this study aims to provide a better understanding of the effects of SALW proliferation on the dynamics of conflict in general, but in particular those pertaining to the protracted Afghan conflict.

The increasingly all-pervasive traditional media, burgeoning social media, and exponential growth of global telecommunications have largely facilitated the empowerment of individuals and communities to ascertain their own futures through amplified awareness of the political rights that they can acquire and the socioeconomic, cultural and structural consequences that this may have. In such a fluid and globally interconnected milieu, access to readily available SALW, where significant latent grievances, structural disparities, and discriminations may exist, can cause the rapid empowerment of aggrieved, disaffected, and disenchanting individuals and communities to coalesce and challenge existing socioeconomically engineered, culturally reinforced power centres and dominant classes of the political status quo. However, this, in itself, is just a part of the social transformation processes that have been taking place throughout the history of human civilisation. What is significant, however, is, how SALW can influence the comparatively rapid breakdown of historically rooted social structures, which may regulate law and order, through the formation of cycles of violence and the consequent reduction of the thresholds of violence; that is, the breakdown of socially accepted norms and mores on the regulation of social order and use of violence. What is paramount here is

that, new structures to regulate violence and social conduct may not arise to replace old or existing structures at the same rate as the disappearance of the latter; which may, invariably, lead to the creation of power vacuums from the reduction or evaporation of law and order in conflict afflicted areas or regions due to the decreasing or receding monopoly of coercive power of existing or previous centres of governance, whether political power brokers, regime, or elected government of the affected territory or country. Furthermore, such power vacuums only exist momentarily, since alternative parties or entities, which may or may not oppose the existing regime, readily fill the space, whether for the benefit or detriment of the afflicted territory(s); as was the case for the previous territorial possession of North Waziristan (NWA), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan, by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; a coalition of about 30 violent extremist groups engaged in an insurgency against the Government of Pakistan) until the recent NWA military campaign.

1:1:3 – Limitation of the Time Period of Study

In accordance with the research requirements of this study, it is prudent to provide parameters within which the thorough examination and understanding of the breadth and depth of the historical and contemporary weaponisation of Afghanistan is made possible through appreciating the developments that assisted in the diffusion and entrenchment of firearms into the cultural consciousness of the region's indigenous population and more specifically the variegated populations that inhabit the territories encompassed within the present boundaries of Afghanistan. The foremost parameter is defined by the initial conception and first recorded wide-scale strategic use of small arms, originating from the Afghan region, by an organised military body in April 1526, under the command of the Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur (b. 1483 – d. 1530), during his invasion of India from Kabul, and defeat of the Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi (r. 1517 – 1526), on the plain of Panipat, near Delhi, India; upon which he founded the Mughal Empire in India.

The provision of a comprehensive historical account of the use of firearms within the Afghan region facilitates an understanding of the centrality of SALW in the current socio-structural, ethnic, sectarian, ideational, national, regional and geostrategic conflict that has plagued modern Afghanistan since the period after the bloodless coup to disenthroned the last king of Afghanistan, King Zahir Shah, while he was visiting Italy, by his cousin General Muhammad Daoud Khan on 17 July 1973, and his formal abdication on 24 August 1973², which consequently led to the abolition of the Durrani Monarchy that had existed since the inception of Afghanistan in 1747³. The abolition of the Afghan (Durrani) monarchy led to an era of socio-political fluidity, instability, upheaval, structural turmoil, human devastation, economic collapse, protracted violent conflict, internecine warfare, foreign invasions, and state disintegration, which has not yet come to a conclusion. Moreover, this period was accompanied by a massive diffusion of munitions in both degree and intensity to such an extent that no prior epoch of equal duration throughout Afghanistan's history is able to equate to it. The proliferation of armaments throughout this period has contributed more to the change in Afghanistan's present socio-economic condition and political status quo than any period before it.

It was after 1973 that the process of the mass proliferation of SALW into Afghanistan began to take significant proportions in comparison to earlier periods⁴, and may have led to the empowerment of those

possessing such weapons to assist in the initial conflagration of a limited conflict into a geo-strategically significant contest between the existing superpowers of the time, the United States (US) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The historical analysis of the proliferation of SALW is therefore divided into significant milestones within Afghanistan's historical and contemporary political and strategic history. However, the temporal analysis of this study has been limited up to the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York's twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Washington D.C. Pentagon building. This is primarily because the current phase of conflict that erupted after the 9/11 attacks exponentially aggravated the difficulty in acquiring credible and verifiable information of arms flows that were not classified by any of the conflicting parties, and for which any field research would have required greater sources of funding than were available; furthermore, as well as being, in the author's estimation, a greater danger to his life due to the deteriorating security environment. Four main sections have been developed to distinguish between major periods of historical significance and socio-political change, conflict, and proliferation of SALW. Namely:

- a. The first use of firearms by Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur (b. 1483 – d. 1530) in April 1526, during his invasion of India from Kabul, until the General Muhammad Daoud Khan's coup d'état to topple King Zahir Shah on 17 July 1973;
- b. The abdication of King Zahir Shah on 24 August 1973 to the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979;
- c. The beginning of the Soviet invasion until the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, when the last Soviet troops left the country; and,
- d. The end of the Soviet occupation until the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

1:2 - Identification of Thesis and Sources

Until recently the central theme of this thesis has remained a niche subject area, principally because the ongoing instability in Afghanistan has not facilitated a feasible comprehensive investigation of the effects of SALW proliferation on the conflict dynamics therein. The study of the mass diffusion of SALW is itself a recent development, as outlined earlier, especially for the subject of this thesis for which no comprehensive study exists. Recently, however, several institutions have begun to realise the importance of this subject area due to the changing political environment, after the collapse of the Taliban, and the desire for greater international involvement in the *post-Taliban* reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, the protracted conflict is yet to be resolved; and, given the uncertainty of the consequences of the completion of the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdrawal, before the end of 2014, on the political and strategic landscape of Afghanistan, the conflict may remain unresolved for a considerable time to come.

Having chosen this area of study, the most relevant information was predominantly sourced from within Afghanistan and Pakistan; although, the British Library (London, UK), the recently declassified National Security Archives at George Washington University (Washington D.C.), the Library of Congress (Washington

D.C.), the National Archives (Washington D.C. and College Park, Maryland) did provide substantial corroborative information⁵. For primary sources of information, and in order to facilitate the research process for this study, a range of relationships were established with the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan, political agency authorities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincial government authorities in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa of Pakistan (KPK), the Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Force (a combined police and military organisation), the Pakistani police force, Pakistani military and intelligence services (Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI], Military Intelligence [MI], Intelligence Bureau [IB], and the Federal Intelligence Agency [FIA]), sub-state actors, religious organisations, gunsmiths, arms dealers and smugglers⁶ (for an elaborate account of the research methodology component of this study, see, Section 1:5 – Research Design and Methodology).

To provide a more comprehensive understanding of the ground realities in Afghanistan, which cannot be wholly appreciated from relying upon secondary sources of information alone, a number of relevant structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with notable government officials and political figures. Furthermore, field research was approached with the view that it would be an eye opener; while it also assisted in the establishment of links and contacts that could provide direct and indirect access to primary sources of information for further research⁷.

Other sources of valuable research material were found at the British Library (London), and in particular, the India Office therein; specific Pakistani University Libraries that have extensive archival deposits on the region as a whole, including the University of Peshawar, which has been at the forefront of information collection on the ongoing Afghan conflict. In relation to the University of Peshawar, the Department of International Relations, and the Centre for Central Asian Studies were extremely helpful, where senior faculty members were closely involved in the analysis of the Afghan conflict during the 1980s⁸. Extensive use of the library facilities at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI – a government run institution), was also made.

1:2:1 - Examination of Sources

The resources available to academics were severely limited. Other than studying the mechanisms of the SALW trade in the open market, one can only deduce the processes involved for such trade in the underground Afghan economy through existing material as concrete records on this subject matter are not openly available, predominantly because of their classified nature by government agencies of different countries. However, particular declassified documents were found to be available at the National Archives and Records Administration (Washington D.C.), which were helpful in understanding the processes involved in the proliferation of SALW; especially during the Soviet Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Furthermore, a special database facility for declassified documents from the United States Central Intelligence Agency, based at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, was also extensively used to acquire recently declassified documents. It would have been a failure on the part of this study if it did not investigate sources of information other than those produced in academic circles; such as, intelligence and military documentation, and NGO publications.

1:3 – Literature Review

1:3:1 – Development of Existing Research

The study of the modern conventional arms trade after World War 2 has been thoroughly investigated in virtually all its aspects, especially by prominent organisations and think tanks such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and the Arms Control Association. As new technologies evolve, the interest in their uses and effects also grows, leading to an increasing output of studies. However, the study of the trade in SALW, although having grown extensively, is still relatively recent vis-a-vis the conventional arms trade in major weapons. During the Cold War era (1945-1989)⁹ the vast majority of the research undertaken on the subject of the arms trade was committed to understand major conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)¹⁰. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War in 1991, there has been a steady growth of interest in conflicts other than inter-state disputes¹¹. This interest has brought to light the consequences of the unchecked proliferation of SALW, and hence, an urgency for greater understanding. Initial interest focused on the extent, consequences and curtailment of the unchecked proliferation of anti-personnel land mines leading to the *International Landmines Ban Treaty*¹² which was open for signature on the 02 December 1997, being an initiative launched by the Canadian Government and strongly supported by a coalition of over 1000 NGOs (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines)¹³. From this success, there have been a growing number of individuals, NGOs and governmental bodies focusing upon SALW proliferation. In fact, within the past decade, research within this area has grown exponentially, with the creation of organisations concentrating solely on the issue of SALW; for example, the Small Arms Survey, based in Geneva. The following sections will highlight the available literature and sources that have been produced on SALW, with specific regards to Afghanistan.

1:3:2 – Small Arms and Light Weapons

1:3:2:1 – International Recognition of SALW

The availability of literature on the trade in ‘armaments’ is vast¹⁴. Moreover, although a recently emerging area of study, the literature on SALW has been growing exponentially and in proportion to the increasing number of governmental, non-governmental, and academic institutions that have evolved to incorporate this important area within existing debates on the arms trade, which will be further elaborated as the review ensues. However, hitherto, much of the literature on SALW has focused on security sector reform, disarmament, and enhancing SALW trade regulations in the open market; while, relatively little literature has focused on the substance, working mechanisms, processes, impacts and consequences of the trade in SALW in particular regions of the world, one of which is Afghanistan, where the underground economy is the foremost channel through which SALW transfers are undertaken¹⁵ and where “the vast majority of weapons sales are illegal in Afghanistan”¹⁶. Consequently, only the literature that has a direct bearing on this study was searched for to narrow down the net of available literature; and therefore, attention was specifically concentrated on the

proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan, the impacts and effects of SALW on conflict dynamics in general, and in particular, those relating to Afghanistan.

Literature on the patterns, trends and general diffusion of SALW on the open market is a contemporary area of documentation that has gained ground due to numerous conventional arms reduction talks, which were held during the latter part of the Cold War era; growing number of organisations advocating the institutionalisation of regulatory bodies that would aim to control the SALW trade; and, as a consequence of the rising tide of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the geopolitical realities of the detrimental consequences of the proliferation of SALW are increasingly influencing policy and decision-making processes in emerging twenty-first century theatres of conflict where the instruments of power and strategic value, due to their lack of utility, are not necessarily weapons of mass destruction or major conventional weaponry. This is especially so in local level or intra-state conflicts. Nevertheless, even though recognition of the potency of SALW proliferation has been relatively slow, but gaining ground, the implementation of agreements controlling SALW has verged on the genetic¹⁷.

Many of the studies that have been committed to assess SALW proliferation have primarily been commissioned by non-governmental and/or independent and privately funded organisations¹⁸. While many of these have focused upon the scope and extent of the proliferation of SALW rather than the direct or indirect impacts that SALW have on society, some have undoubtedly been more prolific in their research of this latter subject matter than others. The author's survey of available literature published by these organisations found many related subject matters being taken into account; covering all aspects of the dynamics of the SALW trade in the international, regional and national realms, and within most conflict ridden regions of the world. However, in this respect, few studies directly approached the Afghan conflict. Afghanistan was mentioned in passing, or as context within wider studies, but it was rarely pointed out directly and independently of other countries, with the exception of the studies mentioned from the more prolific publishers in this review¹⁹.

Few organisations have the capacity to employ personnel to gather information within an unbiased/neutral framework on a truly international platform. The United Nations is one such organisation. It has the capacity to employ personnel that have a high degree of speciality, technical and analytical skill, and data collection and collation capabilities. The primary agency that is working on the issues relating to the mass proliferation of SALW within the United Nations is the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); which has produced an extensive number of works specifically on SALW related issues; however, while a number of relevant works are mentioned in this review, to date, UNIDIR has no research publications solely concentrating on SALW related issues in Afghanistan²⁰. Nevertheless, between January 1995 and December 1997, UNIDIR commissioned a series of twelve studies focusing on collective security, under the 'Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project – Managing Arms in Peace Processes', for the purpose of exploring the dilemma posed by SALW during UN peace operations²¹. According to the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project (DCRP) project coordinator and lead researcher, Virginia Gamba (1995), since "the project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be

a tool for ensuring stability”²², the attainment of long-term stability cannot, therefore, be achieved by solely concentrating upon the sources of violence (socio-political and economic issues), but must also prioritise the instruments of violence (weapons and munitions); which corroborates the premise of the hypothesis of this study by indicating that the wide-scale availability of SALW acts to influence instability in a society wrought by violent conflict. Furthermore, the DCRP indicates the considerable influence that the efficacious control of SALW has upon international and national actions within and without conflict environments²³. Accordingly, arms control and management is an integral element for successful conflict settlement; a diplomatic instrument of conflict prevention and/or de-escalation; and, a crucial component for post-conflict reconstruction. However, the DCRP does not pursue the sources of SALW proliferation; it only provides an examination of the processes involved in arms control and management. Nevertheless, since the analysis of future conflicts necessitates careful consideration of the broader international and regional contexts (that is, instability in neighbouring countries, third party interference, and so on) the DCRP proposed that all approaches to intra-state conflict resolution must include three principal aspects²⁴:

- a) The execution of a wide-ranging, methodical disarmament initiative immediately upon the initiation of a reconciliation operation²⁵;
- b) The institution of an efficient administration of the weapons reduction initiative, which should be maintained well into the national post-conflict reconstruction phase of the peace building programme²⁶;
- c) The implementation of a regional collaborative approach to the weapons reduction initiative and its cross border administration amongst countries within the proximity of the peace building programme²⁷

The above principles are intrinsically applicable to the protracted Afghan conflict; however, as in this very case, they are immensely difficult to conduct given the strategic ground realities within Afghanistan, the region, and the geostrategic rationale for the current phase in the Afghan conflict will be further elaborated upon throughout the study.

In the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse and during the subsequent Balkans conflict, numerous international bodies called for a complete ban on anti-personnel landmines (APL), including the United Nations General Assembly, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The UN General Assembly (1997) Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms definition of SALW accepted APL as SALW²⁸ (see, Appendix II, Table 1.1 – Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons Categories; and, for further discussion on definitional issues, see section 2:2:2 – Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2:2:2:1 – Definition & Classification). The United Nations General Assembly had earlier noted in a consensus resolution in 1994 that “states can move effectively towards the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines as viable and humane alternatives are developed”²⁹. Although it did not include firearms of any kind, the call for the ban of anti-personnel landmines (APM) was a step forward towards the eventual recognition of the destabilising consequences of SALW proliferation, and especially in countries with limited firearms regulatory structures and institutions. Subsequently, the United Nations hosted the ‘Review Conference of the UN Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons’ (September-October 1995), often referred to as the ‘Inhumane Weapons Convention’ (IWC) (or sometimes as the CCW due to the problems caused by the indiscriminate use and consequences of APM) to revise and strengthen

Protocol III (landmines, booby traps, and other similar devices)³⁰ (see, Appendix I, Legal Instruments – Section A – The Work Undertaken by the United Nations on SALW).

The UN Review Conference (1995) paved an opening for subsequent UN Conferences to comprehensively discuss a vast variety of factors relating to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in much greater depth. Further progress was made upon the United Nations' adoption of the non-legally binding 'Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects' in 2001³¹. The Program of Action (PoA) has established an infrastructure to monitor and aid in the eradication of SALW; however, it relies upon the voluntary inclusion of states for its implementation. In respect to Afghanistan, the PoA has had some limited successes, albeit, related to 'Ammunition Stockpile Destruction' as well as the 'Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups' (DIAG) in Afghanistan, which was led by UN entities³². Nevertheless, hitherto, the present Government of Afghanistan has found it increasingly more difficult to independently deal with the growing accumulation of SALW within its territorial boundaries, given the continued Afghan Taliban led insurgency, which shows no signs of abating.

The PoA provided a significant step in the recognition of the destabilising effects of SALW, which was further consolidated upon the United Nations General Assembly's invitation to member states to provide information of SALW transfers to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)³³ upon the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/54 'Transparency in Armaments' on 08 December 2003³⁴. Nevertheless, the voluntary contributions of States concerning their SALW transfers is noticeably limited in comparison to the scale of international SALW transfers³⁵, with international SALW transfers never having been reported at all by several significant SALW exporters³⁶.

Hitherto, no comprehensive treaty on SALW that could significantly alter the current trade in SALW, whether on the open, grey or black market has come into force. Nevertheless, the recent adoption of the comprehensive Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)³⁷ by the United Nations General Assembly with an overwhelming vote of 154 States in favour and only 3 against³⁸, on 02 April 2013³⁹, covers all conventional arms from fighter aircraft, battleships, tanks, and SALW. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council consolidated the ATT through the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2117 (2013) at its 7036th meeting, on 26 September 2013, by recognising the importance of the treaty and the necessity for all States to 'strongly encourage' support for efforts to tackle the scourge of SALW in all its aspects⁴⁰. Nevertheless, the ATT is yet to be ratified in order to for its entry into force to come into legal effect, which will allow its implementation on the global platform, since "Fifty states must ratify to bring the Treaty into force"⁴¹; while, as of 08 November 2013, only eight States have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty⁴².

Sub-state actors, or non-state actors⁴³ (there have been countless examples of non-state actors contending with established or newly emerging states throughout the development of the modern international state system over the past century, and especially during the decolonisation period during the Cold war era.), are fundamentally intrinsic to the kinds of conflicts that have aided the proliferation of SALW; namely,

asymmetric conflicts such as civil wars, insurgencies, or guerrilla campaigns⁴⁴. The growing sources of data on the arms trade, of which the most comprehensive are the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's *Annual World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*⁴⁵ and the *Annual Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations*⁴⁶ published by the Congressional Research Service, do not include information on the transfer of arms to sub-state groups or non-state actors. Of the arms transfers that are mentioned, there is no mention of a distinction between non-state actors and the states which they may reside within; or whether or not such actors even accept the national territorial boundaries within the states that they reside in. Therefore, there is no possibility of distinguishing between state to state or sub-state transfers. Moreover, this is further exacerbated by the lack of credible data on SALW transfers; for example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which is a leading source of information on conventional arms transfers, does include transfers to some sub-state actors but does not take account of SALW transfers, since only major conventional weapons are given consideration. However, SIPRI has been making greater efforts to research transfers of SALW to conflict prone states, which may, thereby, assist to increase its capacity to take account of SALW transfers amongst a few, if not all, non-state actors⁴⁷. However, as noted above, SIPRI has encouraged the publication of material on SALW issues to address their destabilising effects with a view to maintaining focus on regulatory methods, structures, SALW transfers, and data collection. In addition, aside from the greater effort being made by SIPRI, the quandary of SALW proliferation is being given increased attention by a progressively greater number of independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs)⁴⁸ (see, Appendix I, Legal Instruments – Section B – The Work Undertaken by International Governmental Organisations on SALW). The recent successes by the anti-personnel landmines campaign were largely aided by an organised information dissemination campaign intended for large sections of the population in target environments by NGOs working on SALW issues. The numbers of such NGOs are constantly increasing⁴⁹.

In addition to SIPRI, the most significant development in the collection and collation of data relating to small arms transfers is that conducted by the Norwegian Initiative of Small Arms Transfers, which has the “only on-line global database of small arms transfers”⁵⁰, containing detailed small arms transfers between 1962 and 2011 amongst 250 states and territories⁵¹. In relation to Afghanistan, the database only covers state to state SALW imports to Afghanistan from 1974 to 2003⁵²; however, the transfers covered within this period are for the years 1974, 1975, and 2003 only, while no other transfers are covered between and including 1976 and 2002, with the exception of one single transfer of BGM-71A TOW anti-tank missiles from the United States to Afghanistan in 1989⁵³. Nevertheless, this database is a work in progress and is constantly being updated.

1:3:2:2 – SALW Proliferation

Oxfam has been prolific in its contribution to literature on SALW, with publications detailing the extent of the international diffusion of SALW through general policy papers that discuss the deficiency of international regulatory mechanisms by the world's principle arms exporters, such as in their paper on *The G8: Global arms exporters - failing to prevent irresponsible arms transfers*⁵⁴, which was jointly commissioned by the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Amnesty International, and Oxfam after they

mutually launched *Control Arms* in 2003⁵⁵. The Control Arms coalition has grown exponentially, and currently includes 15 national and international organisations that are members of its steering board, as well as 85 organisations that are members of the coalition, which engage in producing literature on a variety of subject matters related to SALW from around the world⁵⁶, and are committed to an international campaign to include SALW within local, national and international arms control mechanism.

The Jointly commissioned study by the Control Arms coalition, *The AK-47: The World's Favorite Killing Machine*⁵⁷, has a direct bearing on this study due to the status that the AK47 holds as the foremost weapon of choice amongst all other SALW present in Afghanistan. The AK47, and its derivatives, are highly prized by all parties in Afghanistan because of their durability, ruggedness, lethality, and ease of use and maintenance by just about anyone, whether they are the Afghan Government security forces⁵⁸, militias, paramilitaries and civilians, or the contending parties and non-state actors engaged in a virulent insurgency⁵⁹, and child combatants, which have been used not only by all Afghan parties throughout the protracted conflict until present⁶⁰ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.80 – The Frontlines – A Young Talib, Tahir, Practices at Mortar Targeting, July 1999), but also in many diverse conflict ridden countries throughout the world⁶¹. As will be discussed later in this study (see, Part 2: The Weaponisation of Afghanistan 1979-1989), the mass influx of AK47s into Afghanistan was facilitated by the United States, in Operation Cyclone, which, with its allies, supported the Afghan resistance, the Mujahideen, in opposition to the Soviet Union's invasion between 1979 and 1989, and was assisted by the CIA's long held principle of plausible deniability⁶².

1:3:2:3 – Controlling SALW

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate upon the mechanisms and instruments necessary to control and restrict the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan, a review of the available literature was deemed important to discover related literature on SALW in Afghanistan so as to provide alternative avenues of inquiry for this study because of the limited availability of existing studies specifically related to the effects of SALW in Afghanistan. In this respect, there is a plethora of literature available on arms control in general, with the burgeoning field of SALW control increasing by the day. However, in relation to Afghanistan, studies are few in number. Nevertheless, in 2006, Oxfam commissioned and published a study specifically dealing with SALW control in Afghanistan, *The Call for Tough Arms Controls: Voices from Afghanistan*⁶³. This publication primarily advocates support for the Arms Trade Treaty, which was in its embryonic stage of development; and, as such, it does provide some, if little, discussion on the reasons for the influx and impacts of SALW in Afghanistan and why the ATT should be adopted. However, in large part, this Oxfam study is little more than publicity for the ATT, rather than an academic study based on scientific principles, because of the lack of depth of the interviews that were conducted to elaborate upon the effects that SALW are having on the protracted conflict. Nevertheless, given the dire lack of studies dealing with SALW in Afghanistan on the whole, the presence of this Oxfam study may be appreciated because it provided a precedent for future and more details studies to be conducted, and therefore, avoided a complete vacuum of such studies.

1:3:2:4 – Direct and Indirect Impacts of SALW on Conflict

The first comprehensive⁶⁴ study to appreciate the intrinsic connection between the small arms trade, the underground economy, and the impacts on stable and conflict environments is examined in a collection of essays commissioned by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences focusing on the trade in SALW, *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*⁶⁵. In his chapter on *Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking*, Edward J. Laurence (1995)⁶⁶ illustrates the increasingly pernicious repercussions of the unconstrained sale of weapons at sub-national, national and international levels, with particular reference to SALW, due to the change in the orientation of many conflicts from inter-state to intra-state war, and especially, ethnic conflicts. Laurence (1995) identifies four areas within which the illicit arms trade can induce negative consequences: Political; Economic; Military/Strategic; and, Humanitarian⁶⁷. These areas represent the basic building blocks of nations, a negative impact upon which could severely impair societal development. However, Laurence does not elaborate upon the effects that the mass diffusion of SALW have on social development in relation to the eruption of a conflict environment through the facilitation of a nurturing atmosphere for the breeding of conflictual relations between parties within a given social context, such as the institutionalisation of violence and the breakdown of social barriers and thresholds through the use of firearms, which may inadvertently affect social relations; the structural organisation of a particular society; the outbreak of a resource-based conflict; and the transformation of latent social conflicts into violent social conflicts, through the empowerment of parties with existing grievances, whether structural or constructed.

The emergence of literature on the significance of the negative effects of SALW was concurrently contributed to by the publication of *Light Weapons and International Security*⁶⁸, which was compiled subsequent to a 1995 international workshop on the proliferation of SALW in New Delhi, that was organised by Pugwash Conferences; within which, Jasjit Singh et al (1995) direct the discussion on the impacts of SALWs proliferation on local, national and international security, and the necessity for a new way of thinking to understand the SALW arms trade and its impact on human society. This is especially illustrated in the chapter authored by Tara Kartha (1995), *Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage*⁶⁹. Laurence's (1995) ground-breaking articulation of the impacts of SALW in *Lethal Commerce*, and Singh's (1995) *Light Weapons and International Security*, set the parameters and direction of discussion by highlighting the effects of the mass dispersal of SALW; thereby, facilitating the slow, but progressive, increase of literature and awareness over the past two decades.

Further to Laurence (1995) and Singh (1995), a World Watch paper, *Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament*⁷⁰, by Michael Renner (1997), describes the extent and causes, detrimental effects, policy tools, instruments and methods that are being developed and employed to curb the proliferation of SALW. However, given the focus on providing a generalised understanding of SALW issues, Renner (1997) makes very few references of the conflict in Afghanistan; which, in addition to the lack of references on Afghanistan made in the other publications in this field of study, is indicative of the lack of awareness of the dire circumstances that Afghanistan has been facing under the scourge of SALW since the beginning of the

Afghan conflict. This is also the case for a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, authored by Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor in 2002, *Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development*⁷¹. In discussing the impacts of SALW diffusion on social development, Muggah and Batchelor (2002) are able to provide a systematic approach towards understanding both their direct and indirect effects, while also appreciating the difficulties in verifying available statistical data on direct impacts, which are invariably incomplete, given the practical difficulties encountered in the collection of data in most conflict environments. However, Afghanistan is only mentioned in passing, even though it was receiving unprecedented publicity during the US-led ISAF/NATO invasion, after 07 October 2001.

The study, *Guns or Growth - Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development*⁷², by the Control Arms Campaign (2004) highlights areas of understanding that are particularly relevant to Afghanistan in relation to the impacts of arms transfers and their relationship to sustainable development, security, governance, and the risk of arms races in developing economies. However, as in many other similar studies, it fails to identify any pertinent examples of impacts of arms transfers in the context of Afghanistan. Moreover, the lack of information on Afghanistan, with the exception of the odd reference to the Afghan conflict, is disconcerting as far as an understanding of intensely conflict ridden environments is concerned. This may be due to the sensitivity of a study of this nature and the practical realities of data collection in highly insecure environments; since they are exceedingly unsafe, which precludes detailed investigations of the multifarious parties involved in the conflict. As such, very few studies have ever been conducted on Afghanistan since the beginning of the conflict in April 1978, because researchers tend to seek safer environments to produce equally publishable studies without incurring a risk to their lives. Those studies that have been conducted are inclined to maintain focus on safer regions of the country that invariably skews any data that may be acquired, and which provides an inaccurate appreciation of the gravity of the situation on the ground for a variety of reasons. That is, for the vested interests of the parties involved in the research and their political or financial sponsors, so as to promote a particular idea, understanding, or perception, or merely because of the inability to acquire comprehensive information within insecure environments, while having the necessity to do so. Nevertheless, studies such as the Control Arms Campaign (2004) *Guns or Growth* study do provide avenues for further investigation into the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan once the security environment permits.

Irrespective of the general trend of not engaging in research in violent conflict environments, some studies are able to tabulate violent events through media reports. One such rare study is that conducted by a team of political geographers, John O'Loughlin, Frank Witmer, and Andrew Linke (2010), in *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008-2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence*⁷³, who were able to collate in excess of 5,000 violent events occurring in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2008 and 2009, which were collected from media articles and reports. By geo-coding to provide accurate locations of the violent events the authors were able to correlate them with available information on the dynamics of conflict in those locations through an exploratory spatial data analysis, and as such, they were able to provide insight into the escalation of violence within conflict environments.

As noted above, there have been limited accounts of the impacts of the proliferation of SALW on the Afghan conflict. Nevertheless, a relative plethora of publications have dealt with the geopolitical and geostrategic consequences of the conflict in Afghanistan. For example, in *The War in Afghanistan: An Account and Analysis of the Country, its People, Soviet Intervention and the Resistance*⁷⁴, André Brigot and Olivier Roy (1998), show an appreciation of the reciprocal corollary of the multifarious geopolitical decisions that were made concerning the political environment and their physical impacts on the protraction of the Afghan conflict. In this regard, Linda Racioppi's (1994) *Soviet policy towards South Asia since 1970*⁷⁵ also illustrates how the slow but progressive influence inculcated by the Soviet Union within the complex South Asian playing field during their competition with the West eventually led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While, Thomas T. Hammond's (1984) *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences*⁷⁶ concentrates on the geostrategic impacts of the Soviet invasion on the wider international community during the final stages of the Cold War, John Fullerton (1984), in *The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan*⁷⁷, describes the historical and contemporary narrative that led to the Soviet invasion and occupation, how the international community responded, and how the USSR's military influenced Afghanistan through arms assistance. Further to the aforementioned, Edward Girardet (1985), in *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*⁷⁸, points out the prevailing understanding of the Afghan War from both within and without the Soviet Union by describing not only the geostrategic compulsions of the USSR and their intervention, but the reaction of the international community and the escalation of Cold War tensions. Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam (1987), in *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival*⁷⁹, attempt to understand the structural organisation of the Afghan resistance movement and how it fared against a superpower, the numerous divisions of the parties and the effectiveness of the resistance movement within the context of the structural organisation of Afghan society.

The eventual withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan is narrated by Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison's (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*⁸⁰. Cordovez, a United Nations mediator who was directly involved in the negotiations between the superpowers for the USSR to extricate itself from the Afghan imbroglio it had created for itself, and Harrison, a South Asian academic expert, illustrate how it was not only the finance and weaponry that was supplied to the Afghan resistance that led to the withdrawal but also the continuous negotiations that were being conducted on a global platform to facilitate an end to the conflict as soon as it has begun. According to Cordovez and Harrison (1995), the CIA also assisted in the protraction of the conflict by supporting the Islamic fundamentalist resistance parties with arms and finance to the detriment of the more liberal and moderate parties, and may have helped the fragmentation of the Afghan resistance, which had already been quite divisive throughout the Soviet occupation, and the inevitable metamorphosis of the Afghan conflict into a civil war. Olivier Roy (1995) further accentuates this discussion, in *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*⁸¹, by noting that although the original reason d'être for the resistance may have been the expulsion of the USSR through a tenuous unity based on Islam, it was soon expunged as the country fell into a brutal internecine conflict.

Although not exclusively within the scope of this study due to its time period limitations, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*⁸², by Seth G. Jones (2009), nevertheless amplifies the discussion above by drawing attention to the further protraction of the Afghan conflict after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. It may be argued that the protraction of the conflict may have been due to geostrategic dynamics that is, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan on 07 October 2001. However, this intervention was also directly related to the continued conflict within a country that was able to empower the multiple contesting parties, whether indigenous or foreign, with easily accessible weapons so as to enable them to compete for their particular goals, interests, visions (physical or metaphysical), or grievances without being completely subordinated by another party's dictates, and to counter them with violent force if necessary.

1:3:3 – Afghanistan

1:3:3:1 – Introduction

With the focus of this thesis revolving around the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan, and given that the protracted conflict within the fragmented Afghan state has not ended, there has been little effort to produce an in-depth study on the extent and consequences of extensive SALW proliferation in Afghanistan. This is further constrained by the lack of an established independent and governmental institutional framework with efficient administrative machinery. However, with the establishment of a unitary governmental body, albeit extremely weak, a study may be possible in the future, given available financial and human resources, as well as a degree of political stability; given, that the growing consensus towards the stabilisation of the political and military situation in Afghanistan maintains momentum after the US, NATO/ISAF withdrawal that took place at the end of 2014. Conversely, stability is highly uncertain given the ambiguity of the continued presence of foreign forces on Afghan territory, however large this may be; the disaffection of the Pushtun population from significant positions of centralised power, especially in the Afghan National Army⁸³; the continued threat posed by the increasingly emboldened Afghan Taliban and its affiliated non-state actor associates after surviving a sustained military campaign against the United States and up to fifty other states; and, the threat to regional stability by the continuing 'war on terror' (aka, the 'long-war').

Literature published on subjects related to Afghanistan over the past three decades has primarily focused upon the protracted Afghan conflict, with a surfeit of literature concerning the current phase of conflict after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 07 October 2001. However, by far the greater proportion of such literature dealt solely with Afghanistan's fluid socio-political and strategic circumstances through descriptive historical and contemporary analyses. Very few publications made mention of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan; and, those that did, only mentioned this without any extensive elaboration on the issue. Although the Afghan conflict has been through several different phases, the common denominator between them is that firearms were predominantly supplied to the variegated contending parties through covert channels⁸⁴, with the exception of arms supplies from the USSR to their Afghan People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) Communist hosts during the Soviet occupation between 1979 and 1989, and for the maintenance of the PDPA Communist government from 1989 to 1992. Consequently, what little information is openly available comes from published first-hand accounts within the memoirs and reports of those

individuals that participated in the conflict in one way or another; declassified US State Department cables from Kabul, Peshawar, Islamabad and Washington; intelligence reports from the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); correspondence between Congress and the executive branch; field reports from US Agency for International Development (USAID) officials in Pakistan⁸⁵ at the National Security Archives in Washington DC; declassified intelligence reports from the CIA's database at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; interviews with political figures, military officers, arms manufacturers, dealers and traffickers; and, secondary information from sources such as books, newspapers, journal articles, and civil society studies and publications on Soviet, Mujahideen, Taliban or 'Northern Alliance' operations, security studies, and arms transfers and their impacts.

As mentioned above, many valuable accounts of the protracted Afghan conflict have been published, whether as sole studies, or as in Swadesh Rana's (1995) attempts to highlight the extent of SALW diffusion within intra-state conflicts in, *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*⁸⁶. However, aside from some brief description of the general concentration of SALW within intra-state conflicts, Rana has not provided more than a cursory mention of the presence of SALW in Afghanistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (previously, North West Frontier Province) of Pakistan in the mid-1990s⁸⁷. Moreover, Rana (1995) fails to provide corroboration for the figures that he uses in most of his study, such as the 700 Stinger surface-to-surface missiles that were introduced into Afghanistan during the Afghan-USSR War between 1979 and 1989⁸⁸. This is also a testament to the inadequacies and difficulties imbued within the collection of sensitive data, which may not be available through verifiable and credible open sources of information. Nevertheless, in his chapter on 'Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia', in *Lethal Commerce*, Chris Smith (1995) identified the rising tide of violence that the South Asian region was incurring through the adoption of the 'Kalashnikov culture', which was a product of the increased proliferation of SALW as a direct consequence of the CIA-ISI arms pipeline that came into existence to assist the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989)⁸⁹.

In another report commissioned by UNIDIR, *The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia - Features and Implications*⁹⁰, and what can arguably be described as one of the first comprehensive studies specifically concentrating on the proliferation of SALW in Central Asia, wherein which Afghanistan is included, Bobi Pirseyedi (2000) recognises the magnitude of the colossal diffusion of SALW into the region as a result of the Afghan conflict. Pirseyedi (2000) highlights the extent of the diffusion of weapons in Afghanistan, pointing out that according to the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms⁹¹ "roughly one half of the small arms currently circulating within Afghanistan arrived there"⁹² during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). Furthermore, Pirseyedi (2000) provides a brief account of the diffusion of SALW during the Afghan Civil War period throughout the ascendancy of the Taliban between 1994-2000; which, therefore, makes this one of the most significant account of the diffusion of SALW during the Afghan Taliban's tenure and ascent to power in Afghanistan (1994-2000).

UNIDIR later carried out an extensive study between 2004 and 2006 (In addition to those previously mentioned), after having been commissioned by the European Union, *European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War*⁹³. This extensive study also includes a paper, *The Reconstruction of Afghanistan: A Case Study*, which the author was commissioned as a consultant to produce, and which takes account of the impact of SALW proliferation on the reconstruction process in Afghanistan and how this effort was being constrained by bureaucratic obstacles in the prioritization of European Union disarmament efforts in Afghanistan. However, the mandate of this particular study was limited to the feasibility of the development of EU Policy towards SALW and explosive remnants of war. Nevertheless, the process of the global SALW circulation was discussed to a limited extent, with emphasis on the SALW lifecycle and its relationship with the illicit SALW market⁹⁴ as well as a limited account of the impact of SALW on development and security⁹⁵.

In addition to the organisations mentioned above, the Small Arms Survey (SAS), a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, based in Geneva, Switzerland, is particularly noteworthy, as it has become a highly prominent, prolific, and valuable primary global resource for independent and publically disseminated information, data collection, and research and analysis on all aspects of SALW in conflict and non-conflict zones. The SAS has worked extensively on a large quantity of credible publications whose principle focus is SALW. However, given the gravity and centrality of the Afghan conflict in contemporary international affairs, SAS has been slow in recognising the scale, scope and impacts of the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan, with only a handful of studies concentrating on Afghanistan as the subject matter of the study; and, mostly only chapters within larger studies. With this in mind, SAS have produced one study that concentrates on Afghanistan in its entirety; namely, the study by Mark Sedra and Michael Bhatia (2008), *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament and Security in a Post-War Society*⁹⁶, which largely highlights the mechanisms of the limited Japanese-led Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation efforts of the ISAF forces in Afghanistan as well as Government Security Sector Reform that, although mentioning some of the major parties involved in the conflict, focuses solely upon the enhancement of the central government's security forces. Sedra and Bhatia (2008) provide an insight on the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan to a limited extent; however, Sedra and Bhatia's (2008) study falls short of a detailed analysis of the processes that led to the weaponisation of Afghanistan and the impacts that such diffusion have had on the dynamics of the protracted Afghan conflict. Nevertheless, Sedra and Bhatia (2008) do provide the basis for more concentrated research on SALW at SAS, and the development of a more comprehensive study in the future.

1:3:3:2 – Diffusion of SALW – The Pipeline

During the post-Second World War period, recorded information concerning arms transfers and military aid packages, albeit, limited, was available through professional and academic institutions, governmental bodies and officially published military statistics. However, as mentioned above, the types and quantities of weapons being transferred to Afghanistan rarely included comprehensive statistical data detailing arms transactions and transfers in open sources of information. Of the relatively limited data that was available, the vast majority

referred to the quantities of heavy conventional weapons, maintenance and spare parts supplies, while information on SALW transfers was sparse in its detail and seldom included the quantities transferred. Nevertheless, intelligent estimates can be derived from the number of weapons that were acquired and used by the Afghan Government's security services, thereby providing some insight into the SALW that entered Afghanistan. For example, a publication by Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert (1969), *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid and Diplomacy*⁹⁷, states that the Afghan Army, which numbered about 80,000 men according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) publication, *The Military Balance* (1971)⁹⁸, was exclusively equipped with weapons of 'communist-bloc' origin. Difficulty in finding relevant information is substantiated by the fact that research institutes focusing on conventional weapons transfers, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968/69*⁹⁹ entirely excluded SALW transfers from its publications.

The political instability that ensued the abolition of the monarchy in 1973, with the PDPA coup in April 1978, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, and the Afghan civil war between 1989 and 2001, with the inclusion of the Taliban's ascent, conquest and retreat in 2001 by U.S. led NATO/ISAF forces during 'Operation Enduring Freedom', provided much greater research interest than any period prior to it. Consequently, numerous volumes of publications, newspaper articles, documents and reports were produced; which facilitated this study in its acquisition of information on SALW proliferation. However, due to the covert nature of arms transfers during every phase of the protracted Afghan conflict, it is no less problematic to produce *exact* figures for the quantities of SALW that were introduced into Afghanistan.

Understanding the political and strategic environment as a result of the abolition of the monarchy, as well as its geostrategic impact, was crucial in order to appreciate the processes involved in the proliferation of SALW, and through which, the approach used to gain an understanding of the methods utilised and the extent of the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan was more readily available for this study. Publications that approached the subject from a geopolitical perspective and strategic analysis were more favoured to analyse the *raison d'être* for the conflict. Hafees Malik (ed., 1987) provides an authoritative account of Afghanistan's geopolitical relationships in *Soviet American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*¹⁰⁰, but also notes the methods employed to purchase arms through US arms aid in his chapter on the *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and its Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy*¹⁰¹. The extent of the political and military impact on the growing diffusion of weapons after the PDPA coup in 1978 is succinctly illustrated by V K Bahsin (1986), in *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan*¹⁰², when he identifies the once powerful 100,000 strong Afghan Army as the major source of weaponry for the newly forming Mujahideen. The Afghan Army "had been reduced to less than 25,000 men by the end of 1980"¹⁰³ as a result of defections and desertions, and in contrast to the growing numbers of soldiers and civilians swelling the ranks of the Mujahideen.

In addition to the texts on Afghanistan's geopolitical significance, a number of texts did provide accounts of the diffusion of arms into to Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion (1979-1989). Amongst these, Anthony Cordesman (1990) offers the most significant in *The Lessons of Modern War: Volume III: The*

*Afghan and Falklands Conflicts*¹⁰⁴. Cordesman provides an account of the weapons used in Afghanistan by all conflicting parties, including the Afghan Government armed forces, the Soviet army, air force, and Special Forces, and the variegated Afghan Mujahideen resistance parties. However, Cordesman's (1990) investigation of the different types of weapons used in the Afghan conflict was, unfortunately, limited to period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Moreover, Cordesman (1990) does not elaborate upon the mechanisms that led to the diffusion of SALW, their quantities, and the consequences of their introduction to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, he does provide a strong preface from which to further investigate the proliferation of SALW and their consequences in Afghanistan.

The arch-strategist and administrator of the CIA-ISI arms pipeline, Brigadier General Mohammad Yousaf, in conjunction with Mark Adkin (2001), provide a controversial, yet, grounded understanding and a first-hand account of the conduct of the Afghan-Soviet war. In *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story*¹⁰⁵ Yousaf and Adkin articulate a comprehensive account of how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Inter-Services Intelligence's (ISI) armed, trained and organised the Afghan Mujahideen to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) through the institution of Operation Cyclone and the covert supply of billions of dollars of predominantly Warsaw Pact and Chinese origin firearms to the Afghan resistance in order to maintain plausible deniability for the United States and Pakistan. Furthermore, Yousaf and Adkin (2001) also discuss the creation of a network of financial institutions that were organised as far afield as the UK, Middle East and East Asia and the methods they used to facilitate the CIA-ISI arms pipeline, while highlighting the ideological, political, military, and logistical issues that had to be dealt with by the covert coalition of countries that agreed to assist the arms pipeline, such as the paramount importance of the secrecy required when Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan coordinated the supply of Soviet origin firearms captured during the Arab Israeli Wars to the Islamic Afghan resistance¹⁰⁶. However, Yousaf and Adkin (2001) limit their scope to the supply side of SALW transfers, and do not mention the consequential effects of the mass diffusion of SALW on Afghan society, and the durability of the arms supply networks use by the arms pipeline, which has and continues to pose immense threats within Afghanistan and the region.

A more recent and relevant study by Matt Schroeder and Benjamin King (2012), *Surveying the Battlefield - Illicit Arms in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia*¹⁰⁷, published in the Small Arms Survey 2012 Yearbook, discusses the scope of the illicit arms market in Afghanistan, which has a direct bearing on the weaponisation of Afghanistan and the entrenchment of political economies that may act to thwart future DDR processes. Furthermore, the authors attempt to quantify the extent of the illicit SALW market in Afghanistan. However, since this attempt is wholly reliant upon analyses of the seizure of arms caches by US, Australian and British military forces in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2011 and without an extensive study of the processes and methods of local manufacture, illicit sale, and distribution of SALW, the study fails to appreciate the severity and scale of the illicit market in SALW in Afghanistan. As such, an attempt to provide further understanding of illicit SALW as part of the weaponisation of Afghanistan is a core component of this thesis, and the field research conducted on the arms manufacturing industry in Darra Adam Khel and other areas of the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan in relation to their impact on arms flows into Afghanistan does attempt to contribute to this hitherto ignored area with new knowledge.

The role of the CIA as a major conduit for arms assistance from the United States has led to a number of studies, articles and publications; one of which is illustrated by Kurt Lohbeck, a former politician who covered the Afghan War for the three major US news networks between 1982 and 1991. In, *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan*¹⁰⁸, Lohbeck (1993) uses his understanding of the conflict through his personal experiences, contacts, discussions with noted Mujahideen commanders, and the CIA personnel to provide a critical account of the covert actions, and extensive political and logistical support that was provided by the CIA to the ISI and the Afghan resistance; is intrinsic to discovering where and how the extensive diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan occurred. In this respect, the Pulitzer winning *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*¹⁰⁹, by journalist Steve Coll (2004), provides a detailed analysis of the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan, the arming of the Afghan resistance parties, the origins of Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda, the failure to appreciate the significance of maintaining involvement in Afghan affairs once the Soviets had withdrawn as well as the ascent of the Taliban and the ensuing ascent of Al Qaeda through the lack of intelligence assets in the field in Afghanistan. What Steve Coll (2004) provides is an appreciation of the absolute ground realities and the consequences that might proceed the application of short term measures, such as the influx of SALW into a potential conflict environment. In fact, although not realised at the time, the arming of the Afghan resistance movement in the late spring of 1979, decisively resulted in the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Chalmers Johnson (2010) further elaborates these same sentiments, in *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope*¹¹⁰, which will be discussed in this study's chapters on the 'Weaponisation of Afghanistan', when he states that "It should be now be generally accepted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 was deliberately provoked by the United States... [when the]... American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahideen guerrillas not after the Soviet invasion, but six months before it"¹¹¹. Without direct inference, Johnson (2010) assumes that, in essence, the influx of weapons to aid a particular party, whether deliberate or not, may have significant repercussions in the eruption or protraction of a particular conflict, as was the case for Afghanistan. This is, intrinsically, the crux of this study. As such, it is not only the discovery and use of specific publications and research materials that focus completely on the effects of SALW proliferation in Afghanistan that are of particular value to this study. This is exactly why a thorough search of non-specific, yet, related publications was of absolute necessity.

In reference to the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan, whether direct or indirect, and their consequential impact on its course of history, Dalton Fury (2008), the pen name for the Delta Force commander who chased Bin Laden to the Tora Bora Mountains in Eastern Afghanistan, offers an insightful explanation in *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man*¹¹². Fury (2008) notes the methods used to induce Northern Alliance fighters to cooperate in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden. This book is not directly related to the subject matter of this study in the literal sense; however, Fury's (2008) account of the assault on the Tora Bora Mountains to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden is perceptive because it

highlights the methods used by the US military and CIA to finance and arm warlords and indigenous Afghan fighters to oppose the Taliban. Such arming and facilitation of paramilitaries and militias throughout the course of the Afghan conflict has been one of the many avenues for the diffusion of SALW into Afghanistan and a consistent obstacle and irritant to disarmament efforts. Fury's (2008) first-hand account of the events leading up to and unfolding at Tora Bora are illustrative of the many instances of similar occasions where short-term measures were deemed more important than the detrimental long-term consequences of SALW proliferation, whether in Afghanistan or in many other conflict environments throughout the world.

1:3:3:3 – Conflict Dynamics

Although no comprehensive study on the affects of SALW proliferation on conflict dynamics in Afghanistan exists, more generalised studies are available. Tara Kartha (1999) demonstrates an accurate insight into the effects of SALW proliferation in South Asia by complimenting her research articles with her publication: 'Tools of Terror'¹¹³. She comments on how the combination of the thriving narcotics trade (particularly 'heroin', before and after refinement from opium) and arms smuggling has brought further uncertainty to the increasingly unstable political and strategic climate of the sub-continent. Kartha (1999) also provides an insightful account in one of the first attempts to document the spread of SALW originating from the conflict in Afghanistan in her chapter, *Weapons Warehouse: Afghanistan - Strategies and Ambitions in Light Weapons War*¹¹⁴. Detailing the bitter conflict in Afghanistan, she investigates the sources of weapons flows into and out of the country, piecing together reports, articles and relevant publications from diverse sources. Another beneficial publication, authored by Sreedhar Mahendra Ved (1998), *Afghan Turmoil: Changing Equations*¹¹⁵, examines the civil war in Afghanistan and the strategic itineraries of the major parties involved. Ved (1998) charts the rise of the Taleban and the significance of the proposed oil and gas pipelines, which may, foreseeably, attribute to their success in the aftermath of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF departure in the near future. Such factors may be significant in the continuation of the conflict, and hence, further proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Ved (1998) accurately identifies the persistence of the conflict as dependent upon continued interference from external forces because of international and regional interests. An excellent account of the proliferation of SALW during the Taliban period and the continued civil war was provided by a Human Rights Watch Report (2001), *Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fuelling the Civil War*¹¹⁶, which investigated the arms transfers to Masood's Northern Alliance by Iran and a several other countries, and those to the Taliban by Pakistan and its associates.

1:3:3:3:1 – Structural Dynamics

To ascertain a thorough understanding of how the mass diffusion of weapons have impacted upon Afghan society politically, socio-economically, culturally and psychologically on a short-term and long-term basis it is intrinsic to appreciate the socio-cultural origins and societal structures of the diverse ethnicities of Afghanistan. Relatively few comprehensive and systematic anthropological studies have been carried out on Afghan society. The few that exist generally cover only specific aspects of the society and rarely encompass every ethnic community in Afghanistan. Louis Dupree's (1980), *Afghanistan*¹¹⁷, is one of a kind in its approach and depth. Yet, it seems implausible to consider this, as great as it is in its depth and wide in its comprehension, as more

than a general introduction to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it provides a starting point to branch out and study specific aspects of Afghan society in depth. For example, Federick Barth (1969), in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Differences*¹¹⁸, provides a grounding in the structural organisation of Afghanistan's variegated ethnic composition, whilst Elizabeth Bacon (1951), facilitates a more in-depth analysis of the Hazara ethnic group in his PhD thesis on *The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan: a Study in Social Organisation*¹¹⁹, with which, in addition to Syed Mousavi's (1998) *The Hazaras of Afghanistan*¹²⁰, further tangible leads were discovered on how the political and structural transformation of Hazara society over the past three decades has directly and indirectly influenced the holistic affects of the proliferation of SALW on Hazara society. A more distinct analysis was found in Akbar Ahmad's *Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*¹²¹, where he offers an anthropological explanation of Pushtun tribal society, its social stratification, social conditioning, and historical inclination towards resistance to foreign occupation through the culturally reinforced adoption of Pushtunwali (the Pushtun code of conduct). In essence, conflict dynamics within Afghanistan cannot be understood without a thorough grasp of the Afghans' evolutionary adaptation to their geographical and socio-cultural environment, which has led them to become so intractable in conflict and war; and, maybe, to the detriment of their political and economic development as a state.

1:3:3:3:2 – Escalation Dynamics

Literature on conflict has had a tendency to focus more on the results of escalation or resolution, especially through the journalistic narration of events, than the meticulous analysis of the processes, mechanisms and dynamics that bring them about. The omnipresence of an extraordinarily high number of confounding variables that are based upon subjective psychological analysis and evaluation within the study of conflict do not easily facilitate the separation of the constituent processes of escalation and de-escalation for individual scrutiny; in fact, they exacerbate the difficulty of thorough examination. However, in this respect, empirical studies on specific case histories are becoming more numerous. Nevertheless, very few attempt a comprehensive approach to escalation processes in war. Recent attempts at understanding escalation have been more successful by analysing how to control it by evaluating how the processes, mechanisms, and dynamics of conflict induce it to escalate. Richard Smoke (1977), in *War: Controlling Escalation*¹²², proceeds exactly on this premise, giving a number of case histories of escalation with evaluations and analyses of its working mechanisms. Sociologist Louis Kriesberg (2007), in *Constructive Conflict: From Escalation to Resolution*¹²³, comprehensively evaluates the processes and dynamics of escalation by explaining the emergence of conflict, conflict transformation processes, and the strategies that contending parties may employ to reach the threshold of violent conflict. Because of the depth of the analytical approach that Kriesberg (2007) uses to understand conflict, it has been favourably employed in this study.

While Brzoska and Pearson (1994), in *Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-Escalation and Negotiation*¹²⁴, identify ten case studies of inter-state wars within which the relationship between the transfer of arms is correlated with the escalation and de-escalation of those conflicts. Brzoska and Pearson (1994) do not, however, include SALW as mitigating variables within the arms transfers that are identified as assisting the

escalation of conflicts, since only major conventional weapons are deemed to be the game changers in their study. However, Brzoska and Pearson (1994) do recognise the utility of SALW when they were employed in several of the conflicts that they have studied, such as the successful initial advances of the Salvadoran forces against the Honduran troops during the 'Central American Football War' in 1969, through the recent acquisition of 'modern' assault rifles from West Germany¹²⁵. Nevertheless, according to Brzoska and Pearson (1994), major conventional weapons transfers and availability are perceived as having an overwhelming impact on the escalation of conflicts.

The American Behavioural Scientist paper, *Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: a Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict Escalation and Intractability*¹²⁶, by Coleman et al (2007), helps to provide an approach to understand the conflict in Afghanistan through the use of the *Dynamical Systems Approach*. Coleman et al (2007) highlight the importance of the interactions between the various elements, parties, behaviours, variables, beliefs, and forces at work in conflict environments to propagate and shape the conflict environment for self-sustainability and intractability. However, it can be assumed that such self-sustainability itself negates extreme escalation in conflicts because that would be self-destructive, as in the Cold War modus operandi, mutual assured destruction (MAD). Although, Coleman et al (2007) do not specifically discuss SALW, the Dynamical Systems Approach helps us to appreciate such weapons as significant variables within the conflict environment that may propagate the conflict's sustainability and escalation; while, their mere presence may assist in negating the conflict's de-escalation and termination.

The intrinsic importance of violence in the escalation of conflicts is a cornerstone of this study, as it is the defining point of the potential immediate and irretrievable use of SALW. The study by Zeev Winstok (2008), *Conflict Escalation to Violence and Escalation of Violent Conflicts*¹²⁷ seeks to understand the significance of the processes involved in the use of violence and how passing through such a threshold often leads to new and more intense dynamic interactions within conflict with explosive results. Winstok's (2008) understanding of violence in escalatory processes fits in well with the Dynamical Systems Approach introduced by Coleman et al's (2007), and therefore, enhances the understanding that this study brings to bear on the proliferation of SALW and their direct and indirect effects on conflict dynamics in Afghanistan. In respect to the latter, the interaction between arms and escalation is further elaborated upon by Michael D. Wallace (1982) in, *Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses*¹²⁸. Wallace (1982) contends that the presence or absence of arms races, in reference to major conventional weapons, does not have any bearing on the presence or absence of war¹²⁹. Nevertheless, Wallace's (1982) stance has been thoroughly discussed with contending views achieving pre-eminence in the general field of arms and conflict; such as those views pronounced by John Lambelet's (1975), *Do Arms Races Lead to War?*¹³⁰, which is unrelated to Wallace's paper, and where Lambelet (1975) notes that wars and arms races are mutually exclusive to each other. The point being made is that this debate has been ongoing for decades, and the rationale behind this it is that of the use of major conventional weaponry, as opposed to SALW, which are the foci of this study, and for which the debate is just beginning. This study, therefore, aims to prove some clarity to this embryonic debate.

1:3:3:4 – Disarmament Processes

The debate on whether a disarmament process in a conflict environment is intrinsic to the successful resolution of any particular conflict vis-a-vis the resolution of the core issues between contending parties is still ongoing in terms of major conventional weapons. However, in relation to SALW, this debate is quite recent. Organisations such as the Small Arms Survey have been actively involved in gauging the applicability of disarmament and concurrent demobilisation and rehabilitation programs on conflict termination in the sub-Saharan Africa region with numerous completed studies. However, it is only recently that the Small Arms Survey has successively published several analyses of the viability of SALW disarmament processes in Afghanistan, but only as part of more comprehensive studies; such as, Michael Bhatia and Robert Muggah's (2009) study on *Demobilization and Reintegration Dilemmas in Afghanistan*, which is part of a larger study on *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*¹³¹. However, the issues dealt with in this study ignore the status of the Afghan conflict, thereby negating the very assumption of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan; since the conflict has not yet been resolved, nor has violent conflict been terminated. Nevertheless, Bhatia and Muggah (2009) do recognise this very situation in the Small Arms Survey 2009 Annual Yearbook chapter entitled, *DRR in Afghanistan: When State-Building and Insecurity Collide*¹³², indicating the inevitability of the clash between the processes involved in state-building and conflict insecurity during Afghanistan's Japanese-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) initiative; which was part of the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP). According to the SAS 2009 yearbook, the ANBP did have some initial success, but was overwhelmed by the increasing pace of the resurgence of the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan, which eventually negated any successful disarmament progress that was accomplished¹³³. The failure of the DDR program in Afghanistan, therefore, provides viability to the notion that the core grievances being pursued by the contending parties may be of paramount concern when instituting such programs.

Other studies concerning the disarmament process in Afghanistan are few and far between. The previously mentioned UNIDIR DCRP studies¹³⁴ are examples of related literature, where discussions have tended to concentrate on the positive and negative outcomes of the use of instruments to implement disarmament. These are largely dependent upon the prevailing military, political and economic circumstances of the country in question and the executors of the arms control agreements, if any. Although there is a requisite to understand the conflict environment, the socio-political and economic circumstances proscribe many large scale studies due to the inset limitations and requirements of the interests of the military powers that are entrenched in conflicts, such as the US/NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to point out that, although the subject matter of disarmament is beyond the scope of this study, it is still particularly relevant when trying to gauge the intrinsic destabilising impacts of SALW on Afghan society due to the necessity of producing alternative solutions for the amelioration of the intractable conflict in Afghanistan. That is, if we recognise that the presence and availability of SALW act to destabilise social communities in conflict, then the absence of their presence may help to reduce such destabilising impacts, which this study aims to identify.

For there to be any real progress in the eventual stemming of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan, a thorough understanding of the ostensibly successful disarmament program instituted by the Taliban is therefore needed. That is, taking into account that the emergence of the Taliban movement and their rapid growth, development and incredible success, constrained the availability of information during their tenure; which was, furthermore, not a reliable and accurate keeper of records. As such, future research on the intricacies and processes of the Taliban's successful disarmament process may well only be able to rely on the assumptions and conclusions of a growing number works on the Taliban, which are continually being published to offer an insight into their organisation and practices. Nevertheless, in order to maintain cognisance of the foci of this study, the matter of disarmament is discussed in the final chapter to elaborate upon the necessity for further research to be carried out in the future.

1:4 – Theoretical Framework

In examining the impacts and effects of the large-scale diffusion of SALW on Afghanistan, a combination of perspectives ranging from socio-psychological analysis in the form of behavioural approaches to complement structural analysis have been employed when examining social and tribal organisation, while also employing the increasingly important human security-centric approach and constructivist interpretations of individual and collective interactions within the structural organisation of Afghan societies. Furthermore, strategic analysis is utilised to understand the significance of international and geostrategic factors on conflict dynamics within Afghanistan. Therefore, the application of a single holistic approach on the extremely complex dynamics within and without the Afghan conflict would be highly reductionist, such as the sole utilisation of the traditional realist approach, while the application of multiple perspectives may have a great bearing on our understanding when applied to explain the variegated aspects of the Afghan conflict, from the reasons behind the mass diffusion SALW throughout the course of the conflict, and the escalation of the conflict to surpass the threshold of violence, to the geopolitical and geostrategic sustenance and maintenance of the intractability of the Afghan conflict in general. The several approaches and perspectives utilised in this study to provide explanations of the many issues that arise from the subject matter of this study, are, in effect, complementary rather than contradictory, as would be assumed from the first impressions of their declared use; since, a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the proliferation of SALW is provided through their inclusion rather than their exclusion.

1:4:1 – Perspectives

1:4:1:1 – Realism

Realism, and its various derivatives, has been the primary lens through which foreign policy experts have understood state-centric inter-state relations in the Cold War era and beyond¹³⁵. The lack of an overarching global political framework through which to regulate international order inevitably imbued an inclination towards a sense of chaos in relations between nations, where trust does not exist between states, which vie for interests that on many occasions are contrary to another state's interests¹³⁶. In fact, where no authority exists beyond the state, the only mechanism through which states may interact in an anarchical world is through the

intelligent use of power to achieve one's own interests, irrespective of the detriment to another state's interests. In this respect, Hans Morgenthau's (1978) elucidation of the use of power in, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*¹³⁷, may apply, where:

Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man¹³⁸.

This was the case to the fullest extent were the presence of bi-lateral and multilateral treaties non-existent. Nevertheless, 'As long as there was no sovereign power to manage enforcement, critics argued, international law was meaningless. Regarding it as otherwise was not just unrealistic but dangerous'¹³⁹. However, the world has changed to a significant extent where the international legal system, albeit, in its embryonic stage, does impart some form of protection for weaker states in their dealings with more powerful states¹⁴⁰. Nevertheless, this is also because of the presence of an overwhelming superpower in the unipolar world that has taken upon itself the responsibility to offer protection to other states in order to provide some form of order to the international state system¹⁴¹, and to facilitate the smooth running of the global economy; which, in essence, is for the maintenance of its own interests in an increasingly interconnected and globalising world¹⁴².

International treaties and agreements are intrinsically for the benefit of the co-existence of individual states as they compete in an anarchical world, because they provide some form of shielding from more powerful states, but they do not necessarily prevent latent conflicts from ascending to violent conflicts and wars. Therefore, all states must prepare for conflict and war because there is no certainty that other states will not use their military capabilities in the pursuit of their interests, given their rational decision making on the costs and benefits of pursuing their interests through the threat or use of violent conflict. As Robert Gilpin (1981) illustrates in his seminal work, *War and Change in World Politics*¹⁴³:

The fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world is the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just as it was in the past. International society cannot and does not stand still. War and violence remain serious possibilities as the world moves from the decay of one international system toward the creation of another¹⁴⁴.

As such, realism does provide a perspective through which to understand and examine the geopolitical and geostrategic interactions between the superpowers that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent US involvement through the formation of alliances to indirectly engage and defeat the USSR in Afghanistan within the larger geostrategic global systemic competition between the US-led West and the USSR-led Warsaw Pact, which will be elaborated upon in greater detail as this study progresses. Furthermore, realism also provides the rationale for the arming of the Afghan resistance movement to undermine the Communist PDPA and the USSR in their Afghan adventure. Nevertheless, realism, being state-centric¹⁴⁵, does not bode so well in explaining the detrimental and destabilising consequences of the mass proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan, and the protraction of the conflict, because of the lack of depth that the employment of realism has within the boundaries of the state, where the primary actors may not necessarily be

the state, and where the individual or sub-state group may have more significance to the course of events, which do not come within the purview of realism.

During the Cold War, the primary concern for the superpowers was to maintain a balance of power between the two main strategic blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As such, a competition for influence upon non-party states was evidently intense, so as to secure strategic advantages through access to resources in non-aligned countries, thereby undermining their competitors. The omnipotence of mutual assured destruction negated direct conflict between the superpowers, and as such, the strategic blocks engaged indirectly to undermine their respective competitors. While the defeat of Vietnam may have induced a sense of weakness, insecurity, and threat of a decline in the relative balance of power for the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the actions of the US upon their ambitious inducement of the USSR to invade Afghanistan¹⁴⁶ by overtly and covertly funding the Afghan resistance, alongside a monetarily heavy policy to out-spend the Soviet Union and force them out of the competition by ratchetting up pressure with an arms race through the development of the Strategic Defence Initiative¹⁴⁷, although the debate continues as opposing views do indicate that the USSR defence expenditure remained relatively constant throughout the 1980s¹⁴⁸. Nevertheless, military preparedness was amplified, and may be interpreted through defensive realism as an attempt by the US to increase its relative security and in the protection of its interests; as was stated by President Carter on 04 January 1980, a week after the invasion:

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighbouring countries in Southwest Asia..... A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies..... If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic, and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies, and our friends.¹⁴⁹

With respect to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union acted in their self-interest through a combination of actions that may be interpreted through the prism of defensive realism up to and including the invasion in December 1979. Upon the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet Union perceived that it was in a position of strength and therefore, tried to maximise their relative position in the balance of power vis-a-vis the United States¹⁵⁰. In this respect, the USSR may have felt that their increasing influence in Afghanistan, as an expansion of their power, which led to the Communist PDPA coup d'état in April 1978, did not invite a high degree of risk, given that Afghanistan was assumed to have been in the Soviet sphere of influence in any case¹⁵¹. However, the interference of the United States in Afghanistan during the latter half of 1979¹⁵², and the increasing inclination of Afghanistan's President Amin towards the United States, was perceived as a threat by the Soviet Union¹⁵³, which acted, due to its inherent insecurity from the US' containment policy, and according to defensive realism, to invade Afghanistan in order to rebalance the balance of influence, and hence, power, in Afghanistan.

In terms of the socioeconomic and locational evolution of the Afghans, the perspective of realism may be able to impart some understanding of the social organisation of the tribal societies that exist within it and their

defensive structural stratification, especially in Pushtun societies. However, the state-centric limitations of realism do present some drawbacks to providing an interpretation here. Nevertheless, realism's central premise of the pessimistic nature of humans does provide a basis for the structural organisation of Pushtun tribal society, where the segmented patrilineal lineage of males is paramount, and where the development of the warrior archetype prevailed in the evolution of a defensive structural organisation of Pushtun tribal society (see chapter three for an elaborate discussion on this matter).

1:4:1:2 – Constructivism

An alternative prism through which to analyse the superpower competition during the Cold War, and specifically the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, is provided by alternative international relations theories, in particular, the constructivist approach advocated by Alexander Wendt¹⁵⁴ and Friedrich Kratochwil¹⁵⁵. In this respect, constructivists would view Soviet interests, rationale and compulsions for invading Afghanistan based upon the necessity of supporting the shared ideas, values, norms, and identity of the PDPA communist that were being undermined by a different set of ideas and values by the United States through capitalism; since, the shared identities that the Soviet leadership had with the communist leadership of Afghanistan after the April 1978 coup d'état also defined their shared interests in maintaining the PDPA regime in Kabul. However, although the values and identities between the United States and the Islamic Afghan resistance parties may not necessarily have been shared, their self-interests in the idea of maintaining an independent Afghanistan superseded that of their lack of individual shared identities through different culturally imbued ideas and values, since the cultural meanings attached to the concept of freedom, as per the understanding of the individual Afghan fighters, were relatively similar. Nevertheless, the *Christian* United States applied added emphasis to their overarching and broader shared religious values with the Islamic resistance, as 'people of the book', to rationalise a commonality of interests through shared ideas and values, in contrast to atheistic ideals espoused by the Soviet Union¹⁵⁶; although, this construction was highlighted to illustrate the use of shared identities in the fulfilment of the pursuit of shared interests.

Tribal societies, such as those that are epitomised in Afghanistan, not only share lineage, an antecedent that is shared between male tribal members, but also identify with their kith and kin through mutual values that impart collectively shared meanings upon concepts that are culturally reinforced through traditions and practices, and which, solidify group consolidation within tribal and ethnic relations¹⁵⁷. As such constructivism can impart a richer understanding of the meanings behind tribal organisation and the transgenerational transmission of the warrior archetype to reinforce social bonds within a defensive socially stratified society. In the following chapters, the discussion of the social stratification and organisation of Afghanistan's variegated cultural entities will be elaborated upon through the concept of sodality; that is, non-kin groups or parties which share ideas, values and beliefs and are organised as such.

Although there have been several distinct stages to the Afghan conflict, in essence, Afghanistan has been in the throes of civil war since April 1978, including the invitation of external parties by internal parties, of dubious legitimacy (whether the PDPA communist regime or the Northern Alliance), engaged in violent

conflict with other internal parties. However, civil war is not just about the application of power between groups, as would be the assumption under a realist approach, which is important when recognising that conflict resolution processes often grind to a halt when only material factors or the distribution of power are being dealt with, without the meanings associated with core grievances, such as injustice, discrimination, and equality being given consideration. Such meanings have often had long histories of development and construction by the different contending parties in conflict, which are propagated through social norms, values, beliefs, cultures, and traditions that impart meanings to actions on the ground¹⁵⁸. Violent actions by contending parties may be amplified or diminished depending upon the significance of the meanings that they represent within a particular social environment as opposed to another and the respective parties engaged in conflict. The beating of a male child, to the point of severe injury or even death, within the martial culture of a Spartan school in ancient Greece was appreciated as a method of positive child rearing to accustom the child to a future as a warrior¹⁵⁹; while, in modern day England, this beating would be associated as akin to child abuse. Therefore, the reasons that different ethnically and religiously aligned parties within a state fight between themselves in a civil war is viewed by constructivists as having greater meaning than just the distribution of power. Constructivists, such as Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil (1994), who propose that “in all politics, domestic and international, actors reproduce or alter systems through their actions”¹⁶⁰, view drastic change in international politics as social transformation processes wherein which the social norms, mores, and rules of political engagement and interaction are changed, which “occur when beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered thereby also altering rules and norms that are constitutive of their political practices”¹⁶¹.

Civil wars, by extrapolation, such as that which has existed throughout the protracted Afghan conflict, are viewed by constructivism as being wrought to produce significant changes in domestic practices between constituent political actors so as to change or modify political structures and/or the political system, through the alteration of beliefs and the relative identities of the self and others by the acquisition of power through forceful action, but not necessarily for the sake of the acquisition of power; the latter for which realism would advocate. In this respect, Stathis Kalyvas (2008), in *Ethnic Defection in Civil Wars*¹⁶², suggests that “civil wars are dynamic social and political contexts that potentially shape the behavioural expression of ethnic identities”¹⁶³. Therefore, the use of the constructivist interpretation permits this study to discover alternative explanations for the civil war that has permeated the whole period of the Afghan conflict, from 1978 to present.

In relation to the subject matter of this study; while realism denotes only material significance to SALW, where firearms are classified according to their tangible characteristics that are invariably in terms of their lethality and firepower, and which may be standardised across the board, irrespective of socio-cultural or national boundaries, constructivism facilitates a more in-depth analysis of the abstract meanings, associations, and conceptualisation that people bestow upon SALW, which may differ greatly depending upon the locational, cultural, ideological and historical significance of SALW between different nations, ethnicities, communities, tribes, individuals, and even genders. Such constructed meanings, associations and concepts are

intangible; however, they provide greater appreciation as to why a particular group may be culturally organised with positive associations of SALW and their benefits to society, whilst others may bestow negative associations to SALW. For example, a martial society may imbue positive meanings and associations on firearms, through cultural and traditional transmission, as icons symbolic of masculinity, status, and security; while, pacifist societies may denigrate firearms with negative symbolism. The actual firearm maybe the same, however, the meanings attached to the weapon will differ, and, as such, the use of the weapon and the impact on those respective parties that possess them will be different.

1:4:2 – Approaches

1:4:2:1 – Regional Security Complex Theory

This study will also discuss the strategic significance of the Afghan conflict with the assistance of the Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's *Regional Complex Theory*¹⁶⁴ to explain the dynamics of the relationships between all the parties involved in the conflict, whether local, national, regional or international. The Regional Complex Theory provides a prism through which this study may be able to fathom the complexity of the interests, motives, causes, processes, functions, and responses of all the parties involved in the weaponisation of Afghanistan, especially between the fall of the Monarchy on 17 July 1973 and the attacks on the United States (world trade centre and pentagon) on 11 September 2001. Furthermore, the Regional Complex Theory may help to understand the future course of the Afghan conflict, given the centrality of Afghanistan in the geostrategic security environment over the past four decades, as will be elaborated upon throughout the course of this study. The Regional Complex Theory is provided within the context of the analysis of the strategic environment surrounding the geographical location of Afghanistan, its historical significance, and the prevailing geostrategic, regional and national imperatives, which not only gave rise to the political dynamics that engulfed the state, but also led to its destabilisation and subsequent exploitation by regional and international actors within the interwoven conflict dynamics of the Cold War era and the ensuing regional proxy war in the 1990s.

1:4:2:2 – Human Security Approach

Contrary to the state-centric prism, which realism emphasises, the *Human Security* approach centres itself on the individual as the referent object and most important constituent within all aspects of security, and readily fills the vacuum that realism displays in many aspects of supra-state, inter-state, and sub-state issues, such as the environmental, industrial, economic, health, and structural aspects of all levels of security¹⁶⁵. The concept of Human Security found its origins in the nineteenth century beginnings of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)¹⁶⁶, and in Abraham Maslow's (1954)¹⁶⁷ conceptualisation of human development, in *Motivation and Personality*¹⁶⁷, through the satisfaction of five basic human needs, including psychological needs, the need for belongingness and love, safety, respect and esteem, and the need for self-actualisation¹⁶⁸. In *Control: the Basics of Social Order*¹⁶⁹, Paul Sites (1973) further elaborates upon Maslow's (1954) five basic needs by highlighting the necessity of satisfying eight intrinsic tangible and abstract human needs to achieve human behaviour that is deemed 'normal'; that is, that which is not violent or deviant¹⁷⁰. Nevertheless, it was John Burton (1979), in his seminal work, *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of*

*Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*¹⁷¹, who propelled the ‘basic human needs’ approach into the international consciousness that he later developed as an understanding of protracted social conflict and conflict transformation¹⁷², which is emphasised throughout the course of this study. It was the amplification of Burton’s (1990b) understanding of social conflicts by the United Nations Development Programme’s adoption of the human needs approach in the *Human Development Report 1994*¹⁷³, through their elaboration of seven dimensions of security that enhanced the international acceptance of the concept of ‘human security’¹⁷⁴. In fact, in the late 1990s, Canada incorporated Human Security as a core principle in its foreign policy, while Japan similarly integrated it into its development policy through greater emphasis on a people-centred approach to international security and international assistance, respectively¹⁷⁵.

Human security is a universal concept and applicable to every human, irrespective of time and space; while all the constituent elements are deemed interdependent, such as when a disease in one part of the world may impact on the health security of another part of the world, as is the case for HIV/AIDs, which is supranational in its orientation and impact; or, the impact of an individual act of bioterrorism upon global security. In this respect, for issues, such as the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan, Human Security offers an approach to gauge the protracted conflict’s root causes by assessing the effects that the micro-level actions of individuals may have upon macro-level situations¹⁷⁶; such as in the empowerment of an individual through their possession and use of firearms that can escalate an inter-personal latent conflict into a broader community level violent conflict between multiple parties, and their consequent effects upon the macro-level dynamics of conflict, such as the processes involved in the institutionalisation of violence and militarisation of society¹⁷⁷. In respect to the latter, conflict dynamics are essentially understood as processes, which may involve multifarious factors and have multitudinous impacts on the individual and collective society as a whole. This study, therefore, aims to provide a broader understanding of the short to long-term effects of SALW on conflict dynamics in Afghanistan through a complementary appreciation of the Human Security approach.

1:4:2:3 – Dynamical Systems Approach

The ‘dynamical systems approach’ to conflict is utilised to understand the complexity of conflict dynamics in Afghanistan. Highlighted in a paper co-written by Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska (2007), *Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict Escalation and Intractability*¹⁷⁸, the dynamical systems approach seeks to develop a theory of conflict intractability by examining the underlying dynamics within protracted conflicts and how the various elements, events, beliefs, motives, actions, forces and actors interact and self-organise in conflict systems. This study does recognise the relevance of using the theoretical framework used by the dynamic systems approach to understand escalation processes; and, as such, it aims to extrapolate the understanding of dynamic systems to the Afghan conflict, which is an ideal example of an intractable conflict with a complex multitude of parties, interests, variables, forces, events, elements, and factors that continue to interact to cause the conflict to persist.

1:4:2:4 – Arms Races, Security Dilemma, and the Spiral Model

The development of models to explain arms races and conflict is not a recent phenomenon in the political science discipline; for example, in *Mathematical Psychology of War*¹⁷⁹, Lewis Richardson (1919) attempted to devise a mathematical model to explain how nations compete with major conventional weapons build-ups according to threat perceptions, which are a reflection of an adversary's arms levels as well as one's own nation's resistance to arms spending. However, SALW were never incorporated into such models, which were not even signified as a clear and present threat, and as such, are difficult to utilise to increase our understanding of SALW proliferation. Nevertheless, relatively recently, Robert Jervis' (1978) seminal paper, *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*¹⁸⁰, although describing the behaviour of states in the international state system, intrinsically defines the processes that can lead to and ensue from the diffusion of SALW; since, the 'security dilemma' applies to both the individual as well as the collective, the micro as well as the macro level, given that these entities stem from a common denominator, that of the realist premise on human nature, where, "the underlying problem lies neither in limitations on rationality imposed by human psychology nor in a flaw in human nature, but in a correct appreciation of the consequences of living in a Hobbesian state of nature"¹⁸¹. By extrapolation, therefore, the security dilemma helps explain the detrimental effects of SALW availability; for example, the possession of SALW by an individual or party ('A'), especially where there is a law enforcement vacuum or the lack of law and order, can lead to feelings of insecurity and fear of being exploited by the individuals or parties ('B') not in possession of SALW, and, as such, induce them to acquire SALW also. This process can lead to what Jervis (1976) describes as the 'spiral model', where even though the party(s) ('B') may have balanced or increased their acquisition of arms and hold "no aggressive designs, there is nothing to guarantee that they will not later develop them"¹⁸², which may induce one or other of the parties to decrease their perceived vulnerability and acquire greater and more lethal SALW because of the uncertainty of their adversary's intent, thereby further increasing the insecurity of the other party(s), fuelling inter-party competition, and straining political relations¹⁸³.

In terms of conflict dynamics, strained political relations further increase the polarisation effect between the contending parties, where conflictual goals may develop and solidify as tensions increase and further arms are acquired. In this respect, David Singer (1958), in his decisive work, *Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma*¹⁸⁴, elaborates upon the dynamic relationship between arms and tension formation, albeit, on the international stage, when he posits that "the circularity and self-generating nature of the arms-tension pattern is manifest, and threat-perception is its prime ingredient"¹⁸⁵, which is central to the impetus of the polarisation process within conflictual relationships. Furthermore, Singer's (1958) *Armaments-Tension Spiral Model* does provide some basis for appreciating the impacts that SALW proliferation may have upon helping latent, existing, and new conflicts gravitate towards tension, hostility, and the use of violence through escalatory processes. In fact, "even after a conflict ends, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons can exacerbate local security dilemmas and greatly complicate efforts to increase security and stability"¹⁸⁶.

The spiral model provides a basis for understanding the development of conflict in Afghanistan that can arise due to the increasingly cyclical insecurity and suspicion induced by the pragmatic acquisition of arms by

respective parties, which, according to Jervis (1982), seldom “consider seriously the possibility that such a policy will increase the danger of war [or conflict] instead of lessening it”¹⁸⁷. In this respect, the spiral model, according to Jervis (1976)¹⁸⁸, is at variance with the deterrence model because of the parties’ differing intentions; since the latter model emphasises the malign intent of an adversary, which must be deterred to achieve a semblance of perceived security because of the fear of a vulnerability being exploited, while the spiral model accentuates the nature of the relationship between the parties within an anarchic environment and the necessity of a self-help approach due to the lack of an overarching authority that is able to protect and regulate the parties’ interests and activities¹⁸⁹.

1:4:3 – Analysis

Two methods of analysis are employed in this study to facilitate an explanation of two distinct but highly inter-related aspects of the weaponisation of Afghanistan. Historical analysis is employed to understand the processes and events that led to and assisted the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan; while, structural analysis helps elucidate how the differing social structures of the variegated societies in Afghanistan may contribute to or negate the effects of the mass proliferation of SALW.

1:4:3:1 – Historical Analysis

Primarily, the research design in relation to the weaponisation of Afghanistan rests on an historical analysis, which predominantly employs the qualitative method of inquiry to discover past occurrences and events through historical records, reports, journals, memoirs, and official governmental accounts¹⁹⁰. However, the quantitative method has been used, although to a limited extent, due the lack of availability of authoritative quantitative information; since, “finding and assessing primary historical data is an exercise in detective work”¹⁹¹. This is specifically the kind of investigation that was undertaken to identifying the processes and methods involved in the weaponisation of Afghanistan, using the historical descriptive case study.

This analysis is not, per se, about establishing absolute causality between an independent variable, such as the proliferation of SALW upon the dependent variable, such as the protraction of the Afghan conflict; since, establishing causal relationships by the manipulation of the independent variables through randomised experiments is an extremely difficult task in a descriptive study, especially given the immense complexity of the case study at hand, the Afghan conflict, and the normative explanations of the effects that SALW may have upon social perceptions such as empowerment, which are entirely subjective to the society that they have been diffused into. It may seem that there is a contradiction in the methodology being employed through the use of a historical descriptive analysis, whilst also utilising the case study to appreciate the documentation or determination of some form of relationship between the SALW proliferation and the negative impacts they have upon conflict dynamics. However, it was no less than Emile Durkheim¹⁹² who, albeit, contrasted with Max Weber’s “case-orientated qualitative historical methodology”¹⁹³, advocated the use of combining “two different but complementary methods of investigation: those of social statistics, on the one hand (of any other approach that might be useful in analysing ‘currently operative variables’) and those of case-oriented historical inquiry, on the other (so as to analyse the formation and significance of those variables)”¹⁹⁴. It is in

this sense that an historical descriptive account of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan is used in this study, while also cognisant that through ascertaining the extent of the diffusion of SALW in Afghan, which is a daunting task in itself that this study will be unique in identifying, and appreciating the assertions that are being recognised by the international community about the detrimental impacts of the mass diffusion of SALW (as described in this study) that a better understanding of the relationship between the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan and the effects that they have upon the intractability of the Afghan conflict may be provided. The purpose of using the historical analysis, therefore, is to provide structured insights, even though rigorous and scientifically validated and precise conclusions may not be possible to produce.

1:4:3:2 – Structural Analysis

Discovering a relationship between SALW proliferation and its effects on society is, to say the least, a complex, yet, very important task; and, therefore, much more difficult. There are a number of ways in which a high level of SALW proliferation can affect society. These can be seen in terms of direct and indirect impacts on society, including physical and psychological effects throughout all levels of social interaction. To better understand and investigate the effects of the mass diffusion of SALW on the dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan, the social structures of its urban, rural and tribal societies were considered; and, in order to fulfil this requirement, the roots of the underlying problems in Afghan society were explored by examining the regulatory ‘codes of conduct’ that were developed by the variegated social groups with complementary social structures to assist in alleviating the constancy of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions, which were exceedingly exacerbated by the Soviet invasion and the consequent policies used to contain their perceived expansive policies through the exploitation of ideational, religious, sectarian and ethnic fissures by parties external to Afghanistan. To this extent, ‘structural analysis’ has been employed to examine how SALW are perceived throughout Afghan society and history to facilitate an insight in to the relationship between the weapons and societal violence.

Structural analysis, as a unique form of social inquiry, investigates how the patterns of human ties and relationships within and between social networks affect the ways in which social systems function and resources are allocated. Barry Wellman (1998), in his chapter on *Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to Theory and Substance*¹⁹⁵, notes how the intellectual integrity of structural analysis is supported by the development of five definitive attributes. Namely, that, structural limitations on social activity provide the basis for the interpretation of behaviour; the relationships between entities are the focus of analysis; the behaviour of members of a network are mutually affected by the complex patterns of relationships with multiple, yet, differing, ties and linkages; the overall structure is an interwoven and intermingling *network of networks*, which may affect the structure as discreet groups, as the sum of their component parts, or even individually; and, the methods of analysis deal directly with the character of the relational pattern of differing ties, linkages and the meanings between them¹⁹⁶. At its heart, structural analysis is about explaining the structure of social behaviour within social systems, from structural analysis of interpersonal behaviour, for example, as elucidated by Lorna Benjamin (1974), in *Structural Analysis of Social Behaviour*¹⁹⁷, to Claude Lévi Strauss’ (1963) structural analysis of human languages, which he argues, in *Structural Analysis in*

*Linguistics and Anthropology*¹⁹⁸, is essential in understanding kinship-based social relationships amongst humans.

Structural Analysis facilitates an understanding of the importance of social organisation through the social stratification of Afghanistan's multifarious societies, and how their social-structures are a product of a process of natural evolution as well as human construction in response to Afghanistan's geographical location, socio-cultural milieu, as well as the complex interactions between simultaneous, concurrent and temporally differing historically significant events and episodes in the region, given that the country and its people were and are considered as a buffer situated at the juncture of three predominantly competing and strategically important subcontinents¹⁹⁹. Furthermore, structural analysis assists this study by understanding how the social organisation of the variegated ethnicities, their ties, linkages, and patterns of interpersonal and intra and inter-residential and communal networks, have catered for, or have adapted to, the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan through the social evolution of regulatory codes of conduct, norms and mores, for which the ethos of the male warrior archetype has become intrinsic to the development of the defensive structural organization of tribal societies, with specific regard to the Pushtun tribal system²⁰⁰.

Understanding the meanings that the male warrior archetype confers upon firearms, and their possession, helps to comprehend the impacts that the wide diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan's variegated tribal and non-tribal societies may have upon the eruption of violent conflict, its escalation, and consequent institutionalisation of violence through the perpetuation of progressively devastating cycles of violence and instability, and the subsequent protraction of violent conflict. In this sense, structural analysis naturally complements the human security-centric approach being employed for in this study, as well as the constructivist perspective's interpretation of individual and collective interactions within the structural organisation of Afghan societies.

1:5 –Research Design & Methodology

1:5:1 – Hypothesis Testing

To test the hypothesis, this study investigates the relationship between the independent variable (the proliferation of SALW) on the dependent variables (social and conflict dynamics - as interpreted through the processes that facilitate the protraction and escalation of the conflict in Afghanistan). However, as discussed above (see section 1:4:3:1 – Historical Analysis), due to the inherent difficulties of isolating the effects of SALW from the complex multiple levels of interaction between all the geostrategic, regional, and local policies, motives, intentions, and interests of all the parties involved in the conflict; the effects of the employment of major conventional weapons by all parties; the production and trade in narcotics; the use of a variety of forms of warfare, from conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and information and psychological warfare, it is very difficult to establish absolute causality between the independent and dependent variables. Nevertheless, this study attempts to provide insight into the relationship between the two variables.

1:5:2 – Qualitative Design

This study utilised a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, with greater emphasis being offered to the qualitative method²⁰¹. Quantitative methods of inquiry, however, are also employed when investigating the direct impacts of SALW on Afghan society; such as for the evaluation of quantitative data on the casualty rates attributable to the use of SALW, which is essential to our understanding of the extent of the detrimental physical impacts on society. However, the psycho-socio-political and geo-strategic effects of the proliferation of SALW are estimated and derived by using statistical changes in demographic indicators and trends, while, again, giving emphasis to authoritative qualitative sources. The latter are extensively used; from primary methods, such as structured and unstructured interviews to overt and covert participant observation techniques during in-situ research in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A brief discussion as to the use of interviews is provided below (see section 1:5:4:4:1 – Interviews).

1:5:3 – Ethics of Research

A number of ethical considerations were encountered when the field research component for this study was being undertaken. In this respect, a brief elucidation on the code of ethics being followed is necessitated below so as to distinguish between the fine-line that can be drawn between issues that were difficult to deal with on an intellectual level, and those that were ethically bound. The code of ethics that provide parameters for this study, and within which definitive boundaries were drawn, so that the field research component would not be compromised is a complicated subject matter; especially given the subject matter, which deals with, what can be termed as, the ‘cutting edge’ of interpersonal, intrastate and interstate relations during a period of heightened international systemic competition that was characterised by devastating internecine conflicts, which were being exploited by multiple external parties for their particular interests on a regional and global scale, to the extreme detriment of those parties directly engaged in conflict. Afghanistan is one such conflict.

A thorough search, conducted by the author, of the Higher Education Commission’s (HEC) ethical guidelines for academic research, covering aspects that go beyond rudimentary issues such as plagiarism, but, in fact, cover issues such as those encountered while conducting field research in a conflict environment, discovered no discernible or readily available code of ethics or guidelines on academic research. Furthermore, such guidelines, which should be readily available to the researcher, were not made available throughout the course of this study. Therefore, it was proposed after consultation with senior academicians that for the benefit of this study, the ethical boundaries, without delving into the epistemological and positivistic origins of the debate on ethics, which is beyond the scope of this study, should lie within the code of ethics of academic research that deals with research on cross-cultural and transnational global issues, and which is acceptable to the standards of the academic community from international academic centres of excellence. As a result of this observation, it was decided that the code of ethics relating to academic research followed by the institution that this research study was initiated in should be followed; that is, the Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London, which allows its researchers to follow one of several codes of ethics for academic research depending on the kind of research being conducted²⁰². In this respect, the guidelines provided by British Sociological Association, the British Educational Research Association, and the National

Children's Bureau were chosen because of their suitability to the kind of research that was being conducted for this study²⁰³. The latter was deemed especially pertinent because of the research conducted whilst embedded with child combatants, which will be discussed below.

The decision to follow guidelines set by external bodies is not a reflection of the institution that this research study is being submitted to, as it is still in its embryonic stage as a relatively new university, having received its charter as a university in 2007; and, as a result, the code of ethics from centres of international repute may contribute to the development and formation of a comprehensive code of ethics that will help guide academic research and debate at the National Defence University, Islamabad.

1:5:3:1 – Ethical Issues Encountered

Concern may arise when a researcher's study involves individuals, groups, or communities of people whose understanding of ethical issues may be at variance with his or her ethical code of conduct because of the varying cultural, religious, and scientific interpretations of morality and behaviour, such as good and bad or right and wrong; which is especially so when the behaviour of those being studied go far beyond the boundaries of the researcher's ethical code of conduct. However, in this respect, ethics is not a set of rigid rules and regulations about behaving or acting in one way or the other, but it is an acceptance of a social consciousness that guides the behavioural norms of the researcher towards the people and environment being researched. Some of the ethical issues that the author encounters are discussed below.

1:5:3:1:1– Crossing Borders

Since a decision was taken to conduct the participant observation method of acquiring primary information, there was an immediate ethical implication, given the hostile and insecure environment that the research was going to be conducted within; that is, Afghanistan. Due to the hostility that was prevailing in the conflict environment, and the Taliban's control of the routes into and out the country from Pakistan it was pertinent to engage the Taliban. This was done by initially being accepted as an independent researcher that was given the status of a guest, for which they extended their hospitality. However, it was not possible to enter the country from Pakistan through regular channels due to the security concerns that they had imposed upon the kind of research that they perceived was being conducted, even though complete transparency was provided about the rationale and purpose of this study. The only way that it was possible to conduct this research under the protection of the Taliban, without which no research was possible in the majority of Afghanistan, was to acquiesce to their demands, which were to cross the porous international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan through irregular channels so as to circumvent official control, although an official Afghan entry visa was applied for and received on all occasions.

The foremost issue arose when trying to appreciate the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan and how such weapons were manufactured, traded, and transported into Afghanistan. The first ethical challenge, therefore, was the circumvention of the laws pertaining to crossing official international border points. However, given that only by engaging with the arms traffickers, to the extent that no other person was physically or mentally

disturbed or hurt in any way, would afford an opportunity for a more in-depth appreciation of the subject matter being studied through complete access to the methods employed by arms traffickers, a decision was made to go ahead, with the provision that all legal technicalities were fulfilled to pre-empt any potential border infringement issues in the future.

1:5:3:1:2– Training Camps

A regular issue that was confronted was one of being accepted within the Taliban community, especially with their intelligence division, which regularly checked the progress of the research that was being conducted in accordance with the official requests that were made for access to conduct research in Afghanistan. It was extremely important not to discuss personal philosophical issues in order to avoid further interrogations as to the purpose of this research study, and to engage in observing religious practices as they perceived them, whether or not they were held or agreeable so as to not arouse undue attention and suspicion.

One of the ways that undue attention was reduced was to attend a Taliban military training camp in Afghanistan for new recruits from Pakistan for several weeks. This was beneficial for several reasons. It helped build a measure of camaraderie with new recruits; provided the necessary physical and mental training to deal with the harsh Afghan environment and the realities of the violent conflict; facilitated an official seal from the Taliban on the research study in respect to being able to have wider access to Afghanistan; and therefore, assisted this study by facilitating a wider network of contacts and greater access overall. Part of the training programme included a continuous, and at times, quite intense, indoctrination process to influence new recruits towards self-sacrifice. It was more than imperative to maintain a presence of mind at all times, and to provide an alternative perspective to the one that was constantly being espoused by the Taliban and militant commanders, to counter any influence that it might have. Furthermore, this had to be done in such a way that no one could realise that a counter-influence technique was being employed; especially by other recruits who were always present or in close proximity.

There was a constant requirement for the maintenance of a sense of external tranquillity and acceptance of the Taliban's philosophy, while perpetually engaged in a tense internal debate to negate any influence that would compromise this study throughout the course of every field research visit to Afghanistan. Physical appearances had to fit the circumstances at all times, including the growing a beard well before every research visit. However, on the first research visit in June 1997, a beard that was deemed too short resulted in the author's hands being caned more than several times, which was accepted without undue argument. However, the beating of other recruits was also often overheard, which was quite severe at times. Nevertheless, to avoid any conflict of interests, any situation that could potentially cause problems for this research study was avoided, and personal convictions were held at bay.

1:5:3:1:3– Frontlines

Before the first deployment on the frontlines on the Shomali Plains, north of Kabul, not more than a hundred meters in distance, the signature and last will and testament were required of all recruits, which was the first

occasion during this research study that the immediate threat of death was encountered. Soon after which each individual recruit was assigned an AK47 assault rifle, or one of its derivatives, which had already been used in the weapons training section of the training camp. The weapons were provided so as to be used for live firing at the Taliban's adversaries, the Northern Alliance, only a few hundred meters north of Taliban positions. On the occasions that Taliban fighters were ordered to direct their fire, immediate ethical implications of this action came to the fore, and as such the author's rounds were made sure not to hit their target by a long distance. However, this was only possible due to the distance between the contending parties.

1:5:3:1:4– Child Combatants

On the final research visit to Afghanistan, between May 1999 and September 1999, the author was embedded with a troop of thirty child combatants, between the ages of 13 and 17 years. Being embedded was not a personal decision; however, the prospects of being able to engage with children to gauge their perceptions on SALW and their rationale for fighting, having already undergone psychological indoctrination, was an opportunity that was not to be lost. A total of over five weeks were spent with the troop. Nevertheless, it was not until the 28 July 1999 Taliban offensive that basic ethical principles on the conduct of this research study were severely questioned. The Taliban initiated their offensive against the Northern Alliance with an artillery bombardment, after which hundreds young fighters, including the child combatants, were force to rush through the mine fields that separated the two armed forces. The Taliban's rationale was to clear the mine fields by forcing the mines to explode as the children passed over them so as to rapidly deploy as many vehicles towards their adversaries in a form of manoeuvre warfare with more experienced fighters on armed pick-up trucks acting as highly mobile and rapid deployment troops to surprise the Northern Alliance. In fact this has been a strategy that the Taliban had extensively and successfully used throughout their campaign to conquer Afghanistan. As a guest of the Taliban, and an accepted observer, the author was not required to engage in direct combat situations; however, the troop of child combatants that the author was embedded with were required to do so. To maintain silence at this juncture so that this research study avoided being compromised through the researcher's interference was no longer tenable when it directly threatened the young fighters being observed, who were to face an almost inevitable death on the minefield. However, any protests that were made to the Taliban and militant commanders fell on deaf ears.

Due to the fluidity of the changing events on the battlefield of Shomali Plains, and the Taliban's detainment of the author in a bunker to prevent him from interfering with their military operation, it is not known how many child combatants were killed. Nevertheless, the failure of the Taliban to decisively defeat the Northern Alliance in the offensive led to a devastating counter offensive on 05 August 1999, in which the initial artillery barrage inflict hundreds of Taliban rank and file casualties, especially amongst the younger fighters. Two young child combatants, Tahir (14 years) and Tariq (15 years) were witnessed being *blown to pieces*. What was more significant here is that a certain brotherly affinity had developed between them and the author. Nevertheless, in relation to understanding the conflict environment and the rationale for using SALW, no ethical principles were compromised. However, in relation to non-involvement in the community that is being observed, it was felt necessary to forgo certain ethical obligations to this study to help save their lives. This

was successful when the above child combatants were prevented from entering the minefield. But it was not successful when they were exposed to the counter-offensive. In any case, it was deemed to be of a higher ethical order to make exceptions in the ethical principles of this research study for those occasions and situations that were deemed highly dangerous to the life of the author and those that were being observed, or for any other that the research ethics applied to.

1:5:3:1:5– Maintaining Integrity

Throughout the period of research and beyond, the necessity to maintain the integrity of the people being interviewed and studied was of utmost importance. Upon returning to Pakistan in September 1999, the author was detained by Pakistan’s border security at Landi Khotal prison, Khyber Agency, for several weeks. When asked to divulge the names of the people that were interviewed or observed, and more importantly, when asked to provide the information that was received, it was ethically essential to maintain their integrity and not to divulge sensitive information, since doing so may have directly endangered their lives, while compromising and undermining the credibility of the author and this research study, especially for any future endeavour to conduct research on Afghanistan. As such, maintaining a certain silence on such issues was essential. In any case, release from imprisonment was achieved with the assistance of lawyers and senior political contacts that eventually led to a *blown cover*, which meant that it was no longer possible to conduct field research in Afghanistan with the Taliban’s protection and assistance of some of their associated militant groups.

1:5:4 – Research

1:5:4:1 – Data Collection

Methodological constraints flourish when trying to assess the extent and impact of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan. The overthrow of King Zahir Shah was the beginning of a series of events leading to the eventual loss of control over the rural areas and the collapse of the development of limited centralisation that took centuries to take root. Prior to this juncture in the historical evolution of Afghanistan, however, the ability of the Afghan Government to collect data was already severely limited because of the dire lack of intellectual and physical infrastructure necessary to conduct national and even regional data collection programs. Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion degraded such efforts more severely. However, even the collection of this type of data was, as Louis Dupree (1980) noted in his *Magnus Opus Afghanistan*²⁰⁴, a collection of ‘intelligent estimates’: “Statistics on Afghanistan abound, but most consist of ‘intelligent estimates’, that is, wild guesses based on inadequate data, and practically all figures given in this book must be considered to be such intelligent estimates²⁰⁵”.

Upon the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the surrender of the communist PDPA government in April 1992, all government data collection, limited as it was, ceased completely. The subsequent civil war, with its continuous bombardment of Kabul, was another blow for NGOs attempting to collect data. In this regard, a major source of information is the NGO establishment, especially the agencies under the United Nations umbrella organisation. In respect to the latter, the United Nations Development Programme is of special importance, whose action plans and rehabilitation efforts rely on a combination of

government data and intelligent estimates based on UN and NGO programmes operating in various localities throughout Afghanistan. With a highly unstable and fluid political conflict environment, the provision of the kind of data expected from a standardised record keeping system that must be established throughout the country is, sadly, not available. In addition, this is in itself an indicator of the lack of development in the country, which is further compounded by the devastating effects of an intractable conflict. Furthermore, mistrust of the United Nations and other foreign bodies, partially because of the imposition of UN authorised sanctions during the Taliban's tenure (1996-2001) in government, exacerbated the already fragile collection and collation of credible data and statistical information.

Reliance on 'intelligent estimates' is insufficient for the fulfilment of the research requirements for this thesis, since an in-depth understanding of Afghanistan requires the fulfilment of in-field/in-situ research to gauge the availability of data, which is further complicated by the subject-matter of this study. Availability of data on the proliferation of SALW is scant even in the more standardised countries where transparency is a requirement of institutional and government practice. These practices are virtually non-existent in Afghanistan, given the continued presence of conflict, the inherent mistrust between the contending parties, as well as those disparate constituent parties within the present Government of Afghanistan, where information concerning the extent of the diffusion and possession of SALW is highly valued as actionable intelligence by all contending parties, to the detriment of the wider necessity of curtailing the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan with such information. As such, where relevant information is available, much of it is distorted and skewed in favour of the vested interests of the respective contending parties providing it. Therefore, establishing the exact extent of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan may not be possible until the protracted conflict therein has been resolved, and a strong sense of governance and the implementation of measures to instil honest practices towards transparency and accountability with the appropriate checks and balances have been standardised throughout much of the country with the simultaneous construction of the intellectual and physical infrastructure for data collection by the country's establishment and growth of a cross-section of civil institutions while undergoing a dedicated process of democratic reform and progressive re-education towards reducing the cultural acceptance of corrupt practices within all aspects of socioeconomic and political interaction. However, this development is unlikely in the relatively near future. Nevertheless, this study does propose to provide an understanding about the weaponisation process in Afghanistan up to 2001; after which establishing reliable accounts of the proliferation of SALW are extremely difficult due to the prevailing security environment and classified nature of transfers between the Government of Afghanistan, the United States and other NATO or ISAF member countries as well as the Afghan Taliban and other non-state actors engaged in the Afghan conflict hitherto. As will be clarified in detail later in this study, the historical analysis of the weaponisation of Afghanistan has been subdivided into four parts, and hence, four separate chapters, covering distinct time periods, so as to differentiate between the local, regional and international geostrategic and political reason d'être, events, factors, and processes that led to the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan within these distinct periods:

- ☞ 1, The Weaponisation of Afghanistan: Pre 1973
- ☞ 2, The Weaponisation of Afghanistan: 1973-1979
- ☞ 3, The Weaponisation of Afghanistan: 1979-1989
- ☞ 4, The Weaponisation of Afghanistan: 1989-2001

1:5:4:2 – Verification, Validity, Objectivity

With the exception of primary sources of information, research for this study, with special reference to the weaponisation processes involved in the pre-1973 period, also utilised secondary sources, which, therefore, entailed the investigation of authoritative accounts of the introduction, production and use of firearms in Afghanistan. As far as is possible, this study also endeavoured to use material from sources that were directly involved, had first-hand knowledge, or personal experiences of an event or episode that was being considered. The sources of information that were considered included the memoirs and/or diaries of leaders, first-hand travel logs and accounts in the journals of literate observers that travelled to the Afghan region, official government and military treaties, multilateral agreements, trade agreements, documents and reports. The corroboration of historical sources is often difficult due to the lack of available research materials; while, verification of the authority behind the source of a given piece of information rested upon corroboration with different authoritative sources to gauge its authenticity. The authority itself can be defined by its relationship to the information with respect to its literacy; degree of public authority (a leader such as a king, priest, or military officer); and, chronological distance from the time of the event being described or referred to.

1:5:4:3 – Field Research

Field research is an essential component of this study; principally because the availability of primary research focusing on SALW proliferation in Afghanistan is scant, to say the least. However, a significant factor that discourages academics from approaching this area of research is the much-needed in-situ fieldwork. The environment in which the fieldwork is most necessary is inhospitable, in terms of the physical environment, political instability, and the highly insecurity social environment; while, the human elements on which related research relies upon are in most cases not forthcoming due to financial or security concerns; which may be a result of the dreadful nature of conflict environments in general. However, underground economies, for many commodities, rely upon such conditions for their existence. Therefore, without good affiliations and understandings with contacts throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, it can be virtually impossible to research this field of study; which, therefore, makes it essential to visit the actual geographical location of research to produce informed opinions and evaluations. Nonetheless, significant restrictions on accessing information from these sources were still present. Security procedures and concerns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are rigorous due to the prevailing instability in their political and security environments. With regards to the collection of information in Afghanistan, the assistance of the Taliban was essential, especially with regards to information concerning the disarmament of the population within the territory that they controlled, and without which little or no headway may have been possible during field research visits to Afghanistan.

1:5:4:3:1 – Building Contacts and Secondary Sources

Within the financial, socio-cultural, political, religious, linguistic, and physical constraints that have been imposed upon this research study, it was, nevertheless, offered a degree of latitude through the provision of secondary sources in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the UK and the United States of America. The successful conclusion of this study has relied upon variegated sources of information. Undoubtedly, the most interesting of which has been that obtained from five field research visits to Afghanistan over a period of three years; which facilitated a thorough understanding of Afghanistan's physical, socio-cultural, political, psychological, and strategic environments within which the mass proliferation of SALW occurred, and without which this study would have been made redundant. It must also be noted that this study was entirely self-funded, with absolutely no external financial support at any point; and, moreover, with obstacles imposed at every stage and juncture, whether institutional or personal, bureaucratic or through the mere jealousies of others because of their inherent insecurities, physical and intellectual, and the undue ignorance of those that were engaged and those that were not. However, every hardship, every shame, every death that was witnessed and encountered, and every physical, financial and mental pain was endured for the purpose of conducting an objective study for the sole purpose of gaining knowledge, for advancing personal and collective knowledge, and to add to the body of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Overall, this research study produced what it set out to produce; which is, a profound sense of understanding of the devastation of violent conflict and the processes that lead to it, and the immensely detrimental impacts that the diffusion of SALW has upon personal and social consciousness, the fabric of society, and the fragmentation of nations.

The field research for this study facilitated the collation of an assortment of secondary information from a number of research facilities in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, such as archives at Peshawar University (Department of International Relations; The Centre for Central Asian Studies; and, The Centre for Pakistan Studies); the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI); NGO coordination offices (AKBAR Centre, Peshawar and Kabul); the United Nations Research Facilities in both Pakistan (Peshawar, UNDP office; and, Islamabad, the United Nations Library (Saudi-Pak Tower)) and Afghanistan (Kabul: UNDP office); the United States Information Services (USIS – Islamabad, currently closed due to the deteriorating security situation); and, the Pakistani military library (Rawalpindi). The majority of secondary information, however, came from library catalogues within the London University Collegiate System at Senate House in London, UK, and the current and archive catalogues at the British Library (London), UK, especially for the British India Office, at which considerable time was spent. The United States Library of Congress and the National Archives, based in Washington D.C., were extensively explored for primary and secondary information. Primary information in the form of declassified documents and reports from the State Department, Treasury, Department of Defence; declassified intelligence reports and documents from the Defence Intelligence Agency; and, the Central Intelligence Agency's database of declassified intelligence documents were sourced at the National Archives, based at College Park, Maryland, USA. Additional sources also included:

- a) Pakistan – political bodies, institutions, officials, and figures; the military; the police service (particularly the customs and tribal police on the Pak-Afghan border within the Tribal Agency areas); anti-narcotics force; governmental and non-governmental bodies; and, public records libraries; and, hospitals and clinics.

- b) Afghanistan - the Taliban, their shadow government officials, including their Ministry of Planning and Interior Ministry; the Military Wing of the Taleban; the University of Kabul and other educational institutions; regional headquarters of a number of NGOs and governmental bodies in Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul; public records libraries; and Ministry of Justice records library and archives; hospital, clinic and surgery records in the above cities.

There are a large number of credible institutions, governmental and non-governmental, working on disarmament and conflict resolution throughout the world. Access to these was not difficult via conventional methods, such as email, postal mail, telephone, or even personal contact. The number of institutions withers drastically when we consider work on armaments and disarmament specifically in relation to Afghanistan prior to 2001. NGOs involved in Humanitarian aid programmes in Afghanistan were strictly restricted to activities that did not intrude upon the security concerns of the Taliban; while, the arms trade and disarmament was perceived as a security concern. Furthermore, any contact with NGOs in Afghanistan by external researchers required authorisation from the Taliban. Failure to do so often led to an unforthcoming attitude and misdirection by many NGOs.

A wealth of secondary information was also acquired from the internet. With the growth of the internet over the past decade, the number of organisations with a web presence dealing with SALW have mushroomed exponentially, further increasing their exposure through the ease of access to pertinent information on SALW, and therefore, global awareness of the detrimental issues associated with SALW proliferation.

1:5:4:3:2 – Primary Research

Prior knowledge of the Afghan environment, cultures, religious affiliations, ethnic rivalries, linguistic differences, and more importantly, the precise security conditions facilitated a favourable position to conduct primary research through to its conclusion; for which various source contacts within both Pakistan and Afghanistan were utilised during several research visits. Meetings were arranged with a number of significant people covering a range of officers from the military and intelligence agencies; politicians and political operators; bureaucrats; arms dealers and gunsmiths; variegated leaders, commanders, and fighters from the Afghan resistance movement (the Mujahideen); Taliban ministers, commanders, and fighters; child soldiers; Afghan civilians; Afghan Arabs; party leaders and spokesmen; academics; medical personnel; United Nations and other NGO officials; mine clearance officers; and arms and narcotics merchants, traffickers, and smugglers on smuggling routes or while incarcerated in prison.

In retrospect, a real sense of adventure also assisted the field research process. This, undoubtedly, provided motivation to explore hostile environments; meeting with tenacious and threatening personalities; enduring extremes in terrain and weather, from deserts to high mountain passes, and severe changes from the sweltering heat of a prolonged drought during daylight to extreme cold during the nights in the passing of a single day, for weeks; frequently crossing international borders through smuggling routes to appreciate the veracity of the people involved, their motivations, interests, and intentions, as well as the methods they used; and facing near death experiences on multiple occasions on the frontlines during the Taliban offensive in June/July 1999, where first hand observations of hundreds of child combatants being killed while crossing mine fields were

witnessed; and, pushing the boundaries of acquiring knowledge for the sake of learning, even when being bombarded by shells and light weapons suppression fire upon the Ahmad Shah Masood's counter offensive in July 1999, or when walking along a high ridge with a Taliban commander on the edge of the front lines under the sights of the opposition forces and snipers to prove my courage, and therefore, to gain further access to Taliban leaders.

Gaining a more profound understanding of the psychological motivations of individual combatants and their factions, and the socio-cultural conflict environment within and from without Afghanistan entailed successive visits to Afghanistan, as a neutral observer amongst a circle of Taliban leaders and combatants aligned, as well as a several commanders and fighters aligned with the Taliban through Kashmiri Jihadi movements, *Harakat al-Ansar* (Movement of the Partisans), and after its designation as a terrorist group by the United States in 1997, when it was reorganised as, *Harakat ul-Mujahideen* (Movement of the Holy Warriors), as well as the political leaders of an anti-Taliban faction, *Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan* (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), led by Pir Sayyid Ahmed Gilani (b. 1932), such as Professor Rasul Amin. Acquiring reliable contacts involved daily conversations and participation in the group activities of both young and older members of these parties; with the leaders and the led; in urban and rural areas; and, at both the rear training bases and frontlines of the Taliban. However, establishing reliable contacts was not limited to the individuals and parties directly engaged in violent conflict, since there were numerous humanitarian aid organisations that dealt with the effects of the protracted Afghan conflict, and included the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), HALO (de-mining operations) to CARE (Kabul) and Norwegian Aid (in particular, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, who had until recently held the post of Afghan Interior Minister between 2008-2010, Minister of Education 2006-2008, and Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 2002-2006). To gain a better appreciation of the geo-political context of this study and earn considerable insight, interviews were also conducted with a host of political and military leaders from both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1:5:4:3:3 – In at the Deep End – Underground Economy (Crossing Borders)

The trade in SALW can be divided into two prominent areas of research: a) the open market; and, b) the underground economy. The latter is undoubtedly central to the successful diffusion of SALW throughout major conflict zones, and its understanding is also central to this study. However, the mechanisms employed within the illicit trade in SALW are seldom discussed openly, and have only been lightly touched upon in articles and publications, with marginally greater success being achieved by television documentaries, due to the secretiveness of the trade; the repercussions caused by the devolution of information; and, the lethal reactions of the participating individuals and parties to any interference into their activities. Other than the rather academic appreciation of the illicit trade in SALW, any information that was obtained from field research was based upon the first hand experiences of individuals involved in the illicit trade, or those engaged in combating/countering the illicit trade in SALW. In addition to this, the personal experiences of engaging with the very people involved in this trade enabled the development of an intrinsic appreciation of the secretive methods, techniques and processes involved in the trade by arms manufacturers (and independent

artisans) in their workshops, arms merchants in their retail shops, and arms traffickers and smugglers, as well as individuals representing non-state actors, while observing arms deals between sellers and buyers during several journeys travelling along different smuggling routes across the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which were assisted by members of the banned militant organisations, Harakat al-Ansar and Harakat ul-Mujahideen.

Travelling along such routes afforded a first-hand experience of the actual processes involved in trafficking firearms, narcotics, and other contraband from Peshawar to Jalalabad. However, an opportunity to converse with a number of arms and narcotics traffickers facilitated a far better understanding of the symbiotic relationship between them and of the processes involved in the underground economy than could be gained from merely reading another's account of such processes. In reference to the aforementioned, further insight was provided when an opportunity to interview a smuggler serving a prison sentence (Landi Khotal Prison, Khyber Agency, FATA, September 1999) for smuggling arms from Afghanistan to Pakistan presented itself after the author was apprehended whilst crossing the Afghan-Pakistan border in the company of arms and drugs smugglers and detained in Landi Khotal Prison upon return to Pakistan during a research visit in September 1999.

1:5:4:3:4 – Militants and Mullahs

Access to the Taliban's military facilities were enabled through the Pakistan based banned organisation, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (formerly Harakat ul-Ansar before 1997, and Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam - 'Islamic Struggle Movement' - before 1993), which assisted the Taliban in conducting military operations in Afghanistan, and in return facilitated reciprocal military training to Pakistani and Afghani recruits to wage a low intensity conflict in Kashmir against regular Indian armed forces. Approval to enter such an organisation was only given to those that were talibs (a religious students); and therefore, once acceptance had been secured, access to indulge in free-flowing conversations without reservation was possible. Interviews with such people were organised on the premise that the information would not be used against them in any way. The trust that was established helped to differentiate between the differing motivations and interests of the Afghan and foreign combatants that were recruited to participate in the conflict. Moreover, a thorough insight and appreciation of the religious, socio-economic, political and even personal motivations and rationale for waging war as individuals and as a collective body was only made possible through regular interaction with Taliban troops, commanders, and religious and political leaders.

1:5:4:3:5 – Indigenous Arms Production

Presently, Afghanistan does not have the capability of the indigenous production of SALW within its current political boundaries; however, Pakistan's autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that borders Afghanistan and is adjacent to Pakistan's Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province, is viewed as an indigenous producer of arms for both Afghanistan and Pakistan; especially considering the large unregulated flow of arms that is facilitated by the long and porous Pak-Afghan border. Numerous visits to the nerve centre of FATA's arms production, principally located in Darra Adam Khel (Orakzai Political Agency), secured a number of

interviews with arms manufacturers and dealers. The interviews and guided tours of the arms retail and production process helped construct a more cogent picture of the arms manufacturing process and the methods used to diffuse them into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and further a-field. See chapter seven for a detailed case study of the processes involved in the manufacturing, sales and trafficking of firearms from Darra Adam Khel.

1:5:4:4 – Methods

In order to fully realise the research aspects of this study, and as will be discussed below, utmost objectivity was maintained while conducting in-situ participant observation field research and unstructured interviews. This was achieved by a thorough appreciation of the variegated perspectives that are employed to objectively interpret the behaviours and actions of the multifarious parties involved in the conflict.

The use of structured and unstructured interviews, and participant observation techniques were deemed to be the most suitable methods for the nature of research being conducted in Pakistan and Afghanistan; especially given its predominantly qualitative orientation. Questionnaires were not used because of the lack of utility, given the subject matter, and the immense difficulty in conducting surveys in a very insecure and hostile environment. Without reaching a cross section of the highly variegated Afghan society, results would invariably have been skewed towards a particular social group or ethnicity. Furthermore, gaining access to every section of the Afghan community was not possible because of the socio-cultural and religious restrictions that half the Afghan population faces in conducting matters outside their homes; that is females. Nevertheless, accounts of the methods that have been used are provided below.

1:5:4:4:1 – Interviews

Conversations with all of the source contacts, as mentioned above, did not always lead to interviews; however, the information gained from them helped to further develop contacts that led to new avenues of investigation, which were pertinent to this research study. Nevertheless, where feasible, interviews were conducted when an opportunity arose, whether at the residences and offices of the interviewees, or in the militant and Taliban training camps, on the frontlines, in the middle of raging battles, and even when detained in a Taliban container used as a crude and rudimentary, but suffocating, prison cell, or in Landi Khotal prison, Khyber Agency, FATA, after being detained by Pakistani border guards when returning to Pakistan from a field research visit to Afghanistan. Irrespective of the venues, all of those that were interviewed were subject to minutes, hours or even days of interviewing, both structured and unstructured, the majority of which were recorded on tape, or hand written on available material. The primary difference in the types of interviews that were undertaken depended upon the interviewees. The majority of interviews were unstructured, and distinctly free flowing conversations, to elicit more information and insight, although, the interviewees often tended to become distracted in the conversation until redirected with questions pertinent to the issues being discussed. At times, it was also not possible to record the interview, because, to do so, would have endangered life itself. Under such circumstances, brief notes were taken, and if this was also not possible, notes were written as soon as it was safe to do so after the interview. In respect to the latter occasions, the

interviews tended to be relatively brief, so as to discuss the essential issues, and therefore, to be able to write up the interview while the information was still fresh in the memory.

Inevitably, some of the information from these interviews did contain contradictions and ambiguities; however, this was largely rectified by asking the same questions that would lead to the verification of the more pertinent issues for this study. In this sense, some interviews were also structured, when the intention was to obtain brief responses to directed questions. Nevertheless, on occasion, it was possible to spend several days with some interviewees, such as with Pakistan's former foreign minister, Sardar Aseff Ali Ahmed, by residing at his home for ten days; or, Pakistan's former interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, who was interviewed on several separate occasions. The latter also helped to verify the consistency of some relevant issues, when a similar question received the same response on different occasions. Overall, however, responses to many questions were highly subjective, due to the inherent biases of the interviewees, given the subjective-laden issues being discussed. Nevertheless, the opinions of leading authorities or first-hand accounts of experiences were the very responses being sought after.

1:5:4:4:2 – Participant Observation

It is noticeable that committing to participant observation techniques does require some clarifications in relation to the depth of observation required by particular circumstances or situations. No doubt, the researcher would be required to maintain the utmost integrity in all circumstances and situations. However, the degree of trust that is required between the observer and the observed is proportional to accuracy of the information acquired, which can lead to a greater degree of objectivity when interpreting and analysing the information collected. As such, there was a determined effort to maintain a high degree of trust with the people that were being engaged at all times, irrespective of the situation, due to the need to maintain the maximum objectivity as an **independent neutral** observer by not allowing personal biases, such as philosophical dispositions, perspectives, feelings and emotions to cloud or in any way obstruct the observations and findings of this study. Undoubtedly, very difficult times were encountered, given the subject matter, where the lives of those that were being engaged were endangered due to the highly insecure and unstable environments of Afghanistan and neighbouring regions. The author employed participant observation methodology observing child combatants during a one month period within which he was embedded with a troop of child combatants between 09 July 1999 to 10 August 1999, which included the Taliban's summer offensive, 28 July to 03 August 1999, and the Northern Alliance's counter offensive beginning on 05 August 1999, led by Ahmad Shah Masood. The initial stage of the period was spent in a Taliban training camp with child combatants (recruits) aged between 13 to 17, as well as older Taliban recruits and fighters, up to the age of 22 years.

The highly insecure environment within which this technique was used also gave an unprecedented degree of access, which would with certainty not have been possible had this method not been sought after. The fact that the decision to use participant observation was taken during the initial stages of research had a profound effect on the direction that the field research eventually took. Gaining access to the Taliban, their associated

militant organisations, and child combatants was only possible once such a decision was made. Otherwise, the necessity to undertake such risk would not have been feasible. Moreover, the immensely prolific advantage of really appreciating the ground realities of the Afghan conflict through witnessing the complex interactionist dynamics between the contending parties, the smuggling and trafficking of arms and narcotics, the arms manufacturing and distribution processes, the intense first-hand experiences of the devastation of war and violent conflict, and the effects that they have had on individuals and society as a whole would never have been possible had the decision to undertake participant observation **not** been taken. Once made, however, a determined effort to maintain absolute credibility in the face of daunting obstacles and dangers was always present to ensure the validity of the objectivity of this study. Furthermore, ethical issues abounded, since the environment that was being observed was inherently replete with contentious issues, as discussed above.

The actual approach and methods used to fulfil the requirements of the participant observation technique required the complete acceptance of the people being observed. As already mentioned, access was only possible as a *talib*, and hence, the persona of such a person was maintained throughout the stay in Afghanistan during five separate visits. This was, again, done to be able to witness and understand the conditions of the conflict, as well as appreciate, to the fullest extent possible, the reasons and constructed perceptions that caused the conflict by engaging in free-flowing conversations with the combatants and decision-makers. Although it was essential to maintain the persona of the talib, it was also imperative to ensure that the reason d'être for conducting this research was of paramount importance, and therefore, ensure the prevention of 'going native'. In fact, the latter was significantly assisted by the personal philosophical approach to life and orientation in liberal beliefs that were and are held, which absolutely contrast those of the militant individuals and groups that were being engaged, including the Taliban. Nevertheless, it was also important to ensure that these beliefs and perceptions did not impinge upon the individuals, events, circumstances and situations being observed.

Ordinarily, notes were taken immediately after the events, interactions or situations being witnessed. The use of video equipment was absolutely prohibited. Although, a camera was smuggled into sensitive environments on occasion, which was used sporadically when safe to do so. This was done to ensure the acquiescence of the party(s) being observed, and so as not to induce a negative perception from them, which would have curtailed the activity immediately. However, there were many occasions when the author's motives and intentions were questioned, which often resulted in accusations from individuals within the Taliban, Harakat al Ansar and Harakat al-Mujahideen of being a spy that was working against them. On occasion this would be severe, however, most of the time, it was done in jest. Nevertheless, wary of the implications to his safety and security, and, in fact, curtailment of life itself, the author made greater efforts towards becoming indistinguishable from his hosts. The degree of effort and situational awareness required for this, as well as the patience need to maintain a perception of calmness in the face of certain death was, at times, quite overwhelming. Nevertheless, the insights and experiences gained are irreplaceable and immeasurable, which provide added credence to the research conducted for this study on the effects of the mass proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan.

1:6 – Chapter Outline

This study is divided into ten chapters, each of which fulfils relevant aspects of the stated hypotheses.

1:6:1 – Chapter One – Introduction

The first chapter incorporates the introduction to this study. It sets out the research statement and hypotheses that will be tested. A detailed literature review is provided, which discusses the general emergence of the study of SALW, while also accounting for the research and literature produced hitherto for the study of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the principle assumptions of this study and the relevant areas that will be researched, with a detailed account of the theoretical framework, which includes the perspectives and approaches employed within this study. Finally, a discussion of the research methodology employed and the ethical implications of using particular methods are highlighted, as well as those that arose throughout the course of the field research component of this study.

1:6:2 – Chapter Two – The Main Areas of Study

The second chapter concentrates on introducing the main areas of interest in this study, which includes the emergence and development of the field of SALW, and an appreciation of conflict theory within the parameters of this study. A discussion on the dynamics of conflict is provided, and includes an interpretation of the processes of escalation and de-escalation with specific reference to the concepts of the acceleration and deceleration of conflict, which this study introduces.

1:6:3 – Chapter Three – Afghanistan, Case Study

Chapter three focuses on the core case study around which this study revolves; that is, Afghanistan. The historical relevance of the societal structures that have developed to reflect the strategic location of Afghanistan, and how these have facilitated the development of the archetypal warrior culture in patrilineally segmented tribal societies is discussed. Furthermore, a structural analysis of how the tribal structure (especially, Pushtun) is self-sustaining and self-propagating through its reaction to both external and internal interference is also provided. This understanding is essential to the central investigation on the psycho-socio-political and cultural impacts of the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan.

1:6:4 – Chapter Four – Weaponisation of Afghanistan, up to 1973

Chapter four is the first of four chapters that provide a descriptive analysis of the historical and contemporary diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan. This chapter discusses the introduction of firearms into the region from their first use up to the fall of the monarchy in 1973. Furthermore, chapter four concentrates on the developments that facilitated the growth, use, and diffusion of firearms into the cultural consciousness of the region's indigenous population and more specifically the populations that inhabit the territories encompassed within the present boundaries of Afghanistan. Historically significant records and text have been used to provide an chronological account of the extent of the weaponisation of Afghanistan, as well as the development of the regional and indigenous manufacture, trade, transportation, and general diffusion of

SALW in Afghanistan and the region, in the context of important events, and their impacts on the development of Afghanistan as a state.

1:6:5 – Chapter Five – Weaponisation of Afghanistan, 1973-1979

The dissolution of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 is an important milestone that led to changes in the traditional power-authority structures that had persisted for hundreds of years, and marked the end of four decades of stability that were enjoyed by Afghanistan during the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973); which, also encouraged events to unfold that led to the development of the protracted Afghan conflict (1978-present). This chapter concentrates exclusively on the rationale behind the geo-strategic superpower rivalry in Afghanistan that began to gain increasing pace after the fall of the Afghan Durrani monarchy in 1973, resulting in internal instability; external interference; the *Saur* Revolution on 28 April 1978 to install the communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as the new ruling regime; and, the consequent national uprising that set the scene for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.

1:6:6 – Chapter Six – Weaponisation of Afghanistan, 1979-1989

Chapter six discusses the immense diffusion of SALW into Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, between 27 December 1979 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces on 15 February 1989. This chapter concentrates on the extent of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) during the most contentious and determined period of weapons diffusion within Afghanistan's history. The intrinsic character of this chapter revolves around a detailed analysis of the mechanisms, processes, techniques and methods used to diffuse SALW into Afghanistan for the contending geo-strategic, regional and national rationales by the major parties involved in the Afghan conflict during the Soviet occupation. Emphasis is given to the establishment of the external Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and internal Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) arms pipeline; problems between the security services; the variegated state and non-state actors involved; logistical issues encountered; the drugs and weapons relationship; political contentions; deep seated corruption; and, the conflicts and the solutions of the various problems that arose during the period of concern.

1:6:7 – Chapter Seven – Weaponisation of Afghanistan, 1989-2001

Chapter seven discusses the influx of SALW from the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 until the 11 September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the Twin Towers and Pentagon buildings in the United States (US). This period of the Afghan conflict was dominated by the emergence of a brutal civil war between indigenous Afghan parties and indirect external interference by regional and extra-regional states through arms and financial assistance to their respective Afghan proxies, who were in a violent contest of constantly shifting alliances to gain strategic advantages over other parties. Furthermore an in-depth discussion on the strategic rationale for the protraction of the Afghan conflict and the emergence of the Taliban movement is interspersed throughout this chapter.

1:6:8 – Chapter Eight – The Direct Effects of the Proliferation of SALW

Chapter eight analyses the direct impacts of the extensive proliferation of SALW on the individual and the collective through an understanding of the process of empowerment and how this affects human interpersonal and societal behaviour, the polarisation of inter-party relations, and the eruption of violent conflict through the reduction in the thresholds of interpersonal and inter-party violence. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the different impacts that the proliferation of SALW may have on differently organised social structures, such as tribal and non-tribal societies.

1:6:9 – Chapter Nine – The Indirect Effects of the Proliferation of SALW

Chapter nine discusses the indirect, or secondary, short to long-term socio-psychological effects of the mass proliferation of SALW in any social environment. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on the indirect effects of SALW proliferation on the individual and collective, and explains how, on a macro-level, SALW play a significant part in the national war economy, by fuelling, exacerbating, and facilitating the protraction of conflict. Moreover, it discusses how SALW proliferation may induce social disintegration, militarisation of society, destabilisation of the political and socio-economic infrastructure of society, institutionalisation of violence, the protraction of conflict, and the consequent psycho-social trauma that a country in conflict may undergo due to protracted conflict, with special reference to the Afghan conflict throughout.

1:6:10 – Chapter Ten – Conclusion

The final chapter provides a general conclusion to this study, and revisits the central proposition of the hypothesis. The findings of this study are summarised through an analysis of the main research statements and questions that were proposed in the introductory chapter. This study's contributions to the body of knowledge and research in the field of SALW proliferation are highlighted. Furthermore, the author's personal observations as to the course of this study are also provided; illustrating some of the difficulties and problems encountered, as well as the solutions provided in the accomplishment of this study. The limitations and constraints imposed on this study, especially on the field research component, and proposals for future research studies and policy recommendations are discussed; while it concludes with a final analysis.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART I

CHAPTER TWO

MAIN AREAS OF STUDY

PART I

CHAPTER TWO

MAIN AREAS OF STUDY

2 – Main Areas of Study

2:1 – Introduction

Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change¹.

Three and a half decades of conflict, characterised by a socio-politically unstable and consistently fluid environment, has devastated Afghanistan and resulted in constant upheaval of the socio-economic conditions of the country by dividing tribal, ethnic and religious affiliations, institutions, organisations, allegiances and boundaries. One half of the population has experienced displacement inside and outside the country and up to a third of the population was residing in refugee camps in neighbouring countries². Many rural Afghans have adapted to an urban existence within the refugee camps and have been partially detribalised, thereby providing skills that are essential to the future of Afghanistan. The infrastructure of the country is currently being sustained by United States (US), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, which are supporting a highly divided central government whose continued maintenance after the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan, by the end of 2014, is essential if it is to avoid collapse within the highly uncertain future of the country. Nevertheless, informal organisations through tribal and regional systems that have existed for centuries still continue to dominate the predominantly rural population. However, even these institutions have disintegrated to a point where they cannot enjoy self-sufficiency to the degree that they once did, due to the protracted Afghan conflict³.

In order to bring some light to the subject matter being discussed in this study, this chapter will introduce the main areas of study that help illuminate its direction and focus within three parts: the small arms and light weapons (SALW) trade, conflict theory and dynamics, and the case study, Afghanistan.

2:2 – The Small Arms and Light Weapons Trade

2:2:1 – Introduction

An increased consciousness of the dangers posed by the proliferation of conventional weapons accompanied the end of the Cold War (1945-1989)⁴. However, during the Cold War, the threat of global mutual assured destruction was the overriding issue, and what little attention remained concentrated upon the detrimental build-up of conventional weapons that had epitomised international warfare hitherto, for example, jet fighters, naval vessels, long-range missiles and armoured vehicles. In order to provide a degree of peace and security on a regional and international level, and due to the relaxation of military preparedness by most governments in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War era, there was an urgency to secure control over the proliferation of major conventional weapon systems, which were perceived to have facilitated the eruption and

materialisation of numerous ethnic, intra-state and regional conflicts. However, these regulator mechanisms took little or no account of the predominance of SALW in intra-state, low intensity, and asymmetric conflicts.

The rapid emergence of sub-state actors, be they drug cartels, organised crime mafia, separatists, political extremists, insurgents or terrorists have produced the most destabilising arms buyers in the post-Cold War era, further escalating ethno-political conflicts and the demand for SALW. According to the UNDP's *Human Development Report, 1994*⁵, 79 countries were engaged in some form of conflict from which 37 had a lower level of political violence, and the remaining 42 countries were involved in 52 major armed conflicts⁶. Of the 79 countries in conflict, 65 were in the 'Less Developed World'⁷. However, the *Ploughshares Annual Report 2011*⁸ noted that by 2011 there were dramatically fewer active armed conflicts, numbering only 26⁹. According to the *Human Development Report 2011*¹⁰, a total of 187 countries were categorised with ranks as very high, high, medium and low on their human development index (HDI). Furthermore, "countries with low levels of human development are much more likely to be affected by armed conflict"¹¹, and, as such, in 2011, 44 per cent of the countries engaged in the 26 active armed conflicts ranked 'low' on the Human Development Index (countries with a HDI between 142 & 187)¹²; while, only one country (Israel – HDI, 17) experiencing armed conflict had a very high human development index ranking (those with a HDI between 1 & 47)¹³.

The continued state of armed conflicts undoubtedly facilitates the distribution and redistribution of SALW by arms manufacturers, dealers, and traffickers intent on profiting from the supply of arms to parties within conflict environments. The forced recruitment of citizens into the military and/or paramilitary, or the active encouragement of civilians to arm themselves, as was the case for Peru, Guatemala and the Colombian governments respectively, from the late 1960s to early 1980s¹⁴, has considerably aided SALW proliferation and its detrimental effects by substituting traditional leadership structures and eroding traditional values. While, the conflict in Rwanda also illustrated how the widespread availability of weapons (including, knives, machetes, and swords) in the possession of undisciplined civilians aided the exacerbation of inter-communal tensions and the ensuing genocide of more than 800,000 people¹⁵.

According to the United Nations, SALW are responsible for greater than 90 per cent of all war deaths, amounting to the deaths of well over 40 million people in armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War¹⁶. Although, SALW played a central role in virtually all of these conflicts, the proclivity to injure and slay other beings does not solely dwell in the possession or ownership of firearms or their technical advancement, nor is the opportunity to kill predestined in any way; since, "war doesn't necessarily require guns and artillery; fists and wood bats can also be wielded ferociously"¹⁷. For example, the conflict between the Hindu and the Muslim communities during the partition of India exemplifies a conflict in which 200,000 to two million people were killed¹⁸ with, in many cases, nothing more than pitchforks, club, knives and bare fists, and some rudimentary firearms. If the determination to kill is present, then, any object can be a tool to take life. What needs to be made apparent, within the context of the human security paradigm, is that the opportunity to use lethal force has increased substantially due to the near exponential technical advancements in military hardware and the symbiotic expansion of the globalising and interconnected world; which has led

to the concurrent development of distribution networks, and has assisted the growth of transnational organised crime syndicates and cartels. In this respect, the “blurred boundaries of the conflict-complex”¹⁹ where insurgents and separatists involved in ‘low intensity conflicts’ (LIC), organised crime turf wars, and even localised gang warfare, have a greater capacity to inflict mass slaughter because of the relatively greater rates of firepower, lethality, and accuracy of SALW, coupled with their ready availability in conflict and non-conflict environments alike, ‘knows no borders, is heterogeneous, and is spatially, temporally and demographically differentiated’²⁰.

Unlike major conventional weapons, large quantities of SALW are required to have an impact on a national level conflict environment; that is, with the exception of high technology light weapons, such as the heat-seeking surface-to-air Stinger missiles used in the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). Smaller and lighter weapons have provided a greater legitimate utility to civilians who are intent on establishing their own personal security, which can provoke a security dilemma by causing further insecurity, whether intended or not, when introduced in large quantities; and, therefore, induce further proliferation, that can encourage a spiralling effect of further insecurity. This is especially true of societies, which have not encountered the mass ownership or possession of SALW, where socio-cultural regulatory structures and mechanisms, such as those ingrained within Pushtunwali, to regulate the use of SALW may not have been inculcated into the consciousness of their society’s collective psyche. There may, therefore, be utility in comparing those societies within which SALW are an integral part of the social consciousness of the cultures of many societies; for example, within the Pushtun culture. Once the insecurity spiral has been established, however, any attempt at the prohibition of these high utility weapons in a weapons saturated environment is fraught with difficulties, especially due to the simultaneous destabilisation of society because of their effects on the degeneration of social order and social cohesion through cultural desensitisation²¹, and hence, the consequent circular amplification of the security dilemma; which will be discussed in greater detail throughout this study.

2:2:2 – Small Arms and Light Weapons

2:2:2:1 – Definition & Classification

SALW do not have the exotic appeal of sophisticated high-tech big budget weapons. Their cost is minuscule by comparison, and their potential long-term destructive capacity is readily overlooked. However, the weapons used in intra-state conflicts mostly consist of SALW, and these are the weapons of choice for the general rank and file of most sub-state groups whether in contemporary times or in the past.

SALW transactions typically involve much lower prices than major weapons systems, with total sales that are usually no more than a few million U.S. dollars. “As a general rule, the total cost of maintaining a well-equipped militia involved in periodic fire fights amounts to roughly \$75 million annually per 10,000 troops. Of this, some \$40 million dollars will be for arms, billeting and supplies like food and clothing; the rest is for salaries”²². However, these figures are dependent upon the extent of the conflict and its strategic significance; for example, at the height of the Afghan-USSR War (1979-1989), American support for the Afghan resistance under the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ steadily rose to an unprecedented high of \$670 million per annum for covert

operations²³. The vast majority of this was spent on providing SALW and ammunition for the Afghan resistance.

There are a great variety of weapons that can be defined as small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, for the purposes of this thesis, limitations on the variety of available weapons must be established. Nevertheless, new categories and classifications are constantly being added to existing lists as exponential advances in technological development, and new and more complex combat scenarios and applications are envisaged and devised.

A universal definition of the distinctions between light and major conventional weaponry is not available. However several approaches to this definitional issue have arisen. Swadesh Rana (1995) cites, “manufactured small arms, also described as light weapons, are all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle. These are weapons which do not require an extensive logistical or maintenance capability.”²⁴ Klare (1995) goes further by making distinguishing between light and major weapons “...in operational and user terms. Heavy weapons typically require an elaborate and logistical maintenance capability that can only be provided by professional military organisations with sufficient technical experience-in other words, by the armed forces of established states.”²⁵ A differentiation between light weapons and small arms is also given by Louis (1995): light weapons being a term “...to describe all conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle.... Small arms is a sub-category of this classification, defined by the United States Department of Defence as including automatic weapons, up to, and including 200mm.”²⁶

Consistent with the definitions above, the *United Nations General Assembly Report of the Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms* (1997) defines SALW as ranging “those weapons just below those covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, for example, mortars below the calibre of 100mm”²⁷. Analogous to the defined purposes of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Report, this thesis is primarily concerned with those SALW which have been fabricated according to military specifications for use as deadly tools of war. However, many weapons are made within militarily defined parameters, yet for civilian use only; for example, riot control electric batons or tear-gas dispensers. In uncontrolled environments, even these weapons could be used to a lethal extent. On the other hand, we have those weapons that have ‘dual-use’ attributes. Therefore, the terms of reference, in relation to SALW, focused upon in this thesis lie within parameters that are defined by their use within “all armed forces, including internal security forces, for, inter-alia, self-protection of self-defence, close or short-range combat, direct or indirect fire, and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short distances”²⁸. However, the UN report provides a broader definition of small arms, as weapons which are “designed for personal use”²⁹, while light weapons are “designed for use by several persons serving as a crew”³⁰ (See, Appendix II, Table 1.1 – Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons Categories).

Small arms, which are principally shoulder controlled weapons (or hand held), can be defined further by their calibres which range up to 12.7mm and have a “relatively flat trajectory”³¹, whose primary purpose is to “incapacitate or suppress the enemy with bullets or fragments”³², and therefore, bring control over the person(s) with the minimum possible force. In addition, ‘ammunition’ and ‘explosives’ are wide-ranging and general terms for all projectiles, missiles, military high-explosives and pieces of equipment that can be used for offensive and defensive purposes. The kind of ammunition that this study is concerned with includes ammunition for hand-held guns, shoulder-held weapons (rifles), machineguns below 20mm in calibre, rocket propelled grenades, mortar shells, and anti-tank shells and missiles. Concerning explosives, they include military high explosives such as plastic explosives (C-4, Semtex), explosive devices such as land mines (anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines), hand-grenades, industrial explosives (dynamite and its derivatives), and explosive initiators (detonators) (See, Appendix II, Table 1.1, Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons Categories). Definitional issues and discussions are ongoing. However, this should not detract from the focal subject matter on the effects of SALW proliferation on social and conflict dynamics.

Four major characteristics are stressed within the definitions provided above³³:

- Weapons and ammunition, which are ‘lethal’ and generally used by *military and paramilitary forces*, to the exclusion of privately used lethal and non-lethal weapons³⁴.
- The weight and size attributes are stressed, that is, *man or crew portability*³⁵.
- Ease of maintenance, light training, little serviceability and sparse logistical backup.
- Frequency of recent use by regular or irregular forces, or *weapons that really kill*³⁶.

It is the durability of SALW that makes them particularly dangerous. The weapons in circulation can range from brand new to over a century old; for example, bolt-action Lee Enfield 3.03s were already present in Afghanistan, but were also supplied in their tens of thousands by the CIA to the Mujahideen throughout Afghanistan in the early stages of the Afghan-USSR War (1979-1989)³⁷. Furthermore, the attractiveness of SALW can be found in their limited need for spare-parts, which can enhance their life expectancy; for example, there are merely 16 moving parts in an AK-47 assault rifle. Due to their durability, these weapons tend to circulate from conflict to conflict. Once a violent conflict terminates, the highly utility value of SALW is determined by the fact that they often find their way across borders to other conflicts via the black market, or underground economies.

2:2:2:2 – Processes of Distribution

Contemporary transfers of weapons are increasingly being facilitated by the technological advancement in conjunction with the burgeoning interconnectivity of global communications systems, commercial and financial institutionalisation, increasingly complex transportation networks, and the simultaneous symbiotic explosion of the highly developed and multi-faceted global black market and underground economies³⁸; thereby resulting in the reduction of the costs of SALW and their consequent increased availability to greater numbers of people and sub-state groups³⁹. Estimates in 1997 valued the annual international cross border SALW trade at \$3 billion⁴⁰. However, concerning the estimated annual value of the combined legal and illicit

SALW trade crossing international borders in 2011, the Small Arms Survey's Eric Berman, stated that "the authorized trade is larger than the illicit trade, although the illicit trade may do more damage or be more problematic... So it's not just a question of total value, but I think we can clearly say that the two combined would be over \$10 billion"⁴¹.

The 'New World Order' concept originating at the end of the Cold War, influenced the availability of weapons by creating an overabundance in the arms industries of Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Union, and hence, a surplus for the international arms trade.

The pressure to sell and reduce this surplus and the extension of black market opportunities has ensured high levels of weapons deliveries across the world. With a drop in domestic military spending privatised Russian firms, for example, have been under mounting pressure to increase their export sales. This has led to dubious or illegal transactions.⁴²

After the end of the Cold War, the characteristics of SALW recipients changed towards an increasing number of non-military entities receiving advanced weapons technologies, from individual and organised crime syndicates to private citizens. In comparison to the military, the non-military have benefited more from the lowering of prices. High-tech and sophisticated weapons were not previously easily accessible to the non-military due to civil and financial constraints that deterred their proliferation. However, these constraints were progressively degraded by the increasing demands for weapons by non-military elements, which had started to emulate military trends and sources of proliferation; for example, demilitarised and second-hand weapons from shrinking armies and demobilised combatants.

The greater proportion of weapons in terms of quantities supplied to military and non-military recipients has generally been SALW.

Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2004-2011, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 68.6% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 79.2% of all such agreements globally from 2008-2011, and 83.9% of these agreements in 2011.⁴³

This trend has been reflected in the reduction of purchasing power of less developed countries and the growth in the number of low intensity conflicts⁴⁴. Competitiveness has increased amongst weapons manufactures as the number of potential suppliers for these low intensity conflicts has risen due to the greater industrial capacities of emerging economies⁴⁵.

2:2:2:3 – The Underground Economy

The illicit movement of weapons involves a triangular transfer system, which includes the underground economy; covert state-to-state relations; and, non-state actor support (for comprehensive explanation of the differences between the licit and illicit trade in SALW, the underground marketplace, and its historic development in the region, see chapter four, section 4:4:1 – Licit & Illicit Trade in SALW; and, section 4:4:2 – Development of Regional Trade and the Afghan Wars). The scale of the underground arms trade is anything between \$2 billion to \$10 billion⁴⁶, while profitability depends upon the prevailing global security

environment, the number of potential and active violent conflicts, availability of suppliers, and severity of armament controls regulations. Insurgents and black marketeers share troubled but mutually beneficial relationships due to the lack of credit facilities offered by black market entrepreneurs, who prefer immediate payment and for the client to organise their own transportation. Sub-state groups generally require large quantities of weapons, while the black market works more effectively in the supply of high-tech and high-value items, which are not easily affordable by sub-state groups on a regular basis, especially since black market prices are often three times to ten times greater than those asked for on the legitimate circuit. In this respect, non-state actors are usually limited to SALW by the constraints imposed on the market environment. The services required by recipients of arms that are transferred on the legitimate market are not available on the high risk black market, where the continuation of an open pipeline furnishing training, spare parts, operating facilities, maintenance and overhaul services is impossible without detection. The penalties in the event of detection range from prosecution and sanctions to torture and execution. This is especially so in the highly unstable Afghan conflict environment.

The black market signifies the circumvention of controls that have been put in place by previous and existing regimes, governments and the international legal system. Consequently, prices are much greater on the black market due to the comparable risks associated with the acquisition and transfer of weapons in order to circumvent the controls placed by national and international regulatory structures and institutions and avoid penalties. There is also a 'grey' market that operates on the fringes of both legitimate and illegitimate markets, where a legally exported commodity may be diverted from its original destination to a sanctioned or covert destination; that is, arms deals that countries or non-state actors are struggling to keep covert. For example, the arms aid from the United States to the Afghan Mujahideen was kept covert to allow the United States the right of plausible deniability until the supply of the US-made Stinger surface-to-air missile system (SAM) negated their covert involvement in the supply of arms and financial aid to the Mujahideen.

The circumvention of controls typically involves the falsification of paperwork in order to provide an impression of legality; such as, the use of government-provided end-user certificates. An end-user certificate is usually a list of weapons on a piece of paper, identifying the seller and the buyer, and can be readily obtained from government sources by illicit arms dealers.

Private arms dealers can be of great service to sub-state groups if they have the capacity to supply the appropriated weapons and systems. However, the authorities in major producer countries often keep such groups under close observation. "The appeal of short-term profit through questionable transactions is negated by the promise of steady legal business"⁴⁷. Most successful private arms dealers become careful businessmen. However, exceptions exist, such as in loosely regulated environments; for example, the former Soviet Union.

Organised crime and narcotics cartels also advocate the use of the black market and have the financial and organisational resources to acquire large-scale capabilities through their financial transactions. Such cartels have grown extraordinarily through their income from the narcotics trade and human trafficking, which they

protect with heavily armed militias. “The need to operate within territory normally controlled by states has required the arming of criminal organisations and the establishment of private armies to defend the criminal interior from other sub-state groups and the state itself”⁴⁸. Weapons may also be successfully acquired through the drugs-for-guns barter system. This method was often used by the Afghan Mujahideen to arm themselves, where drugs were bartered for weapons from Soviet soldiers wishing to get rich quick or feed their habits. Moreover, this same method is still being practiced by insurgent groups in Afghanistan, such as the Taliban, which partially finances itself through the taxation of opium and hashish that they impose on poppy and cannabis farmers, refiners, transporters and smugglers⁴⁹. The United Nations Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Report, dated 04 September 2012, noted that the Taliban received a large share of its annual income of \$400 million⁵⁰ for the Afghan calendar year 2011/12 (between 21 March 2011 and 20 March 2012) through taxation on the poppy economy from farmers and traffickers to the amount of approximately \$100 million⁵¹. The report does note, however, that “the Taliban share, while sizeable in absolute terms, is not particularly large in percentage terms. This suggests that the Taliban do not make great efforts to exploit this potential source of revenue”⁵². Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the routes used for the clandestine transportation of drugs are often the same as those used by the arms smugglers (see, Appendix IV, Plate 2.1 – Author travelling on a smuggling route towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar; and, Plate 2.2 – Rear View, Looking at the Vale of Peshawar).

2:2:2:4 – Global Proliferation of SALW

2:2:2:4:1 – Extent of the Proliferation Problem

In 1995, available evidence suggested that there were well over “500 million military-style firearms, in addition to many hundreds of millions of guns designed for police forces or for civilian use”⁵³ in global circulation. More recent analysis and investigations conducted by the Small Arms Survey (2007) have raised this combined global total of civilian, military, and law enforcement owned SALW to 875 million; of which nearly 75% were owned by civilians, or approximately 650 million⁵⁴. The increase in numbers does not necessarily imply that all of the 375 million additional weapons since 1995 came onto the global arms circuit; since, the progressively more effective and efficient research methods, and increased global reporting and tabulation of data from increasingly responsive states that has also led to the increase in numbers, as suggested by the Small Arms Survey⁵⁵. Furthermore, current trends in the supply and demand of SALW have been facilitated by the consistently changing strategic landscape since the end of the Cold War.

On the supply side, many of the stock-piles and weapons flows initiated by the superpowers have been released from controls which hitherto prevented unrestrained proliferation. The evidence from a number of case studies illustrates the difficulties of controlling the transfers and the spread of light weapons and small arms once they have entered the free-flowing, transient supply and demand markets of the international arms trade.⁵⁶

Huge SALW stockpiles in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the eastern European states entered the international market through a number of channels and were major sources of weapons for the FSU’s ethnic minorities and sub-state groups in other countries. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the most significant cause for the extensive proliferation of SALW in the South Asian Subcontinent, and the associated

growth of the ‘Kalashnikov’ culture⁵⁷. A comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of SALW into Afghanistan is provided in chapters four to seven.

The accumulation of weapons in the arms bazaars of Pakistan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (formerly, North West Frontier Province - NWFP) exacerbated the religious and ethnic fissures in Pakistan and Afghanistan⁵⁸; especially since such firearms represented a relatively significant technological development in the types of weapons that had been entering the sub-continent. The Stinger surface to air missile (SAM), an advanced “man portable, shoulder-fired guided missile system capable of effectively engaging low altitude jet, propeller-driven and helicopter aircraft... and designed with an all-aspect engagement capability, an IFF system, improved range and manoeuvrability and significant countermeasures immunity”⁵⁹, is an example of a high-tech smart-weapon that became difficult to locate within Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and FATA’s arms bazaars. Initially, both the CIA and ISI feared the introduction of the Stingers in the Afghan war. However, after repeated requests from Pakistani President Mohammed Zia al-Haq, US President Ronald Reagan authorised the transfer of the Stinger in March 1986⁶⁰. Two hundred and fifty launchers and about 1000-1200 missiles were transferred to Pakistan to allow the Mujahideen to undergo training⁶¹. A US Army study (July 1989) illustrates the successful deployment of the stinger when the Mujahideen shot down 269 aircraft with only 340 firings⁶².

2:2:2:4:2 – Models of Proliferation

There is an emerging acknowledgement that a model of immense complexity is needed to explain the global proliferation of SALW and guide the development of policy, tools and instruments to curb this growing problem⁶³. A detailed analysis of the models of global proliferation is beyond the scope of this study; however, a concise description may aid an understanding of the processes involved in the proliferation of weapons in Afghanistan, which will be elaborated upon throughout this study. Three primary models may apply to this study⁶⁴:-

- a) **The Proliferation Model:** Where a relatively small number of weapons producers export to a large number of recipients. Policies within the scope of this model concentrate upon restricting the flow of arms at both the supply and recipient sides⁶⁵.
- b) **The Circulation Model:** Due to the enormity of the weapons that have already been diffused at flash points and conflict zones around the world, policies focusing on trade approaches may not be sufficient to curb the circulation of SALW through non-conventional means and routes. Governmental stores are often major sources of weapons and ammunition, and are, therefore, prime targets for insurgent groups and other non-state actors; since, the characteristic durability of SALW not only permits but also encourages the circulation of such weapons from conflict to conflict, within the region and beyond, and usually through the black market.
- c) **The Diffusion Model:** As a combination of the previous two models from a policy perspective, policy makers have a tendency to focus on a cross-section of areas where the diffusion and circulation of SALW may be curbed and their acquisition by belligerents in a variety of conflicts may be halted. Such as:-
 - 1) Indigenous production
 - 2) Legitimate imports
 - 3) Illicit exports and imports
 - 4) In-country circulation

The models described above complement and highlight the approach being followed for this study; that is, the ‘security dilemma’ and ‘spiral model’. However, to fully appreciate the effects of SALW on conflict dynamics, this study will utilise the human security paradigm, which offers a broader understanding of the effect of SALW on humans, from individuals to the collective, and the interaction of both.

2:2:2:5 – Effects of SALW Proliferation

Determining the effects of the proliferation of SALW is a contentious issue when identifying potential solutions. Once the historical and contemporary sources, methods and rationale for the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan has been elaborated upon, this study will discuss both the significant direct impacts as well as the indirect effects of the excessive accretion and accessibility of SALW on Afghan society, with particular concern for their effects on the dynamics of conflict.

2:2:2:5:1 – SALW and the Dynamics of Conflict

The introduction and accumulation of SALW can affect the tensions and stresses of intra and inter-party relationships within existing and latent conflict environments at various stages by contributing to the outbreak, continuation, and termination of conflict, as well as its re-eruption in the post-termination environment⁶⁶. The proliferation of SALW may have their greatest demand within low intensity conflicts (LICs - including insurgencies, separatism, ethnic and political violence, civil wars and terrorist campaigns) due to their comparatively lower financial importance and utility to the contending parties, in comparison to major conventional weapons within such conflicts⁶⁷. Since these conflicts also focus on the psychological aspects of warfare, such as in mobile, high-impact and low-wastage conflicts, they therefore have a preference for SALW as the weapons of choice.

We are compelled to relate to the (light) weapons as exploitable by the non-military and a non-state actor (insurgent, terrorist, etc), equally worthy of armed combat, versatile, cunning and unencumbered by conventional inhibitions.⁶⁸

The relative ease of accessibility to SALW, commonly through underground economies, by drug cartels, paramilitaries, guerrillas, terrorists, and common criminals, often propels ordinary citizens to obtain weapons due to fear and the lack of personal security, even after a violent conflict has been terminated⁶⁹. The continuation of this process of arms possession through easy availability, vast supplies, reduction in prices and increasing firepower through improved technology, often creates conditions favourable for the establishment of weapons ownership as a cultural norm, which may consequently induce a progressively more acceptable perception of the use of violence within social behavioural norms, especially in reaction to the increase of predatory behaviour by organised criminal violence⁷⁰, where existing patronage networks that were established during the conflict by taking advantage of the war economy, may, in fact, flourish in the post-conflict environment⁷¹. This is especially true for protracted conflicts; where a ‘culture of violence’ may evolve⁷², in which the youth, usually deprived of the opportunities to learn a productive trade, divert their attentions to banditry or disruptive social activities in order to survive⁷³. “The formation of paramilitary groups, civilian defence groups and armed vigilante groups can be seen as both symptoms and causal factors of processes of societal militarisation and weapons proliferation”⁷⁴.

An investigation of the effects of physical violence on a short to long-term basis at the individual, community, and national levels is an integral component in a comprehensive investigation of the consequences of the mass proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan. However, it would be pertinent to add that SALW are only part of a whole arsenal of weapons that were and are being used to devastating effect throughout the Afghan conflict; while the experiences of the Afghan population and their perceptions of violence have been consistently evolving throughout this conflict. The separation of the perceptions of violence produced by the availability and violent use of SALW from those produced by the major conventional weapons and WMDs (namely, chemical weapons used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan⁷⁵) would indeed be very difficult. Nevertheless, it may be possible to illuminate a relationship between the proliferation of SALW and their effects on society if enough credible data became available, which was able to differentiate between areas of high and low saturation of SALW in Afghanistan in conjunction with credible available data that illustrated where major conventional weapons were predominantly used so as to surgically separate the effects that these two categories of weapons may have had upon Afghan society. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, credible data was rarely available, if at all, before the eruption of violent conflict in Afghanistan; and, as such, the highly insecure environment during the violent conflict further degraded any attempts to produce authoritative, verifiable and credible data. Nevertheless, what is possible is an examination of the direct or indirect impacts and effects that can be attributed to the wide availability of SALW, which have been surfacing through research studies from around the world over the past two decades and can provide a basis for extrapolating the emerging understanding that they have produced of the effects of the mass diffusion of SALW to a greater understanding of their effects upon Afghan society and its protracted conflict. Furthermore, this study will outline the dynamic processes encompassed within a conflict and how it may be exacerbated, or escalated to a higher degree of intensity; while discussing the consequences of the multifaceted interactions between the mass diffusion of SALW and conflict processes within the context of the Afghan conflict, and the contributory variables that give rise to a diverse structural stratification as a result of its variegated multi-ethnic and multicultural social structures.

A progressively expanding proportion of research on conflicts is concentrating upon the structural sources of diverse types of conflicts; that is, both communal disputes and inter-state wars may be explained in terms of the structural causes of adversarial relationships, since common patterns of human behaviour can be observed across different conflict settings⁷⁶. In this respect, Deutsch (1973)⁷⁷ and Schelling (1960)⁷⁸ have already noted that the dynamics of conflict may be generalised from one setting to another. Therefore, the following section concentrates upon understanding conflicts with respect to the dynamics within them. Moreover, significant attention is provided for concepts such as the escalation of conflict, and how they may or may not be affected by the mass proliferation of SALW, which is the purpose of this study.

2:3 – Conflict

2:3:1 – Conceptual Issues of Conflict

Conflict represents the manifestation of the competition for resources, perceived differences in values and irreconcilable material interests, which lead to an incompatibility in goals, and thus, the development of adversarial relations. Therefore, the term ‘conflict’, regarding either interpersonal or inter-group relations, is denoted by the incompatibility of goals, means and resources, which may develop friction and tension, and hence, lead to conflict if they cannot be reconciled; that is, if goals are pursued. In this respect, the incompatibility of means and resources are more easily resolvable than incompatible goals. Johan Galtung simplifies the discussion: “A conflict simply involves incompatible goals”⁷⁹.

The conflict process can be reduced to a number of stages; that is, decision-making on incompatible interests and objectives may lead to actions that interfere with another’s capacity to satiate their own interests, objectives and needs that may lead to increased tension between opposing individuals and groups, and therefore, a polarisation of opinions and attitudes coupled with an amplified tension, leading to friction and hostility on even minor issues, which may result in a deepening of adversarial relations. As hostility ensues, and the more the friction between contending parties becomes commonplace, desensitisation to the friction sets in⁸⁰.

At a certain point, due to factors particular to the situation, the threshold of violence may be crossed. The further the conflict progresses the greater the perceived incompatibility of goals, and hence, the greater the polarisation between parties (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – The Ladder of Conflict), leading to the widening of the distances between individuals or collectives, and hence, the negative spiralling of the conflict to a point at which the initial incompatible goals may be superseded, eclipsed, or overwhelmed by issues that develop during the process of polarisation.

At every stage of the conflict process, the conflict may escalate or de-escalate by the actions or reactions of the parties involved; since, “conflict entails a reciprocal activity in the sense that its dynamics consist of a sequence of action and reaction”⁸¹. Therefore, in order to appreciate the impacts that SALW may have upon conflict dynamics, a comprehensive discussion of the nature of conflict, its processes, the structural forces and the interpersonal or inter-party interactions that can cause it to arise, and the most pertinent constituents of the dynamics involved in the progression or regression of conflict is not only essential but unavoidable. However, the complexity of conflict dynamics varies extensively depending upon the particular circumstances in which they take root. Therefore, in order to understand the effects of the mass diffusion of SALW, this study concentrates upon a spectrum of different types of conflicts that have developed in Afghanistan since the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coup d’état on 28 April 1978, until the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, United States, on 11 September 2001. With respect to this, a range of conflict dynamics, from interpersonal to inter-group, that are approaching the threshold of violence or have superseded this threshold, in the context of the Afghan Conflict will be discussed.

Conflict expresses the vast range of heterogenic diversity in ideas, beliefs, values and interests produced from the evolutionary process of social change as new permutations of these factors and variables contend existing ones. These permutations can comprise different factors or aspects of values and beliefs, or interests depending upon the socio-cultural and strategic context and the parties involved. Interests can encompass several dimensions: a) from the universal, such as those introduced earlier with John Burton's (1990) 'human needs theory', for example, the needs⁸² for security, identity, happiness, social acceptance, resources, and physical and mental well being; and, b) to the specific, such as the satisfaction of the desire to attain a given objective. A conflict arises when these factors are translated into aspirations (these aspirations being perceived as credible; that is, achievable, depending upon past successes, social norms, and power relations) that are perceived as incompatible with the interests of another party in which an intrinsic relationship exists or comes to exist as a result of conflicting interests. This incompatibility is dependent upon the extent to which available alternatives can satisfy the interests of all parties. If such alternatives are agreeable with these aspirations, then, as such, conflict does not exist. Therefore, we can infer that the greater the degree of compatible alternatives, the less the perceived conflict; and, the poorer the degree of compatible alternatives, the more severe the perceived conflict. Rubin et al (1986) indicate that conflict can be connoted as "a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously"⁸³; and hence, an important aspect of a conflict is the awareness of its existence, as Park and Burgess (1924) note, "conflict is always conscious. Indeed it evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions, and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort"⁸⁴. Yet, a conflict of interests can exist regardless of the present awareness of one or all parties. Therefore, non-awareness of the incompatibility of interests does not necessarily mean that no conflict exists. For example, many people, especially in less developed countries, may not be aware of their exploitation at the hands of large corporations due to their relative social contexts, circumstances, or social engineering. Karl Marx (1847) describes such people as having a 'false consciousness'⁸⁵. For example, employers may be aware of a conflict with their employees, but discourage the manifestation of its awareness amongst them. Nevertheless, these potential or latent conflicts can become manifest social conflicts⁸⁶ under certain conditions.

Manifest social conflicts may arise on many levels, between individuals (such as, marital disputes or other conjugal relationships) or between groups (larger social entities such as organisations, ethnic groups, religious communities, classes, governments, states, and nations). The way in which these social conflicts manifest themselves is also of concern. According to Kriesberg (1998), there are six primary ways in which conflicts can and do vary⁸⁷, and consequently, the way conflicts are contested vary. They are generally classified under very vague categories, such as coalition wars, inter-state wars, civil wars, revolutions, ethnic conflicts (for example, ethnic cleansing), or global wars. However, even though a certain conflict may be placed into a particular category, it does not necessarily share all the characteristics of other conflicts in the same category. Although, positivist assertions and realist approaches have been the *modus operandi*, where conflicts are largely based upon the interests of the states, as opposed to the needs of the people, the numerous combinations and variations of factors and interests make each and every conflict unique; and therefore, it is

difficult to provide an over-arching theory of conflict. Furthermore, alternative theories deal with issues that contrast with traditional theories, and are rarely complementary for the same issue or situation; such as normative and post-modernist interpretations of conflict. Nevertheless, stressing individual classifications, conventional labels, approaches and perspectives too much may, alternatively, lead to the danger of accepting simplistic interpretations. However, the likelihood of finding a “logically exhaustive, mutually exclusive, operationally explicit, semantically consistent, and substantively comparable”⁸⁸ typology is remote. Conflicts can have a life of their own by not fitting into predefined boundaries, and changing in their very nature as a result of their own dynamics and mechanisms of progression, and moreover, they are in a constant state of flux; of which, Afghanistan is a prime example⁸⁹.

Most of this study will focus on the destructive aspects of conflict rather than the constructive aspects of conflict. Within constructive conflicts, the outcome is favourable for the people’s, society’s and state’s development. For example, the Chinese War of Independence (1925 -1949), led by the Chinese Communist Party against European Colonialists, the Japanese, and the Chinese Nationalist (led by Chiang Kai-Shek), provided a rallying point for the unity of the fragmented Chinese nation and successfully resulted in independence from foreign interference (1949)⁹⁰.

As the basis of this thesis is to identify and understand the direct and indirect impacts of SALW proliferation upon Afghanistan, it is therefore necessary to analyse the sources and causes of conflict; the processes of escalation and de-escalation; the consequences of the conflict with special consideration for the re-eruption of violent conflict; the sequential processes of the contention of interests between the parties; and, the decision-making processes involved. In doing so, this study illuminates how parties engage on multiple levels, contending whilst also communicating through non-contentious and even co-operative interactions.

2:3:2 – Conflict Processes

As a conflict progresses, the parties involved in the conflict have a tendency to polarise; while representations of the opposition (for each party) become more and more negative as perceived harms are suffered, resulting in the development of grievances and the advocacy and assignment of blame on an opponent⁹¹. Particular issues tend to lose acuity as focus is transferred from specific threats or issues to the general. Concurrently, generalisations of the opposition envelop the conflict, and communication breaks down at virtually all levels of social interaction due to the development of in-group and out-group processes when deindividuation⁹² and dehumanisation⁹³ processes take hold of practically every aspect of the perceptions of the opposing party(s)⁹⁴ (its close, and even distant, associations if not aligned to one’s own group) and attitudes of ‘all or nothing’ emerge; that is, zero-sum thinking, where there is no middle ground and binary narratives predominate; or, one must win and the other must lose⁹⁵. Due to these changes, a degree of hostility may develop at all levels of social interactions where an opponent is involved. Therefore, the ‘party’ must distinguish itself at all levels when confronted with the ‘opposition’. This inevitably leads to hostile and competitive goals that further entrench the conflict and may bury the original contentious issues⁹⁶ (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – The Ladder of Conflict).

2:3:3 – Theories of Conflicts

Theories of conflict are, like the typology of conflict, problematic. Can a “unified theory of conflict”⁹⁷, which can be applied to all levels of human conflictual relations, provide explanations for different types of conflict⁹⁸ in different countries or communities with differing territorial, geographical, cultural, and historical characteristics at different stages of political and economic evolution or development? Explanations do exist, but vary immensely. Post-modernist theorists, such as Kenneth Boulding (1993)⁹⁹, Johan Galtung (2004)¹⁰⁰ and John Burton (1990)¹⁰¹, have been increasingly critical of, and are cognisant of the limitations of, the traditional paradigms of security and conflict in providing explanations for conflict, such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism and neo-liberalism, and even non-traditional paradigms, including those espoused by ‘historical sociologists’¹⁰², ‘post-structuralists’¹⁰³, and ‘constructivists’¹⁰⁴ perspectives, which have facilitated an enhancement of the understanding of conflict through their respective advocates.

Some perspectives place emphasis on the protagonist as the source of the conflict when defining the relationships that exist between the adversarial parties in contention; which generally belong to the behavioural sociology and social psychology traditions¹⁰⁵. Others generate conflicting parties to explain a conflict; for example, the Neo-realist and Marxist theories, the ‘class conflict’ having been understood, and hence, generated by the latter¹⁰⁶. Yet, some can be politically biased, being based on particular worldviews and centred on the propagation of that view. For example, the Cold War camps, NATO and the Warsaw Pact (1945-1991), expounded diametrically opposing perspectives of the conflict to satisfy their rationale (whether Marxism/Communism class conflict, or capitalism and realism), and hence, facilitated a generational continuation of the conflict until one of the camps began to accept the shortfalls of its own perspective, and the advantages of its adversary’s perspective¹⁰⁷; which, in effect, occurred within the context of the Soviet camp’s failing industrial and economic capacity to sustain its competing interests in the Cold War.

The variegated theories of conflict mentioned above are not in contention within this study; however, for a thorough understanding of conflict they do provide a point of reference for discourse. Although this study does not undertake to follow any particular theory, the conceptual framework of this thesis does emphasise non-traditional paradigms of security, with greater emphasis being given to the constructionist and post-structuralists perspectives, such as the symbolic interactionist perspective to appreciate the sources of conflict through the human interactions, and the meanings that are applied by individuals and groups to explain contentious relations that aid incompatible goal formation and its pursuit, such as that espoused through the works of Georg Simmel (1904)¹⁰⁸, Erving Goffman (1956)¹⁰⁹, George Herbert Mead (1910)¹¹⁰, and Charles Cooley¹¹¹. Nevertheless, elements of realism, specifically defensive realism (as discussed in chapter one), have also been incorporated to provide a more comprehensive and holistic prismatic guide through which the conflict in Afghanistan can be explained. While one perspective may shed light on a particular aspect of the Afghan conflict, another may act to complement by explaining a different aspect, and so on¹¹². This chapter examines the sources, dynamics, processes and stages of conflict in greater depth, especially the processes of

escalation and de-escalation, in order to further discuss the effects of SALW proliferation on the conflict environment in chapters eight and nine.

2:3:4 – Sources of Conflict

The eruption of a conflict often seems sudden, since, until the first acts of violence trigger the initial interest in the conflict, media attention is usually limited. However, violence is the result of many incremental and gradual changes in the relationship(s) between potentially contending parties, and is a further stage in a conflict that has already erupted upon the recognition and definition of incompatible goals by the parties involved. It is at this point that the necessary combinations of conditions for conflict coalesce, without which no social conflict may erupt. As is the case for a chemical reaction, where the constituent chemicals may be present; however, without the necessary conditions for a reaction, no reaction occurs. Where sub-surface and underlying issues are present and simmering between potential adversaries, a catalyst may facilitate the eruption of a conflict or act as a source of conflict; for example, the ready availability of weapons to inflict harm upon an opponent. In this respect, Kriesberg (1998) states that four primary conditions are required for the generation of social conflict¹¹³. Moreover, social conflict can be generated through any one of a multitude of combinations of these four conditions: taking note, however, that a minimal average threshold of the four conditions must be reached. They are¹¹⁴:

- a) All conflictual parties must believe that they are mutually exclusive from all the other adversarial parties in the conflict;
- b) One or more of the parties must feel aggrieved, or perceive that there is an unjustified disparity in the way that they are treated in the allocation of their material resources or needs, or in the under-valuation of their personal and social norms, cultural traits, values and beliefs;
- c) One or more of the parties must feel that another is responsible for their grievances, and hence, formulate goals opposing those parties towards a desired change - the conflict erupting when the opposing party(s) rejects these goals and demands for change; and,
- d) The aggrieved party must believe that the opposing party will change if it pursues a certain course of action for a desired opposing goal.

Once initiated, social conflicts instigate a range of dynamic processes. Group members interact and develop notions that reflect their aspirations. Once members begin to identify themselves as a distinct and separate group these notions may be pursued, therefore leading to a conflict of interests with other groups that are pursuing similar interests. Consequently, a process of progressively reinforced bonding between members of a particular group may occur, leading to a consolidation of opinions on particular issues within the group. Such consolidation may also trigger an in-group out-group reaction; that is, respectively, praise of one's own group and denigration of an opposing group. Experimental research into the group consolidation phenomenon¹¹⁵ by Brewer (1979) and Fisher (1990), and on ethnocentrism¹¹⁶ by Brewer (1986) and Booth (1979) has shed much light on inter-group and intra-group interactions. Once the in-group out-group process starts to take its course, group members may begin to advocate greater support and praise for the avenues of approach and actions taken to achieve respective party goal(s), which may previously have seemed inconceivable. William Graham

Sumner (1907) identifies this group consolidation as the ‘social categorisation effect’ (or ‘minimal group effect’)¹¹⁷. Social categorisation can have a significant effect on in-group and out-group interactions¹¹⁸, but it is only one of the many dynamics and features of conflict.

2:3:4:1 – Group Consolidation Process in Afghanistan

With respect to Afghanistan, a multi-ethno-cultural and religious society that had existed for millennia, the increased political awareness and participation under the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud in the 1960s, as well as the formation of the communist *Hezb-e demōkrātik-e khalq-e Afghānistān* (People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, PDPA) party, instigated the process of group consolidation between the different social groups. In-group consolidation was further enhanced by the re-ignition of the *Pushtunistan* issue to coalesce Afghans against Pakistan so as to solidify the Afghan national identity and cement the divisions between diverse communities. Nevertheless, this group consolidation process was largely limited to the educated Afghan elite, and more particularly, to Kabul. Contrary to the assumption that increased freedom of expression and political participation would lead to greater in-group consolidation, there was a slow erosion of the central government’s authority that inevitably led to geopolitical interest in this largely forgotten part of the world, in the context of the global competition for political, economic and strategic influence between the superpowers, which succeeded in exploiting the socio-structural, political and economic divisions of the country. The direct consequences of which were the abolition of the monarchy in June 1973, and the communist ‘Saur Revolution’ of 28 April 1978. However, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989), which actually triggered a nationwide fracture that had ideological and religious foundations.

The Soviet invasion further exacerbated already tense inter-group relations, and largely facilitated the coalescence of the multiple groups, for a variety of interests, into two major parties; namely, the Soviet Union and their Afghan communist PDPA collaborators (along with numerous socio-economically and politically deprived and disenfranchised groups); and, in opposition, the anti-Soviet resistance groups that came from a spectrum of Islamic and secular/nationalist orientations, and reflected the Afghan identity, which was a rejection of ideas that were deemed as non-indigenous that was supported by the overwhelming majority of all sections of the general Afghan population, and was predominantly Islamic in orientation.

A national consensus arose, where, to become an Afghan one had to have convictions that espoused anti-communist sentiment, supported a belief in Islam, and did not tolerate foreign occupation. Those that had a contra conviction belonged to the out-group and included the USSR and all sympathetic to its cause, particularly the PDPA communists. In contrast, the USSR and its sympathisers viewed themselves as the in-group and all others as the out-group. In the final outcome, the Afghans attained victory against overwhelming odds through their resilience but most importantly through their unifying convictions and common identity through Islam, which produced a profound sense of in-group solidarity, albeit, for the common purpose of expelling a foreign occupying power; after which, the unifying force of solidarity swiftly lost momentum.

According to Allen and Wilder (1975)¹¹⁹, this identification with a common group results in a perceived similarity with other members of the group, resulting in the development of positive sentiments towards other members of one's group. A constructed perception of shared belonging and goals loosely united the Afghan resistance until the fall of the Communist regime in March 1992¹²⁰. However, once the shared or common threat had dissipated the fraternity of belonging that had developed since the Communist PDPA Coup d'état (April 1978) rapidly fragmented. This was due, in large part, to the resurgence of deep-seated ethnic and religious realignments and rivalries that were present throughout Afghanistan's history, which had initially been restrained by the Afghan monarchy through the construction of the Afghan identity; especially during the reign of King Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901). After the collapse of the communist regime in 1992, the constructed social bonds, norms and codes of conduct that bound the multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian Afghan (Islamic) opposition against the communists rapidly eroded as the historically stronger ethnic and tribal group identities, replete with their competing interests, came to the fore; since, the monarchy as an institution, which had previously provided a focus for unification had now entirely disappeared as a politically feasible entity. Ethnic identification became an increasingly stronger common group identity than the national security of Afghanistan by many of those groups that had accrued a degree of power to propel their self-interests during the Soviet invasion.

The threat to Pushtun dominance¹²¹ as perceived by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Ghilzai Pushtun and the leader of the *Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party) faction, from the predominantly Tajik *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society of Afghanistan, under the political leadership of late Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, and military leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood {military commander} - Tajik), which rushed to take Kabul after President Najibullah's declaration of 'unconditional surrender' in March 1992¹²², after General Abdul Rashid Dostum's (leader of the *Junbish-e Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan*, National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) withdrawal of allegiance from the ruling party to Ahmad Shah Masood¹²³, plunged Afghanistan into a multi-party civil war. Numerous alliances and coalitions were created and broken between the largely ethno-centric parties. However, all parties displayed a social categorisation effect; since, because of the increase in the number of parties in the conflict, and their reduced size and composition along ethnic lines, there was a stronger group identity formation due to the greater degree of ethnic or sectarian homogeneity¹²⁴ within the parties. The degree of immutability of group boundaries was also directly proportional to the strength of their group identities¹²⁵, and therefore, the likelihood of inter-group conflict was greater. The likelihood of inter-group conflict is greater because collective identities produce group aspirations due to the perception that one's group, as noted by Abeles (1976) and Walker & Mann (1987), has or is being deprived through 'fraternalistic deprivation'¹²⁶. This was the case when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and it was also the case when Ahmad Shah Masood's Tajik Forces (in alliance with Abdul Rashid Dostum) took power in Kabul in April 1992¹²⁷. The aspirations of the Pushtun Hezb-i-Islami faction diametrically opposed to those of the Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami faction. As a consequence, inter-factional conflict, inter-ethnic conflict, sectarian, and internecine civil war were inescapable. A social reality was constructed by the Pushtun, over a period of several centuries that they were the rightful rulers of Afghanistan, which was the actual case since the formation of the Durrani Empire in 1747, by Ahmad Shah Abdali, until 1992 (with the exception of a nine month period during which an ethnic

Tajik, Bacha Saqao, took power during the revolt that deposed Amir Amanullah Shah in 1929¹²⁸ when Ahmad Shah Masood took control of Kabul, which was perceived as a direct threat to Pushtun interests and a challenge to their perceived supremacy in Afghanistan. This threat led to the formation of grievances that were attributed to the Tajik population as a whole, and any others that may support them. In contrast, however, the Tajik community perceived the past actions of the Pushtun as the cause of their grievances and their lack of relative political control, which consequently propelled the Tajik need and desire to achieve a degree of independence to offset Pushtun dominance to satisfy their grievances. The Pushtun believed that the only way to satisfy their grievance was to dislodge the Tajiks from the perceived seat of Afghan power in Kabul¹²⁹. The immutability of both sides resulted in a new phase of the protracted Afghan conflict through the imposition of 'will' by the use of force rather than dialogue and peaceful settlement¹³⁰, which has been diffused to some extent by the prominence of Pushtun at the helm of Afghan affairs since 2002. However, it remains to be seen what will occur in the succeeding years after the US/NATO/ISAF 2014 withdrawal deadline has passed.

2:3:5 – Conflict Dynamics

Arising out of incompatible goals or contending issues, a conflict can develop cyclically until it is resolved completely. However, depending upon the nature of the conflicting parties, the issues being contended and the contentious goals being pursued may lead to a process of conflict transformation that may be either violent or non-violent. This results in a degree of social change that is dependent upon the intensity of the party's commitments to change or resistance to change. The relationships between parties may be similar, as between the superpowers during the Cold War (1945-1991), which was a symmetric conflict. Alternatively, the relationships may be dissimilar, such as a majority versus a minority, as in an asymmetric conflict. The latter type of conflict may find its roots in the structural relationships between the parties.

Advocates of post-modernism (post-structuralist) and social psychology (the human needs theory) do not solely concentrate on the satisfaction of the basic needs for sustenance and protection, as in food and shelter respectively; they also identify the satisfaction of constructed identities as intrinsic needs. Conflict transformation processes often change social structures, which may lead to changes in identities and relationships in a natural evolutionary process of structural readjustment. As individuals and communities come to terms with dealing with social upheavals they are also discovering new meanings amongst their changing circumstances and surroundings, which may cause individual and collective anxieties to ensue.

Transformation of symmetric and asymmetric conflicts can be very different. Johan Galtung (1969)¹³¹ developed a model incorporating both these types of conflict in the late 1960s when he proposed that conflict could be visualised as a triangle (see Appendix III, Figure 2.2 – Johan Galtung's Conflict Triangle), noting that for a full conflict to exist, the presence of all three elements is essential. Otherwise, without attitudes or behaviour, a latent conflict exists. In reference to the Afghan conflict, the conflict triangle may assist in appreciating the confluence of all three elements when each is applied to the protracted Afghan conflict. In this respect, the perceptions formed by each of the many contending parties arise out of their historical origins while also concurrently evolving out of the complex fluid action-reaction processes within the protracted

conflict. Furthermore, the complex interaction between the perceptions from within and without the multifarious parties contending for their respective contradictory interests ebb and flow like the waves within a cyclone, tumultuous and ever changing in depth and scope. The ensuing mass of behaviours that are the external manifestation of the intricate perceptual interactions between contending parties provide additional impetus for the further actualisation of rapprochement, polarisation, escalation, de-escalation, or even resolution within the conflict environment. However, where multiple parties are involved, outcomes can rarely be speculated upon primarily because of the multifaceted associations between the simultaneous divergence and convergence of perceptions within the conflictual relations of the parties that are in a continuous process of transformation, and are rarely static; which, therefore, gives rise to further uncertainty and continued conflict, even though this phenomenon may well be the product of misguided perception formation by some or all parties involved.

When the incompatibility of goals leads to a clash of interests, the pursuit of those interests may lead to the development of hostile attitudes towards other parties contending the same interests. Hostility provides a focus for the conflict to be formed around, allowing it to grow and develop, widen its scope, facilitate the generation of secondary conflicts, and envelop external parties. This behaviour reflects the polarisation of parties, their incompatible goals and the extent to which the relationships between the contending parties may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Furthermore, a conflict may be terminated, but its re-eruption may suggest unresolved root issues from the original conflict, or issues that were produced as a result of the original conflict. Therefore, social conflict may be envisaged as possessing a lifecycle that passes through various changing stages, which Miall, Ramsbottom, and Woodhouse (1999)¹³² define as: a) peaceful social change; b) conflict formation; c) violent/non-violent conflict; d) social conflict transformation; e) resolution/termination; and, again, f) peaceful social change. This cycle is, of course, not absolute, and it may vary greatly depending upon the human, environmental, and historical conditions that are prevalent throughout a particular conflict. Nevertheless, this conflict life-cycle facilitates an appreciation of the progression of social conflict (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.3 – The Social Conflict Cycle).

Conflicts involve a complex of shifting intra-party and inter-party relations. This dynamic and fluidic nature of conflict processes nullifies any static approach to the conflict cycle, thereby negating traditional paradigms of security such as the realist or neorealist perspectives, and constituting a requirement for a greater understanding of conflict through post-structuralist and constructivist prisms.

The bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as given, and on that basis makes efforts to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate contradictions between them. Yet, the issues, actors and interests, change over time as a consequence of the social, economic and political dynamics of societies. Even if we deal with the non-structural aspects of conflicts, such as actor preferences, the assumption of stability, usually made in the game theoretic approach to conflict studies, is unwarranted. New situational factors, learning experiences, interaction with the adversary, and other influences, caution against taking actor preferences as given.¹³³

Vayrynen (1991) is cognisant that conflicts can transform on a number of levels. From their analysis of the works of Burton and Azar (1986)¹³⁴ and Curle (1971)¹³⁵, amongst others, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse

(1999)¹³⁶ have identified five general transformations within the conflict process: a) context transformation¹³⁷; b) structural transformation¹³⁸, that is, the structural transformation in the actors (intra and inter-relations), the contended issues and the incompatible goals that gave rise to the formation of the conflict; c) actor transformation¹³⁹; d) issue transformation¹⁴⁰; and, e) personal and group transformation¹⁴¹.

When advocating the notion of conflict resolution, a thorough understanding of the dynamics of conflict, and the processes within such dynamics, is intrinsic to this study; that is, how a conflict transforms, or how the variations between and within conflicts can lead to escalation or resolution. In this respect, the provision of generalisations may facilitate an appreciation of how conflicts take particular directions along a certain path towards a 'full conflict'¹⁴². Although not absolute, conflicts pass through certain thresholds to reach higher levels or orders of conflict, but are rarely linear and tend towards phases of intensity and escalation. Nevertheless, for a conflict to pass to the stage at which point violence is used, it must first pass through the initial stages, that of the formation of contentious or incompatible goals; since, conflicts do not occur in a vacuum. The significance of this stage should not be undervalued. It is at this point that parties can conceive of other parties as their adversaries. Henceforth, it is the actual pursuit of the incompatible goals that will be focused upon. As such, the pursuit of the incompatible goals, and the consequent role that the usage of SALW has, may be dependent upon constructed, perceived, actual or quantified grievances, which act to fuel conflicts. These grievances may have actual or perceived root causes in an individual's or a social entity's past experiences. The degree and depth of the grievance may reflect the methods being pursued. In this respect, the use of small arms may, to most in a peaceful society, seem to be a last resort when all other methods of pursuit have been exhausted.

The following analysis provides a discussion on how the usage of weapons may become relatively easy and sudden, and perceived as the immediate course of action following the realisation of incompatible goals, rather than as a last resort.

2:3:5:1 – Conflict Escalation Processes

I've got to get the maximum violence out of this campaign now!¹⁴³

Recognising the processes involved in any conflict permits the identification of the forces, conditions, factors and variables at play at any given point or stage of the conflict. Nevertheless, there is no certainty that one conflict will erupt and increase in intensity, while another remains dormant, or is easily resolved when it was presumed to have increased to a higher degree of intensity. With all the information of a conflict at hand, including sound evaluations from the past experiences of the adversary(s), their reactions, capabilities, motivations and tendencies, we can only make predictions, estimates, speculations based upon the 'likelihood' of the conflict taking a certain course. While both inter-group and inter-personal conflicts have a tendency towards intractability, the dynamics of inter-group conflicts are much more complex than those in interpersonal conflicts. The interactions between individuals within a party, their attitudes, personal goals, and positions of power, coupled with contentious interactions with other players within their party, all play a part in the path taken when the party interacts with a potential adversary. Therefore, it is in this study's

interest to try to appreciate, as concisely as possible while retaining focus on pertinent issues, how a conflict may increase in intensity. With this appreciation, this study is in a better position to understand how the impact of certain factors, elements, variables or conditions (for example, the introduction of large quantities of SALW), and their interactions with the multiplex of individual and multiple interactions of other elements and conditions within the conflict environment, may result (individually and as a whole) in the increase or decrease of conflict intensity, its prolongation, intractability, cessation or termination. This phenomenon or behaviour is witnessed at all levels of social interaction and within all types of social structures starting from small dissident groups, large provincial or corporate factions, to states as a whole when they are a party to a conflict.

Group conflicts involve a much larger magnitude of processes than interpersonal conflict; however, both types of conflict pass through a number of stages to reach higher levels of intensity. This process of conflict intensification is known as ‘escalation’. The word, ‘escalation’, not only signifies the movement of ascent (rising in an upward direction), but also an active upwards projection¹⁴⁴. When the word is referred back to its Latin origins, from ‘scala’ (stairs, ladder)¹⁴⁵, it can be relate to the ‘ladder of conflict’ (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – Ladder of Conflict), we describe the raising of intensity or ascension to a higher intensity of conflict. To clarify, each level of conflict has successive incremental thresholds above it that may be reached as the intensity of the conflict is increased. Rather than just an expansion in the conflict, the word carries the implication of a ‘step by step’ qualitative growth, and more than just a linear quantitative growth. In terms of actual conflict, either one of the parties in conflict may deem it necessary to use higher levels of tactics than previously used against their adversary(s), or all parties may increase the intensity of the conflict as a whole. In other words, there are “increases in severity of coercive inducements used [&/or] ...increases in the scope of participation within a conflict”¹⁴⁶. In this regard, the escalation may take place without consideration of the implications of actions being undertaken by parties involved. There may also be an organised, determined and pre-designed policy to increase the intensity of coercive measures against an opponent with an appreciation of the risks; however, the full extent of the effects of such measures can never really be known, since uncertainty, risk, disorder, and confusion¹⁴⁷ have a tendency of prevailing in conflicts to the detriment of intended goals and may adversely affect one or all parties involved.

The modern usage of the term and attitudes toward the process of escalation finds its origins in the aftermath of the Korean War (1950-1953) through an attempt by academics and analysts to interpret and evaluate the impacts of violent conflict on the attitudes, practices and assessments of future conflicts within the Cold War scenario; in other words, how could a war be limited to the conventional domain or to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons without a catastrophic escalation that may result in total war and the absolute devastation of the planet? Total war was the only experience of military conflict in the twentieth century until the limited Korean War broke out, which led to notions of restraint at inevitable flashpoints between the two superpowers towards ‘limited wars’ or ‘small wars’ and campaigns, and allowed a degree of conflict stability to exist between the USA and the USSR. As a result, there was a prolific development of ideas and literature on how conflicts grow and on the concept of escalation¹⁴⁸.

Escalation essentially begins as soon as the involved parties recognise that their goals are incompatible, and at any point where there is an upward movement of a conflict towards a higher level of intensity in a conflictual relationship. It may be a considered tactical or strategic movement, or an immediate response to a provocative action. The issues that are in contention can vary in their disposition for escalation; for example, issues of vital interest or those that are essential to the existence of a party, if contended, may have a great potential for escalation¹⁴⁹.

2:3:5:2 – Perspectives, Approaches and Models of Escalation

Conflicts contain dynamic processes where each factor, element or variable may interact with every other factor, element, or variable individually or collectively, which may already have interacted to produce new factors needing consideration, to produce some aspect of the whole conflict. As can be seen in figures 2.4 and 2.5 (see Appendix III, Figure 2.4 – Conflict Interactions, and, Appendix III, Figure 2.5 – Key to Conflict Interactions) conflicts rarely have sharply defined boundaries and tightly controlled variables, whose constituent elements and factors may be counted in terms of millions of different and changing variables. When a new element is introduced into this complex conflict environment, the results are difficult to predict. However, an understanding of the factors involved may allow a better evaluation or even add to the confusion, depending upon how well these vast numbers of interactions can be reasonably explained and understood. As such, the ‘Dynamical Systems Approach’ (see, chapter 1, section 1:4:2:3, for a concise description of the Dynamical Systems Approach) advocated by Peter Coleman et al (2007)¹⁵⁰ does help to decipher the complex workings of a conflict, which can be defined as a complex dynamic system. According to Elman et al (1998), a dynamical system can be defined as “any system whose behaviour at one point in time depends in some way on its state at an earlier point in time”¹⁵¹. However, the approach illustrated by Coleman et al (2007) aims to understand uncertainty and probabilistic events within the complex conflict environment through a mathematical approach using computer simulations of observable patterns, which Michael Hoffmann (2007), in *Power and Limits of Dynamical Systems Theory in Conflict Analysis*, believes has intrinsic limitations when trying to fathom complex conflict dynamics that have a very high degree of uncertainty, especially because it is a mathematical theory that has been developed from its application in the natural sciences, such as physics, engineering, chemistry, and developmental biology¹⁵². Although this is not a comprehensive approach to complex conflict dynamics and has many significant limitations based on the uncertainty of a multi-party conflict environment, the basic reasoning behind this approach does, nevertheless, support the approach taken in this study, which emphasises the complexity and non-linearity of conflicts, as opposed to the simplistic linear terms that are used to explain most conflicts when analysing and aiming to make decisions about them¹⁵³.

Social psychology provides us with numerous ways with which to view and explain escalation. The Cognitive Dissonance Theory¹⁵⁴, Entrapment¹⁵⁵, Selective Perception¹⁵⁶, and Emotional Anti-response¹⁵⁷ are a few well-known examples. However, several broad models of escalation are available¹⁵⁸ to assist in a better understanding of the processes and to explain what is happening when escalation occurs. None is entirely

comprehensive or mutually exclusive; each one has value and explains the development of certain kinds of escalation.

1) The Aggressor-Defender Model: Each party involved in the conflict is defined as either a defender or an aggressor. The aggressor seeks to introduce some degree of change at the expense of the defender.

2) Conflict Spiral Model¹⁵⁹: The second model deals with the circularity of escalation in a vicious circle of action-reaction, as mentioned above and in chapter one (see section 1:4:2:4, chapter one, Arms Races, the ‘Security Dilemma’, and the ‘Spiral Model’).

3) Structural Change Model: Burton(1962)¹⁶⁰, Coleman (1957)¹⁶¹ and Schumpeter (1955)¹⁶² introduce the *Structural Change Model*. This model particularly concerns the deep-rooted effects of conflict and their likelihood of encouraging escalation in forthcoming conflicts¹⁶³. The cycle of escalation, according to this model, occurs when the party uses extreme tactics, thus, provoking similar tactics by the opposition as a product of the resultant structural changes. The opposition’s tactics, in turn, lead to structural changes in the party, and the cycle continues (see section 1:4:3:2, Chapter one, *Structural Analysis*).

a) *Psychological changes*: In the context of the structural change model, psychological states of individuals and collectives are of another class, having a similar impact on conflict as temporary psychological states, but with a tendency to persist. For example, Struch and Schwartz (1989)¹⁶⁴ note negative attitudes and perceptions; while, Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981)¹⁶⁵, elaborate upon deindividuation and dehumanisation; and, hostile and competitive goals¹⁶⁶.

b) *Structural and functional changes* - the psychological stages that develop in individuals also occur at group level (organisations, countries, nations), albeit, through a more complex process.

c) *Structural changes in communities* - where the changes that occur in the wider community to which the conflicting parties belong¹⁶⁷.

These models allow us to view escalation from different perspectives; while each maintains validity, they also contribute to other models. When viewed together, the models allow us a greater understanding of the placement and effects of the individual processes and dynamics involved in escalation. This, in turn, facilitates a better understanding of the processes involved when de-escalating a conflict through the resolution of the roots causes.

2:3:5:3 – Escalation within the Protracted Afghan Conflict

2:3:5:3:1 – Cold War Foes

The PDPA Communist coup d’état on 27th April 1978 (the Saur Revolution), in Kabul, only produced a slight escalation in the Cold War between the NATO-led West and the Warsaw Pact¹⁶⁸. In contrast, escalation within Afghan territorial boundaries, and to a lesser extent, the region, had a significant impact upon the relationships within and between the parties involved. Aside from the covert military aid by the Carter Administration (1976-1980) to the newly evolving opposition to the communist PDPA, the coup was seen as an internal Afghan matter. However, when 10,000 Soviet troops reportedly landed in Kabul’s Baghram airbase between 23rd and 26th December 1979¹⁶⁹ and finally stormed the presidential *Tajbeg* palace on 27th December 1979, assassinated President Amin early in the morning of 28th December 1979, and installed

Babrak Karmal as the new President in support of the failing communist regime¹⁷⁰, the West immediately recognised it as a threat to their vital strategic interests, and hence, the strategic stability of the Cold War relationship, which was perceived as part of a global expansionist policy by the USSR, which had been underway since the Cold War began¹⁷¹. Viewed in retrospect, the invasion was an escalation of the Cold War¹⁷², which had achieved a degree of stability through the détente period and the thawing of relations in the 1970s; especially in regards to the improving relationship between the United States and the People Republic of China¹⁷³. In response, the West and some non-aligned nations escalated their own combined position to begin overt and covert participation in an anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. Guerrilla actions were stepped-up and a massive military aid program was initiated through overt and covert channels¹⁷⁴. Consequently, the relationship between the Cold War foes steadily polarised.

2:3:5:3:2 – Afghan Internecine Conflict

According to Charles Gochman and Zeev Moaz (1984), multiple party contentions of issues tend to escalate more than dyadic conflicts¹⁷⁵. Although the Afghan conflict has essentially been a civil war, with at least one indigenous contending party inviting external military assistance to help oppose another indigenous contending party, the civil war that initially erupted between the two strongest factions, Hezb-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami, on 28 October 1992¹⁷⁶, and was limited to areas in which these factions bordered each other such as in Kabul and its suburbs grew in scope and intensity when the other existing indigenous Mujahideen factions perceived that the conflict between the two strongest factions was rapidly evolving to become a threat to their own vital interests and perceived future power structures of Afghanistan. Consequently, the conflict quickly engulfed the whole of the war torn nation, and became a multi-polar and multi-fronted conflict. The scope of the conflict had been increased to every point at which the factions bordered each other. The severity, or intensity, of the conflict had also increased alongside the increased scope. This was evidenced by the increase in the numbers of massacres and intensity of unremitting shelling of the capital, and to a lesser extent, Herat, as well as other major provincial capitals.

Identity issues contribute to escalation, whether they are personal or collective¹⁷⁷. Where a party believes that its collective identity is at stake, resistance is likely to be intense; especially for ethnic orientated conflicts¹⁷⁸. In this respect, the civil war in Afghanistan (1992-2001) had many facets¹⁷⁹. In-group out-group stereotyping consistently played upon the differences in ethnicity between the Mujahideen factions throughout the Afghan-USSR War (1979-1989) (see, Appendix II, Table 2.1 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Political, Ethnic and Religious Orientation; and, Table 2.2 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Patrons & Political & Military Leadership). Identity was also a major issue in the stubborn resistance by the Northern Alliance (largely consisting of Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek ethnic minority groups) against the Taliban, since its seizure of Kabul in September 1996. The minority ethnic groups pictured the Taliban as a Pushtun force (the Taliban has been estimated as comprising about 90% Pushtun¹⁸⁰) bent upon restoring the whole country under Pushtun control, which could lead to the disenfranchisement of the hard won empowerment that they had fought for since the Saur Revolution.

2:3:5:4 – The Processes and Dynamics of Escalation

In order to be able to appreciate the full scope of the different stages and processes involved within a conflict and to better understand how to deal with the conflict, these processes are introduced in a linear order as noted through the ladder of conflict (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – Ladder of Conflict). However, actual conflicts may not necessarily precisely exhibit such linearity; nevertheless, they are introduced in such a manner to simplify the complexity of a conflict. Furthermore, in attempting an explanation of the escalation processes, the constructivist perspective is employed because of the value laden processes involved in conflicts, and the relative meanings that they may hold for the respective contending parties in a conflict.

It is pertinent to note that the following sections are inherently related to the escalatory processes involved when individuals come into the possession of SALW through their mass diffusion within a collective body or entity. The behavioural responses of individuals is significant in the escalation of conflicts primarily because SALW are principally weapons that are used and possessed by individuals, and therefore, have impacts on the dynamics of escalation on collective bodies writ large. The significance of the value and meanings that particular firearms, or weapons as a whole, hold for individuals, communities and certain societies as a whole is important in understanding their potential usage in peaceful and conflict environments, through the evolution of structural and social norms associated with weapons of this kind.

Hitherto, this study has discussed the formation of contentious and incompatible goals. Once the parties recognise these goals, their own and their adversary's, a barrier, metaphorically speaking, begins to form between the parties. Henceforth, for the benefit of paucity of space, the contending parties will be denoted as 'party' and 'opposition' in order to simplify the discussion ahead¹⁸¹.

The goals having been set, all parties may begin to contend with each other at the expense of the other; where, in-group and out-group processes begin to unfold, and contentious actions are employed by the party to judge the stance of its opposition. Gestures, ploys, moves and countermoves are employed according to the situation and circumstances at hand. These actions¹⁸² may range from ingratiation¹⁸³, gamesmanship¹⁸⁴, guilt trips¹⁸⁵, persuasive argumentation¹⁸⁶, threats¹⁸⁷, and irrevocable commitments¹⁸⁸. It is usually the case that such actions are employed in an escalatory sequence, and are escalated when the party feels that it is not achieving its own goals, and therefore, has to 'put the heat on'. When viewed within the in-group out-group process, the party is perceived as escalating as a result of the opposition's contentious behaviour(s); which, may, in turn, lead it to further compound or reinforce attitudes and stereotypes amongst its ranks against the opposition. If the sequence was used in the reverse manner (greater to lesser actions), the opposition may construe the party as being weak, due to its inability to impose its will upon the opposition¹⁸⁹.

2:3:5:4:1 – Dynamics of Incompatible Goal Formation and Conflict Escalation

Conflicts may be pursued over two kinds of issues:

- a) interests, such as the distribution of resources and capital, or the disparity in gains; and,

- b) values and/or beliefs, for example, when a particular party holds a set of values or beliefs and acts on them, another party may find this objectionable as perceived from their own value base, and hence, if they have the capacity, forbid them or act in such a way so as to repel those beliefs, for example, sexual freedom as a taboo in contrast to being an individual liberty.

In reference to value-based contentions, when a party supporting a taboo acts to forbid individual liberty, it has sought to pursue a defined goal, and one that is incompatible with any other parties that advocate liberty. The latter may either concede by accepting restrictions to their freedom, or form their own goals and act to resist the imposition of such restrictions to their individual liberty. The act of forming incompatible goals has implications for the paths that a potential conflict might take. When the issues in contention are interest related, then, a certain degree of compromise is possible, for example, through a more equitable redistribution of resources. However, when the issues are value based, a degree of restructuring of the relationship between the parties is then necessary, without which the conflict may not be easily settled. Such issues may become latent, but invariably arise again because values are difficult to compromise on. Such dissensual relationships may involve one party converting the other to their own way of thinking, unless all parties can eventually compromise on accepting each other's values. However, a number of conditions serve to foster an escalation in conflictual relations, the most notable of which is the perception of the high degree of divergence of interest¹⁹⁰, in which all parties to a conflict aspire to lofty and rigid goals with no common ground between them; whereby, the greater that the perceived divergence of interest is, the less likely the chance of communicating and/or yielding¹⁹¹. In such a case, contention is perceived as the only credible route to achieving the party's goals¹⁹². The measures in contention may range from the application of pressure, such as threats to the actual use of violence; therefore, the greater the perceived divergence of interests, the greater the intensity of tactics that are perceived to be required. If the action involves the use of lethal and harsh violence, then, an escalation may result in which the opposing party may retaliate in kind or with a greater capacity that may result in the escalation of the conflict. A second notable condition that fosters escalation is the stability of the relationship between potential or actual adversaries¹⁹³. Very large divergence of interests are needed to push very stable inter-party relationships into highly escalated actions¹⁹⁴, whilst only small divergences are needed to push highly unstable inter-party relationships into highly escalated actions¹⁹⁵.

Once goals are formed, alternatives, by definition, become limited, and the choices taken by parties in pursuit of their goals may be undertaken as a consequence of deep reflective thought. On the other hand they could also be impulsive and ill-considered. Nevertheless, a number of basic considerations affect the party's adoption of strategies for the pursuit of their chosen goals. Kriesberg (1998)¹⁹⁶ identifies four basic considerations that are fundamental to all conflict scenarios: a) the actual goals of the parties¹⁹⁷; b) the characteristics of all the parties¹⁹⁸; c) the relationships between the parties¹⁹⁹; and, d) the social context and environment within which the parties exist²⁰⁰.

After the initial strategy has been chosen, parties become involved in very complex interactions based upon the satisfaction of the criteria of their chosen strategy. The variables upon which their strategies are chosen by each party provide a fluid environment for them to interact. Party 'A' and its adversary 'B' may choose a

strategy that leads to reconciliation and settlement. However, 'B' may act to show its strengths and not its weaknesses so as to subordinate 'A's reactions in an attempt to accrue additional leverage with which it may bargain. 'A' may misconstrue 'B's bargaining and counteract in kind to raise the threshold of the conflict. In doing so, an escalation of the conflict has occurred, that is, an increase in the severity or intensity of the conflict, even though both parties had originally intended to decrease the intensity of the conflict; which may occur because of the misperception of the parties' relative positions of strength, sincerity of intentions, and even means of attaining a better relative bargaining position.

As the conflict proceeds to a higher order or intensity, it escalates. When a conflict escalates to a point at which violence is used the dynamics of conflict become less controllable and entirely dependent upon the goal reformation of the conflictual parties; where, the parties must change their objectives drastically, especially if a compromise between the parties is sought. Otherwise, the conflict can proceed in either of several directions:

1. Complete victory of one party over another, which, in essence, means that the victor dictates the terms of the outcome through the subjugation of the other party(s). However, this does not signify the resolution of the conflict, but merely its termination; since, the root causes of the conflict may still be present. That is, unless, the victorious party agrees to benevolently compromise from the position of strength towards the subdued party. The Sri Lankan civil war is a pertinent example of outright and complete victory of government forces over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). However, although in a position of political strength, the government has been slow in instituting the necessary structural changes that would prevent a future conflict from arising²⁰¹.
2. Compromise is sought via dialogue, which may lead to the resolution of the conflict if the root causes of the conflict are honestly discussed and resolved through the proactive implementation of agreed measures and conditions. More often, however, a contest for a more superior bargaining position is sought, in order to attain greater leverage while negotiating the resolution of a conflict, since the final outcome of a conflict is rarely a completely equitable resolution of conflicting interests and goals, but a compromise to facilitate an achievable level of co-existence where contending parties perceive that they have all achieved some of their goals. An example can be provided by the current competition of relative strengths between the Karzai-led Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. The latter seeks to undermine the credibility of the government to attain a better relative position of strength through which it may aim to negotiate a final settlement after the forthcoming Afghan presidential and national elections. The current position of the government is perceived by the Taliban as being relatively weak, and within which, the presidency has waning authority. Furthermore, with the departure of the vast majority, if not all, US, NATO, and ISAF troops by the end of 2014, the present Afghan government's position is further weakened, which is being exploited by the Taliban to gain a more favourable position and authority in the event that it pursues a path towards ending the violent conflict through negotiations with the new Afghan government, which will not have the support of foreign forces on the ground. The fallout, however, of this contest of strength is the continued conflict, which may negatively impact upon the initial intentions of both Afghan parties to settle the conflict, and may, in fact, assist in the continued intractability of the protracted conflict and escalation of conflict intensity as intentions are misunderstood and misperceived, especially if particular red lines are crossed due to the intrinsic values and meanings that they hold by the respective parties, from which it is difficult to return by one or all contending parties.
3. A stalemate may ensue where there is no movement by either side to engage in dialogue even though an outright military is not possible by either of the conflicting party(s), resulting in the successive re-eruption of violent conflict until either of the above two directions is achieved, or via third party intervention to facilitate dialogue, negotiations and compromise, or in the military support of one or more parties against another to achieve outright military

victory; as was the case during the US-led NATO/ISAF invasion of Afghanistan in support of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime on 07 October 2001²⁰².

2:3:5:4:2 – Analysis of Escalation: Acceleration and Deceleration on the Conflict Curve

While it is the multitude of constituent processes within a conflictual relationship that contribute to encouraging escalation, and where others act to encourage de-escalation, it is the ratio between the two (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.6 – The Conflict Curve) that signifies whether a conflict is escalating, de-escalating, or is in a state of balance at any given period on the conflict curve. We can appreciate this by understanding that the multitude of forces that distinguish the direction of the movement of a conflict are in a constant state of flux, where they are increasing and decreasing in magnitude of intensity, scope, and direction at all times; or expanding and contracting as a living entity. Therefore, the overall conflict may be seen to be escalating or de-escalating at any given point in its given life span; as such, windows of opportunity may be available to any of the contending parties at particular points of the conflict to exploit the circumstances against their opponent(s), and therefore, escalate the conflict, or act to initiate dialogue and reduce polarisation by enhancing confidence building measures to increase trust, and therefore de-escalate the conflict.

The time curve of a conflict shows us that every point along its path is based upon factors encouraging escalation as against those factors encouraging de-escalation (unfavourable to escalation). The curve is therefore not linear and is susceptible to constant change (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.7 – The True Conflict Curve - Factors Favourable and Unfavourable to Escalation). The overall direction of the conflict being the average between two points (time period) in that life span. The individual processes at any given point may be favourable or unfavourable to an average escalation. The degree of difference between these processes at any given point indicates the intensity of the escalation. If the conflict is escalating continuously, that is, when the factors favourable to escalation are always greater than those favourable to de-escalation, how do we differentiate between those periods of intense escalation and those periods of gradual escalation? The simplified formulaic analysis of the processes of escalation and de-escalation on the conflict curve, provided in Figure 2.8 (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.8 – A Simplified Mathematical Explanation of the Processes of Escalation and De-escalation on the Conflict Curve), illustrates through a simplified mathematical explanation how conflicts are extremely complex systems that go well beyond a simple line on a graph; however, the simplicity of the analysis and practical applicability arises from its ability to explain in generalised terms the dynamics of flux in complex conflict environments.

From the conflict curve we can see that the escalation is not constant (not linear) nor uni-directional (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.6 – The Conflict Curve, and Figure 2.7 – The True Conflict Curve - Factors Favourable and Unfavourable to Escalation). It is, in fact, constantly changing as factors continually modify ratios of intensity (ratios between factors favourable and unfavourable to escalation). How do we measure the change in escalation on a conflict curve? When a conflict escalates at a certain rate per unit time ('T'), it may not remain at that rate constantly. If the intensity of a conflict increases we can see that the conflict has escalated. However, if the conflict intensifies again, but to a higher degree (where the rate of change of intensity has increased), we can say that not only has the conflict escalated again (since, by saying this, we may only infer a

similar change per unit time as the previous escalation) but has in fact accelerated to a higher pace (the rate of change in intensity in unit time), and is therefore, constantly changing and escalating (see, Appendix III, Figures 2.9 & 2.10 – Acceleration and Deceleration [1 & 2]). That is, not only is the conflict intensity increasing (escalation) but at a higher rate per unit time (acceleration). A conflict may escalate and continue to do so (see, Appendix III, Figures 2.11 – Linear Conflict Intensity Curve); however, the rate of escalation may also change, as can be noted by a change in the gradient on a conflict curve (see, Appendix III, Figures 2.12 – Non-linear Conflict Intensity Curve). We, therefore, refer to this as the ‘**Acceleration**’ of a conflict, in which not only is the escalation constantly changing, but so too is the direction of the conflict. The inverse of this occurs when factors and conditions favourable to de-escalation are greater than factors and conditions favourable to escalation. At this point, there may also be a change in the rate of de-escalation; we can say that the conflict is decelerating. Continuing from the formulaic analysis provided in Figure 2.8:

The Acceleration of a conflict is measured by²⁰³:

$$\mathbf{Acceleration} = \frac{\mathbf{\Omega}}{\mathbf{T}^2} = \frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{T}} = \mathbf{\alpha}$$

Acceleration is the rate of change in intensity per unit time.

We can infer from the notion of acceleration that a conflict may not only escalate but will also continue to do so at a progressive rate (accelerate). As factors change, where factors favourable to escalation increase (not all factors are equal, as each factor or element is qualitatively and quantitatively different in the scope and/or severity of the impact or the effect it has on the conflict overall), a conflict may quicken its pace at certain points along the conflict curve. At other points the pace may become slower; nevertheless, the conflict may still be escalating. Factors unfavourable to escalation may take root in the conflict leading to not only a slower pace in escalation but also a reversal, to such an extent that escalation becomes negative, or de-escalation. Likewise, de-escalation may vary in pace and not remain constant. This is negative acceleration, or deceleration (see, Appendix III, Figures 2.9 & 2.10 – Acceleration and Deceleration (1 & 2)).

The linear conflict intensity curve in figure 2.11 (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.11 – Linear Conflict Intensity Curve) illustrates that the intensity not only escalates at certain points but also continues to do so at a constant rate. The intensity follows a linear path; if at every time unit it increases by 2 intensity units. For example, points ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ have the same gradient:

$$\mathbf{E} = \frac{\mathbf{4\Omega - 2\Omega}}{\mathbf{2T - 1T}} = \mathbf{2}$$

This is the change in intensity per unit time.

The non-linear conflict intensity curve in figure 2.12 (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.12 – Non-linear Conflict Intensity Curve) illustrates that escalation may also vary. The rate of change in escalation may vary at different points in time along the conflict curve, for example, the change in intensity per unit time may increase to 3 Ω units per unit time; therefore, the escalation is now 3 Ω units per unit time. That is, at every

time unit where the escalation is 3 Ω units per unit time the level of intensity of a conflict increases by 3 Ω units. At 'B' the gradient is now 3.

$$\mathbf{E} = \frac{\mathbf{\Omega}}{\mathbf{T}} = \frac{\mathbf{3}}{\mathbf{1}} = \mathbf{3}$$

However, the intensity may continue to increase again to a point where at every elapsed time unit the intensity is now greater by 4 Ω units. At 'C' the gradient is now 4.

$$\mathbf{E} = \frac{\mathbf{\Omega}}{\mathbf{T}} = \frac{\mathbf{4}}{\mathbf{1}} = \mathbf{4}$$

This is therefore the rate at which intensity is increasing (accelerating):

If at every second time unit the intensity increase is greater by the addition of one intensity unit, at every time unit the intensity increase is greater by 0.5 intensity units. Therefore, the rate of change of intensity per unit time is:

$$\frac{\mathbf{\Omega}}{\mathbf{T}^2} = \frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{T}} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{2}}$$

$$\mathbf{Acceleration} = \mathbf{0.5} = \mathbf{\alpha}$$

Where there is Negative Acceleration ($-\alpha$), it can then be defined as:

$$-\mathbf{\alpha} = \mathbf{\delta}$$

Where,

$$\mathbf{\delta} = \mathbf{Deceleration}$$

From the simplified analysis of the acceleration and deceleration of the intensity of a conflict provided above, it is imperative to note the impact that the introduction or availability of large quantities of SALW may have on conflictual relationships within a given environment. Although, it is not possible to presuppose that all other factors will remain constant for the proliferation of SALW to be objectively analysed, and given their attributes and characteristics, their impact may be quite significant because of their contribution to the options available to the contending parties.

2:3:5:4:3 – The Use of Threats in Conflict Escalation

During the pursuit of their defined goals, the threshold at which parties construct intentions to commit to behaviour that is detrimental to the interests of their opponents depends upon whether or not any of the contending parties construct and pursue deterrent-laden threats that are direct at their respective opposing

party(s), which can be violent or non-violent. What characterises this threshold is the intention to commit harm, whether or not it is implemented. James Tedeschi (1990), in his chapter on *The Structure of Conflict*²⁰⁴, suggests that there are two types of threat:

- a) **contingent** – this depends on some form of compliance otherwise harm will be imposed for non-compliance, therefore, contingent threats can be compellants or act as a form of deterrence, where a threat is backed by force and willingness to use it; and,
- b) **non-contingent** – these threats just state that harm will be done, and are, therefore, coercive actions that can be conceived of as punishments in themselves, since they impose several types of harms just with their issuance, such as fear and humiliation.

For the party to produce a threat that can act as an effective deterrent, it must first have the capability to inflict a punishment that outweighs the benefits of not complying with the threat, and secondly, be credible. As to the latter, the opposition must believe that the party has the capability to fulfil the threat and that the party has the will and determination to carry out the threat out in the case of the opposition's non-compliance²⁰⁵. In this respect, both promises and threats can be used to bring about desired behaviour in conflict environments. Threats use the prospects of negative consequences to bring about a desired behaviour²⁰⁶. In contrast, promises use the prospects of positive consequences to induce the desired behaviour²⁰⁷, and have greater informational clarity of promises than threats²⁰⁸.

The use of threats, as opposed to promises, may be perceived as more inviting in contending relationships; since, foremost, successful threats cost the parties nothing²⁰⁹. Secondly, Black and Higby (1973) in their article, *Effects of Power, threats and Sex on Exploitation*²¹⁰, demonstrated that threats are more likely to motivate compliance than promises in a conflictual relationship or, as Pruitt and Carrivale (1993) noted in *Negotiations in Social Conflict*²¹¹, are more influential towards compliance. A number of reasons account for this, including the perception that threateners are more powerful than promisors, or more in control, especially since the threat contains more information in its message than a promise as noted by Rubin and Lewicki (1973) in, *A Three-Factor Experimental Analysis of Promises and Threats*²¹². Furthermore, Taylor (1991)²¹³ discovered that the avoidance of a potential loss was more motivating than the loss of a potential reward. Lastly, even if the party does not follow through with the enforcement of its threat when the opposition does not comply, it can benefit by being seen as humane. On the other hand, a promisor failing to carry out a promise will with certainty be regarded as untrustworthy. However, both the threatener and the promisor run the risk of losing credibility, but the promisor more certainly than the threatener. Threats do, however, provoke responses in kind leading to further escalation in adversarial relationships, while also producing dislike, mistrust and friction as a consequence. In this way, threats and counter-threats, as exemplified by the 'security dilemma', can spiral out of control as each party vies to out-threaten the other. When SALW are used by individuals and groups to threaten another party, the consequences of immediate escalation is very high; since, if a party is not deemed credible, and the opposition also possesses SALW, their resistance may lead to their use of SALW after having called the bluff of the party, thereby inducing further responses by both parties²¹⁴.

The approach taken by the threatener varies with the circumstances, conditions of the conflictual relationship, and the goals to be attained. Where a party perceives that there is no discernible achievement of its goals through lesser methods of persuasion and manipulation of the opposition it may resort to issuing threats. To this extent, threats are seen as a last resort to avoid overt coercive tactics or brute force. On the other hand, the party may envisage threats as legitimate primary tools to influence the opposition, with the intent to use force and the willingness to show 'who's in charge' only as a formality before direct coercive actions are used. This latter use of the threat may involve controlled, clear minded, decisive planning and decision making, or it may be the product of crisis decision-making that has involved irrational ultimatums and decision management. As such, the use of threats in this latter case may be perceived as a form of either aggression or anger.

The significance of the threshold of threat cannot be underestimated when considering the nature of the diffusion of SALW. Concerning protracted conflicts, where the willingness to use weapons has become widespread the perception of personal security is degraded because of the credibility of harm that can follow a threat made by individuals carrying small arms²¹⁵; especially in a society where arms have been part of the male attire for centuries. Not only does the possession of SALW by one party induce other parties to possess SALWs as a deterrence, by stimulating a circular response and the spiralling of SALW possession (for an explanation of the use of the 'Spiral Model' for this study to help understand SALW proliferation, see chapter one, section 1:4:2:4 – Arms Races, the 'Security Dilemma', and the 'Spiral Model'.), SALW may be used to threaten another party by their mere possession. This is often the case when an individual acts to enforce another's compliance on a particular issue, event of situation.

2:3:5:4:4 – Escalation through Aggressive Behavioural Actions and Responses

The social interactionist approach views aggression as a tool used to achieve defined values or goals through influence, retribution and revenge, and as a form of protection of social values and identity²¹⁶. As such, aggression is seen as a continuation of normal conflictual behaviour and relationships rather than just a reaction to emotions, frustration, instincts, and genetic programming²¹⁷. Although the latter conditions do affect the instigation of aggression, they are not the sole inertia for its manifestation. According to Tedeschi and Felson (1993), in *Aggression and violence: social interactionist perspective*²¹⁸, contextual and interpersonal interactionist factors are critical in the instigation of aggression. In this respect, the construction of perceptions towards aggressive behaviours vary between different cultures; for example, a loud voice used within a particular cultural environment may be perceived as normal social discourse, while in another cultural environment it may be construed as aggressive behaviour, which, therefore, designates aggression as a relative concept²¹⁹.

As a method of threatening, Averill (1982) and Muhammedey et al (1984)²²⁰ have shown aggression to be counterproductive, often contributing to the spiralling of the conflict to greater intensities. Furthermore, David Singer (1958)²²¹ indicates that threats used in the form of aggression work in both directions, for the

party and for the opposition. While, when a party issues a threat, the opposition may perceive this as an attack; and, as Tedeschi and Felson (1993) and Tedeschi, James and Felson (1994)²²² have noted, the attack may itself be perceived as an indicator of aggression leading to the opposition retaliating with an aggressive action in the guise of a defence. In this respect, Patterson (1982), in *Coercive Family Processes*²²³, has identified that an escalatory cycle may be initiated, which can easily spiral out of control as the party responds with aggressive actions. Therefore, aggression is not solely a method used in threats, it can be an overt form of punishment and coercive influence, the aim of which is to achieve victory and avoid defeat in social conflict. In this respect, Berkowitz (1965)²²⁴ and Feshbach (1970)²²⁵ have divided aggression into two categories:

- a) **hostile** – the injury to the opposition is the actual goal, and therefore, aggression is the objective; and,
- b) **instrumental** – the opposition is attacked in order to achieve another goal, where Pruitt et al (1993)²²⁶ suggest that aggression is used as a means to an end.

With the above view in mind, aggression can be perceived as a stage in conflict in its own right. However, it has a range that encompasses all levels of conflict from aggressive negotiations to aggressive violence as opposed to passive talks and passively controlled defensive violent actions²²⁷, and can therefore be envisaged as a threshold within each stage of the conflict ladder, such as aggressive threats, or aggressive use of SALW by individuals as opposed to passive and controlled use; for example, waving firearms or firing in the air or above the heads of the opponent(s) to indicate intent.

2:3:5:4:5 – Individual and Collective Emotion-Laden Responses and Escalation

The perception of a grievance can occur at different points in a conflict depending upon the issues in contention. However, it is most likely to occur once an injustice has been recognised to have been committed. Parties may formulate goals whilst not being aware of the incompatibility of their goals vis-a-vis the goals of other parties. This awareness can occur at points where the parties' methods of pursuit of their goals interact or intercept each other, thus, highlighting incompatibilities. For example, where two parties are in pursuit of the occupation of a territory, each unaware of the other's presence or intentions, a point may be reached at which the boundaries for zones of influence, occupation, or possession of the territory come into contact with each other. At the point of contact, the parties may each recognise the other's possession of the territory that they have gained. On the other hand, an incident or event may occur that could identify the parties' individual intentions and goals as being incompatible with each other; and hence, resulting in the achievement of an awareness of their situational incompatibility. If the incident was significant enough, within context, for the afflicted party to perceive an injustice, thereby, instilling blame on the inflicting party, feelings of individual and collective resentment and anger could ensue. In this respect, Averill (1983)²²⁸ has noted that the most important aspect of anger is that it is a reaction to some perceived misdeed.

Anger is an emotion that accompanies most grievances, since it is associated with the cognitive process of blame attribution to other people. Klein, Bierhoff and Kramp (1991)²²⁹ have found that grievances or perceived injustices are the cognitive elements of anger, and that anger arousal is therefore reactive and not

active or passive. The physical manifestations of an individual's or group's anger are controllable if cognitive processes are allowed to adjust. Even though the feelings of anger may be present, they may not be displayed in the physical form. Unlike anger arousal, the expressive behaviour of anger is not reactive and does not have a single goal (for example, to harm the perpetrator of the misdeed) because the conditions for the experience of anger may be distinguished from the likely responses performed by the party after the experience of anger. Tedeschi and Felson (1994)²³⁰ provide an evaluation of the disruption of cognitive processes when anger is aroused, noting that, "anger arousal disrupts and disorganises cognitive processes"²³¹. The misdeed and its executor become the paramount focus of the afflicted party. Unless the party allows time for consideration, attention shifts significantly from future costs and consequences to reacting to the present situation. White (1968)²³² notes that there is an inclination that information processing in angry people becomes simplified and judgements become more black and white, or binary, than when consideration is given to the situation. In such circumstances, an angry person does not think through their actions, and therefore, a clear expression of behaviour is not possible. Rather, behaviour becomes crude, impulsive and intense due to the disruption of cognitive processes. Radford, and Govier (1980)²³³ have noted that depending upon the individual characteristics of the angry party, angry behaviour can involve the raising of the voice, the increase of the amplitude of motor responses, such as waving arms, and distorted facial expressions to the actual usage of limbs and body as weapons. The greater the perceived injustice, or the better the construction of that injustice, the greater the arousal of anger is likely to be, and hence, the greater the expression of anger through emotional behaviour. For a party involving a group, especially one with an autocratic or totalitarian hierarchical organisation, angry responses can involve immediate dictates or orders to act in a manner involving coercive measures, without recourse to consideration, in order to keep a firm hand on the situation. Nevertheless, organised collective bodies may also manufacture or construct an increased degree of injustice to induce a heightened emotional response amongst the collective populous.

Anger significantly contributes to the disruptive and detrimental effects of small arms proliferation on social and conflict dynamics, particularly manifesting disruption of conflict resolution processes. This is especially so when considering intractable protracted conflicts, as in Afghanistan, where violence may have become institutionalised²³⁴. In such environments, where insecurity is all-pervasive, the expression of anger allows an externalisation of issues (as opposed to anxiety which internalises such issues), and hence, a reduction in anxiety; that is, a reduction in the feelings of insecurity and an increase in the sense of authority and relative power, since the expression of power potentiates command and control over a situation. The objective of a threat is to induce a state of fear and compliance; as such, anger can be a useful tool for the purpose of intimidation. The immediate eruptive and intense expression or display of anger can cause an intimidation effect, and hence, significantly increase the credibility and capacity to fulfil the threats that the angry party has issued. The possession of SALW coupled with the expression of anger significantly increases the intimidation effect through the threatened party's amplified perception of that threat, which may lead to immediate compliance if it is not armed, and therefore, the acceleration of a conflict. If, however, the threatened party is also armed, the intimidation effect may result in aggravating a situation by provoking an irrational violent response through its feelings of insecurity, thereby accelerating the conflict to a higher threshold of intensity,

and preventing a de-escalation of the conflict due to the rapidity of the changing circumstances and events, which may thwart conciliatory actions. There are an exponential number of scenarios that can unfurl in such circumstances, which may be dependent upon a wide range of contributing or confounding variables, especially those related to human behaviour.

With respect to the ‘ladder of conflict’ (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – Ladder of Conflict), anger can be displayed on many levels and is a significant factor in the escalation of a conflict from a lesser to a higher order of intensity. If a conflict is approached whilst in an aroused state of anger, more heavily contentious behaviour is likely to result, since the conflict may have previously induced cumulative feelings of injustice, grievance, and hence, anger. Zillmann, Johnson and Day (1974)²³⁵ see this as the ‘Excitation Transfer Effect’. When a party is already in a state of arousal and is further provoked to become particularly angrier, the reason for the original state of arousal might be forgotten, leaving the entire cumulative state of arousal to become attributed to the latest event or immediate causes of conflagration, thereby expressing the current state of anger disproportionately to the latest provocation. For example, a party may have originally suffered a loss in the family as a result of a war with a foreign power. If later, this party suffers a further injustice, unrelated to the original injustice, such as the theft of a possession by a person who may be of a similar foreign origin, the original anger is compounded by the latter provocative action to a greater state of arousal of anger. The party, already frustrated by the prior loss and with a degree of cognitive disruption, may respond disproportionately, whilst in this heightened state of arousal, by severely harming or even killing the thief. The party has therefore attributed the entire compounded state of aroused anger on to the thief. Hence, the desire for retribution against the foreign power is displaced onto another offending target. The availability of a weapon during such an aroused state of disrupted cognition is especially dangerous to anyone in the vicinity who may be attributed with an association to the original injustice due to the immediacy of ‘killing power’ at hand, which may be used without giving time for considering the effects of ‘pulling the trigger’.

Anger is very significant in understanding how small arms can disrupt the peaceable norms of a society even after violent activities between contending parties may have ceased. The greater the number of times the party’s state of arousal is compounded (the number of times a party is provoked into a state of anger), especially without an intervening outlet, the more extreme the potential behaviour is likely to be once it has a focus for its manifestation. This, in turn, may be exponentially exaggerated through the manifestation of the aroused state of disrupted cognition to induce a legitimisation of heightened collective response by further complementing the perceived grievance(s) with the added construction of further infringements by the opposition of the party’s shared social norms, beliefs, ideologies, customs or traditions, and in essence, their identity; and thereby, providing an outlet, or sublimatory transference, of collective anger directed towards an opponent.

2:3:5:4:6 – Dynamics of Tension Formation between Conflictual Parties

Threats, and the methods of their employment, are significant in the formation of tension between contending parties. However, numerous other factors can also contribute to tension formation. Through provocative

stances, contentious goals can be a source of tension even without their pursuit. However, this does depend upon the party's perception of the impact of the opposition's pursuit of its goals. Tension can form between the party and other third parties external to the contentious issues; for example, Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia in September 1938 produced enormous tensions with other European countries, because the invasion was perceived as a provocative action, by the production of a high degree of threat to the security and stability of other European countries²³⁶.

The Oxford English Dictionary provides us with a basic definition of 'tension' as a "stretched or strained state; a state of barely suppressed emotion, such as excitement, anxiety or hostility; opposition between conflicting ideas or forces"²³⁷; while, the UNESCO *Dictionary of Social Sciences*, provides a precise definition with more relevance to the humanities:

In psychology and psychiatry 'tension' denotes: a) motive... or drive; and, b) a state of strain within personality arising from conflicting motivations. While sociologists and social psychologists also use the term in these senses, they have extended it to denote strains within a group or between groups arising from conflicting attitudes, motives and values. In all cases one speaks of intensity or severity of tension measurable in terms of psychological manifestations, subjective feelings, or overt behaviour.²³⁸

With respect to international relations, however, a state of tension between parties does not necessarily exist if parties have conflicting attitudes, motives and values, and the change in the intensity of tension is not necessarily dependent upon a change in values or goals. Pruitt and Snyder (1969) provide a clearer definition in this case:

Usage of the term tension in literature on international relations... summarises [such] motivational constraints [as] the perception that one's national goals are incompatible with those of another state; the perception of another state as a threat; fear, distrust, frustration, and hostility associated with another state. These elements can be lumped together under a single rubric, because they imply one another psychologically or have common roots.²³⁹

The state of tension can be visualised as a wire ('the bonds') between two objects that are moving apart (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – State of Tension, 2.6.1). If this wire reaches a point at which it cannot give way anymore, it is strained, or *tense* (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – 2.6.2.a). Therefore, when the objects act to move further apart, the wire has a greater likelihood of breaking when no further strain is tolerable. When an external element applies pressure to the wire (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – 2.6.2.b), it may enable the objects to move further apart or closer together; thereby, forcing the wire to snap through added strain to the already heightened tension (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – 2.6.3.a), or enable the wire to slacken by reducing the tension (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – 2.6.3.b). This analogy can be likened to two parties in a conflictual relationship. As the conflicting parties' contending goals are further defined, and events, incidents, or disagreements increase in their occurrence, the interparty relationship may reach a point at which further separation may lead to the solidification and consolidation of the respective goals and objectives being pursued by the parties, with little or no space remaining for compromise or resolution between parties. However, before this point is reached, compromise, reconciliation, or resolution is possible. Since, relations, albeit strained and up to breaking point, have not disintegrated completely. As in-group out-group processes

begin to dominate, the parties increasingly polarise. In the analogy above, when the wire snaps, all the parties tend towards diametrically opposed directions until they have reached a stage of complete polarisation. Their only perceived solution is to fully commit to their own goals through any means possible within their capabilities, or within externally imposed limitations²⁴⁰. Consequently, conflict resolution initiatives tend to become increasingly difficult or nearly impossible to implement at this stage. Parties may enter a stage where hostile and violent actions are very likely. Any incident perceived as a threat is likely to further increase polarisation and compound the cumulative pressure upon the parties' relationship. At this point, external parties may either succeed in alleviating the build up of strain or provide additional pressure to break the relationship. Even though an interactive relationship still exists between the contending parties, the positive working relationship ceases to exist, while a predominantly negative relationship comes to the fore.

Goldman (1974) indicates that within the confines of the perception of threat, tension can imply that all parties recognise that they "expect to become involved in conflict behaviour"²⁴¹. Goldman (1974) goes further to say that "tension exists between two actors, coalition of actors, to the extent that they expect conflict behaviour to occur between them"²⁴². In this regard, factors with which tension varies, in relation to the expected conflict behaviour, include the scope of the conflict, its likelihood, and/or its immediacy in time. For example, if a person expects a physical assault rather than verbal abuse, tension is greater.

2:3:5:4:7 – The Polarisation Effect in Escalatory Relationships

As parties pursue their incompatible goals, they polarise (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.13 – State of Tension). Former neutral parties, within the conflicting parties' boundaries of influence, may begin to gravitate or be pulled towards one party or the other. The positive relationships between the contending parties end either gradually or drastically, and are replaced by negative relationships that become stronger as the conflict progresses. As parties polarise, the effectiveness of neutral third party influence begins to diminish, whilst the pressure on third parties to join the contending camps gradually increases. In such situations, third parties may become so irrelevant as to be engulfed by the conflict; for example, during the Cold War, the West and Warsaw Pact rushed to gain as much influence amongst third parties that willing third parties were completely overwhelmed. Spheres of influence were established within which privileges were accorded and without which sanctions were applied. Any party wanting to leave a camp faced considerable pressure to remain, for example, Korean War between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953; the invasion of Hungary by the USSR in 1956²⁴³; the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR to retain a puppet government in December 1979; the occupation of South Vietnam by the USA, to retain a pro-western regime in opposition to the communist North Vietnam, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions after the US defeat and withdrawal²⁴⁴; and, the imposition of sanctions on Cuba by the USA²⁴⁵. However, the pressure to induce third parties to join respective contending camps is dependent upon the relative influence that the contending parties have upon third parties, and the latter's interests in supporting the parties and/or in sustaining the conflict.

The polarisation process is exemplified by the Second World War, for example, when the German Nazis demanded that, "if you are not for us, you are against us"²⁴⁶; or, after the Al Qaeda attacks on the Twin

Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, when President George W. Bush warned, “you’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror”²⁴⁷. Coleman (1957)²⁴⁸ notes that as parties grow further apart, the loyalties to the overall community (whether it is a national, regional or global community) are also diminished. Hence, the actions conducted against opposing parties have a tendency to become progressively extreme and intolerant; while, opportunities for communication on even non-contentious issues decrease. Consequently, the process of negative stereotype association for opposing parties and camps becomes more extreme the further apart the parties become, or the more polarised they become, leading to increased dehumanisation, demonization, and vilification of the opposing camp, which may become the norm. In this respect, polarisation is exemplified in the case between Pakistan and India, between North and South Korea, and between the Palestinians and Israelis.

The polarisation continuum, within the ‘ladder of conflict’ (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – Ladder of Conflict), has a large range and varies widely. There is no fixed point at which polarisation terminates. Since, full-scale thermonuclear war (Mutual Assured Destruction) is viewed as the most extreme behavioural action possible for humankind, it may provide us with an example of the extreme degree to which polarisation between parties can reach; although, this point has not been reached as yet.

If it can be considered that the greater the extent of polarisation is related to an increase in the extremity of conflicting behaviour; then threats, such as the use of sanctions, aid in the provocation of a response from the threatened party. For a conflict to reach a higher level, a harsh response to a provocation is a defining condition. These responses are, in turn, likely to provoke the provocateur into responding with even harsher and more extreme measures, and as such, this cyclic behaviour can continue indefinitely while progressively escalating to even higher intensities of conflict. Furthermore, the harsher the respective parties’ responses become, the faster the conflict is likely to reach higher orders of conflict. Every time a party is further and more severely provoked, the more likely the members of the party are to feel the arousal of anger deepen, and hence, respond disproportionately to the current provocation. At such a point, provocations or reactions may not necessarily be directed at the parties involved. Other external parties or entities, which have been identified as having close or significant relations and ties with the opposing parties, may also be targeted. This not only increases the scope of the conflict but also pushes the conflict further away from possible communication and resolution. In small-scale local conflicts, the wide availability of SALW may stimulate a disproportionately harsher response to a provocation due to the greater capability of inflicting a devastating and immediate reaction, which could provoke a spiralling of increasingly greater responses through the provision of widely available firearms, which have been diffused into the conflict environment.

When *tension* in a conflict reaches breaking point, and opinions, attitudes, values, goals, and objectives have polarised between the contending parties, a point where no other communication or non-violent recourse to resolution is perceived possible or even sought after may have been reached. At this point, the parties may perceive that the only possible solution is to take up a hostile position and act to compound and consolidate in-group goals. In an environment where SALW have not hitherto been widely diffused, contending parties may

be provided added impetus to acquire further supplies of SALW to achieve an advantage over their opponent(s); and thereby, induce a spiralling response in the acquisition of weapons with progressively increasing numbers and lethality as the security dilemma becomes more entrenched.

2:3:5:4:8 – Hostility as an Escalatory Response

Man's hostility to man is expressed in every conceivable way, from mild gossip to murder; in crime, both individual and organised; through 'irrational hostile acting out' by individuals and some political and even so called religious groups; and in the common social inconsiderateness and meanness of everyday life.²⁴⁹

The negativity of anger and aggression is conducive to a state of hostility²⁵⁰. Therefore, if, as Depitone (1966) posits, hostility is the opposite of attraction²⁵¹, then it may be likened to a state in which a party not only fosters anger, aggression, and harmful intent, but also acts to satisfy them. Hostility is an expression of anger, or rather; anger can be expressed by hostility. However, hostility is definitionally distinct from aggression, even though a lay-person may use the terms interchangeably. Dolf Zillmann (1979) provides us with a succinct differentiation between hostility and aggression²⁵²:

- 1) Any and every activity by which a person seeks to inflict bodily damage or physical pain upon a person who is motivated to avoid infliction constitutes 'aggressive behaviour'.
- 2) Any and every activity by which a person seeks to inflict harm other than bodily damage and physical pain upon a person who is motivated to avoid such infliction constitutes 'hostile behaviour'.

Zillmann (1979) describes such behaviours as a range that becomes increasingly severe within the ladder of conflict (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – Ladder of Conflict). Hostile behaviour, is therefore, imposed, but is a lesser behaviour than aggressive behaviour. If the receiving party consents to such behaviour, then hostility cannot exist. The hostility of one party does not necessarily indicate that the party at the receiving end of the hostility is also hostile. Unlike aggression, hostility is always negative and destructive. In comparison, aggression has its positive aspects, such as an aggressive study program in education or an aggressive training program in sport. Coming from its Latin origins (hostis: enemy)²⁵³, hostility is not ambiguous. Furthermore, aggression is descriptive of behaviour, whilst hostility is descriptive of attitudes, feelings, motivations and intentions. Therefore, unlike Zillmann (1979), Saul (1980) goes further to define hostility as "a motivating force, a conscious or unconscious impulse, tendency, intent, or action – aimed at injuring or destroying some object, animate or inanimate"²⁵⁴. To this extent, and contrary to Zillmann (1979), Saul (1980) includes violence, brutality and murder as forms of hostility.

Threats are expressions of hostility. Parties may become polarised because of the negative perception of such threats as manifestations of hostility, hence, further entrenching negative stereotypes and in-group out-group processes. Consequently, an increase in the hostility displayed by the threatened party to the threatening party may evolve. The greater the hostility between the parties, the greater the degree of threats and other provocations become; and, therefore, the greater the polarisation between the parties.

All the processes and behavioural aspects that have been mentioned hitherto work in conjunction with each other, but not always together. For example, an aggressive attitude is not necessarily a hostile attitude, but a hostile attitude incorporates a negative aggressive attitude. Anger may be felt, but not necessarily always outwardly displayed. Yet, hostility is the outward display of anger. Hostility and threats result in polarisation, but polarisation does not always imbue hostility and threats. Threats are the behavioural manifestation of anger and hostility, but anger and hostility do not always result in threats. These factors add to the cyclical nature in which conflicts progress. None of the processes are greater than the others, but, are in fact, working in a complex dynamic with each other, under the conditions imposed by the parties involved through to the goals being sought after, the contexts of the conflictual relationships, the interactions between the contending parties, and the significance of the relationships of external parties with the contending parties. All these processes can exist under non-violent conditions. However, they take on an altogether more dangerous and extreme dynamic once violence is introduced; and for this reason, the manifold dangers that firearms represent when they are introduced into a conflict environment, which has not passed the threshold of violence, are further heightened.

2:3:5:4:9 – The Significance of the Threshold of Violence in the Escalation of a Conflictual Relationship

War is not only a state of affairs, but a process of gradual realisation. First, one has to get used to the idea of it. The idea then has to become part of everyday life. Then rules can change, rules of behaviour, of language, of expectations.²⁵⁵

When we refer to war we mean that it is a stage in a conflict at which point the means to achieve a desired goal is violence. War is violence, without the use of which there is no war, as illustrated by Melvin and Singer (1982) when they posit: “We must define war in terms of violence. Not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war”²⁵⁶. However, by definition, violence does not always indicate war²⁵⁷, since war can be defined as the organised threat and/or use of violence by military forces²⁵⁸. The Oxford English Dictionary (1998) defines violence as “the quality of being violent, using or tending to use aggressive physical force; vehement, passionate, extreme; the unlawful exercise of physical force; intimidation by the exhibition of this”²⁵⁹. With regards to ‘law’, where violence is an ‘unlawful exercise of physical force’, the party defining the law also defines violence. One party’s violence may not be another’s violence if we depend upon the criteria of violence within different definitions of law by different parties. A party may, in fact, retaliate with physical force to the provocation of another party’s use of physical force. Is this retaliation unlawful? The retaliating party would perceive this as lawful. However, this would not be the case for the party receiving the retaliation, which would perceive this as unlawful, and hence, as violence, leading to further actions and reactions. Subjective definitions of law and violence therefore propagate the conflict. This is also one aspect of in-group out-group processes. Nevertheless, each case should be evaluated with due regards to its context.

Conflictual relationships do not always reach a stage of violence, since many are resolved through non-violent means; such as, diplomacy, conciliation and co-operation through discussion and recognition of each other’s

goals and objectives. Processes at work within the conflictual relationship can give rise to a threshold at which point one or all parties may perceive that no non-violent alternative is available to achieve their goals successfully²⁶⁰. At such a point, the parties may seek to diffuse the conflict and begin a process to resolve the issues at hand to avoid violent confrontation, by willing to compromise their desired goals. This does depend upon the importance of the desired goals as compared to the risks of engaging in violent activities. On the other hand, violence may be used as an instrument to accomplish those ends, and be perceived as being an acceptable avenue of approach to achieve the desired goals.

Violence may initially be used as a reaction to a non-violent threat, or to a non-violent coercion in order to break a stranglehold. Alternatively, violence may be used as a means to fulfil a threat in the form of actualised violent coercion. That is, direct physical damage to members of an opposing party, their property, resources and interests. However, violence may be more than the use of direct physical force. Johan Galtung (1969) goes further to define violence to include the actions or inactions by a party that results in “human beings being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations”²⁶¹. Therefore, to impose sanctions upon a party, which induces starvation, is a violent act in itself; since, it is physically damaging to the party. In this regard, violence can also refer to psychological intimidation, especially psychological torture, whereby a party is not physically touched, but put into a state that is physically and psychologically detrimental to its stable functioning or even, existence. Violence through direct physical means can vary from a blow to the body to mass slaughter, such as genocide. The latter being an extreme form of human violence, as is the case for the use of thermonuclear weapons on large human populations.

Henceforth, this study will proceed to discuss violence as a negative action (where violence is destructive) rather than as a positive action (where violence is productive). In fact, violence, committed for whatever end, is rarely productive, and is often counterproductive within the context of a conflictual relationship. This is because violence tends to stiffen the resolve and resistance of the opposing party, and usually results in some form of retaliatory action, whether immediate or delayed, and depending upon the severity of the violent action²⁶², aids in the mobilisation of the opposing party.

Conflicts that have surpassed the threshold of violence can continue to deepen in intensity. The more extreme the violence inflicted by one party on its adversary, the more likely the adversary is to resist and fight back. However, this does depend upon the adversary being in a position to resist extreme and intense violence. If a party has the ability, capacity, and willingness to sustain its intensity of violence, and even exceed it, then its opposition’s ability to receive and absorb the violence must be greater or proportional to that being received. The opposition’s ability to inflict violent acts also enables and facilitates the continuation of the conflict. This can result in a stalemate if reciprocal actions are proportional to actions received. For example, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) became stalemated during the early stages of the conflict. The unwillingness to compromise by either side was due, in part, to their similar capabilities and capacities to inflict and absorb the violence committed in the conflict. Alternatively, the willingness of the Afghan Resistance and population to endure

and absorb constant and savage violence was greater than that of the Soviets, even though the USSR's ability to inflict such violence was considerably greater, hence, the withdrawal of the latter. As O'Balance (1993), Fullerton (1983), and Bhasin (1984)²⁶³ have noted, the foregoing also exemplify the importance of 'national character', with culture²⁶⁴ and ideology being significant motivating factors in the victory achieved by the Afghan nation against overwhelming odds, while pitted against a superpower.

The dynamics of social conflict entail a cycle in which a process of social change is possible through conflict transformation, whether it is violent or non-violent. If parties are in conflict over defined issues and incompatible goals, any kind of transformation will result in social change. Social transformation can occur in several ways in a violent conflict, through: a) direct violence, where violence is directed at an individual or group, such as armed hostile actions that are committed by specific individuals or groups; b) structural violence²⁶⁵, where violence arises due to the structure of the system, regulations and sanctions, and results in the degradation of the social apparatus, famine, poverty, and death; and, c) cultural violence²⁶⁶, where the beliefs that are passed down, impose certain values of physical or mental attitude that can result in the harm, injury or destruction of others. Afghanistan is an example of a conflict that has been plagued by an epidemic of violence at all levels of social interaction. It has become a prime example of a protracted conflict showing all signs of social, economic, political and psychological malaise, disintegration and chaos. The continuous occurrence of violence has traumatised Afghan society and created a culture of violence²⁶⁷ in which structural and direct violence is inescapable.

These forms of violence have not been explained under a single unifying theory of violence; however, explanations have been attempted with the aid of several variegated perspectives. For example, socio-biological propositions debate the origins and functions of violence, and question whether we learn to behave violently (as in cultural violence) or are inherently inclined to act violently through our biological instincts and aggressive drives²⁶⁸. Concerning the latter, according to Machiavelli (1469-1527), one of the fathers of realism, in order to be human, one must seek self-preservation and fulfil the desire for political power²⁶⁹; since, the individual is a rational and self-interested entity; and, therefore, the desire to dominate is a natural phenomenon. The inherent desire to dominate precludes that the goals of all parties are in direct conflict, since, the other party is naturally inclined to dominate also.

According to the archetype realist interpretation by Thomas Hobbes (1651), in *Leviathan*²⁷⁰, the Hobbesian analysis on the 'State of Nature' also recognises conflict (especially in terms of war, or the use of extreme violence) as originating in biological drives, instincts and the natural order. According to Thomas Hobbes (1651), the use of violence is a means of self-preservation when the state of nature is defined by fear. Hence, violence is derived from reasoning upon the context of its use. Hobbes clarifies the process of reasoning: "it is a precept, or general rule of reason that every man, ought to endeavour peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of warre"²⁷¹. However, 'reason' can itself become a tool for the renunciation of violence when the individual desire for dominance and self-preservation is passed into the hands of an authority whose function is to protect the

individual. Therefore, violence of individual against individual is denounced by reason. In relation to the collective, violence can still be conceived through reason when the State deems, through collective reason, to act violently in order to enhance its domination amongst other states or to act in self-preservation. Coinciding with collective reason, we find that anthropological research contributes significantly to our understanding of violence by establishing that “violence is pre-eminently collective rather than individual, social rather than asocial or anti-social, usually culturally structured and always culturally interpreted”²⁷².

Human and social psychology has shown that unconscious emotional processes affect human conduct greatly²⁷³. For example, the projection of certain unwanted impulses or thoughts onto another. Control of these impulses and primitive drives has been an element of human and social civil development²⁷⁴. The frustration from the primitive drives may cause emotions that can be displaced (since they cannot be directly satisfied due to civil disruption) or channelled to other objects. In other words, according to Sigmund Freud (1938)²⁷⁵ control is affected by internalising the superego while encouraging the functioning of a strong ego. However, social conditions also greatly affect the human capability of displacement; since, even though violence may be widespread, the ability for co-operation is also clearly evident amongst humans²⁷⁶.

As Sigmund Freud (1938) articulated, all organic life seeks the reduction of nervous excitation to the lowest possible level. By extrapolating, he believed that all pleasure seeking is basically orientated towards the lessening of internal tension²⁷⁷, he maintained that all living organisms essentially wanted to die, for to die was to be free from stimulation or tension, since ‘the goal of all life is death’²⁷⁸. However, Freud (1938) also realised that this ‘peace’ could not be easily attained. Death is usually feared and consciously avoided rather than sought out. This is because the yearning for self-annihilation is opposed by the life instinct, Eros, causing the death urge to be deflated outward²⁷⁹. As a consequence, instead of seeking their own death, people are supposedly impelled to attack others²⁸⁰; since, their search for inner peace presumably forces them to desire the active destruction of others. Moreover, according to Freud (1938), whatever outward aggression people display, whether in fantasy or in open behaviour, lessens their internal drive to die²⁸¹. To apply this thesis to a specific case, we could say that Mahatma Ghandi’s abhorrence of all aggression necessarily required him to seek his own death. This application could also be true for Jesus Christ, and numerous other martyrs throughout history.

Research on the sources of conflict by sociological theory²⁸² indicates that socialisation contributes to people and groups being prone to conflict and violence²⁸³. Primary socialisation tends to come from the parents through attitudes and general methods of child rearing²⁸⁴. However, socialisation also comes from interactions with other siblings, kin, peers, role models, figures of authority, and institutions at an early age²⁸⁵. In this respect, the ‘Social Learning Theory’²⁸⁶ hypothesises that children who are physically punished or abused by their parents or other authority figures are susceptible to reproducing conflict and violent actions in later life; for example, in early or even late adulthood²⁸⁷. Intergenerational transmission of violence has been supported by a range of research on family violence²⁸⁸. We may go further by suggesting that a ‘spartan’ socialisation in childhood leads towards an inclination to engage in violent behaviour during adolescence and adulthood²⁸⁹.

Ross (1993) also identifies 'male identity confusion' as a factor in the production of adults prone to conflict and violence²⁹⁰. This factor is especially important in patriarchal societies where fathers tend to distance themselves; therefore, leaving male children to form strong bonds with their mothers to compensate. However, in order to fulfil the requirements of masculinity (male behaviour: pride, tough, strong, and without the show of soft emotions) in juvenility or early adulthood, males are forced to break these strong bonds (not only with their mothers, but also with others who they have formed strong bonds with, such as childhood companions), which invariably leads to frustration and the generation of hostility and aggression²⁹¹.

Violence does vary according to the circumstances and the social context within which it may be used. For individuals, biological factors such as instincts or drives may contribute to violent tendencies, and as already mentioned, harsh socialisation may produce adults that may be prone to overt conflict. However, for collective intra-action and interaction, the dynamics and processes involved may differ to an extent. Biological instincts and drives of individuals may impinge upon the workings of the collective, especially if the individuals concerned are within the leadership however, the formation of a conflict within and between groups is very different from that for an individual, by far. The tendencies of groups to indulge in conflict prone behaviour are to a large extent based upon characteristics and conditions that may foster conflict inducing emotions and cognitions; such as, peer pressures, cultural values and norms that encourage hostile behaviour (for example, xenophobia), as well as other social structures of institutions that engender outward conflict.

National character is a controversial subject²⁹², however, particular socialisation experiences, such as childrearing patterns, if shared by society members, may allow certain behaviour patterns to be more uniform and prominent than not, such as aggressive traits throughout society; for example, open or tacit approval of parents is a contributing factor in the habit-forming process that makes a weapon a part of an individual's attire and their conscious or subconscious readiness to use it. Cultural, situational, geographical and environmental factors that are shared by a society may also contribute to socialisation. However, these psychological and socio-psychological processes must be shared by a significant proportion of society for them to be pertinent to the behaviour of the whole social entity. In this respect, cultural aspects are significant in the collective's conflict perception. Different degrees of conflict perception are also provided by cultural norms and values. The types of reactive behaviour or confrontational behaviour that different cultures accept do vary. For example, a particular culture may incorporate the notion of retaliation or revenge to the provocations of another social entity, while a different culture may propagate the idea of pacific reactions, such as 'turning the other cheek'. These behaviours can be attributed to the collective character and how a particular social entity may react in a given conflict situation, whether for or against a violent response.

Other factors can also contribute to national character, such as the ideology adopted by a social entity. The interpretations of the social world that a group displays do reflect its way of thinking, and hence, how it may behave in conflict situations; for example, whether the way of thinking is worldly (secular) or out-worldly

(religious). With respect to the latter, the concept of Jihad in Islam is fundamental to the national character of Afghanistan.

Narrowly conceived, ideology provides an explicit analysis of the group and its place in the larger social context. On the basis of that analysis, it prescribes conduct to advance the values and interests of the group and its members.²⁹³

Hitherto, the discussion has concentrated on those factors that contribute to the progress of a conflict from a lesser stage to a higher stage, or from a lower to a higher intensity. The higher the intensity of conflict, the more difficult it is to resolve. Overall, the interaction of the processes described above with the actions of the conflictual parties may result in either the escalation of a conflict, its de-escalation, or a protracted stalemate. Therefore, the question arises, although beyond the scope of this study; once parties are engulfed in a conflictual relationship, why do some parties allow themselves to deepen their involvement in situations that may eventually be counterproductive for them?

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART I

CHAPTER THREE

**AFGHANISTAN
CASE STUDY**

PART I

CHAPTER THREE

AFGHANISTAN – CASE STUDY

3 – Afghanistan – The Core Study

3:1 - Introduction

The State of Afghanistan and its concern for the maximisation of its potential for survival in a hostile environment is not merely the main case study, it is, in fact, the core of this thesis. This study does not aim to simply highlight the causes and consequences of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in general; it will also investigate the nature of Afghanistan, its people, and society by identifying the immensely traumatic effects of war and how they have critically debilitated the society's every attempt to return to a state of stability. Therefore, the unique nature of the people, environment, and conflict in Afghanistan, impels a culturally sensitive analysis of the importance of the cultural traits of the diverse ethnic groups, their religious affiliations, tribalism, stratification, gender roles, environment, and political differences within the broader society, when considering the impacts of the proliferation of SALW on Afghan society and their effects on the dynamics of the intractable conflict in Afghanistan.

This chapter will underscore the development of the cultural norms that have accentuated the role of weapons through the evolution of the *archetypal* male and warrior culture in Afghanistan, which may have assisted the stagnation of its socio-political evolution. This will be illustrated by identifying the specific historical epochs that have moulded Afghanistan's cultural maturity¹. Furthermore, understanding the development of the warrior ethos allows us to appreciate the inculcation of culturally orientated regulatory mechanisms for the control of weapons and violence through the codification of rules pertaining to conduct and behaviour.

This chapter will also look at the consequences of the social mores of *martial*² societies undergoing a pacification process, their direct impact upon the social self-perception of society, and hence, the perception of weapons. As such, a discussion on particularly relevant attributes of Afghan society are employed, such as the differences between *Nang* and *Qalang* social orientations³, and the paradigms that they utilise to explain the effects of settlement, that is, the transition from non-settled areas to stability in settled areas and their affects on social psyche transformation. In other words, in relation to the social perceptions of the Afghan, from offensive social behavioural norms when residing in inhospitable rural mountainous environments, and the social acceptance of raiding to obtain food, income and general sustenance, to defensive social behavioural norms when residing in settled environments, which induce a necessity for self-protection from raiders.

This chapter will discuss the role played by the *archetypal male* model within the social stratification of Afghan society on a national level and within different ethnic groups⁴. This analysis will explain the mechanisms and processes involved in tribalism, which confronts and deters effective centralisation of

society. An important facet of the cultural attitude towards weapons and violence is the understanding, acceptance and conversion of Afghan society from a pacific Buddhist past to the more martial character, imbued through and concurrent with the advent of Islam. Therefore, the impact of the concept of *Jihad*⁵ upon the cultural traditions of Afghan society, and perception of weapons and violence is elaborated upon towards the end of this chapter.

3:2 – The Warrior Ethos within Afghanistan’s Tribal Societies

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a Warre, as is of every man, against every man.⁶

Humans, as singular political entities can only exercise their political will inside the broader environment within which other humans reside, and without which, they do not exist as political agents, since they have no political function. Therefore, the basic political unit exists where two or more humans interact, because the dynamics of power, hierarchy, and role come into play. To this extent, the *tribe* is a larger political unit, which is greater than one residential unit (the family unit)⁷. However, the tribe in Afghanistan is defined by its social organisation, and particularly by the development of the social stratification of Afghan society through patrilineal segmentation, which derives unity through extended kinship and common ancestry rather than territorial identity⁸. This is especially true of acephalous tribal groups identifying through patrilineal descent, such as the Pushtun. With respect to the term *ethnic group*, there are marked differences such as its greater identification with territory and a particular language than extended kinship; for example, common ancestry, cultural traits, historical traditions, and language, are shared within both the tribe and ethnic group, however, the tribe can be recognised as a subset of ethnicity rather than parallel to it. Ethnic groups can exist without tribes, but a tribe cannot exist without the ethnic group or its associated identity. Nonetheless, the defining point is the particularly pronounced role that kinship plays in the political organisation of tribal society; since, without kinship, a tribe cannot exist.

The paramount prerequisite for security and economic survival in every community has been the primary motive for the evolution of a warrior ethos, which eventually cultivated military survival. In effect, the latter ensured the continuation of economic survival through the politicisation of man through the establishment of social organisation. For the warrior, militarization was synonymous with his political function. Within non-tribalised society, the warrior *class* became a distinct and separate body after the division of labour to ensure the utmost preparedness for military survival⁹. Since, for an environment within which there is a continual threat of attack, survival is dependent upon preparation for future attacks. In contrast, there is no distinct division of labour in highly tribalised societies, and as such, every able male assumes the reins and responsibilities of a warrior. The long-term consequence of politico-militarism within the tribal make-up was the de-politicisation of the female, and her exclusion from the political process¹⁰. With reference to the British defeat in the First Afghan-Anglo War (1839-1842), Mayer and Paget (1879) conceded, “the Afghan army might, according to General Ferrier, consist in case of necessity of the whole male population, as every man is a born soldier”¹¹. This may also be the defining point in respect to the increased opposition American and British interests are currently facing in Afghanistan.

One of the overriding consequences of the development of such a culture is the adoption of a particular lifestyle, which may largely be dependent upon the environmental conditions within which the community resides¹². Certain cultures may adopt particular rituals or develop institutions to regulate and exemplify their warrior characteristics. For example, the sun dance, as practiced by the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras of Upper Missouri, represented the formalisation of the military sections of the Native American plains tribes, as did the development of war societies¹³. Tribal males are often programmed from birth towards becoming warriors, and therefore, their psychological make-up is partially predetermined within warrior cultures¹⁴. Programming often involves a continuous process of accounts of acts of bravery and their importance in battle above all other virtues through stories and fables, such as those of *Antara ibn Shaddad* (an Arab adventurer and poet in pre-Islamic Arabia) in Classic Arab literature¹⁵, and with emphasis on death in battle as the highest achievable honour. Consequently, the nature of tribalism has its roots in inter-tribal warfare¹⁶. Passion for and the defence of one's tribe is a paramount characteristic of tribal societies, and is true for larger communities such as, countries or ethnic groups. However, the underlying rationale for these is the need to identify with and be part of a group that is greater than the individual.

3:2:1 – The Socio-political Imperatives of Martial Cultures

Historically, the competition for resources forced communities and societies to develop their personal defence, and hence, the development of war strategies that facilitated the symbiotic evolution of offensive-defensive tactics; as is exemplified by the development of the martial arts in China during the Xia dynasty under the Yellow Emperor, Huangdi (r. 2697-2597 B.C.)¹⁷, which was encouraged by constant raiding party attacks from the Mongolian Steppe. Codes of conduct and ethics were incorporated within the culture and eventually legitimated by religious authority, as in Japan's adoption of Zen Buddhism, which became an integral part of the *Samurai's* (the zenith of Japan's warrior class) armament¹⁸.

The rise of regular armies, as opposed to raiding parties, encouraged the societal division of labour along hierarchical lines, within which, the warrior class was usually the most prominent¹⁹. Consequently, many societies encouraged their children to acquire schooling within martial institutions; for example, the Spartans of ancient Greece²⁰. The use of such armies to conquer and subdue others, for prestige, resources and wealth for the homeland, led to the wider diffusion of such institutions and their methods of learning.

Where a region lies at the strategic junction between rising empires, continuous invasion by contesting groups seeking to find strategic dominance, or at least parity with their rivals, are inevitable. Where invading armies are predominantly of the warrior class, indigenous populations are, therefore, in a continuous process of bombardment by martial knowledge. Over the passage of time and the need for constant defence against further invasions, such influences provoked indigenous populations within many societies to acquire methods for efficient and effective self-organisation and evolve cultural characteristics that aspired towards an archetype of an efficient martial society. Such an evolved society develops value for its prime assets, its warriors. Consequently, although warrior cultures developed for the protection of their own communities, the

larger armies of expanding empires also seek them out. Xerxes' vast Persian armies utilised large contingents of Afghan warriors during the Achaemenid expansion and invasion of Greece, in 480 BC (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.1 – Extent of the Achaemenian Empire), where the majority of these armies were composed of warriors from pre-conquered territories²¹. The Cossacks, who were feared for their martial abilities, were even employed against each other by competing countries, as illustrated by the seventeenth century Russo-Polish Wars²².

The cultural development of Afghanistan has been inextricably linked to conflict from within and without, as is true for many nations. Its distinguishing feature, however, is its strategic location, as a confluence between three dominant sub-continent, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Persian/Middle Eastern region. The expansion of empires and the competition to acquire resources further afield made Afghanistan a contesting ground and battlefield for opposing powers. Within this context and the harsh environmental conditions, over the course of several millennia, Afghanistan's diverse ethnic groups developed cultural characteristics that exemplify the *warrior archetype*.

3:3 – Afghanistan's Historical Evolution

A brief understanding of the emergence of Afghanistan, historically as a location within the boundaries of numerous significant military powers, whether whole or part, and recently as a dynamic state entity with a national identity, will exemplify the characteristics of its diverse ethnic groups, and illustrate the highly fluidic nature of its political environment. The extensive upheaval of Afghan society has enabled *conflict* to become intrinsic to its social and cultural fabric to such a degree that its absence may be perceived as an abnormal and even revolutionary event. However, this environment of intractable conflict has had a disastrous impact upon the development of the Afghan nation (see, Appendix II, Table 3.1 – General Demographics of Afghanistan).

The demographics in Table 3.1 suggest that Afghanistan is not only suffering from extreme environmental conditions, but also socio-economic degradation after more than three decades of continuous protracted violent conflict. The all-pervasive and apparent impoverishment within Afghan society is a direct result of every ethnic group's struggle for peaceful coexistence during millennia of perpetual internally and externally imposed conflicts, invasions and occupations. While socio-economic, political and technological advances have engulfed the rest of the world, every attempt to change the status quo within Afghanistan through internal reform, occupation or conquest of the indigenous population has resulted in its socio-psychological resistance, withdrawal and stagnation, giving rise to stringent and ultraconservative cultures bent upon self-preservation, in detriment to Afghanistan's future development.

Afghanistan is comprised of a variety of ethnic groups of diverse origins, which is to be expected in an area that has been a juncture and corridor for people finding their way across its terrain to Persia, Europe, Africa, India, Central Asia, China, and beyond since prehistory. These migrations have left indelible, linguistic, cultural, traditional, and religious signatures on present day Afghans, and have resulted in an especially variegated language and population map of Afghanistan. Coupled with this, the shock of regular invasions,

occupations and conquests by unknown foreigners cannot be measured in physical terms alone. Unrelenting threats to their survival emerged at every stage of their existence, resulting in a state of perpetual fear and personal insecurity. These socio-political conditions were reflected by the development of a culture within which traditions evolved to provide substance to significant events and situations, heightening their relative importance. Transgenerational transmission of traditions within the family structure assisted the evolution of cultural traits amongst Afghan communities, instilling behavioural norms into successive generations, while codifying and instituting social regulations to secure the preservation of future generations. Incessant upheavals, coupled with geographical location, assisted the codification of a *martial* culture.

3:3:1 – Ancient Origins²³

The origins of the collective noun *Afghan*, as Dupree (1980) notes, may date back to the third century A.D. Sasanian reference to *Abghan*²⁴. However, the area incorporated within the region Afghanistan has been inhabited since well before prehistory and as early as 100,000 years before present (B.P.)²⁵. Archaeological research since 1922 has found evidence of Neanderthals dating 30,000 years B.P. during the Middle Palaeolithic Period, and of early Neolithic culture around 11,000 - 8,000 B.P.²⁶. The strategic location of the region now known as Afghanistan was inherently manifest by constant migrations from the North, South, East and West since the beginnings of civilisation, and is illustrative of the progressive accumulation of martial knowledge, as is exemplified by the following brief historical account.

In most cases, the territorial area now denoted as Afghanistan had existed as a frontier for centuries, on the periphery of great civilisations. Nonetheless, it was under complete occupation during the Achaemenid era, under Cyrus the Great (b. 590-580 BC, d. 529 BC)²⁷ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.1 – Extent of the Achaemenian Empire). Alexander the Great overthrew the Achaemenids when he defeated Darius III (r. 336-330 BC) at the conclusive battle of Guagamela (331 BC). Subduing the Persians, Alexander progressed to the satrapies of Arachosia, Aria, Bactriana, Khorasan, and Parthia (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.2 – Persian Political Division of Satrapies: also see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.3 – Alexander the Great’s Campaign Routes).

Some of Alexander’s excursions involved subduing isolated tribes called the Ariasprians (Pushtun and Baluch) in Arachosia, north of Gedrosia (Baluchistan) and on the southern borders of present Afghanistan. These tribes had never been pacified by the Persians and had instituted their own form of government, which according to Arrian (III, xxvii, 4) greatly mirrored the open councils of the Greeks. Alexander was considerably impressed by the tribal assembly, the *Jirgah*, and prudently left their tribal lifestyle unhindered²⁸. In continuous fighting, from northern Afghanistan, through Laghman, the Kunar River, Bajaur and Swat, the hardened local mountain people, who had developed a warlike culture²⁹, resisted Alexander at every turn. When his troops mutinied at the Beas River, Alexander was forced to return to Babylon. Shortly after his arrival, he died after a short intense illness on 13 June 323 BC.

The movement of people between Central Asia and Khorasan (Afghanistan) had well established patterns in-line with trade routes and seasonal nomadic migrations. However, Central Asian civilisations only rose to their zenith when they sought to move away from their indigenous Central Asia Steppes. The drive for

dominance over the rich Indus Valley and the Persian Empire began through the strategic gateway of Khorasan, and led to countless major incursions of the south, leading to unremitting ethno-cultural upheavals of the southern borderlands' composition.

The tug of war between Persians and Central Asia persisted for several centuries until the rise of Islam, in AD 642, and the defeat of the Persian Empire. It took four long centuries for the Islamic armies to take control of, and impart Islam to, the indigenous cultures apparent within Afghanistan, after which, numerous successive Islamic dynasties rose and fell, including the Tahirids, Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids³⁰, and the Ghurids (or Ghorids, from Ghor in Central Afghanistan). In the 1219 AD, Genghis Khan (born Temujin, in 1162 A.D., the date most favoured in Mongolia, d. 1227 AD) tore through Central Asia to the Persian Empire under Sultan 'Ala' ad-Din Muhammad, the Khwarizm Shah (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.4 – The Mongol Invasions of the Muslim East during the Thirteenth Century). In his *History of Afghanistan*, Fraser-Tytler (1967) did not exaggerate when he said, “the Mongol invasions of Central Asia and Europe were, until the rise of the Nazis under Hitler, the greatest catastrophe which has befallen mankind”³¹. The Afghan territories were no exception, as their characteristically stubborn resistance induced disproportionate retaliation from the Khan, who brutally avenged any hint of a reversal to his vast conquests³². Over the following two centuries, the Safavid and Mughal Empires tenuously annexed Afghanistan between themselves (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.5 – Safavid Persia in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 1501-1722 A.D.).

3:3:2 – Modern History

The history of modern Afghanistan began with the events that brought about Pushtun suzerainty under Ahmad Shah Abdali, in 1747. Hitherto, the Pushtun were, at one point or other, bitterly divided and engaged in inter-tribal conflict. However, they were often recruited into the armies of neighbouring empires due to their martial nature, and commonly employed to fight against other Pushtun tribes with which they had disputes. Nevertheless, shrewd and audacious Pushtun manipulation of other ethnic groups located throughout Afghanistan contributed to the creation of the Afghan Empire, wherein many non-Pushtun ethnic groups only acknowledged Pushtun suzerainty under duress. The Afghan Empire took shape as a direct result of its Pushtun leadership. Consequently, scholars have paid little attention to the contributions made by minority ethnic groups in the development of the Afghan Empire. Irrespective of their bitter divisions, the Pushtun ensured that no other group would be able to wrestle power from their control.

Nadir Shah sought to consolidate his hold on his tenuously held and wavering Afghan territories by subduing the Pushtun tribes with overwhelming force, especially the divided, yet, rebellious Abdalis in Herat. However, Nadir Shah's invasion acted as a catalyst for Pushtun cohesion between the Abdali and Ghilzai tribes who had been engaged in an ongoing dispute over tribal supremacy and in a perpetual *state of nature*³³ in the provinces and cities of Herat, Farah and Kandahar³⁴. Nevertheless, on both expeditions, between 1731 and 1732, Nadir Shah overcame the combined strength of the Ghilzai and Abdali Pushtun³⁵. Although a constant threat to Nadir Shah, many Abdali³⁶ joined the ranks of the Persian Army after having been ordered to migrate to Persian Khorasan. Assisted by his Abdali contingent, Nadir Shah occupied much of south-

western Afghanistan before Kandahar fell to an army of over 80,000 men, in 1738³⁷. The Shah's pleasure at the performance of the Abdali contingent permitted their resettlement in Kandahar and the surrounding regions of Zamindawar and Qal'a-yi Bist³⁸. In contrast, the Ghilzai were forced to migrate to Persian Khorasan, thereby restoring the Abdali's original status quo and tribal supremacy. The consequent dispersion of Pushtun tribes in Afghanistan remains as such today. Nadir Shah was assassinated by his Persian officers on 19 June 1747. However, Ahmad Khan Abdali (an Abdali Pushtun officer in the service of Nadir Shah, who commanded a body of 4000 horse cavalry) escaped the coup d'état with his cavalry intact, as well as Nadir Shah's portable treasury intact, including the Kohinoor (mountain of light) diamond that had been captured from Delhi.

The Afghans found that their loyalties could be channelled towards the creation of a separate Afghan political identity. Upon Ahmad Khan Abdali's return to Kandahar, a tribal *Jirgah* was held to elect a political leader for the new Afghan body, and was closely contested between the stronger tribes (Kohzad). Upon the ninth day, and at the request of a *darvish*, Sabir Shah, Ahmad Khan was unanimously declared the *Badshah Durr-i-Dauran* (King, Pearl of the Age), which he amended to *Durr-i-Durran* (Pearl of Pearls, 'one amongst equals'), therefore, pronouncing himself a paramount chief, and not a king³⁹. The Abdali were, henceforth, to be known as the Durrani (of the Pearls)⁴⁰.

The present boundaries of Afghanistan began developing as Ahmad Shah conquered the areas north of the Hindu Kush Mountains, successively pacifying the Turkoman of Asterabad, the Uzbek of Maimana, Balkh and Kunduz; the Tajik of Khanabad and Badakhshan; and, the Hazara of Bamiyan. These diverse ethnic groups accepted, albeit under duress, the suzerainty of Ahmad Shah Durrani and the overlordship of the Pushtun. Ahmad Shah Durrani utilised every possible opportunity to obtain arms, artillery and ammunition through raids, invasions and conquests throughout his reign⁴¹, and was therefore able, during his remaining years, to push the boundaries of Afghanistan from the Atrek River to the Indus River and from Tibet to the Arabian Sea, incorporating regions and people as diverse as the Sindh, Kashmir, Khorasan, Kalat, Baluchistan, Multan, and the Punjab⁴².

Possession of the provinces that Ahmad Shah *Durrani* had conquered were retained by his son and successor, Timur Shah (r. 1772-1793), (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.1 – Royal House of Afghanistan – Hereditary Lineage Tree), without expanding them. Timur Shah relocated the Empire's capital from Kandahar to Kabul in order to reduce his rivals' power in 1778 (his family and contesting tribes), and facilitate co-existence with the non-Durrani tribes and non-Pushtun ethnic groups which constituted large parts of the empire. Although provincial structures were prevalent, the Afghan Empire existed without a significant central administrative structure.

Amir (Arabic, leader) Dost Mohammad Khan (Barakzai tribe of the Durrani Confederation: r. 1826-39) consolidated Afghanistan's territories into one geo-political unit⁴³ until he was deported to India upon the British Invasion of Afghanistan and the start of the Afghan-Anglo War (1839–1842). He returned to the

throne (r. 1843–63) shortly after the successful defeat of the British⁴⁴ and the killing of their *Puppet King*, Shah Shuja (from the same Popalzai Durrani sub-tribe as his descendant, President Karzai⁴⁵, in April 1842. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (the *Iron Amir*, r. 1880–1901) continued the process of internal consolidation (*Internal Imperialism*), during which the present boundaries⁴⁶ of Afghanistan were delineated, albeit, under duress by Britain and the signing of the treaty of friendship with Czarist Russia⁴⁷, for which the latter succeeded in bringing influence to bear on the Afghan court. The Iron Amir created an effective centralised state structure, which was sustained by his son, Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–1919), who succeeded to the throne without the usual fratricidal infighting.

3:4 – Afghan Society

3:4:1 – Introduction

The relationship of the individual to his society has been as central to thought in the history of mankind as it has been polychromic in its complexity.⁴⁸

The structural manifestation of Afghan society, as much as any other society, is a product of the necessity to protect itself. However, in most societies, the survival of the many has been at the expense of the few. Nevertheless, the dynamics of social change have produced incessant upheavals in the character of the matrix of interlacing and largely fixed social patterns that define the individual's relationship to society. In this respect, the development of a martial culture in Afghanistan has inextricably defined the individual's relationships and functions for the preservation of society, albeit, at the cost of the individual's liberty to circumvent psycho-socio-cultural constraints. Society has been largely successful in programming the individual to obediently accept its circumstances through socially constructed concepts, and collective mores and norms that enforce codes of conduct and behaviour to maintain predefined societal power structures. Only within such socially defined parameters, is the individual able to create leeway to consciously or unconsciously manipulate society in order to maximise itself to an optimum point, of which, the "ultimate expression is the pursuit and attainment of political power"⁴⁹. Nevertheless, this is not unlike non-martial societies, since, as Leach (1954) states: "I consider it necessary and justifiable to assume that a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is a very general motive in human affairs"⁵⁰.

The worlds of men and women being vividly apart from each other, however, the acquisition of power for women is generally, although not universally, limited to its influence and exercise within the household in patrilineal and patriarchal societies, such as Afghanistan. Even the self-maximisation of men is, to a large degree, limited to the stratification imposed by a socially constructed hierarchy, despite the ethos of fierce independence being the cornerstone of Afghan society (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.2 – Boundaries of Social Stratification and Self-Maximisation in Afghanistan). Therefore, we can assert that a differentiation exists between a woman and a man that acts socially and within the constraints imposed by social hierarchy, and one that is simply behaving⁵¹.

Special events and circumstances may arise that provoke a man and/or woman to override established social constraints and actualise the ethos of fierce independence. This dichotomy in human action and social

makeup is instituted to regulate society if its social hierarchy is threatened. In this respect, self-maximisation to achieve political power regularly facilitates economic enhancement; however, in contrast, the social structure of tribal society frequently constrains economic relations within and between tribes in order to maintain a state of equilibrium⁵², and hence, inhibits community wide self-maximisation and its effects.

The following section describes the environment within which the social hierarchy has established itself, from the intractability of the terrain to the social mechanisms and concepts that control social mobility and behaviour. The relevance of this section will become evident as it progresses; nevertheless, it illustrates the extent to which the character and stratification of Afghan society is able to withstand the immense impacts of the proliferation of SALW and the intense intractable conflict.

From the barren and infertile deserts to the highly ridged mountain passes and glacial formations, Afghanistan oozes inhospitability and a harsh lifestyle. The rough terrain severely constrains human existence. Nevertheless, it provides ideal conditions for resistance to central authority, and has facilitated the development of a character and culture that mirrors the harshness of the environment through a distinctly ferocious tradition of guerrilla warfare.

The Afghan character is a strange medley of contradictory qualities, in which courage blends with stealth, the basest treachery with the most touching fidelity... and a lavish hospitality.⁵³

The Afghan character has significantly contributed to Afghanistan's stubbornly slow progress. Resistance to authority is not limited to foreign invaders, but also any central authority wishing to extend its control over Afghanistan's regional and local power structures. Economic development necessitates the integration of a country under a strong unitary central government, or a cooperative federal structure that provides some autonomy for ethnically defined provinces coalescing under larger units in order to maintain economic growth and expansion, which, in turn, depends upon the centre's successful exercise of authority and leadership. However, nothing is certain at this moment in time due the fragility of the current central government, which is not wholly autonomous, given the government's absolute dependence upon foreign occupying powers. The lack of a credibly legitimate (within local cultural definitions of legitimacy), strong and stable central government has encouraged many uprisings in Afghanistan in response to its centralisation programs⁵⁴, where variegated ethnic groups and tribes have regularly manipulated government weaknesses to their advantage, and have often acted as kingmakers or breakers. However, this accommodation has made it difficult to harness the appearance of a modern State⁵⁵. In this respect, the multifarious interests of the different ethnicities, tribes, and other interest groups must be accommodated through mutually a negotiated appreciation of their respective parameters to facilitate an effective central or federal system of governance; as is a case for many pluralistic societies.

The history of Afghanistan's political development has been one of periodic fusion and fission.⁵⁶

To understand the forces that aid this fusion/fission process, the domestic perceptions of the central government and what it represents to the different ethnicities and tribes should be taken into account. Ethnic groups and tribes have historically perceived their interests as far outweighing the interests of the central

government; thereby, manifesting themselves as centrifugal forces that invariably impeded the consolidation of the monopoly of power by the central government, which invariably reacted forcefully to reduce such forces upon itself. Consequently, the perception of government interference with those interests has often resulted in the actualisation of such centrifugal forces to induce revolts⁵⁷ and rebellions. Therefore, many regions of Afghanistan that are ethnically and linguistically homogenous developed a significant degree of autonomy from the centre; for example, Uzbek autonomy over the past three decades, especially under Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Tajiks of Badakhshan and Herat, and the Hazaras of Hazarajat. This is especially the case over the course of the Afghan conflict, through which many disparate interest groups were empowered through the ability to resist centralised control, with access to SALW and other easily available weapons, within the umbrella of a national or local resistance to foreign occupation or Pushtun dominance.

Due to the conflict between local and national interests, the evolving autonomous regions within Afghanistan, have accentuated the polarisation of Afghanistan's ethnicities and further deteriorated attempts at a permanent national unification, rather than the ad hoc attempts being made under the protection of foreign occupying powers, which will eventually be leaving the region in the near future. In this respect, the forceful imposition of *will* is not possible for contemporary governments, as it was for Amir Abdur-Rahman Khan under his policy of internal imperialism. These social cleavages have developed into open fissures that can, and are regularly exploited by internal or external parties that further amplify societal fissures to the detriment of the long-term future of Afghanistan; for example, the *Pushtunistan* issue soured relations between the majority Pushtun and the remaining ethnic groups. The issue is one of demographic, especially population percentages. Estimates as to the proportion of Pushtun in Afghanistan range between 40 and 55 percent, the former may well be an interpretation by the latest occupiers of Afghanistan to emphasise the importance of the non-Pushtun in demographic term, albeit, with absolutely no evidence for their calculations of such figures; which is, in essence, a redefinition of the distribution of resources and power in favour of the non-Pushtun minority ethnicities in Afghanistan. The reintegration of the Pakistani Pushtun into Afghanistan would overwhelmingly increase the Pushtun majority, forcing the remaining ethnic groups to oppose any form of reintegration. Nevertheless, *Pushtunistan* has been a contentious issue between every Afghani and Pakistani Government since the delineation of the Durand Line border in 1893 and independence of Pakistan in 1947, respectively.

3:4:2 – Afghan Social Structure

The complexity of Afghan social life is intricately linked to its structural stratification. Policy implementation, alliance formation, and war fighting are guided and essentially controlled by the established social order, which consequently contributes to Afghan martial success. Ethno-national identities principally define inter-group relations for Afghanistan's numerous ethnicities, of which eight are prominent (Pushtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Aimaq, Turkomen, Kirghiz, and Baluch). The following structural analysis of the social stratification of the variegated Afghan ethnic groups will enhance an appreciation of the variation of the intrinsic historical development of defensive structural organisation by certain ethnic groups as opposed to others and their consequent inter-group relationships, which have been further reinforced through constructed

concepts to enhance defensive structures and regulatory codes of conduct, as well as the constant barrage of invasions over the course of time; and consequently, the feedback they produce within Afghan social organisation.

As a segmentary society, pastoral Afghanistan displays many of the traits of an *acephalous*, or headless, and stateless tribal society. In ideal acephalous societies, no internal hierarchies exist, that is, excluding natural hierarchies established; for example, through parental authority, which often extends into the *society of elders*. However, acephalous societies retain a degree of internal organisation, in which “near relatives should unite in disputes with more distant relatives”⁵⁸ based on an ideology of kinship and not through stratification and rank. The foundations of a segmentary lineage society are organised around *unilineal* descent, in which the ‘lineages maintain a set of varying relations with each other with respect to putative genealogical distance’⁵⁹ (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.3 – Structure of a Patrilineal Segmentary Society). Therefore, the whole tribe claims descent from a single ancestor; a male ancestor in patrilineal societies, such as the Pushtun. The tribe is a large collection of residential groups linked through common descent. As a residential kin group (the basic being the father, mother and children)⁶⁰ fissions into two segments (the separation of the first order progeny), they may still associate with their direct origin, and still perceive themselves as a kin group, a residential group. This kin group is a higher-order lineage, which is composed of two or more lower-order lineages. However, when secondary groups fission, allowing segmentation to continue, the genealogical distance from the common ancestor grows and the residential factor diminishes in regards to the earlier residential groups, but grows with regards to the recently subdivided. Referring to this structure as *monadism*, Gellner (1969) notes how the primary, secondary, and tertiary segmentary groups mirror each other’s structures, and recognises that “the smaller group is an embryo tribe, the tribe is the smaller group writ large”⁶¹.

As the significance of the residential factor decreases, the degree of relation to the common ancestor acquires more distance. Nevertheless, the relation to the common ancestor remains significant. Furthermore, the residential factor is inversely proportional to the growth of a sodality⁶²; where a sodality is an abstraction as opposed to the residential group, which is a distinct fact. Therefore, sodality bonds require the use of symbols, such as mythology or insignia, to strengthen them. Nevertheless, for a tribal sodality to exist and signify a relationship, through common ancestry, the residential factor does not diminish completely.

The tribe, composed of hundreds if not thousands of basic residential units, is therefore a system in which, “the more closely related lineages [are] allied as segments of a conceptualised higher-order lineage, which in turn is allied with others of that order into a still larger, more dispersed lineage of still higher, more abstract, order”⁶³. Ideally, such a system rules out any form of internal tribal hierarchy based upon rank of power or prestige, as each segment fits into the tribe equally amongst others due to its common ancestor that can be traced back through patrilineal decent. Every individual can trace their genealogical distance to every other individual in the tribe, and hence, know their political obligations in relation to other individuals. In this respect, the distinctions are made on the basis of the order of birth and genealogical distance from the

ancestor; that is, the first-born son of the first born sons rank the highest and eventually succeed their fathers through the application of primogeniture. In reality, however, individuals do manipulate their genealogical position in the tribe, utilising kinships as and when needed and discarding them when not useful. Frequently, a non-first-born may take up the reigns of authority based on his ability. In addition, the establishment of Islam in Afghanistan has instituted clear laws on inheritance, giving rights to all immediate progeny, including females.

The purpose and function of this system of organisation, through its intrinsic philosophy of reinforcing internal social cohesion with the constant presence of threat from external forces is political, since strong kinship bonds enable effective use of offence-defence alliances against outsiders, which generally only transpire negatively in response to external threats. Close kinship relations with contiguous residential lineages can easily unite into alliances. Distant lineages can be brought into alliances through sodality-like concepts; for example, common ancestry, which can form strong alliances with contiguous residential lineages to further enlarge the overall alliance, with the exception of units in opposition. The taboos placed upon breaking these lineages and, to a lesser extent, sodality bonds, facilitate effective resistance to any external threat. As such, the tribe is organised and geared towards warfare, and is “most successful and self maintaining, under archaic conditions in low production areas”⁶⁴.

Disputes within and between residential groups have a strong tendency towards stalemate due to the propensity to form symmetrical alliances of numerical equality, which proscribe extreme defeats. This acts as a built-in mechanism to enforce peace within a tribal community due to its deterrent effect. However, the formation of an alliance is not usually long-lived, with fusing groups generally splitting up into their segmentary groups and within their *units in opposition* once the tribal crisis and the need for an alliance is over (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.4 – Patterns of Conflict Relations amongst Residential Units). In this way, the growth of a central authority is prevented. What is interesting here is that the deterrent laden organisation within a tribe based upon *units in opposition* may be likened to Kutilya’s *Mandala* concept; where, simply put, an “enemy of one’s enemy was a friend”⁶⁵ (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.5 – Patterns of Co-operative Relations amongst Residential Units).

The consistent presence of external threat ensures internal unity. In fact, the necessity for internal unity also assists the competition between tribes, and on a larger scale, competition between ethnic groups to ensure unity within ethnicities. Therefore, the tribes’ external political processes tend to be predominately military in nature, with a sheer lack of co-operation in other fields. The consistency of the continuous military stance employed by the tribes indicates that a perpetual state of conflict exists between them⁶⁶ (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.6 – Conflicts and Co-operation amongst Tribes). However, the pan-ethnic sodalities that exist between them ensure a unified stance amongst the tribes against a threat external to the ethnic group; for example, posed by another ethnic group. By extrapolating, we note the successful unified stance by all ethnicities against a source that threatens the sodality between them; such as the unity cohered to by all Afghan ethnic groups under the ideological sodality of Islam against the Communist Soviets.

The potentiality to unify the whole society against external forces implies that this system has the capacity to develop into a growing system, by overcoming, integrating and/or enslaving neighbouring groups, which are deficient in their potential to form a united opposition⁶⁷. Consequently, those groups that may exist within the sphere of shared sodalities, but do not have an ability to form strong kinship alliances due to the absence of a kinship based social structure are in danger of being continuously subjugated by the more militaristic groups that can form strong alliances through their kinship organisation. The domination of the Pushtun in Afghanistan has largely been because of their ability to form a united front when faced with a threat from other ethnicities, regardless of however bitterly divided they are within themselves. For example, the Taliban's success in overcoming, securing and integrating the vast majority of the country was because of their ability to form strong alliances within the Pushtun tribal structure, albeit, under the veneer of pan-Islamism.

The Hazara are similarly organised through patrilineal segmentation; the basic unit normally consisting of a father, mother, unmarried children, and married sons with their wives and children⁶⁸. The family may be regarded as consisting of several nuclear families, known as *khanawar*⁶⁹ (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.7 – Socio-ethnic Structure of Hazara Society). Strong kinship bonds are established, which can readily be organised to create effective alliances that tend to be defensive in nature. Historically, however, their inability to overthrow Pushtun domination and other ethnic groups has not been because of the failure of their tribal social structure, but primarily because the sodality bonds that they share with other ethnicities are weaker than those bonds between other ethnicities. This is largely because they overwhelmingly adhere to Shia Islam, while the overwhelming majority of other ethnic groups profess Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 also illustrates occasions where the strengths of sodalities can vary in circumstances where survival becomes an issue of paramount importance.

Islam has generally provided a strong sodality for virtually all Afghans, and has facilitated a bulwark resistance against all outsiders, as exemplified by their unity against the Soviet invasion. Conversely, when faced against stronger ethnic sodality bonds, Islam failed to unite the warring factions during the Civil War period (1992-1996). However, when the ethnic sodality bonds reached a point at which they were interpreted as self-destructive to the overall community within which all the ethnic groups reside, they were readily perceived as the new external threat. At this juncture, the need to rebuild ethnic ties and subdue the strength of ethnic bonds required the emergence of sodality bonds which could act as a uniting element. The only bonds that were capable of uniting all Afghan ethnic groups against this new external threat were evidently those provided by their common ideological stance; that is, Islam with the veneer of Afghan nationalism (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.8 – Sodality Bonds between the Major Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan). However, those adherents who were not tainted by the Civil War (1992-1996) were initially envisaged as the only ones that could reinforce the pan-Afghan sodality.

The advent of the Taliban was sudden and meteoric. Regardless of their origins and backers, and having arisen from the epicentre of the Pushtun heartland, they were initially accepted in readiness by the Pushtun population, which had suffered immensely from the fractious internecine conflict, primarily because the Taliban had not been tainted by the bitter Afghan Civil War (1992-1996). Their call for a return to an unpolluted Islam to unite the country and all the ethnicities within it legitimated their immediate credence amongst the general Afghan populous. In this respect, the sodality of Islam was a uniting factor within the Pushtun ethnic group; while the ethnic sodality was still strong amongst the other ethnicities. However, once they had secured the majority of the Pushtun territory, and had established a firm base of support, any further advance to gain control of Afghanistan was primarily military in nature. Nevertheless, their Islamic appeal was still high amongst Afghanistan's war-weary population as Herat fell without a fight on 05 September 1995⁷⁰. The Pushtun population readily acclimatised to the Taliban's doctrine, based on a purist version of Islamic Shari'a from the *Doebandi* School⁷¹. However, Herat's relatively liberal population was unable to acclimatise as readily. This was not a failure of Islam as a sodality, but because of the Taliban's particular purist Deobandi interpretation of Islam, and their inability to understand or willingness to accept the different interpretations of the Islamic sodality amongst Afghanistan's minority ethnic groups without their ethnic sodality interfering. The Pushtun dimension of the Taliban's Islamic doctrine contradicted their call for the unification of the whole of Afghanistan under the sodality of Islam. Thereafter, the Taliban became increasingly associated with an existential Pushtun threat by most of Afghanistan's minority ethnic groups. This became more apparent when the Taliban captured Kabul, and established a government based upon their rural Pushtun interpretation of Islamic Shari'a.

Even though the Taliban had unified the vast majority of Afghanistan under their rule, their government fell soon after the initiation of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, which began on 07 October 2001, because the positions of power in Afghanistan are principle held in the historically consolidated patterns of land ownership. The Taliban were not great landlords in contrast to opposition leaders. Their downfall is especially true when we negate the ethnic sodality effect; that is, in minority ethnic territories, their control was interpreted as Pushtun domination; and therefore, their departure from these areas was largely due to ethnic rivalry. If the Taliban had been composed of a true cross section of the Afghan population, their swift departure could have been interpreted in terms of their lack of a political base founded upon territorial holdings; as was the case in Pushtun dominant areas. In retrospect, even if they had established control of the whole of Afghanistan, their rule would not have been entirely secure, given their lack of a permanent political base. The permanent status quo, in which the great landlords control the levers of power, would have re-materialised, as they have done. As it emerged, the Taliban have been able to resurface and re-establish a large degree of control by reducing the levers of landed power through a campaign of detribalisation largely dominated by an effective program of targeted assassinations of tribal elders, tribal leaders, and the landed elite and political power brokers who are invariably very wealthy⁷². In other words, the Taliban became aware of future obstacles to their power consolidation, and rather than co-opt them and retain an ever-present irritation and potential opposition, they are efficiently subduing their obstacles by killing them off and/or

forcing them to migrate⁷³. On some occasions, the Taliban has been redistributing vacant land to local peasantry, and thereby, changing structural realities⁷⁴.

3:4:3 – The Dynamics of Land and Power – Transformation of Sources of Conflict

In a study conducted by Frederik Barth (1959), *Political Leadership Amongst Swat Pathans*⁷⁵, on the Swat region in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, predominantly inhabited by the Yousufzai Pushtun tribe⁷⁶, he provides an appreciation of the importance of land ownership in the control, exercise, and maintenance of power, not only amongst the Pushtun but also the general population of Afghanistan.

Land forms the basis of the whole system of organisation in Swat... Its owner, by his mere possession, gains authority and control over numerous persons. The whole population of Swat is dependent on land in some form or other; and non-landowners can only gain access to it through agreements with landowners. The ownership of land is thus a direct source of political influence. An increase in land holdings implies an increase in such influence, indeed the possession of extensive land is a basic requirement for any kind of security in a position of ascendancy.⁷⁷

Although, the Yousufzai Pushtun do not entirely represent the broad Pushtun population in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms of their contrasting land distribution structure in Swat; the control of power that their ownership of land implies does not differ.

Yousufzai Pushtun landownership is cited to provide several illustrations. Their social organisation is built upon patrilineal segmentation; however, their social norms may change concurrently with changing land distribution patterns. In other words, social norms may be transformed as the forced resettlement of Yousufzai agriculturalist by more war-like tribes illustrates; this results in a dilution of the archetypal nomad ethos imbued through the development of their warrior culture. Nevertheless, core Pushtun values remain at the heart of their culture, for example, the Yusufzai's domination of less militaristic societies. However, this also demonstrates the parallel development of two contrasting types of societies amongst the Pushtun, the *Nang* and *Qalang*⁷⁸ (described in the following section), which are important for the possession of SALW due to the erosion of the significance of weapons, and therefore, firearms, in the less militaristic Qalang society. Consequently, the reduced emphasis in the possession of weapons may have reciprocal effects on the erosion of individual codes of conduct and social responsibility in relation to their possession and use due to the lessening necessity of their individual possession because of the evolution of structurally organised and permanent institutions to ensure the security of the collective. Moreover, this was made possible, in part, by the increasing wealth afforded by the collective body's social compromise and division of labour. Nevertheless, the extent of the collective institutionalisation of security may also be related to the degree of erosion of the personal and social responsibility in understanding the importance the impacts of the possession and use of weapons. In this respect, and as is discussed below, an erosion of individual responsibility, with respect to the possession and use of weapons, may have devastating effects when they are widely available in societies whose regulatory codes of conduct are no longer built into the cultural psyche of the individual and collective.

In respect to the Swat Pushtun, its uniqueness lays in the periodic land distribution and re-distribution system amongst lineage segments, that is, *wesh*. Equilibrium was established by providing cohesion amongst lineages through the segmentary system and formation of *units of opposition*. A permanent democracy and equality was ensured by the regular rotational ownership of allotted portions of land amongst lineages over every 10 to 20 year cycle, in which the favourable characteristics of an allotted land over another did not permanently advantage one residential unit over another. However, this negated the development of a permanent land base, and hence, the power base needed for the evolution of a central authority. It was also detrimental to the establishment and construction of permanent cities and abodes. Nevertheless, current economic conditions have facilitated the transition from an essentially nomadic existence to private ownership of land.

The agriculturalists Yousufzai Pushtun were forced to migrate from areas in the region of Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province, by more martial Pushtun tribes, and conquer the relatively less martial Swat region in 1515⁷⁹. Swat's unorganised, parochial, subordinate, and indigenous population served a sequence of different lords as tenants⁸⁰. "Subordinate and superordinate social positions were created and maintained; economic status was thus confirmed through genealogical charters"⁸¹. The initial feeling of military occupation persisted, but gradually faded as the Yousufzai reinforced and consolidated their ownership of land over a period of about four hundred years, to the exclusion of all non-Yousufzai.

Tribal segmentation provides both territorial and ethnic identity, while also guaranteeing a form of pastoral democracy. Nevertheless, "this is a structural democracy, rather than an ideological democracy. It is not based on a theory, on a set of principles or norms"⁸². Although ideal acephalous societies are stateless, the reality of a multi-ethnic Afghanistan is that it is not wholly structured upon unilineal segmentation due to its growing urbanisation, increasing rate of detribalisation, and returning refugees, has provoked the formation of a hierarchy based upon the distribution of land. While the latter also includes land acquisitions gained through historical and contemporary ethnic and/or tribal expansion, the Afghan social structure limits the self-maximisation of its citizens to within socially defined boundaries, and reflects a feudal society with defined positions of rank that reduce social mobility within all ethnicities. The PDPA coup (Saur Revolution – 1978) swiftly recognised the extent of land distribution disparities, claiming, "The vast majority of the villagers lease land under feudal conditions"⁸³. The *Kabul Times*, a regime mouthpiece, further claimed that 95 percent of the population subsisted on about 50 percent of all arable and cultivatable land, while the remainder was controlled by only 5 percent of the population⁸⁴.

While only occupying a medial position, the *Khan* is one of the most significant social positions that exist within this social hierarchy. Nevertheless, he maintains considerable control over his subordinates. The fluidity of centralised control largely depends upon the interaction between the centre and the Khan, and consequently, the Khan-peasant relationship; therefore, maintaining stability in Afghan social life. However, centre-Khan dynamics should be analysed within the context of the Afghan conflict (1978-present), shifting patterns of loyalties, insignificant centralised control, and regional precedence. Regional warlords exercise

extensive power, command wide-ranging loyalty from their client base of support, and are the backbone of any political faction because of their great landholdings. However, their loyalties also shift according to their econ-political interests and prevailing circumstances. The client base also shifts in conjunction with the patron. However, frequent shifting of loyalties by the patron or client is not possible since the patron-client (Khan/warlord-peasant) relationship is based upon equal and mutual reciprocity of interests. In a *face to face* society, where a person's social standing is defined by reliability, and within which reputations travel like wildfire, a fickle client or patron is likely to be perceived unfavourably by the new patron or clients, respectively, hence, acting as an intrinsic mechanism for the maintenance of stability and balance in the social system.

Afghanistan's social structure is a clearly perceptible materialization of the inexorable actuality of economic oppression supported by *coercive authority*, as is plainly evident in the Khan's patronage. Nevertheless, segmentary ties inflict considerable limitations on the imposition of coercive authority, and hence, the Khan's relationship to his clients, since, "Tribal ties disallow the rule of might and the most powerful and affluent Malik will think twice before imposing his will through force on the poorest or weakest of his clansmen. The consequences of any rash act are so severe that they have a deterrent effect"⁸⁵.

Barth (1959) observes that this relationship is one of political solidarity between equals, which is not implicit in any other relationship such as common descent or kinship. It is based upon contractual agreement and is, therefore, one of free choice, the foundation of which is the maximisation of one's chances in life. Since, "all relationships implying dominance are dyadic relationships of a contractual or voluntary nature"⁸⁶. This contractual nature of the dyadic patron-client relationship is the element that maintains equilibrium within the Afghan social structure. In reality, this relationship is asymmetrical, since the patron dominates the client, while the feudal social hierarchy leaves little room for self-maximisation. The client's choices are limited, because his dependency on the tenancy and protection provided by the Khan severely constrain the contract's unilateral annulment.

The Khan can significantly strengthen his reputation to form stronger alliances and blocs when he is seen as having access to networks of larger landlords, while displaying evidence of his political strength through the loyalty of his client-base. However, these alliances and blocs are not everlasting enclosed bodies of individuals founded upon unilineal descent and functioning solely within fixed territorial boundaries. Rather, they are temporary networks or quasi-groups that are established for current and urgent political concerns and crises, and may therefore cut across segmentary and tribal constraints and loyalties⁸⁷. Consequently, "these very prominent leaders, by spreading their net of alliances very wide, thus create some degree of consistency in the alignment of local blocs in opposition"⁸⁸. High-ranking commanders within Mujahideen factions, which formed in response to the Soviet invasion (1979), similarly gained support that cut across segmentary boundaries. However, the majority of these leaders and local commanders solely relied upon their bases of support within tribal, and hence, segmentary boundaries.

Certain sections of the social structure are exempt from the traditional basis of power through the ownership of land. The division of Islamic societies into *warriors* and *priests* is a common feature in the sociology of Islam. However, the formal establishment of priesthood in Afghanistan did not occur until the recent emergence of the Taliban, since the lack of a religious threat constrained its formal and regular development because the need to adopt a defensive posture to oppose a non-Muslim presence did not exist. Therefore, a religious authority was only required for social *rites de passage*.

Traditionally, Afghans have been susceptible to religious symbols, especially those that reinforce the prevalent social customs and norms; for example, *Jihad* and *religious wars* provide sustenance for the exercise of the archetypal warrior character, and facilitate the coalescing of variegated tribes and ethnic groups under one banner in times of crisis. Religious authorities, such as Mullahs or Saints, may emerge as natural leaders in response to the dire socio-political circumstances. However, once such critical conditions have dissolved, the need for religious leaders, along with their support, also expires. This brings us to question their relationship with the Khan, because the acceptance of a religious leadership in times of crisis could distort the perception of the socio-political interaction that occurs within local circles in non-critical periods. Due to the lack of a formal priesthood, the division between the secular and the religious is virtually indiscernible. Hence, the Mullah's entrance into the political arena is exposed to the same manifest machinations as any other figure. However, the relationship is also a symbiotic one, and one in which the Khan and Mullah work best to reinforce each other, largely due to their shared political and economic interests. The dividends for a successful relationship accrue in the level of respect that both the Khan and Mullah are able to gain from individuals in the village and tribe. However, this level of respect is proportional to the influence that the Khan or Mullah is able to exert, but in no way does this mean that they exert complete control over the actions of individuals. In fact, the actions of individuals can create social structural change as the "individual continually seizes the opportunities, and in so doing possibly changes the structure of society in as much as he redefines some norm of behaviour or creates a new status"⁸⁹.

Socio-political interaction within the tribe is centred on the tribal village council, the *Jirgah*, and on the Khan in socially stratified villages. Religious authority is restricted within this environment in order to divorce secular reasoning from the religious, and often emotional, way of thinking which can cloud rational decision-making. This dichotomy in Afghan village life, especially within Pushtun society, creates a structural balance between the politics of the village mosque, and that of the institution of *Hujrah*, the usual meeting place of the Jirgah and other significant tribal occasions. In most Islamic societies, the mosque remains the most significant socio-political focus and forum. However, in Afghanistan "the Hujrah provides the platform for political manoeuvre and test of strength"⁹⁰. The fragile nature of the tribal authority structure cannot direct a given course of sustained action for a prolonged period due to its inherent precariousness, and is more reliant upon the personal and charismatic qualities of a leader than upon obedience and loyalty to a hierarchy or ideology, with exception of loyalty to religious obligations in times of crisis.

The emergence of the Taliban phenomena⁹¹ is a peculiar, yet, significant event that changed much of the Afghan political landscape and mindset. A formal priesthood that had not previously existed in Afghanistan, arose as an inevitable consequence of the dire crisis that ensued from the Civil War period (1992-1996) after the amplification of the *warrior-mullah* in the form of the *commander* during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989); which was a construction of General Zia-ul-Haq's religiously orientated strategic outlook to empower the religious *non-nationalist* inclined elements of the Afghan resistance as opposed to the nationalist elements due to the fear of the return of the Pushtunistan issue. The consequent anarchy of the civil war destroyed the basic fabric of Afghan social life and expunged all hopes of the erstwhile racial harmony returning to the bitterly divided multi-ethnic environment. In this respect, the Taliban had initially sought to re-establish a degree of coordinated and peaceful racial interaction, albeit, imposed. However, as they progressed, the unity that they tried to inculcate did not take permanent root within Afghan hearts and minds. The Taliban were perceived as synonymous to Pushtun political ambitions and expansionism, whilst their entry into Afghanistan's political imbroglio pitted them against the same pressures and forces that plagued every other faction. The return to racial equilibrium had rebounded upon itself.

The Taliban's expulsion from political dominance, at the end of 2001, reawakened the dormant tribal/feudal disputes quelled during their government. Tribal land rights and politico-military primacy are once again the main issues within Afghanistan's ethnic groups. Consequently, the predominately non-tribal and cohesive Tajik society has taken advantage of the relative disunity within the remaining ethnic groups, especially the Pushtun. The re-eruption of conflict is high given the saturation of weapons, increasing Taliban insurgency and tribal control of political power.

3:4:4 – Ethno-Structural Diversity & Differences in Regulatory Codes of Conduct

The development of Afghanistan as a defined political entity in its own right invariably, since 1747, has led to the evolution of particular distinguishable characteristics that are common to all constituent Afghan ethnicities; that is, a distinct *Afghaness*. However, considerable cultural, traditional, linguistic, ideological, and religious differences do exist between ethnicities and tribal groups, and are reflected in the diverse lifestyles they have adopted⁹² (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.6 – Ethnolinguistic Groups in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan). The following section provides a brief account of the distinguishing features of the diverse ethnicities that are a constituent of Afghanistan in order to illustrate the complexity of Afghan life, the inherent dangers of simple generalisations, and provide an insight into the differing development of cultural constraints and controls for the use of firearms between ethnicities. Although there are at least eight major ethnic groups (Pushtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen, Baluch, Aimaq, Nuristani), this study will concentrate on the most demographically significant due to their historical and contemporary importance in shaping Afghanistan.

When investigating Afghanistan's socio-economic and political structure, the use of *nation-state* as a concept to define a singular Afghan identity as a model upon which to base this study's analysis will be prone to numerous intellectual obstacles. This is significant because Afghanistan has not been able to solidify and

consistently entrench a sense of solidarity, through a determined effort, between their citizens through their political ethos and the evolution of institutions whose *raison d'être* is to consolidate such a national identity even though it may be highly ethnically diverse. This was because the Pushtun overlordship from the inception of Afghanistan until the Saur revolution in April 1978 primarily enforced a highly Pushtun version of the Afghan political entity that was invariably rejected by Afghanistan's other ethnic identities, although, not overtly. Nevertheless, the recent past, wherein which, the country has been forced to coalesce to counter an existential threat to its common Islamic sodality, from within and without, by the *atheist* communist usurpation of the Islamic Afghan identity in April 1978 did provide a semblance of national identity until the bitter civil war erupted between ethnically aligned Mujahideen parties. Afghanistan is currently in its embryonic stage of development as a nation-state, and cannot ideally be recognised as one until the centripetal dynamics of the common identity of *Afghaness* have been thoroughly entrenched into the Afghan psyche over the forthcoming generations; if that is at all possible, given the centrifugal potential for the fragmentation of Afghanistan in the future. Furthermore, none of the major political parties, whether presently or during the Soviet occupation, openly espouse an ethnic dimension to their respective parties, and rather, amplify the Islamic sodality⁹³. To differentiate on the grounds of ethnicity would invite irredentist tendencies and association with the aspirations of neighbouring countries, and further the fragmentation of Afghanistan, which is not in the interest of any of the Afghan parties.

3:4:4:1 – Development of Defensive Structural Organisation of Tribal Society and Culturally Reinforced Codes of Conduct for SALW

What makes this land and people so intractable?⁹⁴

When James Spain (1977) posed a question concerning the intractability of the terrain in Afghanistan, its eastern borderlands and its inhabitants, he was not referring to all the different ethnicities, but solely to the Pushtun. His answer is comprehensive and irrefutable.

To most writers at least, it is in the nature of the Pathan and his land that the hard core of intractability lies... A numerous and virile people still possessed of real tribal affiliations and attitudes with a literature and tradition which glorifies independence, battle, and personal bravery and a deeply inbred code of honour (Pukhtunwali) whose three cardinal tenets are revenge, sanctuary, and hospitality, present a very formidable problem of government indeed.⁹⁵

The Pushtun straddle both sides of the disputed Afghan-Pakistan border. Within Afghanistan, they form the largest ethnic group, and represent a sizable minority in Pakistan. Until recently, Afghanistan, *the land of the Afghans*, literally referred solely to the Pushtun⁹⁶. Their origins, however, are shrouded by myth and folklore. The Pushtun popularly ascribe their origins to the lost tribes of the Bani Israel, that is, one of the twelve tribes of the Israelites that left Palestine and Judea for the East⁹⁷. However, many scholars have concretely refuted such claims, and concluded that they are the direct descendents of the original Aryans⁹⁸. Associations with the Bani Israel are predominantly surrounded by theological justifications to consolidate and entrench a religious Islamic identity within the Pushtun mindset (as *people of the book*) due to four hundred years of the latter's resistance to the Arab socio-political, strategic and religious onslaught on the millennia-long Buddhist and Pushtun way of life prior to the Bedouin Arab expansion in the 8th-9th centuries Anno Domini. Recent history, starting from the tenth century AD, saw the propulsion of this distinct people onto the world stage, whose

history had been exclusively characterised by uprising and rebellion against external authority. They have subsequently provided dynasties ruling the non-Pushtun far from their homeland, and consequently, further enhanced the role of the warrior and his martial spirit within Pushtun socio-cultural consciousness and national psyche.

Their mountainous and arid terrain has partly shaped their social identity, structural stratification, political approach and economic arrangement, while also defining their stringent code of conduct, *Pushtunwali*. Pushtun social organisation mirrors the acephalous tribal segmentation model, based on patrilineal descent, more closely than any other ethnic group residing within Afghanistan. Comparatively, the Pushtun may also represent the world's largest existing tribal system⁹⁹. At a distance, the Pushtun boasts no conflict between the principles of Islam and his *Pushtunwali*. However, fundamental disparities exist between certain aspects of the Pushtun's normative behaviour, through his *Pushtunwali*, and the teachings of Islam. Henceforth, further discussion will be limited to those aspects of Pushtun society that are intrinsic to its functionality, yet, differentiate it from other ethnic groups. These characteristics are also central to understanding the nature of the Afghan conflict, its prolonged activity, and the dynamic inter-play between the defensive structural stratification of Pushtun society and SALW. In this respect, those aspects of Pushtun society that have assisted in the development of regulatory structures and codes of conduct for the possession and use of weapons are emphasised.

A distinguishing feature of the Pushtun is their characteristic state of perpetual inter-tribal conflict, primarily due to three abiding factors; *zan*, *zar*, and *zamin*, these being the Pushto/Persian words for women, wealth/money, and land, respectively; the latter two essentially representing power and control of resources. Disputes that involve these factors are more likely to arise due to the formation of *blocs in opposition* between neighbouring residential units, which are usually cousins rather than strangers¹⁰⁰ (see, Appendix III, Figure 3.4 – Patterns of Conflict Relations amongst Residential Units [within a Tribe and/or Village]). The rivalry between cousins, *Tabur* (agnatic rivalry), is especially significant when considering the character of conflict amongst the Pushtun. The extent of this rivalry has even produced a proverb when comparing the degree of enmity between two or more parties, that one may be “as great an enemy as a cousin”.

A vital aspect of Pathan social organisation and political behaviour is based on the determinate role, markedly peculiar to Pathan society, played by the male agnate ascendants and descendants in the life of ego.¹⁰¹

Peters (1960)¹⁰² notes that this agnatic rivalry is not particular to the Pushtun alone, but is common to many Islamic societies. Ahmed (1976) further suggests that this phenomenon is also present outside Islamic societies, for instance, *Tabur* can be equated with *Bhai Shatru* of the Rajput of India, that is, “your brother is your enemy”¹⁰³. With respect to the Pushtun, *Tabur* has been codified under *Taburwali* (code of the cousin) and specifically relates to the father's brother's son(s). In this way the patrilateral parallel cousin does not share the sibling terms that all the other related children come under. The term *Tabur* connotes enmity¹⁰⁴, and therefore, further distinguishes those cousins (father's brother's son[s]) with whom there are unfriendly relations, and who are specifically referred to as *Taburan*. The differentiation between cousins is politically

significant due to the dilemma that is imposed upon the Pushtun *ego* within the patrilineal descent system, as Barth (1959) explains:

The bonds between brothers and the bonds between fathers and sons are given political primacy; yet an organisation based on these principles would unite ego with his close agnatic collaterals, who..., are his prime opponents. The political dual division develops as a direct result of the choices that individuals make in seeking a solution to this dilemma, and the political organisation can thus be understood only in terms of the structure of the unilineal descent system.¹⁰⁵

As well as facilitating the formation of alliances and aiding cohesion against external threats, the patrilineal descent system is subject to the profusion of agnatic rivalry, which inevitably has severe detrimental effects upon any conflict resolution process due to the constant eruption of feuds that are destructive to the development of community relations, and any reconstruction projects. Political decisions have to be carefully calculated in accordance with the divisions affected by rival alliances.

Although Afghanistan was created as a Pushtun state, the Pushtun have come to identify certain areas as their homeland (southern and eastern Afghanistan, *Khyber Pukhtunkhwa* province, FATA, and large parts of Baluchistan province of Pakistan) as their *Pukhtunkhwa*, within which they are the overwhelming majority¹⁰⁶. This concept of *Pukhtunkhwa* provides a “territorial expression to their ethnocentrism”¹⁰⁷. The Pushtun’s martial qualities have enabled them to expand beyond their *Pukhtunkhwa*; however, they have exhaustively defended their homeland without compromise and with unparalleled success when the need arose. The *Pukhtunkhwa* is reinforced by their distinct cultural and linguistic traditions, and customs that have been solidified by their *Pushtunwali*. However, this ethnic pride has produced a degree of chauvinism and a sense of cultural superiority that has led to prejudicial attitudes towards the non-Pushtun minorities in Afghanistan, and other ethnicities in Pakistan.

Considerable differences do exist within the Pushtun tribal system, between not only the different tribes but also more specifically the different environmental locations, within which the Pushtun reside, of which two stand out; namely, the mountainous ecology and the lowland agrarian/urban ecology. These contrasting habitats have diversely shaped the degree of archetypal martial qualities, social identity, political strategy, and economic structure of their Pushtun inhabitants. The example of the Swati Pushtun settlement, cited above, illustrates the development of the contrasting natures between the mountain and settled societies. The archetypal male is partly defined by the mountain ecology¹⁰⁸ through the development of *Pushtunwali*, in which the mountain dwelling Pushtun base their subordinate and super-ordinate relationships around the predominant concept of *Nang* (Pushto: literally, honour), and its self-conscious perception of its constituency inside an acephalous patrilineal segmentary political framework, with tribal membership providing the social identity; while socio-political life is carried out along egalitarian lines. In fact, *Nang* dominates because of the restrictions imposed by the ecological environment upon the avenues for economic mobility and power. Hence, *Nang* has come to symbolise social stature and mobility.

Nang acts as a reference point for understanding normative tribal behaviour and socio-political interaction, and has been codified by the development of *Nangwali* (Pushto: ‘code of honour’) within *Pushtunwali*.

Young Pushtun in poverty-stricken mountainous environments can attain Nang through personal valour and skill in combat or battle, and hence, an elevation in social status. For elders, status elevation comes through wisdom and propriety. In this respect, the tools, such as firearms, for the uplifting of status through valour are highly prized, albeit, fiercely possessed and protected to maintain their identity and status amongst their peers¹⁰⁹

In contrast, settled and even detribalised urban Pushtun, living on an agrarian economic base, developed polar characteristics based upon the concept of *Qalang* (Pushto: literally, rent) and ownership of land, which in turn gave rise to a hierarchical order. The strong adherence to patrilineal segmentation, as displayed by Nang society, has been diluted by the necessities of maintaining economic sustenance through the development of socially stratified and bounded subordinate and super-ordinate social relationships, where land is the basis of social interaction and is expressed through *Qalang*, which defines the roles within the symbiotic patron-client relationship and highlights the character of that symbiosis. Social status is dependent upon an individual's economic base, while elevation is attained through the mobilisation of resources¹¹⁰ rather than personal ability. Furthermore, the symbolism endowed upon weapons by Nang society is diluted in *Qalang* society due to the necessity of maintaining permanently organised security institutions, which may only become more effective in maintaining security by obtaining a monopoly over coercive power by a consistent social de-emphasis of weapons, such as firearms, through long-term socio-cultural programming. However, the essence of the Pushtun archetype still remains a primary element of Pushtun male identity in *Qalang* society; and, as such, weapons do not lose complete significance, and are, to a large extent still central within Pushtun *Qalang* society, albeit, within socially defined constraints consistent with an evolving *Qalang* society based on the division of labour and compromise. Nevertheless, adherence to *Qalang* is not uniform throughout Pushtun settled society; since it becomes weaker the lower an individual is positioned within the social hierarchy. Conversely, Nang becomes stronger the weaker *Qalang* becomes. In this respect, Nang-*Qalang* represent the extreme ideal-type structures of a spectrum that is the model for the social phenomena that help explain normative Pushtun behaviour and their social organisation. Nevertheless, this spectrum is uni-directional and does not facilitate an oscillation between the extremes¹¹¹. Movement is from Nang to *Qalang*, from pastoral to urban, and from tribal to feudal. Nevertheless, *Qalang* society does not prohibit Nang concepts, on the contrary, it keeps these concepts alive, albeit, in a diluted and compromised form.

Nang society coincides with the informal, rural and the mystical (Sufic), whilst *Qalang* coincides with the formal, urban and orthodox (Islam). Therefore, the socio-economic classification of the Pushtun solely through the segmentary lineage system produces confusion, as the Nang-*Qalang* dichotomy may even exist within a single tribe or family, since tribal territory may cover both the plains and mountain ecology, or even within a single person who exhorts his return to a nomadic way of life, to his basic essence as a Pushtun. For example, the Momand tribe spreads across the mountainous Momand Agency in the FATA to the settled Jalalabad district in the Nangahar Province of Afghanistan (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.7 – The Afghan-Pakistan Border Region along FATA). Intra-tribal relations, therefore, exist within a complex pattern of

interactions. Consequently, successful understanding of political organisation and power comes through recognition of the ecological constraints and their resultant economic structures in Pushtun society.

غرتک اوخودې د امان قلنک اوخودې

Honour ate up the mountains and taxes ate up the plains.¹¹²

Many foreigners venturing into Afghan areas have noted how cultural attitudes covet weapons and have especially identified Pushtun fondness of their weapons. On describing this peculiar cultural trait, a missionary doctor, T. L. Pennell (1909) noted that “there is nothing which an Afghan (Pushtun) covets more, or to steal which he is more ready to risk his life, than firearms; and though he might not otherwise wish harm to the missionary, the possibility of securing a good revolver or gun would be too great a temptation, even though he had to shed blood to secure it”¹¹³. These and many other depictions of the Pushtun during the period of British adventurism should not be taken too literally. However, there is some authenticity to the claim that the Pushtun, and to a lesser extent the other ethnic groups, display fondness towards weapons. Much of this attachment comes from the inbuilt cultural indoctrination that young male children undergo, as explained above, and is a facet of the archetypal male that they aspire to. In the very least, the acquisition or possession of weapons is symbolic of personal prestige and status within the community, especially within Nang society. The aspirations of male children to the society of men and adulthood are represented, in the first, by the perception of the authority and power that the possession of weapons imbues. Of course, the more powerful or the greater the quantity of weapons the higher the status, the greater the identification to the archetypal Pushtun, and inevitably, the greater their perceived authority. However, these are not the core reasons for the position that weapons have in Pushtun society; they are just symptoms of the cultural insecurities that are prevalent throughout Afghanistan. In this respect, Nang society is intrinsically insecure in comparison to Qalang society, and as such, the possession and display of weapons is less of a necessity for the latter, as opposed to the former; which is also largely because of the overarching security apparatus that is organised to protect Qalang society and their interests. By identifying the underlying causes for the symptomatic insecurities prevalent in Pushtun society, we begin to ascertain the reasons for their widespread possession aside from their proliferation due to the Afghan conflict; for example, Pushtun cultural attitudes towards weapons are reinforced by the martial political culture of Islam, which helps to justify the possession of weapons to defend against internal or external threat.

Know that Paradise is under the shades of swords.¹¹⁴

Like Pushtun patrilineal organisation, some of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan also display tribal structures that facilitate cohesion against external threats; such as the physical structure and social relations within Hazara communities, which reflect the genealogical makeup of society. Hazara communities are physically structured according to their environment. The rural community¹¹⁵ is composed of a *Navah* (major valley) and contains several *Qaryah* (large village), which is composed of several *Qol* (small valley), *Qishlaq* (small village) or *Aghil* (sub-village or hamlet), that are comprised of several *Qala* (castle). The qala is the basic structural unit of Hazara Society¹¹⁶ and can comprise several family units (a *khanawar*). A qala is usually a spacious compound with one to several buildings depending upon the size, need and economic

resources of its residents. The site of the qala is chosen because of three factors, namely: drinking water; arable land; and, a mountain that offers the possibility for defensive fortifications¹¹⁷. The latter illustrates the perceptions held throughout Hazara society concerning the need for security based on their own insecure human environment, and how military considerations have been integrated into daily life, thus, acknowledging the ability to readily confront any misadventure from outsiders and even neighbours.

The place of abode is not the only aspect in Hazara society that has military considerations. The whole structural and physical organisation of Hazara society is based upon such considerations, from the positioning of villages to the command structure in the hierarchy of leadership positions. During the Afghan-USSR War (1979-1989), the Hazara's tribal hierarchy gave way to considerable factional infighting. Tribalism was given precedence over the common resistance against the Soviet enemy, as factions fought each other to consolidate their positions. Unlike Pushtun tribal society, according to Olivier Roy (1986) the Hazara are "marked by an absence of egalitarianism and by the harshness of their social relations"¹¹⁸, whereby the tribal structure is rigidly hierarchical. In this respect, is it the aspect of egalitarianism that assists culturally reinforced inhibitory mechanisms, where upon, cultural reinforcement of the recognition of another's equality, as opposed to their dehumanistic reduction, acts as an initial barrier to the use of weapons, given that one is cognisant that the 'other' may respond in kind? In this respect, rigidly hierarchical societies invariably rely upon inequality to impose class structures through the enforcement of coercive measures and sub-group consolidation within the same society to maintain order. What is important here is that inhibitory mechanisms are enforced through the strict class structure and the potential repercussions that may be received from the tribal leader, the *Mir*, rather than culturally reinforced regulatory mechanisms through codes of conduct, which are missing in the case of the Hazara.

Within Uzbek tribal organisation, kinship is the basis of nomenclature and classification of component parts. The actual racial origins and makeup of a confederation are not as significant as the name that they are represented through; therefore, providing a form of corporate identity and continuity even when sizable communities of outsiders are incorporated into the confederation. The name acts as a stronger sodality between the groups that comprise the confederations than ideological or religious ties.

The origins of the Uzbek can be traced back to the Turkic Tatar tribesmen who were followers of a descendant of Jochi Khan (b.1185, d.1227, aka Juchi¹¹⁹), Genghis Khan's son, namely, Özbek Khan (b.1282, d.1341 AD; reigned, 1313-1341 AD), an Islamic proselytiser, after whom they took their name and religion¹²⁰ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.8 – The First Homeland of the Uzbek Tribal Confederation, 1400 AD). The Uzbek order of stratification is similar to that of the Pushtun. Uzbek tribes are organised through patrilineal segmentation; however, cultural patterns of behaviour and conduct between the settled and the migratory Uzbeks became significantly different and continued to polarise over time¹²¹ with much greater emphasis to settlement and the eventual abandonment of their original nomadic way of life¹²². This differentiation is similar to the differences between the Qalang and Nang Pushtun; that is, the settled and nomadic societies, respectively. However, noteworthy differences exist between the Uzbeks in Afghanistan and those in Central

Asia; the latter being influenced by the period of Sovietisation that significantly assisted in the virtual abandonment of the Uzbeks' nomadic origins, and consequently, the inevitable reduction in the importance of cultural codes of conduct in response to evolving social norms through modernisation. Afghan Uzbeks were not impacted by modernisation to the same extent, and as such, they retain, although highly diluted, some tribal organisation. Nevertheless, codes of conduct belonging to their martial past have become significantly diluted. In this respect, the possession and use of firearms is reflective of the general insecurity that has pervaded Afghanistan since the uprisings began after the Saur revolution in 1978; especially because, as a small minority group, they have historically been unable to project their relative interests since Amir Abdur-Rahman Khan's internal pacification campaigns in the late 19th century.

Like the Pushtun and Hazara, the primary unit in Uzbeki social organisation is the household, followed by the kin network and tribal structure whose membership is based on the common male progenitor. Tribal structure and organisation is based on the divisions within the greater Uzbek identity, that is, the *Uruk* (Uzbeki, Tribe), and its subdivisions of lessening extent, the immediate tribal subdivision *Oymak*, the *Aris*, and finally the *Tire*. Commonly, gender and age provide the distinctions for the division of labour, which, with rare exceptions, tend to be rigidly adhered to¹²³. Obligations to kin are very significant and extend beyond local residential units to kin residents in other towns and provinces in northern Afghanistan¹²⁴. Neighbour relations between ethnicities tend not to be as strong as kin relations. In his study on *Central Asian Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Salinsky (1994) noted that the Uzbeks even make distinctions between different neighbouring ethnic groups, for example, the *Muhajir* Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley tended not to develop relations with their Pushtun neighbours whilst they did develop warm relations with their Tajik neighbours¹²⁵. This phenomenon is best illustrated by miscegenation when it seldom occurs. On such occasions, Uzbeks are much more likely to join through marriage with Tajik families than Pushtun families¹²⁶. This ethnic dimension underscores the long existing negative perceptions by minority ethnic groups towards the majority Pushtun and exemplifies the problems associated national reconciliation.

3:4:4:2 – Aggregation of Ethnic Identity and the Formation of the Tajik Entity

Historically, the Tajiks have been a sedentary people with “a predisposition to peaceful avocations, and especially to agriculture”¹²⁷, the largest proportion of which live throughout much of Afghanistan, principally in the western and north-eastern regions, with large urban populations in the Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat (see, Appendix IV, Plate 3.6 – Ethnolinguistic Groups in and around Afghanistan). They are the dominant ethnic group in the Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan constituting a population of about 7,800,000¹²⁸ but also have significant populations in neighbouring Central Asian Republics, namely; Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and the Xingjian province of China. The Afghan Tajiks, together with their Central Asian kin, “are not viewed as having any tribal origins”¹²⁹, and hence, have no specific social organisation based upon segmentary lineage. Their sedentary origins can be likened to the Qalang classification in Pushtun society, with the exception that Qalang society has Nang origins, and therefore, a strong tribal orientation.

Tajiks, as suggested by many scholars¹³⁰ are *Farsiwans* (Persian speakers) “of diverse origins”¹³¹, speaking *Dari Farsi* within Afghanistan, and a number of other dialects in their local communities, such as *Tajiki*, which is spoken in Tajikistan¹³². Tajik society is not structured around any form of tribal paradigm or concept, and is therefore, better able to adapt to urban environments. Nevertheless, rural Tajiks still profess a strong sense of community loyalty, as do significant urban Tajik populations. The lack of a nomadic past, and the ability to adapt to a settled existence without tribal conceptual constraints facilitated the growth of cities, and establishment of centres of culture and learning wherever the Tajiks resided; for example, Bukhara and Herat. The majority of Tajiks, however, still engage in agriculture and herding, where large landowners (*zamindars*) have emerged as village leaders after the Soviet Invasion. The hierarchical distribution of power in this stratified society relegates the concept of egalitarianism amongst the Tajik.

Centuries of constant conquests and migrations of martial peoples into their region of settlement in northern Afghanistan have imbued the warrior ethos within Tajik cultural traditions, myths, and lore. However, unlike the Pushtun, and especially Nang Pushtun society, the Tajiks are not socially organised with codes of conduct relating to the regulation of the possession and use of firearms through their implicit consequences, such as through the Pushtun code of *badal* within Pustunwali; which is ingrained within the Pushtun cultural consciousness. The cultural codes of conduct act as inhibitory mechanisms to prevent the irrational usage of firearms through the continuous reinforcement of deterrent-laden, and consequent-driven, regulatory concepts, such as *badal*.

While *badal*, or reciprocity, deters the use of firearms amongst the Pushtun through the explicit expression of blood feuds as a consequence of taking the life of another person, the Tajiks have not had such a culturally explicit concept indoctrinated into their collective consciousness since childhood. That is, although revenge is common amongst the Tajik, it is not socio-culturally regulated to become part of their archetypal concept of masculinity to the degree inherent within the Pushtun. In this respect, the Tajiks may be likened to a more diluted form of the Qalang Pushtun, whereby, the division of labour has induced a greater acceptance of the delegation of responsibility for the enforcement of security by dedicated institutions. Nevertheless, the Tajik also impart a sense of status to the empowerment imbued through the possession of firearms, although to a lesser extent than the Pushtun, whose complete social structural consciousness revolves around such concepts. Consequently, when firearms are widely available in society, a Tajik individual may not have the same degree of inhibition inbuilt within his or her psyche for their possession and use. As such, without culturally reinforced inhibitory mechanisms to prevent the irrational usage of firearms, an individual may be more susceptible to the influences of the conflict environment, which may propel individuals to act to possess and use firearms through grievance-laden justifications.

3:4:4:3 – Latent Demographic Conflict - Historical Development or Construction

The Farsiwan, collectively known as Tajiks, represent the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, albeit of diverse origins; however, due to the current unstable strategic conditions, the lack of available census data, and the political implications of the population debate, the actual percentage figure is not available.

Nevertheless, rough estimates suggest that they number between 15 and 27 percent of the population¹³³, with the upper figure having only recently been made available. The perpetual circuitous advocacy of demographic statistics may reinforce perceptions of the currently published figures, however, without providing concrete evidence of the pronouncements of such figures their authenticity and credibility may be questioned, given the lack of a national census in recent times.

Schetter's (2005a) assertions of the social construction of the Tajik ethnic identity are in contrast with historical accounts; however, his contention may have validity due to the perpetual historical self-imaging of many of the other ethnicities for political and strategic interests and advantage for social positioning in the regional environment that was dominated by constant Persian and Uzbek migrations into the northern Afghanistan. In this respect, Schetter (2005b) points out that the inability to create a positive self-image, given the necessity of maintaining ties to the Afghan nation while also reducing potential ostracism in Afghanistan if an alignment to a *greater Tajikistan* is made, the Tajiks have "preferred a regional rather than an ethnic identity and still refer to themselves as Panjshiris, Kabulis, Shomalis, Heratis. Similarly the *Jamiat-i Islami* (Islamic society) which tried to position itself as a Tajik party disintegrated into independent regional groups competing with one another"¹³⁴.

Whether or not the Tajik are a defined grouping of people with shared values and origins is important when appreciating their relative social position in Afghanistan, especially in relation to the Pushtun, for which they are the primary competitors for political power. The ethnic fissures that have emerged as a consequence of the political upheaval that has beset Afghanistan, since absolute Pushtun overlordship was uprooted by the fall of the monarchy in 1973, are likely to remain prominent until political realisation for the necessity of power sharing is culturally accepted by the Pushtun. However, concurrently, an acceptance that military consolidation through political over-reach must be gradually balanced by the Tajik community in order for an equilibrium in ethnic relations to come to fruition; which is likely to be a generational transformation in inter-ethnic relations. Nevertheless, the emergence of latent conflicts due to demographic manipulation is not a recent phenomena.

Recently, the Tajikistan capital, was the scene of post-Soviet independence turmoil in September 1992. Tajikistan President Nabiyeu was forced to resign by the joint Islamic-democratic opposition (a coalition of parties – the United Tajik Opposition - UTO). However, in contrast to the necessity of maintaining overt independence from the Tajiks beyond Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Masood's Jamiat-i Islami provided sanctuary and military support for the Islamic component of the UTO based in northern Afghanistan¹³⁵ in order to sustain a guerrilla campaign against Tajikistan's new hawkish government headed by Imamali Rakhmonov¹³⁶.

Ahmad Shah Masood's political and military support was not borne out of humanitarian compulsion alone, since it further strengthened Tajik position in Afghanistan by enhancing cross-border bonds. This is also true for the Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, and Pushtun ethnic groups and their respective cross border communities. Furthermore, Ahmad Shah Masood's support of the UTO facilitated the circulation of large quantities of

SALW from a weapons saturated Afghanistan to Tajikistan¹³⁷. The Tajik government and UTO were eventually forced to join the negotiating table by the overt display of military power by Russia through their deployment of 25,000 troops from the Russian Federation's 201st Motorised Division stationed as peacekeepers along the Afghan-Tajik border, in December 1993¹³⁸. Negotiations were assisted by third party mediation, led by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sardar Aseff Ali Ahmed¹³⁹, who was interested in the drive to build a network of oil and gas pipelines from the Central Asian republics to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan's port at Gwadar, Baluchistan¹⁴⁰, which required peace in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Conflict reduction was sought for pragmatic self-interest; that is, for the acquisition of resources.

Population increases to Afghan ethnic minorities from Central Asia pose a significant threat to other Afghan ethnicities that are continually vying for political power. In this respect, the Tajikistan civil war caused hundreds of thousands of fatalities and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees, many of which fled south into Afghanistan; thereby aggravating demographic disputes, whether assisted by design or accident. It is significant to note that the fluid movement of people across Afghanistan's borders does significantly change the political balance of contesting factions. Moreover, the grievance-laden demographics debate is further cause for ensuing conflict in Afghanistan; which, while being fuelled by the massive dispersion of SALW throughout the country bodes negatively for the settlement of the ethnic internecine conflict in the near to medium term future.

3:5 – The Modernisation Process in Afghanistan – A Retrospective Analysis

Afghanistan has undergone numerous episodes of development and expansion within its bureaucratic and industrial sectors followed by stagnation and even regression. Of those, one of the most significant episodes was the evolution of the modern State of Afghanistan, which is generally accepted as having developed under the leadership Amir Abdur Rehman Khan (r. 1880-1901). His process of internal imperialism sought to expand centralised control over the whole of Afghanistan, which “necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one role”¹⁴¹. However, as with many other periods of development, the death of the Iron Amir was followed by a period of stagnation under his son Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919) as he sought to contend with the internal strife that was a direct consequence of his father's draconian policies; the turbulent situation in the north as Czarist Russia collapsed; and, the international implications of the First World War. In reference to the latter, Habibullah's determination to remain neutral led to his assassination¹⁴². Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929), Habibullah's third son, seized the throne and immediately leaped onto the well intentioned, yet hasty, road to the reform and modernisation of Afghanistan; which eventually stalled due to resistance from the ultra-conservative Afghan society, and led to his dethronement.

Amanullah was greatly influenced by Kamalist Turkey, and the process of modernisation that it had undertaken. However, this influence can also be credited to the persuasion of his father-in-law, Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Tarzi had been expelled from Afghanistan by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, but returned in 1902 and started Afghanistan's first newspaper, *Seraj ul-akhbar-e-Afghanistan* (Torch of Afghan News), in 1911.

During his years in exile, Tarzi was a bureaucrat in Ottoman Damascus and had direct contact with European modernism. His newspaper advocated two themes: a) Muslims must modernise or perish; and, b) colonialism and imperialism must go. Tarzi recognised that the Muslim world was in recession and decline due to their ignorance of modern science and institution building, and that modernity belonged to all humanity for the taking¹⁴³. Amanullah believed that European power grew out of the West's cultural, economic, industrial, and technical development and achievements, and not only through military power. Therefore, to achieve the same goals, Afghanistan had to industrialise. However, moral and cultural factors resisted the change to a new socio-economic environment and existence. Nevertheless, Tarzi believed that the tools of modern culture were not the same as the culture itself. That is, to use the tools developed in Europe, does not mean that European culture must also develop in Afghanistan, leading Amanullah to conclude that Afghanistan's indigenous culture could adapt to the modernisation process. But, what does this process of modernisation incorporate?

Does modernisation only include the advances afforded by new technology, or does it also involve socio-cultural, political and economic change?¹⁴⁴ We know that Afghanistan's first attempts at modernisation were those conducted by Amir Dost Mohammad and later by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan as they centralised control through effectively detribalising and subduing regional warlords to Kabul. The latter was also able to institutionalise the army, the bureaucracy, and the royal succession. The worry in Amanullah's time was whether or not modernisation also meant the loss of control over the development of their society to external forces, especially the European nations. There is no doubt that traditional culture and social norms would change. The British industrialisation of India significantly changed social patterns and attitudes.

In the products of the handloom the magic of man's living fingers finds its expression, and it harmonises with the music of life. But the powerloom is relentlessly lifeless and accurate and monotonous in its production.¹⁴⁵

Industrialisation, as a product, reduces the vitality of life and social customs to insignificance. Social roles, attitudes and mores change. As a result, social transformation is inevitable, while money and wealth become more significant in the quantification of social and interpersonal relationships. Critical reasoning pervades society and undermines the transcendental claims of religion. Greater communication and travel expand exposure and reduce traditional barriers to external influences, thereby, breaking down the impact and significance of tightly controlled cohesive community regulatory institutions, such as the mosque. In essence, modernisation is dependent upon the theory of science and its application through technology, which includes all aspects of knowledge (physical and non-physical sciences, such as, the humanities, behavioural sciences, and social sciences); by the systematic advance and improvement of a body of knowledge and practice through experimentation in order to better comprehend nature and the world of man-made objects. The achievement of a better comprehension inevitably leads to a transformation of society in order to adjust to the greater understanding that has been achieved, and hence, an improvement of some form is made to the machinations of society. Bertrand Russell writes:

There are direct intellectual effects: the dispelling of many traditional beliefs and the adoption of others suggested by the success of the scientific method. In the pre-scientific world, power was God's.

There was not much that men could do even in the most favourable circumstances. If you wished to skip through life without disaster, you must be meek. In the scientific world, all this is different. It is not by prayer and humility that you cause things to go as you will, but by acquiring a knowledge of the scientific laws. We were told that faith could remove mountains, but no one believed it; we are now told that the atomic bomb can remove mountains and everyone believes it.¹⁴⁶

However, in the case of Afghanistan, we know that it is a land of extreme environments, from the desolation of the scorching deserts to the rugged frozen mountains, and, so too, are its people. The development of the society, and the cultural variations within it, has continually been stagnated by external forces vying for political and military dominance, whether for adjacent territories or for Afghanistan itself. A period of relative peace in which social mechanisms can evolve to form a bridge between the modernisation and progress of the world outside Afghanistan and the medieval society within has not been permitted to exist. Afghanistan has been, and is, a victim of external ambitions, its territorial inheritance, and strategic position in Asia. As a result, the indigenous ethnic and tribal groups share common characteristics, some more than others, with each other. As external forces have imposed alien ideologies or traditions upon the indigenous society, and at times contrary to the socio-political culture that was extant, the consequences have often been the withdrawal of the Afghan psyche to the rigid adherence of the basic, yet, core, values system within which the society had previously structured its foundations upon¹⁴⁷. Nevertheless, revolutionary changes have occurred and can be exemplified by the Islamisation of the Afghan psyche from the Hindu/Buddhist paradigm. However, *revolutionary*, in Afghan terms, is not synonymous to that definition employed in the rest of the world. Islam took over 400 years to penetrate the social fabric of Afghan life from its first forceful encounters. Real conversion only took place through persuasion, and could never have been accomplished through forceful means.

With extremely low literacy levels throughout the country¹⁴⁸, the main source of learning, with the exception of the few urban areas, has traditionally been from the *Madrasa* (schools for religious learning), and controlled by *Mullahs* (religious teachers – some of these were barely literate, and only a few actually understood the Qurán in its original Arabic script, but could pass on basic moral norms and history verbally) in the rural areas which comprise the majority of Afghanistan's population. The Mullahs have always had a strong and stubborn hold on the intellectual development of the vast majority of the country's population, whilst vying with any form of influence, which may undermine their peculiar interpretation of moral order and their position in the social and political hierarchy.

Amanullah and Tarzi were faced with advancing society in such a way as to avoid foreign dominance and acclimatise the conservative Afghan population, especially the mullahs, to the newer realities of modernisation without a backlash. Amanullah's victory in the Third Afghan-Anglo War (1919) succeeded in bringing him the support of the religious leaders and the conservative *Ulema* (religious scholars). During the post-World War One period, the old world order was in the process of reorganisation. As the self-determination of nations was announced by President Woodrow Wilson, the spirit of pan-Islamic nationalism concurrently ensued throughout the Muslim world. Within this context, Amanullah embarked upon a program of modernisation. He faced an illiterate¹⁴⁹ and highly tribalised society with the powerful tool of education in

the hands of the mullahs. Amanullah was proposing to increase centralised power at the expense of local tribes, chiefs, and mullahs. This would require an effective and efficient system of control, more so than the successful Iron Amir had been able to institute. The periphery's power at this time was considerable. Centralisation required the unification of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious society that had hitherto only acceded control to the centre through force of arms, as during the Iron Amir's period of Internal Imperialism. By the 1920s, Kabul's control was only a formality in the rural plains and mountain valleys, a situation, which has replicated itself in present day Afghanistan.

Amanullah's modernisation program encompassed three stages¹⁵⁰: a) 1919-1924, modernisation of the legal and administrative framework of government; b) 1924-1928, The establishment of the Pushtun Academy and the introduction of foreign languages in schools; and, c) 1928-1929, cultural changes to the dress code of Afghans in administrative and government positions, where men were required to wear western clothes. The entire system and essence of government was targeted by Amanullah's reforms, which called into question the traditional methods and forms of patronage, personal payment, local and tribal rule. To a large extent, these had all been dictated by the nature of local power, largely based on the patron-client relationship. In reality, the entire social reality of Afghan life was up for debate and transformation.

The reforms were sensitive throughout, however, those that involved the socio-religious and cultural basis of Afghan society induced intense resistance. For example, Amanullah rashly proposed to have government regulated schools for the training of mullahs, and partially nationalise the religious land (*Waqf* – religious endowments) production and rent income. He also proceeded to alienate the status of the Ulema by westernising the Law Courts, proposed the reform of government and administrative structures¹⁵¹, and a revolution in the education system¹⁵².

The most sensitive issue to face the Afghan population, with reference to the male archetype, was the emancipation of women through the reform of women's rights. Amanullah declared the abolition of forced marriages through the introduction of the freedom of choice marriages, including a minimum age for marriage, while a campaign to discourage the institution of *Purdah* (the veil) was also initiated. The campaign encouraged unveiling, but there was no sanction on retaining the veil. Government protection was to be provided to those women who wanted to emerge from the veil. However, the Ulema and the mullahs did not interpret this as voluntary, but as an outrageous and mandatory dictate. Not all the reforms were implemented. Many, if not most, were innovative proposals only. However, the tribal land based and religiously orientated power structures had to change to accommodate these proposals if they were to succeed. Those who could not change from the old system would lose much of their wealth, whether material or abstract, such as pride &/or status.

The major elements in the traditional power structure were the Pushtun tribes. In Amanullah's mind, every individual was a citizen of the state and a positive contributing element of the greater reality. Hence, the tribe was defunct. In effect, the pattern of power distribution, which had existed in Afghanistan since prehistory,

would have to disappear if Amanullah was to succeed in his far-reaching reforms and restructuring. An important aspect of the development and centralisation of the state is the reduction of importance in the value of kinship, since when the society becomes a state the extended family essentially ceases to exist and the tribe disintegrates as a focus of socio-political organisation. However, it would be precisely the same tribes which would have to implement these reforms if they were to succeed. The reforms did not succeed primarily because the tribal power structures were not willing to inflict such a completely self-destructive and annihilating punishment upon themselves. In retrospect, Amanullah's reforms were ingenious, yet idealistic and fantastical, in a country that had not gone through a long period of evolutionary development (in fact, Afghanistan had been in a period of developmental stagnation since its inception), which would have resulted in the gradual reduction in the concentration of power in tribal structures, and hence, the greater effective control of centralised government institutions.

To put such a grand design into operation even in the most favourable circumstances, would have required the combined talents of a gifted innovator, a brilliant administrator and a master politician. Amanullah was amply endowed with the first requirement but deficient in the other two.¹⁵³

Of particular abhorrence to the tribes was the emancipation of women and their emergence from *pardah*, greater public education for the girls and courageous initiatives for the participation of women in public life, especially government institutions. There was a flood of anti-Amanullah propaganda, especially after his grand tour¹⁵⁴. Even before Amanullah's departure for his tour, the majority of the local chiefs and leaders of the tribes, the Ulema and mullahs, the traditional rural populations, and even some of his friends had already become alienated. By November 1928, after his return, disturbances had broken out throughout the country. They came to a climax when the Sanghu Khel and Alikher Khel, of the Shinwari border tribe, attacked government outposts near the Khyber Pass. Amanullah found no support whatsoever to counter the uprising¹⁵⁵. As the uprising grew, Jalalabad was captured by the Pushtun rebels, and Tajik rebels threatened Kabul from the north. Seeing an advantage in the chaos of reforms and the disunity between Amanullah and his army, the Tajiks pressed on. It was their first potential chance to topple their Pushtun overlords. Amanullah abdicated on January 14, 1929, and fled to Kandahar. Bacha Saqqao, the leader of the insurgent Tajiks, assumed power. However, within nine months, he was deposed by the traditional Pushtun Aristocracy. It is important to note here that this was the first significant challenge to the Pushtun hegemony of Afghanistan. We may also compare the situation of the Tajik, Ahmad Shah Masood, who took the advantage when the Communist Government fell, in 1992, entered Kabul and established control of all strategic positions without the mutual consent of all other Mujahideen parties, most significantly the stronger Pushtun *Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

By explaining the historical context of Afghanistan and its people, the turbulence of its evolution, its resistance to foreign interference, and any kind of reform of its ultra-conservative tribal power structures and general social reality, we may be able to acknowledge and appreciate an understanding of the mindset of the nation in general and of the individual ethnic groups also. The fissiparous tendencies and distinct ethnic and sectarian divisions are real and all pervasive throughout Afghanistan. The dominance and significant lack of power-sharing of the Pushtun, and the retention of that dominance, regardless of the cost, has changed

drastically since the U.S. invasion; yet, Pushtun disaffection to U.S. favouritism for the ethnic minorities (especially the Tajiks) has become a major obstacle for the future development of Afghanistan. As was evident from the nationwide uprisings in reaction to Amanullah's reforms, every advantage is taken by minority groups to secure the reins of power or gain greater political leverage if the opportunity, whether or not related, presents itself. It is, therefore, evidently clear that once the coverage of Pushtun dominance is lifted, albeit for short periods of time, the fissiparous tendencies, tensions, and most importantly the underlying root causes to conflict and the need for the abolition of the social disparities between the ethnic groups and acceptance of equality at all levels of social intercourse, come rushing to the fore, as exemplified by the Tajik and Uzbek seizure of power to reverse Pushtun dominance (especially Durrani – recently under the Taliban) during the American bombing campaign of Afghanistan (2001- present). However, the present status quo can easily be reversed once the external mechanisms of interference subside. Nevertheless, a solution that is amicable to all parties will only begin to arise once the society has evolved to such a state that a consensual government, which recognises the universal equality of all peoples, races, and ethnicities, arises from within the country without the stigma of external interference, yet is accepted by the internal and external power elites, albeit at the cost of their vested interests.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART II

CHAPTER FOUR

**THE WEAPONISATION OF
AFGHANISTAN PRE-1973**

PART II

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WEAPONISATION OF AFGHANISTAN PRE-1973

4 – Historical Weaponisation of Afghanistan

The weaponisation of the region now known as Afghanistan can be better understood through an appreciation of the historical regional development of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Since political boundaries are inextricably linked to the unremitting migrations and movements of people for trade, livelihood and abode, during peace and conflict, their very nature has been transitory and in a state of constant flux and delineation throughout the course of human history. Consequently, the diffusion of firearms in Afghanistan is intricately linked to the socio-political and strategic developments of its regional environment.

Part two begins with the first of four chapters on the *Weaponisation of Afghanistan*, all of which aim to identify the historical and contemporary diffusion of SALW within and around Afghanistan. This chapter concentrates on the developments that facilitated the growth, use, and diffusion of firearms into the cultural consciousness of the region's indigenous population and more specifically the populations that inhabit the territories encompassed within the present boundaries of Afghanistan. This chapter focuses on the initial conception and first use of SALW in the Afghan region in 1526 to the bloodless coup d'état on 17 July 1973 to topple King Zahir Shah (r. 1933-1973) by General Mohammad Daoud Khan and the proclamation of the Republic of Afghanistan. Chapter five focuses exclusively on the geo-strategic superpower rivalry in Afghanistan that began to gain increasing pace after the fall of the Afghan Durrani monarchy in 1973, which resulted in internal instability; external interference; the *Saur* Revolution on 28 April 1978 to install the communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as the new ruling regime; and, the consequent national uprising that set the scene for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Chapter six, therefore, discusses the immense influx of SALW into Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, between 27 December 1979 and 15 February 1989, the day of the withdrawal of the last of the Soviet military forces from Afghan soil¹. Finally, chapter seven will cover the influx of SALW during the Afghan civil war period, from the withdrawal of Soviet forces until the 11 September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the Twin Towers and Pentagon buildings in the United States of America (USA), during which there were no foreign forces on Afghan soil officially fighting for any of the Afghan parties.

4:1 – Introduction

This present chapter is based upon several themes that describe the regional and indigenous development and production of SALW; the importation of weapons to the region, and the methods and routes used; and, an indication of the increasing quantities transferred and diffused. The information provided does not solely relate to transfers and acquisitions of SALW but also describes sources of payment, such as, financial rewards, subsidies, and trade through which such acquisitions were made.

A number of references to bilateral and multilateral treaties that permit or restrict the importation of weapons are made, many of which provide detailed references of heavy conventional weapons transfers but not SALW transfers. Therefore, due to the breadth of these generalisations, and the scope of this thesis, only those restrictions and permissions that relate to SALW are mentioned. Most transactions that do mention the trade in SALW do not include the specific quantities being transferred. Additionally, the production and importation of arms (pre-1973) was minute in comparison to the military growth and expansion of the European powers, USA, Tsarist Russia or the USSR. In this respect, an understanding of the prevailing military requirements of the empire, country, tribe, or group is provided in order to gauge the extent of the SALW trade, while an historical account of the development of indigenous production and importation of firearms is also noted when considering the present conflict.

4:2 – The Development and Design of SALW

Technological advances in SALW were generally driven by the requirements of warfare, and have simultaneously stimulated and accompanied momentous changes in battlefield tactics and overall strategic thinking. The development of the first category of SALW, firearms (See, Appendix II, Table 1.1 – Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons Categories), was incremental, tediously slow, and dependent upon developments in associated technologies, since every weapon is a complete system incorporating a range of connected components, which have an independent developmental history.

Holmes (2001)² suggests that the Chinese invention of gunpowder, around 1000 A.D., was the principle catalyst for the development of SALW. However, Chinese manuscripts mention the use of explosive mixtures in ancient China and India; for example, the use of explosives in cannons, *huo-pao*, to fire incendiary missiles during the siege of Pienkingu in 13th century BC³. Such explosive mixtures during this period were primarily used for pyrotechnics rather than as propellants, since gunpowder underwent several developmental stages before it could be used as an acceptable propellant for firearms. The thirteenth century European development of *corned gunpowder* (grains; that is, air spaces between grains facilitates a much faster ignition and burn) finally provided the necessary combustible characteristics of an acceptable propellant through the gradual refinement of a mixture of saltpetre, charcoal and sulphur⁴. The first recorded use of this kind of propellant for firearms, according to a statement by Albert the Great in 1280, was that used by cannons at the siege of Seville in 1247 AD⁵.

4:2:1 – European Development

The first use of ‘small arms’ came in the fourteenth century in the form of derivatives of primitive cannons; that is, a metal tube mounted on a rod with the addition of a stock giving support from the shoulder, such as the hand cannon, an example of which was found in a disused well of the Tennenberg Castle in Hesse, destroyed in 1399 AD⁶. This system was refined, developed and improved to become the *matchlock*, which first appeared in the early fifteenth century⁷. The matchlock was later improved upon by the *wheel-lock* system, developed in Nuremberg in 1515 by Johann Kiefuss, a clockmaker⁸. Five varieties of the *flintlock* system, an extension of the wheel-lock, were developed from the 1630s, and became the standard for military

firearms for over 200 years in the form of muzzle-loading muskets. The Spanish *snaphaunce* was one of the flintlock systems still in use in military and sporting guns throughout the Middle East, Turkey and Persia long after the flintlock was obsolete⁹.

Since the flintlock's introduction, designers had two objectives: to increase man-portability and firepower; and, reduce weight by improving projectiles and the propellant's chemical constituents. However, the propellant's (gunpowder based) increased recoil forces, which are directly proportional to projectile mass and velocity, placed constraints on design. To acquire greater accuracy, lower recoil was necessary, which subsequently reduced the projectile's killing power, and therefore, necessitated a change in the propellant and general design of the firearm.

During the industrial revolution, England established a national system of small arms manufacture using mass-production under the Ordinance Office Decree of 1722, which standardised the army musket, the *long-hand*. Its utility in the field induced continuous changes in design and manufacture, improved production techniques, led to increased lock strength, reduction in barrel sizes, and facilitated the use of interchangeable parts between different musket models.

Scotsman, Reverend Alexander John Forsyth's percussion ignition system (*detonation lock*) invention, in 1805, albeit, a vital innovation¹⁰, did not detract from the projectile's cumbersome muzzle-loading, loose barrel fit, and ineffective trajectory beyond seven yards, and hence, encouraged the development of breech-loading projectiles; that is, self-contained cartridges, which were self-obturating, and more energy efficient. Paper cartridges were initially used; however, hazardous gases and explosive materials were discharged due to poor seals at the breech. Major Bode's percussion cap based hard brass or copper jacketed metallic cartridge provided a gas check, which could withstand the propellant's charge forces, and ensured the "maximum delivery of energy upon the object attacked, and the minimum waste of work spent in deforming the bullet"¹¹. This became the standard design of modern cartridges for firearms and artillery shells. Further development sought to increase the rate of fire for revolvers and magazine repeaters, and develop the smokeless primer and propellant charge; for example, nitrocellulose, a controlled burn smokeless powder with three times more energy than black powder was introduced in the 1880s.

During World War One, following the example of the 1898 German Mauser, all major conflicting powers had introduced smokeless powder, bolt action, magazine-fed repeater rifles with aerodynamic projectiles encased in thin copper sheaths. Hand-held weapons were also revolutionised in design through the self-loading mechanism, such as for semi-automatic handguns and rifles; paralleled by the introduction of fully automatic weapons, such as infantry support weapons like the machine-gun. The multiple barrelled *Gatling gun* is an example of an earlier automatic machine gun which was approved for Imperial service with ten barrels, yet used with only eight barrels by the British in the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1879-1880)¹². The belt-fed *Maxim Gun* was the first successful fully automatic machine gun, invented by the American, Hiram Stevens, and employed by the British to devastatingly suppress the Frontier's Pushtun tribes at the turn of the twentieth

century. Later, infantry high-explosive weapons (hand grenades) were developed to counter the threat posed by armoured vehicles. Furthermore, propulsion systems were developed to thrust explosives towards a target at great distances, such as rocket propelled grenades, rockets, and shoulder-fired missiles.

Anti-colonial wars of independence were paralleled by massive SALW proliferation throughout the bi-polar world. Developments in SALW design corresponded with the diffusion process, increased lethality, and devastation in such conflicts. However, Afghanistan did not mirror the West's historical indigenous design, development and manufacture of SALW. While, weapons available in Afghanistan between the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries were originally imported from European countries or the Ottoman Empire via Persia or India. There is no recorded history of any SALW manufacture on a national level before Ahmad Shah Durrani established rudimentary arms factories. However, artisans from Pushtun Frontier tribes did engage in regional arms production (see, chapter seven, section 7:4, Indigenous Production – Darra Adam Khel: The *Home Grown Weapons*, Case Study).

4:2:2 – Firearms and Eastern Empire Building

The Ottoman Empire existed as a junction of technological advancement eastwards to Asia and westwards to Europe for centuries. Having been the first Asian people to take advantage of the invention of artillery in Europe¹³, firearms and artillery were quite common amongst the Ottomans at the beginning of the 1400s¹⁴. Their use by the Ottomans, under Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451 – 1581), was devastatingly effective against Turkmen cavalry under Uzun Hasan (r. 1453 – 1478: an *Āq Quyūnlū* Turkmen Prince who had had a meteoric rise during his conquest of the *Qarā Quyūnlū* Turkmen of the Caucasus and Azerbaijan region), in 1473. Prior to his defeat, Venice became a vital source for weapons to counter the Ottomans. The collapse of the *Āq Quyūnlū* Order facilitated the formation of the Safavid Empire (1501-1736) and over two centuries of structured progress in Persia. Nonetheless, unremitting Uzbek invasions, Safavid and Mughal (and their Timurid antecedents) military developments and conflicts over Afghan territories, such as Herat and Kandahar, were fundamental to the impact of cultural perceptions and early diffusion of firearms in the region now denoted as Afghanistan.

The Persians' complete lack of fire-arms and artillery significantly contributed to the Safavid defeat, under Shah Ismā'īl (b. 1487 – d. 1524), against the Ottomans, under Sultan Selīm I (b.1465 d. 1520; r. April 1512 – 1520), at the battle of Chāldirān on 23 August 1514¹⁵. Shah Ismā'īl subsequently incorporated both artillery and firearms, through the creation of the post of *tufangchī-bāshī* (riflemen commander) in the Safavid army, which included many European, Venetian and Portuguese mercenaries¹⁶. The Persians, under Shah Tahmāsp (b. 1514 – d. 1576, r. 1524 – 1576; Shah Ismā'īl's son), learnt valuable lessons in the use of firearms and artillery, during their victory over the Ottomans in the battle of Jām (24 September 1528)¹⁷. They also improved upon perceived European design flaws, even under European supervision. As Jean Chardin (1811)¹⁸ illustrates, “the Persians don't make use of a flint to their Guns, nor to strike fire with. They have a Wood which serves them instead of Steel and Flint, and has the same effect”¹⁹. Persian manufacture of firearms was also revised, since “they solder the breech of the barrel with the heat of the fire, and reject

screws, saying, that a screw breach going in without stress, may be thrust out by the violence of the powder, and is not to be rely'd upon²⁰.

It was Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur's (b. 1483 – d. 1530) invasion of India from Kabul, and defeat of the Pushtun (Afghan) Sultan, Ibrahim Lodhi (r. 1517 – 1526), on the plain of Panipat in April 1526, which led to the establishment of the Mughal Empire²¹ through the first recorded wide-scale strategic use of small arms originating from Afghanistan, with the exception of those Afghan territories lying within Safavid Persia. The matchlock muskets and field artillery²² significantly contributed to 12,000 men successfully defeating Ibrahim Lodhi's 100,000 strong army²³. Babur had acquired the muskets from an earlier alliance with the Safavid Shah Ismā'īl²⁴ to recover Samarqand and occupy Bokhara and Khorasan from the Uzbeks in 1511²⁵. However, this was not the first time that gunpowder was used in India, since Mahmud of Ghaznī (r. 998 – 1030) had already defeated Rājā Anang Pāl, in 1008, with the aid of gunpowder incendiary shells²⁶.

Before his passing on 26 December 1530 A.D., Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur's victories in India were aided by his advantage in firearms. However, the Afghans incessantly took advantage of any weaknesses present immediately upon his son's, Nasiruddin Muhammad Humayun (b. 1508, r. 1530 – 1556), enthronement and throughout his reign. Under Sher Khan Sur (aka, Farid Khan, and Sher Shah when enthroned – b. 1472 or 1486 [uncertain] – d. 1545), whose army of 150,000 Cavalry and 25,000 infantry were armed with matchlocks in addition to their standard swords, bows, axes and spears, the Afghan possession of firearms and artillery²⁷ aided the skilful recapture of the capital, Agra, and other lost Indian territories in 1540. His successor, Shah Ismail (r. 1545 – 1553) successfully mustered an army of over 300,000, armed as above, when he marched against Humayun's forces in 1552²⁸, who eventually regained control of Delhi for the Mughals, in 1555²⁹.

During Abu'l-Fath Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar's reign (aka, Akbar the Great; b. 1542, r. 1556 – d. 1605), son and successor to Humayun, the infantry remained secondary to the army's principal branch, the cavalry; while, matchlocks varied considerably throughout his long reign, where, according to the *Ain-i-Akbari* (Constitution of Akbar, *Akbarnama*)³⁰ the infantry's main section was the *banduqchis* service, or matchlockmen, which had a standing strength of 12,000³¹ under a *Bitikchi* (superintendent)³². Nonetheless, during periods of conflict, many more troops trained in firing muskets and pistols could be mobilised. Similarly, the Persian Safavids under Shah Tahmāsp promulgated a modest corps of musketeers (*tufangchiyān*), which gradually increased in strength and significance to 12,000 musketeers during Shah Abbās's reign (r. 1587 – 1629)³³.

In respect to literature on the subject of Indian arms since the publication of the Akbar's *Ain-i-Akbari*, Lord Egerton of Tatton (1896) notes that information was scarce³⁴. Akbar's accounts in *Ain-i-Akbari* describe the general arms held by both soldiers and officers throughout Mughal history, including parts of present Afghanistan. Albeit short, he provides a description of the pervasiveness of firearms that were accessible to the Afghans. Both cavalry and infantry preferred the bow throughout his reign, and well into the eighteenth

century, during which the Europeans, and especially the English, secured large parts of India. According to Irvine (1903), Akbar's troops used two kinds of matchlocks of different lengths, 66 and 41 inches respectively. "They were made of rolled strips of steel with the two edges welded together. Both the barrels and stocks were profusely decorated with the surface... The longer of the two weapons could only have been used, I should say, by a man on foot. Part of the matchlockman's equipment was a prong or tripod, called *shākh-i-tufang*, on which the gun was placed when about to be fired"³⁵.

Akbar came into direct contact with Europeans settled on India's western coast upon his conquest of Gujarāt, in 1572, and employed large numbers within his armies to provide much needed expertise during his early reign, especially within the artillery branch; for example, they included various Europeans from the English, Dutch, French and Portuguese³⁶. However, Shah Muhi-Ud-Din Muhammad Aurangzeb Alamgir (r. 1658 – 1707) later reduced the numbers of Europeans. The perpetual state of war between the Mughals, Afghans, Jats, Marathas, Rajputs, and Sikhs during Aurangzeb's reign, forced the Mughal army to maintain an immense 6-700,000 cavalry and about 1,400,000 infantry, most of which bore firearms as primary or secondary weapons³⁷.

Although muskets were the primary firearm for regular troops, the *tamanchah*, the pistol or handgun, made its introduction into India by the end of the seventeenth century, and was limited to nobles and high-ranking soldiers. These were not the only form of man portable weapons in service during the Mughal period. For example, the *dasti*, although defined as light artillery, could also be categorised as light weapons, and were distinguished by the fact that they were the size of a double musket, carried on the backs of animals, and used as field pieces. According to Bernier (1891)³⁸, Aurangzeb had *dasti* attached to the backs of between two to three hundred camels, but "much in the same way as swivels are fixed in our vessels"³⁹. Another subdivision of light artillery was the *artillery of the stirrup*, being part of the Emperor's personal entourage; it consisted of "fifty or sixty small field pieces, all of brass"⁴⁰, which were transported by wheeled carriages. Such weapons can be likened to swivel-attached light weapons on vehicles such as jeeps, offering mobility in battle.

The matchlock was the primary Mughal firearm upon the European occupation of India, while important changes in firearms design assisted the emergence of the flintlock in mid-seventeenth century Europe. Another century passed before the flintlock was introduced to India and Afghanistan. "It was not until regular battalions armed and drilled in the European manner, were entertained by the Mahrattas and the Nawab Wazir, that the flintlock could have got into the hands of the Indian troops to any appreciable extent"⁴¹.

On the Safavid-Mughal periphery, scattered nomadic tribes were engaged in a state of constant war. The Afghans were no exception; however, resident between two empires, they recognised the necessity of the acquisition and adaptation to firearms to acclimatise to the evolving realities of warfare. Conversely, the Kurds, on the north-western Safavid frontier, thought it unmanly to carry a *tufang*, the musket. Unsurprisingly, the Afghans' introduction to the matchlock by Babar in the early 1500s brought about the Safavids' downfall.

The Afghans have historically been forced to develop and adapt to unknown methods of warfare, albeit, utilising ideo-theological legitimacy to do so, such as *Jihad*. Throughout the Safavid period, except during Shah Abbās's reign, Afghans were treated with cruelty and barbarity, without immunity to age or sex, due to their natural aversion and rebellion to foreign subjugation. The Afghans, under Mir Wais Ghilzai (b. 1673 – d. 1715), succeeded in wresting control of Kandahar from Safavid governorship in 1709, under the Georgian Gourguin Khan (aka. Shah Nawaz Khan), and led to a sustained effort of rebellion, eventual defeat, and transference of Persia suzerainty to the Afghans under the son of Mir Wais, Mir Mahmood Ghilzai⁴². Throughout this unstable period, the Afghans were consistently inferior to the Persians in terms of the number of soldiers under arms, and lacked firepower through artillery and firearms, which were also of inferior quality⁴³; however, during their advance and siege of Kirman in 1721, a Dutch Company resident witnessed the Afghans extensively use firearms⁴⁴. During the attack on Isfahan the following year, the Afghan leader, Aman-Allah, also reportedly deployed sixty *zanburak*, camel-mounted swivel guns⁴⁵, which can be likened to the contemporary man portable machineguns mounted on vehicles such as the pick-up trucks that were extensively used during the Taliban's conquest of Afghanistan during the 1990s. However, according to Ferrier (1858), this Afghan army could not utilise light artillery, which was “unfit for siege purposes”⁴⁶. Nevertheless, following the Isfahan siege, Mir Mahmood's cunning use of firearms, fired in massed volleys in the battle of Gulnabad, on 08 April 1722, secured a victory that eventually led to the citadel's capitulation, and the abdication of Safavid Shah Sultan Hussain on 14 September 1722⁴⁷, in favour of Mir Mahmood. The psychological effect of the ability to adapt to the superiority of firearms over the sword, and not only the advantage gained through their mere possession, won the day.

Shah Mir Mahmood's sociopathic tendencies, however, resulted in widespread political instability throughout Persia, and led to the rise of Nadir Shah (aka, Thamas Kuli Khan) as his successor. The battle successes of Ahmad Shah Abdali, one of Nadir Shah's favoured Afghan lieutenants, facilitated his meteoric promotion to head the Shah's 4,000 strong cavalry bodyguard armed with an assortment of weapons, including firearms⁴⁸. Animosity from Persian officer ranks towards the Shah's favouritism for his foreign bodyguard led to his assassination in 1747, forcing Ahmad Shah to amass large quantities of ordinance and escape to Afghanistan to form the new Afghan Empire with the aid of his formidable advantage in firearms⁴⁹.

Concurrently, the European, and increasingly British, occupation of Southern India was progressively threatening contending indigenous forces within India. The European threat was manifested through their greatly enhanced military organisation and its strategic adaptation to the application of superior weaponry. During its ascendancy, the East India Company formed variegated transitory, and shifting political and commercial alliances with indigenous parties contending for political and military supremacy throughout India, pitting them against each other with the supply of firearms in order to weaken dominant forces and, consequently, divide and diffuse their combined strength so as to stealthily move forward to a position of undisputed possession of coercive power in India for the British.

The development of the flintlock continued, since even disciplined troops, firing in volleys, only achieved a rate of three per minute. The introduction of breech-loading firearms as early as the 18th century was stymied because large-scale production could not be achieved due to the craftsman-based manufacturing process. However, the development of the primer, propellant, and effectively sealed cartridge housing hastened the production of the breech-loading system, initially through the conversion of flintlocks. Nonetheless, new production methods gave way to originally designed breech-loading rifles, leading to various types of bolt-action single shot rifles, which were superior to the flintlock because of their ability to produce several carefully aimed shots per-minute-per-person⁵⁰. According to General Robert's Proclamation, Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-1866, and 1869-1879) was able to obtain about 7,000 breech-loading Snider rifles before the Second Afghan-Anglo War⁵¹. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's (son of Afzal Khan, the eldest son of Dost Muhammad Khan; b. 1844, r. 1880 – d. 1901 A.D.; r. 1880-1901) military reforms were coupled with a complete transition from the use of traditional weapons, such as the sword, to breech-loading firearms in Afghanistan's new professional army.

The First World War accelerated firearms technology and the mass production of new weapons; especially machine guns such as the rapid-fire Lewis gun⁵² and the Vickers machine-gun⁵³, many of which were readily available in the British Indian army's arsenal before the Third Afghan-Anglo War in 1919. Individual soldiers, whether British or Indian, were all armed with the successful smokeless-powder, bolt-action, magazine-fed, short-barrelled .303 Lee Enfield rifle⁵⁴; trench mortars; and, hand grenades⁵⁵, all of which were new developments in Afghan warfare. With the exception of exponential technological development during the two World Wars, SALW development has progressed uniformly throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, upon the abolition of the Afghan monarchy in 1973, most Afghans still held turn of the century weapons, such as the .303 Lee Enfield rifle. The Afghan Army, however, was equipped with modern Soviet weapons, such as the AK-47 semi-automatic assault rifle.

4:3 – Production of SALW

4:3:1 – Pre 18th Century Manufacture

The first organised attempt at an indigenous arms production capability east of the Ottoman Empire involved Safavid Shah Abbās I (b. 1571 – d. 1629; r. 1588 - 1629) utilising Ottoman deserters who were proficient in the manufacture of new artillery and firearms⁵⁶. Numerous Europeans also worked as specialists in various fields, principally in the establishment of the court's ordinance foundry for the production of arms and artillery during the reigns of Abbās I, Safī I, and Abbās II, and during Shah Sultan Husain's (b. 1668? – d. 1726; r. 1694-1722) industrial expansion; for example, Sir Anthony Sherley advised Shah Abbās I on European methods of war during his Persian travels⁵⁷, focusing upon the Shah's intended campaign against the Ottoman Turks.

Beginne a warre with the Turke, (in which muft bee ingaged the vttermoſt of your ſtrength) what other opinion is to be had of them, but that, like old enemies, and freſhly more then euer offended they will rebel, and inſeſt you with the greateſt reſolutions that extreme enemies can? And againe, Where is your Maieſties treaſure? Where is your munition? And

where is your Artillery: all which muft bee had for a warre; and through your fortune, and the nature of the country (which hath no ftrong places) did not require them againfy the Tartars, yet of neceffity, you muft haue them againft the Turke, who hathe a Fortrefse in Tauris, Tifflis and Vannes, ftrong places; and neuer moueth his Armies, but full of Artillery: which you muft alfo haue, if you meane to proceed honourably, and with condigne fortune againft him.⁵⁸

Although there was nothing original in Sir Anthony Sherley's advice⁵⁹, European gunners were frequently solicited and used at the forefront of Persian-Mughal hostilities, in which firearms were routinely used over the possession of Kandahar⁶⁰. The Mughals also used Turks, for example, a Turkish artilleryman, Ustad Ali, helped Babur raised a park of artillery and a large body of musketeers. Ustad Ali was appointed the Master of Ordinance between 1514 and 1519, and later charged to supervise the casting of cannons and the manufacture of muskets for the army⁶¹. No one in Northern India, including the Indian army under Ibrahim Lodhi, had hitherto been introduced to artillery or fire-arms⁶².

According to Egerton (1896), European advances in the manufacture of firearms improved the indigenous design and production of weapons: "In many parts of India clever imitations of European arms are made after the latest fashion, but the process of manufacturing of matchlocks has probably not much changed since the time of Akbar"⁶³. Lord Egerton's account of the manufacture of firearms is indeed descriptive of artisan production and not factory production instituted by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. However, this was also the case in Europe's pre-industrial revolution. Such practices still flourish in the autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas, adjacent to the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province in Pakistan, in the arms workshops of Darra Adam Khel (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.1 to 7.72); therefore, facilitating an appreciation of the Mughal era, for example, as the *Ain-i-Akbari* elaborates: "the workshops where the guns were made were very remarkable. An open shed with a couple of small mud forges where the chief objects visible. The bellows consisted of two bamboo cylinders with pistons worked by hand"⁶⁴.

Mughal nobles prized original European weapons, since they were rare unless shipped by the Europeans to help create alliances with the variegated contending parties, much as is the case in contemporary times. Large weaponised Mughal and Persian armies aided the diffusion of firearms when maintaining control over their respective Afghan populations. Through incessant raids, harassment and rebellions against occupying armies, the Afghans disseminated firearms into the general population. Captured weapons were symbols of bravery, courage and honour; and hence, icons of the masculinity enshrined within the archetypal warrior ethos, aiding further diffusion of weapons⁶⁵.

4:3:2 – Afghan Indigenous Arms Production

Ahmad Shah Durrani utilised every possible opportunity to obtain arms, artillery and ammunition through raids, invasions and conquests throughout his reign⁶⁶. His prior knowledge of firearms and artillery from his service under Nadir Shah is undisputed; for example, upon his march to besiege Nishapur (Khorassan, Persia), in 1771, he ordered every cavalry soldier to carry the equivalent of 6lbs of iron for casting shot for firearms and cannon⁶⁷, which were placed in storage upon arrival. During the siege, he "cast a gun upon the spot,

which threw a projectile weighting 472lbs. English, and one month was employed in casting, boring, and placing this monster gun on its carriage”⁶⁸.

With the exception of snippets of information published in various volumes on the travels, adventures, and observations of British military officers attending court at Kabul, relatively little information on the indigenous production of arms in Afghanistan is available. However, according to Singh (1959), in order for Ahmad Shah to institutionalise firearms into his army’s structure, three quarters of which constituted the cavalry with the infantry and artillery taking up the remainder, he organised and was personally involved in the construction of arms and ammunition factories after establishing a separate colony in Kandahar, where “the site of the powder magazine, situated in the neighbourhood of *Top-Khana* and *Istabl-i-Shahi*, is still known as *Baroot-Khana*”⁶⁹. The commander-in-chief, (*Sipah-i-Salar* - Minister of War and Defence), only answerable to the Shah, was responsible for organising, training, and equipping the army in peacetime, and planning and conducting operations during wartime. He was aided by many of the army’s administrative deputies, including the *Qurchi Bashi* (Director of Arsenals), from within the *Qur Khana* (Department of Munitions). The *Qurchi Bashi* was responsible for the maintenance, manufacture, storage and transportation of firearms and ammunition to different army sections, as well as the upkeep of factories.

It was due to their defeat against the Afghans at Panipat (13 January 1761) that Maratha remnants, under Mahadji Sindhia (1761 – 1794), realised the importance of artillery and firearms by establishing a factory to mass produce weapons under European supervision⁷⁰, thereby keep pace with the Afghans, and later, the Mughals under Tipu Sultan (b. 1750 – d. 1799; r. 1782 - 1799), who had already established a factory in Mysore⁷¹ and a naval shipyard to study western maritime sciences⁷². Nevertheless, Indian use of firearms remained limited, and their diffusion depended upon the distance from active weapons importing ports; for example, ports on principle distributaries such as the Hugli in present West Bengal⁷³. As late as 1818, writes Fitzclarence (1819), “the Flintlock, an introduction of the Europeans, is far from being general, and I may even say is never employed by the natives: though the Telingas, armed and disciplined after our manner, in the service of Scindiah [*Sindhia*] and Holkar, make use of it. Some good flintlocks, are, however, made at Lahore”⁷⁴.

4:3:3 – Afghan–Anglo Wars: 1839-42, 1878-1881

Ahmad Shah’s weapons factories were undoubtedly still in use after his son, Timur Shah (r. 1773 - 1793), relocated the capital from Kandahar to Kabul to reduce the strength and influence of his rivals within the formidable Pushtun tribes at the beginning of his reign (early 1773)⁷⁵. However, Kandahar’s continued existence as the centre of Afghan arms production is unlikely to have continued because of Timur Shah’s loss of control as a result of the relocation of the capital. It is likely that these factories were also largely relocated to Kabul. Nonetheless, Bellew (1862) notes that arms manufacture existed in both Kandahar and Kabul decades later, during the reign of Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826-1839, and 1842-1863), when he stated that smooth-bore percussion weapons were “little used, as the Afghans have not yet succeeded in manufacturing caps for them, and can depend upon but a very small supply from the British. Of late years, they have turned

out a number of two-grooved rifles and carbines, both at Kabul and Kandahar, on the pattern of those used by the frontier corps of the British Indian Army”⁷⁶. Varma (1968)⁷⁷ also provides an excellent account of Timur Shah’s turbulent reign; however, while concentrating on historical events in detail he provides no account of their socio-cultural impacts, such as the effects of the capital’s relocation.

Concerning the manufacturing process, Dost Muhammad’s son, Muhammad Akbar Khan (b. 1816 – d. 1847), greatly improved the *Jezeil* and superintended “the manufacture of them in person”⁷⁸ during the relocation of arms factories to Kabul. This suggests that the Afghans were not only involved in copying the arms but also redesigning and improving upon existing models, as Lal’s observation of the effectiveness of Afghan manufactured arms illustrates, referring to the Afghans; “their muskets are also better for throwing balls to a long distance than those of England”⁷⁹. Indigenous arms production continued to improve when Dost Mohammad’s eventual successor, Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-1866, and 1869-1879), established a modern arms and ordinance production and manufacturing base in 1869⁸⁰, for the national standing army⁸¹ of 56,000 men⁸². “Considerable Turkish assistance was given in training this new model army... The Amir was able to obtain ample numbers of jezail muskets, and some modern muzzle-loading rifles”⁸³.

In concert with the continued development of firearms, the Afghan military underwent a process of renewal and reformation during Dost Mohammad Khan’s consolidation of power through the establishment of an *askari-i nizamiya* (‘regular’ Afghan Army), which previously relied upon the *suwara-yi gushada* (tribal cavalry) and *piyada-yi sakhlau* (local militias) under the Sadozais⁸⁴. As Mohan Lal (1978) observed, other permanent troops included the *Shaheenchees*, or *Shahnaks*⁸⁵, “men mounted on camels which carry large swivels”⁸⁶, numbering around eight hundred camels, and therefore, eight hundred light artillery mounted guns. In addition, the *Eeljauree* (tribal militia) were recruited or conscripted by force when the occasion demanded from up to a tenth of the poorest population⁸⁷. Concerning regular troops, Elphinstone (1972) notes that:

A few of them have fire-locks [*flintlocks*]. The chiefs have generally pistols, as have a few of the common men... The Gholams are armed much in the same way, but have more fire-locks and spears... The infantry have generally a sword, a shield, and a matchlock with a rest. Those of the Cohistan of Caubul, who are reckoned the best they have, carry a firelock, a pistol, and a short dagger, but no sword”⁸⁸.

Lieutenant Macartney, a British cavalry officer, describes the types of weapons carried by the Popalzai Durrani Pushtun troops:

Their arms and dress are the same as the other Dooranees, swords, daggers, battle axes, short matchlocks, and some with locks (firelocks) not longer than a carbine, but with a larger bore. And some of them have bayonets to fix on them. They also carry long horse pistols, but few of them carry spears.⁸⁹

Given that Afghanistan existed without a distinct administrative structure and bureaucracy after Ahmad Shah Durrani, Amir Abdur Rahman continued his grandfather’s improvements through the militarisation of the administrative structure in conjunction with his drive to industrialise Afghanistan by comprehensively organising Government public offices and works departments. Since “every person is practically a soldier, and Ghaza (to fight for the truth and faith) is every citizen’s bounden duty”⁹⁰, he “divided the departments and

institutions under two headings: 1) Military, or Nizami; 2) Civil, or Mulki”⁹¹. The Military Department was responsible for the army, the construction and maintenance of the indigenous arms industry, and the Military Secretary’s office, which regulated the payment of workers in the arms industry. The Amir organised the army into several branches: Artillery; Cavalry; Infantry; Police; *Khasadars* (Militia); *Khwanin Sowars* (cavalry militia attached to the provincial chiefs and leaders); and, volunteers (aged between 16-70 years), instituted in 1896. Furthermore, he structurally divided these into “divisions, columns, batteries, cavalry and regiments”⁹². Concerning the volunteers, every eighth man was sent for military training and his expenses were paid for by the remaining volunteers. Upon completion he was replaced by another of the eight, thereby providing much of the adult population with military training, since “the Afghan people are credited with being good warriors, and every one is a thorough soldier, but without proper drill and training, and discipline, however brave they may be, they could not fight against the skilled and organised armies of modern European nations”⁹³. The Amir sought to mould the tribal warrior into a modern fighting machine by introducing modern weapons and methods of warfare, because “it is of the utmost importance that the whole of the Afghan army should be armed with the best and most improved modern weapons”⁹⁴. For example, his first major engagement pitted him against his cousin, the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1878-1881) hero Mohammed Ayub Khan, who had humiliated and defeated the British at Miawand on 27 July 1880. Well armed and ready to fight, Ayub Khan aspired to retain his independence from the centre. With a force of 20,000 well armed fighting men⁹⁵, Ayub Khan lost his engagement with the Abdur Rahman’s modern firearms equipped army on 22 September 1881, which seized the citadel⁹⁶.

4:3:4 – Factories in Kabul

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir Sher Ali’s nephew and successor, went further by maintaining and reinforcing his power-base and governmental departments through the provision of funds and arms for an effective army by establishing his own mint “where rupees were coined by means of hand dies, because there was no machinery for the purpose”⁹⁷. However, he swiftly established a fully mechanised mint working upon the European model, which provided the financial resources to sustain a modern army equipped with indigenously produced weapons. The Amir testifies in his autobiography that he “employed all the workmen available to make rifles, cast guns and shells, and to make cartridges by hand, as there was no machinery in the country”⁹⁸. Having been a superintendent of the arms workshops during his grandfather’s (Amir Dost Mohammad) reign, under the direction of his uncle, Amir Sher Ali, Amir Abdur Rahman noted that “the works had fallen into a bad condition. I re-organised them upon a much larger scale”⁹⁹. After which he invited “some European workmen and engineers to reside at his court for the purpose of casting guns”¹⁰⁰ at his workshops. One such person, Sir Salter Pyne, became his superintendent at the workshops, which the Amir regularly visited and where he “even filed metal and turned wood with his own hands”¹⁰¹. Furthermore, the Amir testifies that he sought to purchase machinery to manufacture arms and ammunition, and reduce foreign dependency on the necessary raw materials to achieve self-sufficiency in defence:

I also wanted to buy machinery suitable for getting iron, coal, lead, copper, and other minerals out of the mines in Afghanistan. These, however, required a much larger sum than I could spare from the other necessities of my Government. I therefore first bought machinery for making guns, rifles, and cartridges, before establishing the more expensive machinery

required for mining operations, and for providing the raw materials for the daily consumption of the machines.¹⁰²

To facilitate large scale arms production, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan selected a tract of land located on Kabul's outskirts, which he named *Alam Ganj* (the treasury of world - knowledge), "as a fitting site for erecting manufactories and workshops"¹⁰³, which also commanded a panoramic view and the use of "a canal to convey water for the use in the works for the engines, boilers, etc..."¹⁰⁴. After consulting Mr Pyne, the foundation stone was laid on 07 April 1887. Although the primary focus was the manufacture of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and equipment for his army, the Amir also manufactured numerous other products in increasing numbers of factories that he constructed in the *Mashin-Khana* industrial park, which was "one-third of a mile long and 200 yards wide"¹⁰⁵. Nevertheless, the "weapons were modernised with each of the Amir's annual military campaigns"¹⁰⁶, as he affirms:

Year by year the workshops have been enlarged, new ones being erected as required. Machines were bought and placed in these buildings for making Martini-Henry and Snider rifles and cartridges; also saw-mills were built together with machines for all kinds of carpenters' work. I also bought and started the following machines: for making cartridges for Martini-Henry and other rifles; 100-horsepower condensing engines with boilers; steam hammers with boilers; boot making and leather-sewing machines; power-making manufactories [*explosives, gunpowder, propellants, and initiators*] soap and candle-making machines; stamps and dies for coining at the Mint; distilling apparatus for wine, etc.; tanning and dyeing leather; agricultural and gardening implements; furnaces for smelting ore and metals for making heavy guns and for black smith's work; machines for making swords, cartridge caps and for loading and filling the cartridges; machines for casting and making shell for mortars and heavy guns and various other machines. I continue to increase the stock of machinery every year by buying new inventions as I find need for them... I would not give up my determination to proceed on the road I had marked out for myself. I knew well that unless I had the same sort of guns, rifles, and other war materials that were used by other nations, it would be impossible to keep the integrity of my Government intact, and to protect the country from attacks of foreign aggressors.¹⁰⁷

This manufacturing base also signified the country's first determined attempts at industrialisation, with "about 100,000 men employed in Afghanistan in the work of road-making, building, manufactures, industries, mining, and many other branches of work"¹⁰⁸ by the end of the Amir's reign. Many weapons were made by reverse engineering original European samples. When the sample was not available for the workmen to copy, as is the case for the Hotchkiss guns, which were blocked from entering Afghanistan by Lord Lansdowne's Government¹⁰⁹, the Amir still "succeeded in turning out Maxim, Gardiner, and Gatling guns from drawings and designs, the instructions and all particulars being translated into Persian"¹¹⁰.

The Amir expanded and developed his Army through better training and equipment, and armed it with the best weapons available at the time, to quell countless uprisings, rebellions, and general anarchy prevalent throughout Afghanistan. After the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1878-1881), the Amir recognised the necessity of greater superiority in arms vis-à-vis his opponents, and hence, an appreciation of the breech-loading rifle, which was initially acquired in large quantities, and later, mass-produced indigenously. Before their industrial manufacture, the quality of breech-loading rifles was inferior to European models, with the exclusion of those produced by a handful of exceptionally skilled artisans. Consequently, the Amir "bought a complete plant for making Martini-Henry rifles"¹¹¹, and employed Cameron, an Englishman, to supervise and teach the necessary manufacturing techniques to artisans. However, he also made "several improvements in the cartridge works; also in the gun works, and the various small arms factories"¹¹².

There was a significant increase in the quality, quantity, and variety of weapons that could be produced, where “by means of this new machinery fifteen Martini-Henry rifles could be turned out daily, all complete, and the number could be doubled if necessary... The same lathes, drilling, rifling, and turning machines can be used for making repeater rifles, Lee-Enfield, and other guns and rifles, by substituting new tools and instruments”¹¹³. According to the Amir, over 10,000 Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles could be produced every year¹¹⁴. The additional production of other types of rifles, machine-guns, and side-arms, enabled the Amir to furnish the whole army with modern small arms and light weapons within several years. Henceforth, the Army possessed a variety of different weapons; for example, modern German Mauser pattern breech-loading guns, Austrian breech-loading carbines, and modern Russian weapons¹¹⁵.

In order to secure weapons stocks, and avoid their loss through theft, desertion, raids and battles, “a very tight control was maintained over ammunition, very few rounds being issued to soldiers, and hardly any for training purposes”¹¹⁶. The new breed of breech-loaders used cartridges that could not be easily reproduced without specialised factories, workshops, machines and tools that only the Amir possessed. Being hand-made, the cartridges were initially “few in number and of an inferior quality”¹¹⁷; however, with the purchase of appropriate machinery for the manufacture of Martini-Henry cartridges, and the employment of another Englishman, Mr Middleton, acting as supervisor and teacher, the Amir claimed that, “ten thousand cartridges can be turned out of my Kabul workshops daily, and in the case of an emergency this output can be doubled”¹¹⁸. Concerning Snider rifle cartridges, the Amir “bought a complete plant”¹¹⁹ and employed yet another Englishman, Mr Edwards, to supervise and teach Kabuli artisans so that “the number of cartridges turned out daily in ten hours is 10,000, which number can be doubled if necessity arises”¹²⁰. Both Englishmen taught artisans until they were able to produce weapons without further assistance.

Amir Habibullah Khan (r. 1901-1919) retained the arms production capabilities of the factories his father constructed in the *Mashin-Khana* where “numerous workshops existed on the frontier, [and] guns of all types were manufactured”¹²¹. However, these became underused and eventually fell into dereliction as funds to manufacture weapons fizzled out. In an evaluative report to determine Afghanistan’s military strength in the event of an Afghan-Turko-German alliance to invade India, the Hentig-Niedermayer Expedition, in 1915, noted “that the non-existence of arms factories was a matter of regret”¹²². Upon Amanullah Khan’s enthronement (r. 1919-1929), the *Mashin-Khana* still existed in Kabul and had combined capabilities to “repair weapons, produce shells and ammunition”¹²³, and “by 1920 the number of workers in the industrial sector had increased to 5,000”¹²⁴. Furthermore, Jalalabad had a factory that could produce enough *black powder* (gunpowder) for the Army’s needs. However, the fact that cartridges had to be imported from India does indicate the dereliction of Kabul’s factories to some extent.

Although a source of anxiety in Zahir Shah’s (r. 1933-1973) Afghanistan, Nazis Germany was favoured, above all, to be the dominant third party in an impressive modernisation initiative¹²⁵, which included re-armament to a war-time level. Germany was to provide all the necessary machinery and equipment to

construct factories for the manufacture of gunpowder and ammunition¹²⁶, and was exclusively charged with the complete development of Afghanistan. Fraser-Tytler (1958)¹²⁷ clearly identifies German assistance for the construction of arms manufacturing factories as one of the factors that undermined British leverage in Afghanistan¹²⁸ until World War Two negated German advances.

4:4 – Trade and Methods of SALW Diffused

It would be a futile adventure to account for all the weapons that have entered and continue to exist in Afghanistan. Such an exercise is simply impossible. However, an appreciation of the SALW that have entered or have been produced in Afghanistan may be qualified through examples of importation transactions and indigenous production estimates, as well as the methods of transfer. Nevertheless, the vast majority of adult males possessed some form of firearm during the mid-1800s, except those inhabiting remote regions, such as the *Kafirs* (synonymous with the Kalash in Pakistan) in north-eastern Afghanistan¹²⁹. Due to their endless disputes, feuds, and constant state of readiness (*state of nature*¹³⁰), Pushtun individuals were rarely without weapons, as testified by Bellew's (1862) insight into Afghanistan's mid-nineteenth century military establishment, composition, and civilian weapons possession:

The military forces of Afghanistan consist of a regular standing army and militia. The former comprises of some seventeen or eighteen regiments of infantry... There are three or four regiments of light dragoons... and also a small force of artillery... The militia force is a very numerous body, the numbers of which are very difficult to ascertain. But in case of foreign invasion it would include almost the entire male population between the ages of sixteen and sixty. Their arms are the jazail or long Afghan rifle; the sword, or in its stead, the charah, or Afghan knife... The militia provide their own arms, and receive no pay, except when on active service for the state.¹³¹

Individual Pushtun prioritise superiority of arms for defence, offence, personal prestige, and status. However, successive orientalist have mistakenly interpreted such possession; for example, in reference to the continuous state of war amongst Yusufzai Pushtun, Mountstuart Elphinstone (1815), noted how “in most parts of the country the inhabitants live in perpetual fear... and plough and sow with their matchlocks and their swords on their persons”¹³². While, Bellew (1862) observed that other Pushtun tribes, for example, the Tori, as invariably armed with some kind of weapon, since “most of them wore the Afghan knife, or ‘charah’; some instead carried a sword, and many, besides one or other of these, had a rifle slung over the shoulder. In fact, it appears that these people are so constantly at strife with each other that they never move out of their houses without being armed; even in their fields, it is a common practice for one man to be ploughing whilst his comrade is on the watch, rifle in hand, for the approach of an enemy”¹³³. Irrespective of their motivations, Afghan individuals have invariably paid great attention to the possession of firearms since their first introduction to the region.

4:4:1 – Licit and Illicit Trade in SALW

While the definition of an *illicit trade* is dependent upon the legitimacy and authority of the country, organisation, group or individual that uses the term; legitimacy, as far as this study is concerned is governed by the dictates of international law. Nevertheless, international law, itself, does not have any standardised mechanism or process through which it is created, with the exception of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Most international laws are usually created through bilateral or multilateral treaties between

countries that impose obligatory legal commitments on all signatories to the treaty. However, some international laws are created through sustained and uniform state practice, in the form of codes of conduct, which give rise to rules within customary law. The increasing bulk of domestic laws relating to restrictions on the transfer of weapons also play a significant part in the development of customary laws. The majority of international laws oblige states to account for their behaviour; however, this is not true for non-state actors, such as individuals or groups. Nevertheless, increasingly, the creation of domestic laws is beginning to reflect the mood of the international community on certain issues, and therefore, bring more focus upon the actions of non-state actors on the international stage. Since much of the illicit trade in SALW involves non-state actors, who are the traffickers, recipients and users of SALW, international influence on the formulation of domestic laws is a significant factor in the reduction of the global diffusion of SALW.

Historically, many of Afghanistan's Amirs ignored arms smuggling from British India in order to maintain influence amongst the tribes. Yet, "neither of the two governments was able to effectively guard the frontier"¹³⁴ and control trans-border tribal trade in illicit arms. Tribal raids into British India were virtually pre-determined by the high status Afghans bestowed upon firearms, especially modern weapons; for example, the *Mahsuds*, under the impression that the British were to withdraw back across the Indus after their defeat in the Third Afghan-Anglo War (1919), raided British occupied territories on the Frontier, "where the tribesmen had captured no less than 1,200 new-model rifles and nearly a million rounds of small arms ammunition. Over one hundred raids were made in six months on the adjacent districts"¹³⁵. Other tribes also specialised in raids to earn a living; for example, the "Ut Khels, a tribe of some three hundred Ghilzays from the Laghman valley in Afghanistan, specialised in stealing rifles. They roamed far into India and became such a threat that the government of India contemplated the restricting of the free influx of Afghans"¹³⁶.

The *Afridis* smuggled arms from British India via Muscat or the Persian Gulf¹³⁷. Once in Afghanistan, firearms were freely sold and sought after "by every class and creed who could afford to buy them"¹³⁸. Furthermore, "it was a common boast of the Afghans that the price for a good rifle was the same in Kabul as in Calcutta"¹³⁹. Moreover, the Afghan Government actively encouraged Frontier raids into the heart of India by supporting numerous Indian Revolutionary groups, the *Mujahideen*, which used the frontier as a staging post with active tribal acquiescence; for example, up to 50,000 men engaged in fighting during a general frontier uprising in 1915, disrupting British supply lines, and acquiring arms and ammunition¹⁴⁰.

4:4:2 – The Diffusion of SALW through Regional Trade and the Great Game

The Persians were not as enamoured as the Europeans or Ottoman Turks with an indigenous arms manufacturing industry, but preferred relying upon European imports, which also facilitated the creation of trade routes for other goods and industries, including *restricted* goods such as arms through trade missions that were disguised as *diplomatic* missions, especially Russian missions¹⁴¹. This also helped the development of a rudimentary black market in arms. Persian-Russian trade often included the transfer of firearms, such as when Tsar Ivan IV dispatched his agents to go as far as Hormuz with his royal wares in 1567¹⁴², one of which was dispatched to Qazvin with 100 pieces of artillery and 500 firearms¹⁴³. Concerning Afghanistan,

informative sources on the arms trade during Ahmad Shah's reign are scarce. However, we know that regional and local arms merchants and traders were aware of the burgeoning requirements of the expanding Afghan Empire, which facilitated the arms trade.

The diffusion of firearms may be appreciated through their acquisition methods; for example, the Afghan government acquired firearms through trade and political bargaining, while other Afghan groups, tribes or individuals often resorted to raids and ambushes to enhance their capabilities and status. The much reported 16,500 strong British retreat from Kabul to Jalalabad, beginning on 06 January 1842, in which only Dr. William Brydon reportedly reached Jalalabad¹⁴⁴, illustrates how numerous amply supplied British combatants and captured Indian sepoys were often abundant sources of new British firearms through Afghans raids and ambushes. "Mostly both British soldiers and Indian sepoys were armed with the India Pattern Flintlock musket, first introduced into the British army in 1797 (which had a 39-inch barrel, an overall length of 55 inches, and a calibre of 0.75 inches)"¹⁴⁵.

Prior to the First Afghan-Anglo War (1839-1842), firearms were also imported through trade with countries bordering Afghanistan, and those further away. India was a substantial source of weapons. The growing British power in India, and their innovative firearms designs, accounted for imports through trade, treaties, and the regular Pushtun *lashkars* (tribal raids) entering Indian territory from bordering tribes. Moreover, the Tsarist Russian expansion and its variegated trade with the Persians and Afghans also facilitated the movement and diffusion of weapons across borders; while, Afghans serving in the Persian Army secured weapons from the Russo-Persian trade, and diffused them further.

The Persian defeat and acceptance of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813)¹⁴⁶, during Russia's southward expansion, directly threatened British plans for the consolidation of India, and highlighted mutual perceptions of immediate threat, the *Great Game*. Russian relations with the Durrani leadership through trade treaties and declarations of friendship, therefore, countered British advances. While maintaining neutrality, the Afghans successfully played the dominant powers against each other in order to acquire financial and military support; for example, during Persia's active ambitions on Herat, the Afghans persuaded the British to negate their policy of *Masterly Inactivity* over their north-western frontier and conclude the treaty of *Perpetual Peace and Friendship*¹⁴⁷ with Amir Dost Muhammad in March 1855, thereby providing him with "a sum of Rupees five lakh for strengthening his defences and to relieve Herat from Persian Aggression"¹⁴⁸. After the Anglo-Persian war to evict the latter from Herat, occupied in October 1856, Dost Muhammad was granted a further supplement of one *lakh* rupees per month, or £10,000 Sterling, "to maintain a sufficient body of troops to defend his possessions"¹⁴⁹, and stipulated that he should "keep his present number of Cavalry and Artillery, and shall maintain not less than 18,000 Infantry, of which 13,000 shall be Regulars divided into 13 Regiments"¹⁵⁰, which were armed with "old flint-lock musket or smooth bore percussion guns"¹⁵¹.

Amir Sher Ali also sought a beneficial alliance with both the British and Russians. Consequently, British Governor General John Laird Mair Lawrence (1863-1869), overturning his initial rejection, granted aid with

the provision of “rupees six lakh and a quantity of arms and ammunition”¹⁵². This award “had been accompanied by a present of some thousand stand of small-arms”¹⁵³. Lawrence’s replacement, Lord Mayo (1869-1872)¹⁵⁴, promptly invited Sher Ali to meet at Ambala, in March 1869, and “provided the Amir with some help in money and arms and promised aid and support”¹⁵⁵. Although Sher Ali’s comprehensive requests for a *fixed* annual subsidy and assistance in arms and men were not fully granted¹⁵⁶, he did receive “a present of two batteries of artillery and 10,000 stands of arms”¹⁵⁷. Nevertheless, Afghanistan was pushed to the brink of war by Persian adventurism, which took advantage of the inherent instability caused by the Afghan civil war (1863-1869), through their annexation of Afghan Seistan. Consequently, over half of Seistan was lost to the Persians during British arbitration in Tehran¹⁵⁸ on 19 August 1872¹⁵⁹, under Maj. General Frederic John Goldsmid (then Colonel)¹⁶⁰. Afghan protests were only appeased when Amir Sher Ali grudgingly accepted British compensation of ten lakh and five lakh¹⁶¹ rupees of arms and monetary gratification, respectively¹⁶².

Anglo-Afghan affairs rapidly deteriorated after Lord Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton (1876-1880) promoted the *Forward Policy*, within which the British advocated the incorporation of all Afghan territories up to the Hindu Kush, including Herat. In response, General Kauffmann, Russian Governor-General of Turkestan, proposed a subsidy of one lakh rupees per month and the supply of a “considerable amount of arms and ammunition” through a Russian mission to the Amir on 9 August 1878¹⁶³; which led to the British declaration of war on Afghanistan (1878-1881)¹⁶⁴ and the entry of British troops into Afghanistan on 21 November 1878¹⁶⁵. Amir Sher Ali died soon after failing to acquire further Russian assistance; while, Yaqub Khan’s (the Amir Sher Ali’s son) inability to stop the British advance led to the Treaty of Gandamak on 26 May 1879, British representation in Kabul, and their control of Afghan foreign affairs¹⁶⁶.

During the initial stages of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign (r. 1880-1901), the eruption of several major revolts¹⁶⁷, which facilitated the release of large quantities of SALW from strict government control and gradual diffusion into the civilian population, resulted in the immediate pacification of the rebellious Afghan population through the process of ‘internal imperialism’¹⁶⁸. The Amir used the threat of Russian advances to the border of northern Afghanistan, especially their occupation and conquest of the Merv Oasis in Turkestan, formerly in Khorasan, to gain military and financial support from the British, who acknowledged that “to provide against the Russian advance, the Amir was to be strengthened; and for this his demands for ammunition and money were to be acceded to... The Amir, with the help of the British arms and money had, to some extent, restored law and order in his country”¹⁶⁹. However, deficient British assurances forced the Amir to demand concrete evidence of pledges, which eventually materialised as a “grant of twelve lakhs of rupees annually for the payment of his troops and the defence of his frontiers”¹⁷⁰, since the Amir viewed Afghanistan and Britain as complimentary because “Britain had arms and money and needed only Afghan fighting men, whereas Afghanistan had enough men but needed arms and money”¹⁷¹. However, the British did not realise nor appreciate this view, since they generally thought “that a powerful army, equipped with British arms, would be almost as likely to use its arms against Britain as against Russia”¹⁷².

During Afghanistan's tumultuous period of awakening and formation, initiated by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the possession of firearms became a guarantor of security, but also accelerated the diffusion of firearms¹⁷³. For example, while the majority of the Hazara population residing within Hazarajat were in revolt during the Hazara War (1891-1893), the Amir's call to arms against the insurrectionists was popularly accepted by all other Afghans¹⁷⁴. The Amir's forces were well trained, battle hardened, and possessed variegated arms, from converted flint-locks and newly acquired or manufactured breech-loaders to swords. "An enormous force was put together: some 30,000 to 40,000 government troops, 10,000 mounted government troops, and some 100,000 civilians"¹⁷⁵. The large number of troops used to quell the rebellion reflects the extent of the rebellion, which enjoyed popular Hazara support. To quantify: "The whole of the Hazarajat was inhabited by approximately 500,000 families, of which some 300,000 were under the control of government rule"¹⁷⁶. Although equipped with firearms, it is unlikely that many Hazara tribes possessed new breech-loaders in large quantities; of those that did, many belonged to Hazara army troops that mutinied, or were acquired from raids against army outposts or defeated army units.

According to Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, "all the arms and war materials, including shells and cartridges, are ready for 300,000 soldiers, if necessity arises"¹⁷⁷. In fact, due to the constant threat of war with the Russians, Persians, and British, the Amir was preparing to provide Afghanistan "with 1,000,000 fighting men, all armed with the most modern weapons and war materials, stores and provisions, and pay for two years, to carry on a war that should last for that time"¹⁷⁸. In recognising the Afghan nature, the Amir noted how the "country is full of arms, [where] every man or woman possesses a gun or a sword"¹⁷⁹, thereby conceding that regular troops need not comprise the whole force: "One Million fighting men are more than enough for the protection of Afghanistan against any foreign aggressor... These men I have divided into two classes: 300,000 regular army, and 700,000 volunteers and militia; the last-named must, however, be properly trained and drilled"¹⁸⁰.

The Amir's eleven-year exile (1868-1879) under Russian hospitality, numerous consultations with the British, and reign of internal conquest, consolidation, and industrial progress influenced him greatly, not least in the production and acquisition of modern arms and ammunition to protect his possessions from Imperial invasion and domination. "To secure this purpose the arrangements that I am trying to make are that each gun of modern improved design ought to have 500 shells, and each magazine repeater of Martini-Henry rifle 5,000 cartridges, for the time of war"¹⁸¹. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's reign is illustrative of the diffusion of modern SALWs on a large, yet, controlled, scale through Afghan exposure, and one that is symbolic of the real beginning of the proliferation of modern firearms amongst the Afghan population.

4:4:3 – The Twentieth Century: Consolidation

Contrary to tradition, Habibullah Khan's succession was unopposed, on 4 October 1901, and uncharacteristically peaceful, except from within his family and royal court. The Amir's stubborn assertion of Afghan independence and Russian suggestions of direct communications forced Britain to negotiate their obstinate stance that all foreign policy should be conducted through London. During negotiations, Louis Dane, the head of the British Mission, received a memorandum from the Amir on 1 January 1905, which

included a petition, in the form of a draft treaty, from Afghanistan's State Council (*Ahali-ye-Shura*) declaring that the previous "treaty was personal and insisted that the subsidy was paid in return for lands ceded by Afghanistan"¹⁸²; since, as the Council noted, "Afghanistan had gained nothing by her friendship with Britain except the enmity of Russia", and, to rectify this, "Britain must contribute to Afghanistan's defences by agreeing to a plan of military action... [whereby] British aid in arms was to be rendered in a predetermined quantity and with a definite schedule of delivery"¹⁸³. Britain viewed these and other stipulations as tantamount to relinquishing complete control to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, ameliorating Afghan-Russian ties provoked the Secretary of State to *recommend* the Amir's treaty on 16 February 1905, and concede to the annual subsidy of 1,800,000 Rupees, the subsidy in arrears that had stopped in 1901¹⁸⁴, and the unrestricted "right to import arms through India"¹⁸⁵. Referring to the latter, Dane "assured the Amir that the British Government would certainly raise no objection to the importation of any arms and munitions of war required by the Amir"¹⁸⁶. However, Viceroy Curzon demanded the imposition of controls on the unobstructed importation of arms, stating that the "only form of check that could be imposed on the import of arms was the amount of money given to the Amir in subsidy and the threat of breaking with him if his imports reached a point where he became either a menace to India or forced Britain into a war with Russia"¹⁸⁷; and, required that weapons importation be regulated "in the form of prior information regarding their import"¹⁸⁸. Nevertheless, Amir Habibullah was no different in his use of British subsidies, since "from the beginning Afghan rulers used the subsidy for the purchase of arms and ammunition and for the machinery needed for their manufacture"¹⁸⁹.

The call for *Jihad* by anti-British factions and Sultan Abdul Hamid of the Ottoman Empire, thoroughly tested Afghan neutrality during World War One. Neutrality became particularly problematic when the Turko-German Hentig-Niedermayer Expedition, having left Berlin "carrying large quantities of gold, arms and ammunition"¹⁹⁰ on 10 April 1915, arrived in Kabul five months later, to persuade the Amir to join the Axis powers against British India¹⁹¹. Through shrewd procrastination, the Amir secured an untenable agreement from the mission, through which the German Government "pledged to furnish the Afghan Government as much assistance as quickly as possible, gratis and without return 100,000 rifles of the newest pattern, and 300 guns, small and big, with complete new pattern equipment of the appropriate munitions, and other necessary war material, and a crore fund, i.e. 10 mil. Sterling"¹⁹². In response, the Amir, in concert with tribal forces, pledged to attack the British¹⁹³. Consequently, Hentig and Niedermayer sent a telegram to the German Foreign Office concerning their positive consultations with the Amir, and his opinions of an eastern front against the British and Russians indicating, "war begins at once as soon as 20,000 to 100,000 German or Turkish soldiers arrive in Afghanistan. On these would fall the task of covering Afghanistan's rear against Russia"¹⁹⁴. However, the Amir's procrastination and massive Turko-German losses in World War One, successfully invalidated the treaty¹⁹⁵.

I have declared myself and my country entirely free, autonomous and independent both internally and externally. My country will hereafter be as independent a state as the other states and powers of the world are. No foreign power will be allowed to have a hairbreadth of right to interfere internally or externally with the affairs of Afghanistan, and if any does I am ready and prepared to cut its throat with this sword.¹⁹⁶

Amir Amanullah Khan's (r. 1919-1929) public declaration of Afghanistan's complete independence from foreign interference, upon his enthronement on 13 April 1919, led to an immediate British rejection and the start Third Afghan-Anglo War after Afghan forces crossed the Durand line¹⁹⁷. An Afghan mission received by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, after reaching Moscow on 10 March 1919¹⁹⁸, achieved an alliance¹⁹⁹ and a reciprocal Soviet mission under N.Z. Bravin, who reached Herat in early July with "120 pony loads of ammunition and thirty cavalymen, including one German officer and about ten Austrians who were said to have been experts in the manufacture of field equipment"²⁰⁰. The Soviet alliance included a yearly subsidy of one million gold or silver roubles²⁰¹. Subsequently, numerous alliances and treaties of friendship were signed after independence, including those with Persia (1921), Turkey (1922), Italy (1922), Belgium (1922), France (1923), and Germany (1926).

At 1919, the Afghan army consisted of some 50,000 regular soldiers "organised into twenty-one cavalry regiments, seventy-five infantry battalions, and three pioneer battalions, supported by 280 modern guns and some obsolete crank-operated Gardner machine guns"²⁰². Although, O'Ballance (1993) notes that the 38,000 strong infantry was divided into 78 battalions²⁰³, while the 4,000 artillerymen shared about 260 breech-loading guns, "mainly Krupp 75mm (maximum range-4,500 yards) and the 7-pounder (maximum range-3,500 yards)"²⁰⁴. Individual soldiers were well armed with the modern Martini-Henry or Snider rifles that Amir Habibullah had been able to acquire as a result of his uninhibited importation of arms and ammunition²⁰⁵ because of the leeway provided by the Treaty of 1905²⁰⁶.

Preceding the short, but decisive, Third Afghan-Anglo War (1919), which led to the complete independence of Afghanistan from supposed foreign suzerainty on 08 August 1919, and after the arrival of an Afghan delegation in Rawalpindi on 25 July 1919, Amir Amanullah defiantly rejected Lord Chelmsford's terms of continued British reconnaissance flights and the withdrawal of all Afghans to 20 miles of British positions, noting that "the Afghan people could not be moved – all of them being soldiers... since, there are guns in every house [and that he] could not restrain the people from firing at the planes"²⁰⁷. Nevertheless, during the war, the Kabul armoury contained "15,000 small bore rifles and 400,000 Martinis"²⁰⁸, many of which were diffused into the civilian population for defence against British attacks. However, such weapons were also used for personal benefit, that is, on one particular occasion during British air-attack, modern rifles that were being handed over to tribesmen to reinforce Afghan Army positions were seized by the tribesmen who hastily departed into the hills during the bombing²⁰⁹. Afghan armouries that became well endowed with the latest British weapons often *lost* older weapons, which frequently found their way into trans-border tribes and were regularly used, through tribal raids, to harass British communication and supply lines, thereby acquiring further arms and war materials²¹⁰. After the war, Amanullah seriously deliberated upon resuming hostilities with Great Britain to obtain a balance of power between his two neighbours upon the receipt of "80,000 to 100,000 rifles with 600 rounds per rifle; 1,500 machine guns and 50 million roubles of gold from Soviet Russia"²¹¹.

Improving Afghan-British relations resulted in a treaty of friendly and commercial relations on 22 November 1921, and secured British assurances for Afghan arms imports via India, dependent upon friendly Afghan intentions and use, as Article 6 of the treaty states: “with regards to arms and munitions, the British Government agrees that as long as it is assured that the intentions of the Government of Afghanistan are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation in Afghanistan, permission shall be given without let or hindrance for such importation”²¹². Improving relations provoked Amanullah to reconsider dependence upon Soviet arms, while the British redefined their initial restraint on Afghan arms imports to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan, stating that “if Afghanistan is to purchase arms it is to our advantage, that she should purchase arms from us, and desirable that we should do what we can to discourage her from going exclusively to Russia”²¹³.

Britain understood Afghanistan’s arms requirements, and the role of Afghan representatives abroad to secure financial aid and military transactions²¹⁴; for example, “military material arrived from a number of sources. Soviet arms arrived first, but soon Italian, French, and international interests joined as suppliers of arms”²¹⁵. Under the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1921, the Soviets gave 120,000 gold roubles and 500,000 gold roubles in March 1921 and August 1921 respectively, reaching a total of one million roubles by the end of 1923²¹⁶, superseding the Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty of 13 September 1920 that had provided “5,000 rifles with ammunition, several aircraft and the establishment of an aviation school, a gunpowder plant, and sundry technical aid” for Afghanistan²¹⁷. Nonetheless, “occasionally the weapons delivered were of such poor quality that the Afghan government refused to accept them”²¹⁸. The British recognised this and provided new weapons for the Afghan army, such as the .303 Lee Enfield²¹⁹.

While Amanullah began establishing an air force due to Afghanistan’s aerial disadvantage, the British continued to undermine Soviet influence by sending their military attaché to the Afghan War Ministry when Afghanistan was under Soviet threat over the sovereignty of the Oxus River’s Darqad Island, offering “large quantities of ammunition from India, as well as rifles, small arms ammunition, Lewis guns, and pack artillery”²²⁰. However, the attaché failed upon the diplomatic conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet border incidence. Nevertheless, Amanullah maintained neutrality by creating diplomatic relations with numerous nations to secure military and financial assistance; for example, during his grand tour he received military matériel as gifts and grants²²¹, including two lorries of ammunition from France²²² with a total accrued income of £460,000.

The possession of weapons facilitated the violent enforcement of grievances through ethno-tribal rebellions. However, rather than adopting diplomatic measures, Amanullah exacerbated rebellions by creating tribal disunity through arms and ammunition grants. Consequently, these arms acquisitions increased the success rate of tribal raids, promoted further weapons supplies, provoked the Amir’s abdication, and helped install a Tajik bandit, Habibullah Kalakani (more commonly known as *Bacha-i-Saqao*, son of the water carrier) when he captured Kabul without consulting other anti-Amanullah factions and tribes in Afghanistan. Bacha’s government was subsequently overthrown within nine months by General Nadir Khan, who was enthroned on

03 November 1929 with the overwhelming acquiescence of the armed tribal Pushtun. Consequently, the British sent “10,000 rifles, five million cartridges and about 180,000 sterling pounds”²²³ to endorse Nadir Shah’s reign, who purchased a further 5,000 British rifles and 16,000 rifles with 1.8 million cartridges from France²²⁴. Within four years, Amanullah’s supporters, the Charkhi family²²⁵, assassinated Nadir Shah on 08 November 1933. His nineteen year old son, Zahir Khan, peacefully ascended to the throne same day²²⁶.

4:4:4 – False Neutrality and Soviet Infiltration

Shortly after the USSR provided the ‘League of Nations’ a semblance of credibility by joining when other European nations were leaving, Afghanistan joined in 1934²²⁷. Afghanistan also sought to establish new non-aligned trading partners, especially Germany, Japan and Italy, which became prolific arms suppliers when properly approached, especially after Japan’s impressive victory against Russia (1904-05); which induced Afghanistan to begin accepting Japan as stabilisers against potential Soviet aggression. The Afghan Prime Minister, confiding in Herbert Schwörbel, German Minister in Kabul, in 1935, about how Japanese troop movements in Manchuria were putting the USSR on the defensive, said, “the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan had been followed by a marked softening in the Soviet tone; endless difficulties, border disputes and protests had stopped as soon as the Japanese minister had arrived”²²⁸.

Fears of an arms race between European nations and the consequent promulgation of the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference, led many smaller nations to believe that arms supply restrictions would adversely affect their ability to defend themselves. However, many were sceptical of the conference’s ability to hold the Europeans to account; for example, when the Afghan Foreign Minister, Faiz Muhammad, noted this as “an exceptional opportunity for the Afghan delegate to pick up military materiel at cut-rate prices”²²⁹. The ‘Conference’ and ‘League’ failed within a decade, leaving Germany as Afghanistan’s only viable arms supplier. Subsequently, Afghanistan’s weak economy and undeveloped industrial base forced it to seek British, German and Czech assistance to rearm its small but modern army. The British “undertook to furnish small arms... From the great Skoda armament works came machine-guns and a proportion of howitzers... But it was from Germany that the Afghan Government obtained the greatest assistance”²³⁰, which had already provided some 5,000 rifles and half a million ammunition cartridges²³¹.

German hostility to the USSR and the encroachment of World War Two in Europe plunged Afghanistan into a dilemma. Nevertheless, German economic cooperation continued because of Afghanistan’s requirement for neutrality, security from good trade relations through the export of natural resources and the import of military materiel, and US disinterest. Although a comprehensive trade agreement was secured during 1939²³², the German invasion of Poland and interference in trans-frontier tribal relations forced the Afghans to reassess their situation²³³. Nonetheless, trade negotiations were abandoned after Germany invaded the USSR in 1941, thereby provoking a British-Soviet alliance and the proclamation of Afghan neutrality. Germany continued to interfere by financing and arming renowned frontier guerrilla fighters and tribesmen through their Kabul legation²³⁴ even after a dozen tribesmen and two German *Abwehr* agents were discovered “carrying arms and ammunition for the Faqir of Ipi”²³⁵ south of Kabul on 19 July 1941.

German goods, machinery and arms supplies to Afghanistan were ultimately blocked by the British and Soviet invasion of Iran between 25 and 29 August 1941; which forced Afghanistan to pragmatically accept British and Soviet demarches, announced on 9 and 11 October 1941 respectively, concerning the departure of all non-diplomatic axis nationals from Afghan²³⁶ to neutral territories²³⁷, since, British occupied territory now offered the only credible transit route. Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Hashim Khan, was also offered £500,000 in instalments over two years to assure his good will. However, German machinery and factories in Afghanistan had hitherto already substantially increased Afghan small arms and ammunition production capacity. Furthermore, the US government also established cordial relations with Afghanistan, through the expansion of economic ties via intensive trading, military training, arms supplies, and politico-cultural exchanges before the Second World War ended. However, Pakistan ultimately created political fissures between the US and Afghanistan over the Pushtunistan issue.

The US embarked on penetrating Afghanistan by recognising their Government in 1934, concluding the first Afghan-US Friendship Treaty in 1936, and finally, exchanging missions in 1942 and 1943²³⁸. The *Pushtunistan* issue was always at the forefront of the almost constant US rejections of Afghan requests for economic aid, even through repayable credits, which became indicative of military assistance. Pakistan's entry into the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (Central Treaty Organisation-CENTO)²³⁹ further cemented US-Pakistan relations, as Afghanistan preserved its neutrality by tactfully playing off the US against the USSR, while maintaining the pseudo-belief that the US would finally ensure Afghanistan's security; as testified by the Afghan Prime Minister's mistaken belief, "I am convinced that America's championship of the small nations guarantees my country's security against aggression. America's attitude is our salvation. For the first time in our history we are free of the threat of great powers using our mountain passes as pathways to empire"²⁴⁰.

Afghan aid submissions were repeatedly rejected by the Truman administration because of its inability to appreciate Afghanistan's vital strategic value, and internal and external security concerns, maintaining, in a US Defence Department JCOS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) report, that "Afghanistan is of little or no strategic importance to the United States... Its geographic location coupled with the realisation by Afghan leaders of Soviet capabilities presages Soviet control of the country whenever the international situation so dictates"²⁴¹. During Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan's (1946-53) US visit, President Truman noted "the limitations of the ability of the US to furnish military assistance"²⁴². Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan resubmitted the request in 1953, for which the Afghans were offered military assistance under the "proviso that Afghanistan must have a security guaranty of its own borders before it could accept military aid"²⁴³. The despondency with which the American decision was received on 28 December 1954 finally persuaded Afghanistan to reverse its policy and open negotiations with the USSR on "their long-standing offer of military aid which the Afghans had previously ignored"²⁴⁴.

The refusal of the United States to provide arms to Afghanistan and the simultaneous provision of arms to Pakistan – Afghanistan's regional rival – provided the Soviets with an opportunity to gain influence in Afghanistan through arms sales.²⁴⁵

On the promulgation of substantial US military aid to Pakistan, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that it was “necessary for the Soviet Union to think about our neighbour, Afghanistan’s defense, and make sure we [*the Soviet Union*] are safe”²⁴⁶. Later, Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin’s visit to Kabul, in 1955²⁴⁷, dramatised a new relationship through the first Soviet economic development aid package²⁴⁸ to a non-communist state of a \$100 million long-term low-interest loan of 2%²⁴⁹. Nevertheless, Afghan neutrality still produced a degree of scepticism.

Preceding the Afghan-Soviet agreement, the Afghan Government had already negotiated the cash purchase of \$3 million in arms from Czechoslovakia in August 1953²⁵⁰, which subsequently became part of an Afghanistan-Soviet arms aid agreement in 1958²⁵¹. The USSR often used smaller intermediary nations to furnish Soviet origin arms for non-aligned recipient nations to avoid compromising their *neutrality*. Exact figures for Czechoslovakian SALW transfers are unknown since the contents of arms consignments arriving at the Afghan-Soviet border were not publicly announced. Nevertheless, consignments contained substantial quantities of SALW due to the Afghan Army’s modernisation drive, the lack of significant alternatives, and persistent blockades by Pakistan.

Daoud’s commitment to the Pushtunistan issue was successfully used to gain the *Loya Jirgah*’s approval for Soviet military assistance during November 1955²⁵². “In July 1956 a loan of \$32.4 million was agreed with Moscow for military aid”²⁵³, making Afghanistan “the second recipient of Soviet Bloc arms aid”²⁵⁴ after Egypt in 1955. Following Pakistan’s closure of its border, in response to Daoud’s stance on Pushtunistan²⁵⁵, an Afghan delegation secured an economic and military assistance package in 1957, after which “large supplies of arms and ammunition had started pouring into Afghanistan from the USSR”²⁵⁶, becoming the first of many Afghan-Soviet military aid agreements, reaching over \$100 million by the end of 1960²⁵⁷.

Although the lack of information precludes a determination of the quantity of SALW within the first consignments of Soviet military aid²⁵⁸, Nisha Achuthan (1988) confirms their presence: “following the 1956 agreement, Afghanistan received 11 MiG-15 fighters, 2Mi-4 helicopters, 1 Il-14 cargo plane (gift) and small arms”²⁵⁹. Furthermore, a fiscally small percentage of the military aid package could substantiate a significantly large quantity of SALW, given the comparatively greater expense of major conventional weapons. With the exception of a small \$3.3million US military assistance programme between 1958 and 1967²⁶⁰, the USSR became Afghanistan’s sole supplier of military assistance, including Soviet origin SALWs, between the mid-1950s and late-1970s²⁶¹. The zenith was marked by a “situation of total dependence of the Afghan Army on Soviet Military supplies and logistical support”²⁶².

The USSR’s influence as the sole transit route declined when Afghan-Pakistani relations thawed and borders opened, allowing Afghanistan’s traditional neutrality to prevail until Daoud overthrew the monarchy in 1973²⁶³. Nevertheless, Afghanistan eventually gravitated towards becoming a Soviet client-state by receiving “over two-thirds of total Soviet aid up to 1968”²⁶⁴ as one of five favoured nations.

Between 1955 and 1972, Afghanistan was given military aid worth \$455 million by the Soviet Union²⁶⁵. Till the end of 1977, the total Soviet military aid deliveries to Afghanistan had exceeded \$600 million²⁶⁶. Moscow has supplied more than 95% of the military equipment to Afghanistan since the early 1950s... Soviet Military aid to Afghanistan has been a major part of the overall pattern of Afghan-Soviet relationship.²⁶⁷

The vast majority of military aid and trade from the USSR to Afghanistan was high technology major conventional weaponry. However, firearms also entered service as general issue weapons in the Afghan Army, which numbered 80,000 men by 1967²⁶⁸ and “was almost completely equipped with communist-fabricated weapons”²⁶⁹ of Soviet or Czechoslovakian origin, for example, the Avtomat Kalashnikov 1947 (AK47), which became one of the most widely used weapons in the world as numerous countries imported it and its derivatives in large quantities²⁷⁰.

4:5 – Impacts of SALW on the Changing Course of Warfare and Society

Traditional methods of warfare that were bound to notions of honour, courage, valour and bravery provided constant obstacles to the incorporation of innovations, such as firearms, into the generally conservative European or Asian war machines. The initial scepticism to the adoption of firearms also involved practical matters. Muskets and arquebus were heavy and burdensome weapons. The cavalryman found no practical application for such weapons unless they were used from the ground, that is, until the development of the flintlock, which was introduced to India upon the nadir of the Mughal era; too late for the process of adaptation to take effect, thereby providing the British a dangerous advantage that was effectively used. The serious introduction of firearms on a large scale required the comprehensive social reconstruction of traditional warfare with the formation of large battalions of infantrymen at the expense of the cavalry, the mainstay of Asian armies. Their main assets, mobility and speed, used through traditional *Steppe Blitzkrieg*, had to be compromised for confrontations based on sedentary warfare of fortifications and heavy infantry. Socio-cultural attitudes towards feudal hierarchy and ideology had to change simultaneously to facilitate the noble cavalryman’s descent to the level of a mere infantryman. This transformation inevitably took time, and led to the subjugation of those unable to adapt by powers that readily adapted to the newly changing environment. Consequently, the demise of the Safavids and Mughals was the product of their inability to adapt to the new social realities of warfare.

Military tactics inevitably paralleled the diffusion of modern arms during the British consolidation of India. The flintlock’s development inexorably propelled the infantry beyond the cavalry. However, the inability to readily adapt to scientific methods of military organisation at the expense of socio-cultural and religious values curtailed Indian socio-political development, and hence, reduced them to subservience. Ahmad Shah Durrani’s successive victories over the Marathas, especially at Panipat in 1761, were aided by his diligent use of new flintlocks; for example, 8,000 Maratha musketeers commanded by Ibrāhīm Khān Gārdī²⁷¹, in 12 infantry battalions drilled and armed with flintlocks in imitation of French sepoy²⁷² were defeated by superior Afghan tactics during battle’s first attack. “The Marathas were also the most deficient in the use of muskets and matchlocks. Like Rajputs, the Marathas preferred to rely on horses, and on swords rather than on firearms... The new firearms seem not to have been adopted by the Marathas”²⁷³. Similarly, the British

inability to successfully adapt to Afghan guerrilla warfare, enabled Afghanistan to retain a large degree of independence. “The Afghans adopted the use of the flint-guns from the Iranians, and by skilful use of them, the Afghan foot soldiers virtually signalled the end of the domination of the cavalry which started in the 8th-9th centuries with the coming of the iron stirrup”²⁷⁴.

There was a subtle transformation in the Afghan’s weapon of choice from the sword and bow to the firearm during the early nineteenth century because of the matchlock’s greater rate of fire due to the replacement of various forms of flintlock. Even so, neither the Afghans nor the Europeans abandoned the sword for close quarter combat. “The Jezail was muzzle-loaded, taking two minutes or more to make ready and was of doubtful accuracy, accordingly having to be fired in volleys to have any real effect”²⁷⁵. The household troops, the *Jezailechis* (named after their long-barrelled *Jezaile*), used their cumbersome weapons to give them greater effectiveness. “For offensive use, the Jezailechi [on horseback] commonly carried two of three loaded weapons with him, discharged them rapidly at the enemy and then either withdrew or closed on him to fight with sword and shield”²⁷⁶.

The Afghans adapted to the military requirements of modern weapons by successfully reproducing European flintlocks and deploying them in terrain that defeated the European model of formation warfare. “In the North [of India], the large community of craftsmen in metals quickly learnt to manufacture flint guns so that a ready supply was available [*especially to the Afghans and Sikhs*]”²⁷⁷. The Afghans “utilised the traditions of metallurgy and the manufacture of arms, which had already attained a high level and which was widespread in the area”²⁷⁸. Swift Afghan progress in artillery and firearms manufacture was only possible due to the existence of deep-seated cultural traditions, and established infrastructures for metallurgy, general handicrafts, and markets for weapons dispersal²⁷⁹.

Both the Afghans and British suffered a pendulum of defeats and victories during the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1878-1881) until Abdur Rahman Khan announced his Amirship on 20 July 1880²⁸⁰. Nevertheless, the possession of breech-loading rifles continued to provide the British with an overwhelming advantage and shifted the balance in their favour up until the end of the war, on 21 March 1881²⁸¹. Impressed by the developments in technology, Colonel George Pomeroy Colley declared that “a single regiment, armed with breech-loaders, and plentifully supplied with ammunition, should be able to march at will throughout the length and breadth of Afghanistan”²⁸². Even though the breech-loader was not new, the Afghans had not appreciated its importance until after the end of the war. Consequently, the Amir recognised the advantage that such arms provided, and began acquiring and manufacturing large quantities of breech-loading rifles. Furthermore, the fact that the breech-loading Martini-Henri rifle was on general issue in the British Army from 1871, and that “most Indian units were equipped with the breech-loading Snider rifle”²⁸³, is significant when considering the origins of their eventual extensive diffusion into the general civilian population.

The development of better long-range rifles led to the refinement of Afghan battle tactics, which previously relied upon massed head-on charges to overwhelm the opposition, but transformed to accommodate

concealment and evasion, heavy artillery support, long-range engagement and sniping, and ambushing, at which the Pushtun were particularly adept as “they were fighting men born and bred. They knew their hills, and could survive with the minimum of provision for their comfort. They were tireless, fearless, and elusive. They did not respond well to discipline, but they were unsurpassed in fast-moving warfare in which personal bravery counted as much as military efficiency”²⁸⁴. The Afghans also had a practice of positioning fortified supply depots roughly twelve miles apart along main routes between major cities, about a day’s march, which contained provisions for the re-supply of “a given number of soldiers on a march for a given number of days, thus enabling fairly large bodies of troops to be deployed quickly”²⁸⁵. These were effectively used during the Third Afghan-Anglo War (1919).

The military arsenal continued to grow with the incorporation of newer weapons while SALW diffused into Afghan society throughout the 20th century. The mass manufacture of heavy conventional weapons and developments in aerial warfare; mechanised warfare; napalm and high explosives; and, heavy artillery far out-paced the relative impact of developments in SALW on the nature of warfare and negated their utilisation during raids by large tribal *lashkar* (tribal raiding armies) who depended upon mobility and strength in numbers to oppose static armies. In order to resist British penetration of the *Sarhad* (formerly NWFP, now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province), the Afghan Government was therefore compelled to support the tribes with subsidies, financial and military assistance, employment as *khassadars* (tribal militias), and refuge through *nanawati* (protection or asylum, within Pushtunwali – Pushtun code of conduct). Consequently, guerrilla warfare, utilising SALW rapidly evolved in reaction to the British deployment of heavy military hardware.

The reckless bravery of the Afghans and their skill in a guerrilla-type war frustrated the conventional forces of the British and made the British military commander willing to strike the Afghans wherever and however he could. Because the tribal soldier was difficult to locate and defeat, the British upheld the concept of collective responsibility and retaliated by bombing the villages of the tribesmen they could not defeat in the field.²⁸⁶

During the latest phase in Afghanistan’s tumultuous history, traditional Afghan *lashkars* evolved to predominately use fast *hit and run* tactics with SALW. SALW have developed through the centuries and forced radical changes in the nature of warfare, from the domination of the cavalry by the infantryman to the domination of the air by a single fighter with a single light weapon, albeit, technologically advanced, such as the Stinger surface to air heat seeking missile. The latter half of the 20th century saw the mass empowerment of people seeking independence from foreign suzerainty through the development of sophisticated and powerful firearms; foremost of which has been the remarkably easy to use Avtomat Kalashnikov, AK47, and its derivatives, which is, hitherto, the world’s most successful breech-loading assault rifle.

The AK47 still remains the weapon of choice for the countless guerrilla groups around the world, as well as standing armies. It has been successfully battle tested, as has its counterpart, the M16 rifle manufactured by the United States. The AK47, and later AK74, became the general issue weapon of the Afghan security forces; that is, the armed police, army, and air force personnel, and remain so today. The weapon has been able to replace both sub-machine-guns and rifles due to its semi-automatic and fully automatic capabilities. With the addition of a heavier barrel, it can also act as a platoon support weapon, such as a light machine-gun

(the RPK and RPD)²⁸⁷. The round used, a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge, also continues to serve a number of other weapons of Soviet, Chinese (Type 68 and Type 56), and European (the Finnish M-60 and M-62: the German Heckler and Koch HK-32: the Swiss SG 510-3 gun) origin.

4:5:1 – Impacts of SALW on Political Society

Small arms and light weapons have not only affected the course of warfare, but also the political society within which they have been dispersed on a large scale. Firearms have represented empowerment and control for every individual that has possessed them; and, this holds true today. The effects of the possession of weapons, whether large or small, is the same, that is, an increased degree of coercive power, and hence, socio-political leverage; whether towards another individual or group. As such, they have become prestige and status symbols within the cultural traditions of some societies.

The ability of the tribes to obtain firearms consistently challenged the capacity of both the Afghan and British governments to simultaneously subdue the tribes, while obtaining political leverage against each other. Consequently, the British assisted the Amirs in securing India's northern borders; whereas the Amirs, for example, Sher Ali and Abdur Rahman, utilised this assistance to build an effective, disciplined, and well motivated army, through the use of fixed wages, to consolidate their position in Afghanistan and bring its turbulent regions within centralised control. Nevertheless, the Amirs also maintained cordial relationships with border tribes in case the British resumed their recurrent forward policy to extend their domains westwards. Conversely, the autonomous tribes and variegated ethnic groups were in constant contradiction between the need to develop and the desire to remain free. The ability of the tribes to organise themselves through their acephalous organisation, martial nature, and capacity to arm themselves to a man increased their political leverage and bargaining power vis-à-vis the Amirs, while also providing them the capability to defend against, and hence, deter British attacks.

The recommencement of hostilities against the imposed Treaty of Gandamak, the establishment of a permanent British presence²⁸⁸, and the abdication of Yakub Khan on 11 October 1879²⁸⁹, during the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1878-1881), compelled the British to reduce further resistance through the forced disarmament of Kabul's population²⁹⁰. General Frederick Roberts's proclamation at Kabul's Bala Hissar fort on 12 October 1879, upon the direction of private letters from Viceroy Lytton²⁹¹, stated that:

It would be a just and fitting reward for such misdeeds if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed and its very name blotted out... For the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or fire-arms, within the streets of the city, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates is forbidden. After a week from the date of this Proclamation any person found armed within those limits will be liable to the penalty of death... For every country-made rifle, whether breech or muzzle-loading, a sum of Rs. 3 will be given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture Rs. 5.²⁹²

The disarmament of the civilian population is interesting for several reasons; initially, because of the severity of the punishments imposed upon those carrying firearms, for example, General Roberts's diary notes that as of 15 November 1879, "The Military Commission disposed of sixteen cases during the past week. Seventy-eight persons in all have now been executed upon the recommendations of the Commissioners"²⁹³; secondly,

because the proclamation thoroughly crushed related local customs and traditions, leading to its complete failure and expulsion of the British occupation force; and finally, because the recommencement of hostilities were symptomatic of the availability of firearms, which demonstrated the general diffusion of modern weapons amongst the population, especially breech-loading rifles, and because they facilitated tribal willingness to forcefully regain independence.

4:6 – Final Observations

The diverse ethno-cultural and tribal population, military engagements and civil wars for regional autonomy, and internal power struggles by *loyal* family and divisive pretenders that all the leaders of Afghanistan confronted, contributed significantly towards political destabilisation and the proliferation of SALW; thereby constraining the government's ability to centralise power. Nevertheless, the Amirs ruthlessly confronted these revolts in order to establish a degree of centralised control by recognising the dire extent of the problem:

Every priest, mullah, and chief of every tribe and village considered himself an independent king... The Mirs of Turkestan, the Mirs of Hazara, the chiefs of Ghilzai were all stronger than their Amirs, and, so long as they were the rulers, the King could not do justice in the country... Every chief, official, prince, and the King himself had parties of assassins and large numbers of hired robbers and thieves... Every one of those robbers had a band of his own armed with rifles and guns”²⁹⁴

Although the military strength of every rebellion is unknown, a large proportion of the adult male Afghan population possessed firearms. Their availability in-sync with a warrior-orientated culture enabled a forceful venting of grievances against any supra-ethno-tribal control. For example, in successive battles, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan encountered large bodies of men willing to oppose him, from a force of 15,000 armed Shinwaris²⁹⁵ in the winter of 1883²⁹⁶, to the approximately 30,000 armed men in the Ghilzai uprising lasting two years²⁹⁷, some having mutinied from the Amir's Army stationed at Herat²⁹⁸, who were consequently compelled to migrate to different areas of Afghanistan by the Amir, scattering their unified potential.

Continuing his father's policy, Amir Habibullah (r. 1901-1919) sought to gain influence with the independent Pushtun border tribes. The coerced acquiescence of the Durand Line, defined during Abdur Rahman's reign, therefore, never stopped Amir Habibullah from sending deputations to maintain friendly relations with his Pushtun brethren throughout the borderlands, “subsidizing tribes and inviting tribal deputations to Kabul where they would receive *Khilats* (robes of honour) and various presents”²⁹⁹. The Amir maintained this policy: to preserve Frontier Pushtun allegiance to the Afghan throne in opposition to the British; to act as a defence against armed rebellion within the State; and, to act as a buffer to the aggressive designs of the British by maintaining and protecting the reservoir of fighting men in case the British attempted to invade Afghanistan. As Fraser-Tytler (1958) notes: “To the ruler of Afghanistan interference meant armed interference. They did not consider themselves debarred in any way from sending emissaries across the line to maintain Afghan influence among the independent tribes throughout the border”³⁰⁰.

Unlike Habibullah, Amir Amanullah sought to institute far-reaching socio-economic and political reforms to modernise society, curb tribal power, and reduce the influence of rebellious mullahs, by developing a “small but efficient and cohesive disciplined army, drawn from the population as a whole rather than from tribal

levies – a fighting force thoroughly professional and capable of maintaining internal security”³⁰¹. However, he failed to maintain the army’s readiness and strength, re-organise and reform the army without causing rifts within it, and lacked the focus and attention required for military affairs in order to counter an inevitable backlash to his reforms because of his inability to anticipate their effects, as illustrated by the first of a series of uprisings by the Mangal Pushtun of Khost³⁰². Amanullah had to break the vested interests of the power elite, local power structures, and the influence of tribal heads in the selection of army personnel, which were selected under the *hasht nafari* system (during Habibullah’s reign), to be successful in his reforms. He therefore sought to enlist auxiliaries from the Afridi, Mohmand, Kunari, Shinwari, Waziri and Hazara tribes to counter the Mangal Pushtun by gaining “the sympathies and armed support of tribes which had family feuds with the recalcitrant Mangals, thus arming the rival tribes from the State arsenal against their own kith and kin in the strict sense of the word”³⁰³. Similarly, the British supported various Afghan tribes, through arms and financial assistance, to fight against the Amir³⁰⁴. Consequently, arming one group against the other resulted in Amanullah’s inexorable demise by empowering them for future revolt against ill-considered reforms in an ultra-conservative society. This was amply demonstrated by the arming of multiple factions during the recent Afghan conflict, as Ikbal Ali Shah (1933) virtually prophesises:

The encouraging of this inter-tribal war amongst virtually the peoples of the same country assisted in disintegrating the national cohesion of the Afghans as a nation... Although it could, in certain circumstances, destroy the unity of the tribes against the Government, at the same time, in the long run, it would materially damage the national basis on which nationalism as a growing organism thrives and flourishes”³⁰⁵.

Amanullah’s reign failed because his reforms produced socio-political, cultural, and religious grievances against him; threatened tribal authority; and, reduced his credibility. In addition, the extensive tribal acquisitions of modern firearms facilitated the uprising and provoked his abdication on 14 January 1929. In contrast, although Amir Abdur Rahman’s rebellions were much larger and ferocious, they were defeated because of his professional army, and strict control and regulation of firearms and ammunition. By encouraging one tribe against the other, and arming the Surkh Roodi, Chaparhari, Lugmani, and other tribes to wage war against the Shinwari, Amanullah pursued a divisive policy, which inevitably recoiled when the tribes turned against him with their government arms. Numerous government armouries were raided to increase the firearms possessed by revolting tribes. Many government troops dissatisfied with his policies also defected en-mass with large supplies of arms and ammunition³⁰⁶. Moreover, many non-Pushtun joined the revolt to gain further autonomy, including non-Pushtun government soldiers who “surrendered without firing a shot”³⁰⁷ with extensive stores of war materials, arms and ammunition.

Amir Amanullah’s attempts at soliciting tribal support and reducing tribal unity through arms transfers, rather than addressing the rebellions through diplomatic measures, only succeeded in increasing grievances and reinforcing ethnic and tribal unity against him. The supply of lethal weapons enabled the violent expression of grievances, thereby facilitating further arms supplies through successful raids and the conflict’s escalation. Further conflict was only avoided by the King’s abdication, which was hastened when the Amir’s attempt to Bacha-i-Saqao against the Shinwari with an offer of a Colonel’s rank and a hundred Lee Enfield .303 rifles with 2,000 rounds per rifle³⁰⁸ rebounded when, instead, the bandit attacked a large army garrison of 900

mostly non-Pushtun Government soldiers in the Koh-i-Daman of Jabal-us-Seraj, north of Kabul, on 10 December 1928. As mass desertions ensued, Bacha immediately attacked Kabul; entering the capital the following day, and proclaiming himself King on 16 January 1929 in opposition to a potential power-sharing arrangement between Afghanistan's ethnic and tribal communities.

The perception that military and financial assistance solidified tribal support³⁰⁹ continued. As such, the Directorate for Tribal Affairs was established in 1934 to liaise with the Afghan tribes, and was later extended to include the *Ghair-ilaka* (now, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas)³¹⁰, putting Afghan-Anglo relations under immense constant strain. Even so, Amanullah's reforms were the first attempts to modernise and transform a xenophobic and intransigent martial society. However, his dethronement is testament to the strength of the clash of political forces unleashed by the reform process, and more significantly his inability to correctly judge the consequences of empowering aggrieved forces with lethal weapons. Nevertheless, Amanullah succeeded in laying the foundations of Afghanistan's socio-economic and political reform process.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART II

CHAPTER FIVE

**THE WEAPONISATION OF
AFGHANISTAN 1973-1979**

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THE WEAPONISATION OF AFGHANISTAN 1973-1979

5 – The Monarch Falls

The end of the monarchy on 17 July 1973, which lasted nearly two hundred and twenty five years, was a turning point in the social stability of Afghanistan. In the following decades, the country was to see itself torn apart, its social fabric warped out of the modern world and into a world of destruction. The toppling of the monarchy by Mohammad Daoud (b. 18 July 1909 – d. 27 April 1978)¹, the cousin of King Zahir Shah, set the country on course for four decades of political fragmentation, conflict and war. As in most contemporary wars, civilians suffer the most. Their lives collapse in front of their eyes as the introduction of the means to wage war gradually increase. In respect to Afghanistan, all the contending parties vied to offset the others' advantage by increasing their own lethality. This chapter focuses on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan from the fall of the monarchy at 02.30 am on 17 July 1973 and the declaration of Afghanistan as a Republic in a virtually bloodless coup by the new President, Mohammad Daoud, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.

5:1 – Introduction

The focus of this chapter is not solely to count the numbers of weapons that have entered Afghanistan, which is colossal in the least, but to try to appreciate the lengths that the various contending parties went to to ensure that such small arms and light weapons (SALW) got into the country by understanding the local, regional and global geostrategic reasons for such proliferation. The events that led to the decisions to initiate and intensify the conflict will also be discussed. Furthermore, the forthcoming analysis will facilitate an understanding of the complexity of conflicts and the tendency for unintended consequences to overwhelm and confuse the original objectives and rationales for an ongoing conflict; such as the materialization of latent and or structural flaws. Essentially, however, this chapter focuses on providing the *raison d'être* for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), while making it evident that this proliferation cannot be divorced completely in its impact on society from the more lethal heavy conventional weaponry that was also introduced into the confines of Afghanistan throughout the continuing protracted Afghan conflict.

The following discussion will touch upon a whole range of factors that aided the proliferation of SALW, including the transportation of weapons; establishment of the infamous Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arms pipeline; problems between the security services; seizure of the opposition's weapons; the variety of state and non-state actors involved; logistical problems; relationship between narcotics and arms; political contentions; deep seated corruption; arms purchasing and selling processes; methods involved in procuring arms; distribution of arms; routes used to transport the arms; conflicts and the solutions of the various problems that arose during the whole conflict; and, amongst many other factors, the impact of the self-perpetuation of the processes and methods that were used to aid the diffusion of the arms.

This chapter will progress through a number of historically relevant stages in the development of the conflict; which include:

- a) Mohammad Daoud Khan's coup d'état on 17 July 1973 that led to the Abolition of the Afghan Monarchy; and
- b) People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coup d'état on 27 April 1978 (*Saur Revolution*).

This chapter will focus, throughout, on the extent of the proliferation of SALW during the initial stages of the Afghan conflict (1973-1979), the entities involved and the methods that were used to saturate the country with SALW. The discussion will also be contextualised to reflect the geo-strategic state of affairs that ultimately gave rise to the Afghan conflict.

5:2 – The Daoud Period (1973 – 1978)

5:2:1 – Political and Military Agenda

The resignation of Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud in 1963 led to a reduction of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and a concurrent increase in United States (US) activities in the region; although, cordial relations continued to exist, and opportunities to consolidate them were regularly utilised, such as the Afghan Prime Minister Abdul Zahir's visit to the USSR between 14 and 22 March 1972, wherein which his delegation was cordially received in Moscow and included talks "with top Soviet political and economic leaders, including Kosygin, Brezhnev, Novikov, Baybakov Gromyko, Patolichev, and Arkhipov... 'in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding'"². Consequently, the abolition of the monarchy by Daoud with the help of both the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA in July 1973 served to provide the Soviets an opportunity to re-establish influence within Afghanistan's internal political situation, and hence, to counter and displace the US. The period being discussed in this chapter comprises the later stages of the political and economic offensive that the Soviets launched in order to penetrate Afghanistan to offset the development of US foreign policy in the Middle East during the fourth quarter of the twentieth century.

5:2:2 – Military Imports

With the loss of influence after 1963, the Soviets refrained from overtly interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs, however, trade continued to increase. The proportion of total imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) reached 54 percent in 1966/67 at the end of the Second Five Year Plan, but dropped to 8.5 percent by 1972/73³. After 1973, Afghan imports from the USSR increased, reaching 34 percent by 1977/78, with an exponential surge to 60.8 percent in 1978, and attaining an all time high of 87 percent during 1979, the year of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan⁴; wherein which, "by 1978 total Soviet aid [economic] to Afghanistan was valued at \$1,265 billion"⁵.

Afghan trade with the USSR, as described above, is illustrative of the degree of connectivity that the two countries had developed, albeit, with entirely different *raison d'être*s and premises, and provides an indication

of the extent of Soviet weapons exports to Afghanistan; which, therefore, assists in correlating between the arms trade and political developments on the ground. Due to the lack available data, only a general quantitative description of the importation of military weaponry can be provided for the period between 1973 and the communist PDPA coup, on 27 April 1978. Data for much of the military hardware that was imported into Afghanistan is not publicly available; therefore, negating a breakdown of every transaction, in order to determine the quantity of SALWs that were imported into Afghanistan. Nevertheless, a general quantitative description can be ascertained.

Soviet military aid to Afghanistan valued at \$455 million between 1956 and 1973⁶, with intelligence estimates at the time indicating that: “The USSR, Afghanistan’s sole source of military supply, has provided over \$300 million of weaponry since the late 1950s, ranging from small arms and ammunition to jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles”⁷, “at 75% off the list price”⁸. However, between 1973 and 1977, military aid exceeded a total of \$600 million⁹. More than 95 per cent of Afghanistan’s military supplies and equipment came through the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites in the Warsaw Pact¹⁰, making Afghanistan the third largest recipient of Soviet aid to less developed countries, behind Egypt and India (see, Appendix II, Table 5.1 – Major South Asian Recipients of US, Soviet, and Western European Arms, 1975-1979; US\$ Mn)¹¹. The size of Soviet aid to Afghanistan, especially in comparison to US aid to Afghanistan (US aid stood at \$471 by 1977¹²), is indicative of the importance that the Soviets gave to countering US influence in Afghanistan, which was approximately “60% of Soviet economic aid”¹³. Military aid to Afghanistan also came in the form of Soviet instructors and logistical support to train and maintain the Afghan Army. In effect, the Afghan Army became entirely dependent upon Soviet military supplies; especially “given the chronic maintenance and logistic problems of the Afghan military, the recent influx of the sophisticated weapons systems increases Afghanistan’s dependence on the USSR and on hundreds of military advisers and technicians stationed in the country”¹⁴. In contrast, the US repeatedly rejected Afghan calls for military aid so as to maintain Western influence over Iran and Pakistan. This was especially so for the latter, which had an ongoing border dispute over the *Pushtunistan* issue.

Of the total arms transfers to Afghanistan between 1973 and 1978, the Norwegian Initiative of Small Arms Transfers database¹⁵, indicates a small number of arms transfers that included SALW, which were only to the Government of Afghanistan for the years 1974 and 1975, which had a total annual value of \$392,149 (US Dollars) and \$221,159 respectively¹⁶. Nevertheless, although the actual types of weapons are not provided by NISAT and only categorised as *non-military firearms* (including ammunition), the quantities imported into Afghanistan were quite substantial; amounting to the total importation of 2,138,780 and 63,724 units of non-military firearms in 1974 and 1975, respectively¹⁷, predominantly from European countries, such as, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, and the USSR, as well as the United States of America¹⁸.

5:2:3 – The Coup D'état: External Interference

5:2:3:1 – Daoud's Pushtunistan

Daoud's insistence on *Pushtunistan* led to further deterioration of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The latter facilitated the emergence of a religious opposition in Afghanistan to divert its attention to internal dissent rather than the Pushtunistan Issue¹⁹. The Daoud Government, which was recognised by the US as residing within the Soviet *sphere of influence*, was quick to manoeuvre the 1973 armed insurrection of the Mangle and Marri tribes in Baluchistan to its advantage, by aiding Baluch separatists, in order to advance the Pushtunistan issue, "a proposed autonomous or independent state to be created of tribal areas in Pakistan along the Afghan border"²⁰. However, the insurrection was forcefully countered by Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who also prevailed upon the Soviets to influence Daoud in his actions, and viewed his actions as "interference in Pakistan affairs"²¹; although "there has been little evidence so far that either country is getting ready to initiate hostilities"²² against each other. Nevertheless, Bhutto "once again resorted to the stick in his dealings with the opposition, arresting a number of anti-government politicians in the province of Baluchistan"²³. After dismissing the opposition-controlled government in Baluchistan in February 1973 he politically manoeuvred himself "in an effort to secure a majority in the provincial assembly for his supporters. He was not successful, and the arrests last week – including the former governor, the former chief minister, and the head of the largest party in the province – signal the beginning of a tougher approach to the politics of the province"²⁴. Consequently, Daoud's State visit to the USSR, as the President of Afghanistan, in June 1974, was a resounding disappointment as the Soviets pressured him to negotiate with Pakistan to settle the issue. The visit had an immediate and lasting effect upon Daoud's foreign and domestic policies. Upon his return, Daoud began to ease out significant Parchami from his cabinet and other government posts²⁵. At the same time, in a programme developed and co-ordinated by Brigadier Naseerullah Babar, who was the then inspector general of the 2nd Frontier Corps, Pakistan, aided, trained, and armed up to 5,000 members of the Islamic opposition in Afghanistan, including Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar²⁶ through the *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society), and organised bomb blasts in Jalalabad and Kabul as tit-for-tat actions vis-a-vis Afghanistan. The Islamists were brutally repressed²⁷; for example, "in March 1975 Hekmatyar tried to organise uprisings in four provinces of Afghanistan with Bhutto's help. But these failed"²⁸. On 21 July 1975, the *Jamiat-i-Islami* even attempted a coup against Kabul with the full backing of Bhutto²⁹. Some of the better known Islamists originally trained by Pakistan for their own interests went on to spearhead the opposition against the Communists and Soviet occupation in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

Daoud made surreptitious proposals to China, India and Saudi Arabia for economic assistance in order to reduce Afghanistan's reliance on the USSR, but had mistakenly thought that Parchamite influence had been significantly reduced; however, a declassified Top Secret CIA Intelligence Bulletin noted at the time that according to the US Embassy in Kabul an assessment "indicates that Parchamists have infiltrated the government and now hold many positions at the working level, some with decision-making authority"³⁰. Iran had also noted these developments, and sought to wean the Afghans away from the Soviets into the Western fold, seized the opportunity by concluding the Treaty of Helmand, in which a Dam was to be built across the Helmand River. Furthermore, the Shah of Iran offered Daoud a billion-dollar loan³¹ that was subsequently

increased to \$2 billion³², with encouragement from the US³³, to construct a railway from Kabul to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, under the proviso that Daoud distance itself from Soviet influence³⁴. In addition, Daoud's internal security apparatus was complemented by the Shah of Iran's CIA trained secret police, SAVAK³⁵ (Ministry of Security), who began to replace many of the Soviet advisors.

Detente with Pakistan came during the summer of 1976 when Daoud received Bhutto in Kabul to reduce inter-state tensions and restore peaceful relations by discussing the relegation of the Pushtunistan issue. "The two leaders did not reach any accord on Pushtunistan, but their discussions were friendly and reinforced the trend towards better relations"³⁶. The US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, paid a visit to Kabul in August to support the initiative. In return, Daoud sent a number of his officers to Pakistan and the US for training³⁷. Daoud was trying to implement the traditional Afghan policy of playing opposing powers off against each other, whilst sincerely trying to reduce Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, to keep the pretence of positive Afghan-Soviet relations going, Daoud also engaged the Soviets with talks on trade during Soviet President Podgorny's State visit, and extended the *Neutrality and Non-aggression Treaty of 1931* with the USSR for a further ten years in December 1975. Although, Podgorny's visit was most probably "to take a first-hand look at Daoud government since the President's purges of leftist officials, including cabinet members, in August and September"³⁸. Realising the drift that Daoud had initiated, the Soviets offered to deliver more sophisticated weapons, including the SA-3 and D-7 surface-to-air missiles, to the Afghan Army³⁹. According to Gupta (1986)⁴⁰, the Soviets were not unduly concerned with Daoud's foreign policy objectives, as they were economically stronger than any other external actor in Afghanistan.

The purges against the Parchami and Khalqi communists that Daoud had initiated during his tenure forced the two factions to unite in July 1977 to form the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), albeit, with significant Soviet insistence to resolve their differences⁴¹. The Parchamites had significant support in the Afghan Army, who had, in fact, assisted Daoud in his coup against King Zahir Shah. A series of events, occurring over less than a fortnight, including the assassination of a leading Parcham ideologue Mir Akbar Khyber and the incarceration of several other prominent PDPA leaders such as Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, sparked the implementation of a Soviet inspired contingency plan⁴² that led to the overthrow and death of President Mohammad Daoud and his government in a bloody coup d'état on 27 April 1978, by PDPA supporters in the Afghan Army.

5:3 – The Hammer and Sickle Coup (27 April 1978 – 27 Dec 1979)

5:3:1 – The PDPA Game Plan – The Pre-Invasion Period

In light of the events, the marked increase of imports from the USSR can be explained in terms of Soviet contingency planning, even though no Soviet personnel were directly involved in the coup on 27 April 1978, which was itself brought forward due to extenuating circumstances because of "the arrest late Wednesday of the leaders of the pro-Soviet Communist Party"⁴³, the PDPA. No doubt, the USSR was gearing up to an inevitable change of circumstances in Afghanistan and was aware of the plans for a coup originally scheduled for August 1978⁴⁴. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, no reports had surfaced "of reactions from the

extremely conservative religious leaders in the provinces”⁴⁵ and there were “no strong reactions to events in Kabul from Afghanistan’s neighbours”⁴⁶, including Iran and Pakistan. Nevertheless, once political power had been wrested from the Daoud government, the Soviets became more secure in their relationship with the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), regardless of the serious factional infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA. However, the Khalqi victors, under Nur Muhammad Taraki (Chairman of the Presidium of Revolutionary Council – effectively President, b. 15 July 1917 – in office from 30 April 1978 - 14 September 1979) and Hafizullah Amin (b. 01 August 1929 – d. 27 December 1979)⁴⁷, began to make serious miscalculations in the implementation of their *progressive* policies.

The initial steps to consolidate power came in the form of international recognition. The USSR being the first country to do so on 01 May 1978. Amin, as DRA Foreign Minister, subsequently visited Moscow, on 20 May 1978, and “met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko”⁴⁸ to discuss financial and military support for his government. Within the first few months of the coup, an increasing and secretive flow of military and technical advisers entered Afghanistan from the USSR, as President Taraki affirms, albeit, indirectly, to the Central Committee Historical Commission in November 1978: “during the first days of the Revolution some persons who had specialisation in Party organisation came to Kabul”⁴⁹. Recognising the need to strengthen the regime from internal collapse and the growing and increasingly menacing insurgency against its abrasive policies, the Soviets rushed in arms and advisors, thereby decisively maintaining a friendly regime in power at all costs⁵⁰. “In addition to the sharp increase in the size of the Soviet military advisory presence in the Afghan Defence Ministry, Soviet advisers have been assigned to the Interior Ministry to oversee the reorganisation of the police”⁵¹. The rapid expansion of the insurgency to the level of a nationwide uprising within a matter of months, and the regime’s inability to cope with the consequences led to the progressive monthly increase of Soviet advisors and arms, which further increased the DRA’s dependency upon the USSR. Furthermore, increasing numbers of Soviet advisers were “assigned to Afghan units fighting rebel tribes in Konar and Paktia Provinces”⁵², where “three Soviets were killed in June while accompanying Afghan units into combat”⁵³.

Afghan dependency on Soviet arms began long before the coup; nevertheless, such military aid was “structured to facilitate expansion of Soviet military influence with a view toward possible future military integration of facilities in Afghanistan with the Soviet system”⁵⁴. During July 1978, an agreement to provide \$250 million in military aid was concluded between the USSR and the new communist regime⁵⁵. In fact, within the first six months of the new regime, “40 or so new economic aid agreements between the two countries were signed”⁵⁶.

Afghan President Taraki’s visit to the USSR⁵⁷, and his signing of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation in Moscow⁵⁸, on 05 December 1978, paved the way for a significant increase in Soviet arms and advisors, as can be noted from the provisions of the treaty, of which article 4 is the most significant in terms of military co-operation, whereby the two countries were bound to “ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity”⁵⁹ of each other. Furthermore, the Afghan regime “gained

greater confidence in both dealing with the domestic opposition and in pursuing foreign policy goals since Afghanistan signed the peace and friendship treaty with the USSR”⁶⁰, whose civilian and military advisors increased to over 4,500 shortly after the signing of the Treaty⁶¹. It is noteworthy that the Treaty was the first indication that the USSR was willing to use force to shield the PDPA regime from being ousted⁶², since it provided the Soviets with a vital foothold in Afghanistan, and officially abrogated the country’s long established non-alignment. However, the Treaty also had regional consequences, such as the PRC’s immediate shipment of significant numbers of arms to the insurgents (the Mujahideen), and hence, to the formation of an anti-DRA coalition composed of the Mujahideen, the PRC, and Pakistan⁶³.

5:3:2 – The Brezhnev Doctrine – Soviet Policy towards Less Developed Countries

Soviet interference in Afghanistan was virtually ordained once the communists had gained power in Kabul, since, according to Brezhnev’s doctrine; any state that had *turned* socialist would under no circumstances be allowed to relapse back to its previous system of governance, or to any other for that matter. This doctrine closely adhered to Soviet foreign policy objectives, which generally followed three broad categories in relation to Less Developed Countries (LDC): political and ideological objectives; military objectives; and, economic objectives⁶⁴.

5:3:2:1 – The Soviet Advisers – The Revolt Spreads

Due to the scope of this thesis, a thorough debate on the actual mechanisms of reforms being implemented by the DRA cannot be dealt with here. Nevertheless, the local to geo-strategic compulsions for the eruption and exacerbation of the conflict helps situate the rationale behind the infusion of SALW into Afghanistan and is fundamentally intrinsic to understanding the effects that such a large and widespread diffusion of SALW has on the dynamics of social conflict in Afghanistan.

The Khalq faction of the PDPA was predominately Ghilzai Pushtun. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the tribal dynamics of Afghan society took a sharp turn. The Durrani Pushtun, who had been the rulers of Afghanistan since its conception, with the exception of the Tajik Baccha Saqqao’s nine month tenure in 1929, had been ousted from their leadership position. Generally, the Ghilzai initially viewed the coup favourably, while those who were Durrani, or those who had close links to the latter, were opposed. Recognising existing tribal, ethnic and religious loyalties in Afghan society, the Khalq utilised social structural differences to their advantage in order to remain in power by advocating the tribal tradition: “Never trust anyone who is not a member of your own qawm”⁶⁵. Thereby, compelling non-Pushtuns to automatically join the opposing camp. The non-Ghilzai Pushtun followed suit after a short period of evaluation. It was only after this that the uprising, which originated from tribal associations and loyalties, became ideological in nature. The opposing camp was initially composed of all those against the communist regime. The primary difference was now communist vs. non-communist, even though the PDPA (and, later, the USSR) actively played tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries against each other.

The expression of information was one of the first few casualties in the aftermath of the coup. Nevertheless, reports of widespread rebellion soon filtered out of Afghanistan during the summer of 1978. Initial reactions to the new government were mute. This was partially because the coup took place during the Afghan harvesting season when most able bodied men co-operatively partake in intense agricultural and herding activities between the spring and summer months, as well as the lack of information being disseminated against communist orientation of the new government and their policies (for a more in-depth discussion of the reaction of the Afghan population, see section 5:3:3 – The Guerrilla War – Alone with Lee Enfield). As such, the regime was under the false impression that the rural population was passive and was not going to actively resist them. However, as a small minority taking power, the communists were well aware that they could not last long unless they took up the initiative and swiftly repressed any potential *counter-revolution* before it could be established. At this point, the regime presumed that they had a relatively loyal and well equipped army, primarily from massive Soviet supplies, supporting them. Their objectives were to reform the agrarian economy in order to wean the support of the mass peasantry, and to reduce the influence of the clergy, the Mullahs, through a mass literacy campaign orientated towards the communist ideology. However, the majority of the PDPA members, being city-bred, had negligible experience and knowledge of the rural areas, traditions, mechanisms, and complex realities through which such a society functioned. The capricious manner in which the regime carried out their agrarian reforms soon became the main cause for disaffection. For example, the cancellation of land mortgages for all those peasants owning five acres or less (Decree No. 6)⁶⁶, or the setting-up of an upper limit of 15 acres on landholdings and the nationalisation of all the sources of Afghanistan's irrigation (Decree No. 8)⁶⁷.

The obvious losers under these reforms were the landed class and the clergy, many of whom were also large landowners. In addition, smallholders and landless peasants could not function without their patrons and the financial help they gained from the large landowners, moneylenders and tribal khans, all of whom existed within a complex interconnected framework of relations, especially amongst the tribalised population. The literacy campaign further exacerbated the situation by adding fuel to the fire. Young and inexperienced male teachers were sent to the rural areas to even *educate* the village elders in mixed-sex classes due to the lack of female teachers. Where female teachers were present, they were often without a veil, thereby causing resentment amongst the male population for *spreading* anti-Islamic tendencies⁶⁸.

Formalised segmentary vertical lineages, with their network of interlocking reciprocal rights and obligations (through *badal*) within kinship and patron-client relationships, triggered variegated responses to the reforms and their implementation. The unification of traditional regional/tribal enemies relegated the numerous feuds, erupting at any moment, when external forces threatened the traditional indigenous vertical structures. As a consequence, the most influential social, political, tribal, and religious leaders came to resist the reforms with the assistance of Islam as the tool to achieve an effective resistance. A symbiotic relationship was therefore established between the landlords and the Ulema as the officers/commanders, and the smallholding and landless peasants as the foot-soldiers/fighters in what became collectively known as the Mujahideen (guerrillas fighting in the name of Islam for a *jihad*, holy struggle). Initially, however, it was the over-reaction

of the new regime to some minor protests, in their zeal to offset any potential *counter-revolution* that ignited a widespread revolt amongst the general population⁶⁹.

The regime first began selectively targeting the higher ranks, or future prospective leaders, of the potential *counter-revolution*; that is, “the elimination of former supporters and skilled government officials”⁷⁰, intellectuals, liberals, clergy, tribal leaders, notable individuals with western orientations such as businessmen and entrepreneurs, and western educated individuals. During this period of repression by the Taraki-Amin regime, an estimated 100,000 people disappeared⁷¹.

Revolts began spontaneously and sporadically, as a result of heavy handed enforcement of communist *reforms*, and extended to their ethnic, tribal or community boundaries. The earliest major revolts took place in Nuristan in July 1978, and by the Hazara of the Hazarajat in December 1978. The initial aims of the resistance were to “retain the relative autonomy of the individual village community... Under the leadership of the traditional authorities in accordance with the social structures of the land”⁷². The character of the revolts was more akin to medieval times than modern. Peasants usually united under the leadership of their village Malik, “armed with a few old rifles, with clubs and knives and had no knowledge of what was happening outside their valley or in Kabul”⁷³. Even when the revolt had spread to the provincial capital, Bamiyan, “4,000 people gathered, armed with ‘knives, swords, sickles, shovels, pickaxes and clubs’; their leaders were secular and religious dignitaries”⁷⁴. The initial uprisings were segmented and uncoordinated, since “most of the fighting in Afghanistan was undertaken by various localised ethnic, tribal, and sectarian groups without direct links”⁷⁵ to umbrella organisations based abroad. “The fragile mosaic of social groups in Afghanistan underscores this segmenting effect. The rebel bands are isolated in their mountains, like the Hazaras; by linguistic and cultural identity, like the Nuristanis; or by bitter memories of political rivalries, like the Pathan Khans of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province”⁷⁶.

From the beginnings of the uprising, one would assume that the modern high-tech weaponry of the DRA and Soviet advisors could not be matched. However, geo-political realities were not reckoned upon by the regime’s leaders in Kabul and Moscow. With hindsight, we know that the massive and complex distribution of sophisticated weaponry was the leverage that changed the course of the simple uprisings. Nevertheless, as a spontaneous reaction to the *reforms* and their forceful implementation, it was only a matter of months before the rebellion had spread throughout every one of Afghanistan’s then twenty eight provinces due to the intensity of the reaction of DRA cadres with their Soviet advisors, using aircraft and napalm bombs⁷⁷. Between June-July 1978, the first contingent of Soviet combat troops, and airborne battalion, were deployed around Baghram Airfield to meet the increasing resistance against the regime and provide for an effective bridgehead for future Soviet expansion⁷⁸. During these initial stages of the uprising and the consequent defections and desertions from the Afghan Army, in many cases with their weapons, “the Mujahideen were forced to fight with only small arms and machine guns up to 12.7-mm”⁷⁹.

The civil strife and the mass executions perpetrated by the regime forced many thousands to flee and seek refuge in Pakistan where the newly established military regime, under General Zia ul-Haq, openly accepted them across their porous border. In fact, there wasn't much hope of actually stopping the flow of refugees into the Pushtun borderlands. General Zia ul-Haq, hoping to consolidate his regime, especially after the execution of Bhutto on April 4, 1979, began to actively assist the Afghan resistance forces, commonly referred to as the Mujahideen, in their operations against the communists across the border. The Mujahideen were able to establish bases in Pakistan, where eight training camps were set up in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province) to assist them in the organisation, training, and execution of operations against the communists⁸⁰. Corroborated by western press agencies, an article in *Pravda* accused the Pakistan Army, and its Egyptian, American and Chinese advisers, of training the Mujahideen on Pakistani soil⁸¹. Shortly after the signing of the Friendship treaty between the PDPA regime and the USSR, a contingent of about 5,000 Mujahideen, under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party), entered the bordering Afghan province of Kunar, and attacked and captured the provincial capital's fort (in Asadabad) during January 1979. This attack was significantly aided by the defection of the local Khalqi army brigade commander, Abdur Rauf.

The defection of army officers and soldiers was to become one of the most significant vulnerabilities of the PDPA regime throughout the war. Whole divisions, including their entire military hardware, defected to the Mujahideen as the government's repression increased. Between the April 1978 coup and the end of the Taraki-Amin regime, in December 1979, approximately 66 to 75 percent of the Afghan Army's full complement of 100,000 troops had deserted or defected with their arms and equipment to the Mujahideen⁸². During the ongoing purges, 60 of the Army's 62 generals had been relieved of their commands and replaced by PDPA supporters from the ranks of captains and majors, significantly reducing the Army's ability to wage war⁸³; which, in effect, cut the head from the army's body.

The arming of the Afghan Army has generally been neglected when considering the proliferation of SALWs in Afghanistan. In fact, a massive quantity of arms entered Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. The actual amount is unknown due to the tight security that the Soviets upheld during their deliveries. The little information that is available comes from defecting Afghan Army officers and troops, and this, more often than not, is not completely verifiable. Unless the Soviet authorities officially publicised their supply of weapons to Afghanistan, there is no reliable way of gaining credible information on the arms supplied to the PDPA regime. The figures that are available from western intelligence sources are therefore not completely reliable. However, they do provide an indication of the minimum quantities of weapons that were transferred to Afghanistan during and after the Soviet occupation. Nevertheless, we can ascertain from the arms transfer data that is available, coupled with the extent of desertions and defections with arms that there was a continuous flow of SALWs into Afghanistan to replenish their constantly depleting stocks. As we shall see later in the chapter, Soviet arms supplies to the Mujahideen and the general Afghan population were not solely reliant upon desertions and defections, since, on many occasions, the arms were bartered by Soviet and Afghan troops for other goods, especially drugs and even food supplies⁸⁴.

5:3:2:2 – Herat Uprising – 17 March 1979

Recognition of the depth of resentment to the regime's attempted reforms in the army came to a head when a demonstration in Herat, on 15 March 1979, rapidly turned into a general revolt by the people of the whole city. An assault was made on the prison to release political opponents of the regime, after which, on 17 March, the whole of the Afghan 17th Division mutinied⁸⁵ with their full complement of weapons under the leadership of Captain Ismail Khan of the Anti-Aircraft Battalion, who became one of the foremost Mujahideen commanders throughout the entire Afghan conflict, and continues to dominate the Afghan political scene. Anger against the regime found its expression in attacks on the Soviet advisors and their families stationed in Herat. Over 50 were "rounded up, tortured, cut to pieces, and their heads stuck to poles for parading around the city"⁸⁶. In response, the government took firm action by deploying the air force, airborne forces, and motorised reinforcements from Kandahar, which, after intense bombing, retook the city at the cost of over 5,000 dead, mostly civilians⁸⁷. Much of the supplies that the Mujahideen obtained came from army defections, including large infusions of SALW from entire armouries. There were two major results from the uprising in Herat. Firstly, the hard-man of the PDPA, Amin, became Prime Minister on 27 March 1979, and Taraki was increasingly relegated to a figurehead, even though he was still the President. Secondly, the USSR became increasingly more involved in Afghanistan, especially militarily.

Soviet anxiety had surfaced when a full politburo meeting was summoned during the zenith of the Herat revolt, on 17-19 March, to evaluate the extent of the turmoil in Afghanistan and the response that was deemed most appropriate. Taraki's requests for arms, ammunition, and rations, as well as Soviet air and ground support through the deployment of the air force and ground troops, were discussed at length by Foreign Minister Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko during the CC CPSU Politburo Session on 17 March 1979 where he noted that, "we must proceed from a fundamental proposition in considering aid to Afghanistan, namely: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan"⁸⁸, which was reiterated by KGB head, Yuri Andropov, and unanimously agreed. Taraki repeated his requests to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin during his telephonic conversation on 17 March 1979, but was again denied Soviet troops to support DRA forces in Herat⁸⁹. KGB head Yuri Andropov was also very much opposed to direct action on the basis of its international implications⁹⁰. However, Defence Minister Ustinov was fully prepared for such contingencies, such as sending in the 105th Airborne Division and an infantry motorised regiment to Afghanistan, where a total of three divisions were ready for deployment, but nevertheless agreed with the rejection of Soviet combat troops on Afghan soil⁹¹.

Taraki visited Moscow on 20 March 1979 and, in a meeting with high ranking politburo members, received assurances from Premier Kosygin that he would receive, amongst other large amounts of heavy military hardware such as BTRs and helicopters, "50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, and an anti-aircraft unit 'Strela' [Arrow]"⁹², but no military personnel acting in a combat capacity. This point was reiterated to Taraki during his talks with Brezhnev in Moscow on 20 March 1979 directly after the talks held with Kosygin and Ustinov⁹³. However, military supplies were forthcoming. On 24 May 1979 the Soviet leadership decided in a

politburo meeting to “deliver to Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 million roubles, including 140 guns and mortars, 90 armoured personnel carriers, 48 thousand machine guns, 1000 grenade throwers [RPGs?]”⁹⁴.

In the aftermath of the Herat uprising, the Kremlin sent General Alexis Yepishev, first deputy Minister of Defence in charge of the Political Affairs of the Soviet Army and Navy and a strong advocate of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, as the head of the first military mission to Kabul, in April 1979, to find out why the mutiny occurred, and how best to rectify the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan by strengthening the Afghan Army⁹⁵. The General recommended a substantial increase in Soviet military supplies, and also an increase in Soviet presence on Afghan soil⁹⁶. A massive delivery of military hardware was rapidly sent to Afghanistan, and included “100 T-62 tanks, a squadron of Mil-24 attack helicopters, twelve MiG-21 fighters, and some Su-20 fighter-bombers”⁹⁷. This delivery also included a large consignment of small arms and ammunition⁹⁸. There was also a corresponding increase in the numbers of Soviet military advisors, raising the total to over 5,000 by August 1979⁹⁹. Coinciding with Yepishev’s visit, over eleven hundred, the entire male population, of the village of Kerala, northeast of Kabul, was massacred by the Afghan Army under the direct command of Soviet advisors for collaborating with the Mujahideen¹⁰⁰. Desertions and defections from the Afghan Army did not cease, in fact, they increased due to the severe actions undertaken by the regime. The first large scale diffusion of Kalashnikov assault rifles, with its many derivatives, came with the massive DRA army desertions in 1979-80¹⁰¹. During this period there was a general collapse of morale and loyalty within the Afghan armed forces; for example, in early August 1979, the troops stationed in the famous Bala Hissar Fortress in Kabul mutinied. The regime quashed them with brute force during a four hour battle using helicopter gunships and tanks¹⁰².

The second large military delegation, headed by Deputy Defence Minister General Ivan Pavlovsky in August 1979, recommended the expansion of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. General Pavlovsky also asked Taraki and Amin whether they would invoke article 4 of the Friendship Treaty in order to gain substantial Soviet military assistance. Amin responded resolutely against the offer¹⁰³. Amin’s response may have been the catalyst for his removal and the decision to finally organise the Soviet invasion¹⁰⁴.

5:3:3 – The Guerrilla War – Alone with Lee Enfield

5:3:3:1 – Arms and Training

Arming of the Mujahideen by the US, Europe, China, and various Arab governments has been documented to a much greater degree than the Afghan Army, especially after the collapse of the Soviet invasion. During President Daoud’s tenure in government, a number of Islamists became actively engaged in armed opposition with the full backing of the government of Pakistan under Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto¹⁰⁵. The networks that had been built up between these rebels and the Pakistani military had not receded after Zia ul-Haq’s takeover. The PDPA coup returned the same Islamists to the forefront of Afghan politics. By the beginning of February 1979, western media had begun to publish articles on the existence of training facilities for the Mujahideen in north-western Pakistan; for example, on 02 February 1979, the Washington Post reported that “Afghan

dissidents are undergoing guerrilla training at a base 12 miles north of Peshawar... [which] is a former military base... [and] still contains some Pakistani army vehicles and is under the guard of Pakistani soldiers”¹⁰⁶. Pro-regime publications have also been forthcoming with information about the intentions of the Pakistani government. Ashtikov (1986) reports that the Pakistani authorities had opened up a camp only a month after the April 1978 coup by the PDPA¹⁰⁷. Yajee (1987) has also recognised Pakistani willingness to aid the Mujahideen through active recruitment and training of volunteers from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. With reference to the Swiss newspaper, *Neue Zuericher Zeitung*, Yajee (1986) notes how the Pakistani government donated over 20 million rupees to the Afghan refugees¹⁰⁸, while appreciating that the “refugees from Afghanistan use all they have to buy arms”¹⁰⁹.

One of the most significant aspects of the training camps was the follow-up process in which the newly trained fighters would return to Afghanistan to carry out raids and ambushes upon Afghan Army troops and their Soviet advisors. The Mujahideen were in desperate need of significant contributions of modern weapons in order to successfully counter the advantage of the better armed Afghan troops. No doubt, the arms gained from the deserting troops significantly aided the Mujahideen. However, a successful resistance against an organised enemy required a continuous turnover of new recruits and the arms and ammunition that they were required to use. An external Western supply of arms demanded a degree of political sensitivity due to the damage that could be caused to international and regional political and strategic relations between the superpowers if arms supplies and training to the Mujahideen became transparent. As such, the training camps that had become established on the Pushtun borderlands within Pakistan had to be kept completely covert. The arms supply to the Mujahideen was similarly to remain covert throughout much of the conflict.

Covert operations require a much greater degree of sophistication and complexity in order to be successful. Even though there may have been no political and legal precedent to lay the foundations for an operation that would carry the weight of its hitherto unknown extent, groundwork had to be conducted to prepare for what was deemed to be an escalating scenario by the intelligence community, whose principle tasks are to evaluate immediate and long-term threats. Such establishments, which are primarily covert in nature, are well grounded in preparatory work for covert operations; for example, shortly after the signing of the 05 December 1978 Friendship Treaty, a special CIA cell had been established in the US Embassy in Islamabad and the US Consulate in Karachi to organise *sensitive* covert operations in both Afghanistan and Iran under the overall authority of CIA operative K. Lessard¹¹⁰. The Egyptians, similarly, whose political orientation had recently turned against the Soviets, was seen by the US as a fundamental pivot in the training and arming of the Mujahideen due to the intimate relationship that they had previously held with the USSR, and their experience with Soviet tactics, and arms. During a press conference on 13 February 1979, the Egyptian Minister of Defence, General Kamal Hassan Ali, was noted as saying that the Afghan Mujahideen were receiving “some help” from Egypt and that “it is training some of them to some extent”¹¹¹.

5:3:3:2 – Chinese Arms

The People's Republic of China's (PRC) involvement in the Afghan imbroglio was hastened as soon as the Friendship Treaty between the PDPA regime and the USSR was signed¹¹². However, Qiao Shi, deputy to the head of the PRC's intelligence agency, the *Tewu*, had already initiated contact with the Shah of Iran and SAVAK head, General Nasser Moghadam, in September 1978, concerning mutual cooperation to stem the tide of Soviet interference in Afghanistan¹¹³. According to Faligot and Kauffer (1989), the parties achieved an agreement to initiate a clandestine war, in conjunction with Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), against the Soviet-backed PDPA regime in Afghanistan¹¹⁴; however, Iranian involvement may have been dampened as a result of the overthrow of the Shah by Khomeini in February 1979. Nevertheless, the Beijing-Islamabad-Tehran axis did seem to work for a time, especially after PRC deputy premier Deng Xiaoping gave assurances to the Iranians of continued arms supplies, especially against Soviet armed Saddam, who eventually attacked Iran in September 1980¹¹⁵.

Even though Pakistan had officially denied all claims of PRC advisors in Pakistan, an article by Yuriy Glukov, in *Pravda*, on 23 May 1979, noted that it was not "accidental that imperialist intelligence services and Peking agents have joined in the training of forces hostile to the Afghan Republic. They are using Pakistan territory for this purpose... In spite of warnings and denials by Pakistan, its territory, as shown by numerous facts continues to be used as a place d'armes for subversive action against the neighbouring state"¹¹⁶. Given the rift between the USSR and the PRC, and Pakistan's special relationship with the latter, it is not inconceivable that such reports were based upon credible sources. The Canadian Magazine, *Maclean's*, reported the discovery of Chinese individuals and groups on the Afghan-Pakistan border by the United States Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, at the beginning of 1979, who were initially suspected of being heroin dealers from Hong Kong. However, their observations later "emerged as one of Pakistan's most dangerous and best kept secrets: the presence on Pakistani soil of Chinese army officers and instructors. They were there to help train and equip rightwing Afghan Muslim guerrillas for their holy war against the Moscow-backed Kabul regime"¹¹⁷. Concerning Pakistan, with its formidable Pushtun population, many of whose tribes have been divided along the *Durand Line*, the co-operation that they were to provide the Mujahideen groups was inevitable. Kinship, tribal, ethnic and religious ties predisposed Pakistan into becoming directly involved in the co-ordination, organisation, training, and implementation of operations conducted by the Mujahideen, and at times jointly with Pakistani military and intelligence officers and troops.

The PRC did not solely provide training; it also aided the facilitation and the infusion of massive quantities of arms to the Mujahideen throughout the Afghan conflict. The small 74-kilometre border between Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu province of the PRC was in a constant state of tension, and incursions by Chinese trained Afghan guerrillas often used this highly mountainous region as a corridor to launch raids. According to Mukherjee (1984), over 10,000 Muslim Uighurs, of the Xingjiang province, were recruited to cut off the Badakhshan province of Afghanistan. "The Chinese also used the Karakoram military road ... to supply arms to Pakistan and Afghan counter-revolutionaries"¹¹⁸.

During the latter half of June 1979, a Pakistani freight carrier, the “Rustum arrived from China carrying 8,000 tons of arms from Beijing patrons of the counter-revolutionaries”¹¹⁹ to the Pakistani port of Karachi. According to John Cooley (2002), the cargo was directed from Karachi to Peshawar and distributed to the Mujahideen groups who were based in the camps surrounding the city¹²⁰. However, with such tight security in an obviously secret operation, questions as to: a) the validity of such claims by the media; or, b) the effectiveness of the secrecy surrounding the campaign, do arise. The orientation of the media, in this particular case, was firmly biased in against the USSR and the Khalqi regime in Kabul. However, it is inappropriate to solely rely upon reports that only originate from the countries and organisations that were opposed to the PDPA coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the credibility of such reports is not assured unless it is completely corroborated by reports from the opposing bloc.

5:3:3:3 – Captured Weapons

Verification of the regime’s claims that the Chinese and the Pakistanis were training and arming the Mujahideen, or, counter-revolutionaries as they call them, often came in the form of weapons captured by the regime from the Mujahideen. “These included arms of US, Chinese, British, West-German, Italian and other makes”¹²¹. The regime would often display such weapons in exhibitions, the first of which took place in Kabul’s Intercontinental Hotel, on 24-27 August 1979. The Mujahideen, in return, would often raid military outposts, forts, or cantonments throughout Afghanistan, capturing large quantities of small arms and ammunition such as anti-aircraft guns, RPG-7 launchers and rockets propelled grenades as well as all the arms that were left by dead, deserting, defecting, and surrendering Afghan soldiers.

5:3:4 – American Anxiety and Carter’s Aid - US Arms and Funding

Fresh recognition of the new regime was not given by the US after the PDPA coup in April 1978. The American ambassador to Kabul told Taraki that “in cases like this we do not extend formal recognition but indicate, as we have done, that we want to continue normal diplomatic relations”¹²², since, Afghanistan was already recognised as residing within the Soviet *sphere of influence* during Daoud’s government. Economic assistance continued by both the US and Western European nations. The official change of heart came when four members of an extremist group, *Setem-i-Meli* (the Oppressed Nation Party, a predominately Tajik group based in Badakhshan which opposed Pushtun domination)¹²³, abducted Ambassador Adolph Dubs, on 14 February 1979, which led to his consequent death in a dubiously bungled *rescue* operation by Afghan security (police) forces in the presence of four Soviet advisers¹²⁴ only four hours later¹²⁵ in the Kabul Hotel. The drastic reduction in American economic aid was an immediate consequence of the questionable operation. On 14 August 1979, President Carter signed a law that prohibited any further aid to Afghanistan under section 620 (F) of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibited US assistance to ‘any communist country’¹²⁶, by accepting Afghanistan as a *communist* country. This left Afghanistan completely open to Soviet advances for a closer relationship as the sole Afghan creditor.

In a meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William J. Casey, at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, head of the Defence Intelligence Agency under Carter for four years,

said he gave warnings to President Carter, which were ignored, that the Soviets were preparing for an invasion of Afghanistan up to six months before it actually occurred. According to Tighe, a Soviet General specialising in the projection of military influence and pre-invasion planning had been tracked to Afghanistan, and that satellite photographs and signals intelligence conclusively proved that the Soviets were planning to invade due to their build up of troops in Soviet Central Asia¹²⁷. This was by no means the first warning that Carter had received. The death of Ambassador Dubs had forced a severance of relations between the US and Afghanistan. On 05 March 1979, the Special Co-ordination Committee of the US National Security Council received several covert action options to the possibility of covert assistance to the Mujahideen once their capabilities had been assessed. The debate continued in the intelligence community as to the possibility of Pakistani and Saudi involvement in the facilitation of “assistance to the insurgents, including small arms and ammunition”¹²⁸.

Continued rebellion and intelligence reports of large scale desertions from the DRA army, especially during the Herat uprising, aided the debate in Washington. DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner, under Carter, had received an *Alert* note from the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR, Arnold Horelick, on 28 March 1979, stating that the Soviets were very likely to provide direct large scale military assistance to the regime in Kabul in the probable disintegration of the Taraki government as a result of the sustained countryside uprising in Afghanistan¹²⁹. In response, Turner considered the extent of the US response if such a scenario were to occur.

The debate was whether American involvement should induce the Soviets into direct intervention, and, if so, what would the consequences be. Former DCI Robert Gates (and recently retired Secretary of Defence) recounts that in a Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting held on 30 March 1979, chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, David Aaron, Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defence, raised the bar by enquiring about the prospects of “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire”¹³⁰. In conclusion, Aaron asked whether there was “any interest in maintaining and assisting the insurgency, or is the risk that we will provoke the Soviets too great?”¹³¹ In considering covert action, the US recognised that by supporting the Mujahideen, they would raise the costs to the USSR and inflame the Muslim population of the world against them. The debate became more intense when the National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, as he mentions in his memoirs, *Power and Principle* (1983), pressed a decision through the SCC, in April 1979, to be “more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s independence”¹³². During the same month, the US Embassy in Islamabad had approached Pakistani military officials to propose the most favourable options amongst the numerous Mujahideen groups for receipt of US aid. In May 1979, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was introduced to CIA personnel by the ISI¹³³. However, in August 1979, the State Department noted that the best Pakistani option, such as Hekmatyar, who had been selected because of his hardline Islamic tendencies, which suited the Pakistanis more due to his greater malleability on the Pushtunistan issue, was not likely to be the best option for the future of Afghanistan after the Soviets had suffered a defeat. A vicious civil war had already been envisioned between the various hardline Islamic groups¹³⁴ after the Soviet departure, even before their invasion.

The pace slowed a little before a SCC meeting was held on 03 July 1979 and President Carter “signed the first finding to help the Mujahideen covertly”¹³⁵, thereby, endorsing the availability of communications equipment for the Mujahideen, and radio access to the general Afghan population by supporting third country facilities, with an allocation of only a little over \$500,000. On the very same day, Brzezinski confirmed, in an interview published in the 15-21 January 1998 edition of the French magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, that:

I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention ... We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would ... That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap ... The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: ‘Now we have the opportunity to give to the USSR its Vietnam War’.¹³⁶

By late August Pakistan was applying pressure on the US to get more involved in the provision of *lethal* military weapons and equipment rather than just logistical matériel. DCI Turner responded by strongly advising the Directorate of Operations to make available communications equipment, funds for Pakistan to buy lethal equipment for the Mujahideen, and lethal weapons for Pakistan to distribute to the Mujahideen on behalf of the US¹³⁷. Thus, began *Operation Cyclone*, the CIA's covert involvement to stem the tide of communist adventurism in Afghanistan and inflict a lethal blow on the Soviet Union by arming and financing the Afghan Mujahideen¹³⁸.

5:3:5 – The Road to Soviet Intervention and Invasion – Hafizullah Amin and the End Game

As the American position on their support for the insurgency against the PDPA became stronger, greater successes were achieved by the Mujahideen on the battlefield due to their improved morale, regardless of the increased brutality of the regime upon the civilian population. The regime suffered massive desertions from its army, further enhancing the capabilities of the Mujahideen through the acquisition of SALW and ammunition, who, hitherto, had very little in the way of external support in comparison to DRA's support from the USSR. However, the USSR tried to influence the Taraki-Amin regime to relax its reform process significantly so as to win over the Afghan population rather polarising them further; for example, between May and June 1979, an unsuccessful and half-hearted amnesty was declared to induce the support of the population from becoming *counter-revolutionaries*¹³⁹.

The Carter Administration persistently discounted a stream of intelligence assessments that continued to give support to a potential Soviet invasion, even though they had already committed to funding the Mujahideen groups. On 17 August 1979, a memorandum by the Office of Strategic Research, *Soviet Options and Forces for Military Intervention in Afghanistan*, speculated the commitment of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan to ensure the survival of the PDPA regime¹⁴⁰. In light of the fact that the Carter Administration wanted to induce the Soviets into an all-out intervention of Afghanistan on behalf of the failing PDPA regime, as confirmed by Brzezinski in his memoirs¹⁴¹, the continuous reports of the Soviets gearing up for invasion may have seemed to be a vindication of their limited efforts in funding the Mujahideen. Nevertheless, apart from the resultant uplift in the Mujahideen's morale, the administration had not made a concerted effort to provide

substantial direct financial support for the Mujahideen, especially in terms of arms and ammunition. It may be suggested from a recently declassified CIA memorandum dated 26 December 1979 and obtained from the CIA database at the National Archives, Maryland, that the reluctance to provide substantial arms aid at this point was due to a perception that the Mujahideen were in receipt of arms and ammunition that may have fulfilled their requirements, stating that:

They have captured significant amounts of rifles, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, ammunition, and occasional tanks and armoured personnel carriers from retreating or deserting Afghan troops and by ambushing supply convoys. They also obtained weapons through Pakistan. Tribal groups in Pakistan – largely immune to government laws – sell locally manufactured rifles and a variety of heavier weapons that could be used against aircraft and tanks. In addition, the arms dealers sell imported weapons or those stolen from the Afghan or Pakistan armies.¹⁴²

It is significantly more likely that, as Fred Halliday argues: “Had Pakistan not played the base-area role it did, and had not the Chinese and Arabs provided their backing, it is much less likely that the Russians would have gone into Afghanistan directly”¹⁴³. Nevertheless, it may have been the perception of large scale US involvement in assisting the Afghan resistance, in addition to their increasing influence on President Amin that were to become the predominant elements in the calculus that eventually provoked Soviet intervention.

The USSR resisted repeated calls by the DRA to deploy troops in Afghanistan; however, in a meeting between Taraki and Prime Minister Kosygin, the Soviets agreed to a large increase in military supplies to the DRA government¹⁴⁴. As far as the Soviets were concerned, the harsh implementation of reforms was playing into the hands of the Western backed counter-revolutionaries. Even as far back as May 1979, intelligence reports were suggesting that the USSR was planning to replace the present Khalqi leadership of the DRA¹⁴⁵. This was later confirmed when the US Ambassador in Kabul had received word from his Soviet counterpart that the USSR was looking to replace Prime Minister Amin due to his vicious reform programme. Further, Carter gave a decisive warning to Brezhnev during the signing of the SALT accords at the end of June 1979 that the US would not tolerate interference from the USSR in the internal workings of an independent country¹⁴⁶. During this time, many Khalqis within the governing regime were also becoming disaffected with Amin, charging him with tyrannical behaviour, corruption, and the mass imprisonment of even fellow Khalqis, as was evident from the circulation of clandestine leaflets, *shabnamas* (night letters) in Kabul during in August 1979¹⁴⁷, which the US Embassy had also acquired¹⁴⁸.

Amin soon came to recognise that the Soviets were beginning to move against him, and therefore began to tighten his grip on power with the expulsion of a number of prominent Khalqis who were deemed to be too close to Taraki. On his journey to a Non-Aligned Summit in Havana, and upon his return on 10 Sept 1979, Taraki stopped off in Moscow to consult with Brezhnev and Gromyko “in a frank, fraternal atmosphere”¹⁴⁹. There have been numerous allegations that the meeting was held to organise the assassination of Amin, whilst others suggest that Amin was already organising Taraki’s removal as soon as he had left for the Summit. In any event, and to not digress from the scope of the study, upon Taraki’s return to Kabul, Amin was tipped off about the plot to assassinate him by Shah Wali, the Foreign Minister. On 14 September 1979, Taraki summoned Amin to a meeting to discuss Amin’s removal of four prominent officials without his presidential

authorisation. Wary of the plot, Amin took an armed escort. Upon his entrance to the Presidential Palace he was fired upon, but was unhurt. He left to return with a small military force. In the ensuing gun battle, Taraki was either killed or taken alive and later killed. Nevertheless, it was two days before the public was to know, from an announcement on Kabul radio, that he had resigned on *health grounds*. A report published by the *Kabul Times* on 10 October 1979, stated that Taraki had died the previous day as a result of his failing health. Bradsher (1985) argues that, according to a report published by the Karmal government, Taraki was killed on the 8 October after having been held in secrecy for over three weeks¹⁵⁰.

Due to the attempted assassination by Taraki in September 1979, Amin began to distance himself from the Soviets. Nevertheless, he continued to pay lip service to the USSR in order to sustain the military and financial support that they were giving to Afghanistan. As a result of his tenuous position, Amin began to make overtures to Pakistan, by inviting Zia ul-Haq to send his foreign minister for talks to Kabul¹⁵¹, which did not materialise due to the damage it may have caused to the Mujahideen's morale. In spite of his overtures, Amin excelled himself in the putsch against supporters of former President Taraki¹⁵², and in a series of brutal offensives against the Nuristanis, Hazaras, and the tribes of the Paktia province¹⁵³. The US also noted the disintegrating relationship between Amin and the USSR. If the US were still trying to force a rift between the USSR and Amin, to induce an invasion by the Soviets, then they may have been behind some of the successes of the Mujahideen during Amin's presidency. As a result of the increasing insurgency, the Soviets were beginning to insist that Amin invite them to suppress the Mujahideen¹⁵⁴. Whatever the circumstances in Afghanistan during December 1979, the USSR had already made the decision to invade the country upon General Pavlovsky's return to Moscow in October 1979 fearing that he might "do a Sadat on us"¹⁵⁵, and therefore, implement the Brezhnev doctrine¹⁵⁶. The Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, had warned Brezhnev about "Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West"¹⁵⁷. Nevertheless, a significant factor in the decision to invade may have been the secret meeting between one of Amin's emissaries and a representative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in late September 1979, in order to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union and to eventually end the insurgency¹⁵⁸. Hekmatyar was offered the office of the Prime Minister, whilst Amin would retain the Presidency. The Soviets became aware of Amin's efforts to slowly reduce Soviet influence in the country¹⁵⁹. However, Cordesman (1990) argues that the Soviets had begun to make preparations for the invasion as early as August, and that the reason that they had sent General Pavlovsky to Afghanistan was not so much for the reorganisation of the DRA army, but to plan the invasion itself¹⁶⁰.

In early November 1979, the creation of the Soviet's 40th Army was underway, with Termez designated as the pre-invasion operational headquarters and the establishment of two army groups in the Turkestan military district and the Central Asian military district respectively¹⁶¹. With the exception of the 105th Air Assault (Airborne) Division, the Turkestan military district's major combat units were all low-grade reserve units. The situation in the Central Asian district was virtually identical. The USSR mobilised up to 100,000 troops, mostly Asiatic Soviets (Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks), in order to strengthen its Category II and III reserve divisions. Compelled to rely on undersized cadres of special airborne units and low-grade reserve

units that were either untrained for sustained independent operations or any combat duties at all, respectively, the Soviets deployed between 1,500 and 2,000 special airborne troops at strategically significant airports, such as Bagram Airfield¹⁶², and to protect the *lines of communication* between 7 and 9 December 1979. Additional security advisors were sent to *assist* Amin, from the special security services (Spetsnaz, MVD, KGB), in local communications centres and power stations as well as disarming potentially die-hard DRA army units such as the 26th Parachute Regiment¹⁶³.

Through the façade of strengthening Amin's hand in Afghanistan against the Mujahideen, the Soviets were paving the way for a full-scale invasion. In a meeting of the elite members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCPSU) in Brezhnev's office, on 8 December 1979, a decision to "remove Amin at the hands of the KGB special agents" and to send "Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan"¹⁶⁴ was made. On 10 December 1979, Chief of General Staff N.V. Ogarkov was ordered, to his surprise, by Defence Minister Ustinov to prepare a limited contingent of 75-80,000 troops for their deployment in Afghanistan, which was communicated to the troops through directive N°. 312/12/00133¹⁶⁵. On 12 December 1979, the document ordering the invasion was signed by all the full members of the Politburo, with the exception of Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Gorbachev, who was not yet a full member¹⁶⁶. According to Cordesman (1990), 15,000 troops were airlifted into Baghram and Kabul between 24 and 26 December 1979¹⁶⁷. However, Rubinstein (1982) and Bradsher (1985) suggest that the figure was closer to 5,000 airborne troops over three days of continuous transporter flights every fifteen minutes¹⁶⁸. Georgy Kornienko (1994) notes that on 24 December 1979, Ustinov officially announced the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in a specially convened meeting of the highest echelons of the Defence Ministry, and on the same day prepared the first printed document stipulating the decision to "send several contingents of Soviet troops deployed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan"¹⁶⁹. Right up to the day of the invasion on 27 December 1979, when Spetsnaz troops killed Amin¹⁷⁰, the USSR was able to convince him of their benign intentions¹⁷¹. Within hours Babrak Karmal, installed as the new Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council¹⁷², as well as Secretary-General of the PDPA, in effect, the President, *invited* the USSR to secure Afghanistan. The next day, he created the *Khedemati-e-Dolati* (KhAD) under the future president Mohammad Najibullah. On 31 December 1979, a meeting of the CCPB formally confirmed its reasons for invading Afghanistan in a summarised *Top Secret* memorandum, with a superscripted approval in Brezhnev's own handwriting¹⁷³. By 01 January 1980, with a deployment of 58,000 Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan, the USSR had already begun to use white phosphorous incendiary devices against villages in Paktia province in its first combined arms operation¹⁷⁴.

5:4 – Final Observations

The fall of the monarchy on 17 July 1973 was a turning point Afghanistan's short history of socio-political stability, and led to four decades of socio-political upheaval and conflict, which continues without abatement to the present. Once the overarching and stabilising umbrella of the monarchy had disappeared, the burgeoning instability facilitated the emergence of a diversity of competing national to geostrategic

ideological, political, and sectarian interests, which marked the beginning of what was to become the most intense period of SALW proliferation in Afghanistan's history.

The preceding discussion in this chapter has sought to appreciate the motivations of the various contending parties and the lengths that they went to to ensure that they were empowered with SALW to either dictate terms or to not be dictated to. Furthermore, this discussion has illustrated the complexity of modern conflicts and the tendency for unintended consequences to overwhelm and confuse the original objectives and rationales that led to the conflict, while facilitating the materialization of latent and/or structural flaws that are part of the conflict transformation process. Essentially, however, this chapter focused on discussing the rationale for the proliferation of SALW, while making it evident that this proliferation could not be separated from major conventional weaponry at this embryonic stage of the conflict; especially since the latter was given precedence.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART II

CHAPTER SIX

**THE WEAPONISATION OF
AFGHANISTAN 1979-1989**

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THE WEAPONISATION OF AFGHANISTAN 1979-1989

6 – The Soviet Invasion (27 December 1979 – 15 February 1989)

This chapter begins as a chronological continuation of chapter five, and will continue as such through a number of stages in the development of the conflict, within the period:

- a) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 until the end of the Soviet occupation on when the last Soviet soldier left Afghan territory over the Friendship Bridge on 15 February 1989¹.

This chapter will focus on the extent of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) during the most contentious and determined period of weapons diffusion within Afghanistan's history. The time period of this chapter has been delineated to reflect the actual phase of physical occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, which was a seminal chapter in Afghan history. As far as is possible, an historical account is made of the SALW that were introduced into Afghanistan based on the available information. Nevertheless, the actual quantities of arms that were infused into Afghanistan and the surrounding region will, most likely, never be known. It must be noted, however, that the intrinsic character of this chapter revolves around a detailed description of the mechanisms, processes, techniques and methods used to diffuse the massive quantities of SALW for the contending geo-strategic, regional and national rationales by the major parties involved in the Afghan conflict during the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

6:1 – Introduction

The theoretical underpinnings of the geo-strategic dynamics that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reside within the realist school of thought². However, constructivist interpretations³ of the conflict can also be appreciated when highlighting the Soviet Union's perception of the meanings behind the threat of their waning communist influence in President Amin's envisaged future of Afghanistan with an independent identity, and due to his growing inclination towards the West. Nevertheless, further interpretations of superpower geopolitical decisions may be illustrated within the context of the system level security complex, as advocated by Barry Buzan (2003)⁴, and the global competition of ideational influences between the Marxist-Leninist and capitalist democratic models, where Afghanistan was merely a playing ground between contesting regional and superpower strategic interests. Buzan and Wæver (2003) emphasize Afghanistan within the continuation of its historical position as a buffer between contesting regional security complexes, namely, the South Asian regional security complex, the Central Asian/Eurasian regional security complex, and the Persian Gulf security complex; which, in effect, predisposes the country towards a constant onslaught of invasion and martial migration. This has been the case throughout its history, and may likely be the case for a considerable time to come unless dynamic systemic global change on the world order negates contesting security compulsions in the future.

In respect to the competing interests of the superpowers, the substantial support that the United States (US) eventually gave to the Afghan resistance (Mujahideen) to oppose the consolidation of communism in Afghanistan can be seen as a response to a system level threat that the invasion posed to their material interests in the Persian Gulf as well as the wider international containment of Communist expansionism, according to the anarchic self-help world of the realist perspective⁵.

Pakistan's response is set within the context of both the systemic level security complex as well as the South Asian regional security complex. For the latter, Pakistan was cognizant of the potential for hostility on two fronts, given India's proclivity towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the absence of any credible condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan's alliance with the US would provide an essential buffer against any immediate or future hostility or adventurism by its arch rival, India.

The House of Saud also had acute security concerns when its friendly ally, Iran, became an enemy within a matter of months after the Islamic Revolution, causing the development of a tri-polar Persian Gulf security complex between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, and the occupation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, may have allayed initial concerns for the Saudis; however, an immediate need to counter any potential Soviet alliance with the Iranians, and the requirement to contain Soviet influence and their possible intentions to acquire access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, which could have further destabilised the hitherto tenuous balance of power in the region, persuaded the Saudis to fund the *Jihad* against the atheist Soviet Union, dollar for dollar with the US. In addition to the consideration given to the balance of power in the Gulf, the maintenance of regime security may have also been quantifiable in the Saudi leadership's decision making priorities due to the threat to the totalitarian Arab absolute monarchies of the Gulf by the Islamic Revolution because of its appeal to the masses, as advocated by F. Gregory Gause III (2010) in his interpretations of the regional security complexes⁶. Furthermore, the need to propagate their particular Salafist Sunni interpretations of Islam to counter and contain the Iranian Revolution's Shi'a influence in the region was prominent in the decision to fund various parties that adhered to Saudi philosophy, especially the Salafist orientated Abdur Rasul Sayyaf's *Ittihad-i-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan* (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)⁷.

The highly multifarious existing systemic security complex in-line with the regional South Asian and Persian Gulf security complexes provided the realist context for the interpretation of the perceived threat that may have led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the self-help bipolar world and the consequent reactions by the primary opposing actors, the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, to counter the Soviet invasion. However, the collaboration between the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can also be seen in the light of neo-liberalist thought through the formation of an alliance to counter Soviet aggression on moral grounds and for the greater good of humanity rather than just for respective state interests. While, constructivist interpretations would argue that the conflict of ideas and norms induced particular collective behavioural responses within a

constant interplay of interpretations of the conflicting parties' actions⁸ rather than the static action-reaction that the realist school would adhere to.

6:2 – The Conflicting Parties

01 January 1980, the first day of the new decade, had begun with the consolidation of the first Soviet invasion of an independent non-aligned country since the end of the Second World War. The Mujahideen were already reported to have made significant successes in the capture of some Sagger and Snapper anti-tank missiles as well as 132 mm rocket launchers from the disintegrating Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) army⁹. These light weapons proved to be significant additions to the already growing arsenal of SALWs that the Mujahideen were acquiring from the various sources available to them.

The initial deployment of Soviet troops was, however, composed of only four under-strength motor rifle divisions (MRD) and one and a half air assault divisions of paratroopers, both of which were mostly reservists that were put together to provide support for the newly installed regime, but not to fight a war, let alone an intense *low intensity* anti-guerrilla war, especially considering that many units were armed with obsolescent weapons dating back to World War Two¹⁰. Furthermore, in comparison, the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia required some 250,000 troops. Nevertheless, in a recently declassified *Top Secret National Intelligence Daily*, the CIA estimated “that as many as 40,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan as of yesterday”¹¹, being the first day of the new decade.

For the protection of the new regime of Barak Karmal, who had replaced Amin, the Soviet Union had deployed a total of 80,000 troops within Afghanistan¹². Kapur (1983) notes that between 85,000 and 100,000 troops had entered at this time¹³. However, he fails to identify which assessment he had taken the figures from. According to Brigadier General Mohammad Yousaf (2001), officer commanding the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, the total number of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan did not exceed 85,000 at the end of 1980, with “just under 60,000 infantrymen, either motorised or paratroopers. The remainder of the 85,000 were made up of artillery, engineer, signals, construction, and border or security units, together with Air Force personnel”¹⁴. This excluded the 30,000 troops stationed across the northern border in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan¹⁵.

The strength of Soviet forces in Afghanistan did increase as the war proceeded; however, the most important aspect of the 40th Army was its evolution and adaptation to the conditions of warfare in Afghanistan, which were very different from those that most of the troops in the Soviet armed forces had trained for, that is, a conventional war in the European theatre. As the Mujahideen began to organise themselves into a somewhat loosely structured *united* front, the Soviets began to adopt a new strategy with an evolving tactical base to conduct the war under the conditions present in Afghanistan. Initial restructuring began in June 1980, within which a large proportion of the initially deployed units were withdrawn due to their unsuitability to a protracted low-intensity guerrilla war. “Altogether 33.5 thousand people were replaced, among those 2.2 thousand officers, and 31.3 thousand sergeants and soldiers”¹⁶. Much of the war materielle that was introduced

into Afghanistan during the initial invasion was also withdrawn, such as the SA-4 surface to air missile brigade, as the Soviets began to utilise weapons better suited to the war. Between 5,000 and 10,000 troops, linked to withdrawn weapons systems, were returned to their “base of origin”¹⁷. They were substituted with “new and more useful units”¹⁸. The incremental expansion in Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan had grown to approximately 115,000 men by 1984¹⁹, 120,000 by 1987²⁰, and reached its pinnacle in early 1988 when the total number of Soviet troops in full-time combat and support duties was 156,000²¹. These were divided into “118,000 regular troops and 10,000 *Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del* (MVD – Ministry of Interior of the Soviet Union) troops in Afghanistan and 30,000 more regular troops across the border in support roles”²² and cross border combat missions. The majority of the Soviet forces had been upgraded to Category I (combat-ready) forces by the time the withdrawal process began.

The DRA armed forces similarly underwent serious upheavals. The situation was, however, very different. DRA forces suffered from a continuous mass loss of personnel as a result of casualties and desertions, but primarily due to defections to the Mujahideen with much of their equipment. By the end of 1980, the DRA army was as low as between 25,000²³ and 30,000²⁴. Estimates as to the total manpower of the DRA forces varies due to the lack of up-to-date data publicly available, given the exceptional circumstances and the inability to reliably obtain data on the paramilitary forces that were part of the overall DRA military establishment.

The training and organisation of both the Soviet and the DRA troops underwent a fundamental re-orientation in order to adapt them to the conditions of war in Afghanistan. The initial Soviet invasion force was mainly composed of Asiatic Soviets who were not highly trained and very unsuited to the conditions of the increasingly vicious guerrilla war that was also evolving as all sides became more and more focused and better adapted to each other. Those that could not adapt and improve disappeared or became defunct, such as the numerous Mujahideen groups that initially rose up within their localities but which did not join the Mujahideen groups coalescing into the *Peshawar-seven* Sunni parties, or the eight Shia groups²⁵. Similarly, the Soviet forces reduced their Asiatic forces and replaced them with the better trained *white* Russian troops, who also had a higher morale due to their lack of kinship, ethnic or religious affinities with the Afghan population, unlike the Asiatic Soviet troops. Also, the Soviet forces began to rely more heavily upon Special Forces units in day to day small to medium sized operations, such as their elite airborne units and the *Spetsnaz*; while they tended to spearhead the large-scale combined arms operations, acting in their main as *behind-the-lines* troops. The paratroopers (air assault) units, having higher grade equipment, being led by higher calibre officers, and deployed by helicopter, displayed much greater effectiveness and aggression than the MRD, especially during offensive sweeps in mountainous territory.

The higher rate of desertion, defection and questionable loyalty of much of the DRA army forced greater emphasis on the improvement of paramilitary groups such as the Parchami dominated *Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati* (KhAD – State Intelligence Agency), which fared better and even served as a substitute for the regular forces in many operations. The KhAD, modelled on the Soviet Union’s *Komitet gosudarstvennoy*

bezopasnosti (KGB – Committee for State Security), included up to 1,500 Soviet advisors, many of them from the KGB, and had extensive organisational links with its *mother* organisation²⁶. The expansion of KhAD, especially since it was under the strongman Maj. Gen. Dr. Mohammad Najibullah²⁷, was a key element of the Soviet Union’s Afghan policy during Andropov’s tenure as Premier²⁸. The *Sarandoy* (Defenders of the Revolution), a DRA gendarme police force, however, was in a state of near collapse at the beginning of the invasion. It was completely rebuilt during the war and remained dominated by the Khalq. By 1988, the *Sarandoy*, modelled on the Soviet Ministry of Interior (MVD), achieved a total strength of about 20,000, therefore, acting as a parallel to the regular army. The maximum number of paramilitary forces rose to a maximum of about 30,000. As an internal condition, the DRA were finding it difficult to suppress the uprising before the invasion. After the invasion, the situation in the army worsened as many of those who were against any form of external intrusion also deserted and defected to the Mujahideen. Mandatory conscription, press-ganging, voiding of exemptions for teachers²⁹ and longer periods of training for Afghan officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) within the USSR, where they could undergo extensive indoctrination to induce a greater degree of loyalty to the DRA regime, were some of the methods used to force an increase of the total numbers of combat-ready DRA forces. These methods did gradually increase the fighting capability; however, the DRA forces were never truly trusted even as the numbers increased, much as is the case for the US-led occupation of Afghanistan, given the large numbers of *green on blue* attacks by Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) soldiers turning their guns on US, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops. Some elite units were, however, very effective in combat, such as the 37th and 38th Commando Brigades, 466th Commando Battalion, and the armoured brigades of the 7th and 8th Divisions. The air force, on the other hand, tended to be more committed to the DRA regime than the Army. Nevertheless, “all strategic and most tactical decisions were made by the Soviets”³⁰. The Soviets, in fact, often regarded the DRA troops as mediocre and below themselves.

The training methods changed to suit the conditions of war, as did the types of weapons that were largely used by the increasing number of Soviet troops and DRA troops. In adapting to the guerrilla war, the Soviets began to make greater use of airpower, specifically helicopter gunships to combat the Mujahideen in their mountain bases. As a consequence, the Mujahideen sought to acquire a greater capability to reduce the significantly superior advantages that the invasions forces had, especially in air power. Mobility and transportability were not only the requirements of many of the weapons systems that the Mujahideen sought to acquire. The Soviet and DRA forces also placed a great deal of emphasis on providing their elite combat troops, such as the Soviet *Spetsnaz*, with greater firepower, yet with the least possible degradation to their fighting capability. What is pertinently illustrated here is that SALW were not the only types of weapons used by all the contending parties. All parties sought to acquire and deploy major weapons systems to effectively boost their offensive and defensive capabilities. No doubt, the Soviet and DRA forces had an obvious advantage in this respect. Nevertheless, the Afghan resistance forces were also able to acquire and use a variety of weapons that cannot be categorised as SALW. As such, differentiating the impacts and effects of SALW from larger weapon systems becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

6:2:1 – Strategy

Soviet troop deployment was static and defensive in nature, with about 50 per cent of their troops concentrated around the capital and the Baghram Airbase, which had the highest concentration of aircraft and air force personnel³¹. The protection of economically feasible areas in Northern Afghanistan and their main lines of communication and supply, via the Salang Highway tunnel, was a constant source of worry due to ceaseless attacks conducted by the Mujahideen. However, the reason that they did not follow the American example in the Vietnam, with a massive offensive deployment of over 500,000 men, was more political and economic cost than just military. The immense cost of stationing 500,000 troops in Afghanistan would have been an economic disaster, and immeasurably crippling to the Soviet economy. In retrospect, the Soviet occupation, with an estimated annual cost of \$12 billion to maintain the war and the PDPA regime³², drained the Soviet Union immensely, and contributed to its eventual disintegration.

The problem that existed for the Soviets was that they confronted a country in which a nation did not really exist. Consequently, their strategy had to adapt to the new reality of fighting a protracted war by subduing an agglomerated mass of individual and independent village-states at varying degrees of self-governance and self-sufficiency. No template existed for the USSR to fight such a war. With an initial defensive deployment to hold important towns and cities, major military bases, and lines of supply and communications, the Soviets began to engage the Mujahideen with an evolving and effective combination of small unit tactics, helicopter assaults, interspersed with strategic and carpet bombing. As a consequence, the Soviets became increasingly more focused on a two-pronged strategy of *scorched-earth* and *surgical counter-insurgency* operations during the mid-1980s, by mounting large-scale *combined-arms* offensives, leading to the destruction of whole villages, crops³³, and irrigation systems through carpet bombing and the mass deployment of anti-personnel landmines³⁴; and, increased use of special forces, such as the *Spetsnaz*, in ambushes and raids on important guerrilla positions deep inside their territory³⁵. The Soviets eventually began to foresee that the only prospect of gaining control of the country, the vast majority of which was under the control of the Mujahideen, which held of over 30,000 of Afghanistan's 35,000 hamlets (about 85 percent of Afghanistan)³⁶, was to wear them down by progressively destroying the general rural infrastructure and targeting the Afghan people. However, the USSR had completely under-estimated the resolve of the Mujahideen to win the war, and had conversely overestimated the capacity and willingness of the DRA forces to engage the Mujahideen in intense combat for the sake of the communist regime, fearing possible future reprisals for killing Mujahideen in combat³⁷, such as, *badal*, the concept of reciprocity in the Pushtun code of conduct, *Pushtunwali*. "Purely military operations aimed at the destruction of a certain rebel unit, or a certain stronghold obviously brings no results in the situation where the enemy controls the extensive territory"³⁸.

In the face of an *unwinnable war*, the pacification of the Afghan population, in order gain to control of the rural areas, seemed all the more unlikely as the Mujahideen grew stronger with an increasing supply of modern weaponry and a strategy that was based upon similar lines as their adversary. That is, to wear down the Soviets and their DRA pawns through a long protracted war of attrition, through 'death by a thousand

cuts³⁹. However, the Mujahideen were also equipped with secure rear bases, in Pakistan, where they could withdraw to, to rest, recuperate, retrain, re-supply and rearm, obtain medical attention, and receive up-to-date intelligence before returning to the conflict zones in Afghanistan to continue the fighting. As a consequence, the Soviets sought to undermine Pakistan's ability to support the Mujahideen by infringing Pakistan's airspace hundreds of times; deploying thousands of KhAD agents in Pakistan to subvert and sabotage its efforts through a bombing campaign on civilian and government targets; shelling Pakistani territory⁴⁰; distributing large quantities of small arms to the border tribes in order to bring about a resurgence of the *Pushtunistan* issue; causing friction and raising tensions between the Pakistani Government and Baluch nationalists; and, increasing the refugee burden that Pakistan carries by raising their numbers through scorched-earth tactics on bordering areas⁴¹, intentionally targeting *green areas* so as to simultaneously depopulate the Afghan areas and alienate the Pakistanis from the refugees⁴², in a campaign that Dupree termed as *migratory genocide*⁴³.

6:2:2 – Lessons Unlearned

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan induced a dramatic shift in the Afghan consciousness, which had hitherto only been a part-time participant in the rebellion against the PDPA regime in Kabul. Although the vast majority of Afghans were opposed to the regime, its reforms, and especially its heavy-handedness, much of the population did not engage in an all out struggle for survival. When the Soviets invaded, all that changed. It was one thing to resist central control, which has been an over-riding trait of the fiercely independent Afghans; it is another to resist a foreign atheist invasion. Before the invasion, there was little cohesiveness and mutual co-operation to achieve a political goal through military means. The invasion brought about a shift in perceptions towards the establishment of a united front. However, tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries still plagued the Afghan resistance from the day of the invasion until the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet forces. Nevertheless, resistance to the *foreigner* became a common goal, a common Jihad.

The invasion of Afghanistan brought about an international outrage, which was “overwhelmingly negative”⁴⁴, and a resolution tabled for the immediate withdrawal of *foreign* troops from Afghanistan at a specially convened emergency United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session, between 10-14 January 1980, which was adopted by 104 votes for, with 48 votes comprised of both those against and abstaining⁴⁵. However, the USSR was quick to respond to the claim that it had invaded an independent sovereign country. Breaking his silence, President Brezhnev said that “the only task of the Soviet contingent is to assist the Afghans in repulsing the aggression from outside”⁴⁶, stating that it responded to a request for help, on 28 December 1979, to stem the damaging insurgency that was a *clear and present danger* to the PDPA regime: a) Under Article 4 of the Friendship Treaty signed on 05 December 1978 between Kabul and the USSR⁴⁷; and, b) as Afghanistan's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nation's (UN) Charter⁴⁸. However, this cannot be substantiated, since, as noted above, the USSR began to deploy significant numbers of troops into Afghanistan from its 40th Army, which was founded on the basis of this specific premise, well before this date. By the end of 1979, reports of “an increased inflow of ammunition from China and the US into Peshawar”⁴⁹ had surfaced, but had later also been used by the USSR to justify their invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan was seen as a failure of Soviet foreign policy; that is, recognition of their inability to control

events and mechanisms in Kabul other than through military intervention. There were very few options available to the USSR. Either they could abandon Amin's regime and watch it disintegrate, and hence, lose a secure southern border to, if not a pro-western, at least an anti-communist government, as Andrei Gromyko noted a decade later, because of "the efforts of the US government... to destabilise the southern borders of the Soviet Union and to create a threat to our security"⁵⁰; or, they would have to intervene, depose Amin, install a more pliable regime, and stabilise the increasingly desperate government with a full-scale invasion. Hitherto, with the exception of "Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946 and Chinese Sinkiang in 1943, the Soviets had never pulled out of a country under similar circumstances"⁵¹. Justifications aside⁵², for and against the invasion, it is unquestionable that the geo-political status quo had changed; the USSR was on the offensive after a decade of *détente*.

6:2:3 – US Responds – Change in US Foreign Policy and Carter's Attitudes

Without financial and military support from numerous states, the Mujahideen may still have been able to cause the collapse of the PDPA regime, but they were certainly not going to overcome a superpower. As observed above, figures such as Brzezinski and Slocombe, with the experience of Vietnam behind them, were eager to get the USSR embroiled into a burdensome and costly war, which had little prospect of succeeding. However, the long-term impacts, and the blowback, of such a war were neither wholly calculable, nor had they been completely evaluated. Nevertheless, with an appreciation of the pre-arousal of the Afghan population due to the actions of the PDPA regime since April 1978, and that the laying of the groundwork for the establishment of the resistance had already been underway since the overthrow of the monarchy, the US government sought to *up-the-ante* by condemning the invasion as a deliberate, pre-planned strategic Soviet advance through the *Third World* to threaten and/or strike at any Western interests at will, chiefly, the Middle East. In this regard, President Carter gave a severe warning in his *State of Union Address* on 21 January 1980, which became the foundation of the *Carter Doctrine*:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁵³

President Leonid Brezhnev later rebuked these allegations whilst addressing the Indian Parliament: "The USSR has no intention of encroaching upon either the Middle East oil or its transportation routes"⁵⁴. However, from the American point of view, and considering the recent gains that the USSR had hitherto achieved in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, the invasion of Afghanistan signalled a wholly new and more dangerous phase in superpower relations, regardless of the defensive rhetoric being used by the Soviets to justify the occupation of Afghanistan, which is very similar to the rhetoric that had been used by the USA for the unjustified occupation of Iraq.

From the very beginning, the question of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was high on the agenda of virtually every political (and even non-political, as in the withdrawal of the US from the Olympic Games in Moscow) engagement. Nevertheless, talks between the Soviets, US and Pakistan continued throughout the period of the conflict; however, the basic conditions for withdrawal could not be met by either of the parties.

Furthermore, the most important group within the conflict, the Afghans themselves, and the Mujahideen groups that were fighting for them had no representation. All negotiations for ending the weapons traffic to Afghanistan failed, and hence, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces failed to materialise. A realisation developed amongst the US, Pakistanis and the Mujahideen, that the conflict was going to be a protracted one, and one that will keep the Soviet Union tied-down; which, in retrospect, was a paramount aim of the US, so as to wear the USSR down through attrition. Charles Cogan, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Covert Operations in South-East Asia, observed, on 08 May 1983, that the Pakistani leadership, or invariably, "President Zia recognises that this will be a long, long war and he is committed all the way"⁵⁵

The initial overt physical reaction of the US, as part of the newly evolving Carter Doctrine⁵⁶, was the imposition of a series of purely cosmetic penalties upon the USSR, which according to Carter "would hit the Soviets where they were most vulnerable... [in addition to] indirect military assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters"⁵⁷. These sanctions coalesced during a National Security Council meeting on 2 January 1980 and subsequently announced on 4 January 1980 during an address to the American public that "the response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action"⁵⁸; the delay in the opening of new consular facilities, which specifically affected the new Kiev Consulate, and the recall of the US Ambassador in Moscow; the deferment of the majority of the cultural and economic exchanges; the ban on the export of high technology, "no high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice"⁵⁹; the ban on the export of 17 million metric tons of US grain to the USSR that they had already sought authorisation for⁶⁰; the curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in US waters; and finally, the non-ratification of the SALT II non-proliferation treaty⁶¹. Carter also announced that the US would be providing military and economic assistance to Pakistan to counter any insecurity that was being felt in that country as a result of the invasion⁶². In late January, President Carter further announced the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. The US media warmed to the hardening of an otherwise lame president, but also pushed for greater activity in the area. However, the US could not be seen to be directly and overtly involved in the supply of funds and arms to the Afghan resistance so as to credibly claim deniability in its role in the Afghan-Soviet War, and thus, sustain the veneer of a Cold War status between the two superpowers.

6:2:3:1 – Funding by the US – A Dilemma?

In late December 1979, immediately after the invasion, President Carter issued a presidential finding to covertly provide the Mujahideen with lethal weapons, using its CIA Directorate of Operations (DO), through Pakistan in order to strengthen the resistance to the USSR. Days after the invasion, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noted the detrimental influence that the Soviets now had over US interests in the Middle East and South Asia: "The key motivation that propelled Moscow's move was to bring its long-standing strategic goals closer within reach. Control of Afghanistan would be a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and to domination of the Asian sub-continent"⁶³. This was an added impetus to get directly involved in resisting the Soviet invasion. "The first arms, – mainly .303 Enfield rifles – arrived in Pakistan on January 10, 1980, fourteen days after the Soviet invasion"⁶⁴. The covert nature of the operation meant that it had to be

truly clandestine with as few CIA operatives as possible under the DO and Special Forces from the *Green Berets* and *SEALS*⁶⁵. According to Bob Woodward (1987), DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner was initially sceptical of such an operation, pondering the inevitability of literally using Afghanistan, and especially the lives of its poverty stricken people, for the strategic interests of the US. However, he knew that “for the first time, CIA-supplied weapons would be killing regular Soviet Army troops”⁶⁶. With Brzezinski adamantly behind the operation, Turner eventually succumbed even though he knew that there was a possibility that “U.S. policy was to fight to the last dead Afghan”⁶⁷. Conversely, former DCI Robert Gates (under President George Bush Sr.) notes in his memoirs, *From the Shadows* (1997), that, in contradiction to his later soul-searching, Turner was already inclined to expand the level of assistance being given to the Mujahideen as “he urged the DO to get moving in providing more help to the insurgents”⁶⁸ in response to the simultaneous requests of President Zia ul-Haq to the US Ambassador, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to the CIA for lethal weapons and equipment for the resistance, at the end of August 1979.

6:2:4 – Carter’s “Peanuts” – Funding Pakistan

Shortly after the announcement of the social and economic embargo of the USSR by the US, in which President Carter had also declared that the US “will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north”⁶⁹, Brzezinski visited Pakistan to meet President Zia ul-Haq in Islamabad on 2-3 February 1980⁷⁰ to establish the ground-rules for the covert supply of funds, arms, ammunition, intelligence, training, logistical support, and operational advice, planning, and support to the Mujahideen. Zia, a convincing and “calculating infighter”⁷¹, in order to re-kindle his weakening status amongst the Pakistani masses, needed the Afghan Jihad to succeed, and was forcefully urged by his Pushtun Director General ISI (DG-ISI), General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, “a secretive, serious man, cold and reserved with a granite-like face”⁷², to resolutely back the Mujahideen⁷³. However, he was adamant “that all arms supplies, finance and training of the fighters must be provided through Pakistan and not directly from the CIA”⁷⁴, and that complete control be in the hands of the ISI⁷⁵, and “absolute silence” should be maintained for all shipments of arms⁷⁶. The clandestine nature of the covert operation, coupled with the need for absolute deniability, induced Brzezinski to a quick approval. A report from the Soviet General Staff and KGB, dated December 1982, later confirmed the Pakistani and US justification and necessity for the maintenance of secrecy and deniability by keeping American personnel out of Afghanistan when it tasked specific Soviet and DRA forces “to capture an American citizen acting in a band of counterrevolutionaries in the territory of Afghanistan”⁷⁷. Following Pakistan, Brzezinski visited Saudi Arabia and advocated Pakistan’s position on greater Pakistani-Saudi cooperation and the facilitation of arms purchases by Pakistan⁷⁸, thereby concluding an agreement that matched any US assistance to the Mujahideen⁷⁹ to fund arms, ammunition, and logistical supplies and training.

Even though no evidence as to Soviet intentions to invade Pakistan existed, the US became more concerned about Pakistan’s vulnerability to Soviet attacks and future annexation; as noted in a declassified CIA intelligence memorandum: “There is some indication that Soviet officials are now willing to consider

retaliatory airstrikes against rebel sanctuaries in Pakistan. In addition, the rugged terrain in the border zone would not preclude small cross-border land-based raids by the Soviets⁸⁰. As such, Pakistan became the most important frontline state between the opposing Cold War camps during the 1980s. The assistance proposed by the US to Pakistan, in its support of the Mujahideen, was confounded by its nuclear programme, which according to section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Symington Amendment (1976)⁸¹, and the Glenn Amendment (1977) of the Foreign Assistance Act, “called for a cut-off of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous nuclear technology”⁸², and therefore induced a ban on arms transfers to Pakistan. However, in spite of this, the Carter Administration offered a unilateral \$400 million economic and military aid package, over a two year period, to Zia ul-Haq in January 1980⁸³. However, having considered the strategic and political consequences of aiding the Mujahideen in real terms, and the risk that Pakistan was taking as a frontline state, President Zia unequivocally rejected the offer as “peanuts”⁸⁴, stating that this small offer did not meet the country’s requirements if it was to wage a massive, albeit covert, campaign against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which would inevitably lead to greater insecurity and tensions on the Pakistani border with Afghanistan and add to its siege complex being situated, as it was, between its two antagonists, India and Soviet occupied Afghanistan. What Pakistan wanted was to vastly improve its military forces to make them comparable to a modern fighting force capable of withstanding Soviet or Indian penetration⁸⁵.

By July 1980, the programme for covert aid to the Mujahideen had rapidly grown to include vast panoply of weapons and military support; however, according to Turner’s brief to the President on 23 July 1980, the Mujahideen were becoming increasingly dependent upon Pakistan for arms and supplies⁸⁶, since “Pakistan has probably provided the most aid so far... Most of the equipment delivered to date apparently has been ammunition, mines, rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades”⁸⁷. Nevertheless, as Francis Fukuyama of the RAND Corporation reported in September 1980, after having visited Pakistan and the border areas, that small arms were flowing into Afghanistan from across the Pakistan border, but Islamabad “can and does prevent the entry of larger and more sophisticated weapons”⁸⁸.

The final act by the Carter administration occurred during a meeting on 29 October 1980, when Brzezinski complained to Turner about the lack of arms reaching the Mujahideen from the CIA⁸⁹. However, at the end of the Carter administration, Presidential Directive PD/NSC-62 (15 January 1981) identified Pakistan as a major recipient of US military and economic assistance to counter any insecurity that was being felt in that country as a result of the invasion⁹⁰. The new administration, led by Ronald Reagan, began its term with a completely different outlook to the geopolitical reality that they confronted. In a meeting between departing DCI Turner and incoming President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President George W. Bush, and new DCI William J. Casey, on 15 January 1981, Turner insisted that the “most important covert action... was the secret support to the resistance in Afghanistan”⁹¹, thereby setting the tone for the new administration in its efforts to confront Soviet adventurism in the less developed world. In a later meeting with Turner’s Deputy Director for Operations, John N. McMahon, Casey suggested that Reagan would want to expand the support being given to the Mujahideen, which was receiving more funding from the Saudis than the CIA, and concurred that it was

the most important engagement with the Soviets at that time⁹². In the first of his bi-annual trips to meet President Zia, in April 1981, at the General's Rawalpindi Cantonment, Casey came away with a positive impression⁹³. However, it was not until 15 September 1981 that an agreement to provide Pakistan with a \$3.2 billion assistance package was completed⁹⁴. The package equally covered both military and economic assistance over a period of six years starting from 01 October 1982, and included the delivery of four squadrons (approximately 60) F-16 jet fighters⁹⁵, in addition to the permission to purchase forty F-16 jet fighters worth \$1.1 billion⁹⁶. The six year aid package was followed by negotiations for a further six year package, which lasted a year and covered the period 1987-1993. On 24 March 1986, the US Government acquiesced to provide Pakistan with a larger second six-year aid package for the sum of \$4.02 billion⁹⁷. However, the U.S. applied the Pressler Amendment in 1990 and suspended the aid package on the grounds that Pakistan was not desisting from its nuclear programme⁹⁸. It is likely that, since the contending threat from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had dissipated, Pakistan was no longer perceived as valuable as it had previously been during the course of the occupation.

6:2:5 – Funding the Mujahideen – Financial and Military Assistance

It was only the initial steps towards a commitment to the resistance that took a little time as the US evaluated the likely consequences of such actions in their increasingly souring relationship with the USSR. A break had been made, not by the US, but by the Soviet crossing of the threshold, catalysed by the invasion. Nevertheless, within days of the invasion, President Carter approved the supply of lethal weapons for the Mujahideen, and the expansion of the covert CIA program to the sum of \$30 million⁹⁹, after which “Carter gradually increased the level of aid to the insurgents”¹⁰⁰ to a total of “about \$60 million a year... [which was] matched by the Saudis”¹⁰¹.

The change in the administration did not lead to an urgent reassessment of the aid being given to the Mujahideen. Even though the Reagan Administration had committed \$3.2 billion to Pakistan, in September 1981, for their support of the guerrilla campaign against the USSR so as to shore up their defences, the actual Afghan combatants did not receive an increase in funding for at least another two years in which the funding “remained essentially at the level proposed by Carter”¹⁰² at \$60 million per annum¹⁰³. In fact, Casey had pursued the matter, albeit a year later, on 26 February 1982, to add another \$20 million to the existing Afghan programme with the aid of the Deputy Defence Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, after reports from the CIA station chief in Islamabad on 14 January 1982 that more weapons were needed by the Mujahideen¹⁰⁴. In his meeting with President Zia on 06 April 1982, Casey was urged to provide more weapons for the Mujahideen to increase the pressure on the Soviets. Zia also asked for better anti-aircraft weaponry, since the Mujahideen were succumbing to Soviet air superiority, especially to their helicopter gunships, but always said that: “We must keep the pot boiling at a certain temperature. We must not allow it to boil over”¹⁰⁵. However, upon his return from his bi-annual trips abroad, and as in the previous months, Casey could not budge the Department of Defence to provide more funds for the Afghan programme¹⁰⁶.

Funding for the resistance was not solely an American concern. Saudi Arabia matched, and even exceeded, the assistance that the US was making to the Mujahideen. Other Arab countries also contributed to the resistance effort. “There was a tradition in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and some other Middle Eastern Muslim nations of funding and supporting Muslim peoples fighting for autonomy or independence from non-Muslim rule... Support for Afghan guerrillas against atheistic Soviet control was, therefore, not an unusual policy”¹⁰⁷. During a visit with his counterpart, Prince Turki al-Faisal, in April 1981, Casey secured the Saudi’s support “to continue to match the U.S. contribution dollar for dollar”¹⁰⁸ and manage it through the Saudi General Intelligence Agency (*al-Istakhbarah al-‘Amah*). In addition to government aid, two other major sources of organised funds existed aside from donations by wealthy Saudi individuals: the Muslim World League (*Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami*), which was headed by Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz; and, a support committee that funded Arab volunteers for Abdur Rasul Sayyaf’s party, which was headed by Prince Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, governor of Riyadh¹⁰⁹. Many other Islamist sources provided funds for the Afghan Jihad that literally only went to the Islamist parties, and were organised through a collective organisation, the Islamic Coordination Council.

The decade that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was also soon to mark the beginning of the end for the USSR. This was no more readily being sought than in the White House and in the mountains of Afghanistan. The failure of *détente* and the lack-lustre response to Soviet adventurism by the Carter administration led the Reagan administration to begin devising a strategy to engage the Soviet Union in all of its recent gains. The main element was not to compete with the Soviets on a quantitative platform, but to engage them qualitatively and force them to *roll-back*. That meant that they had to be economically suffocated so as to drain their resources and their ability to compete with the West on an equal footing, especially in areas where they were *over-stretched*. On 12 November 1982, President Reagan signed the classified National Security Council National Security Decision Directive-66¹¹⁰, which was “the most important secret document concerning the Soviet economy in U.S. history”¹¹¹, and began a secret campaign of economic warfare against the USSR to exploit its economic vulnerabilities by curtailing *Western life-support* to Moscow in order to “cause such stress on the system that it will implode”¹¹², and hence, crippling the Soviet economy¹¹³.

The slow progress of the war and the military superiority that the Soviets were gaining as a result of their air-power in Afghanistan forced the Reagan administration to eventually recognise the value of the Afghan conflict as a drain to the Soviet economy if it was correctly funded. However, this recognition was also partly due to the vocal lobbying of Mujahideen supporters in Congress¹¹⁴, such as senior Democrat Congressman Charles Wilson, from Texas and ideally placed on the Defence Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, who rallied to the administration’s desires to increase funding for the Mujahideen, especially for a greater anti-aircraft capability¹¹⁵, since the meagre sums being allocated to them could not secure their future against the Soviet onslaught. Concurrently, President Zia was requesting Casey for a sharp increase in funding for the Mujahideen whilst the Saudis had agreed to increase their assistance to \$75 million for fiscal year 1984 and \$100 million for fiscal year 1985¹¹⁶. However, Schweizer (1996)¹¹⁷ notes how Casey

secured an agreement with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to commit to an increased Saudi contribution of \$120 million in March 1984, and to escalate the war in Afghanistan by thrusting it into Soviet Central Asia to inflame the Muslim Asiatic Soviets on nationalistic and religious grounds against the USSR. However, this came at a price for the US, who were asked to sell the Saudis the *Stinger* surface-to-air missiles, and hence, begin the proliferation of a new advanced high-tech weapon which could, and did, fall into the hands of opponents of the US¹¹⁸.

Wilson, driven by an anti-communist crusade, had made several trips to Pakistan and even crossed the border along the North West Frontier Province into Mujahideen held territory in Afghanistan¹¹⁹, succeeded when the US Defence Department's appropriations bill, within which the assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen was concealed, had a secret amendment added for the fiscal year (FY) beginning 01 October 1983, which increased aid to the Mujahideen by a further \$40 million¹²⁰, the full amount requested. In July 1984, Wilson secured a Congressional decision to provide a further \$50 million in assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen¹²¹; thereby matching the Saudi contribution to the Mujahideen. During his autumn trip on 11 October 1984, Casey had proposed to the Saudis that they were to allocate \$250 million to the Mujahideen for fiscal year 1985¹²² as part of the total sum of \$280 million which had been earmarked for covert military aid by the U.S. Congress¹²³. With the matched Saudi contribution¹²⁴, 1985 would see the covert assistance programme to the Mujahideen become the largest CIA covert operation in the history of the US. During this period of aid build-up, Casey was able to persuade sympathetic Arab states to also contribute to a reserve fund that was kept secret from the US Congress and State Department¹²⁵ so as to facilitate a greater allocation of funding from Congress and Defence. According to Cordesman (1990), Congress approved an extra \$200 million in aid to the Mujahideen in addition to the \$250 already allocated for 1985. However, this was part of the aid package for fiscal year 1986. Saudi Arabia was also reported to have matched the US by giving the Mujahideen \$250 million in FY 1985 and \$275 million in FY 1986¹²⁶.

National Security Council National Security Decision Directive-66 (NSDD-66) changed the approach the US government had previously been using in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to force a roll-back in the advances that the USSR had made up to and including the invasion¹²⁷. To force the Soviets to retreat, DCI Casey had raised the notion of taking the war into the Soviet Union. Casey secured the commitment of the Saudis, Chinese and eventually the Pakistanis to coordinate attacks and aid uprisings on Soviet territory by the Mujahideen. During one meeting with General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and Brigadier Yousaf, head of the ISI Afghan Bureau (ISI-AB), in February 1984, Casey pointed to a map of the USSR and said, "This is the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. We should smuggle literature, to stir dissent. Then we should ship arms, to encourage local uprisings"¹²⁸. Although the exact scale of the operation cannot be calculated here, there was a significant proliferation of arms into Soviet Central Asia.

Prior to Casey's meeting, Afghan Mujahideen, operating out of Meshed, North-Eastern Iran, had already launched attacks on military posts and border patrols on Soviet territory when they had crossed into Turkmenistan on 24 January 1984¹²⁹. Not only did the upsurge of local dissent within Soviet Central Asia

become a significant factor in the later withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the proliferation of arms also had long-term effects on the stability of the future Central Asian republics, as can be noted from the civil war that was raging in Tajikistan in the mid 1990s. What is important to note here is that the political, economic and strategic parameters within and without the Afghan conflict cannot be divorced from the dynamics and consequences of the proliferation of arms into that region. Understanding the wider political role in the decision-making processes of policy-makers is essential to appreciating the reasons as to why the extensive proliferation of SALWs occurs. Only through such a thorough appreciation can the root causes of the proliferation be tackled head-on. In the context of the Afghan conflict, and the decision to take the war into the Soviet Union, we can see that the supply of large quantities of weapons was instrumental in providing a catalyst for the eruption of the civil unrest that was simmering under the surface of the pseudo-harmonic Russianisation/Sovietisation that had been established since the subjugation of Central Asia by Tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century and its continued domination by the USSR, and present day Russia in the guise of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Due to the scope of this present chapter, further discussions on the effects of the proliferation of SALWs can be found throughout chapters eight and nine.

By the end of 1984 the Soviet Union had become dissatisfied with the course of the war, feeling that the stalemate that had transpired would continue unless they dramatically escalated the war effort and fought to hasten the destruction of the Mujahideen. They had gained enough significant experience hitherto to acknowledge the development of more sophisticated tactics by employing close to a quarter of the Soviet Union's entire Spetsnaz force in Afghanistan to fight the Mujahideen in their territory¹³⁰. Previously, large scale offensive sweeps, such as those used in the Panjshir valley, were not able to push into the side valleys where the Mujahideen often retreated to at the onset of the offensive. However, with the aid of helicopter deployments, arduous specialist mountain warfare training, and coordinated combined arms tactics, the Spetsnaz, being deployed behind Mujahideen lines in the side valleys, became very successful in cutting off their retreat routes. The net annual effect was the doubling of Mujahideen casualty rates in comparison to previous years¹³¹.

As a consequence of the renewed vigour of the Soviet forces and their increasing success, assistance to the Mujahideen also increased by the end of 1985 to double the amount allocated for fiscal year 1985. This increase came as a direct result of the US administration's discontent with the course of the war, the implementation of the strategy to merely *bleed* the Soviets¹³², and the Mujahideen groups' increasingly competitive nature in their desire to acquire arms and assistance¹³³. There was a desire to not only *harass* the Soviets, but to force their complete retreat as well as the fall of their communist proxies in Kabul. During a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting in late January 1985, the US National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, was cogently instructed to develop and codify an overarching strategy for the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan by President Reagan: "Do whatever you have to to help the Mujahideen not only survive, but win"¹³⁴. The result was a fundamental change in the strategy hitherto employed by the US government in regards to their covert support for the resistance. For example, increasing numbers of Mujahideen, about 100 per month, were receiving specialised training in "arms smuggling and use"¹³⁵ by the

CIA and the ISI, which would facilitate greater diffusion of SALWs in years to come. Codified in the classified NSC NSDD-166, entitled *Expanded US Aid to Afghan Guerrillas*, and signed by President Reagan on 27 March 1985¹³⁶, the directive was the first time that a strategy was articulated with explicit objectives for the Afghan conflict, and led to “a significant increase in the quantity and quality of military assistance”¹³⁷.

Funds for fiscal year 1986 were increased by \$125 more than that given in 1985 “to be used to buy more weapons of all kinds”¹³⁸. This coincides with Cordesman’s (1990) estimates that approximately \$470 million in US military aid reached the Mujahideen in 1986¹³⁹. The head of the Near East and South Asian Division of the CIA’s DO, Charles G. Cogan (1979-1984), corroborating this account, notes that the same amount of military aid was given in 1987 also¹⁴⁰. However, Cordesman (1990) points out that the military aid given to the Mujahideen in 1987 was \$660 million, whilst *The Times* notes that of the \$710 million of aid given to the Mujahideen for FY 1987, \$670 was in military supplies¹⁴¹. The military assistance to the Mujahideen increased further as a result of the successes gained, especially against Soviet air-superiority, through the introduction of more sophisticated weapons of non-Soviet origin, negating the fig-leaf of deniability for the first time, such as the hand-held *fire and forget* Stinger surface-to-air missile, which became operational in September 1986¹⁴². However, during the first visit by a limited delegation of the *Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan* (Islamic Unity of Mujahideen of Afghanistan- IIMA), or the *Seven-Party Alliance* based in Pakistan, chaired by Professor Burhannuddin Rabbani, on 16 June 1986, to the US to gain diplomatic recognition, the President Reagan, whilst firmly supporting the Mujahideen’s goal of attaining freedom, ruled out diplomatic recognition¹⁴³ until they acquire “more attributes of a government”¹⁴⁴. Not only was this rejection a reflection of the bitterly divided Mujahideen parties, but also an affirmation that the US could not afford to give up its Embassy in Kabul and therefore lose a valuable listening post¹⁴⁵, nor could it contend with the Soviets in their *backyard* given that the situation in Central America was also fraught with difficulties in the game of *realpolitik*¹⁴⁶. Upon their return, the delegation was rebuked by Hekmatyar and Sayyaf for being too closely identified with the U.S. and for not getting the approval of the whole seven-party alliance¹⁴⁷.

The human and material cost of the war was causing increasingly serious problems to the international standing and domestic popularity of the Soviet Union’s haemorrhaging occupation of Afghanistan. The Politburo session held on 17 October 1985 was the first time that President Gorbachev announced that he was going to make a final decision on whether he was going to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan after having told Karmal that “we will help you, but with arms only, not troops”¹⁴⁸. In order to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the PDPA regime was strengthened through the replacement of President Karmal with the Head of KhAD, Dr. Mohammad Najibullah on 4 May 1986¹⁴⁹, and the introduction of a more conciliatory tone to the resistance, albeit only in words and not in actions, as witnessed by the increasing brutality of the scorched-earth policy being employed by the Soviets and the DRA regime¹⁵⁰. In comparison to the vast amounts being spent by the US in its other programmes to counter Soviet advances, such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the amounts, seemingly high, being provided for the defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan were miniscule in comparison, even though congress approved approximately \$700 million for FY 1988 and FY 1989 each¹⁵¹.

Prior to the scheduled date for the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal, 15 May 1988, which was the agreed date after which no further arms deliveries could be made to the Mujahideen and DRA regime by the USA and USSR respectively, saw a flurry of activity as the CIA rushed to get \$300 million to the Mujahideen to beat the deadline¹⁵². The arms sanctions on Afghanistan, however, failed as both the US and the USSR paid no heed to their agreements at the signing of the Geneva Accords, which signalled the end of the Soviet occupation, and continued to arm their respective proxies in Afghanistan. In the decade long occupation of Afghanistan, the US government authorised approximately \$2 billion in military aid to the Mujahideen, in other words, the cost of one B-2 stealth bomber. However, according to the figures that have been provided, even this figure is quite a low conservative estimate and may be closer to between \$3 and \$4 billion considering the provision of *black* funds that are not accounted for. The actual amount of covert military aid that was given by the US may never be known. The military aid given by the Saudi government, which matched and exceeded US aid, and other donor states will never be known due to the sensitive nature of the operation and the fact that these governments do not have an official *freedom of information* policy whereby a limited degree of information is declassified, and hence, publicly available after a certain period of time, depending upon the prevailing political circumstances. Nevertheless, the amount of military assistance given to the Mujahideen by all sources, from 1978 to collapse of the DRA regime in 1992, may come to a total of approximately \$8 to \$10 billion¹⁵³.

6:2:6 – The Mujahideen – Introduction

The Mujahideen parties were to eventually coalesce into the Pakistan-based seven-party alliance; while the Iranian backed Shia parties were also not an insignificant opposition to the Soviet and DRA forces. However, they had intrinsic weaknesses which led to an inability to organise a coordinated, cohesive and comprehensive overarching strategy. As such, and without the organisational authority, and, to an extent, logistical support and limited supervision by the ISI and Pakistani authorities and external patronage, the Soviets may have inevitably been able to subdue the resistance with all ensuing consequences taken into account. A number of reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces have already been provided. Nevertheless, those that relate to the central theme of this study will be extrapolated upon here.

6:2:6:1 – Character

The resistance was an amalgamation of numerous groups of independent tribal and detribalised Afghans that had a similar aim. They were initially uncoordinated and generally lacked direction within a holistic strategy until they were forced to coalesce into a smaller number of groups in order to survive or disappear through the lack of external financial and military support and patronage. The spirit for survival and ability to endure suffering and privations may exist throughout the human race, but in the Afghans, who have generally lived a *hard* life in their harsh environment and evolved a culture to reflect that existence, we can find a concentration of a fiercely independent and freedom loving character. This was one of the most important motivations for the average fighting man that engaged the Soviet and DRA forces, without which, and regardless of the

ideology used to induce them, it would have been virtually impossible to encourage the Afghans to go spill their blood against a superpower. This is especially so for the Pushtun through their Pushtunwali; where:

Every man must be strong enough to protect his interests – generally defined as gold, women and land – and each man is raised to take pride in his fighting ability. Indeed, the martial arts are taken so seriously that Pashtun boys do not play war games, but from a very early age are trained by their elders in military skills such as stalking and the use of arms... To the Pashtun, the martial arts are to be exercised for the personal, family or tribal honor, pleasure and/or gain. So ingrained are these attitudes that today each generation looks forward to a major battle to demonstrate its self-worth and bands of men for a *lashkar* or war party.¹⁵⁴

This was a very significant advantage that the Afghans had over their Soviet and DRA adversaries. This character is testified by the constant flow of men, women and children that reached Pakistan on bare feet through the highest mountains in the world with mangled limbs, field amputations, and barely a piece of bread to survive on for days at a time. In contrast, the Soviet forces that were initially introduced to Afghanistan were generally *softer* raw recruits with little training and virtually no operational experience. In subsequent years, this was offset by the increasing numbers of elite Special Forces that had to partake in operations to increase Soviet effectiveness against the Afghans. But even these men had little in the way of motivation to defeat the Afghan resistance.

Afghans could live off the land as opposed to the Soviet and DRA forces. They were generally adept at handling weapons from an early age and required little in the way of subsequent training to shoot. However, their discipline in fire-control often let them down and needed to be kept in-check on a regular basis with training courses on the correct operation of weapons on the battle-field. The Mujahideen did suffer from inadequate clothing in the winter, but were generally able to withstand harsher environments than their Soviet counterparts as a result of their upbringing. The Mujahideen were also experts in their own mountain and desert terrain, which they were able to utilise to their maximum advantage. For example, the Mujahideen were successful in defending against Soviet offensives by channelling troops into side valleys and confront them with pre-arranged ambushes. The high-ground was used to great effect, especially against helicopter gunships which were more insecure against fire from above due to the predominance of protective armour on the underside of the helicopters.

One of most serious problems with the Mujahideen was their pride and the consequent inflexibility to change on tactical matters, which often led to constant squabbling between different Mujahideen commanders, groups or parties. For example, covert operations that entailed stealth and silence were not always upheld due to the need for excitement and noise where the young Mujahids could demonstrate their courage and bravery, and secure a degree of *booty*. Extensive training was therefore needed to reorient the Mujahideen from their ancient practices to the new more deadly war. However, in order to prevent the Soviets from gaining an advantage before the Mujahideen were operational for covert missions, trusted volunteer ISI personnel were trained by the CIA in special operations to carry out sabotage missions inside Afghanistan¹⁵⁵. Within a few years, training schools providing “two-week training courses in anti-tank and antiaircraft guns, mine laying and lifting, demolition, urban warfare, and sabotage”¹⁵⁶ were being undertaken by the Mujahideen. According

to Yousaf (2001), “In 1984 20,000 Mujahideen benefited from our efforts, with 17,700 completing courses in 1985 and 19,400 in 1986... [and by] late 1987 at least 80,000 Mujahideen had received training in Pakistan over a four year period”¹⁵⁷.

Unlike their Soviet and DRA counterparts, the Mujahideen seldom received any pay, but subsisted off the land and divided their time by working as fighters, farmers, shopkeepers, and caring for the family. In this respect, the fighters were not full-time. If a commander claimed he had 10,000 fighters, in reality he could only field a fifth of that at any given time. Full-time fighters did exist, however, and they were generally affiliated with the larger parties. During the civil war period in the 1990s, the various warring factions had to pay full-time fighters in order to be able to keep up their war effort (see, Appendix II, Table 2.1 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Political, Ethnic and Religious Orientation; and, Table 2.2 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Patrons & Political & Military Leadership). The exact numbers of Mujahideen that were fighting the Soviet and DRA forces cannot be ascertained, and estimates of the manpower of each and every faction vary. The numerous factions also claimed exaggerated numbers of fighters under their control in order to acquire greater funds and military materials, as well as to deter competing factions from engaging in direct hostilities with them. Cordesman (1990) suggests that, according to US estimates, by the end of 1988, the Mujahideen had a total full-time combatant strength of about 90,000 supported by a part-time reserve of 110,000¹⁵⁸. Others have given varying estimates, from a capacity of as low as 30,000 to a high of 230,000 Mujahideen fighting men¹⁵⁹. U.S. counterinsurgency expert, Colonel Rod Paschall, writes that in comparison to the total forces wielded by the Soviet and DRA forces, of about 200,000, “only 20,000 guerrillas are in active opposition at any one time... [yielding a ratio of] ten-to-one”¹⁶⁰. However, this figure does not include resistance groups that are not directly funded by the CIA-ISI pipeline, or the thousands of loosely organised bands of Afghans that are in active resistance through their tribal networks and local commanders. In any case, if we consider the number of men that have arms at their disposal throughout Afghanistan, the total numbers provide figures that reflect the diffusion of mass quantities of weapons, and could easily be in excess of a million.

6:2:6:2 – Source of Manpower

A large number of the Mujahideen were recruited from the Afghan refugee population that had settled in both Pakistan and Iran. The numbers of refugees grew throughout the war as a result of its periodic intensification by the Soviets, such as the scorched-earth policy, which greatly contributed to the increasing refugee population. There were over 350 refugee camps in Pakistan alone; with camps holding up to 100,000 people each, many of which were virtual replicas of villages inside Afghanistan. However, Mujahideen fighters often left their families in refugee camps, which acted as safe-havens, so as to allow a whole hearted commitment to operational matters in Afghanistan; as noted by a declassified secret CIA intelligence memorandum, *The Afghan Refugees: An Irritant to Soviet-Pakistani Relations*, dated April 1980: “Afghan male refugees re-enter Afghanistan from Pakistan to defend their tribal borderlands from what they perceive as the godless government in Kabul. They return periodically to Pakistan territory to visit their families, to acquire arms and ammunition, and to seek medical treatment, in effect using the frontier areas of Pakistan as safe havens”¹⁶¹.

The squalid conditions in the camps readily provided a reservoir of new recruits, which the Mujahideen parties had heavily infiltrated, while competing to “register the Afghan refugees into their own factions, often coercively”¹⁶², and to gain essential intelligence on matters occurring in Afghanistan itself. Hekmatyar’s *Hizb-i Islami* (Party of Islam) was especially successful in establishing a presence in the refugee camps and within the aid distribution network¹⁶³. The refugee camps were also exploited by hundreds of KhAD agents so as to destabilise the North West Frontier Province and hence Pakistan’s support for the Mujahideen.

6:2:6:3 – Organisation and Structure

The amalgamation of the numerous groups that first arose to resist the communist coup in 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion could not be reduced more than the seven Pakistan-based parties (the Shia parties were too numerous to count in the initial stages, but their operational effectiveness was stifled by the lack of support they received in the early 1980s due to the Iranian pre-occupation with their own war with Iraq). There were serious religious, ethno-linguistic, tribal, and political differences between these groups. The parties were generally very hierarchical, for example, Hekmatyar’s *Hizb-i Islami* was organised with a pyramidal chain of authority in a tight cell structure of which he was the absolute leader. The *seven* can be divided into two distinct categories, the Islamists and the moderates¹⁶⁴.

Both the Soviet forces and Mujahideen were reliant upon their lines of communication and supply in order to survive. The main bases of supply for the Mujahideen were primarily in the borderlands of Pakistan, around Peshawar and the garrison town of Quetta, and to a very limited extent in Iran (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.1.a – Major Supply Routes and Rear Base Areas for Stages 1, 2, and 3 of the CIA-ISI Arms Pipeline during the Afghan-Soviet War, 1979-1989; and, Figure 6.1.b – Key for Major Supply Routes and Rear Bases). Soviet bases of supply were focused around Termez in Uzbekistan, and Kushka in Turkmenistan. Such bases afforded respective forces to re-supply, train, and rest. In the case of the Soviets, they also included airfields from which the Soviets supplied forces based in Afghanistan. The bases included training camps, ammunition dumps, staging areas, party headquarters (for the Mujahideen), and stores. Operational bases were located inside Afghanistan for both the Mujahideen and the Soviets, which provided for the essential daily needs of the forces. Soviet operational bases were often located in the larger cities and were very well defended. Mujahideen operational bases were often located in villages throughout Afghanistan, and were regularly shifted due to the threat of attack from Soviet and DRA forces. The defence of supply and communications routes were essential, and as a result they were often the target of persistent attacks and ambushes, such as the main supply line for the Soviets along the Salang Highway, which was consistently attacked by the Mujahideen to strangle the Soviet forces in Kabul, and hence, very heavily defended.

6:2:6:4 – Strategy and Tactics

The inter-party disunity and decentralised nature of the leadership was a constant thorn in the application of the Mujahideen’s unified strategy, which was difficult due to the varied locational interests, and the comparatively greater strengths of competing ethnic, sectarian, and ideological sodalities; however, it also had

positive aspects by denying the Soviets the ability to infiltrate and disrupt them in significant numbers in order to kill the leadership and cause the collapse of the whole opposition¹⁶⁵. If a group was wiped out by Soviet and DRA offensives in a particular area they were merely replaced by another group once the occupation forces had left the area. There was no central base of Mujahideen operations for the Soviets to attack. In contrast, the Mujahideen attacked distinct Soviet and DRA headquarters and bases from all directions and across borders. The Soviet and DRA offensives tried to block Mujahideen supply routes throughout the war without success. However, their scorched-earth policy was successful in reducing food supplies for the Mujahideen, who then created their own rear-area agricultural facilities to replace those lost to the bombing¹⁶⁶.

6:2:6:5 – Disunity

The difference in political leanings, whether it was merely in the degree of their religious orientation was a very significant factor in the endless bickering amongst the Mujahideen parties. From the beginning of the Soviet occupation, Mujahideen party leaders were often “more interested in their power positions than in contributing to the success of the insurgency as a whole”¹⁶⁷, and in the satisfaction of their personal ambitions when considering their future role after the defeat of the Communists. Ethnic differences also exposed the deep fissures that had evolved over Afghanistan’s history, and was reflected in Afghan society in general and in the relations between the parties. The task of expelling the Soviets was constantly in jeopardy as the holistic strategy, which depended upon a degree of unity between the Mujahideen factions, was undermined by field commanders and party leaders refusing to cooperate with their counterparts in other parties due to their mutual rivalry and even enmity, and often resulted in direct hostility, fighting and vendettas between Mujahideen of opposing parties. Furthermore, the lack of unity between the Mujahideen factions constantly brought into question their credibility and capability to sustain independent resistance against Soviet and Afghan army forces; as is noted by a CIA memorandum dated 09 January 1980:

The exile groups are likely to continue their infighting and probably will have no more than a marginal effect on the course of the insurgency unless Pakistan takes the lead in trying to unite or at minimum increase the coordination among the diverse groups. Without the assistance of Pakistan, moreover, the establishment of an exile command and control structure that could coordinate insurgent military action on a national scale would be beyond the capability of the Afghan exiles.¹⁶⁸

This internecine conflict would often facilitate Soviet offensives in areas where several Mujahideen parties openly competed with each other for local support. A case in point is Ahmad Shah Masood’s numerous ceasefire agreements with Soviet forces in order to gain a pause in Soviet operations against his Panjshiri stronghold and to provide safe passage for Soviet troops travelling through the Salang Pass, knowing full well that the Soviets were therefore free to put their full weight to operations against the Pushtun Mujahideen groups, that he was overtly competing against¹⁶⁹. The Pushtun parties were not unaware of such openly deceitful actions on the part of the Tajik Mujahideen, which fed the disunity by further exacerbating the ethnic fissures that were jeopardising the anti-Soviet campaign.

6:2:6:6 – Consequences of Disunity of the Peshawari-Seven

When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the notion that the Najibullah government would quickly succumb to Mujahideen forces turned out to be a myth. DRA forces quickly established defensive control of the main urban areas and supply lines. The Mujahideen were guerrillas through and through. They were ill-trained and ill-equipped for a conventional war which pitted equally matched opponents against each other. They had no armour or air force that could fight against a much stronger unified defensive opponent that was now more motivated to defending itself due to the departure of the Soviets, and its own presumed annihilation. The Mujahideen on the other hand were in no way united, even though they had established an alliance, and later, a government in exile. There was no unified organisation, whether military or political, with a hierarchical authority structure and no common political platform whatsoever. Furthermore, none of the parties had developed a national profile. The vicious civil war that was to come in the 1990s was, sadly, an inevitable consequence of the dysfunctional relationships and lack of conflict resolution between the Mujahideen factions throughout the period of Soviet occupation.

6:3 – The CIA-ISI Arms Pipeline – Introduction

The US decision to assist the Afghan Mujahideen after the Soviet invasion required a substantial organisation to facilitate the flow of military aid for arms, training and the organisation-building of the Mujahideen. Preparatory ground-work had already been in existence before the invasion with the CIA station chief, John Reagan, working to supply the Afghan resistance with limited aid through the US Embassy in Islamabad and consulate in Karachi. Unlike other similar CIA programmes in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Angola, the Afghan project had been given a green light by an unambiguous Congress, especially during Reagan's administration, to arm the Mujahideen with little accountability because of the preconditions of the co-dependent alliance set by President Zia ul-Haq and the ISI that military aid should have total secrecy, complete deniability, and under absolute Pakistani control after it reaches Pakistani territory and that "no American ever become involved with the distribution of funds or arms once they arrived in the country"¹⁷⁰ in order to avoid the Soviet propaganda that the Mujahideen were really only the *imperialist* proxies of the Americans. As such, the operation, henceforth known as the *pipeline*, was organised into a number of stages. The CIA were responsible for the supply, payment, and delivery of arms to Pakistan through its own organisation and from its contacts with secondary suppliers such as Egypt, China, the UK, and Israel; the Pakistanis controlled the allocation of arms and funding to the disparate Mujahideen parties based in Peshawar (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) and Quetta (Baluchistan)¹⁷¹; and, the parties were responsible for distributing the arms between their field commanders within Afghanistan. Other military aid came in the form of military training for the resistance fighters themselves. An account of this latter point is provided in chapter nine due to its relevance to the increased militarization of the refugee community and the male Afghan population, and hence, its significance in increasing the likelihood of the re-eruption of conflict.

The CIA, having established preparatory cells, needed to secure arms that would facilitate deniability for the US, Pakistan, and certain Western European states that were also willing to aid the Mujahideen. If this had not been the case, the supply of arms to the Mujahideen would not have been such a laborious exercise in

disguise and concealment. The arms would merely have been directly supplied to the Mujahideen parties without the need for such an elaborate operational setup that was being run by the ISI, as was the case, to a limited extent, after the Stinger missiles had been supplied; although, some form of cooperation would still have been needed between the CIA and the Pakistani hosts. According to the head of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI, Brigadier Yousaf (2001), “the foremost function of the CIA was to spend money”¹⁷², and hence, fulfil their primary role as the supplier of arms and ammunition. However, a large proportion of military aid came in the form of *cash* so as to build the pipeline’s logistical and operational infrastructure within Pakistan and Afghanistan, since, “without money nothing moves – particularly in Pakistan”¹⁷³. The distribution of these funds was the responsibility of the General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan and the ISI’s Director of Administration (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.2 – The Flow of Money and Arms in the CIA Arms Pipeline).

The general organisational structure of the CIA was reflected in that deployed to the Afghan programme, which according to Yousaf (2001) could be divided into three types of officer: the career officer with a balanced field and headquarters experience; externally recruited experts, specialists and analysts; and, attached and former middle ranking officers from the US armed forces within their 30s and 40s, usually co-opted from Special Operations Forces. Owing to the nature of the operation, “the number of CIA operatives was very small; no more than a hundred people were involved in the Afghan effort. Slightly less than half of them worked at CIA headquarters [at Langley]; the remainder were in the field in Pakistan and elsewhere”¹⁷⁴. Nevertheless, the CIA facility in Islamabad had become one of the largest in the world¹⁷⁵, which illustrates the importance that the CIA attached to this particular operation, in terms of the resources available, albeit, to a relatively few personnel.

In relation to the CIA’s Afghan programme’s authority structure, Yousaf (2001)¹⁷⁶ observes that a disproportionate degree of influence was attributable to the opinions of the analysts as compared to the field operatives who tended to be more aware of the logistical necessities of implementing operational details, which led to significant mismanagement of funds in the purchase of inappropriate arms in contradiction to Mujahideen requirements.

6:3:1 – Stage One

Aside from the annual allocation of military assistance to the Afghan programme by Congress, the initial stage of the pipeline involved the selection of the types and quantities of weapons required by the Mujahideen to effectively resist the Soviets. Until the end of 1985, this selection process was heavily constrained by the US government’s desire to retain the *fig-leaf of deniability*. Since the Mujahideen had secured the majority of their weapons from deserting DRA formations and captured DRA and Soviet stocks, the only weapons that could be supplied to the Mujahideen to facilitate deniability were those of Soviet origin; hence, limiting the general sophistication of weapons to be delivered, which, however, also helped since weapons that were supplied were easier to use by semi-trained and untrained Afghans, such as the four component AK47. To conceal the origin of shipments of weapons, “rifles, ammunition, and rockets were coming in crates marked ‘television sets’ and ‘appliances’” by the CIA¹⁷⁷. This aspect of the selection process significantly reduced the

potential sources of a significant supply of such weapons, since most Soviet origin weapons tended to be secure within the Warsaw Pact, their various client regimes, and Soviet sponsored sub-state actors. There were, however, some states that were antagonistic to Soviet designs that were producing or had received and captured large stocks of Soviet origin weapons, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Egypt, and Israel respectively¹⁷⁸; the latter being known only to the Americans. Although the PRC was supported and persuaded by the US to aid the Mujahideen, its arms supply operation was largely independent and was defined by its own strategic objectives and *raison d'être* in its rivalry with the USSR. Also, due to the PRC's distrust of the ISI's management of arms supplies to the Mujahideen parties, it also supplied weapons directly to various Mujahideen parties and commanders inside Afghanistan¹⁷⁹. In addition to the arms suppliers, several Arab states were indirectly involved with aiding the Mujahideen by acting as major financial backers through the CIA, and to a limited extent directly to certain Mujahideen parties¹⁸⁰ the most important of which was Saudi Arabia¹⁸¹ (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.2 – The Flow of Money and Arms in the CIA Arms Pipeline).

The personnel used to aid the covert supply of arms were not solely American. Afghan parties opposed to the overthrow of King Zahir Shah and/or Mohammad Daoud's presidency had already been actively arming themselves, albeit, to a limited degree, during the mid-1970s. A network of individuals and groups that were involved in the funnelling of funds and arms to the Mujahideen had already existed before the Soviet invasion, and had grown since the communist coup of April 1978¹⁸². After the Soviet invasion, however, DCI Casey had instructed the Director of Operations, in early 1981, to intensify the location and recruitment of Afghans living overseas to assist the international supply of arms to the Mujahideen under the direction of CIA officials. Within a year, over one hundred overseas Afghans, trained in international arms smuggling techniques, were involved in purchasing and transporting arms and ammunition to the ISI before they were transferred to the Mujahideen¹⁸³.

The CIA generally used three routes to deliver arms to the Pakistanis. The most important conduit was by ship, whereby the CIA purchased arms from secondary suppliers, such as Egypt, Israel, the UK, and China, and was responsible for shipping the cargo and arranging the arrival dates to the port of Karachi, after which the ISI took over. At the beginning, the quantity of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Karachi was small, but it steadily rose to about 10,000 metric tons per annum by 1983¹⁸⁴. However, as Congress progressively increased the allocation of funds to the Afghan operation the annual tonnage of weapons deliveries began to increase rapidly, reaching 50,000 metric tons in 1985¹⁸⁵, and 65,000 metric tons in 1987¹⁸⁶. Secondly, with Saudi finance, the CIA was able to purchase weapons on the international market and air-freight them to Islamabad using the United States Air Force (USAF) from Dhahran, which was used as a trans-shipment point. The lack of Saudi concern for schedules eventually forced the CIA to use Cairo as the trans-shipment point¹⁸⁷. Finally, Schweizer (1996) notes that the CIA often airlifted arms and ammunition from China to Pakistan to be distributed by the ISI, alongside those weapons that were delivered independently of the ISI by the Chinese¹⁸⁸. In addition, Yousaf (2001) categorically denies reports that the

overland route from China, via the Karakoram Highway, was used to transport arms and ammunition to the Mujahideen¹⁸⁹.

6:3:1:1 – Covert Aid and the CIA

Every stage of the pipeline had to be kept completely covert to facilitate deniability. However, as a federal government agency, the CIA was subject to Congressional and public scrutiny, which could threaten certain covert CIA operations underway within and without the Afghan programme. In order to circumvent such constraints, DCI Casey was able to assign certain covert operations as *off the books* and employed within the remit of his sole accountability to the President under his role as the President's adviser assigned to him through his membership of the National Security Council.

The majority of the funding that did get to the Mujahideen was not assigned as 'off the books'. However, the US still tried to cover their tracks by depositing such funds into secret accounts with client banks around the world. One such client bank that helped in laundering CIA and Saudi funds was the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), headed by the late Pakistani magnate, Agha Hassan Abedi and his relations¹⁹⁰. Negotiations to initiate an arms pipeline did not begin from scratch. For example, one particular network of influential official bodies was a precursor to the CIA operation in Afghanistan. The network had been established during the 1970s, with a pact having been signed between the heads of the intelligence services of France, Egypt, Iran, Morocco and Saudi Arabia on 01 September 1976. However, Iran had discontinued its services after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran.

This organisation, named the *Safari Club* by the Egyptian author who discovered it, was created to stem the tide of communism in Africa and Asia and actually did succeed in conducting joint operations from its main centre in Cairo, which had a rotating annual chairmanship¹⁹¹. Its role in the Afghan conflict, however, was limited to the provision of information and expertise that it had acquired over the years, and the close symbiotic connections that had been built with the American intelligence community. Nevertheless, the Safari Club was able to provide reliable groundwork for establishing a network of individuals and groups of arms dealers, international financiers, banks, companies, organisations, and intelligence agencies that were to become the backbone of the CIA arms pipeline.

6:3:1:2 – Finance and Money Laundering Operations of the CIA with BCCI

The majority of the U.S. funding for the Mujahideen came through mainstream congressional lobbying by a number of Congressmen and Senators, which was matched by the Saudis. Private funding for the Mujahideen also came from a number of influential Arab individuals who provided money directly to the Mujahideen parties. The main task of those funding the Afghan Jihad was to buy the arms and ammunition necessary for the Mujahideen without losing plausible deniability. However, when arms deals were made, they were known throughout the arms-trade community within a matter of weeks, if not days.

In considering the various avenues from which to funnel American and Arab funds, DCI Casey became very familiar with institutions, such as the infamous BCCI. DCI Casey had made close contacts with Abedi during his meetings in Washington over the course of three years¹⁹², but was also using his close contacts to penetrate the bank for intelligence-gathering across the world from within the bank's intelligence assets, the *black network*, a 1,500 strong "global intelligence operation and enforcement squad... of hand-picked individuals"¹⁹³ based in Karachi. The BCCI had already acquired "secret accounts in Switzerland, London, Miami and elsewhere"¹⁹⁴ that were used as unique Afghan War accounts, which paid for the arms supplied by a variety of arms dealers from CIA and Saudi money deposited there¹⁹⁵. These accounts were also found to handle funds from the Saudis, under CIA direction¹⁹⁶ and as a result of *quid pro quo* arrangements, for the "Contras in Nicaragua, UNITA in Angola and apparently even support for General Noriega"¹⁹⁷. One of the Swiss bank accounts, in which the US-Saudis had deposited money for the joint covert Afghan arms operation, was also used to finance¹⁹⁸ and deposit money for the Iranian arms sales as an alleged result of a CIA employee's administrative mistake¹⁹⁹. The bank's other variegated facilities were also intensively used for various CIA covert operations supporting the Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation²⁰⁰. Allegations of impropriety, financial irregularities, and the CIA's close working relationship with the fraudulent bank²⁰¹ were eventually released as reporters scrambled for *tasty* stories of the biggest financial scandal to have occurred in the world, especially when its role in the Iran-Contra arms scandal became more apparent²⁰² due to the Reagan administration having been compromised in its actions by supplying arms to Iran, which contradicted the official US policy of denying it armaments and spare parts for its war against Iraq under *Operation Staunch*²⁰³. The CIA also used BCCI accounts in Pakistan to channel funds to the Mujahideen through the ISI²⁰⁴. The *Financial Times* confirmed this through the Pakistan's finance minister²⁰⁵, and was also corroborated by Muhammad Hammoud, a wealthy Lebanese merchant who was a front-man for the BCCI, hours before his death, "if anybody knows how dirty the Americans are in this BCCI business, they'd be surprised – they're dirtier than the Pakistanis"²⁰⁶. BCCI's role was further extended within Pakistan in its direct supply of weapons to the Mujahideen, and they even aided the CIA and Mujahideen in the supply of mules for transporting arms across Afghanistan²⁰⁷. According to Beaty and Gwynne (1993), a testimony in a court case against BCCI went so far as to say that when the CIA-supplied arms could not be delivered to the Mujahideen, they were sold to the Iranians instead²⁰⁸. The relationship between BCCI and Pakistan developed on a much grander scale through the bank's co-operation in assisting Pakistan in the development of their nuclear weapons programme²⁰⁹.

Arms dealers, smugglers, and the general underground criminal gangs and mafias began to emerge without haste when it became known that the CIA wanted to acquire large quantities of Soviet origin weapons and ammunition. One such arms dealer was the Saudi businessman, Adnan Kashoggi, who overtly made a fortune as the official Saudi dealer for the US Lockheed and Northrop Corporations²¹⁰. DCI Casey had been searching high and low for such weapons and had found diverse and often conflicting sources, such as the Egyptians and Israelis, Communist China, and even from oblivious Warsaw Pact Eastern European countries.

The CIA and the Saudis were constantly looking out for wealthy Arab and Muslim individuals from which they could secretly fund their Afghan project. One such source was a young and very wealthy Saudi of Yemeni origin, Osama bin Laden. However, since the CIA was also recruiting Arab volunteers to fight alongside the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, Osama saw his opportunity and began to organise and fund the recruitment of Arab and Muslim volunteers through his earnings and donations from his inherited construction company and wealthy Arab merchants to form Al Qaeda, the Islamic Salvation Foundation, and the establishment of numerous recruitment centres throughout Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan²¹¹. Other wealthy individuals or private Arab organisations also contributed, albeit, directly to the Mujahideen parties rather than through the ISI. One of the more favoured parties was that led by the Arabic-speaking Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, *Ittehad-i-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan* (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)²¹². According to Fullerton (1984), the conservative Pakistani Islamic opposition party, *Jamaat-e Islami* (Islamic Society), was largely responsible for funnelling through finance from various Arab countries directly to some of the Mujahideen parties, especially to Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami, in the early 1980s²¹³, and before his dispute with Sayyaf in the autumn of 1983, after which Arab donors considerably reduced their assistance to Hekmatyar²¹⁴.

6:3:2 – Stage Two – The ISI - Death by a Thousand Cuts²¹⁵

The war was not only a military contest, but also one of political intrigue, deceit, and the machinations of all parties involved on a very grand Machiavellian scale. It was as though conflict was abound between every party and at every level, whether between opposing blocs or even within allied blocs: the Khalq were fighting the Parcham, and the Soviets were unhappy with both of them; the Mujahideen were in conflict with each other, and the ISI and CIA were constantly at loggerheads on logistical matters, which was exacerbated by certain Mujahideen parties not recognising their benefactors, the US or Arab states. On top of this, the ISI had declared that they were going to make the Soviets suffer a long protracted war of “death by a thousand cuts”²¹⁶.

President Zia's decision to support the Mujahideen and provide them with necessary secure rear base areas, which allowed them to retrain, re-supply, and replenish their material and human resources, had to be tempered with a certain degree of restraint in pushing the conflict over the edge that could lead to its full-scale escalation over Pakistani borders²¹⁷. Pakistan was successful in this primarily due to the secrecy within which they conducted the covert arms supply and assistance campaign. With only the ISI involved, the commander of which reported solely to the President himself, the other sections of the armed forces and ministries being kept out of the loop, including foreign affairs, the Pakistanis were able to maintain territorial integrity and contain Soviet and DRA engagements within Afghanistan itself. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the DRA did engage in a large-scale subversion and sabotage campaign against Pakistan without bringing either army into an all-encompassing engagement.

Training camps for the Mujahideen were established throughout the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces. The actual number is unknown due to the secrecy within which they were held, but also because they were often

moved from location to location if they had been compromised. It was also the case that the Mujahideen parties often ran training bases independently, and of variegated degrees of functionality. Mukherjee (1984) observes that at least 100 training bases were being run within Pakistan²¹⁸. However, numerous other bases had also been established in both Iran and China. According to Yousaf (2001), training given to the Mujahideen within Pakistani bases was only given by Pakistani personnel: “let me demolish a myth... no American or Chinese instructors were ever involved in giving training on any kind of weapon or equipment to the Mujahideen”²¹⁹ until after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Americans and Chinese did, however, instruct Pakistani soldiers on the usage of new weapons, which in turn directed the instruction to the Mujahideen. Both the Americans and the Chinese were also very keen on keeping track of the military assistance that was designated for the military supplies and training through numerous visits by high ranking personnel, such as, Brzezinski, DCI Casey, Deputy DCI Gates amongst many others²²⁰.

As to the composition of operational Mujahideen on missions in Afghanistan, some did have a specially selected ISI element that became indistinguishable from their Afghan associates²²¹. This was especially the case for those ISI who were ethnically Pushtun. The increase in military aid from all sources was eventually mirrored by the number of Mujahideen that were being trained. The numbers of Afghans that were given formal training in Pakistan were small compared to the “thousands of men linked to the loosely organised bands inside the country operating under local tribal leaders and field commanders”²²² that were actually trained and fighting locally against the Soviets and DRA. Yousaf (2001) states that by “1987 at least 80,000 Mujahideen had received training in Pakistan over a four year period, and many thousands more had done so in Afghanistan”²²³. This gives us an insight into the militarization of the male Afghan population, not only of those Mujahideen with formal training, and those with DRA and Soviet training, but the many more that were fighting that did not have formal training. A large number of those that received formal training did impart their knowledge and experience to others on an informal basis in the field over the years. In relation to the Soviets, who served in Afghanistan on a rotation of between one and two years, and to a lesser extent the DRA forces, the Mujahideen gained progressively greater experience in the conflict theatre over the course of their lives in Afghanistan with an increasing effectiveness in the field and “an observable tendency toward greater professionalization”²²⁴.

6:3:2:1 – CIA-ISI Liaison

The understanding between the ISI and CIA that was a prerequisite for the effective operation of the pipeline was already in existence as a consequence of a history of cooperation between the Pakistani and US military and intelligence communities. According to a US perspective, CIA appreciation of the ISI was evident in the high regard that the organisation was held up to by CIA personnel and field operatives, such as in the strong friendship that DCI Casey had struck-up with President Zia and his ISI chief, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, and as illustrated by Cogan’s (1993) interview with a colleague and senior CIA operations officer who said that the ISI was “the most efficient, and the least corrupt organisation in Pakistan”²²⁵. However, from a Pakistani perspective, Yousaf (2001) notes how the relationship itself was rarely free of strain and mistrust. “I, and my staff, resented their never-ending probing to interfere in the allocation of weapons, accusations of

corruption and pressing to take over both the training of the Mujahideen and advice on operations”²²⁶. In any case, due to operational necessity and the mutual goal of damaging and expelling the USSR from Afghanistan, the ISI and CIA were forced to accommodate each other in their respective and distinct roles.

One of the most important aspects of the ISI-CIA liaison was the delivery of funds. Cash was the fuel that drove the pipeline, without which supplies in the pipeline soon ground to a halt. The ISI had to “pay for Party offices, construction and maintenance of warehouses, purchase of software (rations and clothes), subsistence allowance for Leaders, salaries for party officials/employees, and transport”²²⁷ from the funds that were deposited into the ISI-controlled account on a monthly basis. In general, the CIA has also significantly enhanced the covert action capabilities of the ISI during the decade long war against the Soviets. In this regard, Indian writer, Bhure Lal (2002) notes that “a number of officers from the ISI’s Covert Action Division received training in the US”²²⁸.

6:3:2:2 – The ISI Afghan Bureau

As figure 6.3 illustrates (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.3 – The Organisational Structure of the Afghan Bureau in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence²²⁹), the Afghan Bureau oversaw the whole Afghan operation from the Pakistani side. It was set up specifically for this purpose, as were two supporting departments that were also commanded by brigadiers; one that Yousaf (2001) terms as the *software* department, responsible for supplying the Mujahideen with provisions of food and clothing funded by the CIA; and, the Afghan villagers’ humanitarian aid department to improve the conditions of Afghan villagers still in Afghanistan, which had separate US Congress funding from the arms assistance.

The Afghan Bureau’s purpose was not solely the supply of arms to the Mujahideen. It also effectively aided the organisation of the Mujahideen parties; the facilitation of their military strategy, especially with CIA supplied satellite photo-imagery of the movements of the Soviet and DRA forces, their strategic military and civilian installations, and other significant targets; and, the coordination, where possible, of their operations.

The ISI Afghan Bureau headquarters and operational base, at the Ojhiri Camp in Rawalpindi, was divided into three branches: the Operational; the Logistics; and, Psychological Warfare. The headquarters itself was a massive 70-80 acre compound that contained mess halls, training areas, barracks, and numerous warehouses for the storage of 70 percent of all the arms that were eventually passed onto the Mujahideen²³⁰. Another smaller warehouse was part of the forward detachment, subordinate to the headquarters in Rawalpindi, at Quetta due to its close proximity to Afghanistan, its relatively large distance from Islamabad, and because arms could be transported directly to it from Karachi for southern and south-western Afghanistan. Peshawar was also a forward detachment with the same duties as Quetta, but did not have a warehouse due to its propinquity to the headquarters, and hence, other associated duties.

6:3:2:3 – The ISI’s Pipeline Logistics

Once the weapons had reached Pakistan from the various external routes that the CIA had used (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.1.a – Major Supply Routes and Rear Base Areas for Stages 1, 2, and 3 of the CIA-ISI Arms Pipeline during the Afghan-Soviet War, 1979-1989; and, Figure 6.1.b – Key for Major Supply Routes and Rear Bases) they became the sole responsibility of the Pakistani authorities; that is, the ISI. The survival of the Mujahideen depended upon the ability of the logistics operation to supply them with the correct weapons in the right quantities and at the appropriate time for Mujahideen operations or to counter expected Soviet and DRA offensives. The allocation of the different types and quantities of weapons to the Mujahideen parties was dependent upon the overall strategy that was being employed by the ISI at its Rawalpindi base. As such, the supply lines within the country had to be operational virtually non-stop throughout the year. Divided into three stages, with no overarching authority responsible for the cohesive and efficient coordination of the whole pipeline, delays often occurred as a result of the irregular flow of weapons arriving in Pakistan, which, on the one hand, occasionally came in excessively large quantities that took no account of the under-capacity of the ISI to handle such deliveries, and on the other, came so infrequently that very few arms were available to supply the Mujahideen. The former often led to bottlenecks as secure storage space became limited at the ports and warehouses, and when the limited inland transport was unavailable, as Yousaf (2001) illustrates in his emphasis of this dilemma: “It was usually a feast or famine situation. I repeatedly stressed that we needed a smooth, regular flow of arrivals at Karachi port, of about one or two ships a month. This we could manage”²³¹. The covert nature of the operation was an added burden that these supply lines had to endure to overcome the *friction*²³² that is prevalent in all wars, in addition to the miscalculations and misunderstandings that can arise as a result of the *fog of war*²³³.

With occasional exceptions, the arms arrived in Pakistan at two main ports: at the southern sea port of Karachi; and, at the Rawalpindi Chaklala Air Base adjacent to Islamabad International Airport, which, is in fact, based on the outskirts of Rawalpindi and relatively close to the Afghan Bureau’s Ojhiri Camp headquarters. Other points of entry also included Gwadar, Ormara, and Pasni²³⁴, after which military hardware and supplies were forwarded to their relative destinations. In all instances, the arms and ammunition were unloaded from the ships and aircraft by a specially designated body of 200 men from the Ministry of Defence Constabulary (MODC)²³⁵ that had already been sworn to secrecy. The contents of the consignments were known only as *defence* stores on the ship’s manifest, whilst the port authorities at Karachi were paid in cash, and the customs were not even involved due to the operation of martial law under President Zia ul-Haq who was also the chief martial law administrator. Weapons stores were moved by rail under armed MODC escort on a daily basis from Karachi. With a load of 20 tons per wagon, between 10-20 freight wagons were used to transport the weapons to the Ojhiri warehouse in Rawalpindi, with a small proportion being delivered to Quetta²³⁶. All internal transportation was controlled by the National Logistics Cell (NLC), whether for the transfer of arms and ammunition or food and relief supplies to the Afghan refugees²³⁷.

Once in the warehouses, the weapons were separated, inspected, and stored. Finally, the arms and ammunition would be divided and allocated to the appropriate Mujahideen parties, in accordance with the

overall strategy, before they were loaded onto a fleet of 200 CIA funded trucks, also based at the headquarters, to be transported to the Mujahideen parties in Peshawar and Quetta²³⁸. Over 80 percent of all the arms that had been passed on to the Mujahideen from the pipeline had been stored at the Ojhiri warehouse²³⁹. Daily, between 50 and 60 highly decorated, civilian-like, MODC driven trucks left the warehouse in small groups at intermittent intervals in order to blend into normal civilian traffic. All manner of contingencies were undertaken to avoid disclosure of the consignments, and hence, the covert nature of the whole pipeline. Sporadically, consignments were delivered directly to the commanders in the field in cases where there was a need for particular weapons due to the requirements of the operations that were being mounted such as SAMs, long distance rocket launchers, and limpet mines²⁴⁰. Throughout the second stage of the pipeline, no records were made of the type, quantity, or delivery of arms arriving into Pakistan and being transported to the parties.

Aside from those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, numerous logistical problems existed with the second stage of the pipeline in relation to the types and quantities of arms and ammunition that were being received from the first stage of the pipeline. For example, the inadequate supply of anti-aircraft ammunition in comparison to its annual expenditure due to the high rate of fire incurred from anti-aircraft weapons, or the inadequate re-supply of RPGs for existing RPG launchers²⁴¹.

6:3:2:3:1 – Allocation

The initial supplies of arms and ammunition were given directly to the numerous Mujahideen commanders in the field in Afghanistan before the amalgamation of the variegated contending Mujahideen groups into the seven distinct Sunni parties based in Peshawar (the position of the Shia parties is not mentioned here since they did not have any relationship with the ISI, but in fact were funded by Iran), after which commanders in the field had to join either of the parties in order to receive any arms, ammunition, and training or become extinct. The formation of the seven parties was still a hindrance to a coordinated strategy in the guerrilla campaign against the Soviets due to the factional grievances, individual rivalries, religious and racial prejudices, and political and economic ambitions of each and every party and leader against the other until the seven were forced by President Zia to form a unified seven-party alliance to facilitate logistics supplies, operational planning, training, and the overall conduct of the general coordinated strategy of the war against the Soviet invaders and their proxy Afghan allies. By 1986, the Alliance had eventually facilitated an effective Afghan resistance force²⁴².

After the formation of the seven-party alliance, liaison between the ISI and the Mujahideen occurred through a military committee, which was comprised of a senior staff officer and a military adviser from each party. Each meeting discussed the allocation of arms and ammunition to the various parties on an individual basis in accordance with the overall strategy being employed; discussion on operational planning; conduct and supervision of training for the Mujahideen; and, general issues pertaining to the Soviet occupation and the war effort against them²⁴³.

The allocation of arms and ammunition to the Mujahideen parties was a consistent point of contention between the CIA and the ISI. The latter stuck firmly to their opposition of the CIA's notion that arms be delivered directly to the field commanders. Considering the number of field commanders in Afghanistan, the pursuit of this process would have considerably aggravated the already complex allocation procedure to the detriment of the guerrilla campaign, and would have led to the loosening of control of the diffusion of the vast quantities of arms. With a strict control of who got what, where and when, the ISI was able to direct the delivery of arms according to the overall guerrilla strategy. However, in allocating arms to the parties, who were then responsible for the delivery of arms to their respective field commanders, the ISI was able to prioritise the support that they were giving to the parties. As a consequence, they supplied weapons to the parties who better served their strategic interests to the detriment of the others. President Zia favoured the Islamist parties more than the moderate and nationalist parties²⁴⁴ due to their limited objectives on the Pushtunistan issue. As a result, the operational efficiency of those parties that had less priority declined, and hence, their effectiveness in the field suffered, which in turn progressively priced them out of future arms assistance. In 1987, the party headed by Sibghatallah Mujaddidi, *Jebh-e-Nejat-e Melli* (National Liberation Front), received only 3-5 percent of all supplies, whilst Hekmatyar's Islamist Hizb-i Islami party became the most favoured of the seven parties, receiving an allocation of about 20 percent of all supplies in 1987²⁴⁵; and, as a consequence, also became the most organised and combat effective against the Soviet and DRA forces²⁴⁶. Yousaf (2001) writes that he prioritised the allocation of arms, ammunition, supplies and training in order to influence the course of the war in accordance with the overall strategy: "the only way I could influence the parties and commanders, get them moving in the right direction, was through the allocation or withholding of supplies and training"²⁴⁷. However, prioritisation had already been put into effect by President Zia ul-Haq and the DG-ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, before Yousaf's tenure as the director of the Afghan Bureau.

The allocation of funds to the parties was also a consideration in their operational effectiveness, and in turn the allocation priorities designated to them by the ISI. On top of funds from their Saudi and CIA benefactors, some of the parties had independent external sources of funding from Arab millionaires, companies and organisations that were sympathetic to their cause. In this respect, the nationalist parties were often sidelined to the detriment of their operational effectiveness, which in turn diminished their allocation quotas from the ISI, and hence, marginalised their future role in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

6:3:3 – Stage Three – Distribution of Arms to the Field Commanders by the Parties

It is important to recognise the complexity of the relationships between the seven parties and the field commanders that were actually fighting the war. As mentioned earlier, the war was not being fought on one front, that is, the Soviets and their DRA proxies against the Mujahideen parties, but on numerous fronts. This was especially the case for the Mujahideen party leaders on the political front as well as on the ground in clashes between field commanders associated with respective contending parties. Throughout the course of the war Mujahideen Commanders gained increasingly more significance, and greater degrees of influence and authority in the battlefield, as compared to their relative youth, than the traditional leaders, tribal chiefs and

elders²⁴⁸. In some cases, the field commanders sought to ally themselves to more than one party in order to receive greater assistance, thereby not only increasing their personal prestige and status, and the associated authority and power, but also aggravating the confusion and conflict within the ranks of the Mujahideen parties. Further to this, the parties were persistently using arms and supplies as leverage to build local constituencies within Afghanistan. This had the added consequence of causing further fissures amongst rival *bands* of Mujahideen fighters under nominal commanders even within the same tribes. *Units of opposition* within segmentary tribal society also illustrates the party alignment patterns of the field commanders. Where residential groups remained in a state of opposition, opposing residential groups would align themselves to different parties to demonstrate their conflict rather than the ideologies that the parties exuded. Unity within Mujahideen ranks was at best tolerable.

6:3:3:1 – Mujahideen Storage

The final stage of the pipeline was arguably the most costly and dangerous. The entire responsibility for the distribution of all weapons and supplies was transferred to the parties once the ISI had delivered the arms, ammunition, and general supplies to party warehouses in Peshawar and Quetta. The methods used by the parties to distribute supplies to their respective field commanders were exclusive to each party. Some would allocate arms to commanders on a proportionate basis, whilst others would assign arms according to operational requirements and requests for the replenishment of arms and ammunition used in operations. Commanders would either send representatives to collect arms, or the arms would be delivered by party workers themselves.

No Afghan party had hitherto managed to establish itself with a countrywide broad-based multi-ethnic and multi-religious following. Each and every party “functioned as a sponsor of fighting militias within the specific regions or localities from which they drew their support, substantially on the basis of ethno-linguistic or tribal identification”²⁴⁹. The commanders in the field were dependent upon their respective parties for their funding, and hence, survival, but were indirectly empowered by the ISI’s distribution system, reducing the capacity of the Kabul regime to influence or exert control over the whole country. However, many commanders were also able to achieve a degree of independence by levying local taxes and tolls on road transport by traders, government suppliers, and even smugglers. The arming of the commanders assisted their trading power, at times, through the force of arms; while “profits accumulated by commanders and traders were reinvested in the drug and cross-border smuggling economies”²⁵⁰.

6:3:3:2 – Transportation

Allocation aside, the methods used to actually transport the weapons and supplies to the field commanders were time consuming and extremely dangerous. The terrain from the borders of Pakistan to that in Afghanistan is one of the harshest in the world. This was further exacerbated by the constant buzz of helicopter gunships on *search and destroy* missions, against which the Afghans had little defence in the early to mid 1980s. All manner of land-based transport was used to get the arms and supplies to their respective destinations, from the distinctly decorated trucks, tractors, motor cycles, and horse driven carts, to the horses

themselves, mules, camels, and even Mujahideen backs. To alleviate the pressure from Soviet checkpoints commanders often made deals with elements of the DRA and KhAD, with and without money, to transport arms in their trucks and vehicles, often to be used against other DRA and KhAD forces.

The first leg of this stage involved the delivery of arms from the party warehouses in Peshawar and Quetta to the fifty-five rear bases on the Afghan border, clustered near the entry points around Chaman and Parachinar amongst others just inside Pakistan²⁵¹. The journey to these bases was facilitated by ISI permits to limit outgoing vehicle searches on checkpoints in restricted areas and *Ghair Ilaka* (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) border areas²⁵². Permits were not available for incoming vehicles due to the possibility of drugs or arms smuggling into Pakistan. If this was not the case, the dire situation erupting in Pakistan, especially in Karachi, during the early to mid 1990s may have been considerably worse. Trucks delivering arms to be transported by animals offloaded and returned to their party bases. Others passed through the border points, mingling in with civilian traffic, to their destinations in Afghanistan.

The increase in the quantity of arms led to thousands of animals being used to carry arms into Afghanistan. This could only be achieved with the use of independent contractors who also accompanied the mules, camels and horses that they hired out to the Mujahideen in order to feed and care for the animals during their trips into Afghanistan, thereby freeing up Mujahideen resources needed for guerrilla operations. The majority of the animals were Afghan ponies, which carried loads on long distances. However, Argentinean horses were later imported, with CIA money, due to the increasing casualties amongst the Afghan ponies. Thousands of mules were also imported from China by the CIA for carrying heavy loads, such as mortars, from the Pakistani bases to the Mujahideen battlefield²⁵³. The animals tended to be the most durable aspect of the transport system which traversed arid mountainous terrain.

6:3:3:3 – Routes

Yousaf (2001) notes that the routes used to transport the arms into Afghanistan in the third stage of the pipeline were limited to just six main entry points from Pakistan and Iran²⁵⁴ (see, Appendix III, Figure 6.1.a – Major Supply Routes and Rear Base Areas for Stages 1, 2, and 3 of the CIA-ISI Arms Pipeline During the Afghan-Soviet War, 1979-1989; and, Figure 6.1.b – Key for Major Supply Routes and Rear Bases). However, numerous other routes did exist, numbering up to an estimated 250²⁵⁵, which followed the hundreds of mountain trails and tracks across the border that cannot be located from routine patrols, through which much smaller quantities of arms, ammunition and supplies passed (see, Appendix IV, Plate 2.1 – The Smuggling Route taken in the Hills Looking towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar; and, Plate 2.2 – The Rear View of the Vale of Peshawar). The use of these was arguably less due to the vast quantities of arms that needed to be delivered to the Mujahideen field commanders, and the constant Soviet and DRA efforts to close down such supply routes, especially from Pakistan. Certain routes were more vulnerable than others due to the terrain that they passed through. On a number of occasions, the Soviet and DRA forces tried, unsuccessfully, to blockade the incoming Mujahideen supplies. They were unsuccessful even when they tried to close the Afghan-Pakistani border, as recognised by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union (CC CPSU). “50 thousand soldiers are stationed to close off the border, but they are not in the position to close off all passages where the cargo is transferred across the border”²⁵⁶. Authoritative US accounts of Soviet attempts to block supply routes have noted that the “rugged terrain, limited [Soviet] manpower... [and] and hostility of the local populace and resourcefulness of the resistance argue against a successful effort to permanently close the passes”²⁵⁷. However, during 1987, about one third of the arms deliveries to the Mujahideen in the field had been destroyed by Soviet air-strikes or night ambushes²⁵⁸.

Along the shortest *official* route (those specifically directed by the ISI), from Chitral to Badakhshan to supply northern Afghanistan, the mountainous terrain hindered Soviet and DRA patrols, yet it also made travel very difficult for the Mujahideen, and was often closed due to heavy snow for two thirds of the year. Two routes navigated open desert country and therefore made them very vulnerable to detection and attack from Soviet and DRA patrols. The first from Quetta to Kandahar, and the second through Baluchistan from the Mujahideen base at Girzi-Jungle, which supplied the Afghan provinces of Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat. Two main routes traversed the northern end of the Sulaiman Mountain Range dividing the NWFP (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) and Afghanistan. This included the shortest route to Kabul. Starting from Parachinar, it was also the busiest route, taking 40 percent of all arms, ammunition and supplies into Afghanistan²⁵⁹. The second started from the Mujahideen bases around Miranshah to supply Kabul and Ghazni and further a-field if necessary. Finally, arms were also delivered to the Mujahideen in western Afghanistan through Iran on a route that was only occasionally used, as relative transportation times could take months due to the strict regulatory requirements for transshipment of SALW through their territory by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

The journey did not always end once the arms had reached the field commanders. The commanders would then have to distribute the arms and supplies to their subordinates according to their requirements, or, as in many cases to reinforce their own position in the local hierarchy against rivals contesting for recognition. Nevertheless, the arms and ammunition could be loaded and offloaded up to fifteen times in a journey from the seller to their actual use in the field. The associated cost for a single round of ammunition or a weapon could conceivably be increased a hundredfold from the price of purchase to its use after going through every stage of the pipeline. Yousaf (2001) states that the charges to transport arms from Pakistan to the commanders had increased drastically by 1986. With the rate at \$15-20 per kilograms, the transport of just one mortar round from Pakistan to Mazar-i-Sharif could cost as much as \$65²⁶⁰.

The Mujahideen had to store weapons in ways that would not be obvious to regular Soviet and DRA aerial and terrestrial patrols. As such, they built immense networks of tunnels within mountains to act as storage facilities and operational bases. One of the main architects of such enterprises was Osama bin Laden, who used his construction empire in the Gulf to build such large complexes; no doubt, for later use.

6:3:4 – Corruption in the CIA-ISI Arms Pipeline

The effectiveness of the arms aid programme to the Mujahideen was by no means fool-proof as the US government began to receive regular reports of the deficiency of American arms reaching the Mujahideen commanders in the field²⁶¹. There were numerous credible reasons for this, such as: the need to deny foreign help, especially Western, in the *Islamic* struggle against the atheist USSR; or, the difficulty to distinguish between the arms captured from the DRA army and any other arms acquired locally, and those weapons of Soviet origin being supplied by the US and Gulf states in their attempt to disguise their involvement. However, extensive corruption of the arms pipeline that had been set up by the CIA and the ISI could not be discounted either. Numerous media sources have noted the massive scale of the corruption²⁶² at every stage of the pipeline in which between one third²⁶³ to one half²⁶⁴ of all the funding was “being diverted... or sold by corrupt Peshawar representatives of Mujahideen groups”²⁶⁵, and therefore, not reaching the target destination. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of arms and ammunition reaching most of the commanders did increase as the scale of the aid programme increased in sync with an agreement between the Mujahideen groups to form a loose unified political structure²⁶⁶ so as to more effectively direct the war against the Soviets and their communist hosts rather than between themselves. The reported corruption did not, however, detract leading US policy-makers, and their Arab and Chinese counterparts, from increasing the aid for the resistance effort; for example, the Karmal run Kabul Radio station had alleged that in the five years preceding the end of the Afghan year in March 1985, China had provided a total of \$400 million worth of arms to the Mujahideen²⁶⁷.

6:3:4:1 – Corruption in Stage One - Profiteering from the CIA’s Open Cheque

The CIA request for supplies of Soviet-origin weapons provided an opportunity for some arms dealers and secondary suppliers to deliberately provide often outdated and unusable weapons to dispose off old stocks. Weapons were found to have rusted together, where rifle barrels were completely corroded or filled with dirt; while ammunition was not properly packed and boxed, but was loose and mixed up, and many boxes of weapons were empty or deficient in quantity²⁶⁸. This was particularly the case with one of the arms shipments from Egypt in 1985²⁶⁹, “to my horror, no less than 30,000 82-mm mortar bombs were found unusable on the battlefield as cartridges had swollen in the damp and would not fit the bombs. The Egyptians had cobbled together arms that had been lying exposed to the atmosphere for many years in order to make a substantial amount of money”²⁷⁰. Another incident exposed a Pakistani arms dealer who had persuaded the CIA to buy “30 million rounds of .303 ammunition... at 50 cents a round”²⁷¹, which were, unbeknown to the CIA, from old stocks of the Pakistan Army stamped with the POF (Pakistan Ordnance Factory) trademark, hence voiding any prospect of deniability and rendering them useless unless they were defaced at a tremendous cost. Other suppliers were also without scruples, such as the Turkish delivery of “60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns, 10,000 pistols and over 100 million rounds of ammunition”²⁷², most of which turned out to be corroded, faulty and unserviceable, but were accepted to avoid a diplomatic row.

Weapons were not only provided in an unserviceable condition, they also often went missing, or were stolen through elaborate methods. One such example that received wide publicity, and in turn voided deniability, was that of the disappearance of a shipment of 29 Swiss Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannons, worth US \$36.25

million, that was extensively lobbied for by Congressman Charles Wilson²⁷³. These are only a few of the numerous examples that can be cited to illustrate the extent of the problem of corruption in the section of the arms pipeline that was the sole responsibility of the CIA, which assisted the unregulated mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

6:3:4:2 – Corruption in Stage Two – Pakistani Pipe Leaks

Once the arms had arrived at the various ports of entry in Pakistan, they were handled by a variety of personnel who could directly affect the quantity of weapons that would eventually be delivered to the Mujahideen. In December 1984, Senator Humphrey claimed that there had been a “serious mismanagement of our aid programme, perhaps of scandalous proportions”²⁷⁴ when referring to the handling of aid by the ISI. In a study by the US National Security Agency the estimated loss was claimed as being in the order of 30 percent²⁷⁵. Being responsible for the arms once they reached Pakistan, Brigadier Yousaf (2001) recognises the probability of their diversion from the pipeline since they were “loaded, or off loaded, at least fifteen times... [and were] moved many thousands of kilometres by truck, ship, train, truck again, and pack animal, before being carried to the firing point”²⁷⁶. The process of delivery gave ample opportunities for all elements engaged in the arms pipeline to siphon off arms. However, he categorically denies reports of corruption within the ISI and the diversion of weapons to the Pakistani Army’s stock and the replacement of older weapons²⁷⁷, regardless of his recognition of the Quetta incident in 1983, when an operation was uncovered regarding the collusion of ISI officers in Quetta engaged in a drugs for weapons trade with Mujahideen party members²⁷⁸. A receipt, issued by a military officer, was signed by a representative of the Mujahideen party military committee for a greater number of arms than were actually received. The arms that were not delivered were sold off to private arms dealers (notably, in the town of Darra Adam Khel, throughout Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, FATA, and amongst many other arms dealers) and the profit was distributed between the officer(s) and the party representatives involved²⁷⁹. The siphoning of weapons by intermediaries had reached such an extent that the frustrations of the Mujahideen commanders and party leaders induced vocal complaints²⁸⁰ of their receipt of only a fraction of the sum of arms being supplied by donor contributions. The Mujahideen leaders, the *Sunday Times* claimed, were accusing “each other, the Pakistani Government, and even the Afghan exiles engaged by the CIA of siphoning off many of the weapons and either stockpiling them or selling them for personal gain”²⁸¹.

6:3:4:3 – Corruption in Stage Three – The Mujahideen Earn a Living

Having arrived at the desired destination, the weapons reaching the Mujahideen were not all used against the Soviets and their Afghan proxies. The insubstantial incomes that the fighters on the ground earned were meagre compared to their ranking counterparts in the rear areas. Many Mujahideen saw this as an opportunity to earn an extra income. As has been described above, Mujahideen participated in diverting arms from their intended destinations. Arms would go missing en-route in stage three of their journey from the warehouses in Pakistan to the field commanders. Many other Mujahideen also found that the arms that they were receiving, because of the profiteering of arms dealers in stage one, were in such a bad condition that any usable parts of the firearms were sold off as spare parts.

6:4 – The Types of Weapons – Supplied and/or Acquired

The Soviets and their DRA proxies had amassed a large military force with the latest conventional military hardware, from the introduction of the latest small arms, such as the AK-74, to jet fighters and helicopter gunships. In contrast, the communist coup in April 1978 catalysed the emergence of a number of *rag-tag* resistance groups, the Mujahideen, barely armed with firearms that dated back up to two centuries, such as the much prized *Jezail* or Lee Enfield 0.33 rifles. As mentioned above, the supply of funds to the Mujahideen was a trickle at the beginning. However, as international military assistance to the resistance grew, so did the acquisition of a myriad of better and more sophisticated arms, culminating in the delivery of one of the most technologically advanced light weapons of its time, the Stinger surface-to-air missile. Initially, however, as the resistance movement grew, before and shortly after the Soviet invasion, the disparate Mujahideen groups secured large arsenals of modern weapons from captured or en-mass defecting Soviet-supplied DRA troops and armouries. The actual numbers of weapons that the Mujahideen secured from the DRA and Soviet forces is unknown, as discussed above. However, what is known is that the vast majority of the weapons in circulation in Afghanistan were and still are of Soviet origin. This is, in part, as a result of the strategy employed by the US and Pakistani governments to conceal their involvement in the massive supply of military aid to the Mujahideen parties throughout the Soviet-Afghan War by only providing weapons of Soviet origin²⁸². The kinds of weapons that were supplied to the Mujahideen were part of the general strategy that the Reagan administration utilised to counter Soviet advances made throughout the 1970s. In reference to the countries that the Soviets had *won* over, DCI Casey, in his long assessment memo to President Reagan after his visit to the Middle East and Pakistan in April 1982, states:

The Soviets' experience in Afghanistan has demonstrated how much more efficient and less costly it is to conquer by subversion than by invasion. Most of these states cannot use and do not need sophisticated or high-priced weapons. What they need is light arms, transport, and communications to deal with multiple, widely scattered hit and run forces. This security and counter-subversion assistance should be low-profile.²⁸³

In the opening years of the Soviet invasion, the weapons in open circulation amongst the variegated groups in Afghanistan included small arms, RPGs and their launchers, and small artillery pieces. The nature of the resistance in this opening phase did not facilitate larger weapons due to the necessity for fluid mobility rather than static defence or offence, leading to a limited ability to inflict damage on the Soviets and the DRA. In view of this, during DCI Casey's visit to Pakistan in August 1982, an agreement was struck with DG-ISI Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan to supply heavier weapons, such as the 122-mm rocket launcher, anti-aircraft guns, and better surface-to-air missiles²⁸⁴. With the signing of NSDD-166, military assistance to the Mujahideen increased quantitatively and qualitatively. The latter included the lifting of restrictions to non-Soviet origin weapons supplies imposed upon the Mujahideen, hence, facilitating the delivery of high-technology weapons from Western Europe. Casey's earlier statement to President Reagan had therefore become null and void.

6:4:1 – Weapons Used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan

6:4:1:1 – Introduction

Hitherto, an account of the sources of military aid that were supplied to all the disparate parties in conflict in Afghanistan has been illustrated. In light of this, one of the aims of this chapter is to produce an explanation of such sources as they relate to the lasting effects that they have had on the socio-cultural, political, and economic environment in Afghanistan in particular, and the wider region as a whole. The primary aim, however, is to provide an appraisal of the proliferation of SALWs in Afghanistan. Therefore, a description of the weapons used by the Soviet forces is relevant and within the scope of this chapter, and hence, this entire study considering that much of the military hardware introduced into Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was removed upon the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989.

Throughout the Soviet occupation, large quantities of Soviet military hardware were captured in ambushes, raids, and confrontations by the Mujahideen. A great deal of the weapons that the Soviets used, with some exceptions, were also used by their DRA surrogates. Upon the Soviet withdrawal, huge quantities of weapons were left behind with the DRA government to support their continued occupation by proxy, which in-turn eventually proliferated throughout the Afghan environment, and further a-field. Much of the military hardware that was returned to the USSR was heavy conventional weaponry, while large quantities of SALWs were left behind to support DRA infantry operations. Also, the majority of weapons possessed by the Mujahideen during the first half of the 1980s were those captured from Soviet and DRA forces. As the Soviets became more entangled in the Afghan imbroglio, their strategic aims evolved to reflect their intentions for a more permanent stay in Afghanistan. According to Sardar Aseff Ali Ahmed, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan (1993-1996), their changing strategic outlook was also reflected in the logistical tactics they used to support their troops in offensive and defensive operations through the construction of hundreds of small bases, forts, and ammunition dumps strung along the main intercity routes so as to enable a more efficient re-supply of their forces, especially in defensive actions or ambushes and raids by Mujahideen forces²⁸⁵. Once known to the Mujahideen, however, these ammunition dumps, as well as others scattered throughout Afghanistan in the main urban areas were often targeted by the Mujahideen with rockets and surface-to-surface missiles. For example, on the night of 26 and 27 August 1986, the Mujahideen successfully targeted one of the largest Soviet arms dumps in Afghanistan near Qargha, about ten miles west of Kabul, where hundreds were estimated to have been killed²⁸⁶.

A description of the types of weapons that the Soviet forces used in Afghanistan is instrumental in understanding the scope and lasting effects of the proliferation of SALWs in Afghanistan. This description will be limited to the confines of the definition of SALWs introduced in chapter one; however, it will also include the extent of the effectiveness of SALW on heavy conventional weaponry and the consequential adaptations in Soviet tactics. It must be noted, however, that the Soviets mainly relied upon heavy conventional weaponry to support their occupation, in contrast to the Mujahideen who were required to rely

upon SALW in accordance with their overall guerrilla strategy. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers were reliant on SALW when engaged in operations and offensives against the Mujahideen.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with a conventional motorised army that was untrained and unequipped for a guerrilla war in the mountains, deserts and cities of Afghanistan. The tanks and APCs were ill-suited to the harsh terrain in which they encountered much of the resistance; for example, T-55 and T-62 tanks would often lose their tracks, had constant clutch problems, overheated, and required nearly fifty percent more fuel on hilly and rocky ground than on level terrain²⁸⁷. Another limiting factor in tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, such as the BPM and BMD, was the lack of elevation that their turrets and heavy guns could achieve which often could not be elevated to aim at high targets on escarpments and ridges on the hills and mountains above them and left them vulnerable to attack²⁸⁸ (see Plate 6.1 – The Road from Kabul, an APC provides a ride. Author is seated adjacent to the turret. Soviet armoured vehicles were passed on to the Mujahideen and later the Taliban). Adaptations and replacements, however, did take effect within the first few years of the occupation. “The Soviets found that they often did not need anti-tank or hard point kill capability but did need long-range anti-infantry area fire and suppressive fire capability... [and] machine guns and cannons which could ‘hose’ targets with high rates of fire, easily track targets (unlike slow-moving heavy machine guns), and be hyper-elevated”²⁸⁹.

Following successful Mujahideen attacks, mounted machine-guns, 30-mm cannons, and other weapons that were still intact and could be detached from destroyed or immobilised armoured vehicles were often scavenged by the Mujahideen for use on their own vehicles, such as on the relatively few open-backed pick-up trucks (until the Taliban were able to adapt their use en-mass), or even as static defence weapons on mountain ridges and for the defence of their bases. For example, the light tank/SP gun BMD included a 73-mm smooth bore gun, a Sagger missile on the gun’s launch rail, and two 7.62 machine guns, all of which could be adapted for use by the Mujahideen parties and added to their growing arsenals. Captured vehicles that were intact, and included mounted weapons were used as a source of prestige by Mujahideen commanders.

Due to the need for mobility, the Soviets emphasised a change to lighter armour to facilitate speed and manoeuvrability, however, this increased vulnerability to attack from heavy machine-guns and RPGs. The problem with armoured vehicles was that they provided the resistance with ideal static targets within which Soviet and DRA troops were virtually powerless due to their restrictive fire-ports from which they engaged the Mujahideen. As a result, the Soviets adopted new tactics and training with increased infantry firepower in dismounted combat. Troops came equipped with machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and flame grenades²⁹⁰ to deter attacks and better protect themselves in ambushes. Such adaptations and replacements in vehicles and enhanced infantry support made the Soviets and, to a lesser extent, the DRA, better suited to confront an infantry threat rather than a relatively non-existent armoured threat.

As the Soviets learnt from their initial mistakes, they began to conduct offensives with more aggressive use of small air-mobile unit actions with high concentrations of attack helicopters and heliborne assault forces to

saturate Mujahideen defences, especially with larger components of Spetsnaz troops and increased combined arms operations. The Mujahideen unanimously agreed that Soviet Spetsnaz and their other elite forces were highly effective fighting units. According to Commander Abdul Haq, of Hizb-i Islami (Khalis party), “heliborne paratroop operations could be described as the most effective Soviet tactics”²⁹¹; or, Commander Jalat Khan, in Ghazni, “the Spetsnaz are quicker and more courageous than regular soldiers... They have silencers on their guns and can always call the helicopters to help them... They kill very well”²⁹². Over a third of all Soviet troops were eventually assigned an airborne assault role as the number of helicopters quadrupled within the first three years of the occupation²⁹³; for example, the 70th Motorised Rifle Brigade (MRB) was principally transformed into an air-mobile heliborne assault unit²⁹⁴. As the Mujahideen adapted to the increased air-assaults, especially with newly improved air-defence guns and surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the large-scale losses of aircraft forced the Soviets to reduce heliborne assaults and concentrated on land-based offensives with armoured vehicles. The number of Spetsnaz operations also decreased from the beginning of 1986 as a result of Mujahideen successes in the field against them²⁹⁵. However, specialised elite Soviet forces (or, *desant* forces), within Afghanistan reached a peak of 18,000 to 23,000; thereby, considerably raising the quality and fighting capability of the whole occupation force as compared to the initial invasion force²⁹⁶. Their ability to conduct precisely targeted counterinsurgency operations significantly improved during the course of the occupation.

The initial phase in the improvement of infantry firepower came with the replacement of the 7.62-calibre AK-47 with the more lethal 5.45-mm AK-74 assault rifle as the standard issue weapon for Soviet forces, which had been operational since 1974. The AK-74 weighs less, is easier to aim with a 20 percent greater effective range, and uses a smaller flat-nosed round, which can produce a more lethal wound due to its tumbling characteristics once it hits matter denser than air²⁹⁷. A number of derivatives of the AK-74 were deployed for the different environments that they were used in, such as the AKMS and AKSU for use inside armoured vehicles or as a substitute to pistols²⁹⁸. Only Soviet troops were issued with the AK-74 rifle, as opposed to the DRA troops who continued to use the AK-47 due to the general belief by the Soviets that DRA troops could not be trusted with the new weapon because of their massive desertion (with weapons) and defection rates. The BG-15 40-mm grenade launcher was also widely distributed to the infantry as an assault rifle attachment. Specialist troops and special sniper suppression squads were also equipped with sniper rifles to act as a counter to Mujahideen snipers.

6:4:1:2 – Infantry – Machine Guns

Increasingly greater numbers of troop support weapons, such as light machine guns, were given to infantry troops. The highly successful RPK and RPK-74²⁹⁹, derivatives of the AK-47 and AK-74, respectively, and firing the same ammunition, acted as squad (platoon) machine guns and were often used in suppressive fire roles³⁰⁰. The Soviets also used a variety of other light machine guns for the different roles that their infantry and Special Forces played, such as the PKMS GPMG³⁰¹. The Soviets did not require an anti-aircraft utility due to the lack of an aerial threat; however, they did use vehicle mounted anti-aircraft guns as direct-fire and area suppression weapons to *hose* Mujahideen positions with higher calibre rounds to produce greater

casualties than was possible with assault rifles; for example, the ZU-23 twin AA gun mounted on BMDs, or M-1939 37-mm AA guns.

6:4:1:3 – Infantry – Grenade Launchers

Rocket propelled grenades were often the foremost weapon to be used in the field by all conflicting parties. They significantly added to the firepower of individual troops. The best known is the RPG-7 with its 70 mm projectile, which the Soviets improved with an enhanced PGO-7V range-finding sight that has a 2.5 magnification. The grenade is designed as an anti-personnel and anti-light-armour weapon, and was extensively used against the Mujahideen. The newer version of the RPG-7, the RPG-16, was also used in Afghanistan but not issued to the DRA until the year of the Soviet withdrawal. The RPG-16 is smaller, has a longer range and is more effective than its older cousin (see, Appendix II, Table 6.1 – Soviet Rocket Propelled Grenades used during the Afghan-Soviet War). The RPG-18, a compact version of the RPG, was also widely used even without specific training being required. It is a single shot weapon in which the disposable casing acts as the launch tube. Its 64 mm explosive warhead can penetrate 375 mm armour at a 90 degree angle. The updated version of the RPG-18, the RPG-22, has an 80-mm chemical explosive warhead that can penetrate 480 mm of armour at a 90 degree angle³⁰², and with a range of 0-250 meters. This was particularly effective against the stone fortifications that the Mujahideen often used, and was therefore very widely used by the Soviets and their DRA proxies. The Soviets continued to improve the lethality and range of their portable infantry weapons for use in the mountains and in ambush conditions where an instant direct fire capability was essential, such as the disposable single-shot RPO grenade launcher which could fire an incendiary grenade up to 200 meters, or the lighter RPO-A which could fire the same projectile up to 1,000 meters³⁰³. General infantry troops were also widely supplied with magazine-fed (max. 29 grenades) AGS-17 tripod mounted automatic grenade launchers that can fire to a range of 500-1200 meters, which considerably aided troops to concentrate explosive fire and disperse Mujahideen attacks³⁰⁴.

6:4:1:4 – Anti-Tank Missiles

In addition to RPGs, the Soviets used numerous anti-tank weapons. Precision guided munitions of various types and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM)³⁰⁵, however, were not deployed to engage Mujahideen armour, which was virtually non-existent, but were effectively used against fixed Mujahideen stone hill fortifications and mountain positions, especially when armoured vehicles had not been adapted to acquire highly elevated targets on hill crests. As such, much of this ordinance was mounted on armoured vehicles to provide them with added firepower, such as the AT-3 Sagger³⁰⁶. A crew-portable version of this weapon was also made for infantry assaults on hard Mujahideen targets. The Sagger missile has a 2.7 kg warhead, a range of 300 to 3,150 meters, and is wired guided by an operator who simultaneously tracks the missile and target. The issue of these weapons was especially restricted to DRA troops and even Soviet troops due to the fear of losing them to the Mujahideen.

6:4:1:5 – Mortars

Artillery was extensively used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. The used of very heavy artillery barrages were effective in suppressing Mujahideen movements and in assaults on valleys, villages, towns and cities. Its use was more extensive when air superiority had been lost after 1986. As far as field troops were concerned, they were extensively supplied with the new automatic 82-mm mortar. This effectively became the infantry artillery on operations in the mountains and on small-scale assaults by specialised troops. The majority of the mortars that the Soviets used were generally crew-served and relied upon vehicles or helicopters to bring them to their firing locations, as compared to the smaller mortars that the Mujahideen used. One of the more successful mortars was the new AM2B9 Vasilek rapid fire automatic 82-mm mortar, which uses a horizontally fed four-round clip, and has a high rate of fire that can deliver rounds in quick succession upon the designated target³⁰⁷.

6:4:1:6 – Surface to Air Missiles

The Soviets did deploy a range of surface-to-air missiles in Afghanistan, not in the event of an aerial threat from the Mujahideen, but because of the prospect of, albeit highly unlikely, a strike from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). This included a small range of man-portable shoulder-fired SAMs. The most common troop deployed SAM was the SA-7, which was withdrawn from the inventory of DRA government forces as early as 1980 due to the treat of desertions³⁰⁸, but also had several shortcomings in its effectiveness against aerial targets³⁰⁹. Two other improved shoulder-fired SAMs were also deployed to infantry troops later in the conflict, SA-14 Gremlin, a copy of the US Stinger, and the SA-16³¹⁰. However, these weapons had limited utility in the field and uncertainty exists as to why they were deployed in the field in the first place.

6:4:1:7 – Mines – Landmines – Anti-Personnel Mines – Anti-Tank Mines

Mines were used by all sides in the war, and are estimated as being the most important source of Mujahideen casualties. Their use was extensive, with an estimated 10 million³¹¹ up to a high-end unrealistic figure of 30 million³¹² having been laid or dropped during the course of the Soviet occupation. However, they have undoubtedly left a legacy of personal loss, and continue to do so with startling casualty rates since the beginning of the invasion³¹³. Over fifty different mines were developed and used by the Soviet and DRA forces to act as perimeter defences of strong points, bases, and urban areas; secure DRA garrison perimeters to prevent them from deserting; limit cross-border traffic by Mujahideen; interdict supply routes and paths usually used by the Mujahideen; and, effect a scorched-earth policy and deny crops to the Afghan population, and hence, food supplies to the Mujahideen.

The mines deployed in Afghanistan were generally used as anti-personnel mines, such as the MON-50 which is a copy of the US M-18A1 Claymore. Other variations included the MON-100, MON-200, and MON-500 which were progressively larger in both size and lethality. Others included the smaller PMN-2 mine which is buried, and the UKM remote control mines (*wave mines*) which are triggered by vibration of an electric current. Mines were often dropped from aircraft on Mujahideen supply and communications routes; for example, the camouflaged PFM-1, or *butterfly* mine because of its protruding wings, which are used to

stabilise and disperse its drop, was widely used throughout the war³¹⁴. The Soviets also used many kinds of booby traps with various disguises from pens and watches to cuddly toys and even stones, therefore, effectively acting as anti-personnel mines. Anti-tank mines were used to a limited extent, but the Soviets often found that they were sometimes detected by the Mujahideen who in-turn used them against the Soviets. Mines caused considerable problems for the Mujahideen, who were obliged to continuously seek different and sometimes ingenious methods to detect and clear them. Nevertheless, they were not able to prevent the Mujahideen from carrying out operations or continue using mined supply routes, but did, and still do cause significant casualties on the civilian population.

6:4:2 – DRA Weapons

As mentioned above, DRA troops often used the same weapons as the Soviets. However, newer weapons were generally not issued to the Afghans due to the risk of desertion with weapons. The AK-47 was the main weapon used by Afghan troops, as opposed to the much better AK-74 and its derivatives, which the Soviets limited to their own troops. Other weapons such as the RPG-16 were also not supplied to DRA troops. The general rule was that the weapons that DRA troops used tended to be older and less sophisticated than those used by Soviet troops. There were a few weapons, however, that only DRA troops used. There were also some elements of the DRA forces that may have used some of the *Soviet-only* weapons, such as the elite 37th and 38th commando brigades³¹⁵ and the 446th Commando Battalion in Kandahar. However, these forces were much more integrated with Soviet forces, being deployed in platoon formation under Soviet command in combined arms operations³¹⁶. With exceptions, many of the weapons that the Soviets used were also used by DRA forces. There were some weapons, however, that only the DRA used, such as the RPD, a machine gun derivative of the AK-47; RP-46; DTM; SKS carbine; PPSH SMG; and, the pre-war Afghan army Czech 7.7-mm ZB-36 LMG³¹⁷.

6:4:3 – Mujahideen Weapons

6:4:3:1 – Introduction

The following section is a detailed account of the kinds of SALW that the Mujahideen used against the Soviet Union and its DRA proxies. It highlights the methods through which they were acquired to differentiate their origins, but also to demonstrate the extent of the proliferation of SALW from different sources. The list is, however, not exhaustive, and is only illustrative of the vast quantities of SALW that were introduced into Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. This account is divided into the introduction of rudimentary SALW and the more sophisticated SALW, such as heat-seeking SAM, into Afghanistan.

In terms of pure military hardware the Mujahideen had few advantages over the Soviet occupiers. The Soviet Union was the largest mechanised army in the world. In comparison, the Mujahideen were barely equipped with weapons dating back to the First World War, such as the bolt-action .303 Lee Enfield³¹⁸, which was the standard weapon amongst tribesmen in southern Afghanistan, the Martini-Henry rifle³¹⁹, and a few FN-FALS supplied by Pakistan³²⁰. However, the Mujahideen were fighting an asymmetric guerrilla campaign that involved the best use of the terrain using man-portable weapons to attack Soviet lines of supply and

communications, strong points and using ambushes to strike at the Soviets at any opportune moment³²¹, and to seek out and exploit Soviet and DRA critical vulnerabilities. The Mujahideen also had a number of other advantages that aided them in their victory over the Soviet and DRA forces:

- a. The overwhelming support of the Afghan population; an absolute willingness to sacrifice themselves to accomplish victory, aided by their belief in Islam, which was their uniting sodality;
- b. A unique understanding of their natural environment and a terrain favourable for guerrilla warfare;
- c. Rear bases in Pakistan; and,
- d. A constant source of funds for arms, ammunition, and other logistics, albeit, in the great scheme of things, was quite limited in comparison to the tasks they faced ahead of them.

The funds, however, were not in ample supply at the beginning of the occupation, and much of their weaponry, came from captured DRA and Soviet stocks or from DRA desertions, with the Afghan army being “the single most important source of weapons for the Mujahideen”³²². Funds did increase and weapons shortfalls were replenished over the course of the war; yet, the Mujahideen suffered dreadfully from the lack of “more and better surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, anti-tank missiles, anti-tank mines, man-pack mortars and tactical radio equipment”³²³. Where regular external sources of weapons were absent, the Afghan Mujahideen often prepared a variety of *home-made* weapons, such as “iron cooking-pots [filled] with locally fabricated explosive material for use as makeshift landmines, in addition to Molotov cocktails”³²⁴.

Mujahideen arms were often displayed by the Soviets after they were captured from Mujahideen bases to illustrate the international backing that the Mujahideen were receiving³²⁵, for example, the quantities of arms captured in one DRA/Soviet operation within Paktia province alone, during the first quarter of 1984, illustrates how well equipped the Mujahideen had become, “13,722 anti-tank mines, 12 cannons of 82 mm, 13 anti-aircraft machineguns, one 23 mm cannon, one consignment of anti-personnel mines, 520 boxes of other ammunition, [and] 48,000 rounds of bullets” were captured³²⁶.

The Mujahideen also suffered from territorialism³²⁷, and the lack of a unified leadership and chain of command structure³²⁸, which exacerbated the coordination of the distribution of weapons from foreign sources and operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, extensive training programmes were promulgated by the CIA and ISI to make the Mujahideen more operationally effective on the battlefield, especially in correct weapons procedures and tactics on a variety of different weapons³²⁹. The Mujahideen did suffer, however, from a constant lack of ammunition during raids and medium-term operations lasting several days, due, in part, to their lack of fire control when discharging their weapons and their inability to carry large quantities of highly mobile supplies into high-density battlefields without the provision of vehicles³³⁰. NSDD-166 gave a big push to the resistance effort as much larger quantities of SALW reached the Mujahideen commanders in the field. The limitation on weapons of non-Soviet origin was curtailed, and therefore, facilitated the delivery of more sophisticated weaponry that tilted the balance in favour of the Mujahideen³³¹. The following account describes some of the more widely used SALW that the Mujahideen were able to obtain; however, numerical

figures relating to their exact quantities are not available due to the lack of transparency of the disparate methods that the Mujahideen used to acquire them, given the covert nature of the arms pipeline. An indication of the extent of the proliferation of SALW can be gauged by the quantity of the funds that were supplied as arms assistance to the Mujahideen as well as the numerous examples of the supply of such weapons within this study.

6:4:3:2 – Infantry - Assault rifles

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion, the Mujahideen had few modern weapons, with the exception of those that they had obtained from deserting or captured DRA forces prior to the invasion. Pakistan had also been supplying them with Indian L1A1 7.62-mm rifles which they had captured in 1965 during their war against India³³². However, the shortage of Ammunition prevented longer use and they were withdrawn early in the war. The collapse of DRA forces in 1980 immediately after the Soviet invasion gave the Mujahideen the chance to acquire large amounts of arms³³³, especially SALW, which they continued to obtain throughout the war until they were virtually saturated with infantry weapons.

The Mujahideen were able to acquire weapons from a variety of diverse sources, such as the Iranian 7.62 mm G-3 assault rifle which was licensed for production in Iran and Pakistan by Heckler and Koch³³⁴, and sold openly on the black market in the *Barra* bazaar on the outskirts of Peshawar, fetching about US\$2100 in 1981-1982³³⁵. The G-3 is a standard issue weapon in Pakistan's armed forces³³⁶. Over the course of the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen had assembled a range of infantry weapons, with large quantities of AK-47s and progressively increasing numbers of high-velocity AK-74 assault rifles and their derivatives, which indicates that captured Soviet arms are a vital constituent of the Mujahideen's expanding arsenal³³⁷. They had also acquired disparate types of small arms of Chinese origin. Many of these were copies of Soviet weapons that the Chinese had agreed to provide the Mujahideen whilst they also had original Chinese made weapons such as the Type-56-1 assault rifle. Other weapons in their inventory also included a range of pistols, shot guns, and even 9-mm Sten guns that were made in the weapons workshops of *Darra Adam Khel*, Orakzai Agency, in FATA³³⁸.

Virtually every infantry weapon that the Soviet and DRA were using in Afghanistan fell into the hands of the Mujahideen in varying quantities. Although limited, the Mujahideen did acquire significant quantities of light machine guns, such as the 7.62-mm RPD, RPK, PKM and older Afghan army stocks of the ZB-36 mentioned above³³⁹. Limited numbers of medium and heavy machineguns were also acquired in the first half of the 1980s, such as the Soviet-designed DShK 12.7-mm *Dasha* medium machinegun and 14.5-mm KPV *Zigriat* heavy machinegun³⁴⁰. These are not light weapons in the strictest sense, and by no means man-portable, but they can act as crew-portable weapons if they are mounted on *pick-up* trucks or military jeeps, however, they were usually used in an anti-aircraft role and ground saturation role.

Even before the signing of NSDD-166, the CIA were debating the delivery of more sophisticated small arms for the purpose of assassinating leading Soviet generals. In early 1985, the DCI Casey approved the delivery

of “approximately one hundred packages”³⁴¹ of sniper rifles to the Mujahideen, who would also receive specialist training in assassination techniques. Sniper rifles were also valued primary Mujahideen weapons due to their greater effective range beyond Soviet infantry weapons³⁴², such as the AK-74.

6:4:3:3 – Infantry – Grenade Launchers

The Mujahideen favoured the use of the RPG in virtually all engagements with the DRA and Soviet forces due to their relative ease of portability and operation. Their acquisition was greatly enhanced after 1982³⁴³ when President Reagan *ordered* the CIA “to provide the Afghan insurgents for the first time with bazookas, mortars, grenade launchers, mines and recoilless rifles of Soviet origin”³⁴⁴. Most common was the RPG-7, although the Mujahideen also had significant quantities of the RPG-2 anti-tank launcher and the newer RPG-22 captured from the Soviets³⁴⁵. After the signing of NSDD-166, the ISI received a total of 10,000 RPG-7 launchers accompanied by over 200,000 grenade rounds in 1985 for the Mujahideen, which was “more than the entire five previous years”³⁴⁶. Nevertheless, large as this particular consignment was, it proved to exacerbate existing friction between the ISI and CIA. Since, as Yousaf (2001) argues, although the agreed allocation of 20 rockets per launcher was satisfied by this delivery, no account was made of the continued supplies needed for the launchers that were already in Mujahideen service since 1980³⁴⁷. The Mujahideen also obtained large numbers of Type 69 tank grenade launchers, Chinese copies of the RPG-7, and were able to capture significant numbers of AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers³⁴⁸, even those mounted AGS-17s from *knocked-out* BMP, BMDs, and BTRs. By early 1988, there were also reports of the use of the high-tech Milan anti-tank missile system in Kunar province³⁴⁹. Another similar system, the Chinese Red Arrow wire-guided anti-tank missile, was not bought for the Mujahideen due to its rejection by the ISI because of its past ineffectiveness on the battlefield³⁵⁰. Vast quantities of a variety of different hand grenades were supplied to the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation. These were effectively used as offensive and defensive weapons in close combat, ambushes and raids by the Mujahideen. Where anti-tank weapons were not initially prevalent, their status and proven usefulness in combat induced a high demand by the tribal resistance, where “often the entire tribe will pool its resources to buy a single anti-tank weapon”³⁵¹.

6:4:3:4 – Infantry Support – Mortars and Light Artillery

Mortars were the primary form of artillery before the arrival of the Chinese 107-mm rockets, after which they were still heavily relied upon as medium range firepower³⁵², but their overall success was partially restrained by the lack of Mujahideen who had received specialised mortar training. “Most of the Mujahideen... find the range [with a mortar] by setting it up, firing off a few rounds and tinkering with it... By the time they’re ready to hit the target, they’ve run out of ammunition” says Peter Jouvenal, a British documentary film maker³⁵³. The Mujahideen did acquire a number of different mortars, ranging from their standard Soviet 82-mm mortar³⁵⁴ and U.S. 81-mm mortar, to the British-made two inch mortars³⁵⁵ and the more effective U.S. supplied Spanish 120-mm mortars that had a range of up to 6-km and were equipped with satellite tracking to facilitate accurate mortar location³⁵⁶. A number of Soviet 82-mm M-1937 mortars were also captured and used by the Mujahideen. An Egyptian mortar was also delivered by the CIA at the expense of ISI complaints

that such a weapon would only complicate training further by adding another unneeded weapon of a different calibre to the already multifarious logistics of the pipeline³⁵⁷.

6:4:3:5 – Infantry Support – Rocket launchers

In general terms, rocket launchers would be superficial to the definition of SALW provide for this study. However, the need to project greater long range firepower in the field encouraged the Mujahideen to find ingenious ways to adapt heavier conventional weaponry for use as guerrilla weapons, and hence, man-portable. With only a limited ability to transport multiple barrelled rocket launchers into the field, the Mujahideen often used very basic firing techniques by holding the rockets in position with makeshift bipods made out of wood and rocks and fired with a battery, thereby severely restricting their accuracy³⁵⁸. Nevertheless, they were useful for targets encompassing larger areas³⁵⁹. The Mujahideen had huge stocks of Chinese 107-mm rockets³⁶⁰ that had a range of 8.5-km³⁶¹, but they needed to be used more efficiently. Yousaf (2001) recalls how he was able to convert a single *tube* from a partially destroyed multiple-barrelled rocket launcher (MBRL) into a working single-barrelled rocket launcher (SBRL) that could be handled by a single man working at night so as to test the feasibility of actually producing more SBRL for the Mujahideen; the success of which paved the way for 500 SBRL to be produced by the Chinese and delivered to the ISI in early 1986³⁶². The SBRL had, in fact, been issued to the Chinese army, but was no longer in service. By late 1987, a further 1,000 SBRLs had been received³⁶³. 100 Egyptian 122-mm SBRLs, which had a greater accuracy than the 107-mm rockets and range of eleven kilometres, were also obtained. However, their use was constrained by their rather large size, which inhibited man-portability³⁶⁴. A variety of other MBRL were also used, such as the Egyptian Saqr-20 107-mm MBRL³⁶⁵ but their discussion is beyond the scope of this study.

6:4:3:6 – Infantry Support – Mines

Although the Mujahideen faced tremendous problems in dealing with minefields and air-dropped mines, they also used them extensively. Initial supplies of mines came from DRA stocks before and immediately after the invasion. For example, the Mujahideen even obtained the majority of the DRA's stock of Soviet TM-46 anti-tank mines³⁶⁶. Foreign sources supplied a variety of mines, such as the Italian Technovar TC/6 anti-personnel mine, or the British Mark 7 anti-tank mine, a derivative of the US Claymore³⁶⁷. Other than being supplied, the Mujahideen made mines out of unexploded aerial bombs, and even retrieved mines from minefields, especially the larger anti-tank mines. The large quantities of mines that the Mujahideen possessed can be illustrated by the 6,000 anti-tank mines and 12,000 anti-personnel mines³⁶⁸ that the Soviets found when they captured the Mujahideen's Zhawar fortress only 6 miles from the Pakistan border³⁶⁹, which is one of the many successful operations carried out by the Soviets with such finds. The consequence of the use of mines by all sides is one of the more prominent and disturbing legacies of the Afghan conflict.

6:4:3:7 – The Introduction of Sophisticated Weapons

The introduction of more sophisticated weaponry brought about a synonymous change in the tactics used by the Mujahideen in ambushes and raids, attacks on garrisons, and other military posts and bases. The overwhelming superiority of Soviet airpower was eventually humbled by the introduction of advanced high-

tech anti-aircraft weapons. However, this change only came after endless bickering between the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and a number of other nations aiding the campaign against the Soviet occupation after their use of much greater aggressive tactics from 1985 onwards³⁷⁰. If such weapons had been introduced earlier in the conflict, rather than the vast amounts of antiquated and useless weapons that were regularly given to the Mujahideen from old and rusting stocks, the Soviet occupation could have been defeated much earlier and with significantly less casualties, especially civilian.

6:4:3:8 – Infantry Support – Anti-Aircraft

The Mujahideen's anti-aircraft (AA) capability was virtually non-existent and obsolete if at all present during the early 1980s. They mainly relied upon 7.62-mm and light machineguns (RPD-51 guns) for air defence. However, these were ineffectual against their main threat from helicopter gunships, such as the Hind 'D' and 'E' which had titanium armour for protection. Although not within the scope of this study, it is worthy to note that a number of anti-aircraft guns did begin to appear in greater numbers after 1982, such as the Soviet crew-served (non-man-portable) ZSU-23-4 23-mm twin anti-aircraft gun³⁷¹ the *heavy* Chinese 14.5 AA gun, and the successful Soviet-designed DShK 12.7-mm Dasha³⁷² and 14.5-mm KPV Zigriat acting in an anti-aircraft capacity, as mentioned above. These latter guns became much more effective after 1986, when Stinger anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles were introduced into Afghanistan, due to the low flying tactics that helicopters were forced to use against potential Stinger attacks, thereby bringing them within range of AA guns. The different types of ammunition that the Americans supplied to the Mujahideen for such AA-guns also made a difference in their lethality; for example, the supply of tungsten rounds with a phosphorous charge to penetrate armour (even titanium) and produce fires inside the aircraft they struck³⁷³.

One of the more significant deliveries by the CIA was that of between forty and fifty³⁷⁴ Swiss made rapid-fire single-barrelled 20-mm Oerlikon-Buhrle GAI-BO1 anti-aircraft cannons³⁷⁵, shipped to the Mujahideen from the company's Italian branch, in order to avoid Swiss neutrality laws³⁷⁶, via Iran and Pakistan. This is not a man-portable weapon, and can weigh in excess of 545 kilograms. However, the Mujahideen were able to break it down into 50 kg loads to transport it by mule. It has an effective range of between 12,000 to 18,000 meters, and 1,000 rounds per minute rate of fire. According to Yousaf (2001), its limitations far outweighed its advantages, since it had a high rate of fire, which caused a high expenditure of ammunition at a high cost³⁷⁷ particularly because the Mujahideen had a general lack of fire control, which would entail further lengthy training to acquire such a discipline, at extra cost. The resources that were spent on this weapon would have been better applied to other much needed weapons supplies, as they were not effective in the field, as Cordesman (1990) opines, they were generally non-lethal against helicopters, and difficult to operate³⁷⁸. The decisions that aided the supply of this and other similar weapons had political undercurrents, and hence, their rejection on the basis of their lack of practical application and general feasibility in the Afghan context could not sway the decision to supply them³⁷⁹. The Oerlikon was, however, prized by commanders as a source of prestige, as were larger weapons of all kinds, and its introduction as a weapon of non-Soviet origin was also a watershed for the delivery of such weapons in the future³⁸⁰. There were other shortcomings to the enterprise

also; of forty Oerlikon cannons from one assigned shipment, twenty-nine cannons, valued at \$36.25 million³⁸¹ never made it to Afghanistan after having been siphoned from the pipeline³⁸².

6:4:3:9 – Infantry Support – Surface to Air Missiles

From the beginning of the invasion, the Mujahideen lacked a significant numbers of surface-to-air missiles to counter Soviet aircraft. They did have a few dated SA-7s, acquired from DRA deserters or captured stocks³⁸³, but these were virtually ineffectual. The numbers of SAMs, acquired or captured, decreased significantly when Soviet forces withdrew them from the DRA inventory in 1980³⁸⁴. Some replica SA-7s were also included in the first Carter administration shipments of covert aid in 1980³⁸⁵, however, the SA-7s possessed by the Mujahideen did not show signs of success according to DG-ISI General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan's complaint to DCI Casey, when he mentioned that "the quality of these systems is no good"³⁸⁶. Nevertheless, the CIA discounted this opinion and continued to supply them in larger numbers after 1982³⁸⁷. The SA-7s were too slow to catch most jet fighters³⁸⁸, had a small explosive warhead that was negligible against many aircraft, and required a high heat signature to track an aircraft, which was easily countered by the 30-50 magnesium flares that helicopters routinely carried³⁸⁹ and also because Mi-24 Hinds had cooler engines with built-in systems to reduce exhaust heat. Both the Chinese Hong Ying and Egyptian Sakr Eye, copies of the SA-7, were also supplied to the Mujahideen, which may have contributed to high misfire rates. The Soviets did introduce improved versions of the SA-7, however, only a limited number of these ever got into Mujahideen hands. The Chinese Red Arrow SAM was also supplied, but was not very effective³⁹⁰. Nevertheless, China became the leading supplier of missiles, accounting for about 70 percent of total missile deliveries, especially the SA-7, to the Mujahideen³⁹¹.

With the lack of improvement in the SA-7's success rate, the Americans opted for the obsolescent *Blowpipe* missiles made by Short Brothers in Belfast, which the British were replacing with the new and improved *Javelin*. With yet another political decision overshadowing the practical realities of warfare in Afghanistan, the CIA ordered 300 missiles with the direct help of the British Government and MI6³⁹². However, the Mujahideen eventually received only 225 missiles by the end of 1985, some equipped with proximity fuses that were partially delivered by a few Arab governments³⁹³, to be used for the first time in Afghanistan in April 1986 to oppose Soviet/DRA aerial bombardment in the campaign against the Zhawar fortress defended by Jalaluddin Haqqani of Hezb-i Islami (Younus Khalis party)³⁹⁴. The Blowpipe system requires continuous guidance and tracking even after the missile is fired, thereby exposing the *skilled* operator to inevitable retaliatory strikes³⁹⁵. It required further extensive training that detracted from the already stretched resources of the ISI and Mujahideen parties. With the lack of success for the SA-7 and Blowpipe, the CIA sought to improve the sophistication of the Mujahideen's anti-aircraft arsenal with the introduction of the US Redeye SAM³⁹⁶.

6:4:3:10 – Stinger Heat Seeking Surface-to-Air Missiles

The lack of an adequate air defence was a persistent problem for the Mujahideen. The few AA-guns and SAMs that were provided were wholly inadequate for the requirements of the Mujahideen who needed

accurate and effective man-portable *fire-and-forget* weapons with a high success rate to counter the aerial advantage of the Soviet Union. The SA-7, Blowpipe, Oerlikon, and Redeye systems were better than nothing, but the intensification of the war was beginning to tilt the conflict in favour of the Soviets, leading to ever greater pressure for an effective air-defence system for the Mujahideen. The U.S. was initially unwilling to send the highly advanced Stinger SAMs to the Mujahideen lest they fall into the wrong hands, contradict US deniability, or even because they thought that the Mujahideen had no real chance against the Soviets and that the supply of sophisticated arms would just be a waste of resources³⁹⁷. However, hitherto, Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger had lobbied for the sale of the Stinger on behalf of Saudi Arabia for some time, to counter the growing threat of Iranian attacks on Persian Gulf shipping, but the US Congress was threatening to block any sale, and the US President had remained non-committal throughout even though the Saudis had already won a controversial \$8.5 billion agreement for the supply of five Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWAC) aircraft during mid-1981³⁹⁸. The deadlock was only broken as a result of a personal letter from King Fahd to the President Reagan, who replied that the US would provide full military support to the Saudis. This was confirmed when Reagan bypassed Congress to immediately supply 400 Stingers that were covertly flown to Saudi Arabia over Memorial Day Weekend in May 1984³⁹⁹. This was a significant breakthrough that paved the way for the eventual delivery of Stingers to the Mujahideen; however, not without the consistent objections of the CIA on the grounds that the capture of a Stinger by Soviet or DRA forces would result in technology transfer and the development of countermeasures⁴⁰⁰. NSDD-166 also facilitated the transfer of sophisticated non-Soviet weapons to the Mujahideen who, according to Vince Cannistraro, a former agent who worked with the CIA during the 1970s, could only “wage a hit-and-run guerrilla war. They didn’t have the weapons to turn back the Soviets. That soon changed with NSDD-16”⁴⁰¹. General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan raised the issue of the supply of Stingers, the *wonder weapon*⁴⁰², with DCI Casey on numerous occasions, since they were seen as, Brigadier Yousaf (2001) recalls, “the single weapon that could turn around the war”⁴⁰³. In late 1985, US National security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, approached President Reagan with the issue, and on 06 December 1985 Deputy DO John McMahon, in a meeting with Weinberger and Undersecretary of Defence Fred Ikle, affirmed the immediate need for Stingers in Afghanistan⁴⁰⁴. However, it was not until 26 February 1986⁴⁰⁵ that the hitherto *covert* precedent of US involvement in the arms pipeline was broken when a decision was taken “in principle for Defence to provide CIA with four hundred Stingers for use by the Mujahideen”⁴⁰⁶. Nevertheless, “President Reagan was forced to lobby extensively to obtain the minimum 34 Senate votes needed to sustain his veto of congressional resolutions blocking the sale”⁴⁰⁷. The 400 Stinger missile systems were to be the first allocation of Stingers to the Mujahideen in an agreement with the ISI where “two hundred and fifty Stinger grip stocks were to be shipped per year, with 1,200 missiles”⁴⁰⁸. The total number of Stinger missile systems that were delivered into the hands of Mujahideen forces is unknown, due in part to the continuing leakage of the arms pipeline; however, it may have been well over a thousand⁴⁰⁹.

The first batch of Stingers arrived at the Rawalpindi Chaklala Airbase, Pakistan, in early July 1986, and training with a US Army supplied simulator began immediately after the Mujahideen responsible for using the Stinger were specially selected by Brigadier Yousaf. The low-altitude Stinger missile has been characterised

as the most advanced system of its kind to be used by the Mujahideen, with an effective ceiling of about 5,000 metres; but its actual advance in comparison to other such systems is its virtual immunity to countermeasures that act as alternative heat sources, such as flares, once it has *locked-on* to a target, since its super-cooled sensor analyses both infra-red and ultra-violet wavelengths of the spectrum and can therefore distinguish between a jet engine and decoy flares⁴¹⁰. It is able to hit a target head on, and with a speed of 1200 mph it is very effective against jet fighters, unlike the SA-7 which is not able to *out run* them⁴¹¹. Any protective armour that an aircraft carries, such as on the jet exhaust, is easily defeated with its high-explosive warhead. The only effective defence to the Stinger is to fly above its effective ceiling and continuously fire flares without interval to stop it from locking-on⁴¹². Given the capabilities and effectiveness of the Stinger, the concerns of the CIA, fearing its use against military and civilian aircraft by antagonistic individuals or sub-state groups, were not unwarranted.

The first use of the Stinger, on 25 September 1986, downed three Mi-24 Hind-D gunships, above Jalalabad's airport, from five missile launches⁴¹³. The general success later rose significantly, averaging about 75 percent for Mujahideen operators⁴¹⁴ and 95 percent for Pakistani instructors who often accompanied the Mujahideen in comparison to the 65 percent accomplished by US troops trained on the Stinger in non-combat situations⁴¹⁵. Other firings were even arranged to be witnessed by Congressman Charles Wilson in 1987; however, on this occasion no helicopter came close, even though they were tempted to come within range of the Stinger crew⁴¹⁶. The allocation policy instituted by Brigadier Yousaf limited the number of Stingers issued to the Mujahideen to prevent them from being hoarded by only issuing new missile tubes upon the return of the spent missile canister⁴¹⁷. There were, however, exceptions to the rule. To encourage an aggressive deployment of the Stinger, the ISI instituted an incentive for the commanders: "for each confirmed hit, a commander would be given a bonus of two more Stinger missiles"⁴¹⁸. But, as the Stinger kill-rate increased, controls slackened, as one U.S. intelligence officer noted, "we were giving them out like lollipops"⁴¹⁹.

Soviet aerial tactics had changed significantly as a result of the deployment of a greater number and range of AA-guns and surface to air missiles. Aircraft remained high above the Stinger's ceiling, pilots were averse to pushing home attacks to their conclusion, and the overall aerial superiority that the Soviets had enjoyed declined significantly to tilt the war in favour of the Mujahideen and their eventual victory against the superpower. The Mujahideen would often announce their possession of Stingers when communicating over the radio even when they didn't possess any, knowing full well that their communiqués would be intercepted by the Soviets⁴²⁰. The success of the Stingers has, however, been hyped to some extent by the US Army and the ISI for propaganda purposes⁴²¹, and it must be stressed that the Stinger was in no way the sole reason for the Soviet withdrawal. Nevertheless, the morale boost amongst the Mujahideen that the Stingers produced did aid a more effective resistance through bolder combat tactics⁴²² and greater freedom of movement. Stinger *kills* also contributed to significant changes in aerial tactics, leading to increased Soviet and DRA aerial ineffectiveness and raising the cost of the war to the Soviets. The SAMs also had another effect on the war. Helicopter gunship attacks on villages and the devastating scorched-earth policy being pursued by the Soviets had forced a reduction in agricultural production amongst the Afghan farmers. The fear of the Stinger, and

other SAMs, frightened helicopter gunships from flying low-altitude missions, and hence, allowed farmers to grow crops again⁴²³.

6:4:3:11 – Lost Stingers – Drawbacks of Stinger Use

There were drawbacks to the supply of Stingers to the Mujahideen. The fear that they could get into antagonistic hands was proved positive when they were captured by Soviet forces. Yousaf (2001) recounts one occasion when Spetsnaz forces captured a number of Stingers from a Mujahideen commander who had entirely ignored security protocols in early 1987⁴²⁴. *Plausible deniability* was no longer possible for the US since the Stinger system was not available for the Mujahideen to purchase on the black market, and hence, could only have been supplied by the Americans. The Kabul regime also bought several Stingers from the Mujahideen at a cost of 5 million Afghanis (approx. \$25,000) each⁴²⁵.

More worrisome for the CIA was the acquisition of at least 16 Stingers by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in May 1987, from the Mujahideen⁴²⁶, later confirmed as coming from two of Hekmatyar aides, for about one million dollars⁴²⁷. In this respect, Cordesman (1990) notes that Iran may have acquired as many as thirty Stinger missiles⁴²⁸. The US later launched a costly campaign to buy back Stinger missiles⁴²⁹ from Mujahideen commanders and further a-field in *Operation Missing-In-Action Stingers*, since the missile was becoming a menace, especially after an investigation found that it may have been used in the downing of an Italian cargo plane in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴³⁰. The operation is still running, especially given the US apprehension towards the possible possession of Stinger SAMs in the hands of anti-American or anti-Western sub-state actors and other groups willing to inflict mass casualty attacks on Western targets⁴³¹.

6:5 – The Mujahideen’s Arms Suppliers

“Weapons are supplied by the United States, China, Egypt, and some other Arab countries, and also Israel”⁴³². The CIA scoured the globe for Soviet-origin weapons in order that the US and Pakistan could have a degree of plausible deniability. As such, the use of former close associates of the USSR was of paramount importance. However, this is not to say that such countries did not have their own motivations and reasons for aiding the Afghans in causing the USSR a humiliating defeat. Inevitably only a few countries turned out to become the main suppliers of Soviet-origin weaponry. Close association was not the only criteria for the secondary suppliers; for example, Iran played a critical role in determining the composition of the Shia resistance groups, and chose to aid such groups, not only because of its contiguous border with Afghanistan, but also, due to its close socio-cultural, historic and religious affinities with such resistance groups. Israel, on the other hand, wanted to help the US in attaining superpower supremacy, but also wanted to make a quick profit out of the Soviet made weapons that it had accumulated over three decades of conflict with its Arab neighbours. There were numerous other countries that also aided the US in its efforts; it’s close ally, the United Kingdom (UK), also helped in the supply of a limited number of weapons, albeit, of western-origin, such as the blowpipe surface-to-air missile system⁴³³ due to their concerns of Soviet expansion, which were invariably shared by most Western European states, albeit, predominantly through financial penalties on the USSR, such as sanctions⁴³⁴; while, about 40 tons of Soviet weaponry captured by South Africa during its campaigns in

southern Africa were included in the CIA arms shipments to Pakistan⁴³⁵. Due to the scope of this study, only the countries that were main secondary suppliers are discussed in detail below.

6:5:1 – China

Henry Kissinger's secret visit to the PRC, facilitated by the Pakistanis, in 1971, was the beginning of rapprochement between the US and China, especially after the latter's split with the USSR in the greater concomitant of Communist states in 1960 when the Soviets withdrew all their advisors from China⁴³⁶, and President Nixon's ground-breaking official visit to Beijing in 1972. The growing Soviet influence in global affairs had become an expanding threat to China during the 1970s. The PDPA coup d'état in April 1978 was, therefore, perceived as an extension of Soviet expansionism and a direct threat to China's strategic interests; which led to the supply of arms and ammunition to the Afghan resistance against the Soviet proxy regime after the 1978 coup. China's decision to join the US in its Jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, upon Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's visit to the country on 04 to 13 January 1980, was a logical extension of not only its warming relations with the Americans but also its policy to counter and contain Soviet influence⁴³⁷, its adventurous and *imperialist* ambitions, and its "strategy of southwards expansion"⁴³⁸ in accordance with its own strategic interests in its rivalry with the USSR⁴³⁹. Although, initially, China was more content to voice support and engage in only a "small scale program to support groups in the northeast, perhaps by sending supplies through the Wakhan corridor or northern Pakistan. Now, with some experience in aiding the insurgents, Beijing may have concluded that the risks involved in a more ambitious program outweighed the potential benefits"⁴⁴⁰.

Brown's visit produced "a growing convergence of views [between the] two governments [in which each country was to] take appropriate steps on its own"⁴⁴¹ against Soviet aggression and continue a close working relationship involving intelligence-sharing⁴⁴², military cooperation, technology transfers⁴⁴³ and a *significant acceleration* of the Chinese military aid that had begun after the 1978 coup⁴⁴⁴. However, their Afghan operations were not jointly operated; rather, they were done in *parallel*⁴⁴⁵, as was indicated by Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua's visit to Pakistan in January 1980⁴⁴⁶. Chinese intelligence's absolute chief, Kang Sheng, and his foremost intelligence agency, the *Tewu* (aka, the Chinese Secret Service), soon began mutual cooperation with the CIA and ISI in the supply of weapons⁴⁴⁷, which President Karmal⁴⁴⁸ claimed in March 1985, and later stated by President Najibullah⁴⁴⁹, had exceeded \$400 million over five years. Earlier, a letter issued to the Chinese Communist Party by the PDPA, on 30 January 1985, had accused the Chinese of supplying "approximately 2,000 heavy machine guns, 1,000 anti-tank rockets and nearly half a million rounds of ammunition"⁴⁵⁰. Unfortunately, actual figures for Chinese financial and military aid are not available for public dissemination, and hence, cannot be quoted. Nevertheless, the amounts quoted by secondary sources do provide an indication as to the extent of the Chinese contribution to the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet invasion and occupation; for example, western observers, at Mujahideen bases in FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, had noted that "up to 70 percent of the weapons were Chinese along with Soviet and Egyptian-made arms"⁴⁵¹. The Afghan Mujahideen were second only to the Kampuchean resistance as the principle guerrilla movement recipients of Chinese SALWs⁴⁵².

The Chinese People's Liberation Army's Military Intelligence Department (*Er Bu*) trained a variety of foreign volunteers for the Jihad as well as Uighur Muslim volunteers from its Xinjiang province "under the joint tutelage of the Tewu and the CIA"⁴⁵³ using "several hundred Chinese instructors...in [the] training [of] Afghan bandits in training centres inside Pakistani territory"⁴⁵⁴ in an operation, which, according to Russian analysts, cost the CIA most of the \$400 million invoiced⁴⁵⁵. Many camps also began training several thousand Uighur volunteers⁴⁵⁶ in Xinjiang province⁴⁵⁷, in the use of the variegated Chinese weapons, and combat tactics⁴⁵⁸.

Roberts Gates reveals how he, as the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR, DCI Turner, and Brzezinski, also secretly visited Beijing between 27 December 1980 and 07 January 1981 for talks with their counterparts and Deng Xiaoping⁴⁵⁹, and secured a firm commitment on joint intelligence collection facilities in western China⁴⁶⁰, which the Americans were in urgent need of due to the loss of their facilities in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah, as part of the overall rapprochement with China and facilitation of the Afghan operation.

The main problem for the supply of weapons was the logistics of delivering the weapons to the Mujahideen groups, and often directly without any ISI involvement. Harold Brown had already secured an agreement to fly arms from China to Islamabad using US planes⁴⁶¹. However, the Chinese also used their own aircraft to transport arms⁴⁶². Other, more dangerous, routes were used, such as, through Afghanistan's mountainous 20,000 ft peaks in the Wakhan corridor that borders with China⁴⁶³, until it was sealed off and annexed by the Soviet Union⁴⁶⁴. The oft-quoted 500 miles long Karakoram Highway was also used⁴⁶⁵; in contrast, Yousaf (2001) asserts that it was never used⁴⁶⁶, which, considering the efforts undertaken to construct it over ten years, seems an unlikely denial, though Pakistan may have wanted to allay Indian fears and divert their attention from the perception that this route was and is a vital military link and flanking move by China and Pakistan against India⁴⁶⁷. Weapons were also supplied directly to the Mujahideen, in part, due to fears of corruption in the arms pipeline operated⁴⁶⁸, especially to those with Maoist inclinations, such as the small *Sholah-e-Javed* (Eternal Flame) group⁴⁶⁹, which disappeared from the scene when the ISI forced the formation of the seven Peshawar based parties by limiting the number of Mujahideen factions.

The Chinese delivered a variety of arms, ranging from assault rifles, heavy machine guns mortars and single barrelled rocket launchers. The latter were specifically manufactured by the Chinese for the Mujahideen so that they would be man-portable. A large proportion of the weapons that the Chinese supplied were manufactured copies of existing Soviet weapons, such as the 7.62-mm Type-56 SKS carbines (AK-47 assault rifle) and 40-mm Type-69 anti-tank grenade launcher (a copy of the RPG-7 rocket launcher)⁴⁷⁰, the 12.7-mm Type-4 machine gun (a copy of the Soviet Dshk)⁴⁷¹, and the ZPU-2 twin-barrelled 14.5 heavy machine gun (non-man-portable)⁴⁷², also known as *zigo-yek*⁴⁷³. However, there were some weapons of Chinese origin that were already present and dated back to the fifties, such as the semi-automatic Siminof rifle, known as the *10 shots* or *da-taka*⁴⁷⁴. Also, some weapons of Chinese origin were captured by the Mujahideen from the DRA

forces, such as the 60-mm Type 63 mortars⁴⁷⁵. Large numbers of plastic anti-tank mines were supplied from an early stage⁴⁷⁶, while 82-mm mortars⁴⁷⁷ and 107-mm⁴⁷⁸ and 122-mm rockets⁴⁷⁹ with SBRL were also supplied by China⁴⁸⁰.

The dysfunctional condition of the Egyptian weapons that were being supplied in large quantities in the early 1980s forced the CIA, under ISI pressure, to increase supplies from China and other sources. During DCI Casey's visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1981, he was able to secure more arms for the Afghan Mujahideen⁴⁸¹. DCI Casey returned to China on successive occasions to secure ever increasing quantities of arms and support for operations in Soviet Central Asia⁴⁸². As a result, China became the leading supplier of Soviet-origin weapons. As Yousaf (2001) notes; "until 1984 the bulk of all arms and ammunition was purchased from China, and they proved to be an excellent supplier, completely reliable, discreet and, at a later stage, even providing weapons as aid as well as for sale"⁴⁸³. Such deliveries of weapons were meticulously regulated and calculated, which, in effect, guaranteed an accurate account of their delivery in contrast to the corruption that was associated with other suppliers and their deliveries⁴⁸⁴. Chinese arms and ammunition also had the advantage of being largely interchangeable with the Soviet and DRA weapons that had been captured by Mujahideen forces, thereby not negating their use due to the lack of ammunition, which was heavily supplied by the Chinese⁴⁸⁵.

Within months of the invasion, weapons with Chinese markings were sighted more often, as can be testified by numerous accounts from the Western journalists that were saturating Peshawar for war-stories. However, such reports also noted the lack of arms reaching the Mujahideen from the US, or related sources in the early 1980s; as when, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that, "for many resistance members inside Afghanistan, foreign assistance from the US, China, or the Gulf countries is regarded as a joke"⁴⁸⁶. Nevertheless, reports of increased weaponry began to filter through with increasing frequency in 1982, as, "scores of Mujahideen or insurgents crossed the border day after day carrying new Kalashnikovs with markings in Chinese or Arabic"⁴⁸⁷ that were being delivered in caravans of horses and mules, which were loaded with "medicines and dextrose from various countries, brand new Chinese-made Kalashnikov assault rifles, heavy machine guns and antitank mines, ammunition for rocket propelled grenade launchers and various other weapons"⁴⁸⁸.

6:5:2 – Egypt

Even before Brzezinski's post-invasion visit to Egypt, in January 1980, to secure support for the Afghan Mujahideen, President Anwar Sadat had publicly declared his willingness to aid the *West* in its defence of the Middle East against Soviet aggression with the provision of military facilities for the US, in December 1979⁴⁸⁹ in response to Brzezinski's consultations, in early September 1979, "with the Saudis and Egyptians regarding the fighting in Afghanistan"⁴⁹⁰. Nevertheless, there were numerous reasons as to why Egypt's help was chosen. Cairo's Al-Azhar University was renowned as the centre of Islamic learning in the Muslim world. Leading Islamist Mujahideen had studied in its confines and had established strong links with Egypt's *Ikhwaan-I Muslimeen* (Muslim Brotherhood) – a close relation of Abul Alaa al-Mawdudi's Jamaat-e Islami

based in Pakistan, and the guiding light of Afghanistan's Hizb-i Islami and *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society). Another more significant reason for the recruitment of Egypt was that it had acquired vast quantities of Soviet arms during the period of close relations with the Soviet Union before all links were severed.

President Sadat had agreed to the use of its airbases, such as Qena and Aswan, by US cargo planes carrying arms, ammunition and supplies for the Mujahideen. "Egypt's military inventories were being scoured for Soviet-supplied arms... [and] An old arms factory near Helwan, Egypt, was eventually converted to produce the same kind of weapons"⁴⁹¹, which were soon flown to Pakistan by USAF C-5 Galaxy and C-130 transports. The old Saqr factory had initially been one of a network of arms plants that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt had invested a total of \$1.04 billion through the *Arab Organisation for Industrialisation* to encourage indigenous Arab arms production. Saqr initially produced the SA-7 SAM as well as other types of SAMs, anti-tank grenades and assault rifles, such as the AK47⁴⁹². In July 1979, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar backed out of the project due to Egypt's rapprochement with Israel, and hence, forced the closure of the factory until 1980 when the US began to fund the manufacture of Soviet-origin weaponry for the Afghan Jihad.

U.S. Special Forces were also flown to Egypt to train its security services, who in turn trained selected Egyptian volunteers and Afghan Mujahideen⁴⁹³ for the Afghan Jihad. This was soon made public by the Egyptian Minister of Defence, Lt Gen Kamal Hassan Ali, who, in a press conference on 13 February 1980, stated that Egypt was "training some of them to some extent"⁴⁹⁴ and confirmed that they were also providing weapons. The Mujahideen were later to acknowledge the receipt of arms in July 1980, when two Mujahideen were interviewed: "This is no longer a secret. The Afghan revolution receives weapons and ammunition from Egypt.... All we receive from [other Islamic and Arab nations] is some financial aid, and some kind words"⁴⁹⁵. The publicity surrounding the support of the Mujahideen with arms and supplies did not, however, compromise the position of the US and their need for plausible deniability even when President Sadat gave a TV interview, saying in effect that "Egypt will send more arms – along with clothing, medicine, and food – to the Moslem rebels fighting Soviet forces"⁴⁹⁶. However, on 22 September 1981, President Sadat openly referred to the US in an interview when he mentioned that they had contacted him after the invasion, saying that they [the US – and specifically Brzezinski during his visit to Egypt in January 1980] "told me, 'Please open your stores for us so that we can give the Afghanis the armaments they need to fight,' and I gave the armaments"⁴⁹⁷. This statement was, however, denounced by Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, who headed the mainly Saudi-funded Mujahideen party, in a press conference that was staged to maintain a degree of credibility for its Islamic Jihad and distance from foreign sources of funding and arms assistance⁴⁹⁸.

American intelligence assets oversaw the flow of arms to Pakistan, but were logistically aided by Egypt⁴⁹⁹. Until 1983, Egypt was the main source of U.S.-supplied weapons to the Mujahideen. This can be testified by the size of the CIA facility in Cairo, which, according to Bob Woodward (1987), was one of the largest in the world outside the US⁵⁰⁰, and a regular stopover point for DCI Casey during his visits to Egypt and the Middle East. China was also a source of large quantities of weapons⁵⁰¹, albeit, acting as an independent contributor.

President Sadat's insistence on sending weapons to the Mujahideen may also have been encouraged by the fact that their Soviet weapons were now aging, and that the U.S. was quickly replacing them with newer and more sophisticated weapons. The Egyptians mainly supplied small arms that were increasingly less useful, such as the AK-47, but some other light weapons were also supplied, such as the SA-7 SAM⁵⁰², partly due to their relative ineffectiveness in the 1973 war against Israel in which only 2-6 Israeli aircraft were shot down after over 5,000 SA-7 (Strela) missiles had been fired⁵⁰³. When the initial stocks of weapons and ammunition supplied to the Mujahideen were found to be rusting, out-dated, and unusable⁵⁰⁴, since according to one US official "the Egyptians were charging top dollar and selling us crap"⁵⁰⁵, American pressure eventually forced the supply of better quality Egyptian stocks of weapons. The improvement in Egypt's supply of weapons became more apparent after the small arms factories in Helwan became operational again, where copies of Soviet weapons were made specifically for the Mujahideen⁵⁰⁶. However, this did not restrain the Americans from applying pressure on the ISI to receive logistically and operationally inappropriate weapons, such as the Egyptian mortar, for political reasons⁵⁰⁷. Newer versions of the SA-7, which were less susceptible to countermeasures had the capacity of detecting helicopters up to four miles away and a higher test success rate, were also manufactured by the Egyptians and supplied to the Afghans Mujahideen⁵⁰⁸. However, due to the intermingling of the different types of SA-7s in Afghanistan it is impossible to gauge the actual effectiveness of the newer Egyptian versions.

6:5:3 – Iran

Since the vast majority of financial and military assistance was being delivered through Pakistan, the share received by Shia minority parties was relatively negligible in comparison to the seven Sunni parties based in Peshawar. The main source of assistance to the numerous Shia parties was Iran. Unlike the publication of information, albeit limited, of arms assistance by the US to the Mujahideen, written evidence of the extent of the financial and military assistance to the Shia resistance groups by Iran is very difficult to obtain from the Iranian authorities. Nevertheless, Iranian assistance was very limited in comparison to the assistance being gained by the Pakistan-based parties, and virtually non-existent before 1983. However, Iran was itself going through a tumultuous period after the revolution which brought down the Shah. The vast majority of Iran's resources were being utilised to repel the Iraqi invasion on its western borders, and therefore, few if any resources were available for the support of the Afghan resistance in general, and for the Shia parties in particular. Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion was denounced by Ayatollah Khomeini as a "brutal intervention... by looters and occupiers... [and a] threat to Iran"⁵⁰⁹ and "the other great Satan"⁵¹⁰.

The Shia minority, of approximately 10-15 per cent of the total population of Afghanistan, is mainly concentrated amongst the Hazara ethnic minority that predominantly reside within the geographical boundaries of the central Afghanistan region known as *Hazarajat*. The Hazaras were amongst the first groups to stage uprisings after the 1978 coup; however, their mountainous region as a whole was viewed as being one of limited strategic value to the Soviets and DRA government⁵¹¹, and hence, the commitment of their already scarce resources to a region regarded as a *void* would have distracted them from their strategic priorities.

This, in turn, significantly delayed the unification of the numerous feuding Hazara factions against a common enemy and the formation of an effective resistance to the Soviet occupation, which was characterised by its absence from the *Hazarajat*. Conversely, Hazara factions were, more often than not, fighting amongst themselves rather than against the Soviet and DRA forces.

Iranian assistance to the resistance effort against the Soviet occupation was concentrated on the Shia religious minorities in Afghanistan. However, Iran was initially discouraged from providing aid to the Shia resistance by Soviet assertiveness, in their cross-border bombing of villages in 1980⁵¹², and warnings through *Pravda* not to oppose the USSR and not to aid the Mujahideen⁵¹³. According to Mousavi (1998), in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion the Hazarajat region was already largely under the control of one local Shia administration, the *Shura-ye Ittifaq* (Council of Unity), led by Ayatollah Sayed Ali Behishti⁵¹⁴, due to its successful resistance against PDPA control after the April 1978 coup when it was set up amongst locally chosen civil officials to replace the recently killed or expelled PDPA officials⁵¹⁵. However, the Soviet invasion led to the formation of a multitude of Shia resistance groups with contending socio-political and religious differences that were partly a reflection of the vicissitudes that had befallen Iran after the revolution between its different Shia factions⁵¹⁶ and the influence of *Mujahideen-i-Khalq* (People's Mujahideen; an Islamic-Marxist party, if there ever can be such an alliance?), and the Pro-Moscow *Tudeh* Communist party⁵¹⁷. Mousavi (1998) identifies three categories of Hazara factions⁵¹⁸, which are virtually synonymous to Oliver Roy's (1990)⁵¹⁹ categorisation of the Shia resistance: the first included the long established secular groups led by the Shia intelligentsia, and included the *Mirs*; the second, groups that were inspired by or were the followers of Imam Khomeini and led by Shia clerics, *Skeikhs*, the majority of which were formed in Iran, and hence, directly affected by the events and politics of Iran and sought to "reshape Afghanistan in accordance with the principles of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution"⁵²⁰; and lastly, those groups that were led by reactionary *traditionalist* Shia clerics, such as the *Harakat-e Islami* (Movement of Islam) led by Asif Mohseni.

The Iranian authorities did not fully support all the groups that had formed. This was evident in the derogatory treatment shelved out by the Iranians to many of the groups that were not from the second category⁵²¹, who were consequently forced out of Iran. Such treatment was reflected amongst the Hazaras within Afghanistan through the eruption of a virtual civil war between the Shia factions after 1982. During this civil strife, the *Shura-ye Ittifaq* was partially displaced by pro-Iranian groups⁵²², such as the *Sazman-e Nasr* (Victory Organisation) led by Abdul Ali Mazari⁵²³, due, in part, to the clear advantage they gained from their receipt of funds from Iran and its policy "to federate the groups under the umbrella of one organisation, *Nasr*"⁵²⁴. Until 1983, the *Sazman-e Nasr* was the only resistance organisation to have definitely received both financial and military assistance, and general supplies from Iran⁵²⁵. Brigot and Roy (1988) have observed that the majority of arms given by Iran to *Al-Nasr* (Victory, a militant Hazara Shia resistance group supported by Iran, and part of the Tehran eight) were small arms, and included the M-1 and G-3 assault rifles⁵²⁶. However, upon investigating the results of their financial and military assistance, the disappointed Iranians "decided to operate through their own Iranian party inside Afghanistan and created the *Sepah-e-Pasdaran*... This year *Nasr* is losing its strength fast and *Sepah-e-Pasdaran* is receiving all the assistance"⁵²⁷. Nevertheless, the

Shura-ye Ittifaq was still reported to have retained the support of about 60 to 65 percent of the Hazarajat population and control of most of its territory by the end of 1983⁵²⁸. Many arms were also acquired, by the Afghan Shia groups, as contraband arms traffic from the Iranian population, who had accumulated them during the Iranian revolution⁵²⁹.

Other Shia resistance groups were also active within their localities; for example, the Iranians were reported as actively funding Shia resistance groups in the Herat and Hazara areas in 1985⁵³⁰, and increased their support of pro-Iranian factions in Farah and Nimruz provinces⁵³¹. Iranian influence increased as a consequence, and therefore, facilitated the reduction and reorganisation of the numerous groups into a limited number of loosely unified Shia groups that were easier to control than a multitude of groups⁵³², which eventually led to the formation of a united Hazara alliance in the form of *Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan* (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), under Abdul Ali Mazari, in 1989, through increased funding⁵³³. Although no financial and military aid is admitted to⁵³⁴, offers were made to certain Sunni Mujahideen parties, such as Jamiat-i-Islami, under the condition that the recipients support Iranian foreign policy, which as a consequence led to their rejection⁵³⁵. Nevertheless, Iran had given “permission to two of the Pakistan-based resistance leaders – Burhannuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to open offices in Mashhad”⁵³⁶.

6:5:4 – Israel

In a bizarre quandary, Israel’s regional interests were relegated for a higher sodality, that of the geopolitical alignment of the Israelis with the US and its allies against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, which, even though a threat to Israel’s Arab enemies, posed a significantly greater threat to the Western world. As a consequence, Israel’s Mossad⁵³⁷ facilitated the sale of weapons to the CIA for the Afghan Mujahideen⁵³⁸ that were primarily of Soviet origin and to a lesser extent of Chinese and North Korean origin; which were captured from the Arabs during three decades of conflict, in particular, from Israel’s *Six Day War* in 1967⁵³⁹, the *Yom Kippur War* against Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1973⁵⁴⁰, and from the PLO during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982⁵⁴¹. The majority of the captured weapons, which included AK-47 assault rifles, RPG launchers, and shoulder-fired missiles⁵⁴², were not serviceable due to Israel’s predominant use of US weapons, ammunition and parts. For the most part, millions of dollars worth of weapons, \$35 million for Soviet weapons captured in the Lebanon invasion according to Harrison (1985)⁵⁴³, were made available “to the U.S. in exchange for favourable prices on Israeli purchases of American-built fighter planes”⁵⁴⁴ under the supervision of Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, deputy assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs in the Near East, Africa and South Asia, so as to circumvent the US Congress. Others were sold directly where the need to circumvent Congress was not required.

The Soviet origin arms and ammunition were initially shipped to US ports, such as Wilmington, North Carolina, which was one of the foremost transshipment points for Warsaw pact and Soviet origin weapons that were acquired by covert means by the US. The weapons were then often transferred to one of three storage facilities, such as the San Antonio warehouse, where all traces of their origins, such as serial numbers were removed by CIA contracted personnel⁵⁴⁵, thereby obliterating evidence of their real sources⁵⁴⁶ fulfilling the

requirements of plausible deniability imposed by the US and Pakistani governments. The Mujahideen were not the only ones to have received Israeli captured weapons. Four other recipients also exist, and include “the ‘Contras’ in Central America, the UNITA forces in Angola, the Habre forces in Chad, and the MNR forces in Mozambique”⁵⁴⁷. According to Beit-Hallahmi (1988), and an example of the implementation of a *higher* sodality, some of the weapons delivered to the Mujahideen came from Israel via Saudi Arabia⁵⁴⁸, indicating a degree of close collaboration between the two adversaries. Also worth noting is that, according to Merriam (1988), Mujahideen parties acquired a number of obsolete SA-7s from the PLO after its forced withdrawal from Lebanon by Israel at a hefty price of sterling £26,000 each, considering that most did not work or were unserviceable⁵⁴⁹.

To a casual observer, the use of arms from Israel to aid a war by Muslim fighters against an atheistic invader may not seem to be of much importance. However, considering the antagonisms between Arab Muslims and the Israelis over the occupation of Palestinian territory, the overt delivery of weapons from Israel would not have been acceptable to the Mujahideen parties. However, the concealment of the Israeli source raises further issues. The CIA, obviously aware of this issue, sought to conceal Israel’s involvement from, as Yousaf (2001) notes, both the ISI and the Mujahideen parties. This is evident in Yousaf’s (2001) denial of having been aware of Israel’s involvement until after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan⁵⁵⁰. However, Israel’s involvement in the supply of Soviet-made weapons to the Mujahideen had become public through numerous articles and publications in newspapers and journals shortly after their delivery⁵⁵¹. In retrospect, Israeli-supplied Soviet-made weapons assisted the US and Pakistan in their attempts at plausible deniability, but were not essential. It may have been a political attempt at giving pre-eminence to the geopolitical nature of the conflict by discrediting the Islamic and Jihadi nature of the Mujahideen’s motivations, which were used as pawns, once Israeli revelations were leaked into the wider public domain. Regardless of the motivations behind the use of Israel in the supply of weapons, it seems highly unlikely that any senior member of the ISI was unaware of CIA-Israeli collusion, given the dissemination of this fact in the world’s press.

6:5:5 – Other Sources of Weapons to the Mujahideen

6:5:5:1 – Weapons Traded or Captured from the Soviets or Afghan Army

Aside from the sources of weapons that I have discussed above, the Afghans became adept at acquiring weapons from other disparate avenues. There were many reports of Soviet and Afghan troops selling their weapons to the Mujahideen for cash, or even to acquire food⁵⁵², and increasingly to obtain drugs such as hashish and opium. This was especially so for Afghan army troops, who “have been a continuing source of material, particularly ammunition. Soldiers regularly cache part of their allotment of ammunition and sell it to the insurgents for cash; the Afghan Army has long had difficulty paying its soldiers on time”⁵⁵³. Furthermore, Soviet troops also generally suffered from a lack of morale due to a number of issues, including: the *raison d’être* for their deployment in Afghanistan; the harsh living conditions; inadequate rations often leading to a poor diet and vitamin deficiency; poor wages, a raw conscript with no qualifications and skills would receive only \$5 a month⁵⁵⁴; and, insufficient bathing facilities leading to poor hygiene. “Everything is for sale by everybody... They [soldiers] sell literally everything possible: fat, butter, canned goods, soap, hardware, and

arms and ammunition”⁵⁵⁵. Considering the brutality of the war and given the desultory standards being offered to the Soviet and DRA soldiers, solace in drugs and alcohol through boredom and despair were an inevitable outcome, “contributing to an increased drug abuse problem throughout the Soviet Bloc”⁵⁵⁶ from Soviet troops returning to their units in the USSR.

6:5:5:2 – Soviet Supplies – Arming the Militias

Weapons also proliferated into the general Afghan population through Soviet and DRA measures to form rural militias that supported Kabul. Regional militias were paid by the DRA Ministry of Defence, and were primarily used for internal security, but rarely, if ever, engaged in combat with the Mujahideen. The two types of paramilitary forces that the DRA created were the tribal militias, and the youth urban militias that had a combined total of about 20,000 on paper⁵⁵⁷. Of the former, many were, in fact, not tribalised, but were small traders and merchants in urban and semi-urban areas that often lost their businesses due to resistance control in their areas. The incentives given by the government were even better than those for the DRA army. However, more often than not, such militias were Mujahideen who needed to supplement their incomes. Those that were not, were found to aid the Mujahideen, as can be noted from Edward Girardet’s (1982) encounter with a militia fort during his excursion into Afghanistan with the Mujahideen, where he reported that the militiamen were on friendly terms with the Mujahideen, and were often related by kin or through the tribe⁵⁵⁸. A number of other militias were also formed to aid the defence of cities, to patrol the streets at night, and were usually committed party members and supporters. The steady escalation of the war, and President Gorbachev’s commitment to withdraw Soviet troops forced the Najibullah government to expand its militia strategy⁵⁵⁹. During the latter years of the Soviet occupation, the effectiveness of DRA regime forces had increased as a result of the better coordination of DRA offensives and the growth of supplementary paramilitary (including the whole variety of pro-regime militias; for example, Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek militia in Northern Afghanistan and especially from Jowzjan Province) and regular forces, which Najibullah claimed had a total of about “half a million people under arms”⁵⁶⁰.

The Soviet and DRA forces even sought to bribe the border tribes in order to gain cooperation to stop Mujahideen supply routes going through their territories throughout the war. Their strategy was a two-pronged political and military strategy aimed at winning more political control over the rural areas and dividing the tribes in their support for the Mujahideen, and hence reducing potential opposition. The DRA and Soviets also tried to bribe and arm the Pushtun tribes residing in Pakistan’s NWFP in order to destabilise its government and support for the Mujahideen⁵⁶¹ through their Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities (*Vezerat-e Aqwam wa Qabayel* - Farsi), which closely coordinated its activities with KhAD⁵⁶². The regime exploited tribal differences whenever possible by bribing and recruiting militias that were willing to fight in order to oppose the Mujahideen from opposing tribes or clans, thereby satisfying their tribal feuds, but also diverting attention away from the central government. However, this was not always the case, as when the regime stationed 400 armed Hazaras, recruited from around Ghazni in December 1985, with an army brigade. The Hazaras, in turn, mutinied and attacked the brigade with the help of many DRA Army deserters⁵⁶³. A similar number of Afridi tribesmen, from the Nazian Valley in Nangarhar Province, were also recruited, armed and

trained during the winter of 1985/86, to fight the Mujahideen. Upon their first engagement with the Mujahideen, the Afridis encircled the Soviet forces and trapped them in crossfire with the resistance, after which they slipped over the border⁵⁶⁴. This was also the case with the Shinwari border tribe, who not only defected, but also began aiding the Mujahideen against the Soviets and DRA⁵⁶⁵. In such a way, the border tribes often took substantial bribes from the DRA and Soviets, but would renege once the money and arms were provided and turn them on their suppliers⁵⁶⁶. Nevertheless, Najibullah did have a limited degree of success in bribing tribes to interdict Mujahideen supply lines. Some tribal leaders did respond to Kabul's material aid with political support⁵⁶⁷. One of the more successful militias was the powerful Uzbek militia led by the infamous Abdul Rashid Dostum, that is, until his defection to Masood's forces led to the collapse of the PDPA regime in Kabul in 1992.

6:6 – The Graveyard of Empires

6:6:1 – The Bleeding Wound – Cost of the War

The Soviet Union was suffering as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan. However, it did not, nor could it, publish accurate casualty reports of Soviet troops wounded or killed in Afghanistan for fear of domestic opinion turning against the venture. Soviet international standing had also been jeopardised, especially amongst the Islamic countries. In addition, Soviet interests in the Third World were a heavy economic burdens; for example, the USSR was subsidising “Cuba to the tune of \$5-\$7 billion annually”⁵⁶⁸. In addition to competing with the US Strategic Defence Initiative and the economic consequences of NSDD-66, the Afghan War was helping to economically and politically cripple the empire, with an increasing annual expenditure of approximately \$7 to \$12 billion by the USSR to maintain its occupation⁵⁶⁹. Yousaf (2001) estimates that the daily cost of the occupation averaged about \$12 million⁵⁷⁰, especially when the scorched-earth strategy forced thousands of hungry civilians into Kabul and other urban areas.

The numbers of Soviet soldiers killed and injured were repeatedly scaled down by Soviet sources. Official figures released in May 1988 indicate that there were 13,310 killed, 33,478 wounded, and 311 missing in action⁵⁷¹. However, these precise numbers were suspected both within and outside the USSR, especially when Soviet sources later admitted that death due to disease alone accounted for 30,000-35,000 Soviet soldiers dead⁵⁷². There are no reliable sources to ascertain the numbers of DRA soldiers killed and wounded, but a rough estimate puts the figure at between 40,000 to 50,000 dead, and many more wounded.

6:6:2 – The Soviet Withdrawal and Scorched-Earth – UN Mediated Talks

The first serious discussions for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan came as a result of the acceptance by the CC CPSU Politburo on 13 November 1986 that this brutal and costly war could not be sustained in the long-term without a 500 percent increase in Soviet manpower⁵⁷³. Consequently, the Soviets were forced to strengthen the DRA regime by replacing Babrak Karmal with Dr Mohammad Najibullah⁵⁷⁴, Head of KhAD, and increasing supplies of military hardware and financial support before the withdrawal began. This was also demonstrated by the aggressive Soviet employment of the scorched-earth strategy to undermine rural support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and through attacks inside Pakistan, to strengthen

Kabul⁵⁷⁵. The final decision to leave Afghanistan, beginning on 15 May 1988 for completion on 15 March 1989, was announced by President Gorbachev in February 1988, with the subsequent Geneva Accords being signed by the foreign ministers of the US, USSR, Pakistan and the DRA regime on 14 April 1988⁵⁷⁶. The last Soviet soldier, General Boris Gromov, was to cross the Termez Bridge a month early on 15 February 1989. However, throughout the withdrawal process and the talks leading up to it, a heated debate emerged as to the continued superpower support for the Mujahideen and DRA regime. The US was deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions, fearing that they might discontinue the withdrawal right until the last Soviet soldier walked out of Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords also prohibited the supply of arms to the Mujahideen, but not the DRA regime, which prompted prominent US legislators to lobby the White House from accepting the Accords. To resolve the issue, the State Department made its first formal announcement on 4 March 1988 that the US Government would insist on the *symmetrical cessation* of military aid⁵⁷⁷, and hence, the moratorium proposal by Secretary of State Shultz for *negative symmetry*, “that should run initially from the time the withdrawal starts until perhaps three months thereafter, and can then be potentially extended”⁵⁷⁸; that is, where both the DRA and Mujahideen would no longer continue to receive arms supplies after a specified period of time. An angry Soviet rejection of this proposal led the US, under pressure from Congress, and especially Senator Gordon Humphrey, to introduce *positive symmetry*, the creation of “a separate unwritten ‘clause’ to the Geneva Accords which stipulated that Washington could aid the rebels as long as the Soviet Union aided Kabul”⁵⁷⁹. Although Moscow did not publically acknowledge this proposal, it was very much aware that the US would continue aiding the Mujahideen through Pakistan. Nevertheless, Gorbachev concluded that whatever the flaws of the Accords, it would be better to withdraw, especially considering that a number of other issues were under the microscope between the Soviets and the US, and because he wanted a shift in the political, economic, and foreign-policy priorities of the USSR. After the signing ceremony for the Accords, Secretary Shultz publically announced that:

The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the US retains the right, consistent with its obligations as a guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the US similarly will exercise restraint.⁵⁸⁰

Both superpowers rushed through massive military assistance to their respective recipients in case there was a last minute agreement at a cut-off. The US pushed through about \$300 million worth of arms, including the first consignment of TOW missiles, using C-5A flights, to Pakistan for the Mujahideen throughout April 1988⁵⁸¹. During the same month, the Soviets announced that they would leave behind over \$1 billion worth of arms, and instituted a regular flow of 400 *vehicle* convoys, including an extra 1,000 vehicle arms convoy on 11 April 1988, and a continuous flow of AN-12 flights to supply Kabul with new arms; while the smaller cities were supplied via Kabul with AN-26 flights⁵⁸². Other cities closer to the Soviet border were resupplied directly, to strengthen Balkh and eight other northern provinces.

Diego Cordevez (1996) notes that during his meeting at the US Embassy in Islamabad, US Ambassador Army Raphel said that once the arms that were destroyed in the Ojhiri (ISI Afghan Bureau headquarters) arms warehouse explosion, which included the \$300 million worth of arms supplied in April, had been replenished,

“all further supplies had been discontinued a few days after May 15”⁵⁸³. David Ottaway of the Washington Post confirmed this on 16 July 1988, noting the “significant reduction in arms crossing the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan”⁵⁸⁴ since 15 June 1988 with the exception of SALW and ammunition for the Mujahideen.

Lt. General Boris Gromov (Commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan) announced on the last day of the withdrawal process that 830 million Roubles, US\$1 billion, in military aid was to be left behind to support the DRA regime⁵⁸⁵. This statement resolved any doubts as to whether the Soviets would have any measure of restraint in the supply of weapons to the DRA during their tenure in Kabul, which the US, Pakistan, the Mujahideen parties, and even the Soviets generally all agreed would only last a matter of weeks or months after the withdrawal of the 40th Army. The CIA also produced a report, now declassified, that accepted that the Soviets did continue to supply massive amounts of military aid to the Kabul regime, given their commitment to uphold the regime at any cost. However, it also stated that, “a unilateral Soviet cut-off of support to the regime would be devastating to Kabul’s prospects”⁵⁸⁶. However, the Kabul regime was to prove everyone wrong.

6:7 – Final Observations

The Soviet invasion and occupation was an immensely destructive period of political upheaval and massive human loss for an already impoverished nation, Afghanistan. And, as history has witnessed, this destruction has continued to impact the present; in part, because of the tremendous quantity of diffusion of SALW within this phase of Afghanistan’s protracted conflict. The quantities of weapons that reached Afghanistan will never really be ascertained. However, as this chapter has illustrated, the sheer complexity of Operation Cyclone, and its associated operations by China, Arab Gulf states, and other nations whose vested interests were affected by the Soviet occupation, demonstrates that nations are willing to go to any lengths to achieve their strategic interests without concern for the long-term impacts that they may have upon the environment that they are engaged within, or the people that they affect.

Many of the networks, processes, and methods that were used to covertly inject SALW into Afghanistan are still in play to this day, albeit, in order to avoid the detection of some of those countries that actually introduced such networks and processes in the first place; that is, the US-NATO-ISAF forces currently occupying the country, in a paradoxical repeat of history. Once such knowledge is introduced into any environment, it becomes entrenched and enmeshed within the local socio-cultural consciousness, and is virtually impossible to extricate once it is consolidated over a period of time. As such, chapter seven discusses and explains the consequential continuation of the Afghan conflict and SALW proliferation, which, to some extent, may be recognised as even more devastating than the period above, given the breakdown of the social fabric of Afghan society.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART II

CHAPTER SEVEN

**THE WEAPONISATION OF
AFGHANISTAN 1989-2001**

PART II

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WEAPONISATION OF AFGHANISTAN 1989-2001

7 – Civil War

This chapter begins as a chronological continuation of chapter six, and will continue as such through a number of stages in the development of the protracted conflict. The period of study within this chapter essentially covers the stage after which the Soviet armed forces left Afghanistan, which instigated the brutal Afghan Civil War, wherein which the parties engaged in violent conflict within Afghanistan were all indigenous Afghans; including the Parchami and Khalqi factions of the communist Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan Mujahideen resistance, who later split up to fight against each other, and the emergence of the Taliban and their governance from September 1996. However, although all the factions engaged in violent conflict may have been Afghan, by no mean were external parties not involved in the conflict throughout the period being studied. In fact, while Afghan parties were in a violent contest of constantly shifting alliances to gain strategic advantages over other parties, their respective external backers were also involved in a global and regional competition to outwit and out resource each other through their respective Afghan proxies; which led to an immensely devastating period of conflict. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the extent of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) during the main stages of the post-Soviet invasion phase and until the eventful day on 11 September 2001; as follows:

- a) The Republic of Afghanistan – 15 February 1989 until 25 April 1992;
- b) Peshawar Peace Accords, Mujahideen Civil War – 24 April 1992 until 26 September 1996; and,
- c) The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban – 27 September 1996 until 11 September 2001.

An in-depth discussion on the strategic rationale for the protraction of the Afghan conflict, which has endured civil war and external global and regional interference since the departure of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the Taliban movement is interspersed throughout this chapter.

7:1 – The Proxy War Part 1 – The Republic of Afghanistan (1989-1992)

The withdrawal of Soviet forces reduced the threat of potential invasion, therefore allowing some relaxation of the necessity for absolute secrecy during the transportation of weapons into Afghanistan for the Mujahideen to maintain plausible deniability; which therefore, removed some of the constraints that were inherently obstructionary, costly, and time consuming in the covert delivery of arms supplies from Pakistan. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also changed their approach by delivering arms directly to the field Commanders rather than through the Mujahideen parties. Furthermore, the United States (US) began to limit supplies of more sophisticated weaponry, such as the Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAM) so as to prevent their loss to groups willing to use them against US and other Western interests. Nevertheless, the Americans and the Saudis tried to mirror the massive Soviet supplies to the Kabul regime. Much of this aid was directed at

modifying Mujahideen capabilities conventional warfare capability, as opposed to the guerrilla warfare capabilities hitherto acquired, due to the need to conclude the conflict by assaulting and seizing defensive positions and strongholds, such as the heavily defended fortifications, towns, and cities. The US supplied \$715 million in aid, with an equal sum from the Saudis¹, in financial year (FY) 1989 to February 1990; however, this soon dropped to \$300 million for FY 1990, and \$250 million for FY 1991². In contrast, Bradsher (1999) cites various Soviet sources as reporting that Soviet military aid to the Kabul regime was valued at 2.5 billion roubles (US \$4.126 billion)³ in 1989, and increased to 4 billion roubles (US \$6.5876 billion)⁴ in 1990⁵. In 1991, the Soviets were estimated at having supplied over 1.8 billion roubles (US \$3.12238 billion)⁶, or \$267.6 million per month according to Goodson (2001)⁷. The collapse of the Soviet Union upon the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, on 25 December 1991, and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), therefore, led to the end of Soviet financial and military assistance to the Kabul regime in 1991. Consequently, having accomplished their stated goal of defeating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the US completely ceased aid to the Mujahideen, in the belief that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) would soon fall without external support.

7:1:1 – The Beleaguered PDPA

The deeply divided ruling Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA, now referred to as the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) after the Soviet withdrawal and the *Hizb-i Watan* (Homeland Party) since June 1990, thereby dropping any remaining Marxist links, reluctantly accepted the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The first major test came during the siege of RA-held Jalalabad, towards which the Mujahideen fired almost 130,000 rockets between March and June 1989⁸ in an ISI-Pakistani Army planned full-frontal assault. The Mujahideen's failure to take Jalalabad reflected their inability to acclimatize successfully to conventional offensive siege warfare against a heavily defended position. This was due to their lack of an effective artillery and anti-armour capability; a complete absence of airpower, air support, and protection from RA air strikes⁹; an inability to coordinate between their divisive factions; an inability to muster a large enough force to counter the RA's 15,000 to 20,000 strong force in Jalalabad¹⁰; and, an ill-considered strategy devised by military strategists that could not comprehend a guerrilla army's conventional limitations.

In order avoid losing their proxy, the Soviet Union supplied the RA with between 25 to 40 large-scale IL-76 airlifts every day. In addition, the Soviets left behind extensive supplies during their withdrawal. The firepower of the RA's air force and army was enhanced to equal the advantage that the former Soviet occupation forces had over the Mujahideen. Massive quantities of SALW were left behind to strengthen the RA infantry by increasing troop support weapons, many that were denied to them earlier, such as the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher. The RA was also able to counter the *Stinger threat* with improved Soviet countermeasures and their supply of over 500 SCUD missiles¹¹, which proved to act as *terror weapons* invulnerable to Stinger attack. In addition, the donation of Antonov 12 transports converted into high-altitude bombers with a capacity of 33,000 pounds of bombs, similarly aided the RA to counter Stinger attacks. The RA became popular in its own right due to the Soviet withdrawal; thereby enabling an increase in manpower.

In contrast, the Mujahideen remained bitterly divided, as illustrated by their devastating loss of about 10,000 Mujahideen¹² over the Jalalabad defeat.

7:1:1:1 – The Formation and Collapse of the Afghan Interim Government

The Mujahideen fared worse than expected upon the Soviet withdrawal. Afghan Army operations increased in intensity. The RA extensively mined defensive positions to deter and stall Mujahideen attacks, which most participants and observers believed would induce the immediate fall of the government. However, the Mujahideen were incapacitated by their inability to provide a credible alternative government; since the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), formed in February 1989, soon collapsed in late 1989 due to the constant bickering and divisions between member parties. Furthermore, the *Hizb-i Wahdat Islami* (Party of Islamic Unity) coalition of Shia parties and Mujahideen Commanders inside Afghanistan were excluded from the AIG, and the overt internecine violence between *Hizb-i Islami* (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society), whose military wing was led by Commander Ahmad Shah Masood. These Mujahideen failures increasingly concerned their patrons, who became uncertain of the course of the war, especially after the August 1988 assassination of President Zia ul-Haq, Director General of the ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, and numerous other high-ranking generals. Furthermore, in February 1990, the US had concluded an agreement with the USSR to allow President Najibullah to stay in power until *free* elections could be held (partly due to Western fears of an uncontrollable Islamist government coming to power in Kabul) even though they continued massive arms supplies to their respective clients¹³.

7:1:2 – The Rush for the Spoils – Masood’s Kabul

The defection of President Najibullah’s largest militia, Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek Jowzjan militia based in north-western Afghanistan, and Sayyid Mansur Nadiri, the son of the head of the Isma’ili Hazara community and also responsible for the Salang Highway’s security, precipitated the end of communist rule in Afghanistan. Dostum formed an alliance with Masood and took Bagram Airbase in April 1992. During the subsequent debate as to the formation of the new interim government, Masood and Dostum rushed to secure Kabul on 25 April 1992, thereby pre-empting Hekmatyar’s presumed military takeover of Kabul. The RA armed forces rapidly collapsed along the ethnic lines, previously established and entrenched under the pretence of the Parcham and Khalq political factions. This trend had already been underway since the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and especially since the Afghan Defence Minister, General Shahnawaz Tanai, closely colluded with the ISI and Hekmatyar in an attempted coup to overthrow President Najibullah in March 1990. The massive quantities of weapons that the Soviets had been providing the Afghan armed forces¹⁴ were, therefore, also lost to vying Mujahideen factions along ethnic lines, and subsequently fuelled the civil war, resulting in the fragmentation of the state of Afghanistan into regional and local autonomies controlled by warlords of varying strengths. However, this process was only one of many phases in the continuing disintegration of Afghanistan, which has seen most of its intelligentsia and bureaucratic apparatus wiped out¹⁵ through extra-judicial executions, assassinations, imprisonment, and forced emigrations by competing RA, Soviet, and Mujahideen interests.

7:2 – The Proxy War Part 2 – The Mujahideen Civil War (1992-1994)

7:2:1 – Introduction

The new interim government that succeeded the PDPA, under the Peshawar Accords of 24 April 1992, presided over by Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, was a sham from the beginning. Masood's military occupation of Kabul, with Dostum's help, negated any legitimacy the government could have gained from a peaceful political transition to an interim government. The designation of the Presidency to Burhannuddin Rabbani and its acceptance by the United Nations was only an extension of the failure of the political process. Rabbani's refusal to surrender the presidency upon the expiration of his four-month term at the end of October 1992 added to the failure of the accords. The fact that the United Nations (UN) continued to accept Rabbani as the legitimate leader of Afghanistan also aided in his relegation as an arbitrator in succeeding years, as well as delegitimizing themselves as biased, which negated any possibility of UN participation as an arbitrator in the immediate future during the 1990s. Regardless of the intentions of the Peshawar Accords, which were concluded in a vacuumous atmosphere compared to the political and military realities on the ground, their acceptance by the international community was short-sighted and ill-considered, most notably to hasten the conclusion of the conflict without tying up unresolved issues. The ensuing internecine conflict was a direct result of the Pushtun community's disaffection from the real levers of power, as is the perception in present Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, Hekmatyar must carry some blame for the continuation of the conflict, though, none less than every other party that was party to the violent conflict. The substantial quantities of weapons held by the contending factions also facilitated the dissolution of Afghanistan as a viable state by providing ready access to vast quantities of weapons to resolve political differences through violence rather than negotiating vested interests through peaceful dialogue.

Before the disintegration of the RA, thousands of tons of small arms and ammunition had been positioned in fortifications along the main inter-city routes to facilitate rapid rearmament and resupply of RA forces on operations. This is especially true of Afghanistan's major cities, which are connected by a circular artery¹⁶. During the final year of the RA's governance, local Mujahideen commanders, who were aligned to various Mujahideen parties, gradually seized many of these fortifications with their full complement of arms and ammunition, due, in part, to defecting RA troops. One of the major periods of the diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan occurred prior to and immediately after the dissolution of President Najibullah's government. There was no controlled proliferation. On many occasions, local Mujahideen would surround a fortification and demand its surrender. The weapons and ammunition were often taken as the spoils of war and either kept for personal use by local warlords and their fighters, or sold to the highest bidder, whether they were aligned to a party or not. Many of these weapons turned up in the arms bazaars scattered throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces in Pakistan¹⁷.

During the Soviet occupation, many Mujahideen commanders built underground bases that included storage areas for arms and ammunition. Ahmad Shah Masood also established secret hiding places for arms caches around the Panjshir Valley to provide a ready supply of arms, ammunition and other provisions whilst

defending against numerous Soviet offensives. Upon entering Kabul on 25 April 1992, Masood secured his rear with large caches of “rockets, small arms, ammunition, rations, fuel, and cash”¹⁸ that were hidden at sites around the Panjshir Valley and the approaches to it, in case he needed to retreat, as he did in September 1996 when the Taliban captured Kabul; which is indicative of his understanding that securing Kabul was only going to be a temporary affair to act as leverage for political positioning in future power sharing.

The dissolution of the RA, and the acquisition of vast quantities of heavy conventional weapons and ammunition, such as jet fighters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, BPMs and BMDs, and an array of artillery, facilitated the adaptive development of the Mujahideen towards the conventional realities of warfare. One of the most significant changes to the Afghan conflict was territorial acquisition and consolidation by Mujahideen factions. Previously, the Mujahideen were not able to hold vast tracts of territory permanently due to their disadvantage in aerial and armoured weaponry. Now, however, the factions swiftly Balkanized Afghanistan between themselves, and therefore metamorphasised into semi-conventional and semi-guerrilla forces. Nevertheless, small arms and light weapons were still the primary weapons of choice in much of the fighting, and similarly, the majority of external military assistance was as such.

Prior to 1992, Kabul had sustained minimal damage because of Mujahideen rocketing due to the establishment of, and steady extension of, a number of concentric defensive rings around the city. Upon the defeat of the communists and during Masood’s occupation of the capital, the erosion of such defences was considerable. Hekmatyar’s rejection of the 26 April 1992 Peshawar Accords was an inevitable outcome of Masood’s rapid military takeover of Kabul. Immediately afterwards¹⁹, and upon Rabbani’s assumption as President in June 1992, Hekmatyar launched a massive bombardment of Kabul²⁰ using much of his newly acquired conventional arsenal, including multi-barrelled rocket launchers, and long-range artillery from the southern suburbs of Kabul and his bases at Charasyab and Maidanshahr. Kabul would suffer a further nine years of unremitting violent bombardment at the hands of Hekmatyar, the Taliban, and later Masood. During Hekmatyar’s period alone (1992-1995), Kabul lost close to 50,000 civilian lives²¹ from rocketing, artillery shelling, and aerial bombing.

As soon as the rocketing started, the fiction of peaceful alliances between the factions was glaringly obvious. When *Hizb-i Wahdat*, which largely controlled the Hazara south-western Kabul, and Sayyaf’s Saudi-backed *Ittehad-i-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan* (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) began fighting each other, they were subsequently joined by other factions that inevitably led to Kabul being literally *Beirutized*²² as opposing factions carved up the city with street fighting, roadblocks, and tanks at every major road junction. Continuous bombardment had reduced over 80 percent of the city’s buildings to rubble by 1996²³. With the addition of the incessant street fighting, over half the population of 1.2 million²⁴ was forced to flee. The remainder were forced to cower in the ruins. The rest of Afghanistan’s urban and rural areas similarly fell into chaotic ethnic and political disintegration. Upon the fall of the RA government, Kandahar, Afghanistan’s primary Pushtun city, fell to three warlords of opposing factions. The profits of the mushrooming opium trade stimulated the political ambitions of all three factions, dominated by the Jamiat-i-

Islami affiliated warlord, Naqibullah²⁵, providing the necessary funds to acquire and maintain increasing numbers of fighters and military hardware, including SALW and major conventional weaponry. As the civil war ebbed and flowed, large shipments of arms and ammunition would often coincide with increases in conflict intensity.

7:2:2 – The Contenders

Without external backing, the establishment of a stalemate that proximated between the warring factions would not have held had one or more of the external backers dropped their clients in Afghanistan, such as when Hekmatyar began to receive consistently less funds from Pakistan due to their realignment to the Taliban. Hitherto, SALW had saturated Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the billions of dollars of arms that had entered Afghanistan since 1978 were of little use without a continuous supply of cash, ammunition, and the arming of new combatants. Consequently, Afghanistan's unstable state of affairs provided external actors ample exploitable opportunities for vested interests.

External interference in the affairs of Afghanistan has persistently been one of the foremost reasons for the re-eruption and continuation of the Afghan conflict. The withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces led to a swift de-escalation of American military and humanitarian aid to the Afghan Mujahideen and refugee population. Nevertheless, regional actors soon became increasingly involved in supporting Afghan factions that best suited their interests. The shifting focus from the superpower competition, after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the predominant rise of regional actors to secure their spheres of influence in Afghanistan vis-a-vis their regional adversaries is a reflection of the centrality of Afghanistan in regional affairs as a buffer between the South Asian, Central Asian and Persian Gulf security complexes, as advocated by Buzan and Wæver's *Regional Complex Theory*²⁶. Therefore, in an atmosphere of incessantly shifting alliances, the pattern of external support also became increasingly complex. The Saudis were directly supporting Abdur Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami, yet, were also supporting Hekmatyar indirectly through Pakistan's ISI whilst these two parties were often in conflict, especially when Sayyaf aligned with Rabbani's government in opposition to Hekmatyar. Between 1991 and 1993, Hekmatyar received the lion's share of Saudi aid to all the Sunni Afghan factions, which according to press accounts amounted to about U.S. \$2 billion²⁷. Shortly after Masood's criticism of Iran's interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs through its proxy, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jamiat-i-Islami received approximately U.S. \$150 million in Saudi aid between 1993 and 1994²⁸.

7:2:2:1 – Pakistan

Pakistan, with Saudi backing, readily took the reins from the Americans to support Hekmatyar against, what was emerging as, a government by ethnic minorities. Pushtun officers in Pakistan's military establishment were instrumental in Pakistan's support for a Pushtun-led Afghan government. However, the situation in Pakistan was multifaceted. Apart from official government policy, numerous other sub-national agencies and actors were also involved in promoting their own interests in Afghanistan after the collapse of the communists. For example, the provincial governments of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Baluchistan tended to have different agendas and criteria for policy from the federal government and other provinces. Very large refugee

populations and long borders with Afghanistan burdened both provinces with associated problems that the other provinces were largely free from. Pakistan's religious parties and their national constituencies supported different factions for different reasons; for example, Pakistan's *Jamaat-e-Islami* (Islamic Society) favoured Hekmatyar, while the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islami* (Society of Islamic Scholars, JUI, led by Fazal ur-Rahman) supported the Taliban after their emergence in late 1994. In addition, the military tended to have a different agenda from the civilian government. After late 1994, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Maj. General ® Naseerullah Babar, saw the Taliban as a potential opportunity to open up Central Asia's vast resources²⁹.

7:2:2:2 – Iran

Iran had hitherto been involved in its own war against Iraq, but, increasingly, its attention was turning to influencing events in its eastern neighbour. Initially, Iran provided financial and military assistance to the variegated Shia Mujahideen groups that formed to fight against the USSR, until it helped form the Hizb-i Wahdat, under Abdul Ali Mazari. Upon the dissolution of the communist government in Afghanistan, Iran soon arose to become the main patron of the Shia factions and the Persian speaking minorities (the Tajiks and Uzbeks) against the Pakistani-Saudi backed Pushtun factions. Sunni Saudi rationale focused upon reducing Shia Iranian influence by strengthening Sunni Pushtun aspirations, especially those of Abdur Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami. Iranian and Saudi support for their respective proxy clients was clearly evident during 1993 when the principle conflicting parties engaged in fighting in Kabul were Hizb-i Wahdat and Ittehad-i-Islami.

During this period of fragmentation, Ismail Khan, associated with Rabbani's Sunni Jamiat-i-Islami, tried to develop regional autonomy for Herat with Iranian aid; which, prior to its capture by the Taliban, had become a flourishing local economy. Iran's support also assisted Hizb-i Wahdat in the development of a semiautonomous Hazarajat before the Taliban finally took Bamiyan in September 1998³⁰.

7:2:2:3 – Russia – India – Uzbekistan

India and Russia also staked their claim to influence events in Afghanistan³¹. Both countries backed the Rabbani government in order to diminish Pakistan's influence and support for Hekmatyar, and hence, their desire for *strategic depth* against India.

During the Soviet occupation, north-western Afghanistan was relatively free from major combat offensives, largely due to the formation of a number of mostly Uzbek pro-government militias. Nevertheless, seeing the ship sink, three major militias, controlled by Abdul Rashid Dostum, Abdul Rasool, and Ghaffar respectively, revolted against Najibullah and subsequently formed the *Jumbish-i-Milli-yi-Afghanistan* (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan)³². United under Dostum, the well-trained *Jumbishi* (movement) militia, numbering about 40,000 fighting men³³, created a virtual semi-autonomous fiefdom in northern Afghanistan, with its capital in Mazar-i-Sharif. The area's large gas reserves, which were scrupulously exploited by the USSR during their occupation, also supplied Dostum with revenue to equip and maintain his large fighting force.

Due to the overwhelming Uzbek ethnic composition of the *Jumbish*, Uzbekistan entered the Afghan affray and became the militia's natural patron, satisfying its own regional ambitions through militarily assisting Dostum with arms, ammunition, and fuel, and thereby extending its influence beyond the Oxus. Human Rights Watch representatives have also noted the maintenance and servicing of Dostum's small air force, acquired upon revolting against Najibullah, in the large military air and land base in the garrison town of Termez³⁴.

7:3 – The Proxy War Part 3 – The Taliban Era (1994-2001)

The breakdown of socio-political order and the practical collapse of the Afghan State in the literal sense, due to the expanding ethnic fissures that gave rise to intense internecine conflict, inexorably brought about a sense of civil helplessness and desire for change. Socio-political and economic reconstruction is an inevitable outcome of human interactions that have reached a destructive zenith. The emergence of a faction that propounded such virtues was, therefore perceived as representing the best interests of Afghan society. The religious priests and students that characterized this faction, the *Taliban*, were initially held in high regard as they swept through a swathe of southern Afghanistan with little or no opposition until they reached the boundaries of the Pushtun hinterland. The introduction of yet another faction into the Afghan quagmire had several consequences that ensured yet further proliferation of SALW, but also *encouraged* the reduction of the diffusion of SALW within the territories that the Taliban controlled.

7:3:1 – Introduction

The period from 1994 to 2001 illustrates the continuation of the Afghan conflict regardless of the introduction of a force whose initial goal was to cause its cessation. In relation to the proliferation of SALW, which is the primary concern of this study, the degree of diffusion was considerably less than during the period of communist governance (1978-1979, and 1989-1992) and the Soviet occupation (1979-1989). The following section covers the military support that the various factions received, whether in the form of financial aid, which was used to maintain their military machines and political organisations, or direct military supplies, which includes the supply of arms and ammunition. The regional and international *raison d'être* and the nature of military support, from various external patrons, will also be amplified to illustrate the complexity of any attempt to resolve the on-going proliferation of SALWs in Afghanistan.

Due to the failure of Hekmatyar to gain significant ground against the well entrenched Northern Alliance (an ever-changing coalition of factions centred around Jamiat-i-Islami), military assistance from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was gradually redirected towards the Taliban, who had rapidly acquired most of the Pushtun territories without much fighting. The perceived threat of the Taliban's rapid advance induced a number of reluctant countries to initiate greater deliveries of arms and ammunition, and at times, direct military support to the diminishing factions holding out under the grandly named, yet practically defeated, umbrella organisation, the Northern Alliance. Without external military and financial support, the vestiges of the old Mujahideen factions would not have held against the Taliban's onslaught. However, this is also true of the Taliban's advance itself.

7:3:1:1 – The Taliban Emerge

The Taliban emerged in response to the dire nature of Afghanistan's internal socio-political, ethnic and cultural upheaval. Reassertion of Pushtun dominance, disguised by the initial veneer of religious purity, was an inevitable consequence of the political occupation of Kabul by the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, in hindsight, the Taliban's *raison d'être* was to *right the wrongs* of the devastating internecine violence after the fall of the communist government in 1992. In this respect, their untarnished Islamic image supported their meteoric rise. Due to the scope of this study, further analyses on the socio-political, cultural, and religious ramifications of the rise of the Taliban will be limited to the role within the process of SALW proliferation³⁵. Nevertheless, the military evolution of the Taliban is grounded in the socio-political, cultural, and religious state of affairs of Afghanistan and its regional neighbours.

The interlaced network of hundreds of *madrassas* (religious schools, usually situated within Mosque compounds or adjacent to them) in present Afghanistan, the FATA, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan, have been the traditional recruiting grounds for Mujahideen fighters for almost two centuries. The call for *Jihad* was constantly vibrating within the confines of such schools since before the British colonisation of India. All the Mujahideen Parties had elements of *talibs* (students) within their ranks. However, these Talibs were often regarded as the most disciplined soldiers within Mujahideen ranks. Upon the departure of the Soviet Union and the fall of the RA government, many returned to their madrassas to continue their studies having fulfilled their religious *jihadi* duties. The post-1992 internecine Mujahideen violence throughout Afghanistan generated disenchantment with the Mujahideen Parties and their flagrant violation of Islamic laws. The Singesar episode became the catalyst that would ignite the Talibs into action; where after the abduction and repeated rape of two teenage girls by rogue Mujahideen near Kandahar in the spring of 1994, the head of the local madrassa, and former *Harakat-i-Inqilab-i Islami* (The Movement of Islamic Revolution) commander, Mullah Mohammad Omar, responded by organising a group of thirty 'talibs' to mount a rescue, of which only 14 were armed³⁶. A gun-battle ensued, resulting in the freeing of the hostages, the hanging of the rogue Mujahideen commander from a tank-barrel, and the birth of the Taliban. The effects of the proliferation of SALWs and other heavier weaponry are evident from this and the countless other incidents that occurred because of the breakdown of law and order and the enforcement of the *law of the gun*. The Taliban were therefore partially a creation of the detrimental consequences of the proliferation of SALW³⁷.

The emergence of the Taliban signalled the realignment of Pakistani and Saudi financial and military assistance; while the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali, began the painstaking process of diplomatic reintegration after a decade of military misrule forced Pakistan to endure years of political isolation. The Central Asian Republics (CAR) were, therefore, viewed as perfect candidates for Pakistan's expanding trade relations³⁸. Concurrently, the Interior Minister of Pakistan, Maj. General @ Naseerullah Babar, created the Afghan Trade Development Cell within his ministry to encourage trade route development to the CAR; but, more importantly, according to Ahmad Rashid (2001), to provide funds for the Taliban³⁹.

Naseerullah Babar's much cited *convoy incident*⁴⁰ became a public announcement of the opening-up of Central Asian trade relations with the sub-continent and the intended construction of road and rail links though Afghanistan. Whether it was a Pakistani orchestrated event, or a coincidence, the Taliban's intervention, after a rogue warlord seized the thirty-truck convoy⁴¹, achieved Pakistan-Saudi recognition as a possible alternative to the increasingly unreliable Hekmatyar. This was confirmed when the Taliban were able to take Kandahar after three days of fighting, and two dead warlords⁴². Western observers also noted that the majority of the Taliban that captured Kandahar were also armed with brand new AK47 and AK74 assault rifles⁴³. Griffin (2001) notes that the success of the hitherto unknown Taliban may have been partly coordinated by the conspiring hand of the Pakistani military⁴⁴; that is, the convoy may not have been carrying goods for the Central Asian Republics, but may have been a decoy that was secretly carrying Taliban troops or Pakistani soldiers disguised as such to tempt Afghan warlords into a conflagration, and therefore, capture Kandahar. In addition, on 9 October, Mullah Omar had already announced that a force of 1,500 Taliban would provide security by operating checkpoints on a road from the Pakistani border up to Girishk⁴⁵, a town 90 km northwest of Kandahar.

Whether or not Pakistan played a substantial part in the fighting, the Taliban were not short of weapons or financial aid. For example, Pakistani traders and Pushtun run trucking cartels provided strong financial support for the Taliban to encourage the opening of the Central Asian markets⁴⁶. Traders regularly pay contributions to madrassas on the border areas that are run or affiliated to different political parties, hence supplementing the Taliban's income. Later, the Taliban received revenues from their exploitation of the Afghan Transit Trade, the imposition of duties on smuggled consumer goods, and even the taxation of opium⁴⁷. Two weeks prior to the convoy incident, on 12 October 1994, they captured the border town of Spin Boldak with some 200 men and an alleged artillery barrage from Pakistan⁴⁸; after which they captured the large ISI-built, Hizb-i Islami run, Pasha munitions depot at Shin Naray, with an estimated storage of 800 truckloads of arms and 15,000 truckloads of ammunition⁴⁹. This event is also illustrative of the redistribution of weapons once they have entered the conflict zone. The storage of large quantities of arms and ammunition is always susceptible to seizure by opposing parties, and can, therefore, lead to the uncontrolled diffusion of weapons to non-combatants within the civilian population and/or the encouragement of future diffusion to new combatants in the re-eruption of the conflict. The capture of Kandahar also produced large quantities of weapons, including 6 MiG-21 fighter jets, a total of 6 Mi-17 transport helicopters and dozens of tanks, BMPs and other armoured vehicles that were captured by Mujahideen forces upon the overthrow of the communists in 1992⁵⁰.

The Taliban's installation of a six man *Shura* (consultative council) immediately initiated the process of demobilising and disarming Kandahar with a limited force numbering only 1,500 fighting men⁵¹. However, new recruits and defectors swelled the ranks of the Taliban to about 2,500-3,000 fighters soon after the capture of Afghanistan's second city⁵². The Taliban's *raison d'être* for such actions were manifold. Not only did they seek to reduce the lawlessness within the city, they also sought to negate the possible regrouping of former Mujahideen who may have threatened their consolidation of the city. However, after years of

bloodshed, lawlessness, looting, ruthlessly overt vendettas and feuding, and bitter infighting, the Taliban were initially welcomed with open arms. The security they offered was initially perceived as being of greater value than the prohibitions that they strictly enforced upon entering the city. With Mullah Omar's announcement for 4,000 more fighters to fill the ranks, in November 1994⁵³, especially from Fazal ur-Rahman's Jamiat-e Ulema Islam madrassas in Baluchistan⁵⁴, the avalanche that was the Taliban, swiftly captured the majority of Southern Afghanistan like a swarm by the end of December 1994, with the exception of the fiercely contested Helmand province led by the Akhundzadeh clan of the *Alizai* tribe, which finally fell after two months of intense fighting; and only then, after negotiations. It is also worth noting that, with the exception of Zabul and Uruzgan provinces, all the other acquisitions of the Taliban involved hostilities and loss of life.

Following their southern successes, the Taliban advanced on Kabul and eventually took Hekmatyar's base at Charasyab along with extensive arms supplies in February 1995. Throughout their drive, the Taliban were able to capture massive quantities of weapons through bribes and their increasing military might. What is certain at this point is that the Taliban would not have been able to push forward so rapidly through Southern Afghanistan without extensive supplies of fuel, rations, ammunition, and especially cash from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban were so successful in their recruitment drive throughout their natural reservoir of madrasa networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan that they had swollen to 20-25,000 fighting men by the end of February 1995⁵⁵; for example, a JUI affiliated madrasa network based at the *Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania* in Akhora Khattak⁵⁶, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, was shut down, and its entire student body of over 2,500 students was sent to Afghanistan to support the Taliban after the Mazar-i-Sharif debacle in 1997⁵⁷. However, Davis (1998) notes that from Defence Ministry sources in Kabul the figure was actually 15,000 in the spring of 1995, but increased to 25,000 by the end of the year⁵⁸. Nevertheless, even though droves of young Talibs joined the movement; prudently, the Taliban did not exclude former Mujahideen and Khalq members of the Afghan Army and security services.

The major breakthrough for the Taliban as a national military enterprise was not the relatively easy occupation of Pushtun southern Afghanistan and its associated inundation of weapons, but the capture of the comparatively liberal mixed minority and Pushtun western province and city of Herat on 05 September 1995. Herat was the backbone of Northern Alliance's terrestrial supplies from Iran. Its permanent seizure concluded any further direct terrestrial deliveries from Iran. In addition to their existing neglected armoured capability, Herat's massive weapons stores further consolidated the Taliban to the extent that they could now integrate their fledgling multi-dimensional Kandahari air force with that of Herat's. However, the expertise of its Talibs was limited to small arms, and not the sophistication of fighter jets. For this, the Taliban had turned to the former communist Defence Minister, General Shah Nawaz Tanai, who, according to *Jane's Intelligence Review*, was rallying former *Khalq* members to provide the Taliban with the necessary military skills to command the ground and the air⁵⁹. The Taliban's rapid advance was more a sign of their adaptation to the realities of conventional warfare rather than the *hit-and-run* guerrilla tactics that many of the Taliban had initially experienced during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989). The addition of a sizable number of ex-communist regime officers, particularly Pushtun Khalq, facilitated their transition to high-speed warfare⁶⁰.

The argument that Pakistan may have been the primary inducer of this transition may be partially untrue when we recognise the input of large numbers of conventionally trained Khalq into the ranks of the Taliban. However, as Davis (1998) asserts, it is highly plausible that General Shah Nawaz Tanai, as a guest of the ISI, could not have reactivated his network of ex-communist officers without the direct involvement of the ISI itself⁶¹. In addition, during research visits to Afghanistan, numerous officials readily dissuaded further investigation of the whereabouts of General Tanai⁶². Pakistani aid in decisive logistics support and Talib-Khalqi skill in adapting to high-mobility warfare were to be the decisive factors that propelled the Taliban forward, especially in their unpredictable Blitzkrieg on Herat after their earlier defeat in April 1995.

The capture of Jalalabad and Kabul by the Taliban, on 11 and 27 September 1996 respectively, concluded their run for the seat of government, and was facilitated by increased manning levels in order to satisfy strategic requirements. Reports of 1,000 fighters entering Afghanistan were prevalent in the month prior to the fall of the capital⁶³. The fall of Kabul was not primarily due to the advantage in numbers that the Taliban had over Masood's forces, but because of their fluid approach, high mobility, and greater command and control capabilities that enabled them to out-general Masood and his forces. According to Rashid (1998) the Taliban's entire air force, and large parts of its armoured and heavy artillery divisions were being operated by former Khalqis⁶⁴. The initial force to enter Kabul was composed of just 3-5,000 highly trained and highly mobile special infantry, which pursued Masood's retreating forces in a clean-up campaign to secure Kabul and its access routes. The secondary and much larger force composed of volunteers with only basic training, raw recruits from the madrassas, and defecting Mujahideen from Masood's forces and other factions were engaged in territorial consolidation and security enforcement operations. Leading up to and during the Kabul campaign, the Taliban utilised a new form of high-mobility warfare using their profusely available supply of radio or satellite phone connected four-wheel drive pick-up trucks with a small troop of between 8 to 10 experienced fighters carrying personal small arms such as the AK47 or AK74 and RPGs, and infantry support weapons such as general purpose machine guns. The pick-ups often included mounted heavy machine guns of various types such as the truck-mounted ZU-2 anti-aircraft cannon, and sometimes BM-21 MBRLs⁶⁵. This far greater organised high-speed mobility overwhelmed the static fighting tactics that the Mujahideen had hitherto utilised after the fall of the communist government⁶⁶.

The combination of military training, combat experience, and access to arms and ammunition of various types by ideologically motivated foreign *volunteers* can also result in the destabilisation of their home countries upon their return. In this respect, the physical manifestation of the proliferation of SALW within an existing conflict zone poses a serious regional and international threat as supply lines begin to be channelled to new zones of instability, causing disruption to the existing status quo and providing a potential for new conflict zones to arise, thereby degrading attempts to resolve the primary conflict as a two way flow arises from the solidification of new arms channels.

7:3:1:2 – The Taliban Recruitment

In order to continue northwards to capture the predominantly Uzbek and Hazara territories, which were captured in August and September 1998 respectively, the Taliban continued their recruitment drive. By the end of the century, the Taliban had secured between 90-95 percent of the country and could call upon about forty-five thousand fighters⁶⁷. The remaining pocket of Northern Alliance Mujahideen held out in north-eastern Afghanistan under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood, but as of June 2001, had still not retaken Taloqan, capital of Takhar province, after its capture by the Taliban on 5 September 2000. In retrospect, a trend can be recognised whereby the Taliban's recruitment of fighters of various types, increased in intensity shortly before large-scale offensives occurred, such as before the drive to Kabul, and the campaigns for Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan. In the same vein, prior to the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif, and two weeks before Shiberghan fell, the headquarters of Dostum, "hundreds of Pakistani volunteers were airlifted into the city of Herat and then trucked to Herat to bolster the Taliban push"⁶⁸. Many of these new recruits had very little training and were generally used as cannon-fodder for human-wave assaults, especially over minefields, and for the enforcement of security and the Taliban's strict religious edicts⁶⁹.

During numerous research visits to Afghanistan, the author closely observed many new recruits passing through basic training, which involved regular exercise, weapons training, and religious *education* (more closely associated with religious indoctrination than education). Weapons training varied and depended upon the calibre of the recruit. All recruits were trained with the standard weapon, the 7.62 AK-47 assault rifle. However, others also trained in the use of RPK light machine guns, the 12.7 mm DShK and 14.5 mm ZPU-1/2 (Heavy Machine Guns), 82 mm and 102 mm mortars, and the RPG-7.

Most of the recruits that were observed by the author were aged between 14 and 25, and had an air of religious idealism about them. The benefits of *paradise* and the rewards of martyrdom were regularly incorporated into their education programmes to instil commitment to the cause, and to reduce the *life-instinct* so that the talib would readily sacrifice his life for their perceived greater purpose when needed⁷⁰. The consequences of such organised training programmes have repercussions in wider society. When one's own material or physical life is not as valued as a metaphysical or supernatural life, the value placed upon the physical lives of others is significantly reduced, especially in a war torn society where the value of life has been considerably lowered already through desensitisation to continuous violence and insecurity. Such indoctrination was reinforced throughout the day through lectures after regular collective prayers, which also reinforced group cohesion. Individuals having gone through such training would perceive each other as having attained a common group identity through which they could associate. Those not having done so were often viewed as the opposition, and at best with apprehension when confronted. Therefore, albeit organised, many young recruits functioning as law enforcers were not able to relate to the dissimilar behaviours, attitudes, and mental reasoning of the people that they were providing security for, especially in the non-Pushtun ethnic areas and cities. This facilitated an in-group and out-group dynamic to take hold and led to a general heavy-handed approach being undertaken by the Talibs when enforcing their particularly limited interpretation of Islamic laws upon others. These measures gradually alienated the civilian populations of the largely non-Pushtun territories that the

Taliban had conquered; however, this also occurred in Pushtun areas to a lesser extent. Defections from within the ranks of the Taliban also transpired because of their heavy-handed approach to local customs and sensitivities⁷¹.

Not all Talibs were of Afghan origin. The Taliban allowed foreign Islamic parties to set up bases in Afghanistan for training purposes. In return, the Taliban gained by receiving a ready supply of self-financed and self-supporting fighting units that also participated in active front-line service. During a number of visits to Afghanistan, the author was assigned (as an independent observer) to different units from *Harakat ul-Ansar* (Movement of the Partisans) (1997-1998), and later *Harakat ul-Mujahideen* (Movement of the Holy Warriors) (1999)⁷², initially in their training bases and offices on the outskirts of Jalalabad and in Kabul, and later on the front lines north of Kabul. From such research visits an understanding of their training and daily activities was acquired. They were independent fighting units with bases assigned to them in Kabul, from which they rotated during active and passive duties. During one research visit between June and September 1999, the author was informed of the activities of other foreign groups, such as the *Arabs*, that were assigned to parallel positions. Although the groups were mutually aware of each other, and were engaged in mutual communication and training, they were not connected politically or administratively⁷³. The Taliban recognised the disparate nature of the variegated political parties that were assisting them, and regulated their assignments according to their strategic value and the fighting potential of each party. The parties themselves gained real on-the-ground combat experience, which they used in their respective home environments; for example, *Harakat ul-Ansar* and *Harakat ul-Mujahideen* were Pakistan-Kashmiri based⁷⁴, and were engaged in active operations in Indian occupied Kashmir.

In 1998, *Harakat-ul Mujahideen* was recognised by the United States as a *terrorist* organisation due to its close affiliation with Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda and became one of the targets of the American bombing of Afghanistan, particularly the Khost province, on 20 August 1998⁷⁵. Estimates as to the strengths of such parties in Afghanistan vary greatly. The Human Rights Watch report, *Crisis of Impunity* (2001), notes that 8-15,000 troops were foreigners, including Arabs from the Gulf and North Africa, whilst up to 30 percent of Taliban fighting strength was made up of Pakistanis serving in units organised by political parties⁷⁶. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia* (2001) notes that up to 10,000 Pakistani *volunteers* fought in the 1999 summer offensive alone⁷⁷, and that there were only a limited number of Arabs (500) fighting as the *055 Brigade* under the command of Osama bin Laden⁷⁸. Estimates of Arab fighters increased by mid-2001, where *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia* (2001) has noted that there may have been up to 3,000 combatants⁷⁹. The remaining *volunteers* may have been involved in general security, static guard, rear support, and administrative duties in Taliban occupied areas⁸⁰. However, the Taliban have made a trend of utilising its reservoir of volunteers on the frontlines and in offensives, in other words, as cannon-fodder.

7:3:2 – Arms and Ammunition Provided by Pakistan

7:3:2:1 – Direct Military Support

Pakistan's extensive involvement in Afghanistan's affairs has not been limited to political, moral and financial assistance, but has included definite direct military support of Taliban operations from 1994 to 2001, including the transportation of Taliban troops to and from frontline positions, direct fire support, high-level military planning, and oversight and direction of operations by both the ISI and Pakistan Army. According to the Human Rights Watch report, *Crisis of Impunity* (2001), Pakistan was suspected of directly supporting the Taliban's *disciplined* operations when they successfully captured the Northern town of Taloqan in September 2000⁸¹. The U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, accused Pakistan of direct support for Taliban operations in his report in November 2000⁸². To this extent, President Musharraf's government had openly announced its support for the Taliban, and overtly assisted them during the July-September 2000 campaign⁸³.

Saudi involvement in Afghanistan dates back to the communist coup of April 1978. During the Afghan-Soviet war, the Saudis provided more military and financial assistance than even the US. Since the fall of the communist PDPA government, the Saudis have been instrumental in sustaining the conflict, with tacit support from the US, in order to contain Iranian influence and its growing involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs, and hence, maintain a proxy war. Once the Taliban had become Pakistan's proxies, the Saudis followed suit. Shortly after the Head of Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Agency, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, visited Pakistan in July 1996, only a few months before the Taliban captured Kabul, the Saudi's became the Taliban's primary financial supporters. Western reporters later recognised Saudi C-130 Hercules transport aircraft delivering small arms and artillery ammunition to the Taliban at Kandahar airport⁸⁴.

Only a day after the Taliban's disastrous, and temporary, first seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif on 25 May 1997, the Saudis became one of only three countries within the global community, alongside Pakistan and the UAE, to recognise the movement as the sovereign government of Afghanistan. The Saudis also directly funded the Taliban's military campaigns by providing them ample financial resources to buy off opposition commanders prior to planned offensives. However, due to the Taliban's refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden, and American pressure, the Saudi's eventually withdrew their financial assistance to the Taliban in mid-September 1998⁸⁵. Nevertheless, significant funds continued to flow into Taliban coffers from sympathetic private individuals from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries⁸⁶.

Other countries also assisted the rise of the Taliban through direct and indirect financial and military aid; for example, according to Larry Goodson (2001), Ukraine provided the Taliban with financial support, most probably to offset the support that Russia was giving to the NA, and hence, counter their continued influence in Afghanistan⁸⁷. Moreover, the United States did not initially abrogate the Taliban. In fact, they viewed the movement as a potential counter to the Iranian influence in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and gave them political support. According to Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1996 the USA supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as

anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western”⁸⁸. Although anti-Iranian and anti-Shia, the Taliban were vehemently anti-Western. The US rapidly realised that their hopes for the construction of trans-Afghan oil and gas pipelines from the Central Asian Republics to Pakistan clouded the realities of the movement’s intentions and practices. Feminist lobbies soon drove the Clinton administration to re-evaluate the Taliban’s treatment of women and its growing human rights violations in conjunction with the emerging threat posed by *Osama bin Laden* and the *Afghan-Arabs*. The US soon found itself facing an about-turn on its initial stance.

Subsequent American pressure further degraded the Taliban’s financial support base when they imposed unilateral sanctions in a belated long-term response to the suicide bombing of the two U.S. embassies in Kenya (the *Holy Kaaba* operation) and Tanzania (the *al-Aqsa* operation) on 07 August 1998 (on the eighth anniversary of the arrival of US troops on Saudi Arabian soil) by operatives from the nebular Al Qaeda network⁸⁹; the immediate response being the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1189 on 13 August 1998 condemning the bombings, but without mention of al-Qaeda⁹⁰. The next day, 14 August 1998, the US had concluded that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda had been responsible for the bombings⁹¹ and began to devise a *proportional response*, which came in the form of cruise missile strikes on the Al Qaeda and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen training camps in Jalalabad and Khost on 20 August 1998⁹². US sanctions included the freezing of all Taliban assets in the United States, and the prohibition of all commercial and financial interactions between the US and the Taliban⁹³. The U.S. then pursued the matter in the United Nations Security Council, which initially pressured the Taliban to conclude a ceasefire with the United Front and demanded “that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice”⁹⁴. In response to their failure to comply with such measures and their refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden, the United Nations Security Council imposed progressively more comprehensive sanctions on the Taliban under Resolutions 1267 (1999)⁹⁵, 1333 (2000)⁹⁶, and 1363 (2001), including an arms embargo⁹⁷. Nevertheless, arms and munitions still passed through Pakistan to the Taliban. An arms embargo was not placed on the United Front⁹⁸. These sanctions are still binding on all members of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, given the continued existence of the Taliban and the failure of the US to dent the al-Qaeda organisation through their ill-conceived *War on Terror*.

7:3:2:2 – Arms Supplies

The Pakistan’s long held policy of providing military assistance to those parties that held the line was also applied to the Taliban. Provisions were supplied to the Taliban in quantities that were regarded as adequate to the Taliban’s requirements for given operations and in given circumstances in order to retain a degree of control over operations. However, the Taliban became impatient, displaying a large degree of independent thinking according to their own interests and objectives, and therefore, began establishing an independent procurement capability. Independent contractors, often former Pakistani intelligence and army officers, who were sympathetic to the Taliban’s cause profited as intermediaries by creating new import-export companies or joining existing companies interested in private security and import-export operations, and utilising their existing networks of contacts that had been established during the Afghan-Soviet war to locate and purchase

the arms and ammunition required by the Taliban's war machine⁹⁹. The shipments often came from China and Hong Kong to the Pakistani port of Karachi and then moved uninspected, as per the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, to Afghanistan¹⁰⁰. Nevertheless, during April and May 2001 HRW sources noted that roughly thirty heavily laden trucks carrying ammunition of various types, including RPG rounds, were crossing the Pakistan border into Afghanistan daily¹⁰¹. In addition to these overt deliveries, the highly porous mountainous border facilitates a continuous flow of smuggled goods, including arms and ammunition, which are regularly purchased from the arms workshops in the semi-autonomous *tribal areas*.

The majority of arms used by the Taliban and Northern Alliance (or alternatively called the United Front – UF) date back to the Afghan-Soviet war. *Jane's World Armies* (1999) lists a number of infantry weapons that all parties to the conflict had been using. These weapons may well be prolific amongst the civilian population (in association with tribal social structures) and the armouries of local warlords to this day. In addition to these weapons, SALW and ammunition are continually being smuggled into the country by all parties (see, Appendix II, Table 7.1 – The Most Common Small Arms and Light Weapons in use in Afghanistan)¹⁰².

The 9-11 attacks of the world trade centre complex and the Pentagon in the US led to a direct confrontation between the United States and the Taliban because of their uncompromising stance towards the extradition of Osama bin Laden. It was inevitable that the Taliban Government would collapse given the overwhelming military power of US retribution in the Afghan-US War (2001), during which the demise of the *Northern Alliance-United Front* was dramatically reversed.

7:3:3 – The United Front – Masood's Iranian, Indian, and Russian Connections

7:3:3:1 – Introduction

During the civil war period, following the departure of the communist regime, the intense rivalry between the variegated contending Mujahideen factions had left Afghanistan in a state of socio-political, cultural, and ethnic fragmentation, and economic collapse. The inevitable rise of the Taliban and its meteoric success at providing a semblance of peace and security within the Pushtun dominant areas, and the solidification of its mandate for the whole of Afghanistan, especially after the capture of Kabul in September 1996, forced the minority ethnic factions to go on the defensive and form a loose coalition (the Northern Alliance, aka, the *United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan* – or United Front) of formerly conflicting factions¹⁰³ to contain the *Islamic*, albeit, predominantly Pushtun, resurgence. A number of natural sponsors, including, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Slovakia¹⁰⁴, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan¹⁰⁵ coalesced around the Northern Alliance to provide it with the necessary active moral, financial, and military assistance to contain the rapid advance, and perceived threat, of the Taliban. However, the factions comprising the UF did not merge their political and military command structures; they did not have a unified military strategy; rarely undertook joint military operations; and, they were generally patronised by different countries according to the latter's own vested interests, which often put the UF factions in conflict with each other. It was a very loose union.

7:3:3:2 – Support

7:3:3:2:1 – Direct Military Support

In support of the UF, Iran has also clashed with the Taliban on the Afghan-Iranian border on several occasions¹⁰⁶. One of the most serious was during the build-up of some 250,000 Iranian troops on the Afghan border in retaliation for the killing of Iranian diplomats and journalists during the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif at the end of August 1998¹⁰⁷, which also induced United Nations Security Council Resolution 1193 on 28 August 1998 condemning the capture of the Iranian Consulate and the abduction of the consular staff and Iranian diplomats (since, the whereabouts of the diplomats was unknown at the time)¹⁰⁸.

7:3:3:2:2 – Funds

In order to sustain their struggle against the Taliban, the UF had been able to fund itself through the mining and export of raw unpolished precious stones, such as lapis lazuli and emeralds, from the Panjshir Valley and other UF-held territory¹⁰⁹. The UF also had the monopoly of gasoline and diesel fuel importation from Tajikistan and the production and sale of salt¹¹⁰. The funds necessary to continue to fund their war machines, however, have largely been attained through external support. Ironically, it was after the fall of Herat that Masood's military position became more tenable. He was inundated with offers of military support from Albania, Bulgaria, India, Iran, Russia, and even the Ukraine¹¹¹ due to the threat that the Taliban's rapid advance posed.

7:3:3:2:3 – Transportation and Routes (Supply Lines)

The number of available UF supply routes has been indirectly proportional to the Taliban's territorial gains. Iran's primary land route focused upon Herat before it fell to the Taliban in 1995. The UF's other routes were primarily air-based, through which they were regularly supplied with Iranian or Russian brokered arms and ammunition supplies from other countries whose sole access to Afghanistan was via air. Although information as to the supply of arms from other countries is limited, the forced landing of a chartered Russian Il-76 transport aircraft carrying Albanian ammunition to Masood's forces in Kabul, by a Taliban MiG on 3 August 1995¹¹² is illustrative of the UF's core faction's willingness to receive arms from any quarter. The loss of Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Bamiyan, and Kunduz to the Taliban, deprived the UF of resupply from serviceable and protected airfields. The Taliban's seizure of the Termez border crossing from Uzbekistan further degraded the UF's ability to resupply itself. After 1998, the sole surviving route left for the UF was across the mountainous border with Tajikistan, which held only one permanent bridge across the Amu Darya at Ishkashim, with a number of other crossing points using towed or motorised pontoon barges that have a capacity for carrying several metric tonnes.

The lack of available supply routes had a debilitating affect upon the UF's ability to conduct offensive operations against the Taliban¹¹³. With no secure airfields available, Iranian arms transfers required transportation through five countries before crossing the Amu Darya. Such a supply route is susceptible to the fragile political atmosphere of the transiting countries. Before the fall of Taloqan in September 2000, Iranian

construction engineers had been witnessed working to widen the access points to the bridge at Dasht-i Qala, and in the construction of a new bridge across the Amu Darya¹¹⁴ to facilitate the land supply route to the UF. The increased capacity provided by the bridges would have allowed direct access to the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, along the A385 highway from Dasht-i Qala, and to the joint Russian-Tajik military base and airfield at Kuliob.

7:3:3:3 – Primary Suppliers – Iran

The desire to provide assistance to their natural clients (the Shia and Persian-speaking population of Afghanistan), to secure influence, and to counter Saudi and Pakistani¹¹⁵ involvement has induced progressively greater Iranian involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs since the end of the Iran-Iraq war¹¹⁶, and especially after the overthrow of the communist PDPA regime; the primary beneficiary of Iranian support, before 1995, being, Hizb-i-Wahdat. The rise of the Taliban had not alarmed the Iranian authorities until after the fall of Herat, even though they had provided ammunition and fuel for Ismail Khan's forces during the Taliban's first abortive Herat offensive in March 1995¹¹⁷, and the death of Hizb-i-Wahdat leader, Mazari, under the movement's custody. After which, the Taliban's hard-line religious approach towards the liberal Herati population caused the Iranians to view them as a serious threat to their vested interests. Iran actively encouraged anti-Taliban parties in the formation of an anti-Taliban coalition, the United Front¹¹⁸. Until the fall of Kabul, Iran overtly supplied military aid to the UF to ensure the survival of Rabbani's government, which also concluded agreements with the Iranians to train UF army officers and repatriate all Afghan refugees of military age for service in Kabul¹¹⁹. Iranian military aid, however, continued to flow to the UF in their increasingly smaller enclave in north-western Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul, as illustrated from the interception of a train, by Kyrgyz authorities in Osh, carrying a large shipment of armaments and munitions from Mashhad, Iran, to UF forces. The inventory of weapons included large quantities of explosives; 120mm mortar shells; RPG-7 grenades; F-1 hand grenades; and, 7.62 mm rifle ammunition¹²⁰. In addition, Iranian anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, such as the NRP A/P (anti-personnel) blast mine (an Iranian manufactured copy of the Israeli No. 4 A/P mine) and YM11 A/T (anti-tank) blast mine m/m (an Iranian manufactured copy of the Italian SB81 A/T mine), have been used by UF forces¹²¹. Prior to the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif, Iran was alleged to have flown 400 sorties to deliver massive quantities of weapons to the Northern Alliance, especially Hizb-i-Wahdat, in Mazar-i-Sharif, in order to shore up their defences¹²². The Taliban noted that the large volume of weapons captured in Mazar-i-Sharif also had Iranian markings¹²³.

7:3:3:3:1 – Transportation and supply by Iran

Iran made considerable use of the UF's airfields whilst they were available. Between 1996 and 1998, military supplies were openly airlifted to the northern airfields in Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan, which both hold airfields that can support large military transport aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules, An-24 and An-32. In the two weeks following the Taliban's attempted seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, dozens of Iranian aircraft landed at the city's airfield with large quantities of arms and ammunition, including, 120 mortar bombs, and 7.62 mm rifle ammunition, for the UF¹²⁴.

7:3:3:4 – Primary Suppliers – Russia

The Russian Federation has maintained a conspicuously anti-Taliban stance since the movement's capture of Kabul. Its *raison d'être* is based upon its fear of the destabilising effect that the spread of extremist Islam will have upon the Central Asian Republics, and its own on-going conflict within the Caucasus, namely, Chechen independence. Russia has not only expressed political support for the United Front, but has openly facilitated the delivery of its own¹²⁵ and Iranian arms supplies through Tajikistan, where it maintains the 201st motorised infantry division under the aegis of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. According to Human Rights Watch¹²⁶, Russian border guards patrolling the Afghan-Tajik border, numbering some 10-12,000 troops¹²⁷, have repeatedly permitted unconcealed Iranian arms to cross the Amu Darya to UF forces, in addition to aiding the maintenance of the UF's aircraft at the joint Russian-Tajik military base at Kuliob. The ability to use the Kuliob base allows the Iranians to quickly airlift war materielle to Tajikistan rather than go through a slow and tortuous land route. Furthermore, the Collective Security Agreement of the CIS, signed on 15 May 1992¹²⁸, enables Russia to multilaterally coordinate Iranian arms deliveries to the UF through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and finally Tajikistan. Russian cooperation for both land and air supplies to the UF were essential.

Russian participation has also involved direct military support through direct deliveries of weapons. Prior to the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, the Northern Alliance was receiving regular Russian Antonov and Tupolev aircraft unloading SALW, ammunition, mortars, and missiles at its Bagram Airbase north of Kabul¹²⁹. In addition, Russia's military intelligence services had been working closely with both Dostum and Masood in the arrangement of military supplies to the UF in Northern Afghanistan¹³⁰ from the Kuliob military base¹³¹. According to Human Rights Watch, witnesses have observed large quantities of heavy munitions, small arms, and their respective supplies (small arms ammunition, artillery shells, mortars, 122 mm rockets, and hand grenades) held in open storage before being ferried across the Amu Darya at Dasht-i Qala¹³².

The other important military base used as a transshipment point was the joint Russian-Kyrgyz military base at Osh, Kyrgyzstan, which is home to a Russian Army transportation battalion. Arms supplies were transported by rail from Mashhad, Iran, directly to the rail terminus at Osh, and then by road, with Russian security, to northern Afghanistan, through Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in 1998-1999¹³³.

According to the *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* (2002), Russia continued to supply the UF with military aid right up to the fall of the Taliban, when, in October 2001, they shipped military supplies worth \$30-\$40 million to strengthen the UF before their assault on the Taliban during the US bombing campaign of Afghanistan¹³⁴. Such a high level of aid illustrates the Russian government's concerns in regards to the spread of religiously motivated instability on its southern borderlands.

7:3:3:5 – Secondary Suppliers

Certain Central Asian states have given political and moral support to the United Front, but have generally refrained from providing military assistance. Their close ethnic links with the Northern Afghan population intimately binds them with the fluid Afghan conflict.

7:3:3:5:1 – Tajikistan

Tajikistan, wrought by internal instability and civil war between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the Government in the early 1990s (ending in 1997)¹³⁵, had given logistical access to its joint Russian-Tajik military facilities at Kuliob, the burden being carried by the Russians. The state of the Tajik economy and its extensive domestic divisions proscribed substantive military assistance to the United Front, as did the fact that Masood's forces aided the UTO during Tajikistan's civil war years¹³⁶. However, private contracts had been made between the UF and the national Tajik Airlines for the maintenance of its Mi-17 helicopters at Dushanbe's civil airport. The airport also acted as a transshipment point for the loading of assault rifles, RPG grenades, and small arms ammunition awaiting air-transportation to Taloqan prior to its fall to the Taliban. For the most part, Tajikistan generally acted as a facilitator of Iranian and Russian military assistance for the United Front. In addition, joint Tajik-Russian border patrols regularly engaged northbound drug smugglers in gun battles to deter further incursions from Afghanistan¹³⁷.

7:3:3:5:2 – Uzbekistan

Unlike Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, having been involved in the Afghan-Soviet War since 1979 as the bridgehead for invading Soviet forces, had given direct and active military support to the United Front, namely to Dostum's Uzbek Junbishi faction¹³⁸. The Taliban's arrival on the political scene was viewed as an immediate threat to Uzbekistan's national security. Until the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, the Uzbek government provided their brother Uzbek Junbishi forces in Afghanistan with a regular supply of arms, ammunition and fuel¹³⁹ from the large military base and airfield at the garrison town of Termez on the Amu Darya. Supplies were regularly transported across the high-volume *Friendship Bridge* to Mazar-i-Sharif¹⁴⁰. The Uzbek government also provided Dostum's forces with heavy conventional weapons such as, APCs, tank spare parts, and enabled the servicing and maintenance of Dostum's small air force at Termez airport. In cooperation with the CIS Collective Security Agreement, Uzbekistan facilitated the passage of Iranian arms and ammunition through its territory, whether by rail or road, to Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. The defeat of Dostum's Junbish forces, in August 1998, led President Karimov's government to begin a serious dialogue with the Taliban rather than actively support an anti-Taliban alliance. Nevertheless, the Uzbek government was still concerned about possible Taliban contacts with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)¹⁴¹.

7:3:3:5:3 – Turkmenistan

Although Turkmenistan had provided no direct military assistance to the United Front, it did facilitate the transportation of large volumes of military hardware from Iran through its territory to either Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan under the aegis of the CIS Collective Security Agreement coordinated by the Russian Federation. This can be concluded from the premise that the Iranian arms shipment that was seized by Kyrgyz authorities

in Osh, in 1998, must have entered Turkmenistan, which is subject to obligatory customs authentication upon entry, and transited its territory with official endorsement in order to reach its final destination, the United Front.

7:3:3:5:4 – Kyrgyzstan

Similarly, Kyrgyzstan's participation in the supply of arms is open to speculation, but evidence as to its direct military support for the United Front exists. It also facilitated, however, the delivery of Iranian and Russian arms and ammunition to United Front forces until October 1998. The 700 tons of arms and ammunition, discovered at the Osh rail terminus by MNB (Kyrgyz Ministry of National Security, formerly the Kyrgyz KGB) and customs officials on 09 October 1998, were found in crates surrounded by 300 tons of sacks of flour and registered as *Humanitarian Aid* by the Iranian Government in the form of a *Gift*¹⁴². The discovery would suggest that even though high-ranking permission had been given, such as the awareness of the Kyrgyz Ambassador in Iran, certain elements within the Kyrgyz authorities were not privy to this information. On 08 October 1998, the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Government were making misleading statements to the press; the latter noted that “the consignment was sent from Mashhad by Iranian authorities without permission of the Kyrgyz authorities”¹⁴³.

7:4 - Indigenous Production: Darra Adam Khel: The *Home Grown Weapons* – Case Study

7:4:1 - Introduction

The immense proliferation of weapons into Afghanistan and the surrounding regions is a consequence of the massive diffusion of weapons by the USSR, USA and their allies. Controls on the supply of such weapons have been limited due to their use as bargaining chips and the need to arm opposing sides as much as possible to counter each other's advantages. While the Soviets came well equipped with a modern conventional army, and so too its DRA proxy, the Mujahideen were by no means a well armed fighting force in the initial stages of the occupation. Many were only equipped with antiquated weapons, such as the Lee Enfield 0.303 and the British Sten Gun¹⁴⁴, and those that were modern were captured from deserting or defeated DRA and Soviet forces. However, apart from the progressive supply of weapons by the superpowers, an indigenous arms manufacturing industry has existed for hundreds of years in the area now known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, sandwiched on Pakistan's border between Afghanistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, especially in *Darra Adam Khel*. Sir Olaf Caroe (1958) takes note of the *Darrah*, or the *Pass*, of the Adam Khel Afridis, and their *rifle factories* in Zharghun Khel, in his narrative of Mountstuart Elphinstone's deputation to the Afghan court in 1808¹⁴⁵. The Darra gunsmiths were even licensed by the colonial British Raj to provide weapons to the border tribes in order to keep them at bay, although, according to Fullerton (1984), this strategy was used to prevent the tribes from acquiring original weapons of much better quality that were smuggled in from abroad¹⁴⁶.

The FATA have traditionally been exempt from Pakistani laws on the production and possession of arms (See, Appendix IV, Plate 7.1 – People Openly Carry Weapons in the Streets; the *wild west* nature of the FATA region is evident, where, due to the lack of juridical restrictions, people openly carry weapons in the streets),

which therefore led to their emergence as a focal point for the manufacture of arms. However, the smuggling of weapons is not exempted even in the FATA, as enshrined in the *Prevention of Smuggling Act (1977)*, which encompasses the whole of Pakistan¹⁴⁷. Musah and Thompson (1999) estimate that the FATA is awash with about one million weapons of all kinds¹⁴⁸. However, given that these statistics are ascertained from Pakistan's Interior Ministry estimates of licensed firearms, the inclusion of a vast number of unlicensed and unrecorded weapons may raise the total number of weapons several times given the nature of tribal affairs vis-à-vis central government and the stature that the tribal Pushtun bestow upon firearms.

The presence of an arms manufacturing industry in and around Darra Adam Khel (the main town in the Orakzai agency of the FATA; the Agency has a population of over 450,000¹⁴⁹), prior to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a fact. Nevertheless, large-scale manufacture and retail of weapons only began to increase significantly during the early 1970s¹⁵⁰. This may have been a consequence of the destabilisation of political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan during Mohammad Daoud's Presidency in Afghanistan and the Baluch insurgency in Pakistan. The PDPA coup in 1978 gave a further boost to the weapons trade in the FATA since the insurgency against the communist government was considerably lacking in modern weapons. "In 1978, when the revolution came, and the refugees followed, the insurgents weren't receiving foreign aid from abroad to buy weapons. In 1978 and 1979, they came here [Darra Adam Khel] themselves and bought weapons from what they could raise, and then fought the war. It was only later that the foreigners gave them the weapons"¹⁵¹. Before the PDPA coup and Soviet invasion, the majority of weapons produced were *repeater rifles* (such as shot guns). However, the growth of the Afghan conflict also enhanced the knowledge and expertise of Darra gunsmiths in the manufacture of more advanced weapons through the reverse engineering of new weapons introduced into the conflict by the USSR¹⁵².

7:4:2 - Types of Weapons

An impressive range of weapons are produced in Darra, including daggers, Colt and Webber handguns, Lee Enfield rifles, a variety of automatic weapons from the M-16, Protecta, and Russian 222 Kalacov and AK-47 assault rifles; Italian Beretta, German Walter, and Chinese TT Pistols¹⁵³; and a variety of 12 bore shotguns, repeaters, submachine guns and smaller anti-aircraft guns. The array of weapons produced and those acquired for sale, such as landmines and RPG-7 rocket launchers, have facilitated a burgeoning black market trade in arms in the FATA, especially in the small frontier town of Darra Adam Khel (for a full pictorial representation of the variety of weapons that are sold in Darra, see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.2 to 7.18 – Darra Adam Khel Arms Stores and assorted weapons produced in the local workshops).

Heckler and Koch G-3 assault rifles, made under licence in both Iran and Pakistan, were often seen in Darra shops¹⁵⁴. According to Darra dealers, G-3s were not made by Darra gunsmiths, but were acquired from Afghanistan¹⁵⁵. Pakistani military aid to Mujahideen parties included limited numbers of G-3 rifles. Iran also provided many G-3s to Shia Mujahideen groups during the Soviet invasion in the 1980s. The preference for the AK-47 led many groups and individuals to sell their G-3s to Darra dealers.

7:4:3 - The Arms Workshops

The quality of the arms manufactured in Darra has improved measurably through the introduction of electricity and the acquisition of better machines to aid the production of arms by the gunsmiths and artisans. The Home Secretary of the Government of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (then, NWFP), Abdul Karim Qasuria, noted that according to a study by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), in October 2000, Darra Adam Khel contained about sixty small arms production units (factories), which employed about 20-25 people each. In addition to the factories, approximately 300 smaller working places (workshops) exist that employ 4-5 technicians each, individually paid on a daily basis and earning an average Rs 300-500 per day, depending upon productivity¹⁵⁶ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.56 – Weapons Workshops – The Process – Conditions, the technicians are generally young, and work and live in very unkempt conditions). According to a 2009 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) report on “*FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy*”, the Chief Operating Officer of Pakistan Hunting and Sporting Arms Development Company (PHSADC), Mohammad Tariq, noted that “around 250 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 2,200 families are associated with the weapons’ manufacturing business in Darra Adam Khel and Barra”¹⁵⁷. However, recent reassessments by the Pakistan Hunting and Sporting Arms Development Company have shown that the numbers of small arms manufacturing units have decreased to 200, which consist of 1,600 workshops in Darra Adam Khel¹⁵⁸. A more comprehensive study to actuate the extent of arms manufacturing and the numbers of units involved has been prevented by the current security conditions in FATA.

While the workshops tend to be located in the back streets (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.19 to 7.22 – The Weapons Workshops - The Back Streets; the back streets of Darra provide a fitting yet unusual setting for the unregulated arms manufacturing workshops, which are even located in places with no regard for the general population, such as next to a girls school), about 400 shops of varying sizes are engaged in dealing with the sale of arms and ammunition, many on the main road through Darra. Estimates as to the number of shops dealing in arms varies considerably. According to a study by the National Institute of Public Administration, Lahore (*Deweaponisation: Problems Challenges and Viable Strategy*), “there are 2600 arms manufacturing, repair and sales outlets in this tiny place which employ over 30,000 workers, including some 8,000 skilled hands”¹⁵⁹. However, Darra’s arms dealers estimated that up to 5,000 shops (throughout the FATA) were engaged in the weapons trade during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989), and that the number of shops decreased considerably after the withdrawal of the USSR¹⁶⁰ (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.23 and 7.24 – View of Typical Shop Fronts on the Main Road in Darra Adam Khel). The main road through Darra is saturated with shop fronts showing small arms of all kinds. Qasuria also noted that 10,000 families may be dependent on the local arms industry around Darra¹⁶¹, and that about 400,000 people were directly or indirectly involved in the arms industry in the Darra region¹⁶² (referring to the FATA as a whole). According to the Pakistan Hunting And Sporting Arms Development Company, there are 2,500 retail arms and ammunition shops in Darra alone¹⁶³.

The manufacture of weapons in Darra has produced a constant flow of a variety of different small arms and light weapons to satiate the demand for weapons from both tribal and de-tribalised Pushtun, the various parties

fighting in Afghanistan, and to satisfy fluctuating demands in the wider region, such as had occurred in the supply of arms to the Sikh separatist movement for an independent *Khalistan* in the Punjab province of India in the 1980s¹⁶⁴ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.25 – The Sikhs were favoured clients of Darra arms dealers), or the rise of the MQM movement in the Sind province and Karachi in particular during the 1990s.

There is no specific organisation who buys weapons in Pakistan. Number one, Altaf Hussain's MQM people did come and buy weapons. Number two, people from Qazi Hussain Ahmed's Jamaat-i-Islami used to buy weapons; Kashmiri Mujahideen such as the *Lashkar-i-Tayyaba* bought weapons; and, the Sikh people for an independent Khalistan also bought weapons from Darra... in the Zia period they used to do that a lot... to destabilise India.¹⁶⁵

During the Afghan-Soviet War, the ISI became increasingly involved in the supply of weapons to Mujahideen parties from Darra and other arms dealers and workshops throughout the FATA. Although, no government contracts were admitted to by the dealers that were interviewed in Darra, they particularly referred to an arms dealer, Haji Baz Gul, and his large *Asia Arms Store* on University Road, Peshawar¹⁶⁶. Haji Gul, a former a senator of Pakistan's National Assembly, admitted that Darra dealers had cooperated with different Mujahideen groups in the supply of arms, but adamantly denied any involvement of the Pakistani government even after accepting that other countries, such as India, Iran, Russia and Uzbekistan were supplying weapons to the conflicting parties in Afghanistan¹⁶⁷.

Our Darra people and dealers did a lot of cooperation with leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen, like Mohammad Naveed Shabib and Pir Shabib. These leaders say that the Darra people have cooperated a lot with them. But, it [*the weapons*] doesn't come from Pakistan.¹⁶⁸

7:4:4 - Weapons Production in Darra Adam Khel

During research visits to Darra Adam Khel, an insight into the methods used to manufacture a variety of different weapons by the local gunsmiths was gained. The process of the manufacture of weapons has been in place since before the British colonised the Indian sub-continent. However, the recent massive proliferation of arms into the region during the Afghan conflict has also seen significant developments in this process; for example, the arrival of electricity and machines has greatly increased the productivity of Darra. The following is a brief account of the general manufacturing process of weapons in a Darra Adam Khel and other workshops throughout the FATA. This description is aided by numerous pictures to facilitate a greater appreciation of the arms manufacturing process.

7:4:4:1 - Acquiring Raw Materials

The raw materials for the production of the weapons that the workshops in Darra require come from a variety of sources. Until the PDPA coup and Soviet invasion, the manufacturing process relied upon small supplies of iron from scrap metal and several iron foundries throughout Pakistan. The numbers of weapons produced were limited to the small local demand in the FATA, and the quality of weapons produced was also limited by the lack of reliable electricity sources and machinery. However, the introduction of electricity, and hence, machinery, increased demand for weapons after the PDPA coup; the greater availability of modern weapons for reverse engineering; and, the increased supplies of scrap metal from destroyed military hardware from

Afghanistan, enabled Darra, and other FATA workshops, to expand their manufacturing capabilities to produce much greater quantities of modern weapons that were qualitatively superior to earlier Darra products.

Scrap metal came from destroyed tanks and planes, and used to come through this way [through *Darra*] from Waziristan to Wana to Dera Ismail Khan to Lahore. Lots of weapons were also smuggled with the scrap metal and auto parts. The weapons were sold here and the scrap went to the Ittefaq iron foundry in Lahore, and through a barter system, essential iron was provided to us.¹⁶⁹

It is interesting to note that the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family own the *Ittefaq Foundry* (for an idea of some of the raw materials used, see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.29 to 7.33 – The Weapons Workshops – The Process – Making the Wooden Stock, showing the wood used for stocks and handles, and, Appendix IV, Plates 7.34 to 7.41 – The Weapons Workshops – The Process – Making the Barrel, showing iron rods used to make the rifle barrels).

Some of the arms merchants that were willing to speak also mentioned that the United States supplied the Mujahideen with weapons in the 1980s that were in very poor condition. These weapons often came to Darra to be reconditioned. The weapons that were initially supplied by Egypt and Turkey in the early 1980s, were obsolete and in such bad condition that they were not even repairable and could not be reconditioned¹⁷⁰. Many of these were used as spare parts; others were completely unusable even as scrap. What can be ascertained from the assertions of many local individuals is that the US lost a great deal of credibility during the initial stages of the Afghan-USSR conflict (1979-1989).

The Mujahideen also acquired large quantities of ammunition, whether by capture or as aid from the US and its allies. The majority of the ammunition was unusable due to its unsafe condition or its inappropriate specification for the majority of weapons that were used by the Mujahideen, whether small arms rounds or tank shells. Such ammunition was often sold to Darra dealers as scrap for its metal constituents, which were separated and then used as raw materials for Darra-made ammunition¹⁷¹. For example, the tank shells captured with destroyed tanks were broken down into their constituent parts; that is, bronze casings, projectiles made of different metals, and explosives. Unusable small arms ammunition was similarly broken down into its constituent parts and sold for cash or working weapons.

Commanders used to sell tank ammunition as scrap because they were not holding the tank, so the ammunition was basically useless. They used to contact us, and we went there [*Afghanistan*] to dismantle the ammunition into its parts and brought it back with us.¹⁷²

Even though the manufacture of weapons in Darra contravenes Pakistani laws, the government has not enforced the closure of the arms manufacturing industry in the FATA. Nevertheless, Pakistani agencies could severely restrict the supply of essential raw materials to the workshops if they desired. For the scrap, auto parts and obsolete weapons to reach the foundries the transporting trucks would have to pass through numerous barriers and checkpoints set up by the political agencies, customs and police.

When they used to pass through the political agent's barrier, they used to give ten thousand rupees per truck, and ten thousand rupees to customs, and ten thousand to the police, and they used to smuggle in the day time between ten o'clock and twelve o'clock. It was all done on a mutual understanding. On

whether they would rather take a bribe or control the weapons smuggling, they did not control weapons smuggling, they took the money, and all this came to the administration.¹⁷³

7:4:4:2 - Quantity of Weapons Produced

Darra does not claim to produce massive quantities of weapons. Nevertheless, the workshops in the small town do have a significant impact on the indigenous production of weapons, and do directly aid the proliferation of small arms and light weapons throughout the region. Estimates vary considerably, although, many are relatively dated in comparison to the rapidly changing market conditions of the arms demand and supply over the past decade. The Small Arms Survey (2003) notes that “the Darra region produces approximately 20,000 units of all kinds of weapons each year”¹⁷⁴; while Musah and Thompson’s (1999) estimates nearly double this annual figure with the production of the AK-47 alone. “They have the capacity to produce over 100 AK-47s per day at less than \$153 (US)”¹⁷⁵. The daily production of 100 AK-47 assault rifle units is equal to an annual production figure of over 36,000 units. The number of other weapons produced would likely bring the total amount to well over 50,000 weapons per annum. This is a massive influx of unregulated and unchecked weaponry into the region. To corroborate, a Darra gunsmith noted that one skilled workshop unit of between four to five workers can produce “one Kalashnikov [AK-47 or Kalacov] in one day”¹⁷⁶. Other larger workshops can produce a greater number of weapons, up to 5 per day¹⁷⁷. With an estimated 3,000 *father and son* production units, the total number of weapons produced may rise even higher¹⁷⁸. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies study (2009), upwards of “6,000 30-mm pistols are manufactured every month and 73,000 annually [in Darra Adam Khel and Peshawar]... [and] 4,500 shotguns of different categories are manufactured here [Miranshah, Sakhakot and Mohmand Agency] every month”¹⁷⁹. According to the Pakistan Hunting and Sporting Arms Development Company, “around 400-700 guns are made in Darra each day and the number is rising with the adoption of more tools”¹⁸⁰, which amounts to between 12,000 and 21,000 a month, or 144,000 to 252,000 weapons a year from Darra alone. This is a staggering number of weapons that are likely to enter the general populous of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the surrounding region.

7:4:4:3 - Process of Manufacturing

The process of manufacturing weapons in the numerous workshops in Darra, and surrounding areas within the FATA, does not vary greatly from those processes within a modern arms manufacturing factory environment. The differences, however, manifest themselves through the automation of modern factories as compared to the artisan handmade processes in Darra workshops. The two do not differ in the approach, since; there is a distinct separation and delegation of responsibilities for making different components. Rather than one person or groups of workers aiming at self-sufficiency in the production of a weapon, Darra has evolved a cooperative method of production amongst groups of workshops aimed at increasing productivity and profitability. Workshops have developed specialisations in the manufacture of specific parts and components. A degree of coordination has evolved over time to allow a more efficient production line. The variegated workshops simulate a production line; that is, workshop(s) linked to others along one part of the line. One workshop may produce rifle barrels for particular weapons, others may specialise in the breach-block and firing mechanisms of certain weapons, or the stocks and ammunition. Completed parts are transferred to or

bought by, other workshops for fitting and testing, after which, they are transferred to, or bought by, retail outlets for public sale. It is possible that a single individual or group may own a number of workshops and retail outlets, as takeovers are not unknown. Weapons are also sold in bulk to various agencies or parties interested in avoiding the recorded and regulated weapons trade (see, Appendix III, Figure 7.1 – The Arms Manufacturing Process in Darra Adam Khel and FATA; and, , Appendix III, Figure 7.2 – Indigenous Small Arms Production in Darra Adam Khel and FATA. For a pictorial representation of the production process following the arms manufacturing process given in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, from raw materials to testing and retail, see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.26 and 27 – The Weapons Workshops – The Process – Handcrafting; Plate 7.28 – The Machinery Used; Plates 7.29 to 7.33 – The Manufacture of Stocks and Handles; Plates 7.34 to 7.41 – The Manufacture of Barrels; Plates 7.42 to 7.48 – The Manufacture of the Breach Housing; Plates 7.49 and 7.50 – The Manufacture of Magazines; Plate 7.51 – A Gunsmith showing the Final Product; and, Plates 7.52 and 7.53 – The Inspection of a 12 Bore Double Barrel Shotgun and Group Inspection of a AK-47 Derivative made in Darra, respectively).

7:4:4:4 - Beating the Licensing Laws on Weapons Types

Darra has also been able to circumvent Pakistani Laws on the prohibition of certain types of weapons. For example, the AK-47 Kalashnikov is a prohibited weapon in Pakistan and a licence cannot be obtained for it. By changing certain specifications of the standard AK-47, Darra workshops have been able to circumvent such laws and regulations and maintain weapons sales to some extent. The AK-47 Kalashnikov is transformed into the Kalacov. The difference being that the latter has a different barrel. “The Kalashnikov is .62 bore and the Kalacov is .333 bore. They make this [the Kalacov] out of the original Kalashnikov... They just change the barrel; the rest of the machinery remains the same. They make barrels according to demand”¹⁸¹ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.54 – A Comparison between the AK-47 and the Kalacov Derivative).

7:4:4:5 - Testing and Quality Differences

The accuracy and quality of the final product does not follow the traditional path of test firing at a secure firing range. In Darra, the firing range is the open space between the back of the workshop and the mountains that surround the town. (See, Appendix IV, Plate 7.55 – The Final Product - Test Firing, Kareem Masoud testing a newly made weapon towards the hills behind the workshops). As would be expected, locally manufactured weapons differ in quality from those that are manufactured under the quality-control conditions of a large factory. Darra gunsmiths unanimously accepted that local products were fundamentally inferior. The initial faults lie in the materials used. Referring to weapons of Russian and Chinese origin, “those weapons are machine crafted, the material used is much better than the material used over here since it is not processed as well, and is generally of inferior quality”¹⁸². The quality of a weapon manifests itself in the life-expectancy that it has before it begins to fail. “Since they are hand-crafted, their barrels are not as precise as they should be. If they burst, they are fixed up again. But, sometimes they are not properly crafted. Either their barrels blow-up from where they are weak or the bolts break because of repeated hammering. These are not as strong as foreign weapons, and are not as reliable”¹⁸³. Therefore, the retail prices of Darra made weapons are significantly less than for original weapons.

7:4:5 - Mechanisms involved in the Supply of Weapons, Distribution, and Diffusion during the Afghan-Soviet war: Smuggling Arms from Darra and CIA Arms Pipeline, Field Research.

7:4:5:1 - Diffusion

The methods used to distribute small arms manufactured in Darra, and FATA in general, have been in existence since the times of the British Raj. The only difference being the addition of new technology to evade capture from law enforcement authorities. Many workshops and factories have their own shops to retail the weapons that they have made. Others also have retail outlets throughout the FATA so as to enable a wider distribution of weapons.

The weapons workshops here have their own workers who distribute weapons to Pakistan. They have their own people who take them to Kurrum Agency, North Waziristan, South Waziristan and then to Quetta.¹⁸⁴

However, the intensity of the distribution effort increased dramatically after the PDPA coup. The arms dealers in Darra not only sold the arms that they manufactured, but also acted as intermediaries between arms buyers and sellers. As Mujahideen parties became established, their demand for arms grew proportionally. Many of the arms that they acquired were initially captured from their adversaries. However, the seizure of arms by party members or commanders in the field meant that they had to be relinquished to party stores, which often meant that those who captured them, many of which had no real relationship with one or other party, were not rewarded for their efforts. In such circumstances, and in order to gain an income of some sort, arms often found their way to arms bazaars across the FATA through various intermediaries. Intermediaries frequently purchased arms from Mujahideen individuals or groups and then sold them at a higher rate to Mujahideen parties, or other groups in need of such weapons. “Whatever the Afghans captured from the Russians and Afghan soldiers over there [Afghanistan] was brought over here to sell to us. We used to buy the weapons and ammunition on a cheaper rate and then used to sell it to some other party at a higher rate to make a profit”¹⁸⁵.

In the early 1980s, many of the weapons that were given to the Mujahideen were obsolete and ineffective. Further, the majority of the Mujahideen had no funds to fight against the Soviets. Weapons that were already in the possession of the Mujahideen were frequently sold in order to pay for food, fuel, and the salaries of Mujahideen fighters. Therefore, “The arms that came from abroad came here or to Pakistan. All the old weapons were given to the Afghan Mujahideen, who sold them quickly and then asked for more weapons”¹⁸⁶. Mujahideen regularly raided arms caches of competing Mujahideen groups, and sold the weapons that they did not need¹⁸⁷, and re-equipped themselves with the cheaper Darra-made weapons. “The Afghans used to sell foreign weapons to us, and get more money, and they used to buy local weapons at a cheaper rate”¹⁸⁸.

After the withdrawal of the USSR, and the fall of the PDPA, the United States announced rewards for the return of stinger missile systems that were still in the possession of various Mujahideen. Consequently, arms dumps were routinely raided for stinger missile systems and other high-value weapons, and perpetuated by

arms-storeowners due to their willingness to sell illicit and stolen arms, hence, providing a market for the raiders¹⁸⁹. Upon raising the question of the availability of the Stinger SAM system in Darra, one arms dealer diplomatically admitted their presence over a decade ago but refrained from furthering the conversation¹⁹⁰. “The Americans used to buy stingers. They started from \$60,000 to \$80,000 (U.S. Dollars). Because of this, lots of people used to break into lots of arms depots, especially for stingers”¹⁹¹. These Stingers were not solely those that were supplied to the Mujahideen, “of the original 900 Stinger SAMs and 50,000 M16 rifles that the US supplied to Pakistan, as many as 560 Stinger and nearly 20,000 rifles were untraceable. There were reports that 312 of these were sold in Landi-Kotal market in January 1993”¹⁹².

7:4:5:2 - Smuggling

The arms smuggled from Darra are, to an extent, facilitated by the pre-existence of the lucrative trade in smuggled goods, especially electrical appliances, due to loopholes in the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) agreement concluded in 1965 between the Afghan and Pakistani governments¹⁹³. The agreement allowed goods imported by Afghanistan to come through the port of Karachi without incurring customs duties. These goods are transported through two main routes, although others are also used: Peshawar-Torkham and Chamman-Spin Boldak. Once in Afghanistan, the goods are unloaded and reloaded on mules to be smuggled along the many mountain passes of the porous border, back into Pakistan’s many *barras* (literally, bazaars, but used to refer to those bazaars in the FATA) to be sold at prices that are much less than Pakistani indigenous and imported products¹⁹⁴. Hence, pre-existing smuggling routes and methods are also used to smuggle arms – which are just substituted for consumable goods – into and out of Afghanistan¹⁹⁵. Close tribal and kinship relations make it easier to retain secrecy from the authorities. The tribes even act as guarantors between dealers in the contraband, narcotics, and illicit arms trade¹⁹⁶. A large police presence is maintained on the main roads within the Frontier and leading to the other provinces, especially Punjab, to deter smuggling activity. However, the rampant corruption within the police force itself has not deterred increasingly larger smuggling activities and, in turn, has allowed a massive diffusion of sophisticated arms into the whole of Pakistan.

It is important to note that for each and every occasion that goods and arms are smuggled to and from Afghanistan, a different method may be used according to the prevailing conditions that facilitate or deter each operation. The human dimension is of paramount importance to every operation. Obstacles may arise at any point whereby the smuggler must adopt various tactics in order to be successful. “They are armed because there is every likelihood of an encounter”¹⁹⁷. There are two ways that the illicit goods (whether arms, contraband, or narcotics) are smuggled across the border. “One is vehicular. People just conceal the weapons, the arms and rifles, and start on the road. The other is on the hilly tracks through the mountains”¹⁹⁸. For the latter, smugglers, calling themselves *Sauda Ghar* (traders)¹⁹⁹, rarely travel alone, preferring to travel fully armed and in convoys of between 20²⁰⁰ to 50 people carrying goods on their backs or on pack animals, such as mules and camels²⁰¹. There is a juridical *raison d’être* for going across country rather than by road. The Frontier Crimes Regulations, which have been inherited from the British Raj by the Pakistani government to maintain a superficial degree of law and order in the FATA, permit the relevant *Political Agents*, of the tribal

agencies concerned, jurisdiction over the roads in the FATA, but not those areas beyond the roads, such as the hills. Therefore, the hills provide the smugglers a degree of immunity from law enforcement authorities.

During the research visit to Afghanistan in 1999, in order to appreciate the difficulties of any smuggling operation, the country was entered through one of the smuggling routes used to circumvent border controls with the assistance of a group of pro-Taliban Pakistani-based Kashmiri fighters, formerly known as Harakat Al-Ansar but currently divided into Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)²⁰² and *Jaish-e-Mohammed* (JeM, Army of Mohammed), and the smaller *Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami* (HuJI, Movement of Islamic Jihad) splinter group closely associated with HuM, who were assigned to take facilitate the crossing to Jalalabad and Kabul in order to view their training camps, meet Taliban leaders, and observe frontline operations (for an idea of the state of the frontlines, the weapons, buildings, and shelters used by combatants, see, Appendix IV, Plate 2.1 – The Smuggling Route taken in the Hills Looking towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar; Plate 2.2 – The Rear View, Looking at the Vale of Peshawar; Plate 7.73 to 7.81 – The Frontlines - The Shomali Plain, North of Kabul. the Frontlines, Weapons, Buildings, and Shelters used by Combatants in Afghanistan; and, Plate 7.82 – The Author Test Firing an AK-47 into the Hills).

7:4:5:3 - The Hawala System

Arms dealers used numerous methods to obtain and distribute arms during the Afghan-Soviet War. One successful and universally employed method depended upon a degree of trust between dealers and couriers in the establishment of an underground network of transactions. Due to the illicit nature of the enterprise, many of the arms dealers adopted the *Hawala* system. A *parchi* (literally, note) was employed by dealers and couriers for the purpose of identification and condition of the weapons. According to Saeed Afridi (a Darra arms dealer)²⁰³, the basic process of a transaction involved a Darra dealer, an arms buyer, an arms source, and several couriers. An arms buyer, for example, from Thailand, approaches the Darra arms merchant and identifies his intention to buy 1,000 weapons. The Darra dealer shows him an original weapon from Afghanistan; for example, from Bamiyan. “Lots of these weapons were bought by Thailand dealers from Bamiyan”²⁰⁴.

The following is an account of the Hawala system, as described by a Darra arms dealer²⁰⁵. The Darra dealer, having already established contact with the arms supplier from Bamiyan, negotiates a deal for the supply of 1,000 weapons at a predetermined rate; for example, Rs 1000 per weapon²⁰⁶ (See, Appendix III, Figure 7.3 – The Hawala System of Arms Dealing). The Bamiyan supplier transports 1,000 weapons at his own risk, to Jalalabad, where a local dealer or courier pays the Bamiyan supplier in full, that is, Rs 1,000,000, and also supplies a *parchi* as proof of the condition of the weapons received and as a form of protection for the supplier, but also receives a *parchi* from the Bamiyan supplier as proof of the condition of the weapons if they are already damaged. The Jalalabad courier transports the arms to Torkham, an Afghan town on the Pak-Afghan border crossing. The Jalalabad courier is paid in full by the Torkham courier, that is, the original outlay of Rs 1,000,000, and also receives a commission covering the transportation costs, risk, and charges, at a predetermined rate, for example, Rs 200 per weapon; thereby, making a total payment of Rs 1,200,000. A

parchi is exchanged by each courier as a receipt of the condition of the weapons given and received. If the weapons have been received damaged, the Jalalabad courier may produce the parchi received from the Bamiyan supplier as proof that they were not damaged by him. Otherwise, he may have to accept that they were delivered damaged by himself and provide a receipt to indicate this if he cannot provide proof to the contrary.

The Torkham courier transports the weapons across the border to a Landi-Kotal courier where he receives a total payment of Rs 1,500,000, including a predetermined commission; for example, of Rs 300 per weapon due to the increased risk taken to smuggle the weapons across the border. A parchi is exchanged by each courier as a receipt of the condition of the weapons given and received, proof of damage to weapons provided if necessary, or responsibility taken and written in the parchi given to the Landi-Kotal courier. The Landi-Kotal courier transports the weapons to the Darra dealers and receives a total payment of Rs 1,700,000, including a predetermined commission of Rs 200 per weapon.

The condition of the weapons is accounted for through the production of the parchi, indicating whether and where they may have been damaged. If the weapons are damaged, the Darra dealer may contact the relevant party for compensation later, if necessary. Nevertheless, in the transaction between the buyer and the Darra dealer, the latter takes responsibility for any damage done during the transportation from the supplier until the weapons are handed over to the former. The Darra dealer receives payment in full for the weapons delivered at the predetermined price of Rs 2,200,000, including the full cost of the weapons hitherto, of Rs 1,700,000, and the dealer's commission covering the risk and profits, for example, Rs 500 per weapon, less the damages incurred if the weapons are received damaged. If the weapons are damaged en-route or are stolen by a courier, even though he may have paid for the weapons, the Darra dealer can appeal directly to a tribal council (Jirgah) within the perpetrator's locality, which can enforce the recovery of the weapons and impose fines and/or sanctions on the perpetrator and his family²⁰⁷.

7:4:5:4 – Smuggling Routes

The availability of numerous routes for these types of transactions, the security incorporated into the Hawala system, and the semi-tribal backing for the trade, successfully prevent law enforcement authorities from fully conquering the illicit trade in weapons. On several of the occasions that a research visit to Afghanistan was undertaken, the border was crossed through surreptitious means; that is, smuggled across the border through variegated routes, and with various associates under trying circumstances (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.83 to 7.84 – The Road to and from Jalalabad to Kabul). At other times the Torkham border point was simply crossed without papers, while acting as one of the local tribesmen who daily cross in their hundreds.

One of the routes that was taken to gain entry into Afghanistan that was frequently used by smugglers, yet rarely patrolled, is along a dirt-track road that travels from Peshawar to Sper Sang and then along the Darya Kabul (Kabul River) into mountainous terrain. During this journey, several small caravans of mules laden with sacks of narcotics passing in the opposite direction were witnessed. The Border was crossed after

consultation, over a cup of green tea, with tribal elders for safe passage across the feud-ridden tribal territory along an undefined level desert-plain with no roads. Once over the border, Darya Kabul has to be crossed to get to the main highway linking Peshawar and Jalalabad. However, the lack of a bridge along the smuggling route has led to the growth of a local crossing over Darya Kabul at *La'l Pūr* comprised of a number of boats large enough to carry a sizeable car across the river. All the boats are connected to strong cables and ropes, linking both sides of the river, that act as guides and supports along which the boats are winched across the river perpendicular to the flow of the current. No pictures were permitted at this juncture due to the presence of a local Taliban administrator and his guards, who were fully aware of the trade passing across the river (see, Appendix IV, Figure 7.4 – Smuggling Route across the Pak-Afghan Border; and, Appendix IV, Plate 2.1 – The Smuggling Route taken in the Hills Looking towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar, and the Rear View; and, Plate 2.2 – Looking at the Vale of Peshawar).

7:4:6 – The Arms-Narco Nexus

The lack of regulations also facilitates the continuation of the ancient narcotics trade, which has mushroomed in recent years with the growth of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Many of the *barras* (literally, bazaars, but used to refer to those bazaars in the FATA) that deal with smuggled goods openly support shops stuffed with narcotics of all kinds, especially *Hashish* (openly sold), opium (sold under the counter), and even those that are not indigenously produced such as cocaine (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.57 to 7.58 – Arms Dealership Adjacent to a Narcotics Dealer’s Shop, along the Main Darra Road). Although no official statistics exist, and apart from those shops that focused solely on the sale of narcotics, many of the arms shops that I visited also sold small quantities of narcotics (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.59 to 7.66 – Narcotics Dealer’s Shops in the Khyber Agency Barra, FATA, arms merchants selling narcotics, including cocaine, and an assortment of weapons). However, Haybat Khan, a *Darra* arms merchant vigorously denied any link between the weapons and narcotics smuggling and trading (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.67 – Haybat Khan. Haybat Khan was one of the very few arms merchants who were willing to have his photograph taken). “There are different people for different things. People who smuggle weapons don’t smuggle narcotics, and people who smuggle narcotics don’t smuggle weapons. They are separate fields, separate staff, separate everything”²⁰⁸. Such denials are contradicted in view of the evidence produced by Pakistani law enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, Superintendent (SP) Iqbal Khan ® of the Anti-Narcotics Force, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, evidently disagreed with the supposition that the arms traders and smugglers were mutually exclusive from narcotics smugglers and traders. “People keep on changing over here. From drugs to customs articles [contraband], from customs articles to weapons. Wherever there is money...”²⁰⁹. SP Iqbal Khan’s assertions were evident from the massive amounts of narcotics and arms seizures that he regularly made during his service (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.68 – Anti-Narcotics Compound, Kohat, KPK. The author standing alongside narcotics stored in the fortified compound. Also see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.69 and 7.70 – Weapons Seized by the Anti-Narcotics Force, Kohat District; and, see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.71 and 7.72 – Readily Available Weapons in FATA, RPG-7 owned by Tribesmen in FATA).

7:4:7 – Retail and Costs of Weapons

Arms manufacture and production is not the only form of income for the people of Darra Adam Khel. The town evolved a significant enterprise in the sale of arms that were supposed to have been supplied to the Mujahideen Parties from the CIA-ISI arms pipeline, and those weapons that were captured from Soviet and DRA sources. Corruption was rampant throughout all of the stages of the arms pipeline. “There is clear evidence that many of the weapons being sold in Darra – and other arms markets nearby – come from CIA-funded arms shipments meant for the Afghan Mujahideen”²¹⁰. Many Commanders did sell off weapons that had been captured weapons and even those supplied by the CIA-ISI in order to raise cash to provide food and logistical support for their fighting men and families²¹¹. According to Yousaf (2001), this was a reflection of their corruption; yet, many Mujahideen Commanders were forced to sell weapons in order to pay for the transport of weapons deliveries and the running of Party offices, in part, because of the lack of funds being allocated from the ISI-CIA pipeline and other Arab donors²¹². This was particularly true of the nationalist-old-regime Parties run by Ghailani and Mujaddidi. Darra, with over a hundred arms stores, was the centre of a lucrative trade in arms, and may be, according to Yousaf (2001), “the biggest open arms market in the world”²¹³.

The cost of individual weapons sold in Darra shops has varied over the course of the Afghan conflict. During the early 1980s, according to Francis Fukuyama, “the standard Enfield cost 10,000 rupees, or \$1,000... the grenade launcher cost a staggering \$9,000. One grenade for the RPG-7 was \$700 and a single .303 bullet cost \$2-3”²¹⁴ at the beginning of the war. In 2001, Yousaf ascertained that the cost of a single AK-47 assault rifle was as much as U.S. \$1,500²¹⁵, while in 1980, Fukuyama noted that the cost was in the range of \$2,000 to \$2,400²¹⁶. More recently, there has been an increase in the costs of weapons, as pointed out by the PIPS (2009) study “*FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy*”:

Mujahideen used to sell weapons [in Darra Adam Khel] earlier, but were now buying arms and ammunition for themselves. Requesting anonymity, the shopkeeper said the price of a second-hand Kalashnikov had risen from Rs 20,000 to Rs 35,000 and that of a new one from Rs 25,000 to Rs 45,000. The price of bullets made in Egypt has risen 14 percent and those in China 19 percent. Previously, the arms market in Miranshah, in North Waziristan Agency, met militants’ weapons needs but the supply has failed to keep pace with the growing demand.²¹⁷

Costs were also depended upon the origin of the weapon. Soviet-made Kalashnikovs tended to be of better quality, and this was reflected in their relatively higher prices in comparison to their Chinese or Egyptian, and especially Darra counterparts. The availability of assault rifles such as the AK-47 was severely limited before the Soviet invasion. According to one Darra arms dealer, the original AK-47 rifles were in excess of Rs 35,000²¹⁸. Prices inevitably fell because of the massive influx of SALWs during the Afghan-USSR war. By 1987, the price of a single AK-47 assault rifle had been halved²¹⁹. In 1990, the same rifle was Rs 15,000²²⁰. The departure of the Soviet Union and the Americans from the Afghan conflict in the early 1990s coincided with the beginning of a gradual and progressive increase in weapons prices. “During the war, Kalashnikov’s [AK-47] made by China or Russia used to cost Rs 15,000 to Rs 16,000, now they are Rs 22,000 to Rs 23,000 to Rs 25,000”²²¹. SP @ Iqbal Khan corroborates, noting that “brand new AK-47 rifles which come wrapped in greased paper cost Rs 20,000 to Rs 22,000”²²². These prices are relatively higher than those for Darra-made

copies and used originals, which retail at Rs 12,000 to Rs 15,000²²³. However, the prices do fluctuate according to market supply and demand. “When we are receiving many weapons in bulk from Afghanistan, and the demand is low, the prices go down. But, when there are is more demand and the weapons are in short supply, then they are expensive, or the prices shoot up”²²⁴.

The ammunition for the AK-47 before the war was relatively cheap at Rs 12 due to the lack of the weapons’ notoriety²²⁵ and limited availability. However, this dramatically changed after the PDPA coup because of the need to acquire greater firepower, especially after the Mujahideen began receiving massive influx of military and financial assistance. The price of the original ammunition is approximately Rs 600 per round, while the Darra made version is about Rs 120 per round²²⁶.

The *anyone is welcome* ethos in Darra’s shops has also led to increased ownership of weapons, with significantly greater firepower, amongst ordinary civilians in the tribal areas, and those who come to Darra from anywhere in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a consequence, shotguns and antiquated Lee Enfield 0.303s have largely been replaced by automatic assault rifles, machineguns, RPGs, and even mortars in tribal feuds, thereby drastically increasing their firepower and catalysing conflictual relations into broader escalating conflicts between feuding parties, given the presence of suitable socio-political and economic conditions (see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.69 and 7.70 – An Infantry Support Light Machine Gun Seized during an Anti-Narcotics Force Raid, Kohat District; and, see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.71 and 7.72 – Readily Available Weapons in FATA, RPG-7 owned by Tribesmen in FATA).

7:5 – Final Observations

The proliferation of SALWs in Afghanistan, as an ongoing process, has been complicated by the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban. The Taliban had controlled the vast majority of Afghanistan and provided a degree of security as a result. The present government, headed by President Hamid Karzai, has effective control only to the extent of the capital’s suburbs. The government’s relationship to the country’s provinces depends upon a quid-pro-quo relationship with the various warlords that have retained a hold of their local dominions. The latter’s desire to retain such authority therefore also facilitates further proliferation of SALW. Afghanistan has also become infamous through its unregulated export of SALWs to insurgencies in countries throughout the region such as Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, India, Burma, Chechnya, China and a number of Central Asian Republics by sub-state actors, arms merchants and dealers²²⁷. The Afghan conflict has not stopped as a result of American action. In fact, the latter has exacerbated local ethnic and tribal fissures. The diffusion of weapons within and without Afghanistan is unlikely to change until a broad-based government that reflects the ethnic and cultural diversity of Afghanistan is successfully installed through a negotiated settlement between all indigenous conflicting parties without external interference. This is a tall order for a region that has had an historical relationship with perpetual external interventions and invasions.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART III

CHAPTER EIGHT

**DIRECT EFFECTS OF SALW
PROLIFERATION**

PART III

CHAPTER EIGHT

DIRECT EFFECTS OF SALW PROLIFERATION

8 – Direct Effects of SALW Proliferation

8:1 – Introduction

Social disintegration, militarisation, destabilisation, institutionalisation of violence, Kalashnikov culture, protracted conflict, conflict re-eruption, psycho-social trauma, and so on, are all terms that are increasingly being associated with small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, there remains a dearth of serious and systematic enquiry into the broad structural effects and humanitarian impacts of SALW on civil societies, and their political and economic development, while the existing literature that is growing in availability is largely grounded in subjective and anecdotal evidence; although, it does provide assistance to research efforts.

The numbers of SALW that have proliferated globally cannot be accurately gauged, largely due to their characteristic durability, the lack of accountability of manufacturers trading throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, and the unrestricted flow of SALW throughout the world's conflict zones; due, in part, to the predominant regulatory concentration upon major conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, statistics are randomly published without credible examination to corroborate and support various journalistic findings, reports, and arguments, and are derived to enhance or reduce the significance of the issues that have relatively recently arisen concerning the detrimental effects of the mass proliferation of SALW. Therefore, such figures must be treated with caution, unless they have been derived through rigorous scientific testing, which is, in itself, a very difficult task, and one that may not occur in the near future. Nonetheless, credible sources still publish very specific accounts of the numbers of SALW that are in global circulation; for example, a policy document published by the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) declared that "there are an estimated 639 million small arms and light weapons in circulation: more than one for every 10 people on the planet. The easy access to these weapons exacerbates conflicts, facilitates violent crime and terrorism, thwarts post conflict reconstruction and undermines long-term sustainable development"¹. The derivation and veracity of this specific figure is not indicated, however, the fact that even the FCO can produce such unverified figures indicates the monumental task faced by researchers arriving at the actual quantities of SALW stockpiled and in circulation around the world. Most sources commonly indicate that "estimates range from 100 to 500 million military style weapons in circulation, in addition to hundreds of millions more designed for police or civilian use"². More recent figures show the vast differences in estimates: for example, the Centre for American Progress recently released a study entitled *Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms*, in which they stated that "approximately 875 million small arms are in circulation worldwide, and only about a third are in the hands of legally constituted security forces"³. In addition to this estimate, some institutions, such as the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), indicate that this number only concerns military style SALW and does not include the "many

hundreds of millions of guns designed for police forces or for civilian use in circulation”⁴; while, “the wide range points to the lack of available data: small arms and light weapons are rarely reported in official statistics on the arms trade, are impossible to quantify independently, and are often manufactured and transferred covertly”⁵.

Intra-state conflicts where irregular sub-state actors vie for political ascendancy with other irregular and regular forces while utilising SALW as their weapons of choice are increasingly becoming the epitome of modern conflict. Such complex and multifarious conflicts rarely value the territorial limits of sovereign states, and have no clear-cut precincts, or fronts. Furthermore, that the majority of these conflicts exist in the less developed regions of the world suggests that economic and political development and stability, or the lack of, may be a viable criterion for increased violent social conflict where there is an unambiguous mass availability of SALW. Alao and Olonisakin (2001) correctly advocate the proliferation of SALW as a significant factor in the growth of natural resource-based conflicts, in part because of their occurrence in the complexities of collapsed or collapsing states, where sub-state actors, warlords, and failing state apparatus vie for political supremacy⁶.

8:1:1 – Interpreting the Direct Effects of SALW Proliferation

Superficially, a correlation between the mass accumulation of SALW, violence, insecurity, social disintegration, conflict eruption, and/or protraction is apparently obvious. However, accurately identifying the precise processes involved that produce such relationships has numerous insurmountable obstacles. It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely measure the number of injuries and deaths caused solely by SALW in complex and multifaceted inter and intra-state conflict environments. Furthermore, unlike a chemical equation, which is quantifiable under certain conditions, the complexity of the countless social and environmental variables involved in just a single social situation negates a scientific quantification of the consequences of an accumulation of SALW. Moreover, we may be susceptible to merely producing tautological explanations through superficial examinations of casualty rates and the apparent mass availability of SALW. In contrast, a detailed qualitative analysis based on violent conflict case studies that take into account the interaction between incalculable psycho-social pressures and forces, which can arise upon the input of large quantities of SALW into an emerging conflict environment, may facilitate the development of accurate reasoning, deductions, and assertions that can illustrate the correlation between the proliferation of SALW and such associations (described above) in the context of the Afghan conflict (1978-present), given that the other innumerable factors and sources that give rise to violent conflict are taken into account. Additionally, we must remain aware that even single violent events can have multi-causal explanations, many of which have no relationship to an individual’s or group’s possession of lethal firearms; and, given that the sources and/or causes of violent conflict remain constant, different circumstances, situations, or contexts can produce dissimilar results. In this respect, the constructivist perspective may assist in understanding the impacts that SALW have on individuals and society in general by helping to explain the values and meanings associated with the possession of SALW for the individual and society, and how such values are susceptible to change over time through the introduction of different norms and values that are constructed as a direct

consequence of the change in preferences, perceptions, and beliefs of respective individuals and societies that are influenced by the impacts that SALW have on them⁷; and, therefore, the eventual consequential change of social structures, which are not immutable. Undoubtedly, the direct impacts of SALW may be standardised across the range of perspectives, given that an injury or death caused by a bullet is a direct physical result of the firing of a firearm; which is, in actuality, its purpose. However, the value or meaning attached to the possession or firing of a weapon may be explained through an understanding of the motives and interests behind the rationale for doing so, and the symbolism that may be culturally ingrained, or constructed, for the justification of doing so. This is, therefore, where the constructivist perspective facilitates a greater understanding of the human perceptions behind the use of firearms.

Explanations as to the rationale behind the use of weapons aside, the interpretation of the actual physical effects of the use of firearms would be presumed to be uncontested. However, even in this respect, interpretations as to the effects of physical injuries and deaths caused by the use of firearms may also be construed through understanding the different meanings that individuals or groups assign to the direct effects of the use of weapons; whereby, an individual or group may interpret the death or injury as either a positive or negative effect depending upon their differing reasons behind the usage of firearms. For example, the legal execution by firing squad of a person convicted, beyond any doubt, of the killing of a number of young children may be viewed very differently from an innocent person who has been killed by firearms. Individuals and groups may assign different moral interpretations and judgements upon such deaths, which are often subjective to the social constructions of the societies that they live in. Nevertheless, the reciprocal effects of these interpretations may have wide ranging impacts in themselves, which may further impact upon the declaration of information of the number of deaths or injuries caused by the use of firearms, and thereby, not facilitating a scientific appraisal of the numbers of people killed or injured by firearms. Moreover, the statistics produced as a result may have far reaching consequences in the way individuals or groups interpret such findings, and how they advocate policies towards curbing or enhancing access to SALW in their respective societies.

8:1:2 – Destabilisation & SALW Dynamics – Individual & Collective

A comprehensive appreciation of the effects of the proliferation of SALW within any society can only be accepted when we recognise their impacts on the process of socio-political and economic destabilisation. As such, this study will examine the dynamics of political, strategic, and socio-economic destabilisation through the impact that the possession of SALW has on individual behaviour, and when diffused en-masse within a collective; for example, the differing processes involved in the empowerment of the individual to that of the collective within non-conflict, emerging, non-violent, and violent conflict relationships within different socio-cultural environments. Through this analysis, this study will explain how SALW act to destabilise such relationships and assist their passage from non-violent to violent conflict. In this respect, the understanding provided in chapter two, concerning the conflict ladder and the inherent threshold through which a conflict passes as it escalates or de-escalates, will be further enhanced to appreciate how the direct effects of SALW affect how conflictual relationships can escalate. Furthermore, this chapter will investigate the association

between the mass accumulation of SALW and the disenfranchisement of vulnerable individuals and other sections of a SALW affected society; for example, the increasing vulnerability and insecurity that is ubiquitous amongst Afghanistan's children, women, and its elderly population. These sections of society have been and continue to be the predominant recipients of unprovoked violence on an individual, local and national level. The effects of their inability to prevent or deter violence have resulted in a debilitating trauma on a national level, which may continue for generations to come, whether they are the recipients of or contributors to violence; as is the case for child combatants (soldiers). In respect to the latter, this chapter will illustrate how the combatants themselves may be perceived as a vulnerable section of society that is unable to break out of a cycle of violence, partly because of the availability of SALW.

8:1:3 – Effects on Social Dynamics of Afghan Society

The proliferation of SALW has affected the social dynamics of Afghan society, both directly, as evidenced through increased morbidity and mortality rates from firearms employment, and indirectly by increasing human insecurity; militarisation of society; evolution of a weapons orientated culture; escalation of the structural, tribal, ethnic, religious and political polarisation of society; aggravation of the breakdown of socio-structural norms, traditional codes of conduct, and moral values; provocation of the breakdown of law and order, which has led to a rapid rise in criminal activity and human rights abuses, primarily targeting vulnerable minorities, as exemplified by ethnic cleansing and genocide, in addition to grave humanitarian consequences; and, the increasing decentralisation of Afghanistan, which has assisted the rise of locally, regionally and nationally aspiring warlords that exacerbate tribal, ethno-linguistic and religious fissures, and have resulted in the fragmentation of the Afghan State.

As will be illustrated below, the mass diffusion of SALW perniciously affects the dynamics of inter-group relations in both the short and long-term, whether conflictual or not. The introduction of large quantities of SALW can tilt the balance of power between contending parties and act to catalyse a violent action or reaction in an environment where friction and hostility have been evolving. Ready access to SALW can also aid the use of coercive measures through posturing and/or use to resolve inter-group disputes or disagreements, thereby aggravating existing conflictual relationships or reigniting terminated violent conflicts.

8:2 – Stability, Change and Destabilisation

8:2:1– The Arms Race & Destabilisation Dynamics

The proliferation of SALW is symptomatic of entrenched socio-structural issues in the socio-cultural environment within which they are diffused; therefore, their associated impacts are also socio-political, economic and structural in nature. As will be highlighted below, there is an increasing consensus that the mass availability and use of small arms and light weapons does affect the tempo and direction of violent social conflict, the rate of social disintegration, and exacerbation of ethno-linguistic, tribal, religious, and socio-political fissures. However, the main issue that is presented here is that of definition, since there are no recognisable norms or standards available to measure the quantity of weapons required to be accumulated or infused within a particular environment to have destabilising effects⁸. Furthermore, the significance of their

effects is also dependent upon the degree of their diffusion within a given context that is conducive to destabilisation; while, the quantity of SALW being proliferated must pass a specific threshold to have a large-scale destabilising effects, which is also relative to the specific socio-political, economic, strategic, structural, tribal, cultural, religious, geographical, and environmental conditions of the particular context within which they have been diffused. The difficulty in gauging the threshold lies in the uniqueness of every context through the presence of an infinite number of variables, each of which could individually, or in any one of their countless permutations, act to have a differing significant, negligible, catalytic, or confounding effect on the threshold to either lessen or increase the potential or actual destabilising effect in any context (see Appendix III, Figure 2.4 – Conflict Interactions, and, Appendix III, Figure 2.5 – Key to Conflict Interactions). In other words, very large numbers of tightly controlled weapons may have no destabilising effects, whilst a small number of SALW can be extremely destabilising under the right conditions, given the variable contexts of their use. This definitional issue was debated for over a year by the United Nations Small Arms Panel of Experts, which concluded that the number of SALW could be termed *excessive & destabilising* under certain circumstances, when a supplier or recipient state:

Does not exercise restraint in the production, transfer, and acquisition of such weapons beyond those needed for legitimate national and collective defense and internal security; b) cannot exercise effective control in preventing the illegitimate acquisition, transfer, transit, or circulation of such weapons; and, c) when the use of such weapons manifests itself in armed conflict, in crime--such as arms and drug trafficking--or in other actions contrary to the norms of national or international law.⁹

Chapter 1 Further definitional issues arise concerning the nature of “legitimate national and collective defence and internal security”, which show some similarities to those questions presented and contested by another contemporary issue; that is, the definition of *terrorism*¹⁰. Nevertheless, in his book on *Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Conflict Prevention*, Edward J. Laurence (1998)¹¹ is cognizant that SALW cannot be defined as excessive or destabilising until some of their detrimental consequences are manifested in the militarisation of society through increases in armed crime and violence, increasing numbers of civilian casualties, subversion of the political status quo through the fragmentation of social structures, impediments to economic activity, and loss of foreign investment and assistance amongst many other effects and consequences. These effects can also be considered as indicators of the presence of excessive and destabilising quantities of SALW in a particular context, which require more focused attention while developing policy tools to curb and prevent further proliferation in potential and existing conflict zones. Furthermore, the excessive accumulation of SALW do not cause the conflicts¹²; they are, in fact, only tools that can act as catalysts in potential conflict environments or propagate them, and should not be confused with the underlying root causes of conflict (as referred to in chapter two), which arise from the accumulation of numerous complex systemic, structural, political, socioeconomic, commercial, ethno-cultural, religious, and ideational factors.

8:2:2 – Socio-Political and Economic Destabilisation

Destabilisation of the socio-economic and political system of a state can be induced by countless internal and external factors that attempt or seek *change*; for example, foreign interference in another state’s internal affairs may cause destabilisation; or, a growing internal demand for basic human rights and/or needs from a

hitherto subdued minority group(s) may incite destabilisation as they strive to change the status quo. In respect to the latter, if a minority group(s) or contending party(s) (whose *raison d'être* is its ethnic, ideological, religious, tribal, or even its structural orientation) perceives that dialogue is an avenue through which it is not capable of achieving its goals and resorts to violent actions through the availability of SALW, or the state begins to subdue the contending party(s) through repressive measures, a degree of political uncertainty may arise, which may have a knock-on effect on the political system, its state of crisis, the potential or actual loss of external and internal investment, resulting in economic uncertainty, with prospects of an economic recession that are dependent upon the extent of the upheaval and/or its subjugation.

Where there is an increase in unemployment, especially of young men, alternatives for employment are often sought as options become increasingly limited to acquire resources and money for the fulfilment of basic human needs. Such alternatives often and readily include employment within armed groups¹³. In such circumstances, familial/domestic pressures may also force able individuals to seek various avenues to relieve such pressures through the pursuit of criminal activities or by joining the burgeoning security services of the variegated conflicting and contending parties. The influence of social mores and norms regulating societal behaviour may become gradually reduced while the demands to alleviate the increasing pressures to survive evolve and develop. Social mores and traditions, as pertaining to the long-term resolution of disputes, may begin to dissolve under growing pressures to discover immediate solutions.

As conflict progresses, young men and/or able women, in need of active employment or activities, may be encouraged by the promotion of warrior attributes to join their ranks. Others may create or join existing groups that follow or are associated with various contending parties or criminal gangs, thereby increasing their sense of belonging and identity through processes that consolidate and reinforce group cohesion. Such processes may facilitate the reduction in dialogue to assist the resolution of disputes. In fact, they often endorse the use of physical violence to resolve issues and force the creation of new demands; for example, the *Sturmabteilung* (S.A.), or brown shirts, were created to act as henchmen using physical violence to intimidate political opponents during the Nazis' initial consolidation of power in the 1920s to early 1930s in Germany. Shortly before his first experience in prison in 1921, Adolf Hitler proclaimed to an audience that "the National Socialist Movement will in the future ruthlessly prevent – if necessary by force – all meetings or lectures that are likely to distract the minds of our fellow countrymen"¹⁴. In such circumstances, with the gradual reduction in the social threshold of the use of violence, the introduction of the tools of violence, namely SALW, can drastically increase the use of violent tactics to resolve disputes or further political, quasi or even pseudo-military, criminal and/or personal agendas. Consequently, increasingly greater numbers of internal security forces are needed to confront rising criminal elements to provide a semblance of security, which may have a contrasting effect, since ensuring security through a reliance on greater fire-power can cause greater insecurity to occur from the resulting increases in criminal firepower, such as the *boomerang effect*¹⁵, and hence, a circular arms race within a particular state. "If security—for a state, a community, or an individual—is to be obtained by reliance on firepower, then one can never have enough of it... But the more heavily armed a society is, the more insecure it may come to feel"¹⁶.

When such situations and tactics are extrapolated to a national level, the destabilisation may become extensive, where state functionality may be substantially impaired, leading to elite fragmentation; the widening of ethnic antagonisms and fissures; ideological struggles, including religious, confessional or sectarian divisions; significant systematic loss of the state's revenue base; the diminution of the state's internal and external authority, and legitimacy, leading to a crisis for unity, increased calls for separatism that may result in state fragmentation, thereby reinforcing the state's use of panoptic coercive measures to fortify itself¹⁷. Each of the aforementioned processes has the ability to propel a stable system from its equilibrium. The inclusion of additional processes can cause a spiralling instability to self-propagate, while the addition of large quantities of SALW at any stage of this destabilisation can considerably hasten its descent, which is partly due to the lack of constraint associated with their use as opposed to major high-tech weapons, whose use is constrained by their technical complexity of operation, high economic cost, potential for overwhelming retaliation, and incompatibility to the needs of modern low intensity and guerrilla warfare¹⁸. In addition, SALW have a greater tendency to be used in offensive actions than major weapons, which further enhances their appearance as tools for destabilisation, as is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the conflicts over the past two decades have been and "are being fought almost entirely with small and light armaments, mostly the cheapest and least advanced kinds"¹⁹ and developed from mid-twentieth century technologies. Nevertheless, the greater level of evident killing power of SALW is not necessarily synonymous with instability if the disruption of the political status quo through battle deaths is the only evaluative variable used, since the vast means through which political destabilisation can occur precludes their comprehensive evaluation. One party's evaluation of balance of power could invariably be another party's perception of imbalance, due to differing strategic cultures, which may suggest an understanding that instability lies in the perceptions that the transfer and possession of SALW may instil in various parties, and therefore, depend upon the ideological, socio-cultural, and philosophical foundations of those parties as collectives. In this respect, the open display of weapons may not be perceived as threatening to the stability of a particular cultural environment displaying martial qualities; while, in contrast, such a display may be perceived as threatening when viewed by a pacific orientated society²⁰. Alternatively, the former party may view an increase in the number of SALW as threatening if its strategic interests were perceived as being endangered by a potential adversary's acquisition of SALW. In other words, there is no clear-cut way of correlating between an increase of SALW and instability without also understanding each party's particular socio-political, cultural, economic, and strategic motivations for their increased possession of firearms; and hence, the variations within their respective strategic cultures. In fact, the conflicting perceptions and mixed messages between parties that may, on occasion, be more important in defining what is destabilising than the actual transfers in SALW. Nevertheless, what is crucial to appreciate is what occurs once firearms have been introduced into a particular environment on a mass scale. To this extent, an analysis of the individual and collective behavioural responses to the availability of SALW is instrumental for our greater understanding of their effects and may help to explain how they can aid the rapid disintegration of the functionality of a society, and its social structure, through the reinforcement of the fragmentation process by increasing the coercive methods used by the growing numbers of identity groups to solidify their internal cohesion.

8:3 – Modification of Human Behaviour

The holistic effects that the diffusion of SALW have on a collective body are particularly important for this study, and to a limited extent, can be extrapolated from the effects that they have on any individual human being. The possession of a lethal instrument, or firearm, whether it is a knife or assault rifle, may induce certain behavioural responses in an individual depending upon their personality traits, socio-cultural environment and circumstances. These responses differ significantly from the dynamic processes produced as a response to the collective possession of firearms. Although individual responses do contribute to the group dynamic due to their constituent role, and can be extrapolated to the collective, the collective holistic response(s) is greater than the cumulative individual response(s). Therefore, such extrapolations cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of holistic response(s), as the proverb “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts”²¹, stipulates; which is also true for the holistic effects that the mass availability of firearms have on the collective as opposed to their cumulative individual effects. Consequently, an account of the numerous individual engagements of SALW may not accurately explain the holistic effects of the diffusion of mass quantities of SALW. Nevertheless, an account of the effects of SALW on individuals is pertinent at this point.

8:3:1 – SALW Effects on Individual Behaviour

Any individual may have a plethora of rational or circumstantial motivations for their possession of firearms, which, in addition to their situation, may arise from a variety of combinations of the need to acquire or maintain security through deterrence and/or protection, culturally defined prestige and status, power and authority, and the acquisition of additional resources through force. However, the acquisition and possession of a weapon may also result from the individual’s personality traits or *gestalt*, for example, whether or not s/he has any sociopathic or psychopathic tendencies, paranoia, superiority or inferiority complexes or other personality disorders; outlook on life, such as, ideological, secular or religious worldview; tribal, cultural, ethnic or other collective codes of conduct where weapons have symbolic value, such as, as a bringer of freedom; and, amongst numerous other reasons, the individual’s occupational orientation, which may entail the possession of firearms for law enforcement or military duties, thereby facilitating force multiplication. The manifestation of an individual’s motivations for acquiring firearms, whether circumstantial, cultural, value or personality based are finally dependent upon the availability and ease of access of SALW within his/her environment.

In relation to Afghanistan, and its multifaceted ethno-cultural diversity, the motivations that any individual may have for the possession and/or use of firearms and other similar weapons varies widely due to the relative and variegated social reinforcements of the value of such weapons within different socio-cultural environments that respective individuals may be nurtured within. Patrilineally segmented tribal societies based upon variations of defensive socio-structural organisation that culturally reinforce and project particular value systems through codes of conduct, consolidate regulatory codes with respect to firearms within their societies from a young age, such as the Pushtun through their Pushtunwali; which are invariably different from non-tribally organised societies. Individuals from varying socio-cultural environments are, therefore,

nurtured to react with different behavioural responses when confronted with the possession or use of firearms; as will be explained later in this section (see chapter two for a detailed analysis of the structural make up of the different ethnic groups within Afghanistan).

The possession of a firearm has numerous impacts on an individual's behavioural responses, foremost of which is the psychological impact, the recognition of the possession of a lethal instrument. However, this may initially depend upon the individual's perception of the weapon and what it entails. For a person that is not familiar with a firearm, a lengthy thought process may ensue, and, given sufficient time, an acceptance that the weapon is a tool or instrument for the projection of force and an extension of the person's ability to express force, or the potential of it. Few ponder beyond accepting a firearm as a tool to fulfil their primary motives and the initial recognition of its lethality to question the ethical and philosophical implications of its possession. For those familiar with weapons, such thought processes may already be deeply ingrained, whether dreaded or appreciated. Nevertheless, most people who acquire a firearm intuitively and clearly recognise the potential or actual power that a firearm bequeaths to the possessor over the potential or actual victim(s)²². Weapons allow a change in the balance within relationships, especially those already involving balances of power²³. Those relationships that do not previously have an existing power differential constituent between individuals have this imposed upon the relationship once a weapon is held by an individual that recognises the inherent value of a firearm and uses it. The mere presence of firearms is not sufficient to change the balance within relationships without the meanings behind their possession and the intention to use them for that purpose²⁴.

Berkowitz and LePage (1967) demonstrated that there was a distinct *weapons effect*²⁵, which empowered individuals, since the mere the presence of a weapon increased behaviour deemed as aggressive²⁶. Further studies were conducted to corroborate this effect in a variety of circumstances²⁷; however, in this respect, what is pertinent is the course taken in the use of firearms. The maxim that "people kill people, not guns"²⁸ may seem rational; however, Berkowitz and LePage (1967) contested this assumption in their study, noting that "guns not only permit violence, they stimulate it as well. The finger pulls the trigger, but the trigger may also be pulling the finger"²⁹. Furthermore, firearms facilitate a greater and more rapid slaughter the greater the firepower, and allow people to dissociate themselves from the physical killing blow, which is not the case with other weapons such as fists, knives and instruments that may be used to cut, stab, or provide blunt force trauma. The potential effect of *pulling the trigger* can induce tremendous behavioural reactions in individuals to consider avenues that would not have seemed possible previously³⁰. When faced with the threat of instant death, given the exception, people are usually immediately subdued, which is the assailant's intention, and typically, the desired response. The ability to drastically change the behaviour of others, and the capacity for instant empowerment is an attractive incentive and important reason for any motivated person willing to progress to a higher threshold and acquire a firearm.

In addition to provoking behavioural responses, empowerment through the acquisition of firearms is a psychological condition dependent upon an individual's perception of firearms and the circumstances under

which possession is contracted. Cultural traditions, codes of conduct, and moral norms also affect the direction of a person's perception and the social acceptability of the possession of weapons; for example, it is culturally acceptable for adult men of all ages to carry firearms openly without permits within the *Ghair Ilaka* (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA) (See, Appendix IV, Plate 7.1 – People Openly Carry Weapons in the Streets). Whether in the tribal areas or in Afghanistan, the environmental conditions and general level of threat to security, be it from within the family and tribe, via *tabur* (first cousin rivalry) relations and/or blood feuds; or, external situations, via the heightened level of alertness and dire lack of security, the typical tribalised Pushtun male perceives firearms as integral to his masculinity and a fundamental constituent of the archetypal male that he aspires to. Furthermore, within the male domain, such cultural norms bestow significant status to those who possess firearms in direct proportion to the level of firepower.

Empowerment may also generate various psychological responses in individuals, dependent upon their personality type, giving rise to a sense of confidence and authority over others who do not possess firearms, which is characterised by an underlying propensity for pseudo-superiority that is fundamentally derived from an inherent inferiority complex based upon the person's innate insecurity within his/her environment³¹. The need to project an appearance of superiority and authority over others is significantly facilitated by the possession of coercive tools such as firearms³². This process is circular, self-propagating, and fundamentally dangerous, since it can lead to conflict between others with similar motivations and personality types; for example, recognition of the ability to make life-death decisions, can lead to a *god-complex*³³ in individuals who are not constrained by socio-cultural norms and morals, such as, socio-paths or those with antisocial personality disorders.

In contrast, aside from personality-type dependent responses, openly carried and displayed firearms also have several social functions in the *tribal areas*, where open displays of strength are not only symptomatic of individual insecurity and the need for protection but are also indicative of structural relations within Pushtun society, and the insecurity of the wider Afghan society as a whole, especially where *tabur*-based or *badal*-based (reciprocity, which is a primary tenet within Pushtunwali) feuds are prominent.

Weapons act as a deterrence to ward off harassment and potential attack from adversaries or raiders; the latter being an important characteristic of many Pushtun tribes, especially those predominantly displaying *nang* attributes. Many Afghans suffer from prolonged blood feuds between residential, family or tribal units for generations, where a family/tribal member or descendant could be picked off at any point, regardless of their personal contributions and relationships with the original party(s) to the feud. In these circumstances, the individual's personality orientated rationale for displaying firearms is subordinated to the necessity to survive a potential attack from prospective adversaries. Furthermore, many people possess weapons to protect themselves because of their perceived insecurity in insecure environments³⁴. However, this is more a reflection of the nature and state of *legitimate* law enforcement authorities and their inability to project their capabilities in insecure environments.

In contrast to overt displays of authority, firearms also represent the potential of freedom from authority. They can be construed as signs of individuality, exemplified by the rebellious and uncompromising nature of the typical Afghan who is unwilling to subordinate himself to the authority of others. It is commonly acknowledged that without weapons, acquired from numerous sources, the Soviet occupation during the 1980s would not have been defeated. Similarly, the Mozambique national flag displays an AK-47 as a symbol of their liberation struggle and as a sign of freedom from colonialism³⁵.

It is assumed that the display of arms represents a credible capability to retaliate against a potential aggression at any moment, and therefore, deter any aggressive behaviour with the prospect of an unacceptable violent response. The threat of reprisal reduces the perceived benefits of aggressive behaviour, and hence, reduces the probability of an initiation of hostilities. However, such a situation can and does lead to one, both, or all parties reciprocally increasing their firepower to both possess the capability to initiate hostilities and substantially retaliate against any attack. Thereby, also acting as further deterrence against an attack, until, that is, another party obtains the capacity to further increase the firepower available to initiate and respond; and thereby, induce a security dilemma that often leads to an *arms race*, which may only be constrained by the financial resources available to acquire, develop, and maintain greater destructive capabilities, or the recognition of the potential destructive capacity of an ongoing arms race and the benefits of a mutually attained agreement to avoid an uncontrollable arms race from spiralling out of control. However, concerning the recognition of mutual destruction and/or agreement to stem the potential destruction, the game theory provides a simple model to examine the complexities involved in the strategic interactions between two or more parties.

In a situation consisting of two parties, the build up of armaments increases the probability for mutual devastation; alternatively, the prospect of cooperation has mutual benefits, but depends upon the willingness of each party to trust that its opponent is also cooperating. From figure 8.1 (see, Appendix III, Figure 8.1 – Game Theory – Possible Outcomes of an Arms Race between Two Parties), we note that the game theory approach (the modern game theory was invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their book, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*³⁶ is able to examine such situations by indicating the possible outcomes and the benefits that each may have for the prospective contending parties.

Briefly, if Party ‘A’ arms itself and Party ‘B’ does not, then the former is stronger, and is likely to win in any confrontation 4 to 1, and vice versa. This is the best option for each party, given that the opposing does not arm itself. The cooperation of both parties to curb the arms race and not arm themselves through mutual understanding would result in the second most beneficial outcome, where each party can receive the second highest ratio, 3 each. However, fearing that the opposing party may also be arming itself, and risking total loss, the prospect of completely losing out may result in all parties arming themselves, which produces the third option, where both parties attain a lower success ratio of 2 to 2. Nevertheless, this outcome can be rationalised as better than losing out completely in the event the other party is armed. The second best option relies heavily upon *trust*, which is usually in very short supply in situations involving a high degree of

generalised security and large quantities of firearms. Many of the decisions taken by the contending parties depend upon their previous experiences with their opposing parties, whether they previously committed to an arms truce or not over an extended period of time, and whether or not such a situation may arise again in the future. As to the latter, the consequences of the present actions must be taken into account, and may indicate that the best course is not necessarily the one in which the opponent is defeated. The use of the *game theory* to examine particular situations helps us acquire an insight into the most optimum outcomes available for the parties involved, so as to make the most proficient decisions according to our intended objectives based upon assessments of the probable effects of our actions.

Trust is the defining factor in all individual and inter-party relationships and interactions, the reinforcement or breakdown of which is dependent upon the motivations and psychological responses of those acquiring and possessing firearms as well as those confronted by them. The conflict resolution, in contrast to the conflict escalation responses by those in possession of firearms skews the perception of confronted individuals towards either positive gratitude and appreciation, or fear, trepidation, and suspicion, respectively. Maley (2003) argues that the *breakdown of trust* on a collective scale “leads to unworkable political communities and disunified political elites”³⁷ through his recognition of the distinction between *face-to-face* trust and *anonymous trust*; the latter is trust between individuals and a more general trust associated with the collective where trust is based upon an understanding of legitimate authority imposed within or without collective structures, such as organisations, institutions or other large bodies, respectively. The possession of firearms is likely to reduce trust between unacquainted individuals or those whose prior relationships are not already based on mutual respect and understanding³⁸, except where the individual positively represents a respected institution based upon the protection or enhancement of the individual’s social, civil, and human needs and rights. The many arms races that have and are enveloping global affairs are a testament to the dire lack of trust that exists between individuals and between collectives; giving concern that the most likely outcomes being played out tend to be 4 to 1 in an increasingly globalising world, whose foundations paradoxically rest upon a mutually beneficial cooperative base.

Firearms may facilitate an impression of security when held by legitimate law enforcement authorities that are accepted by the populous. However, in the face of widespread diffusion of firearms, the authority’s inability to effectively regulate firearms may induce an increased sense of insecurity in the general population. The arguments for and against the possession and overt display of weapons are also culturally determined; since, some societies have frowned upon the overt display of weapons by the law enforcement authorities, such as the United Kingdom (UK), where, the social taboo and stringent regulatory controls on the private ownership of firearms³⁹ provide a greater sense of security to society through a reduction in the rates of armed crime, firearm homicides and firearm suicides⁴⁰, as is also the case for Australia after the introduction of strict firearms possession laws⁴¹. However, even in the UK, exceptions have arisen due to the increasing use of firearms by criminal and subversive elements, where the law enforcer must also be protected; for example, when armed response units responding to incidents where firearms have been witnessed or used, at high value and high threat targets and locations, such as Airport or border security, or authorised close VIP and

diplomatic protection⁴². The possession of firearms by law enforcers in such circumstances and at such locations has, contrary to the general rule in the UK, been largely accepted, and to some extent, extensively encouraged, by the population at large because of significant security concerns due to the increase of armed crime. In a report by the British think-tank, Policy Exchange in 2007, *Gun and Knife Crime in Great Britain*, from a sample of 2,156 adults, “72% support an increase in the number of armed patrols”⁴³. This is especially the case after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and the 07 July 2005 attacks on Central London’s transportation services. It may, therefore be assumed that culturally constructed and reinforced taboos to the overt possession of firearms are relative to the perceptions of insecurity within a given society.

A law enforcement officer may undergo numerous psychological responses to the possession and use of firearms⁴⁴, including confidence and reassurance to protect others against criminals and offenders, and the actualised self-perception of legitimate authority and power, as opposed to self-doubt, inadequacy and diffidence when unarmed and confronted with a threatening situation in which others may be armed, resulting in a reflected response by those needing protection⁴⁵. The possession of firearms for self and community protection by legitimate authorities can increase trust, albeit, with the addition of adequate physical firearms and psychological training, and constant education and re-education in the implicit responsibilities for firearms use and regulatory controls to prevent misuse⁴⁶.

In comparison to the fear and anxiety suffered by children who have experienced traumatic events, fear and mistrust are also common amongst adults. However, their impact and consequences manifest themselves in society differently due to the significantly higher degree of authority and responsibility associated with the actions of adults as compared to children. In this respect, mistrust often leads to misinterpretation of actions⁴⁷. A person may expect a certain course of events to occur in a given situation, which may be negative because of the cynicism developed through the abuse of their trust, and consequently misconstrue actual events to fit their expectations, the result of which may be a negative reaction by the mistrusting individual; which may lead to a process of escalating negative reactions⁴⁸. In an environment such as Afghanistan in which the protracted conflict has enabled the mass diffusion of weapons, the need for security for the individual and community, is paramount. Mistrust helps fuel increased insecurity⁴⁹. Misinterpretations of actions and events can quickly lead to the eruption of violence with the aid of widely available weapons. As the American-led campaign to destroy the Al-Qaeda network forced the dismantling of the Taliban regime, the loosely grouped Northern Alliance and its associated groups formed a new administration in 2002, which continues to govern Kabul and its surrounding regions, but not yet the whole of Afghanistan; while, perceptions of deep mistrust within and without the Government of Afghanistan still persist due to the pervasive corruption⁵⁰ and the disaffection of the dominant Pushtun tribes of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. This mistrust stems from the constant bloodletting and breaking of trust between the different ethnic groups, which have eagerly sought to dominate and subdue each other with the assistance of weapons. The possession of SALW is perceived as indispensable to secure the capacity of one party to dominate another, and hence, provide its own security at the expense of the other party’s security. Without a neutral source to bridge the opposing parties and reduce the mistrust, each and every action and reaction (especially the spilling of blood) that has previously taken

place is compounded and reinforced by those currently occurring and will enhance and add to the cumulatively increasing mistrust, therefore, exacerbating the deep seated conflict and pushing its ultimate resolution further out of reach.

8:3:2 – Women and Arms

The possession and use of weapons has traditionally resided in the male domain throughout history; although, more recently, greater numbers of women are acquiring firearms for self-protection⁵¹. Nevertheless, traditionally women have predominantly been the victims rather than the arbiters of firearms. Furthermore, women generally respond differently to the possession of firearms from their male counterparts for whom the psychosocial and behavioural effects also vary significantly⁵². This is due, in part, to the differing physiology and consequent socialisation processes that women undergo⁵³; for example, the archetypal male warrior is not symbolic of the traditional cultural traits of Afghan women.

A comprehensive joint study conducted in 2005 by Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and Oxfam International, *Control Arms: The Impact of Guns on Women's Lives*⁵⁴ study found that foremost amongst the female population in armed conflicts, who were actually party to an armed group in an armed conflict such as a civil war or guerrilla campaign, where firearms are widely available, is the notion that the possession of a weapon provides a degree of security. “For some women and girls in armed groups having a gun is seen as a way of protecting themselves and acquiring greater status. However, this is frequently illusory; and many girl and women combatants continue to be abused and are forced to commit abuses themselves”⁵⁵. However, the study also found that the illusory security that is perceived through the possession of a weapon is far outweighed by the general level of violence that women are often the recipients of to a massively disproportionate degree in relation to the female possession of firearms. The presence of large quantities of firearms exacerbates female insecurities and not the contra. That is:

The presence of guns invariably has the same effect: more guns mean more danger for women. Violence against women persists in every country and in all sectors of society. When such violence involves the use of weapons specifically designed to cause injury and death and which can fire bullets at high speed from a distance, sometimes at a rate of several bullets per second, then the risk to women's lives increases dramatically.⁵⁶

Given the exception, a sample of women questioned about their perception and use of firearms showed that women did not openly carry weapons in public when permitted to do so; weapons did not provide the perception of status and prestige; and, the desire to achieve a sense of authority through their possession was not present⁵⁷. In a study conducted by Laura M. Milner, Dale Fodness, and Joy Morrison (1991) on *Women's Images of Guns: An Exploratory Study*⁵⁸, there was an overwhelming understanding that weapons were primarily tools for their protection and for their immediate family and friends. Nevertheless, some of the sample did voice their concern and, in a few cases, their anxiety concerning the presence of weapons in their homes⁵⁹. In contrast to the United States, there are considerable distinctions and disparities between the social status enjoyed by women as compared to men in Afghan society, which exist to restrain and suppress female social mobility and their progressive rights, thereby maintaining the status quo in which women are

subordinated in virtually every aspect of human relations and interactions. As such, and to a limited extent, weapons have also been perceived as facilitating an equalisation of gender disparities, by reducing the male's physical dominance to subjugate his womenfolk. However, it is rare that weapons are used in such cases, since socio-cultural norms extensively stigmatise such behavioural conduct.

8:3:3 – SALW and the Dynamics of Collective Behaviour

An individual's behavioural responses to the possession of firearms, and their consequential effects, must be considered when taking account of collective responses. An individual's perception of weapons can be magnified to partially explain the collective's response to their possession. However, individual responses may also have intrinsically related emotional content dependent upon personality traits, which tend to predominate unlike group dynamics.

Collective behaviour is comprised of a dynamic interaction of a large combination of variegated determinants, many of which are attributes of an individual, albeit, on a cumulative level; for example, inherited, physiological, psychological, and coetaneously conditioned traits contribute to the rational or irrational reasoning of an individual and/or collective, which additionally interact with a complex assortment of ideational/conceptual, material/economic, socio-cultural, and/or political/ideological determinants to produce the resultant behavioural response to the possession and/or use of firearms. However, ascertaining behavioural responses through an overarching theory is not possible, because the dominance of one factor over others is dependent upon the particular contextual circumstances in question. In fact, ascertaining resultant behavioural responses can only be achieved through an intricate and comprehensive empirical investigation of every possible contextual situation and their multifarious combinations due to the degree of complexity that arises from the interaction of these determinants, since collective or group dynamics vary considerably from one situation to another; which, therefore, negates the possibility of a generalised theory and its provision for answers for every situation. Nevertheless, a discerning specialist is trained to observe the overall characteristic psychosocial conditions that comparatively predispose certain behavioural responses from individuals and groups; and, as such, extrapolations of group behavioural responses can be ascertained, albeit, requiring an exhaustively objective analysis and evaluation, which is a rarity.

Collective behaviour is, furthermore, very different from an individual's behaviour, whose central nervous system virtually dictates any action or behavioural response upon demand, which is not the case even with a well-disciplined collective due to the relative lack of peripheral integration to the centre. Collective members must be persuaded through various means and processes in order to act upon the demands of the centre. Large organisational systems with elaborate administrative structures must be activated in order for violent actions to be successfully deployed through rational and determined planning and preparation, which the collective undergoes during a period of conflict escalation that is the product of its cost/benefit rationalisation of resource and material protection and/or exploitation, or other ideational motivations. This is not the case for an individual, whose violence may be a result of a premeditated plan of attack, but is usually a result of the

eruption of an uncontrolled emotional behavioural response to a situation. Charles Tilly (1988) agrees that collective violence is dissimilar to individual violence because:

The groups engaged in collective action with any regularity usually consist of populations perceiving and pursuing a common set of interests. And collective action of a considerable scale requires coordination, communication and solidarity extending beyond the moment of action itself.⁶⁰

8:3:4 – Collective Behaviour vis-a-vis Individual Behaviour

During his causal analysis of community violence, Seyom Brown (1994) places the predispositional determinants for the use of force into four interrelated categories⁶¹ which he aptly names *predisposition categories*, namely, 1) *intense grievances*, all-encompassing community feelings of unjust treatment; 2) *structural determinants*, differences within structural relationships, such as between economic classes, political system, demographic distribution; 3) *distribution of coercive power*, the balance of military power may predispose the use of firearms in a favourable situation but not in another where the balance is not favourable; and, 4) *attitudes towards the use of force*, the socio-cultural perceptions of the use of force and/or weapons. With respect to the use of SALW, additional categories can be attached, depending upon whether an individual or collective response is being investigated; for example, *psychological determinants* are important factors in an individual's possession and use of firearms where psychological triggers can induce violent reactions in some individuals and not in others, which is largely due to the individual's genetic makeup and environmental conditioning, and for which an explanation can be derived from the concept of *dynamic complexity*⁶²; and, the predisposition to the collective use of firearms via *strategic determinants*, that is, incompatible goals, the competition for resources, and the mandated use of force, such as law enforcement, and international law and order. However, excluding the policy-makers and leadership of the collective, the dynamics of group, collective, or mass behaviour differ significantly from individualistic behaviour due to the, what can only be described as an, inherent lack of rationality in the former. In his celebrated work, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, Gustave Le Bon (1896), accentuates the "extreme mental inferiority of crowds"⁶³ given their preponderance to emotionality, susceptibility to suggestion, irrationality, non-intellectualisation, and inaptitude to espouse a non-subjective interpretation of their *raison d'être* and adoption of an autonomous approach. Le Bon (1896) asserts that the *average crowd* pre-eminently displays an annihilative persona in opposition to the positive, and states that individuals within the collective or 'crowd', "however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation"⁶⁴. Furthermore, "in the collective mind the intellectual aptitudes of the individuals, and in consequence their individuality, are weakened"⁶⁵.

Le Bon (1896) defines three principle and characteristic differences that the constituent individual possesses when forming part of a crowd in contrast to isolated individuals:

- a) "a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce have kept under restraint", and therefore being "less disposed to check himself from the consideration that, a crowd being anonymous, and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely"⁶⁶.

- b) The manifestation of the phenomenon of *contagion*, in which every emotion and activity is contagious to the extent that it hypnotises the individual to willingly forfeit his/her interests for the sake of the collective's concerns, and in some circumstances his/her life, which wholly contradicts the *life instinct* of an isolated individual.
- c) The susceptibility of the constituent individual to the power of suggestion, of which contagion is only a symptom. The constituent individual loses his conscious personality and is unaware of his/her actions, which are performed with overpowering impulsiveness and contrary to his/her character as an isolated individual. "This impetuosity is the more irresistible in the case of crowds than in that of the hypnotised subject, from the fact that, the suggestion being the same for all the individuals of the crowd, it gains in strength by reciprocity"⁶⁷.

When we consider the collective possession of firearms, we must distinguish between the many different forms that the collective can take, from the well-groomed, highly trained, and professional military combatants to the random, dispersed, ill disciplined, poorly trained, unorganised, ragtag mobs and crowds, which usually attract the general population. Although not self-evident or self-explanatory, the differences may be synonymous to those between the intellectual and the illiterate individual, whereby the professional collective may possess Le Bon's (1896) characteristics as readily as the collective mob, but differ in the overwhelming superiority in their disciplined, structured and organised use of firearms. As such, there are two distinctions, which may explain the different mechanisms that dictate how the collective responds, although these do merge into one another and depend upon the quantity or size of the collective, and its quality: that is, a) the processes involved in the holistic behavioural expression of the collective, and their limitations; and, b) the processes involved in the individual behavioural expression of the majority of the constituent individuals⁶⁸.

Concerning professional military forces, the intentions of those providing the training is to eliminate as much individuality as is possible, to reduce the life instinct and produce a professional collective that is more susceptible to in-group cohesion, suggestion and contagion, and hence, direct their instincts without interference from their isolated consciousness. Furthermore, the unorganised mob's possession of SALW often leads to their uncontrolled, capricious and extreme use, thereby producing chaos, insecurity, and socio-political and economic destabilisation of the affected community(s). For example, when the mass of the collective begins to use its firepower, individual expression is severely limited, since objecting could lead to self-annihilation, given the emotional content of the collective, as was the case upon the receipt of severe warnings upon the author's initial objections to the use of child combatants on the front lines during the Taliban summer offensive between 28 July to 03 August 1999. Mass behaviour therefore acts to nullify potential reversals to the collective momentum. In his book on *The Group Mind*, William McDougall (1920) concurs with Le Bon's (1896) findings, stating that the unorganised group or collective is:

Excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute and extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments; extremely suggestible, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgment, incapable of any but the simpler and imperfect forms of reasoning... Hence its behaviour is like that of any unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation.⁶⁹

Le Bon's (1896) description of the unorganised collective mind is synonymous to that displayed by the crude mindset of people belonging to the early stages of civilisation. Within the collective cognitive attitude, opposing notions exist in parallel harmony and at ease in a complex chaos without any conflict developing

from the rational incongruities between them, which are, furthermore, descriptive of individuals afflicted by neurosis or other similar mental illnesses. Sigmund Freud's (1922) sentiments in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, further corroborates Le Bon (1896) and McDougall (1920) when he concludes that "the group appears to us as a revival of the primal horde. Just as primitive man virtually survives in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out of any random crowd"⁷⁰.

The isolated individual has the ability to evaluate a situation independently according to his/her perceptive abilities, and produce a response based upon numerous factors, including his/her personal intellectual judgement, which may or may not lead to the use of firearms. However, an individual within the group is unable to assess a situation independently due to his/her limited capacity to criticise, and must, therefore, invariably respond as the group responds, in the direction that the group takes, and bear the consequences of the group's actions, whether or not s/he individually agrees or disagrees, since s/he is either unable to or discouraged from utilising his/her intellectual abilities to make personal judgements. As to the latter, the collective's internal cohesion is reinforced by in-group processes, which aid the fear of the collective in the constituent individual and oppose going against the collective's direction. A constituent individual's ability to criticise is thoroughly reduced because it is contrary to the collective's cohesion. Continuous criticism within and of the collective can severely hamper cohesion and reduce the strength and capacity for collective expression, therefore subjugation of individual expression through the reduction of the individual's critical intellectual ability through fear is a dynamic process of the collective's reinforcement of internal cohesion, natural development and growth. Hence, "the crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual"⁷¹.

Emotional responses from isolated individuals in possession of firearms within a collective are usually received with trepidation, since the individual's intellectual capabilities are relatively disorganised and incapable of resolving issues with emotional content. Nevertheless, an isolated individual still has the capacity to *cool down* and rationally reassess the situation before the violence threshold is crossed. In contrast, a normative behavioural characteristic of the collective is its intense emotionality, which is highly contagious within group boundaries. Harold Walsby (1947), in his seminal work on *The Domain of Ideologies* illustrates the irrationality of unorganised group behaviour when he refers to Serge Chakotin's (1940) *The Rape of the Masses*, that this "very characteristic of the crowd, and also... of the masses, is the preponderance of any emotional over any intellectual appeal"⁷². McDougall (1920) calls this the "principle of direct induction of emotion by way of the primitive sympathetic response"⁷³ (also described by McDougall as the *primitive induction of emotion* effect), that is, emotional contagion, as described by Le Bon. This contagion is an automatic response, where the emotional responses of other individuals force the loss of the constituent individual's ability to criticise, thereby facilitating the automatic arousal of similar emotions. Emotional contagion is also self-perpetuating, whereby, through mutual interaction, the constituent individual's aroused emotions further stimulate those very people who initially aroused him/her through an open feedback loop. This automatic process grows in strength in direct proportion to the number of people displaying similar emotional states, hence spiralling the emotion to a continuously increasing intensity within the group. This is,

in other words, an increasingly self-perpetuating feedback loop within the collective, whose effectiveness is greater the simpler and baser the emotion displayed.

Contagion is a powerful aspect of the dynamics of collective behaviour, and is especially significant in regards to violence, which can be an act of extreme unorganised emotional discharge in some cases, or a rational, premeditated, and organised behavioural response in others. In the former case, violence is a symptom and display of strong emotions. Within the collective, the contagion of violence inducing emotions can conflagrate a situation, especially where the *raison d'être* is sufficiently pronounced. Anger is such an emotion, where its aggressive display can be amplified through the *primitive induction of emotion* and lead to a frenzy of uncontrolled violence by an unorganised collective. Since the ability to criticise is highly subdued in such circumstances, and as the collective impresses the need to maintain cohesiveness upon the constituent individual through the use of fear, s/he may readily lose any inhibitions for the use of violence so as not to oppose the collective. Such group dynamics have often been used by political and military leaders to force otherwise peaceful populations to support their campaigns for war. The Bush administration's use of *fear* from foreign threats during its psychological warfare campaign against the American population to gain and maintain domestic support for the second Gulf War (2003-present) is a case in point⁷⁴.

Collective dynamics also affect the possession and use of firearms; for example, the possession of a firearm by a constituent individual can be legitimated by the very fact of the collective's possession of firearms. A number of factors surface when considering this point. In Pushtun society and, largely, in other ethno-linguistic societies within Afghanistan, firearms have become associated with social status, as symbols of prestige and stature through the perceived empowerment of authority and power their possession imparts over others.

In itself, prestige is a core social phenomenon because of its capacity to evoke suggestion and induce contagion within the collective. The sense of empowerment induced through firearms is an important reason for their association with prestige. The greater the firepower a person may have, the greater their perceived authority and power over others, which are also the qualities that the leadership of a collective possesses. To an extent, they are the qualities that the suggestive power of prestige also produces in certain individuals wishing to emulate their leadership, because the collective's structure has a tendency towards a hierarchical distribution of power. Therefore, through the phenomena of suggestion, and its consequent contagion, prestige can increase the possession of firearms within a collective, if the association between them exists, as is the case in Afghanistan. However, the empowerment achieved through the possession of firearms is actually based upon the recognised coercive attributes associated with firearms, whilst a legitimate leadership acquires authority and power through the collective's mass acceptance of the strength of their personalities, convictions and their positions within the hierarchical structure rather than their ability to use coercive measures through the possession of firearms. In other words, there is a false sense of security associated with the coercive empowerment that firearms induce, which can facilitate the misuse of such weapons when that very empowerment is questioned; for example, individuals may be forced to demonstrate their power and

authority over others by actually using their weapons rather than through the force of their personalities, which true leaders possess, or through their position. In such circumstances, whether by mistake or by design, the intense emotional content inherent within a violent action, as is associated with the display of power and authority, can have disastrous effects when the intense display of emotion is encouraged through suggestion and spreads through the contagion of the whole group in an automatic and compulsive growth via the *primitive induction of emotion*.

The nature of violence is such that it produces the strongest and most base of emotions, which are, furthermore, the most contagious and liable to spread instantly throughout the collective. Therefore, the possession of firearms, whether culturally acceptable or not, are not conducive to the maintenance of an equilibrium in human security, since there is a tendency towards further acquisition of firearms as the insecurity increases, which encourages more insecurity, and the propagation of a security dilemma. A cyclical and spiralling dynamic ensues unless potent forces to oppose this tendency take precedence, such as third party intervention to increase security through rigorous law enforcement actions.

Due to the multifarious variety of Afghanistan's civil population, which constitutes numerous sub-sections and collectives within it, each with their own group identities, cultural perceptions, political goals, and codes of conduct, such as the *Pushtunwali* amongst the Pushtun, the diffusion of firearms is therefore a further call for alarm because of the lack of control enjoyed by the central government over its disparate society, and its inability to provide and enforce a uniform and standardised perception of firearms throughout the country.

Concerning ethno-cultural codes of conduct, the expression of a mutually acceptable concept within a collective, such as *badal* (or, reciprocity), is self-reinforcing and self-propagating through its use and application in social affairs. For example, when one party is afflicted by a grievance caused by another party, the employment of the concept of *badal* may reduce the threshold at which firearms are used because it legitimates the use of violence to attain equilibrium. Furthermore, since this concept is central to the understanding of the archetypal male and *Pushtunwali* in Afghan society, its employment may become inevitable even if the party concerned is not willing to pursue this course of events.

Due to the need to show the party's willingness to deter others from attacking it and maintain a viable and credible deterrence, it must employ *badal* when the initial deterrence threshold has been crossed by another party via an aggression. In this respect, deterrence promotes the use of violence to resolve issues, disputes or conflicts. The use of SALW in such circumstances can be legitimated, and the increasing firepower will have the tendency to increase the likelihood of threat perception, thereby inducing other parties to increase their levels of firepower. Consequently, this reaction may produce a counter-action in response, which inevitably leads to a state of equilibrium given the build up of each party's firepower and the segmented tribal structure. However, the only solution available for stalemated parties is to continue until one side or the other is victorious; an enforced settlement through a higher *jirgah* is achieved; or, a low-level blood-feud persists for generations, where anyone from either party, or their descendents, are liable to be killed. With the increased

availability of weaponry and firepower to all parties in an environment such as Afghanistan, small residential disputes can result in massive loss of life as the conflict rapidly escalates with each additional loss of life, causing more *badal*-based conflicts, and hence, temporally long blood-feuds between more parties.

Badal-based conflicts can also expand through the *primitive induction of emotion*, since such conflicts are emotionally charged with the constituent individual's concept of archetypal male, and every tribal male's desire and need to enhance his stature and status within the tribe by proving his warrior credentials. In-group out-group processes intensify significantly in such circumstances, since the consensus of each individual, especially considering the *fear of the collective* effect, is to out-do the others in bravery and daring, thereby increasing one's prestige within the tribe. Furthermore, according to Freud (1922) every party increases its group cohesion by impressing "the individual with a sense of unlimited power" within the party "and of insurmountable peril"⁷⁵ that exists outside the party. The more intense the situation, the more likely the individual will be encouraged to strive towards his perceived archetypal warrior status. The increased status associated with the action also induces further suggestive behaviour, and hence, the contagion of violent actions ensue by encouraging others to pass higher thresholds, thereby engulfing the whole segmented tribe in conflict. The contagion of this behaviour, due to its emotional content, cannot be under-estimated; for example, in reference to Chakotin (1940), Walsby (1947) illustrates the contagion effect with the phenomena of lynching: "it is often sufficient for a single man to make an unconsidered gesture; the contagion will spread to the rest, who will commit any atrocity"⁷⁶.

8:3:5 – Group Consolidation

Modern collective behaviour originated during the 'Upper Paleolithic Revolution', around 50,000 years ago, a period of rapid human development, during which modern human languages developed⁷⁷ and where the inclination to form groups was determined by the basic proto-family, whose survival was determined by mutual dependence upon family members. With the formation of groups and bands to survive through mutual cooperation, the basic collective revolved around the gatherer-hunter. Karatzogianni & Robinson (2010) cite a study by Ruby Rohrlach-Leavitt et al (1975)⁷⁸, who noted that gatherer-hunters are "generally nonterritorial and bilocal; reject group aggression and competition; share their resources freely; value egalitarianism and personal autonomy in the context of group cooperation"⁷⁹. The subsequent development of the collective came about as a result of the natural selection of the group over the individual, of the strongest group over the weakest, and where the cultural mechanism of violent conflict between groups over raw materials and territorial control was developed and maintained by this process of natural selection. With its primordial origins, the fundamental characteristic of collective human behaviour is its readiness to coalesce and form groups based upon observable physical or mental commonalities and differences, whether they are related to proximity; bodily features, such as skin colour; language; metaphysical beliefs; genetic descent; or, even interests in activities and pastimes. There is a strong tendency to herd and aggregate, thereby forming strong in-group identity markers that are distinguishable from other aggregates, herds, or collectives.

The most significant reasons for the development of conflict, that is, over incompatible goals and interests (see chapter two), are more likely to occur as collectives become more defined through in-group processes, where social identity becomes more pronounced in parallel to the need for cohesion as the collective increases in size. In fact, individual identity becomes more defined the more secure the collective attachment becomes: “groups are the central mechanism for providing individuals with their identity; rather than thinking about individuals ‘sacrificing’ part of their identity when they become part of a group, [we should regard] individual identity as possible only in the context of secure group attachments... The notion of individuals apart from groups... is a product of western thought, not the human experience”⁸⁰. SALW are only recent additions as tools for the defence of the individual or collective, whether used in offensive or defensive actions. However, what sets them apart from the other weapons used throughout human evolutionary history is the extent of their firepower and durability, which have been developed by the individual and collective to devastating effect without having adapted to or developed the psychosocial constraining mechanisms of their use. The greater technological capacity of SALW to kill more efficiently using more ammunition within a shorter space of time, through higher rates of fire, has significantly increased the potential to destroy social cohesion, while concurrently increasing civilian insecurity. It is paradoxical that the collective capacity to use SALW to such devastating effects can also result in the collective’s disintegration through the indirect effects of the proliferation of SALW.

8:4 – Direct Effects – SALW Related Casualties

One of the most significant indicators concerning the detrimental effects of the excessive and destabilising accumulation of SALW on society is the direct effect of their use on civilians, which can be determined from statistical data produced from studies on injury-morbidity and mortality rates from firearms use. Nevertheless, the quantification of the human costs of conflict is a difficult task to achieve, given the lack of data available, especially if an accurate evaluation of data is necessary for sound policy recommendations. Statistics of total deaths from armed conflict cannot provide accurate data, since it is difficult to quantify how many deaths occurred from SALW alone, given the multitudinous reasons for such deaths. For example, statistics indicating that 90% of the casualties in modern wars are civilians⁸¹, or that “the AK-47, the M-16 and other so-called ‘small arms’ are responsible for half a million deaths each year”, and that “about 300,000 people- mostly civilians- are killed in wars, coups d’état and other armed conflicts annually as the victims of small arms”⁸², are nothing more than unmeasured estimates generating the most hesitant of conclusions derived from assumptions about the direct role of SALW in producing the global death toll in many of the previous or existing conflicts⁸³, and therefore, cannot provide an accurate measure of the actual direct effects of SALW. Nevertheless, they do provide an indication of the extent of the problem associate with the mass diffusion of SALW.

Even though SALW have been in existence for centuries, the measurement of their role in conflict mortalities is difficult. A number of studies, initiated by some independent NGOs, have recently begun to shed some light on the relationship between civilian and combatant casualties under conflict conditions. As such, Afghanistan has also represented an ideal case for such studies. Generally, studies, hitherto produced, have

focused on civilian casualties in conflict situations; however, they also measured casualties and injuries sustained in non-combat related incidences. The outcome of such studies have indicated the relative effects of the availability of SALW on the civilian population in conflictual and non-conflictual circumstances, thereby providing measurable accounts of the direct effects of the availability of SALW, and hence, extrapolations of their detrimental effects in peaceful societies where they have proliferated, especially in post-conflict societies.

Nevertheless, the study of SALW availability is intrinsically limited when we begin to correlate it to the deterioration of civil society in armed conflict, since it would be virtually impossible to prove the nature of this association, even if complete and accurate data was provided by comprehensive studies on SALW availability and their use-related deaths and injuries. The most that can be concluded is that they are significantly related, since every possible explanation for this relationship would have to be addressed and analysed to evaluate the exact nature of this relationship. Furthermore, an inherent limitation is the inability to acquire data on the exact number of SALW available in a society engaged in armed conflict, given the continuous fluctuations that exist from the licit and illicit trade in SALW, which are virtually impossible to measure due to the dire lack of transparency and accountability, especially for Afghanistan. Therefore, the exact nature of the effects of the mass proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan cannot be determined in its entirety. Nevertheless, we can go so far as to say that there is an increased likelihood of civilian deaths and injuries, and greater potential for social disintegration when there is a ready availability of SALW in a society.

The foremost distinction involves the definition and criteria of *civilian* to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants involved in the conflict environment. The protracted conflict in Afghanistan has generally made clear distinctions between combatants in relation to their sex. Afghan women have and are traditionally regarded as non-combatants; in fact, where exceptions exist, female combatants are usually stigmatised and disgraced, and can be ostracised from their communities if their actions are serious enough, even though they may have acted in defence of their lives, families, friends, homes and possessions.

The branding of women exists due to the predominance of a patrilineal society in Afghanistan, especially amongst its tribalised ethnic groups, such as the Pushtun, Hazara, and Uzbek. The concept of egalitarianism is therefore a contradiction to the continued existence of social organisation within a patriarchal society; since, the inclusion of females within a combat environment negates the veracity of the male display of courage and bravery, and his competition for social status and prestige amongst other men. Consequently, it is perceived as being an affront to the masculinity enshrined in the archetypal male warrior, and is therefore severely discouraged. To this extent, males and females are nurtured with distinctly contrasting characteristics, which are reinforced through differentiable stereotypes throughout their puerile rearing so as to prevent a reduction in the perception of the archetypal warrior male, and self-perception of the vast majority of all Afghan males, which could affect the status quo and continued dominance of the patriarchal society, that is, the dominance of the male over the female; and hence, the volatile reactions, backlash, and revolts created upon the introduction of greater rights and freedoms for women throughout Afghan history. However, exceptions have existed

throughout Afghan history; for example, seventy year old *Abido*, aka *Mujahida Hajanei* (a woman who took part in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation), was in command of 200 male fighters during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. In an interview with the Pajhwok Afghan News she said: “I was a holy warrior. I had no links with any group, my aim was to defeat the enemy and liberate our people, [and] I have used all kinds of weapons and took part in dozens of clashes with the Soviets”⁸⁴. In more contemporary times, ISAF female soldiers who have increasingly been serving in active combat support roles, and active combat when engaged by the Taliban⁸⁵, have provided model examples for their Afghan counterparts who have increased recruitment of females on active duty in the Afghan armed forces and law enforcement agencies⁸⁶.

Children and elderly men over 50 years are also regarded as non-combatants. However, concerning the former, male children have not been prevented from combat duties throughout the Afghan conflict; their recruitment, indoctrination, and encouragement of self-sacrifice at a relatively young age continues to be a decisive factor in the Taliban’s persistent engagements with Western forces in Afghanistan. At 50 years of age, men are generally considered too old to fight effectively in combat situations, although, exceptions exist where the aged combatant has not yet achieved his aspirations, or is unable to acquire an income from other means. Older men who are still effective combatants are often celebrated as examples of the archetypal warrior. This is especially true considering the average life expectancy for men in Afghanistan is 49.3 years⁸⁷.

8:4:1 – Conflict Environments

A cohort study conducted by Michael and Meddings et al (1999), and commissioned by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross, which has had over 140 years of caring for those wounded by weapons) on *Weapon Injuries not related to Inter-factional Combat in Afghanistan*⁸⁸, conducted over a period of six months in the Nangahar province during 1996, in which there were periods of peace, intense inter-factional fighting and peace again, examined 608 people who were admitted to the Jalalabad hospital for weapons related injuries. Since the Jalalabad hospital was the only functional surgical facility in the province, it was assumed that all those reaching the hospital alive were the total number of weapons related injuries in the province. However, the study later ascertained that due to the long journey times to the hospital, many injuries may have not been reported, or many who were injured may not have survived their journeys.

Michael and Meddings et al (1999) noted that 51% of weapons injuries were non-combat related⁸⁹; in other words, injuries that were sustained because of accidents in the home or outside, or violence from tribal fighting. Landmine injuries were not included in this study, whilst injuries sustained during inter-factional fighting were classified as combat related injuries. The study concluded, “Civilians were more likely to sustain non-combat than combat injuries”⁹⁰. Furthermore, “non-combat injuries were inflicted principally with firearms, whereas combat injuries were inflicted principally with fragmenting munitions (bombs, shells, or grenades)”⁹¹. The only non-combat injuries that were not inflicted by firearms were caused by a car bomb in one incident and a tribal clash in another. The study also noted that there was a high incidence of injuries caused by firearms in heavily militarised areas, but without inter-factional fighting.

In addition, Michael and Meddings et al (1999) concluded that the availability of firearms, social changes, and breakdown of civil structures that accompany conflicts may be prognostic of the occurrence of injuries using firearms “that persist independently of conflict”⁹². Family disputes, land disputes, and the breaking up of arguments were the cause of most intentional injuries, whilst “most accidental injuries were self inflicted, followed by stray bullets”⁹³. The primary cause of injuries for women and children was through accidental self-infliction when cleaning assault weapons at home, particularly the AK-47. The study’s conclusions emphasized the recognition of the detrimental nature of the ready availability of firearms, especially in circumstances where individuals may behave on impulse, which was thought to have been a major cause of firearms injuries. As such, tribal clashes, which were traditionally small scale “with individual assaults avenged on a case by case basis”⁹⁴, have been immensely exaggerated by the greater firepower of assault rifles and other munitions that entered Afghanistan during the 1980s on a mass scale.

The *Retrospective Analysis of Prospectively Collected Data about Hospital Admissions*⁹⁵, a study conducted by Coupland and Samnegaard (1999) and commissioned by ICRC in Kabul, provides an account of 18,877 people who sustained injuries by bullets, fragmentation munitions, or mines, and according to whether those injured were sustained by women, girls, children or the elderly. The study’s results showed that, of the total, there were “18.7% of those injured by bullets, 34.1% of those injured by fragments, and 30.8% of those injured by mines were civilians. Of those admitted to the Red Cross hospital in Kabul within six hours of injury, 39.1% of those injured by bullets, 60.6% of those injured by fragments, and 55.0% of those injured by mines were civilians”⁹⁶. The larger number of civilians injured by fragmentation munitions and mines corresponds with the greater military efficiency of the weapons used, and the greater distance between the victim and the weapon’s user. The study therefore concludes that “with greater military efficiency of weapons comes an inherent and increased potential for injuring civilians”⁹⁷. “The incidence of non-combat related injuries was initially high and declined dramatically during the intense military campaign, only to rise again afterwards”⁹⁸. This indicates that, in agreement with what Michael and Meddings et al (1999) concluded in the study on weapons related injuries in Jalalabad, civilians who sustained non-combat firearms injuries were intentionally targeted, but may not be directly attributable to inter-factional fighting. Nevertheless, the direct effects of SALW are not limited to localised combat-laden environments only; since, “weapon injuries that are not attributable to combat are common. Social changes accompanying conflict and widespread availability of weapons may be predictive of use of weapons that persists independently of conflict”⁹⁹.

A prospective cohort study, *Circumstances Around Weapons Injury in Cambodia after Departure of a Peacekeeping Force*, conducted by David Meddings and Stephanie O’Connor (1999), on weapons injuries and civilian/combatant status conducted in north-western Cambodia, may be extrapolated to the Afghan context, after taking account of the conflict rationale and demographic variations, such as, ethno-tribal, socio-cultural, political, economic, ideational, and religious differences between the countries. The study, involving a total of 863 weapons related admissions at the Mongkol Borei Hospital during the period between January 1991 to February 1995¹⁰⁰, showed similar results to the Kabul study, indicating that “injuries occurring outside the context of interfactional combat accounted for a substantial proportion of all weapon injuries, were

experienced disproportionately by civilians, and were most likely to entail the intentional use of a firearm against a civilian”¹⁰¹. Moreover, intentional firearms injuries represented 67% of civilians injured in a non-combat context, which “unquestionably point to either violations of international humanitarian law or a deterioration in the situation of civilians”¹⁰². The Meddings and O’Connor (1999) study further corroborates the studies mentioned above when it concluded, “This supports the contention that widespread weapon availability, in the context of a protracted conflict, is associated with a high rate of social violence”¹⁰³. This inference was made from the results obtained from a study period of four years, which, moreover, were recognised as underestimating actual figures of civilian casualties and non-combat injuries, further strengthening their conclusions, as can be noted from Table 8.1, which presents data on observed weapon injuries from admissions to Mongkol Borei Hospital during the period 1991 to 1995 in terms of the injured person’s combatant status, the weapon which caused the injury, and the combat or non-combat context in which the injury was sustained; and, Table 8.2, which presents the significant points from the study (see, Appendix II, Table 8.1 – Results from the ICRC Prospective Cohort Study on the Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia after the Departure of the UNTAC Peacekeeping Force – Data on Weapon Injuries by Context, Combatant Status and Weapon Type¹⁰⁴; and, Appendix II, Table 8.2 – Results adapted from the ICRC Prospective Cohort Study on the Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia after the Departure of the UNTAC Peacekeeping Force – Weapon Injuries in terms of Percentages of Important points by Context of Combat Status).

Of the studies focusing on the nature of injuries sustained by people, whether combatants or civilians, or in combat and non-combat environments, everyone indicated that the ready availability of SALW in conflict environments resulted in socially violent consequences and high incidences of violence unrelated to the combat environment; that is, where the injuries sustained were not as a result of the fighting between conflicting parties. Furthermore, Collins (1998), in *The Humanitarian Implications of Small Arms Proliferation, A Report for OCHA*, a study about the protracted conflict in Somalia, found that civilian deaths and injuries as a result of inter-clan fighting and banditry “accounted for more deaths than deaths among combatants in pitched battles”¹⁰⁵. In congruence with these findings, an earlier study by David Meddings (1997), *Weapons Injuries during and after Periods of Conflict: Retrospective Analysis*¹⁰⁶, concluded that “continued availability of weapons is associated with increased mortality and a level of injuries from weapons that is only somewhat reduced from that observed during a period of conflict”¹⁰⁷. This conclusive evaluation was derived from a retrospective comparative analysis of the relative frequency of weapon injuries, within the Kandahar Province, between a 50-month period from January 1991 to March 1995, which is denoted as the conflict period during the PDPA regime, the civil war between the Mujahideen Parties, and the rise of the Taliban; and, an 18-month period from September 1995 to March 1997, which is denoted as a post-conflict period¹⁰⁸ during which the Taliban had uncontested control of the province, and under which the population was not disarmed. Data was taken from the ICRC surgical database (initiated in 1983) of 2,332 people injured by weapons and given surgical care after being admitted into ICRC run and supported hospitals within 24 hours of their injury. After adjustments for population growth were made, the analysis shows an overall 33% reduction in the annual incidence of weapon injuries between conflict and post-conflict periods. There was a 40% reduction in the incidence of firearm related injuries. The study concludes that even though the politico-

military rationale for using weapons had disappeared, the weapon injury rates were not significantly reduced (see, Appendix III, Figure 8.2 – Annual Incidence of Weapon Injuries during Conflict [1991-1995 and Post-Conflict [1995-1997] Periods in Kandahar)¹⁰⁹, which suggests that the ready availability of weapons significantly contributes to weapons related injuries whether or not a conflict situation is present, albeit, given that the additional weapons related injuries during conflict periods are taken into account.

The above conclusions allow us to recognise that not only are easily accessible firearms conducive to increased incidences of violence upon and by the civilian population, but also that this increased incidence is not significantly reduced after violent hostilities between adversarial parties have been terminated; which, therefore, provides further credence to the proposal that the mass proliferation of SALW can aid the re-eruption of conflict between adversarial parties due to the continuation of blame assignment as a consequence of weapons-related injuries after violent conflict ends or is significantly reduced. The direct effects of the proliferation of SALW on increased mortality rates are evident from the studies above. However, a more comprehensive national analysis and surveillance is necessary to provide uniform data on firearm-related injury-morbidity and mortality in the Afghan context, which is impossible in this and many other conflict environments because of their dire lack of available uniform security, which deters researchers from conducting an objective and comprehensive study on the representative cross-section of Afghanistan.

In contrast to studies focusing on landmine injuries, conclusive data that provides an insight to the direct effects of SALW in conflict environments has been unavailable hitherto; therefore, inducing a reliance on studies that are not panoptic in their scale and scope. Nevertheless, the statistics produced from the examples provided above do enable a generalised account of the relative effects of the mass availability of SALW in many conflict associated environments, given that the local socio-economic, political, strategic and psycho-cultural conditions are appreciated. Columbia is a particularly good example of a country that is undergoing a low intensity conflict between the government and armed militias, such as the *Revolutionary Armed Front of Colombia* (FARC), *National Liberation Army* (ELN), and drug cartels, yet has an immensely high mortality rate from firearms related homicides amongst civilians. “Firearms, specifically .32s, .38 specials, 9mm revolvers are the weapons of choice for most actors – and used in up to 80 per cent of all political or crime-related homicides”¹¹⁰. In the year 2000, a report funded by the Reference Group on Small Arms (RGSA) of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which includes the UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHA and UNICEF, and prepared by the Geneva based Small Arms Survey, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*¹¹¹, demonstrated findings on a comparative study of the impacts of SALW on civilians in three countries, including Columbia. Their findings noted the extent of the impacts of SALW on the civilian population, in which over 200,000 Columbian civilians were killed from armed criminal violence throughout the 1990s alone¹¹².

Approximately 70-80 per cent of all of Colombia’s average 20,000 firearm homicides a year are officially attributed to ‘delinquency’ or ‘common crime’. Only eight to ten per cent of firearm deaths are attributed to ‘political’ or ‘selective’ homicide or massacre. Though this relationship generally holds in urban areas, the reverse is often true in rural zones affected by high levels of conflict or significant capital interests. Arms play a part in virtually every act of violence - whether massacres, homicide, suicide, domestic violence, robbery or petty street crime.¹¹³

According to this study, Columbia had the highest firearms related homicide rate, with between 5 and 8 per cent of the world's total recorded firearms related homicides; since, about 78 percent (99,851) of the total number of violence related deaths (128,635) in Columbia between 1995 and 1999 were firearms related¹¹⁴. In addition to this, armed violence related lesions totalled between three to five times the homicide rate¹¹⁵.

The precision of these figures are a representation of the meticulousness of the Columbian government's maintenance of statistics on all expressions of violence, in contrast to the authorities in Afghanistan. As a result, the ability to gauge the effects of SALW on the civilian population in Afghanistan faces many problems, given the country's protracted conflict, which has lasted over three and a half decades. Nevertheless, the negative effects of the ready availability of SALW in conflict environments can be deduced from studies involving non-conflict environments. A comparative analysis of countries with a high availability of SALW against those with tight regulatory controls on weapons can demonstrate the link between SALW availability and their associated negative effects. By extrapolating such conclusions, we may be able to gain a better understanding of the increased impacts of SALW proliferation in conflict environments where violence may already be institutionalised. Therefore, by taking account of the relativity of the threshold of violence we may be able to gain a better understanding of the potential use of SALW in localised situations, which do not involve the main adversarial parties involved in a conflict, such as in tribal clashes, *badal*-related feuds, and other interpersonal disputes; thereby appreciating the potential catalytic effects of precursors to the re-eruption of violent conflict when the main adversarial parties have ceased violent actions in the larger national-scale conflict, such as in Afghanistan.

8:4:2 – Non-Conflict Environments

Obtaining relevant data from stable societies that are not engaged in conflict is relatively easier than societies afflicted by armed conflict. The results from a study of fifteen industrialised countries, by the ICRC (1995) on the extent to which the availability of weapons contributes to the increase in civilian deaths, shows a direct empirical correlation between countries with higher household possession of firearms and higher intentional firearms deaths, whether by from self-infliction or homicide (see, Appendix III, Figure 8.3 – Firearms Possession and Intentional Firearms Deaths amongst 15 Industrialised Countries). A number of studies have shown that many self-inflicted injuries and deaths were inflicted as an impulse after the consumption of alcohol or drugs¹¹⁶.

The correlation between firearms possession and deaths may not be limited by regulatory mechanisms to control possession. However, those countries with weak regulatory controls may have a greater correlation between firearms possession and firearms related injuries deaths. A study conducted over a period of one year in 2004 and focusing on homicidal deaths by firearms in Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, found that from a sum of 97 autopsies conducted in 2004, 63 were homicidal deaths. "All homicidal deaths were caused by firearm injuries and all were males. The most common firearm weapons (87.3%) were high velocity firearms (Kalashnikov, rifles, pistols) followed by low velocity rifled weapons (9.53%) and shot

guns (3.17%)". The study concluded that as "all reported homicides were caused by firearm injuries"¹¹⁷, and that a "strong association has been reported between firearm possession and its related homicide, suicide, assault and unintentional deaths"¹¹⁸.

A disorganised mind resulting from the reduction of mental ability due to intoxication, with an availability of firearms at such moments is a lethal mix that often produces actions or reactions to situations that are often unrelated, and ill-considered. The resulting injury or death from firing a bullet is irreversible. Therefore, if the opportunity of using a firearm is taken away, the absence of the potential for *pulling the trigger* in an impulsive act negates the possibility of a virtually spontaneous injury or death, providing time to consider alternative courses of action, which could mean the difference between life and death, and the reduction of fatalities. Impulsive acts are usually caused by one or both acts of cognitive failure: namely, a) failure to obtain crucial information or *misperception*; and, b) failure to predict the behavioural actions of others, often due to misinformation, partly because of the way information is being processed, and hence, resulting in *miscalculation*. In both forms of cognitive failure, an individual's impulsive act is caused by the negation of a situation's correct evaluation and judgement, leading to the lack of information in the formation of his/her perception of the situation and hence miscalculation. The availability of firearms and their empowerment under such circumstances can facilitate the misperception and/or miscalculation of another's actions leading to violence and the likelihood of serious injury and/or death by enabling a sense of ability to rectify the situation and restore the status quo, albeit through panic, which is a product of fear and anxiety at the despair felt from inability to restore a balanced equilibrium. Once firearms are taken away, the impulsive action has fewer avenues through which it can propagate itself, providing more time to assess the situation by acquiring relevant information before it deteriorates, and to make more calculations that are determined from a clearer perception of the situation. Nevertheless, this is dependent upon the personality type of the person in question; for example, whether s/he will misperceive information and miscalculate the consequences while under duress and fatigue according to whether s/he has a *compulsive personality*, *narcissistic personality*, or *paranoid personality*¹¹⁹, or a number of other cognitive impairing disorders.

The above argument is supported by numerous studies that show how greater access to firearms increases the lethality of impulsive acts; that is, how it makes such impulsive acts more likely to result in death¹²⁰. Moreover, a number of comparative studies between countries could not determine a negative correlation between the ownership of firearms and suicides by alternative methods, that is, a reduction in access to firearms did not result in an increase in suicides by other means, such as in countries with tighter and more stringent regulatory controls on weapons, or less firearms ownership¹²¹; for example, a study by Wendy Cukier (1998), *Firearms Regulation: Canada in the International Context*, found that after population differences were adjusted, hand-gun related homicides were fifteen times higher in America than in Canada, which more stringently regulates firearms ownership¹²². A major international study conducted by Van Dijk (1997), *Criminal Victimisation and Victim Empowerment in an International Perspective*, for the Ninth International Symposium on Victimology, involving 54 countries based upon a standardised survey of victimisation, found that the rate of firearms ownership in the those countries studied had a closely correlated

and systematic relationship with armed robbery rates, as well as a substantial relationship with threats and assaults with firearms¹²³. Furthermore, the study also found that in countries with higher rates of gun ownership, such as the US, South Africa, and some countries in South and Central America, there was a substantial relationship to higher levels of general violence (including, assaults, muggings, robberies in shops, banks and other businesses, and homicides and suicides (see, Appendix III, Figure 8.3 – Firearms Possession and Intentional Firearms Deaths amongst 15 Industrialised Countries). All of these studies show that even in peaceful, relatively stable industrialised countries, a strong relationship exists between numerous indicators of social violence and the availability of firearms.

8:5 – Final Observations

The extrapolation of the associations to societies involved in armed conflict or in a post-conflict phase, as mentioned in the sections above, depends upon whether their contextual considerations in conjunction with their amplified fissiparous socio-political, economic, ethno-tribal, ideological, and religious conditions may be deemed too different from stable societies; therefore, making an application of the associations between arms availability and social violence in conflict-ridden countries irrelevant. In contrast, the situation in a conflict-ridden country could itself exacerbate the associations between arms availability and social violence by progressively reducing the threshold for their use, as has been the case in Afghanistan's protracted conflict. Hitherto, there is no conclusive evidence to contradict either conclusion, which leaves the extrapolation of the effects of firearms on peaceful societies to conflict-ridden societies open to extensive debate until a comprehensive comparative analysis of the effects of firearms in different contextual environments is eventually provided; given that it is at all possible to evaluate the effects of the mass availability of firearms in conflict environments. Nevertheless, the associations that exist in stable societies are related to the direct effects of weapons upon civilians. However, the impacts of SALW are not limited to these direct effects on human morbidity and mortality rates, they also have wide-ranging indirect effects on human society through the protraction of conflict and/or its re-eruption, even after the negation of the use of violence by positive efforts to terminate the conflict when the presence of the wide availability and access to SALW still exists. This may be exemplified by the continuation of conflict in Afghanistan even after numerous efforts to resolve interest-based differences, which may be negated because of the simultaneous lack of concerted efforts to reduce the extensive country-wide presence of SALW in the possession of all contending parties and general population at large. In this respect, the following chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the indirect effects of the wide-scale possession of SALW, with particular reference to Afghanistan.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART III

CHAPTER NINE

**INDIRECT EFFECTS OF SALW
PROLIFERATION**

PART III

CHAPTER NINE

INDIRECT EFFECTS OF SALW PROLIFERATION

9 – Indirect Effects of SALW Proliferation

9:1 – Introduction

Although the most immediate, direct and tragic effects of the ready availability of firearms in any given environment is the death of one or more individuals, which can occur from the physical trauma inflicted upon the human body by a bullet or shrapnel from an explosive device such as a fragmentation grenade, humans can also suffer through the indirect, or secondary, short to long-term socio-psychological effects of the mass proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in any particular environment. In this respect, the socio-psychological, behavioural, and human security approaches will help explain the indirect effects of the mass diffusion of SALW as an extrapolation of their direct effects, espoused in the preceding chapter, on society in general, and Afghanistan's variegated societies in particular, with emphasis on the socio-structural organisation therein. Furthermore, the constructivist perspective¹ will assist in understanding the interpretation of the variance of cultural perceptions of firearms and their associated violence, and how such interpretations may be constructed to be instilled within social consciousness, whether for the benefit of the in-group or in detriment to the out-group.

The following chapter highlights the indirect effects of SALW proliferation on the individual and collective. On a macro-level, SALW play a significant part in the national war economy, by fuelling, exacerbating², and facilitating the protraction of conflict. "There is strong evidence both in countries at peace and in areas of conflict that the easy availability of small arms tends to escalate and prolong violence and increases the lethality of violent encounters"³. At the micro-level, the ready availability of SALW facilitates the persuasive empowerment of individuals and collectives leading to the desensitisation of their use in violent actions. However, the micro-level effect is directly proportional to its impacts on the macro-level.

The increased possession of firearms by individuals can lead to an increase in the militarisation of society through the amplification of the security dilemma; where "a culture of arms possession, created and normalized during the militarization of societies, can contribute to individuals resorting to a gun as their first instrument for resolving problems. The *cycle of violence* is difficult to break: fear leads to arming, which breeds violence, which leads to insecurity, which leads to further arming"⁴. Consequently, a culture of violence can become entrenched, whereby "the civilian possession of weapons increases the risk of gun violence in a way that potentially infringes on individuals' freedom, their human rights and indeed sometimes their lives"⁵. Further, violence detrimentally affects a country's potential for national development⁶, where the increasing insecurity can produce a reduction in a society's labour and production capacity. A reduction in agricultural production, for example, can accrue from the loss of opportunity to work in insecure, mined or

territorially threatened fields, and hence, result in increased poverty and marginalisation. “95 percent of the deaths were caused not by bullets, but by malnutrition or preventable diseases such as malaria, which were contracted when people were forced out of their homes by the conflict”⁷. This cycle of violence can result in the reduction of public services and erosion of social capital development capacity⁸, and in the erosion of human *capacities* in general⁹, such as household (inheritance) and other socially defined entitlements of individuals¹⁰; and, more fundamentally, a degradation of basic human needs as human insecurity and the threat perception of insecurity grow¹¹.

Related secondary impacts of the increased possession of firearms include the limitation of individual and societal civil liberties and human rights when countering growing insecurity; reduction in employment opportunities and/or rural livelihoods as unemployment rapidly increases, and the reversal of economic development¹²; growing mortality and morbidity rates related to the degeneration of social services and social structures; magnified internal displacement and migration whether through armed force or induced by the deterioration of social circumstances, since “there is a strong correlation between the incidence of firearm-related massacres or ‘political killings’ and forced displacement”¹³; growing constraints in access to food, and therefore, increasing food insecurity¹⁴; and, the general degradation of human security, and the destruction of common property and resources. Human behaviour, whether individual or collective, changes and adapts in accordance with the changes in the perception of violence and its constant threat to human life, and widens the disparities between the materially empowered (who can afford private security facilities) and the majority who exist without such resources¹⁵.

Tensions between potential adversaries can result in the furcation of communities according to their variegated present and emerging group identities. These disunited communities may seek to acquire greater firepower through SALW to preserve their cohesive integrity, thereby destroying social and physical capital; increase social and human insecurity, which can partly condition foreign direct economic investment; divert energy resources from domestic services and infrastructure requirements, such as energy provisions, education system, health care, physical infrastructure building (roads and railways), and water supply¹⁶; affect allocation of funds from international development organisations, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); and, regulate growing disparities within the central government’s budgetary resource allocation system.

9:2 – Social Effects of the Mass Availability of SALW

SALW-related insecurity acts to undermine socio-economic development at the macro-level, as assets are seized and families disassembled through violence, thereby facilitating the progressive degeneration of society that could potentiate a political entity’s collapse. This was the overt outcome of the Balkans’ civil war (1991-1995). Hence, the term, *Balkanisation*, when the single Yugoslavian political entity split into numerous constituent parts dependent upon their ethnic and religious identity.

This chapter highlights the growing international understanding and appreciation that the indirect effects of excessive quantities of SALW can have on societies, especially given the potential threat of Balkanisation in the case of Afghanistan. Chapter nine follows a relatively linear, but not necessarily ordinate, path, to show how a community may be affected by the proliferation of SALW. It is pertinent to note that the socio-economic, political, geographical, and strategic variables, amongst many others, vary significantly within different contexts. Nevertheless, the following sections aim to highlight the general indirect effects of the excessive accumulation of SALW on the institutionalisation of violence in society in general, and in Afghanistan in particular; the breakdown of law and order; militarisation of the socio-political environment; development of or increase in the culture of war; community fragmentation and disunity; decentralisation; increasing crime rates and human rights abuses; economic disintegration; and, humanitarian development.

9:2:1 – Societal Destabilisation

The destabilisation of the socio-economic and political foundations of a state afflicted by mass accumulation of firearms can follow an unspecified course of unfolding events that are unrepeatable in different contexts and situations. Therefore, as this chapter attempts to explain the dynamics of destabilisation it will also explain how events may unfold in any number of combinations, which may be affected by an infinite plethora of contributing variables. However, this does not mean that they cover every aspect of the social system; the following narrative simply highlights and illustrates the consequential steps of the breakdown of a social system in a state as conflictual relations between parties intensify to the point where the introduction of SALW at any stage can significantly accelerate its destabilising degeneration; as follows:

As a burgeoning conflict proceeds, it is intrinsically characterised by a consequent loss of economic opportunities and investment, which may lead to a subsequent reduction in budget allocations for essential services, such as health, education, transport, energy, and other important government departments as resources are gradually shifted to the defence department to offset and prepare for the rise in tensions.

The onset of violent actions, from any side, can result in the short to long-term reduction in the allocation of resources for a state's socio-economic infrastructure, depending upon the kinds of violent actions being undertaken, and may lead to a gradual infrastructural degradation due to the consequential lack of maintenance and increased reliance on unmaintained services. Public healthcare facilities and services may be reduced to essential operations as the political crisis grows. Refuse collection may slow to a halt, leading to a decrease in sanitation, an increase in diseases, and the consequent lack of facilities to pay attention to the growing health crisis. The lack of public services and deteriorating public health may lead to the build up of friction within local communities supporting diverse parties; while, essential energy services can become affected to a degree that their functionality is no longer guaranteed, further reducing the ability of public services to produce results, which may enhance conflictual relations within disparate communities. When reduced to such a state, minor disputes between neighbours or communities may have the capacity to fuel tensions, causing additional communal friction and polarisation between parties at variance with each other, thereby facilitating the dominance of in-group out-group processes in relation to social affairs. Disputes can

have a tendency to linger without any conclusion as communities consolidate their immediate positions based upon any variety of socio-political, tribal, religious, ethno-linguistic or economic premises. Such tensions can erupt into open hostilities when disputes may seemingly be resolved with immediate effect when catalysts, such as empowerment through access to SALW, are easily available. The original grievances are often blown out of proportion through a reconstruction of events, actions, and reasoning to justify the use of violence to resolve disputes by all parties, whether or not they are the initiating party.

Internal security services may gradually be strengthened, while public security simultaneously shifts into a secondary or tertiary position being offset by the promotion and enforcement of national and strategic security goals and objectives. Concentrating on the security forces can divert scarce resources and revenue sources away from civil structures and infrastructure enhancement; for example, Global Witness, a British non-profit organisation, published a report in December 1999, *A crude awakening*¹⁷, noting how the Angolan government mortgaged seven years of their oil sales, how the Rwandans similarly mortgaged their tea sales, and Somali clans stole all of Mogadishu's electrical wire and dug up its piping to purchase SALW. The security services may consequently become characteristically more conservative and militaristic in their nature, outlook, practices, and procedures. Human insecurity may grow in concert with the rise of criminal activity as the unregulated flow of the tools of violence increasingly diffuse within society further aggravating the security dilemma and spiralling of SALW proliferation. Such insecurity tends to force the economically able to flee deteriorating conditions, hence withdrawing much needed intellectual and material capital, and thus causing a further reduction in the quality of public and private services. Further emigration from disrupted zones by all sections of society can occur as the situation devolves, leading to growing numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees in neighbouring states, which put immense pressure on local resources that are not designed for such stresses, and therefore, create a potential destabilisation of the region as the situation degenerates and exacerbates. In addition, the growth of new grievances, and therefore, groups to advocate them, further polarises the contending parties with little or no quarter being given to the resolution of the conflict, given the materialisation of irreconcilable views, goals, and objectives.

9:2:2 – Institutionalisation of Violence

With the exception of their deterrent effect, SALW are primarily tools for the implementation of violence against other human beings. Whether they are used as tools of last resort in self-defence, for which violence is viewed as legitimate by most communities and philosophies alike, or for offensive purposes where there is a deliberate and calculated use of violence, the goal is to reduce the human capability of the opposing party. Violent human conflict, as patterns and continuities of human conduct, can become institutionalised over time through discursive social and institutional systems, such as the media, educational institutions, and political and theological organisations. Violence can therefore be rendered an institutional form of conduct, and hence, accepted as inevitable¹⁸.

By our readiness to allow arms to be purchased at will and fired at whim; by allowing our movies and television screens to teach our children that the hero is one who masters the art of shooting and the technique of killing... we have created an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have become popular pastimes.¹⁹

The presence of SALW in an insecure environment may gradually increase their acceptability and contribute to the institutionalisation of violence within the individual's and society's psyche; that is, the cultural and social acceptance of violence, and hence, the reduction of the threshold of violence. This development can become a self-perpetuating circular process, where the availability of weapons promotes more possession, resulting in further violence and consequently deeming the possession of weapons and its associated violence as inevitable and conventional²⁰. However, this is not true for all environments, as illustrated by Switzerland's liberal weapons possession laws; which, out of 179 countries, ranked as the third highest in the world in the rate of private firearms ownership per 100 people²¹, yet it had one of the lowest rates of gun related violence in the world with a 0.24 annual rate of homicide by firearms per 100,000 population in 2008²², and 0.7 annual rate of homicides by any means in 2008²³. In comparison, Afghanistan ranked 106 out of 179 countries in the rate of private gun ownership per 100 people²⁴, and had an annual rate of 2.4 homicide by any means per 100,000 population in 2008²⁵. Where 45.7 percent of the Swiss population were in possession of firearms²⁶, while the possession of firearms in Afghanistan was only 4.4 percent in 2007²⁷, there are undoubtedly other environmental, socio-cultural, political and circumstantial reasons for the greater number of firearms related casualties in Afghanistan than the mere possession of firearms would suggest, given the much lower casualty rate in Switzerland. Concerning this latter point, it is a government policy to train the civilian population in the responsible usage of firearms in Switzerland. Since Switzerland does not have a standing professional army, every adult male is required to undergo military training for several weeks a year throughout their lives²⁸. Furthermore, a strict sense of collective responsibility is ingrained into the Swiss population in their formative years, during which the association between firearms and the defence of the nation is entrenched. This may not seem to be the case for Afghanistan; nevertheless, the symbolism associated with the warrior archetype is also ingrained into the male psyche from the formative years. However, the deep sense of social responsibility in relation to the possession of firearms is not uniformly ingrained across Afghanistan due to the large variation in cultural differences, from the tribal Pushtun that ingrain a sense of responsibility through Pushtunwali and especially *badal* (reciprocity) in the event of the use of firearms against other individuals, to the urbanised Tajiks who are more reliant upon regulatory controls within governance structures rather than culturally reinforced codes of conduct, which may fail due to the lack of enforcement of such controls by weak governance. Moreover, as this chapter explains, the conditions within which firearms are rapidly infused within society on a large scale, rather than a slow diffusion over decades through strictly enforced and disciplined regulations, are intrinsic to the detrimental impacts that such weapons have on a society.

In quoting the United Nations report of the panel of governmental experts on small arms on *General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms* (1997), which states that, "while not by themselves causing the conflicts in which they are used, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy rather than a peaceful resolution of unsettled differences. Perhaps most grievously, we see a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons, which itself breed still greater insecurity, and so on"²⁹, Muggah and Berman (2001)³⁰ suggest that the infusion of SALW into a conflict environment can induce a state of violence, whereby cycles of violence are created, which

increase the intensity and severity of violence, thereby disrupting communities and their civil institutions. The increasing insecurity induces further infusions of SALW into many more vulnerable communities, which consequently proliferate greater cycles of violence throughout a society or country as a whole. “Widespread availability of small arms fuels a cycle of violence—arming produces violence that fuels insecurity that encourages arming—that is difficult to break, whether in the context of political conflict or inner city gangs”³¹. The cumulative net product of these society-wide cycles of violence is to induce a modification in the behavioural and attitudinal norms, and social mores of an affected social grouping³². Initially, changes in social norms occur through the creation of a cultural acceptance of violent actions and practices, which become recognised and acceptable alternatives or avenues through which disputes may be resolved, and eventually, to privileging violent over negotiated non-violent and pacific solutions; that is, protection or offensive action through violent physical force is preferred over non-violence, negotiations, peaceful dialogue, or forgiveness to settle disputes. For example, armed violence may become more acceptable in the resolution of political disputes rather than negotiations.

Perhaps the most debilitating element of the small arms demand pressures is that SALW acquisition and use become social norms. The instruments of violence and their use are socialized and become part of the prevailing order that is then extraordinarily difficult to unlearn and reverse.³³

The cultural acceptance of violence is characterised by an idealisation of war and its associated tools of violence, as exemplified by the growing popular media and public recreation attention to foreign military engagements (especially those amplified by the news media to engage the public’s insatiable appetite for extreme news, and their own competition for audience numbers), war and action movies, extreme sports, and high-tech games, which involve the commitment of acts of extreme physical force and violence, and are often publicised by leading celebrity role models. Such idealisation can become a normal constituent of human behaviour within afflicted societies, and is increasingly becoming the case within countries that do not currently have readily available instruments of violence in the public domain due to strict regulatory controls on firearms. The normalisation of violence is further integrated and reinforced within the public’s consciousness by the creation of cultural attitudes disposed towards the display of violence, thereby aiding the development of cultures of violence or *consumerist militarism*, a term coined by Raymond Williams (1983)³⁴, which, as mentioned above, promote violent solutions rather than peaceful ones, and hence, facilitate the institutionalisation of violence within social norms and mores, traditions, and civil structures. Where a culture of violence is prevalent and perceptions of insecurity predominate, the ready availability of SALW facilitates acquisition for self-protection by individuals and collectives, and especially those who feel vulnerable to insecure environmental conditions.

The development of the Afghan conflict from the monarchy’s dissolution to the present low intensity conflict between the Taliban and the United States (US) led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is an ideal example of the developmental processes undertaken by cultures of violence. The initial limited availability of modern assault rifles, such as the AK-47 and AK-74, enhanced the status of any person possessing them because of their associated firepower and potential impact on enemy forces, or *the more kills, the greater the status*. Furthermore, the legitimisation of violence as a tool

for self-defence against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan helped reinforce the institutionalisation of violence within Afghan society through the constant acceptance of every action against the occupation as legitimate, no matter how base. Subsequently, violence used against fellow Afghan Mujahideen, albeit from other parties, gradually became acceptable if they represented a strategic, cultural, and/or ethnic threat; thereby, further undermining the inter-party dialogue and negotiations, and degrading social norms, and accentuating existing ethnic and sectarian fissures. However, the existence of the warrior archetype prior to the beginning of the conflict was also responsible for the intense resistance faced by the Soviet occupation, due, in part, to a prior cultural acceptance of violence, which was developed from hundreds of years of conflictual relations emanating from within and without Afghan society.

The predominance of rationalisations that the resolution of disputes and conflicts can be met through the force of arms has profound effects on the nature of society. Social perceptions begin to symbolise weapons as icons of power and dominance, especially where there has been a recent conflict, because the use of weapons against an aggressor facilitates the elevation of firearms as synonymous to the hard fought freedoms that have been achieved. These perceptions may symbolise the experience of resistance; nevertheless, the utilisation of weapons as symbols of freedom negates and subordinates the mental and physical efforts, and human sacrifices that a given population has made to win their freedom. For example, the Mozambique flag has the AK-47 (Kalashnikov) embedded in the centre to symbolise of the struggle for freedom against their former colonial masters. Such displays, nevertheless, raise weapons to the level of totems without signifying the human cost, thereby celebrating the violence brought on by weapons, rather than the country's national will to resist and the respective sacrifices made, and hence, they legitimate the reduction in the threshold of violence by accepting those losses as fair or satisfactory. Furthermore, weapons such as the AK-47 assault rifle are emphasised because of the efficacy of their *killing power*, which can be conferred upon their owners and lead to a competition for status between them; thereby, increasing the likelihood of firearms possession by civilians who may not have previously required their use.

The institutionalisation of violence within organisations may also be made possible and eventually acceptable through their staff selection criteria; whereby, the ability to effectively and efficiently use violence through martial skills may be emphasised in the selection of potential employees, such as amongst civil protection, law enforcement, security forces, and especially the highly unregulated private security industry (in particular, contractual security employees), rather than stressing their abilities to distinguish between situations in which violence is necessary and those which require tact and diplomacy. This can further reduce the society's ability to resolve internal conflicts, making it susceptible to the enlargement of internal fissures and divisions between socio-political groups. As recent as 2010, Afghanistan's President Karzai highlighted the detrimental influence of the large-scale employment of armed private security personnel, calling them a *cause for insecurity* and as unwanted *parallel structures* while issuing a decree which required "all private security companies to cease all operations in Afghanistan by December 2010"³⁵.

In the case of Afghanistan, the archetypal Afghan male exudes the characteristics of the supreme warrior, which has become a cultural ideal and role model for Afghan males, and has, therefore, produced a sense of acceptance of the use of violence within society. Although, the vast majority would not view violence positively, they may accept it as inevitable in their daily lives; thereby, highlighting the central importance of fatalism in Afghan society.

The socio-political and economic conditions in many parts of the world are also conducive to the disaffected becoming emboldened by the easy access and availability of SALW to arm themselves. The lack of security and reduction in the threshold of violence also facilitates the possession of firearms by the disaffected to increase personal security, and in some cases, ameliorate their living circumstances through their empowerment from firearms, thereby, further legitimating and institutionalising firearms within the civilian population. As was the case after the events of 9/11 and the Taliban's collapse during the US-led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' beginning on 07 October 2001, where the Pushtun population in Afghanistan had no clear and Pushtun-wide national leadership structure through which it could manifest its concerns and project its aspirations, given the meteoric advance and assumption of power by the minority Northern Alliance, which was largely composed of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic minorities.

The massive proliferation of SALW throughout the Afghan conflict has hitherto provided an available resource for many Pushtun to reassess their political circumstance and either retain or gain more arms to maintain security in an otherwise very insecure environment, and assert their authority in the political vacuum that engulfed most of southern Afghanistan. Concerning the latter, the assertion of authority is prosecuted through violent means because it is not perceived as credible through peaceful measures, which may produce the perception of weakness. For example, a study conducted by the Harvard Medical School's Centre for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age illustrated how children reacted to violence in popular cartoon shows on American television, and concluded that, "they learn that the world is one in which only violence is effective in settling disputes"³⁶, and that the children think that "heroes and enemies never get together to negotiate. They only meet to fight. As a result, children are socialised to believe in peace through the notion of strength that is synonymous with hatred and violence"³⁷. Such perceptions are of paramount importance throughout childhood, and their retention in adulthood can have far-reaching consequences for the degeneration of a potential conflict scenario into a full-blown violent conflict, especially if empowerment gained through the possession and/or use of firearms is perceived as facilitating the perception of strength, which leads to further possession of SALW and a corresponding increase in insecurity.

Violence is often viewed as a disorganised action or reaction. However, in *The Causes and Prevention of War*, Brown (1994) notes that it is an often-unsurprising result of deliberate and premeditated pre-emptive behaviour; especially in environments within which few rules, norms, or codes of conduct to prohibit violence exist, such as within cultures of violence or where it has been institutionalised. Brown states:

We need not postulate an instinctive predisposition to violence to explain the violence of violence-provoking behaviour. The only necessary premises are a modicum of acquisitiveness, a scarcity of some valued amenity, and the absence of strong internal and external inhibitions against violence; given these conditions, the violence is an unsurprising resultant of rational calculations on both sides.³⁸

Much of the Pushtun population has been disaffected by the political changes that took place upon the fall of the Taliban, where minority ethnic groups have supplanted the Pushtun as the dominant political force, albeit, with US-led backing. This socio-political upheaval has changed the dynamics of Pushtun self-perception and their position in the future development of Afghanistan due to their political disenfranchisement, whilst increased cultural insecurity has forced many Pushtun to acquire and reacquire SALW for personal and community protection, especially after numerous massacres were perpetrated against Pushtun communities settled in the ethnic minority dominated areas of Northern Afghanistan³⁹. The re-emergence of the Taliban also led to a massive reduction in the reconstruction and development of Southern Afghanistan, because of perpetual attacks on any person or group associated with the government in Kabul through the direct employment of violent tactics by the Taliban, and consequently, the NATO forces to counter them. Personal security has been reduced tremendously by the increased threat to the integrity of life from the institutionalisation of violence, and hence, an increased possession of SALW to enhance personal and community security. Consequently, the empowerment of sub-state groups aiming to counter the Taliban threat also facilitates the widening of ethnic and tribal fissures to the long-term detriment of the amelioration of the situation, and hence, continuation of the Afghan conflict.

9:2:3 – Security & Law and Order

The human security of any collective is significantly affected by the institutionalisation of violence due to the greater likelihood of the use of violence to resolve disputes, which can provide impetus for its use in unlawful actions, such as violence related crime, armed robbery, muggings, armed assaults, and homicides. “Amongst multi-dimensional sources of threats to human security, the most direct threat is the presence of illegal and excessive armaments, and their continued proliferation in post-conflict zones”⁴⁰. The option for violent crime is considerably increased by the ready availability of SALW, which consequently leads to a corresponding increase in insecurity, further demand for SALW, and the acculturation of violence in a circular process of increasing intensity. The breakdown of law and order within any social collective only occurs after the collapse of structural relations within society since it is usually the last institution to fall because of its inbuilt mechanisms to resist change.

The state’s authority may also be eroded to a considerable degree where violence has become institutionalised, resulting in the reduction of its monopoly over the coercive use of force in highly weapons saturated environments; as Martin van Creveld (1994) asserts: “once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrestled out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down much as is already the case today in... Lebanon, SriLanka, or Colombia”⁴¹. Considering that crime is entrenched in the disparities within the socio-structural relations that produce and maintain human insecurity, and that SALW are ultimately a response to such social inequalities and resulting insecurities, readily available SALW have also been recognised as exacerbating dysfunctional tendencies by undermining central authority structures,

and therefore, magnifying economic, industrial, socio-political, feudal, religious, and ethno-tribal fissures. This creates a climate of insecurity that growing domestic and international criminal organisations are able to take full advantage of, effectively spreading lawlessness and criminal violence⁴²; which, in turn, have considerable detrimental impacts, as Keith Krause (2001) observes: “rampant criminality threatens to destroy the social and community fabric, breeding a culture of violence that sooner or later poses insurmountable problems for public policy”⁴³.

With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the massive availability of SALW since the 1980s has helped create an environment of political instability, which many sub-state actors have swiftly taken advantage of, through thriving private security businesses, urban mafias, drug cartels, and criminal organisations. Pakistan’s industrial hub, Karachi, illustrates the lawlessness resulting from the subordination of the state to sub-state actors in terms of firepower and territorial control. A number of attempts have been made to overturn this trend; such as the extreme measures used by Pakistan’s Benizir Bhutto government (1993-1996), whose interior minister, the *hard man* and former Major General, Naseerullah Babar, finally deployed the military into the Sindh province, and specifically Karachi, in order to suppress resistance by any party or individual intent on disrupting social cohesion⁴⁴. Similarly, a constant spate of violence through political assassinations, kidnapping for ransom, and ethnic and sectarian massacres through suicide bombings has brought Karachi to its knees between 2009 and 2013.

In post conflict environments, demobilised combatants who have not been effectively reintegrated into the mainstream civilian population tend to find that their options dwindle fast, resulting in their re-acquaintance with their dominant skills in the use of SALW. The lack of employment often results in ex-combatants turning their attention to banditry, armed robberies and extortion, assaults, kidnapping, and homicides as guns for hire⁴⁵. During the 1990s, disaffection, impoverishment, illiteracy, an exponential rise in criminality, its consequential proportional rise in insecurity, and a perceived lack of alternative options, induced a situation where a *hit man* could be hired for as little as five hundred to a thousand rupees (approximately, between £3.50 to £7 sterling) from amongst the Afghan refugee population in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa⁴⁶. “Small arms can empower disaffected groups to challenge institutions, whose lack of effective control merely compounds the situation. The ready availability of weapons coupled with the absence of a secure environment can lead to a self-perpetuating upward spiral of insecurity and acquisition”⁴⁷.

The disaffected and criminals alike are often drawn to the possession of firearms; the former to protect themselves from the fear inducing insecurity produced by the latter, and the latter to protect themselves from the former’s defences in order to exploit them, thereby advancing the option for the use of weapons, increasing the propensity for violence, and hence, erosion of security, by sustaining and accelerating the demand for firearms, and reducing group relations to a series of *zero-sum* interactions⁴⁸. With violence effectively institutionalised within social structures, the gradual militarisation of society may ensue, in part, because the instruments of coercive force are no longer monopolised by the state, as noted by Mary Kaldor: “violence is increasingly privatised both as a result of growing organised crime and the emergence of

paramilitary groups”⁴⁹. This situation was reflected throughout Afghanistan until the Taliban had secured the hitherto impossible task of taking weapons *off the street* throughout the territory they effectively controlled, albeit through harsh draconian methods and the redistribution of heavy weapons to loyal local commanders. The Taliban’s collapse, as a consequence of the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, resulted in a political vacuum, which was immediately filled by criminal organisations, drugs cartels, local warlords, and the Northern Alliance.

9:2:3:1 – SALW and the Narcotics Trade

Not only has the rise in criminality and the ready availability of SALW been linked to the proliferation of drugs and the empowerment of drug cartels to protect their vast profits from the narcotics trade⁵⁰, it has stimulated “drug-running and other smuggling economies”⁵¹. Illicit networks developed to trade drugs and launder money have been adapted to the illicit SALW trade solidifying linkages between the narcotics trade and illicit SALW trafficking with sophisticated procurement, SALW sales and transportation methods to all buyers⁵², through the drugs-for-guns barter system⁵³. The availability of firearms has increased the use of armed violence within the narcotics trade, by drug dealers intent on protecting their interests and to control their territory against other dealers and legal authorities, by drug users against innocent civilians aiming to pay for their habit, and by individuals under the influence of drugs⁵⁴ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.68 – The Anti-Narcotics Compound, Kohat. The author alongside narcotics stored in the fortified compound. Also see, Appendix IV, Plates 7.57 to 7.66 – Darra Arms and Narcotics). Some drugs cartels and syndicates have grown to massive proportions, with the ability to fund private armies and supply them with significant provisions of the most high-tech SALW, undermine government policies, and create political chaos, which are credible assertions if the estimated annual turnover of the global drug trafficking industry is accepted as being worth over US\$500 billion⁵⁵. According to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), however, “the overall value of the illicit drug market was estimated at about \$320 billion for the year 2003, equivalent to 0.9 per cent of global GDP”⁵⁶. Further discussion as to the exact size of the illicit narcotics trade may be beyond the scope of this study, however, Francisco Thoumi (2005) has noted that such figures were very vague estimates, or *wild guesses*, and not based upon a standardised system of calculation⁵⁷. Nevertheless, he does conclude that the estimated global illegal narcotics trade ranged “between \$45 and \$280 billion”⁵⁸.

Since the 1980s, Afghanistan has been a focus point for the production of opium⁵⁹, aided by the Cold War global superpower rivalry, which “helped the illicit opium-heroin economies thrive in Asia”⁶⁰ and led to immense indirect and detrimental socio-political effects on Afghan society. The protection and exploitation of this illicit industry is assisted by, and has assisted, the prevalence of a state of insecurity amongst the Afghan populace as well as aiding the perpetuation of the Afghan conflict⁶¹ for self-preservation⁶² (see, Appendix III, Figure 9.1 – The Global Potential Opium Production, 1997-2011, Metric Tons)⁶³. This is especially so in the Taliban’s exploitation of the drugs trade to enable it to continue its insurgency in Afghanistan against American, ISAF, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)⁶⁴. Furthermore, the instability produced from the continuation of the conflict has enabled organised crime groups and syndicates within and without

Afghanistan to gain a significant foothold in Afghanistan⁶⁵, which is making it extremely difficult for counter-narcotics and anti-crime initiatives to address the increasing drugs related organised crime⁶⁶ and growing terrorist activities⁶⁷, especially given the criminalisation of Afghanistan's political and governmental infrastructure through endemic corruption and engagement in criminal activities, including the drugs trade⁶⁸.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of the US\$68 billion trade in 2009, which they supplemented with other forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human smuggling. In 2009, the Afghan Taliban was estimated to have earned around \$150 million from the opiate trade, Afghan drug traffickers \$2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers \$440 million.⁶⁹

Afghanistan represents between 80 to 90 percent of the total global potential production of opium, and 63 percent of global illicit opium poppy cultivation⁷⁰, with 131,000 hectares cultivated in 2011⁷¹, and contributing to the generation of the \$68 billion global opium market⁷², including heroin. There was, however, a reduction in the output of opium from 5,800 metric tons in 2011 to 3,700 metric tons in 2012 due to adverse weather conditions and diseases afflicting the poppy harvest in 2012⁷³. Furthermore, Afghanistan is also a leading producer of cannabis after Morocco⁷⁴, with between 9,000 to 24,000 hectares cultivated and producing between 1,200 to 3,700 metric tons of cannabis resin in 2010⁷⁵, and with 12,000 hectares cultivated in 2011⁷⁶.

Not only are small arms used to reinforce the production of narcotics, which cannot be dealt with or treated separately when dealing with either, the illicit trafficking of drugs and small arms also tends to use similar methods and conduits⁷⁷ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 2.1 – The Smuggling Route taken in the Hills Looking towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar; and, Plate 2.2 – The Rear View, Looking at the Vale of Peashawar). Whether at the production, transportation or distribution stage of the drugs cycle, small arms are used heavily. However, the United Nations has yet to develop a coherent understanding between drugs and small arms, especially in regards to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the 2011 United Nations Security Council report from the Secretary General on *Drugs Trafficking and Small Arms* did take note of the need to develop a framework to recognise the commonality between the drugs and small arms trade⁷⁸. The Security Council is, however, in the process of recognising the intertwining relationship between illicit small arms and drugs trades. “Council members appear to be generally supportive of discussing the issue of the drug trade and small arms. Most members seem to agree in principle that the shared characteristics between the two issues (the facts that there are extensive illegal trafficking in both drugs and arms and that the use of small arms in drug related violence has become endemic in some regions) deserve discussion”⁷⁹.

9:2:3:2 – State Violence Contribution to Extent and Severity of Human Rights Abuses

Small arms transfers not only contribute towards increasing criminality, but can also be used to negative effect by legitimate state authorities through their security forces.

Arms transfers can enhance the capacity of the state for repressive violence and thus contribute to the extent and severity of human rights abuses. Such abuses, in turn, contribute to a climate in which it becomes more difficult to ensure the economic and political reforms that are necessary to promote poverty reduction and equitable development. Human rights organisations have documented the use of arms acquired from external sources in systematic human rights abuses, both in counter-insurgency operations and during peace.⁸⁰

Seemingly *less-lethal* weapons can be deployed to “disperse, harass, kill or punish crowds”⁸¹. However, such weapons can also be systematically used to suppress civil discontent opposed to government policies, with the overt portrayal that non-lethal weapons are being used, such as the suppression of the Palestinian intifadas in the Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) during the 1980s and 1990s by Israeli rubber-coated metal bullets and live rounds which actually killed⁸². The Israeli forces continue to use such methods to this day, where “demonstrators were met by live bullets, tear gas canisters, rubber-coated steel bullets, sound bombs and skunk water”⁸³.

The current Afghan government has increased its capacity to conduct such operations to alleviate the pressure on foreign ISAF forces, and also to be able to take complete control of all security operations before the majority of foreign forces leave at the end of 2014. Nevertheless, inappropriate ethno-centric arming of the ANSF for internal security and policing, particularly of the predominant Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups that are highly influential in the current Afghan governmental power structures and security forces⁸⁴, does not bode well for ethnic harmony in the forthcoming years, short to medium term, due to the tendency of ethnic rivalries to flare up very frequently resulting in the large scale human rights abuses of other ethnic groups. This is true of all ethnicities in Afghanistan, especially since the Soviet occupation. Furthermore, the use of greater firepower, designed for operations other than internal policing, but used in this context can aggravate existing fissures and lead to the re-eruption of violent hostilities between rival groups. Moreover, the arming of local or regional militias by the Afghan government to repel Taliban control of the rural areas may also result in heightened tensions and the breakdown of civil order due to the uncertainty of militia loyalties, which may defect from the government to the Taliban, or cause civil strife because of their vested interests, which may be due to their lack of accountability in comparison to regular security forces. In addition, “the greatest threat to stability in Afghanistan is less the existence of a few hundred militias per district in the form of the ALP and more the danger that after 2014 an oversized and unevenly trained armed force will decompose and fragment into myriad competing militia groups”⁸⁵.

In her study on the correlation between the repression and abuse of civil and human rights and the importation of arms by less developed countries, *Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries*, Shannon Blanton (1999)⁸⁶ evaluates whether arms are instruments of human rights repression. The study is comprised of a dataset of 91 less developed countries and their arms purchases in the period 1982-92; while, violation of personal integrity rights is used as the most significant type of repression of human rights, including torture, political imprisonment, forced disappearance, and assassinations and murder. Blanton (1999) concludes that arms imports contribute to increases in domestic insecurity dilemmas in many less-developed countries, and that “arms acquisitions appear to contribute to repression by making violent political acts more feasible”⁸⁷. Blanton’s (1999) conclusions were corroborated in a later study by Soysa, Jackson and Ormhaug (2010), *Tools of the torturer? Small arms imports and repression of human rights, 1992–2004*, concluding that their “study establishes a direct empirical link between small arms imports and the violation of human rights”⁸⁸.

In its seminal report, *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, while cognisant of the validity of findings within similar studies, the ICRC (1999) advocates the implementation of the principles of international humanitarian law in relation to the regulation and limitation of arms transfers, since “the unregulated availability of weapons can increase tensions, facilitate their indiscriminate use and lead to a rise in civilian casualty levels ... Fundamental humanitarian principles require that the issue of weapons proliferation be addressed, as it can needlessly increase the number of victims in war situations”⁸⁹.

9:2:4 – Militarisation of Society and Political Environment

But what does it mean, to think in the images of war? It means to see everything as existing at maximum tension, as reeking of cruelty and dread. Because wartime reality is a world of extreme, Manichaeian reduction, which eliminates all intermediate hues, all things gentle and warm, and limits everything to an aggressive counterpoint, to black and white, to the most primal battle of two powers: good and evil. No one else on the battlefield! Only the good (in other words, us) and the evil (meaning everything that stands in our way, that opposes us, and that we force wholesale into the sinister category of the enemy).⁹⁰

A society that is undergoing a process of militarisation organises itself for the production and projection of violence that encompasses every level of its social organisation, and may proceed according to a militaristic ideology. The society’s socio-political orientation, culture, traditions, social norms and mores, moral ethos, interpretations of historically significant events also undergo a process of transformation to reflect the acceptance of violence and its integration. Moreover, in a highly militarised society, the integration of violence is superseded by its assimilation into every aspect of society. According to Salvadorian psychologist Ignacio Martin-Baro (1988), a cognitive process of *mental militarization* is produced from the excessive militarisation of society⁹¹; that is, violence is a response to social problems and becomes accepted as the norm. Violence is inculcated into the normative culture over time to produce cultures of violence, or warlike cultures. Heavily armed police, soldiers, private security guards, and paramilitaries patrolling streets, guarding public buildings and schools, and openly armed civil defence and armed vigilante groups protecting neighbourhoods demonstrate both the symptoms and causal factors of societal militarisation, as is the case for much of Afghanistan and the Tribal Areas and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa of Pakistan where the *Kalashnikov culture* is rife (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.1 – People Openly Carry Weapons in the Streets). Openly armed societies and overt displays of firearms encourage heightened threat perceptions, which invariably result in local arms races, since personal security becomes a necessity.

Military institutions, military methods of organisation and military codes of conduct and behaviour are espoused to assert vested interests and to construct and solidify a militarist power base. When a civilian’s perception of threat is transformed into a militarist’s perception, every action taken by potentially conflicting parties, which have a tendency to increase exponentially during the transformation process, may be perceived as a potential or actual threat that can only be countered through the demonstration or use of violent force. This stems from the duality of fear and empowerment bestowed by the ready availability of SALW to individuals and the collective, which destroys perceptions of non-violent options in the resolution of conflict by disrupting rational decision-making processes. In other words, progressively fewer non-violent alternatives

are considered when confronting potential adversaries, to the extent that a self-perpetuating hostility is accentuated towards a potential or actual adversary in order to legitimise continued existence and possession of power, for which access to firearms is of paramount importance.

During the institutionalization of violence, which proceeds concurrently with the militarisation of society, the increased perception of insecurity simultaneously encourages the need for self-protection and acquisition of SALW, given that they are readily available. Militarisation also affects the leadership's language of persuasion, which utilise political contexts to support their consolidation of executive powers, for example, the US *war on drugs*; thereby, using military symbolism to induce civilian acceptance of the use of violence and draconian punishments against, not only drug dealers, but also against those afflicted by drug addiction. The implication of a 'war' indicates the utilisation of emergency powers by the executive by circumventing the legislative process.

Militarisation also facilitates the gender definition of identities; for example, James Gibson (1994) notes how cultural identities of masculinity are identified with the warrior in war movies such as Rambo so as to associate bravery, sacrifice, toughness, and patriotism with status⁹², and therefore, enhance the military's image, aid the social mobility of military ranks and officers, and further reinforce the military mindset and its dominance in society. Similarly, the Afghan Mujahideen *commander* gained tremendous social mobility throughout the Soviet occupation, which was previously not feasible without the possession of land and wealth. Through his talent on the battlefield, the commander was able to propel himself into the highest positions of political power, which may not have been possible otherwise.

Although Afghanistan has not endured a process of militarisation in the purest sense, whereby the military hierarchy establishes complete control of the country, it has gone through the militarisation of the mind, through which cultural concepts, traditions, and codes of conduct have changed to reflect the status of the archetypal warrior in Afghan society, as in Martin-Baro's (1988) *mental militarisation*. Furthermore, the evolution of this warrior culture over centuries has become ingrained in every aspect of Afghanistan's social organisation, especially within Pushtun communities. In such societies, the gender identification of the masculine warrior ethos has led to the virtually complete subjugation of women, especially in relation to empowerment through the possession of firearms, which reside solely within the male domain, in order to reduce a potential threat; that is, the empowerment of women through firearms.

The protraction of the Afghan conflict has further entrenched the militarisation of society through the development of armed parties. This was plainly evident during the different civil war periods (1978-1979, 1989-1996, and 1996-2001, where foreign troops were not officially active on Afghan territory), when adversarial parties continued to utilise violence as the primary tool to resolve disputes rather than political dialogue. The current situation in which NATO forces are under continuous attack by resurgent Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan since 2005, especially in the south and east, shows no sign of resolution, given that the pivotal conflicting parties are militarily entrenched to the extent that they reject political non-violent

dialogue, evident through the lack of a concerted effort to resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations. The militarised Afghan environment has also brutalised the sensibilities of the civilian population through continuous displays of violence, proscribing social tolerance, traditional value systems, and normative perceptions of human dignity; thereby colouring the average individual's perception of reality, which facilitates widespread repression, torture, and anarchy, and its acceptance. The most severe consequences were displayed throughout the Afghan conflict, from gross human rights violations, overt bombing campaigns, and virtual genocidal military operations on civilian populations by all parties (including the Soviet forces; PDPA Communist; Mujahideen factions, especially *Hizb-i Islami* (Party of Islam), and *Jamiat-i Islami* (Islamic Society); the Taliban; Northern Alliance, and, the US and ISAF/NATO forces). Furthermore, the nature of guerrilla warfare coupled with the proliferation of SALW in territories held by sub-state actors confuses US-NATO-ISAF and government distinctions between combatants and civilians, given the necessity for the possession of SALW for personal security by civilians in heavily weaponised and insurgent intensive areas.

Since Afghanistan has never had any uniformity in its social-structure or in the systems it utilises, the civil war was able to transform the limited civil administration into small, independent, and fragmented systems controlled by local warlords in possession of significant firepower, who could grant or restrict access to resources from the population within their territorial domains, depending upon their personal, family, and ethnic loyalties. As such, group identities, which are of paramount importance to the consolidation of militarised groups, could be reinforced through stereotypical in-group out-group images; that is, encouraging and building cohesiveness amongst the in-group, whilst demonising the out-group. This facilitated the use of violent force as and when necessary by warring parties, since it constrained and relegated independent thought while advancing structured, programmed, and directed modes of cognition. As a result, the deep-seated fears that became entrenched in the collective's consciousness because of the militarisation of society and proliferation of SALW, have given rise to wholesale societal trauma and resulted in communal divisions, which were and are especially detrimental to agrarian social groups that rely on the necessity of unity for prolific production⁹³. In this respect, societal trauma stemming from social disorganisation, and disintegration in extreme cases, due to excessive accumulations of firearms is poignantly demonstrated by the behavioural responses of children. The experience of social disintegration, extreme violence, and militarisation throughout a child's life, who knows no other reality, deems the rejuvenation and rehabilitation of society intimidating to say the least.

9:2:5 – De-Centralisation: Tribal Disunity and Polarisation of Society

The effectiveness of contemporary, especially ethnic, conflicts to destroy the collective consciousness and identity of communities is growing as new and more powerful weapons are created and used with the aid of the tried and tested brutal methods of war. The increasing civilian casualties are a testimony to the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, albeit, not acknowledged, in order to subdue the war fighting capabilities of whole cultures, societies, nations and even civilisations. This is not a recent phenomenon. The Cold War (1945-1989) suppressed underlying tensions that eventually resurfaced because of the mismanagement, abuse

and exploitation of ethnic loyalties by the old colonial powers, especially in the delineation of political boundaries during the decolonisation period. The end of the Cold War brought basic human needs to the fore, the most significant of which has become a primary political global objective of the dispossessed, that is, the need for self and national (ethnic) identity.

The proliferation of SALW has facilitated the empowerment of local sub-state actors, aggrieved parties, disenfranchised sections of the population, and separatist elements that are primarily ethnic or religious in nature. The *globalisation* of the media, and its diffusion of the modernisation of global culture, has also played a significant part in the egress of conflicts based upon unfulfilled cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, or ideological aspirations, thereby encouraging the use of organised violence by empowering popular mobilisations with excessive accumulations of modern SALW, which, in areas of spiralling structural collapse, have also assisted in further polarising ethnic, religious, economic and ideational/political fissures. This has been testified by the growth of particularism and localised violence throughout the post-World War Two period; for which Kloos (1993) defines *localisation* as “the rise of ethnic identities and communalism and nationalism”⁹⁴. However, although Louise (1995) also recognises that “the rise of particularism/localisation is not necessarily a prerequisite for the eruption of localised violence”⁹⁵, SALW are, nevertheless, viewed as the primary element of such conflicts⁹⁶. Contrary to the prevailing view, such conflicts are not purely religious, tribal or ethnic in nature; many are long-term and highly resource-based confrontations for which profit, resource scarcity, disenfranchisement, and socio-economic disparities and inequalities are the motivating factors⁹⁷.

The vast majority of resource-based conflicts emerge in regions of low to medium human development, which correlates with areas of excessive accumulations of SALW. Therefore, we may associate countries with low to medium human development, weak central and local governance and administrative structures, and low per capita gross national product, with regions that have excessive accumulations of SALW, and greater probability of human rights abuses⁹⁸. The latter is, in part, due to the lack of legal regulatory functionality and institutional capacity to enforce practices catered towards anti-corruption, transparency, accountability and justice. Such countries often have porous borders coupled with weak regulatory structures that facilitate illicit cross-border flows, circulation, and re-circulation of SALW in informal markets and economies between organised crime syndicates, drug cartels, terrorist organisations, sub-state actors, warlords, ethnic secessionists (especially those with cross-border populations), irredentist movements, and international arms brokers, which have developed a large degree of symbiosis⁹⁹. In fact, in relation to Afghanistan, this is ideally descriptive of the situation that has facilitated the protraction of the Afghan conflict, where the lack of an agreed political model for a governmental infrastructure between the variegated adversarial parties has reduced the already limited institutional capacity to regulate societal functionalism, which has been aided by the massive diffusion of SALW throughout Afghanistan. This leads us to a point, which, although beyond the scope of this thesis and demanding of future investigation, is noteworthy, that the political fragmentation in one country may affect and undermine the political economies and development of its immediate neighbours because of the unregulated flow of SALW throughout a region of low to medium development.

9:2:5:1 – Detribalisation

In contrast to tribal power brokerage, the tribal organisation also has strong tendencies towards the resolution of conflicts and enhancement of mutual coexistence through various non-violent tribal mechanisms, processes and institutions; for example, intertribal negotiations and intra-tribal mediation by tribal elders through institutions such as the *Jirgah* (tribal assembly) and/or the *Hujrah* (secular community centre for Pushtun males). Irrespective of tribal background, most tribal societies have forms of inbuilt social conditioning to deter or counter violent tendencies, such as *gham-xadi* (literally, condole - celebrate), or *badal* (reciprocity), as practiced in Pushtun society. Additionally, social ostracism is often used as deterrence against the violation of tribal social norms, and can be reinforced through the repossession and/or destruction of property by the village or tribal *Jirgah*. By most accounts, the overt public display of weapons in certain regions has the superficial effect of deterring aggressive actions. However, such displays have a larger detrimental effect by inducing greater insecurity. The massive proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan has considerably increased insecurity within such environments, and has had a destabilising effect on non-violent tribal methods of social conditioning.

Children learn their first responses to violence through the encouragement or discouragement that they are given by authority figures within the immediate and extended family environment. From a series of research studies comparing aggressive and pacific male children, Albert Bandura (1991) and a number of other social psychologists found that more parental encouragement for a child to exhibit antisocial aggressive behaviour produced a greater tendency to for aggressive behaviour within male children¹⁰⁰. In contrast, parents who discouraged aggressive behaviour induced pacific orientated male children¹⁰¹. The violence surrounding the Afghan conflict as a whole has had a detrimental impact on young males, who have been further influenced by the socio-cultural perceptions of the archetypal male warrior, which are perpetually reinforced and consolidated throughout tribal society, and especially during the overwhelming Afghan response to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Throughout this period, Afghanistan's disparate ethno-cultural and tribal societies focused upon encouraging warrior traits, for which, the use of firearms is symptomatic. Over the entire period of the Afghan conflict (1978-present), the young men who first encountered encouragement to use aggressive behaviour and violence were largely unable to receive an equal degree of discouragement, which may have countered, albeit, to a limited extent due to the prevailing socio-cultural environment of the variegated societies in Afghanistan, the transgenerational upbringing of future male children within an aggression and violence-inducing environment. Consequently, the entrenchment of the warrior ethos may, in no small part, further encourage the use of weapons to resolve disputes due to the simultaneous militarisation of society and institutionalisation of violence within society.

Tribal feuds have been a component of Afghan life for millennia; however, the excessive accumulation of SALW have had the tendency to exacerbate minor disputes into large scale tribal conflicts due to the exponential increase in the ability to kill from the greater accuracy, rapidity of firepower, and expenditure of ammunition within a shorter space of time. With respect to this, the cohort study commission by the ICRC on

Weapon Injuries not related to Inter-factional Combat in Afghanistan and conducted by Markus Michael and David R. Meddings et al (1999) also witnessed inter-tribal fighting and noted that, “while probably always a feature of Afghan rural life, tribal fighting tended to be small scale, with individual assaults avenged on a case by case basis. We believe that the influx of weaponry from the larger intrastate conflict has profoundly changed the way in which these disputes are played out”¹⁰².

A minor dispute can lead to the rapid death of several or more individuals through impulsive reactions when SALW are readily available, and especially where the application of violence has become the predominant form of negotiation. This may, in turn, significantly escalate a dispute into open hostilities between aggregated opposing parties because of the structural organisation of tribal groups, which effectively coalesce according to patrilineal segmentation on the basis of the structure of residential ‘units in opposition’ within communities. What is more significant is the tribal capability to effectively engage government forces, through their combined tribal resources. The addition of large quantities of SALW enables a tribe to sustain military, or *lashkar*, operations for prolonged periods. For example, the government of Pakistan has been engaged in extensive and sustained military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2004, and especially after formation of an umbrella organisation of numerous militant factions under the designation *Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in December 2007. While the TTP initially had support from the local tribes that were providing them protection according to their *Pushtunwali* tenet of *nanawati* (asylum), they held control over large tracts of Pakistani territory in FATA and Pukhtunkhwa. However, after losing tribal support, they successively also lost significant territorial control after large scale military operations were conducted against them by the Pakistan’s security forces. Nevertheless, although the TTP is currently concentrated within North Waziristan, it is still able to conduct successful operations, through tribal alliances and coalitions, in part, because they are largely armed with extensive supplies of SALW, which facilitate a very high degree of firepower against an established military organisation through asymmetric operations. However, military operations from all parties also have many drawbacks, most significantly, the extensive civilian casualties that are caught in the crossfire, or those used as human shields by the TTP.

Tribal possession of extensive supplies of SALW also reduce the Afghan central government’s capacity to control its tribalised regions because of the much stronger sodality that the tribe holds compared to other structural organisations such as the State of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s history has been fraught with tribal rebellions and revolts to reforms and the incursion of centralisation. In this respect, the government cannot hope to evolve a strong centralised administration without reducing tribal power, which has a tendency to oppose socio-political reforms and taxation levies, and has been a significant factor in King-making throughout the history of the State of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the lack of strong central governance encourages tribal adventurism, in the form of the Taliban, to devolve further power from the centre through the ability to mobilise highly armed militias or *lashkars*, force taxes on local populations, and intimidate government functionaries.

In addition to constraining greater centralisation, the proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan also assists the erosion of tribal structures and mechanisms that constrain non-violent behaviour. The authority of tribal elders is significantly reduced as SALW empowerment brings greater discord to the foundations or building blocks of tribal social organisation. Also, empowerment of militant ideational and religious groups undermines the authority and legitimacy of the Hujrah and the Jirgah by dividing its popular secular base and imposing competition through the introduction of alternative authority structures based upon absolutist (religious) forms of governance and social organisation. In this respect, the Taliban has been active, through superior force of arms, in detribalising rural communities to effect permanent change in the structural organisation of Afghan society, especially amongst the Pushtun populations in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, so as to further entrench their position within Afghanistan. This is being carried out by the Taliban's destabilisation of social cohesion through the consistent use of assassinations of tribal elders and landlords (*Maliks*)¹⁰³, breaking down social hierarchies, and undermining tribal structural regulatory mechanisms, which therefore allows them to reassemble social organisation in their own image. To a large extent, the Taliban has used its access to large quantities of SALW to effectively control large parts of rural Afghanistan; since, "in addition to making the ability to kill far easier, the technology now being employed in light weapons, and particularly small arms, possesses a greater capacity for destroying social cohesion"¹⁰⁴.

The Taliban's recruitment drive has also involved the use of empowerment through the possession of firearms for potential talibs and provides an alternative livelihood¹⁰⁵, which assists in the reduction of the sodality to the tribe, especially if there is little or no access to the reinforcement of the tribal identity and its authority due to the lack of proximity and predominance in the immediate socio-cultural environment. Recruitment of refugees returning from Pakistan and Iran generally pays more dividends; since, the returning refugees have been exposed to environments where there is a high degree of dilution of tribal organisation as a result of the need to integrate into highly porous and ethnically or culturally mixed environments, such as refugee camps or large urban areas not within or near their 'home' territorial environments that they identify with through tribal, linguistic and cultural associations. Identity formation processes involving association of the residential group, patrilineal decent, tribal values and social norms, and local traditions and customs of their original tribe become diluted or are not able to take firm root in the consciousness of internally or externally displaced people or youth who have been away for prolonged periods; especially those that have been born and raised outside their areas of origin due to the lack of transgenerational transmission of the above identity factors, and due, in part, to the competitive availability of alternative social norms and customs in host environments.

9:2:5:2 – Sub-State Actors & Warlords

Globalisation and localisation are severely challenging the exclusive right to sovereignty and the functional legitimacy of state institutions. Whereas absolute sovereignty has been eroded by supranational institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the European Community, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, a large number of governments are facing violent internal systemic, ideational, political, ethnic, and socio-economic challenges to their authority, which question the state's authority and leads to the delegitimisation of the status quo because of its inability to adequately provide its citizenry their required

basic human needs in the form of human, political and economic security, and identity recognition. Moreover, this is especially so when the state is too weak to project its institutional authority throughout its territory, leading to a crisis in sovereignty, as exemplified by the current situation in Afghanistan.

The increasing incidence of the emergence of sub-state actors willing to challenge the governing regime through force of arms is alarming¹⁰⁶, which has been facilitated by the ready availability of SALW is also increasingly encouraging socio-political and economically dispossessed groups to acquire firearms to project their grievances and claims. However, in areas of readily available SALW, sub-state actors are more readily empowered to project their grievances, which further justify or politically legitimate their possession of SALW, and progressively, their use of firearms in large quantities. The emergence of increasing numbers of politically motivated sub-state groups using violence to achieve their objectives, which reduces centralised authority, also leads to increasing opportunities for organised criminal elements to take advantage of governance vacuums that may lead to reduced law and order in afflicted areas. Furthermore, the lack of the state's institutional authority throughout Afghanistan has enabled armed criminal groups and political sub-state actors to more readily proliferate further supplies of arms in an already saturated environment, producing further instability, insecurity and consequently further diffusion of firearms.

9:2:5:3 – Land and Power

The political base enjoyed by large landlords through their interaction with the local population via the patron-client relationship is one aspect of the control of territory. According to Aaron Karp (1993), the control of territory “provides a reliable source of income through taxation and extortion of local civilians. It makes large transfers of arms physically manageable”¹⁰⁷. Although noted in reference to insurgency groups, the same principle applies to large landlords that vie for political elevation and predominance through the control of territory. Nevertheless, patron-client relations are also affected by the feasibility, affordability and easy access to the tools of empowerment by any individual; that is, firearms. The patron's authority is clearly reduced due to the greater capacity and firepower modern firearms produce. Especially in the enforcement of his authority vis-a-vis his clients who may acquire greater access to firearms due to their relatively low prices.

The political zenith in Afghanistan became synonymous with the political power base enjoyed through the quantity of land owned. After the Soviet and communist PDPA defeat in 1992, Afghanistan collapsed into numerous variegated territorial zones held by opposing Mujahideen factions, but more certainly, autonomous former commanders, who inevitably facilitated the country's slide into civil war. More recently, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, since 2001, empowered local strongmen throughout the country to counter the Taliban. These rapidly became local and national power brokers through the control of territory, which also enabled many to establish and/or maintain large supplies of SALW and heavy weapons to preserve their control. The political turmoil that ensued in the aftermath of the Taliban's retreat produced a complete loss of security, which was encouraged by local power brokers, such as Ismail Khan in Herat, Abdul Rasheed Dostum in Miamana and Mazar-i-Sharif, and Atta Mohammad Noor in Badakhshan, who continued to compete for resources with the Afghan Central Government.

Since the Afghan central government has not been able to provide adequate protection and security outside the confines of Kabul and some of the larger cities, the general civilian population continues to seek alternative security guarantees from large landlords and commanders who provide much needed local services, but also have sizable territorial control through the possession of well armed militias. Many commanders/warlords are unwilling to relinquish control of their territorial holdings to the central government and other commanders or landlords, because of their accretion of taxation and duties taken or extorted from the local population, traders, and until recently, border import & export duties¹⁰⁸. Consequently, an ethnic consolidation within the country rather than ethnic integration has been produced because of the coalescence of people towards their perceived source of security, culture, and identity, through their ethnicity; which continues to be maintained through the open flow of arms and ammunition that are constantly being used in clashes between various warlords/commanders over resources, territorial control, tribal, ethnic and sectarian disputes. The fragmentation of Afghanistan has only been averted for the time being by US-NATO-ISAF led forces in Afghanistan because of their enforcement of overt cohesion through coercive power. Nevertheless, the rule of law is virtually non-existent throughout Afghanistan, with the exception of the major cities. Conditions of dire insecurity and impoverishment within the country allow warlords and regional commanders to flourish. They have a strong incentive to remain in their positions, and given the centre's likely intrusion into their past, they have little incentive to relinquish their power bases. The main warlords converged on the centres of revenue, the stronger ones being close to the borders of Afghanistan's neighbours¹⁰⁹. However, the endemic corruption within the central government, which is facilitating the current power structures where the warlords flourish, provides, if not legitimacy, at least some justification for the continued insurgency led by the Taliban¹¹⁰.

What should distinguish the leadership from the masses is their ability to rise beyond the fear of the collective, and become isolated individuals, yet, still within the collective. Therefore, their susceptibility to suggestion and contagion is reduced because of their ability to break out of the collective's grasp because of their capacity to question and their strength to lead. Unfortunately, having risen above the collective, the warlords have consistently lacked the provision of strength and leadership for the benefit of the collective.

During the Taliban's tenure in power (1996-2001), there was a relatively strong structure, facilitated by strong coercive measures. However, during the Taliban's sudden demise, much of the country was left in a political vacuum, which could not be filled by the invading US forces. The dispossessed warlords from the civil war (1992-1996) were quick to retake and re-establish themselves within a matter of weeks. The lack of a strong centralised state structure, alienation and disaffection of much of the Pushtun population in reaction to minority control of government institutions and the aggressive search missions and night raids that the US-NATO-ISAF forces frequently implement, coupled with the political elevation of the minority ethnic groups, which are determined not to relinquish their power bases, especially within the Afghan National Army, National Police Force, and Interior Ministry, have facilitated the breakdown of law and order¹¹¹. In certain areas, however, where cultural traditions have not broken down due to three and a half decades of protracted

conflict, there is a strong sense of identity, and community. This is mainly restricted to the highly tribalised areas of Afghanistan, which includes a large proportion of the Pushtun population. Certain Pushtun tribal laws and traditions have not faded with the passage of time, but have been reinforced by continued conflict; largely due to their overriding structural orientation towards military organisation in addition to the overarching projection of the archetypal male model in the form of the warrior philosopher within their cultural traditions, mores, norms, and codes of conduct. Consequently, the institutionalisation of violence and the militarisation of society have amplified and manifested the role of firearms in social intercourse. “There is no difference between the forces of the Taliban and the Mujahideen and all the others who carry guns. Only the faces and the clothes have changed”¹¹².

9:2:6 – Development in Afghanistan

According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, Afghanistan, 2007/8 (the NRVA 2007/8 survey covered food intakes of 20,576 households across 2,572 communities throughout Afghanistan’s 34 provinces over the entire 12 month period from Sunbula 1386 to Asad 1837 A.H.¹¹³), the vast majority of Afghans live in a state of poverty where 36 percent of the Afghan population, or approximately 9 million, cannot meet their basic needs¹¹⁴; where poverty is “a condition that reflects physical, economic, social and political deprivation, as well as a lack of assets and income.... [Whereas] poverty reflects an unacceptable level of well-being, vulnerability captures the exposure to uninsured risk leading to a socially unacceptable level of well-being in the future”¹¹⁵. The survey found that 36 percent of the sample consumed less than 2,100 kilocalories per person per day (which is the threshold of poverty calculated for Afghanistan’s particular socio-economic conditions), which often suffered from insufficient dietary diversity and ill health¹¹⁶. These findings underscore the depth of suffering that has beset Afghanistan during its long protracted conflict, which is being propagated by the intransigence of a culture of violence that is facilitated by excessive accumulations and continuing flows of SALW, as will be explained below.

The proliferation of SALW has an indirect affect on both intra-state and inter-state conflicts, and significantly influences the levels of development and impoverishment. In the first instance, legally acquired SALW by state security forces in highly regulated societies can strengthen internal security, create positive conditions for the impoverished to strengthen livelihoods, deter insurrections and general popular aggression, facilitate crime and violence reduction, enhance border security to prevent arms smuggling, protect humanitarian aid transportation, and disarms irregular forces, militia and other detrimental sub-state groups by balancing the opportunity cost in the purchase of arms as against the gains from enhanced security and their indirect effects to increased welfare¹¹⁷, and therefore facilitate economic growth, development, and poverty reduction. In contrast, SALW acquisitions can induce human insecurity; contribute to the abuse of power by the repression of dissent, reduction of individual liberties and political rights, commitment of human rights abuses, and the diffusion of SALW into nefarious sections of society, thereby undermining democratisation and development, and perpetuating poverty. “With high levels of poverty and, unemployment, holding on to Kalashnikovs or engaging in poppy cultivation and the narco-industry are still considered ways to survive”¹¹⁸.

During civil wars, arms transfers have increased globally through amplified military spending from an average of 2.8% to 5% of GDP¹¹⁹ by siphoning off finance from development budgets designated for poverty alleviation; for example, when child nutrition or education program budgets are cut to finance arms transfers, the likely results are increased malnutrition and infant mortalities. Furthermore the disruption in the delivery of health services from increased insecurity due to the mass availability of firearms also has detrimental effects on child mortality rates¹²⁰. Currently, according to the latest available figures from the UNDP Human Development Report 2011, Afghanistan has (Human Development Index ranking: 172) an under five's child mortality rate of 199 out of 1,000 live births¹²¹, equal to that of the Republic of Congo (HDI ranking: 187 out of 187) with 199 out of 1,000 live births¹²². In comparison, Norway (HDI ranking: 1) has a rate of 3 out of 1,000 live births¹²³.

The removal of men to populate the growing armed sub-state actors and government forces has the indirect effect of denying skilled and unskilled labour to communities and especially to families. Since many men are killed or maimed, household incomes drop and significantly contribute to increasing poverty and infant mortalities, and changing gender demographics¹²⁴. Afghanistan is a prime example of the recruitment of fighting aged men into various government security forces, whether in the Communist PDPA era, Taliban regime, Afghan National Army, contemporary militias, Mujahideen factions, and tribal lashkar, throughout the period of the protracted conflict. Currently, thousands of young men are being recruited into the Taliban for its guerrilla offensives against US-NATO-ISAF forces. The potential for further degradation of the development of Afghanistan and increased impoverishment is very high as the Taliban insurgency may likely evolve into yet another disastrous phase in Afghanistan's long protracted conflict after the 2014 withdrawal of US-NATO-ISAF combat troops is reached.

In a survey conducted in Afghanistan's major cities by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC) in 2004, *Take the Guns Away*, the majority of respondents upon being questioned about the improvement in security over one year, where security is defined as the absence of fighting, responded by indicating that there was a marked improvement¹²⁵. The exception was Kandahar, where only 35 percent of the sample believed that security had improved (see, Appendix III, Figure 9.2 – Improvement in Afghanistan's Security Compared to a Year Ago, 2004). However, the success of the disarmament program faced dilemmas in many parts of the country where local commanders and large militia forces still possess massive quantities of SALW and ammunition in ex-military bases and stockpiles throughout Afghanistan¹²⁶. This is especially so in southern Afghanistan, due to the insecurity created by both the on-going hot *war on terror* against a resurgent Taliban, and the ready availability of SALW, which simultaneously and symbiotically facilitate the conflict and provide barriers to its reduction. Furthermore, the perceptions of increased security from the 'Take the Guns Away' survey were voiced before the Taliban insurgency regrouped to take advantage of the distracted priorities of the US in their Iraq adventure, and therefore, do not meet the actual figures of progressively increasing casualties since 2004, with the exception of a small decrease in 2012 (figures for civilian deaths in Afghanistan between the years 2007 to 2012 are: 2007 [1523], 2008 [2118], 2009 [2412], 2010 [2790], 2011 [3131], 2012 [2754]¹²⁷).

Diplomatic avenues advocating the end of the insurgency have been met with numerous obstacles, not least by the mutual unqualified ideological opposition of the absolutist Taliban and US-NATO-ISAF forces. Furthermore, the Taliban's current commitments to the development of Afghanistan may be extrapolated from their period of governance in the late 1990s, during which their control of over 90 percent of the country did not divert their attentions from their war effort against the Northern Alliance, as Ahmed Jan, the Minister of Land and Mines stated in 1999, "we are currently engaged in a war and must put all our efforts in that direction, so we cannot provide resources for the country until we have full control of the country"¹²⁸.

The massive availability of SALW in Afghanistan and neighbouring regions is a source of continued empowerment for the *Talibanisation* of southern Afghanistan, which is likely to spill over into most of Pakistan, further exacerbating the impoverishment of the largely poverty stricken populations of both countries, while increasing fissiparous tendencies based upon ethnicity, ideology, religion, and socio-economic and structural disparities. However, paradoxically, the lack of development in southern Afghanistan is encouraging the local population to support the Taliban insurgency.

The extreme poverty of the local population and their disillusionment and sense of abandonment vis-à-vis the international community development effort, combined with aggressive and intrusive eradication policies, are pushing communities in the arms of the Taliban.¹²⁹

The only solution that may seem possible to avoid the propagation of such a scenario is the military defeat of the Taliban leadership, and the complete closure of all avenues through which the Taliban is able to recruit further combatant manpower and acquire financial resources to continue their campaign. However, this has been deemed as unfeasible given the inability of international forces to militarily and conclusively defeat the Taliban with all their combined resources at hand. The interest-based projection of the misguided belief that the discordant and divisive Afghan National Security Forces will be able to do what the world is unable to do lacks a significant basis in the ground realities of Afghanistan, and is only designed for global public consumption to deflect from the lack of accomplishment of flawed strategies throughout the period of foreign occupation, yet again.

Chapter 2 One aspect to reducing SALW is to reduce potential new weapons users, which may be achieved through selectively targeting potential recruits to the Taliban and the militias alike. New recruits tend to be young adolescent males from rural and urban environments whose parents perceive that their education is best achieved in the madrassa system due to their inability to provide alternatives due to financial constraints or religious obligations. In fact, according to a report by the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) in March 2005, *Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of Small Arms Projects on Arms Availability and Poverty*¹³⁰, the targeting of particularly dangerous adolescent males for disarmament and rehabilitation increased security in the Republic of Congo to such an extent that the "fragile peace was held together which allowed broader rehabilitation processes to take root"¹³¹. This was primarily because of the perception of increased security, which directly improved the confidence of people to enable them to travel to markets, attend schools and return to farming activities; in the case of Sierra Leone, it was because of the reduction in the frequency of

gunshots being heard led to the perception of a reduction in armed violence¹³². Furthermore, the report also noted a direct consequential reduction in poverty in Sierra Leone¹³³. It may, therefore, be surmised from this report that an increase in the overt display of firearms directly affects the incidence of poverty within a particular conflict afflicted community and/or environment, and as such, the reduction of the availability of SALW may encourage the reduction of poverty. However, it is unlikely that the global community will be able to achieve its primary Millennium Development Goals for Afghanistan to halve the extreme poverty and hunger, if the insurgency continues, as it is expected to. Furthermore, funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan has been inadequate since estimates of about \$42 billion suggested by experts in 2002 for the reconstruction programme were not met, as pledges fell far below what was required¹³⁴; while ten years later at the second international conference held in Tokyo, on 8th July 2012, for the continued post-2014 financing of Afghanistan's National Security Forces and development requirements for the period 2015-2024, seventy international representatives pledged \$16 billion. However, this "\$16 billion does not represent firm pledges by individual countries, but rather a general commitment to maintain current development funding over the next four years"¹³⁵. What is clear here is that the macro aspects of the conflict will have an intrinsic impact on security in Afghanistan in the forthcoming years, much as has been the case throughout duration of the Afghan conflict. "Sudden sharp drops in external assistance can be particularly destabilizing by changing perceptions of the government's strength and encouraging political actors and armed groups to challenge the state's authority. Finally, as aid resources decline, there is a risk that reliance on the opium economy and other illicit activities may increase"¹³⁶.

9:2:6:1 – Post-Conflict Reconstruction of Afghanistan

The threat and misuse of SALW affects the development of a society in many ways, from pressurising its overstretched healthcare system by burdening under-resourced and under-supplied hospitals through fatal and non-fatal injuries to forcing the semi-permanent closure of schools and colleges because of under-enrolment, reduced educational standards, and reduced security; for example, attacks perpetrated by the Taliban have targeted schools as a specific goal and as a strategy to induce fear and dissuade the education of females, forcing the closure of numerous schools in Southern Afghanistan. The availability of SALW generates insecurity, which affects decision-making processes; induces a climate of fear; directly increases mortality and injury-morbidity rates; facilitates the empowerment and growth of sub-state groups, which thrive on civil disruption and exploit communities for supplies and sexual services to advance ethnic polarisation, and adversely affect social capital development through the recruitment or gang-pressing of child combatants and increased criminal activity; and, forces people to leave their livelihoods to seek secure environments away from their localities, thereby reducing local productivity and adding additional pressure on otherwise overburdened local, foreign, and non-governmental institutions to provide scarce resources, whether as internally displaced people or as refugees in neighbouring countries and further a-field.

In January 2006, the then United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recognised the extent of the humanitarian issue when he noted that "there is no long-term security without development. There is no development without security"¹³⁷. Debbie Hiller of Oxfam concurred by identifying a primary cause of

insecurity and its direct relationship with development, stating that, “whether in conflict situations or in communities where there are large numbers of weapons, development is unlikely”¹³⁸. The increase in violence, as associated with excessive accumulations of SALW, is detrimental to development. Conversely, the reduction of violence facilitates development through the provision of greater opportunities and choices for people, and hence, results in less recourse to violence, which is largely because of the increase in or the perception of the increase in available alternatives and choices.

As mentioned above, excessive availability of SALW undermines socio-economic development at the macro-economic level¹³⁹, forces a reduction in foreign direct investment through increasing socio-political insecurity, and hence, reallocation of reconstruction resources from insecure areas to more secure areas causing disparate development rates between communities, which can effectively result in the surfacing of communal grievances and emergence of sub-state actors to effect change in the future. This situation manifested itself in southern Afghanistan, where, due to the dire lack of security, humanitarian agencies have been forced to reduce their activities or move out completely, therefore causing a stagnation in humanitarian development, reconstruction, and institution building. In fact, institutional weakness has facilitated the Taliban’s control of large portions of Helmand province¹⁴⁰. The net effect has been to further disaffect the local Pushtun population from the minority-dominated central government, which provides additional issues for sub-state actors such as the Taliban to raise further grievances and continue their emboldened insurgency with a self-constructed legitimacy, thereby boosting local support for the insurgents; encouraging more civilian acquisition, possession, and use of SALW to attain a perception of personal security due to the lack of trust displayed towards the central government; and finally, therefore, increasing the already entrenched development of *cultures of violence*, which have a negative multiplying effect on the conflict environment. Stagnation in humanitarian development is further compounded by the large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries accrued from US-NATO-ISAF and ANSF employment of aggressive tactics to counter escalating Taliban attacks; which may lead to a progressively spiralling situation of greater insecurity, and further reduction in development and reconstruction.

According to Collier et al (2003), the impoverishment that besets a particular society is more difficult to recover from the lower the rank on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)¹⁴¹. Afghanistan is ranked as 175 out of 187 nations with a Human Development Index for 2012 of 0.374 published in the *Human Development Report 2013*¹⁴². In comparison, it was ranked as 181 out of 182 on the UNDP HDI for 2009¹⁴³. However, considering that there has been a growth of new countries included within the HDI list totalling 187 in 2013, Afghanistan’s improved ranking does not necessarily indicate a vast developmental improvement. Nevertheless, massive international development aid over the past decade has induced some positive results. However, given the increasing likelihood of a heightened state of crisis and insecurity due to the resurgence of the Taliban, and a heightened state of potential fragmentation, the “transition presents serious threats to growth and economic stability, but these do not directly stem from declining aid itself. Key economic vulnerabilities are the risks of drought (which would adversely affect volatile agricultural production) and

falling business confidence as a result of worsening insecurity, corruption, governance, and uncertainty over Afghanistan's political future"¹⁴⁴.

9:2:6:2 – Enforcement of Law and Order and the Narcotics Trade

By definition, the existence of sub-state actors in possession of SALW indicates a significant erosion of the state's central authority and ability to enforce its laws throughout the country, and hence, the consolidation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Ideally, in order to be effective, the state must have complete monopoly of coercive force within its territorial borders, otherwise its ability to provide mechanisms for the amicable resolution of disputes is severely constrained. The loss of the Afghan state's monopoly over coercive force, after the April 1978 communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coup d'état, impelled a cessation in the state's responsibility to protect its civilian population, provide infrastructural and social services, and regulate the country's economy; thereby, causing an immediate impact on the Afghan population's impoverishment. The present Afghan state's territorial authority and exercise of monopoly of coercive force, is largely restricted to the limits of the capital, Kabul, and other large cities, which constrains its provision of services to the general Afghan population. The severe restraints imposed by the country's institutional weaknesses enhance the profile of the numerous sub-state actors (the Taliban, militias, private armies, tribal lashkar, warlords, and organised crime syndicates) that essentially control much of Afghanistan, which consequently induces additional restrictions on the state's structural and institutional development of its democratisation process, establishment of countrywide law and order, enhancement of local and regional capacities, promotion of reconciliation and recovery, and the alleviation of poverty. "Efforts to sustain or improve security—as well as to bolster the legitimacy of the state—will remain of primary importance. This is because serious threats to growth and economic stability during the transition are likely to come less from declining aid itself and more from non-economic factors. These include uncertainty over Afghanistan's political future, falling business confidence, and the weak governance environment"¹⁴⁵.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's administration's limited reach is further constrained by the insecurity induced through the possession and excessive availability of SALW, especially in areas that challenge central authority, which harms the ability of the government to build relationships with civil society. The state's lack of territorial reach limits its ability to impose its laws and regulations, which facilitates socio-economic exclusion and the weakening of the judicial system; reduces its ability to provide security and access to justice, which constrains the democratisation process, delivery of basic services; contributes to growing corruption, intimidation and extortionist practices, and human rights abuses; and, encourages the entrenchment of cultures of violence where the avocation of armed violence may be perceived as a viable alternative livelihood, thereby undermining the ability of national security institutions to resolve disputes and differences of opinion¹⁴⁶, which can be catalysed into violent conflicts by the excessive availability of SALW. This was also the case two decades earlier when the lack of the Mujahideen Coalition's ability to build a functional central authority, after the fall of the communist PDPA in 1992, encouraged the complete collapse of law and order, the fragmentation of the coalition into numerous armed parties contending for political dominance, and the eruption of a full-scale civil war where the impunity of violence led to a complete breakdown of human

security, producing a climate of fear and the consequential increase in the acquisition, possession, and use of SALW for personal protection, which consequently led to a situation of escalating violence and the increased militarisation of Afghan society.

The monetary costs of the acquisition of SALW are important to consider, given that they are usually secured from the already stretched budgets that may, according to the World Bank, be a diversion of resources from social development budgets and expenditure on social services, such as health, education, and other basic services for some governments¹⁴⁷. Many of the current conflicts are in low income countries at the bottom end of the human development index, which also spend a greater proportion of their national product on arms than higher income countries¹⁴⁸. “In recent years, nearly half of the countries with the highest defense burden had low indicators of human development”¹⁴⁹. According to Collier (2006), “developing countries have astonishing levels of poverty, yet their governments choose to devote a significant proportion of their resources to military spending which actually retards growth and so accentuates that poverty”¹⁵⁰. Given that most of these conflicts characteristically use SALW more than major weapons systems, the impact of sustainable development is immense, especially considering the significantly greater need for intense development efforts in low-income countries. The opportunity costs of spending on SALW to increase security lack adequate results and drain necessary resources from social development. However, the economies of low-income countries are warped by military spending that diverts resources from socio-economic development and the civilian industrial sector¹⁵¹, which results in lower rates of development and economic growth¹⁵², respectively. In some cases foreign exchange is borrowed to supplement military expenditure, leading to mounting debt problems¹⁵³.

The facilitation of armed violence through the availability of SALW, leading to the growth of cultures of violence, amplifies poverty for the economically deprived, drains the economy, and instigates the development of profitable alternative livelihoods in war-torn societies, such as narcotics production and trafficking, which are endemic throughout Afghanistan having effectively supplanted the production of sustainable agricultural products in many large regions, thereby dominating the political economy, and encouraging the formation of narco-cartels that employ sizable armed groups to protect their interests. Although the “Taliban edict banning opium cultivation... sharply reduced the country's overall output of opium to almost negligible levels... Following the fall of the Taliban, opium poppy cultivation increased to previous levels and has spread to include all of the country's provinces”¹⁵⁴ (see the above section, 9:2:3:1 – SALW and the Narcotics Trade, for an introduction to the relationships between the narcotics trade and SALW proliferation).

The mushrooming of narcotics production (especially, opium) since the Taliban’s expulsion from Kabul, was in large part due to relaxed government regulatory controls, mismanagement, corruption, institutional weakness, a lack of feasible alternative livelihood strategies, ineffective law and order enforcement, and the growth of sub-state actors that rely upon narcotics production and trafficking to maintain their lucrative

existence (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.68 – The Anti-Narcotics Compound, Kohat. The author alongside narcotics stored in the ANF fortified compound, Kohat¹⁵⁵).

Wheat production has grown at a rate of 3.5% per annum during 1990-2009¹⁵⁶. The average annual cultivatable area during 2008-2010 was 2,355,000 hectares, out of a total cultivatable area of 7,794,000 hectares, which is about 12 percent of Afghanistan's total area¹⁵⁷. With a yield of 1.42 metric tons per hectare, a total production of 3,350,000 metric tons¹⁵⁸, and an approximate value of 17,600 Afghanis per metric ton in December 2010¹⁵⁹, or US \$409 per metric ton¹⁶⁰, the approximate total value of the wheat produced by Afghanistan in 2010 was US \$1.370 Billion. In comparison, 131,000 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in 2011¹⁶¹ that had a total potential production of oven-dry opium of 5,800 metric tons¹⁶², or 44.27 kg per hectare, which is about sixteen times the yield of wheat. When considering that the farm-gate price of opium in 2011 for Afghanistan was approximately US \$250 per kilogram of dry-opium¹⁶³; by extrapolating, the total farm-gate value of Afghanistan's dry opium for 2011 was approximately US \$1.450 billion, which is more than the total value of Afghanistan's wheat production, yet covering eighteen times less agricultural land. As such, given the impoverishment, lack of alternative livelihoods, and availability of SALW to afford a certain degree of security, the cultivation of high value opium poppy is regarded as an exceedingly viable option for many farmers throughout Afghanistan, especially those in the insurgency torn Helmand province (See, Appendix III, Figure 9.3 – Potential Total Value of Opium Cultivation as Compared to Wheat Production)¹⁶⁴.

According to the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, the area under poppy cultivation in Helmand, 63,307 hectares¹⁶⁵, is the largest in Afghanistan, representing more than 50% of the country's total poppy cultivation in 2011, compared to the area under wheat cultivation, 72,000 hectares¹⁶⁶, therefore making opium poppy cultivation second in *relative importance* over wheat cultivation in this province. The farm-gate price for dry opium per kilogram in Helmand Province was US \$197 in March 2012 and approximately US \$10,000 per hectare¹⁶⁷, which would amount to a potential total value of US \$633 million for dry opium for the Helmand Province. In contrast, the province yielded 188,000 metric tons of wheat¹⁶⁸ with a farm value of Afs 5.55 billion¹⁶⁹, or US \$115 million¹⁷⁰, which is more than five times less than the value of the opium poppy crop.

The political vacuum created by the Taliban's collapse, and the massive quantities of hidden SALW throughout the country consequently facilitated the re-growth of warlordism and narcotics production. The inability to counter the initial growth in narcotics production, and its comparatively greater sizeable returns, vis-à-vis other agricultural crops, continues to draw the average smallholder farmer away from sustainable agricultural production, and therefore, distorts socio-economic benefits for the general civilian population, who are being increasingly militarised and enmeshed in a political economy grounded on violence. Furthermore, the competition for resources and enforcement of governmental controls on narcotics also drives armed narco-cartels to protect their immense financial resources and profits through the acquisition of more munitions, which have a tendency to be greater in quantity and more advanced than those possessed by government forces. "Poppy, guns and terrorism reinforce each other. For Afghanistan to have peace, we have

to address all three at the same time¹⁷¹. Moreover, the government's quagmire is further entrenched by the capacity of the narco-cartels to instigate collective revolts through financial inducements to the tribes. However, the government's *war on terror* against Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents also offsets progress on the *war on drugs*, which could help prevent strengthening an alliance between the narco-cartels and the Taliban out of strategic necessity or reduce the functionality of that alliance¹⁷².

Armed violence, especially armed criminality, has considerable macro-economic impacts through the production of a climate of fear and insecurity, political instability, a consequential reduction in direct and indirect foreign investment from the decline in business confidence and reduction in trade, which facilitates a disintegration of the economic infrastructure. A withering economy has other knock-on effects as mentioned above, such as increasing poverty from the fall in the GDP per capita; reduction in consumption; increasing unemployment, and reduction in legitimate alternative livelihoods coupled with a contrasting increase in illegitimate alternative livelihoods (criminal enterprises, narco-trade) through the use of firearms; diminishing social expenditure; increasing social needs; falling health care expenditure coupled with increased burden on health care services; and, reduction in the delivery and uptake of education, which all act to increase the socio-structural disparities that breed social exclusion, thereby further exacerbating tensions and entrenching violent social conflict.

Low incomes and low levels of living standards for the poor are manifested in their poor health, nutrition and education, which in turn can lower their economic productivity, and thereby lead directly and indirectly to a slower growing economy.¹⁷³

The correlation between impoverishment and armed violence throughout Afghanistan is credible, given the socio-economic indicators provided by various institutions, NGOs and supra-national organisations. However, such correlations are manifestly different when comparing provinces and are dependent upon the degree and extent of violence they have endured or continue to face. Since the fall of the Taliban, the reduction in armed violence has encouraged political stabilization in Northern and Western Afghanistan, resulting in growing local economies, increasing participation in the democratisation process, strengthening of the judicial process and law enforcement, increased institutional capacity building, growing employment, increased access to health care facilities, and nutritional sources. However, the situation in Southern Afghanistan shows signs of deterioration because of the growing insurgency. This highly insecure environment is characterized by kidnappings and hostage-taking of local and foreign workers, high intensity engagements between Taliban fighters and ANSF-US-NATO-ISAF forces, political assassinations, ambushes, suicide bombings and attacks, road checkpoints (the Taliban even had a road block less than fifteen miles from Camp Bastion in Sangin, Northern Helmand), especially in the Pushtun provinces of Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, and non-governmental of control of large tracts of territory (principally Taliban as well as other independent warlords and commanders). Since 2006, the Taliban has endured a number of high profile military operations in Helmand¹⁷⁴, which have enabled it to capitalise on consolidating gains, or retreating in order to return once the operations had run their steam (see, Appendix III, Figure 9.4 – Areas under Insurgent [esp. Taliban] or Government/NATO Control and Principle Security Threats in Helmand Province during May 2006)¹⁷⁵.

The lack of security prevents even limited reconstruction, especially where the insurgents target foreign workers and local Afghans aiding government-US-NATO-ISAF development efforts. Consequently, certain provinces in the south have not been as successful as the Northern provinces, since political instability prevents economic infrastructural investment and capacity building, and increases the probability of an escalation in the conflict. Therefore, the decision for US-NATO-ISAF forces to demobilize in insurgency hit regions, such as Helmand, under such circumstances, will make it highly conducive for the Taliban, narco-cartels, warlords, and other militia to readily recruit new combatants, who have few other alternatives for employment due to the lack of economic growth; thereby, further degrading potential economic improvements, while enhancing the socio-economic and ethnic fissures between northern and southern Afghanistan. In this respect, it is pertinent to note that the Taliban have begun to increasingly recruit ‘fighters’ from local resources rather than relying upon their traditional recruitment grounds in FATA and Pakistan, Persian Gulf, and further afield, due to the changing nature of the insurgency, which is becoming progressively more responsive to the concerns of the local population¹⁷⁶. Farrell and Giustozzi (2013) have noted in their study, *The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012*¹⁷⁷, that the Taliban have realised that foreign fighters are not a good fit for an insurgency campaign because they cannot deal with the local population, their customs, and traditions the way local supporters can, which amplifies the local base of the Taliban. The drawback to this for Afghanistan, where foreign fighters may return to their countries of origin, local fighters may, after demobilising from the Taliban, return to their localities and seek alternative livelihoods, which, due to the lack of employment, may mean alternative criminal livelihoods and the exacerbation of existing insecurities.

9:2:6:3 – Displacement of People

The displacement of people, although not forming a direct correlation to the quantity of SALW accumulated within a specific environment, acts as an indicator of the increased insecurity arising from a conflict environment, and potentially, from the excessive accumulation of SALW. Nevertheless, many other factors can also account for such movements and migrations of people, such as natural disasters, and human induced disasters unrelated to the outbreak of violent hostilities. Furthermore, since people are not necessarily motivated to migrate for the same reasons in war torn environments, it is impossible to assign SALW as a common cause of such movements. However, indicants suggest that refugee and *internally displaced persons* (IDP) flows from environments with excessive accumulations of SALW have increased since the early 1990s. “Not only is almost 1 per cent of the world's population designated as either internally displaced or refugee, but small arms intimidation represents a critical factor inhibiting sustainable repatriation or resettlement. Most refugees and IDPs appreciate the persuasive power of a single weapon”¹⁷⁸. For example, the refugee and IDP rates in much of conflict-ridden Africa are endemic, as is the case for the conflicts in South Asia; such as, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Moreover, the threat of renewed hostilities often negates the return of many refugees and IDPs¹⁷⁹. “Violence-induced displacement is often triggered and sustained by the perceived threat or existence of armed threat”¹⁸⁰.

Forced displacements also have numerous knock-on effects, such as the militarisation of many refugee and IDP camps, where armed factions draft a ready supply of new recruits; form local party branches, which often come into conflict with other party branches; and, supply new members with arms to enforce party rules and regulations, even upon non-party members. The insecurity induced through the availability of arms causes further firearms possession and an increased incidence of firearms related injuries and deaths through domestic violence, inter-party to inter-communal violence, and refugee/IDP tensions with their host communities through the spill-over of violence, insecurity, and arms availability to local populations, as well as an insecurity driven reduction in humanitarian activities. In addition, refugees and IDPs are also dependent upon external sources for sustenance, which stimulates a certain degree of competition for resources and results in increased armed criminal activities and potential for localised violence, and the conscription of young fighting aged men by party militias due to the lack of alternative employment sources¹⁸¹; and, increased nutritional deficiencies amongst the young, elderly and weak through inappropriate and overburdened health facilities, which exacerbates poverty¹⁸², adult female and infant mortality rates, and higher incidences of rape and attempted rape. Concerning the latter, Casa Consulting was hired by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), working in the Dadaab refugee camp, north-east Kenya, to assess the incidence of rape of refugee women and girls. “Between January 1998 and September 2000 alone, some 300 rapes and attempted rapes have been documented among registered refugees - with vast majority perpetrated by armed assailants”¹⁸³. Such psychosocial impacts that are the indirect product of the ready availability of firearms tend to be much more acute in refugee and IDP camps because of the high-density of the population and dire living environments, lack of employment and resources, and inadequate healthcare and educational facilities along with the temporary nature of the camps.

The Afghan refugee communities that were forced to seek alternative shelters throughout the three and half decade-long Afghan conflict, whether in Iran or Pakistan, faced violence on a daily basis, in part, because of the availability of firearms, which could easily be purchased from numerous arms merchants with outlets throughout the FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. The increased insecurity, high incidences of domestic violence, individual violence, inter-party and inter-communal violence, rape and attempted rape, as well as a whole range of armed criminal activities, became everyday occurrences, which resembled war zones and not resettlement camps run by the UNHCR. According to one individual who had lived in the *Kacha Garhi* refugee camp in Peshawar, which has since been demolished and its refugee population repatriated to Afghanistan, “you could hire an assassin to kill someone for less than 500 Pakistani Rupees. There was a firing by a person or party virtually every day!”¹⁸⁴ Returning refugees, especially fighting aged young men, were often recruited into various contending factions since alternative sources of employment were not readily available.

9:3 – The Psychological Effects of War and SALW in Afghanistan

Contemporary wars have not only involved combatants, but also, increasingly, the destruction of whole communities, cultures, and ways of life. Ethnic conflicts have seemingly increased in numbers and scope, including those involving the most destructive methods of warfare, *genocide*. The extent of the suffering

inflicted upon individuals and communities cannot be examined in physical terms alone, that is, in terms of numbers killed or properties and material structures destroyed. An appreciation of the psychological effects of conflicts, especially those involving considerable ongoing violence, is paramount to the understanding of the rebuilding of individual lives, communities and nations. The immense stress suffered by those that have experienced violent conflict cannot be understated in the development of the post-war reconstruction process; and therefore, an understanding of the consequences of the acute stress suffered on a national scale is instrumental in the effectiveness of the reconstruction of any nation.

It is instrumental to discuss the effects of war stress and the resultant post-traumatic stress disorders that individuals and communities are afflicted with, from the individual and collective psychological impacts on children, women, and combatants, their perception of personal security, and hence, their susceptibility to violent behaviour; and, the holistic effects on the functionality of Afghan society, especially when SALW are widely available. Furthermore, the social insecurities created by war, the resulting mass trauma suffered by the civilian and combatant population, and the consequential socio-political instability facilitates an environment in which the wide spread dispersal of SALW can negatively damage any ongoing conflict resolution processes and exacerbate the destabilisation of the conflict environment.

To put the following section in context, it is worthy to note that according to the *Conflict Barometer 2011* of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research there have been 388 conflicts since the end of World War Two, including 38 wars which are defined as highly violent, where there is a considerable use of organised violence that has long-term destructive effects, 148 conflicts that are defined as violent crises, and the remaining 202 conflicts as non-violent crises (87 conflicts) and disputes (115 conflicts)¹⁸⁵. Within these 388 conflicts, there were an estimated 41 million human fatalities between the end of WWII and the year 2000¹⁸⁶, with greater than three quarters of those casualties in less developed countries¹⁸⁷. During World War One, 5% of all casualties were civilians, 65% during World War Two, over 80% during the Vietnam War, and over 90% in most of the present conflicts including the Afghan conflict of the 1980s to the present¹⁸⁸. However, Adam Roberts (2010) disputes this latter figure of 90% due to such figures being based upon assumptions and estimates that lack verifiable and credible sources, providing a figure between 65%¹⁸⁹. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, provides a more realistic estimate of civilian casualties: “It is now conventional to put the proportion of civilian casualties somewhere in the region of 75 per cent. I say “conventional” because the truth is that no one really knows”¹⁹⁰. In relation to Afghanistan, figures are not easily forthcoming. This is especially so considering the official stance that a *body count* has not been kept by US Forces for their war in Afghanistan, as Commander in Chief, US Central Command, General Tommy Franks stated: “You know we don't do body counts”¹⁹¹. However, in a study by Costofwar.org, *Assessing the Human Toll of the Post-9-11 Wars - The Dead and Wounded in Afghanistan, Iraq & Pakistan, 2001-2011*¹⁹², Neta Crawford (2011) notes a conservative estimate of civilians that have died in Afghanistan: “At a minimum, about 12,000-14,600 Afghan civilians have died from 2001 to 2011 directly from the war. If one adds the other deaths — of police, army, insurgents, press, and aid workers, about between 30,000 and 45,000 Afghans and others have been killed since 2001”¹⁹³.

According to UNICEF (1996), during the period 1986-1996, over 2 million children were killed in war, with over 5 million injured or disabled¹⁹⁴. On September the 10th 2001, there were 3.695 million Afghan refugees, whereas over 1 million were internally displaced¹⁹⁵, many of these children. Between mid-2009 to mid-2011, “children have comprised nearly 15 percent of all civilians killed” in Afghanistan¹⁹⁶. In fact, according to an annual report on the *Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - for 2010*, by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), there was a “31 per cent increase in deaths of women and 66 per cent increase in deaths of children compared to 2009”¹⁹⁷ by anti-government forces, which includes the Taliban as well as other groups or militias that are opposed to the US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

Children are at most risk during periods of violent conflict resulting in the highest child mortality rates¹⁹⁸, which invariably cause severe disruption in the delivery of health services to children. “It comes as no surprise, for example, that infant and child mortality rates are highest in the poorest countries, among the most impoverished, isolated, uneducated and marginalized districts and communities, and in countries ravaged by civil strife, weak governance and chronic underinvestment in public health systems and physical infrastructure”¹⁹⁹. Nevertheless, the capacity of those in authority (including, parents) to withstand the growing situational pressures is also a significant factor in a child’s susceptibility within such environments. As soon as the parents’ ability to cope diminishes, daily childcare routines begin to falter, the necessary upkeep of the child’s well-being deteriorates, leading to an eventual rise in infant mortality rates²⁰⁰. Unprotected children, including those without parents, are at most risk. Addressing the psychological impacts on children in war affected environments, UNICEF (1996)²⁰¹ unambiguously declared that “10 million children worldwide have been psychologically traumatised by war and that addressing this must be a cornerstone of their rehabilitation because time does not heal trauma”²⁰².

The reaction to stress is defined by the psycho-cultural and socio-political interpretation of the specific stimulus or situation that may induce it. However, stress is usually defined in terms of the excessive demands placed on a person in a given situation, and hence, implicitly or explicitly refers to *strain*; that is, the negative or pathological consequence of stress. Hans Selye (1978) defines these stressors (the situations, events or conditions that induce stress) as stimuli that induce responses regarded as the *general adaptation syndrome* (GAS)²⁰³, the manifestation of which leads to the determination that a person is in a state of stress. According to Selye (1978), GAS has several stages: the stimulus induces a state of alarm; the body responds through a physiological preparation to fight or take flight; and, the body enters a state of exhaustion in the event of an unsuccessful response, resulting in the breakdown of bodily tissue or even death. However, in failing to define the originating stressor, Selye (1978) only deals with the physical repercussions, thereby providing little reference to the significance of the stimulus to each individual, and hence, its mental impact.

Definitions of stress that focus upon situations are usually independent of an individual’s perceptions and reactions due to the magnitude of such situations. For example, unemployment, natural disasters, violent

conflict, combat in war, bereavement, poverty, and an inability to meet the basic needs of life overwhelmingly tax most people to such an extent that individual responses and perceptions may not be as serious a consideration in comparison to their overall situation. Reactions tend to be uniform, leading to extreme strain and resulting in stomach ulcers, heart disease, depression, anxiety, alcoholism, and even death. Other definitions that focus on perceptions of situational demands are dependent upon an individual's preconceived socio-cultural notions of a given situation, that is, perceptions of, and reactions to; violence may be different amongst those people that have evolved under a warrior-like culture in comparison to those that have evolved under a more pacific culture. The former having a greater ability to acclimatise to lower thresholds of violence relative to the latter, due to their greater exposure to violence-orientated environments and a culture that nurtures and prepares them for that; for example, an individual whose social perceptions of violence are institutionalised is psychologically toughened up and geared to expect and deal with violence. "Standards of normality are culturally defined. Maoris are expected to cry while mourning, Apache Indians are not; hit a child in Italy and he will cry, hit one in Bali and he will laugh"²⁰⁴.

9:3:1 – Traumatic Stimuli

There are a plethora of stimuli that can stress the physical and psychological well-being of people. It is when the physical and psychological ability of a person to cope with such stressors is overwhelmed that we can describe such a person as having been traumatised. Within this process, termed *traumatisation*, the "boundaries are broken between past and present, conscious and unconscious memories, internal and external experiences and memories and feelings. The central characteristic of trauma is disconnection with less energy for the present social and work demands as energy is caught up with the past and extreme emotions"²⁰⁵. According to Freud (1920)²⁰⁶, trauma involves the breaching of a protective shield or stimulus barrier, which normally functions to prevent the mind from being overwhelmed by internal and external stimuli. An inundation of unmanageable impulses would lead to large-scale instability and cause all defensive measures to be initiated.

The ability to sail through a traumatic experience and not suffer from it may be, partially, culturally defined. Nevertheless, certain events produce almost universal traumatic symptoms irrespective of cultural differences, for instance, the misery of war. These symptoms (poor sleep, nightmares and painful memories) may also be present in other forms of traumatic experience, such as, broken marriages. Therefore, focusing on and trying to resolve these symptoms would lead to a lack of attention being given to the core aspects and underlying causes of the traumatic experiences being suffered. The significance of the experience of any of these events lies in the meanings behind such events and how they shape the way the sufferer thinks and what s/he does to deal with the problem. In effect, human responses to stressors, such as marital discord and war, are not analogous to physical trauma, such as when a person is hit by a bullet from a firearm. In this respect, the impact of an external force is not passively registered, but is actively engaged by most people who try to find ways of solving the issue. However, the social context, which contains mediating factors for benefit or ill, can not only give rise to suffering, but also provides the environment in which it can be resolved.

9:3:2 – Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

In the war-torn environment of Afghanistan, and in the context of its ongoing violent conflict, the occurrence of *post traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD) is acknowledged as being rife throughout the country²⁰⁷. It is noteworthy to mention the indirect effects that may occur as a result of the direct effects of the usage of firearms, especially within the context of a conflict environment. The trauma suffered after encountering survival threats, multiple deaths and violence on a continuous basis can lead to post-traumatic stress reactive processes as an on-going condition on a national scale. Where a singular loss occurs the bereavement reaction may appear but gradually subsides over a period of time as the person begins to adjust to the new reality. However, the perpetual presence and threat of death, as is common in war-torn environments, negates the adjustment of an individual, community or nation. Behavioural responses can become acutely impaired as more and more individuals begin to suffer from the trauma of the war. A community that is not able to adjust can consequently begin to suffer from the dysfunction of its social regulatory mechanisms, as is exemplified by virtually all communities within Afghanistan, which have seen an estimated 1,850,000 people killed²⁰⁸ as a direct result of the protracted conflict. The dysfunction of the society may lead to a *state of nature*²⁰⁹, or a constant mental state of conflict, as witnessed by Afghanistan's destructive conflict (1978-present)²¹⁰.

Clinical and scientific studies can provide evidence to confirm that different reactive processes occur in response to traumatic and loss stressors. Traumatic stress responses specifically reflect the traumatogenic stimulus; whilst for loss, the reactive processes involved for bereavement, mourning, and grief occur alongside loss specific phenomenon. In common with both kinds of situations, non-specific affective and cognitive reactions may occur alongside stress specific reactions and phenomenon. Certain situations may also involve both traumatic life-threat and loss, in which, for example, a person was involved in a traumatic near death and loss situation, such as a bomb explosion, where s/he may have been severely injured and lost a loved one. Such a person may display both traumatic stress reaction phenomenon and bereavement phenomenon to an extent that is dependent upon and determined by the kind of traumatic stressor, extent of injuries, and degree of intimacy of the relationship to the person that has been lost, and the individual's capacity to cope with stress, which is partly reliant upon his/her socio-cultural upbringing. The management of the stressed person and the prevention of morbidity require an understanding of these processes (see, Appendix III, Figure 9.5 – Outcomes of Traumatic Stress Reactions and Bereavement Reactions).

9:3:3 – Psychological Impacts of War and SALW on Children

The social evolution of a society, its stability and future development is essentially dependent upon the continued well-being of its offspring. Protracted conflicts provide a constant reminder of the continued and evident presence of a threat to life and material possessions. The security of individuals and communities is constantly being undermined by acts of extreme violence, which are personally experienced, witnessed and communicated through various public and personal channels. To this extent, the effects of terrorism, war, and oppressive regimes on children are, to a degree, dependent upon the type of conflict, context, and level of disruption. Where adults (parents) can be aggressors and victims, children are always victims irrespective of their role as combatants, participants or witnesses.

In order to address a child's susceptibility to trauma, the interaction between actual experiences, individual characteristics that influence a child's capacity to cope (such as, age, gender, personality type, temperament, and development), family and social support from the community, socio-economic and political contexts, material, ideological, religious, and cultural structures and orientations of the society must be taken into account. This is also true of adults, but to a lesser degree.

A child's exposure to violence is widely acknowledged as being harmful to its well-being. Recent findings from studies on traumatised children, however, have suggested that not only can traumatic experiences and loss cause short-term symptoms, but can also affect the development of a child's personality, self-esteem, ability to interact and communicate with others, and lead to a lack of or a degeneration of the ability to cope throughout their lives²¹¹. The full psychological impact of the damage that may be suffered by a child exposed to traumatic experiences is unlikely to manifest itself until long afterwards.

UNICEF's (1997) study on the *Psycho-Social Assessment of Children Exposed to War-Related Violence in Kabul*²¹² produced findings on the grief reactions of 260 Afghan children living in Kabul who experienced a death in their family over a four year period prior to the study (1992-6). After the death of a loved one, virtually all of the children felt distressed, and most still missed the deceased. Feelings of anger were felt by over two thirds, whilst over half were engulfed by feelings of emptiness and loneliness without their loved one, who had died within four years of the study. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the passage of time, the majority also experienced drawn out grief reactions. "Many of the respondents reported signs of unresolved grief including shock or disbelief, lack of acceptance of the death, loneliness, and a persistent sense of isolation and despair over the loss"²¹³. Children with exposure to related life-threatening events, for instance, unpredictable shootings, bombings or rocketing in Kabul often had cumulative traumas, resulting in their overall personality development being put at a higher risk of having more permanent damage. "Some researchers claim that repeated exposure to violence may have a desensitizing effect on children in terms of bodily arousal, however, there may be an unanticipated danger associated with reduced sensitivity to chronic violence where the child may be at increased risk of suffering injury or death"²¹⁴.

The majority of studies that consider trauma have focused upon singular traumatic experiences. However, children that endure repeated traumatic experiences and losses may suffer cumulative traumas (serial traumas). A child may be able to escape the effects of a singular traumatic experience due to factors such as its resilience, and the family and community support structures that may be available; however, repeated exposure may cause more permanent damage to personality formation and development than singular events. Exposure to violence can also have a detrimental effect on a child's cognitive capacity by limiting the level of educational achievement, and therefore, provide restraints on the future development of a child. Moral development can become stagnated and result in the lack of social consciousness in relation to the family and community. The latter is cause for concern since it may reinforce and facilitate perceptions and attitudes amongst generations of children that violence is an acceptable means of resolving differences between tribes,

ethnic groups, religious denominations, or even disputes in everyday life. This situation is presently of greatest concern in protracted conflict environments such as Afghanistan.

Within a stable society, adults are generally seen as role models and law providers, especially authority figures. Children can achieve a sense of trust and security when adults display their roles positively. However, the UNICEF (1997) study shows that the sense of trust and security can diminish significantly when adults fail to realise their roles in wider society²¹⁵. In this respect, the acquisition, possession and use of SALW by adults induces distrust due to the imposition of a power differential within human relationships. Given that a large proportion of traumatised children may have witnessed the deaths of other human beings by firearms, the association between death and weapons is impregnated into a child's psyche during its formative years. Exposure to weapons by traumatised children can lead to distress, acute anxiety, and even feelings of terror. Consequently, the vast majority of the children questioned felt that they trusted adults less, at the time of the study, than before the internecine fighting began in 1992. It is essential for a child to develop a sense of trust with its surroundings and the people within it in order to be able to develop stable relationships. Mistrust is also a symptom of the instinct of fear. Asked about what they felt during and after (when the Taliban secured control of Kabul) the fighting, more than three quarters (78%) of the children questioned in the psycho-social assessment said that they felt an overwhelming sense of fear rather than anger (8.4%) or sadness (13.6%) during the fighting. The sense of fear had also persisted, with 40% of children still feeling afraid, even after ten months of the absence of conflict in Kabul²¹⁶.

The reactive trauma symptoms and desensitisation to violence may be of greatest concern for the future development of children in a conflict environment. The traumatic experiences and losses suffered by children may inevitably be displayed through anti-social behaviour in later life as they try to understand, through the confusion of their personal experiences, why such circumstances have befallen them. Due to the prevalent security environment, and the administrative incapacity and inability of the present and previous regime, of the Taliban, studies that can provide data and statistics to show evidence for the long-term impacts of trauma and their behavioural responses are few and far between, if none at all. Although the administrative framework is currently being rebuilt, it will take a great deal of time before such studies can be implemented to show the great extent of the trauma suffered by the Afghan people. Also, restricted access to such groups as child combatants, especially in the nature of Afghanistan's protracted civil war, makes it very difficult to assess the impact of violence on children and the effects of the traumatic experiences that they may have endured during hostilities. However, an understanding of the different effects of reactive processes to traumatic experiences and bereavement allows us to appreciate the significance of the trauma that can be suffered on an individual to a national level, and the consequences of this in an on-going protracted conflict. The importance of this cannot be overstated.

9:3:4 – Children, Combatants, and SALW

Desensitised to violence, and having become acclimatised to the empowerment enjoyed through the possession and use of SALW, many seasoned combatants engaged in conflicts, especially protracted conflicts,

may find that the prospects of laying down their weapons upon the termination of hostilities, coupled with reduced political leverage, status, and income, are not conducive as an alternative future. This is especially so when many of their rank and file have experienced chronic personal and political marginalisation and desperation, domestic misery, unemployment, and failure to reintegrate into society. Access to familiar SALW provide an immediate expansion of their political prospects, especially when substitute skills are limited, and can result in alternative livelihoods through the illegitimate use of SALW, growing personal and collective insecurity, the acculturation of violence, and the escalating consequential diffusion of SALW. In such circumstances, the formation of sub-state actors by mutually aggrieved coalescing combatants can catalyse a re-eruption of violent hostilities and reduce the state's monopoly of coercive force, which consistently results in the progressive expansion of the privatisation of security organisations that further increases the diffusion of SALW into civil society. The security dilemma results in a spiralling cycle of insecurity, instability, and demand for SALW that self-propagates and exacerbates tensions that can potentially erupt into open hostilities, thereby expanding criminality and the engagement of the national security services, militias and other sub-state actors wishing to expand their political advantage using violence. The lack of universal territorial authority, regulatory structures, institutional weakness, and law enforcement capabilities inevitably results in a competition for manpower resources that, depending upon the solidity of socio-cultural norms and political orientations pertaining to the employment of underage combatants, may induce certain parties to employ children as a viable source of manpower to compete against adversaries, as was irrefutably witnessed by the author whilst embedded with a troop of child combatants between 09 July and 12 August 1999²¹⁷ (see, Appendix IV, Plate 7.80 – The Frontlines, a Young Talib, Tahir, Practices at Mortar Targeting – Shomali Plains, North Kabul, 26 July 1999).

During the first years of the war in Afghanistan, 10 per cent of combatants were under sixteen and 17 per cent between sixteen and eighteen (total 27 per cent). In the latest stage, the estimated proportions are 19 per cent and 26 per cent respectively (total 45 per cent).²¹⁸

The mass media is beginning to shed light on the plight of child soldiers in conflicts raging throughout the world, however, not necessarily in a positive way. It is often the case that the more sensational aspects of child soldiers have come to the fore, such as the atrocities they may have committed, or the sexual, drugs and alcohol abuse that they have been subjected to. This has partly occurred because of the real lack of information on the situation of child soldiers. With reference to children in general, child combatants can be distinguished by their weapons training, experience of violent conflict, general lack of inculcation of socio-cultural control or behavioural regulatory mechanisms, absence of the value of life, and complete adoption of violence as an acceptable form of persuasion and dispute resolution. To facilitate an understanding of this area of study, the United Nations commissioned Graca Machel (1996) to conduct a study on the *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, through the *Child Soldiers Research Project*²¹⁹. Being the first of its kind, the study obtained information from twenty four countries where children have been or are involved in conflict, and found that children that were most susceptible to becoming involved in conflict were already from impoverished and marginalised backgrounds²²⁰.

Their [child soldiers] involvement in armed conflict can be directly related to the economic, political, social and cultural conditions which define the circumstances of their families and communities, and

which almost always deteriorate as the conflict continues. It is therefore not only their experiences as soldiers which affects their chances of reintegration and future well-being of ex-combatant children, but also the fact that many will be returning to a situation that is even more precarious in social and economic terms than before.²²¹

A similar study also commissioned by the United Nations (1996), *No Childhood at All: A Report about Child Soldiers in Burma*²²², has shown how the extensive use of child soldiers has guaranteed the exceptional abuse and cruelty of thousands of children in the Burmese civil war whether through witnessing appalling atrocities, or being injured and killed. In corroboration, Graca Machel's (2001) study recognised the vulnerability and susceptibility of child recruitment in "government armies, rebel forces and paramilitary and militia groups"²²³.

Parallels can be drawn with the Afghan conflict. There are no real figures on the numbers of child-soldiers involved, nor is their treatment widely researched. However, it has been acknowledged that all parties to the conflict, since it began, have used child-soldiers. This was more the case for the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet occupation than for the latter due to their military's organisational requirements. All Afghan factions during the civil war period (1992-2001) have used child soldiers. However, due to the lack of available material, conclusive evidence of the numbers of child soldiers used by the different factions is not provided. Nevertheless, in order to gain an understanding of the psyche of the child soldier in Afghanistan the author was able to spend a number of weeks, on several occasions, alongside some young *talib* fighters/soldiers in a Taliban training camp in Jalalabad, Kabul and further north on the Shomali Plains frontlines (1999), with ages ranging between 13 years to 23 years²²⁴. Many young talibs had been recruited from the numerous madrassas that were prevalent along the Afghan-Pakistani border, whilst others with similar backgrounds belonged to the many Kashmiri resistance organisations (such as through one of the author's host organisations, *Harakat Al-Ansar* and *Harakat Al-Mujahideen*, both of which have been designated as terrorist organisations by the United Nations, US, and European Union), which were deployed in Afghanistan according to a symbiotic arrangement with the Taliban, to provide troops to the Taliban's war effort while gaining live combat experience to utilise against Indian forces in the Indian-occupied Kashmir province. While living amongst the *talibs*, and having been accepted within their community as one of them, the author was able to conduct a number of unstructured and free flowing interviews and conversations (the author, having been involved in their daily life as a participant observer) in order to fully appreciate and understand their situation, the treatment that they were subject to, the training and rank structures that they were incorporated into, and the rationalisation for their use by the Taliban.

The Taliban's indoctrination process is without mercy because it is perceived as a strategic asset. In this respect, the intention is not only to inflict physical destruction through an easier route, but to also damage society's psyche and instil fear in opposing parties exposed to the terror tactics of the extremists. In other words, the message they send out is 'we are willing to die. Your lives mean nothing and you are insignificant to us.' This can produce an enormous amount of stress for the targeted community that has no idea how far the militants will go or when the next attack will be or where it will come from. This causes a state of social paralysis brought about through sheer terror and results in the psychological cowering of a community.²²⁵

It was found that many child combatants had been indoctrinated throughout their young lives through rote education involving repetitious indoctrination of notions of paradise through martyrdom and the rich rewards that would ensue. This was especially witnessed during the author's research visit to Afghanistan²²⁶.

The indoctrination process at the camp followed an intense curriculum comprising Quranic studies interspersed with motivational talks by senior students and fighters and combined with physical exercise and combat training in assault with live weapons, more religious, including Quranic, teaching, daily duties, and then more Quranic studies, motivational talks and prayers before resting. The content of the motivational talks and religious study focused primarily on anti-material, anti-western and anti-worldly sentiments as well as the injustices inflicted on the Muslim people in the past and present... Much of this was done through the application of Quranic verses and the teachings of the Prophet (PBUH) pertaining to the paramount reward, the benefits of paradise and the absolute rejection of a worldly life. In addition, there was much focus on the dire consequences (such as a constant stream of molten lead being poured on the head of a citizen of hell) for not submitting to the extremists' interpretation of Islam and jihad and of being a hypocrite or non-believer.²²⁷

Foremost amongst their training was the disciplined use of a variety of small arms and light weapons, which were provided to them alongside an appreciation of the empowerment that the weapons gave them over others. This was especially true of two children²²⁸, aged 14 and 15 years, Tahir and Tariq respectively, who mentioned how they were able to “get other adults to do what they wanted”²²⁹ because of their weapons. Their weapons training began at the age of 13 and 14, respectively, in Kashmiri and Afghani training camps. A year later, they were disciplined and experienced soldiers, which contrasts the images provided by most media about child combatants, especially those in African countries. Furthermore, the indoctrination techniques used upon them introduced and reinforced ethnic and racial stereotyping, to the extent that many perceived other ethnicities as inhuman and non-Muslim, whether or not they professed allegiance to Islam²³⁰. This was elaborate upon by a group of several children who, whilst indicating Uzbek's and Hazara's mongoloid facial features by pointing their fingers to their eyes and cheek bones, used facial expressions to signal their disapproval and disgust, and language to communicate their dislike of the *un-human* nature of these ethnicities²³¹. However, the majority of these young soldiers had never met an Uzbek or Hazara before. Such indoctrination methods enabled the consolidation of in-group out-group processes in young mindsets, which was used to the fullest extent, as was the case when the Taliban entered Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 to retake the city after suffering a disastrous betrayal by Abdul Malik during their initial occupation of Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1997²³². It is estimated that up to nine thousand Taliban rank and file, commanders and mullahs were massacred by Abdul Malik's Uzbeki militia and other Hazara forces in August 1997²³³. The Taliban's 1998 campaign sought to reverse their former defeat. Thousands of Uzbeki and Hazara forces and civilians were massacred in return²³⁴. In a similar campaign in the Hazarajat province capital, Bamiyan, the Hazara population also suffered thousands of casualties. No doubt, the techniques used in the recruitment and indoctrination of children combatants efficaciously aided the massacres.

Their exposure to violence also brought forth a number of other issues, such as their anxiety, apprehension and distrust of adults because of what they had already witnessed in combat environments. However, the majority of the time they acted and behaved as other children of a similar age. Nevertheless, when confronted with a combat situation, during the Taliban's summer offensive, which began on 28 July 1999, and the Northern Alliance's counter offensive that started on 5 August 1999, which was also witnessed by the author during his stay on the frontlines, they were composed and “ready to be martyred”²³⁵. Prior to this event, a deep anxiety and apprehension in a number of child combatants, who feared the forthcoming offensive, was witnessed. This natural apprehension was soon realised in the events that transpired in reality, in which the

author personally observed numerous child combatants killed as Taliban commanders sent hundreds of children into the heavily mined frontlines of the Shomali Plains to clear a path for the Taliban's armoured vehicles and pick-up trucks heading for Northern Alliance forces at the outset of the Taliban offensive on 28 July 1999²³⁶. Both children under the author's observation were also killed in fighting during the Northern Alliance's counter-offensive²³⁷. Countless other child combatants were seriously wounded, many with the loss of one or more limbs.

As the account of the author's experiences with child combatants indicates, children are far more likely to emulate adult authority figure behavioural patterns than other adults, which has been a tool used by many militias throughout Afghanistan. However, the normal desire to copy and compete becomes much more dangerous in war-torn environments, as children try to emulate adult actions that involve violence. This is especially true of child combatants who are indoctrinated to imitate fictitious or real authority figures, by disregarding their life instincts, irrespective of the potential detriment to their personal safety, which they have yet to learn. Children tend to be more willing to obey commands, use weapons without the responsibility associated with their empowerment, which many still view as toys, and use extreme violence without understanding the consequences of their behaviour, thinking that the greater risk is greater power over others²³⁸. The fear and insecurity that many child combatants feel actually fuels their need to dominate others to overcome feelings of inadequacy without appreciating the detrimental consequences of their actions on others²³⁹. The need to dominate to subdue insecurity is a normal reaction, which becomes distorted when empowered through the possession of SALW, but is far greater in children than adults because of their inability to generate alternatives.

Few of them have experienced any semblance of a 'normal' life, or a chance for an education; most have had *no childhood at all*. These children have been indoctrinated to obey orders without question. They have been programmed to solve problems using a gun.²⁴⁰

The militarization of children has serious implications in environments with a high degree of weapons proliferation. The child's knowledge, training, and the experience of using a weapon can greatly damage and destabilise their psychosocial development in the future, having detrimental impacts on society in general, especially where there are large numbers of children that have undergone some degree of training and combat experience. Children are more readily desensitised to the use of weapons due to their lack of learned social controls in comparison to adults. Irrational decision-making in stressful conditions, coupled with the possession of a weapon, readily reduces the threshold at which the child may use a weapon if it has already suffered a degree of conflict related trauma. The child's self-perception, its need for identity, assurance, and acceptance from its peers, and role models (adult combatants or other children that are perceived as being such authority figures), or its need to maintain authority and self-confidence as a leader amongst its peers (ego maintenance) can facilitate the use of a weapon. Children with such backgrounds may begin to define their future with a sense of purpose that is not readily acceptable in civil society, believing that problems and issues can readily be resolved through the use of violence rather than through the skilful use of diplomatic channels, which requires training and experience that matures over time, and a psychological understanding of other people, their needs, motives, intentions, interests and objectives.

The institutionalisation of violence is at its most effective when it targets the children of a society. Desensitisation to violence in children can lead to the stagnation of their emotional development resulting in a consequential lack of communication skills and adaptability to emotional contexts. Desensitised children tend to demonstrate their emotions from one extreme to another, through either indifference or extreme emotional outbursts, due to their inability to evaluate and judge the correct emotional response to a given, and in certain cases, tense, situation. This form of arrested development has genuine long-term implications for later adult life; which can affect perceptions and the perspectives used to evaluate behavioural responses to different situations, with a tendency to use violence to resolve disputes.

Desensitisation can also accrue for the perception of weapons and their use. A child may be enticed to use a weapon due to its importance as a symbol of adulthood. This is especially true for male children who may associate their masculinity with weapons through perceived associations of courage and, more importantly, dominance over others, while possessing an immature understanding of the responsibilities that are associated with the possession and use of firearms that take time to become inculcated within an individual's psychological make-up through socio-cultural norms, mores and codes of conduct. It is, therefore, not only the wide availability of weapons that is a threat, but also the symbols that they represent and their importance in the formation of perceptions within society; especially in the young. The use of weapons to assert dominance is so effective that a child may ultimately begin to believe in its own infallibility when assisted by a weapon. "The availability of light, inexpensive small arms like assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and hand grenades has helped accelerate the trend. The widely used AK-47 assault rifle, for example, can be easily carried and used to deadly effect by children as young as 10"²⁴¹.

The extensive numbers of injured, traumatised, and disaffected child soldiers can create problems for the development of post-war communities. The limited facilities for rehabilitation, the extensive impoverishment and also, in part, the familiarity that they may feel with others in similar circumstances can lead to the formation of numerous large groups of former young and old soldiers, who find it acceptable to use violence, with the aid of weapons, against the civilian population to acquire material benefits. Such as, through terrorising remote villages for food, money, and even their young girls, or setting up check points to make travellers pay a toll with the threat of immediate violence in places where other military groups may not have a large presence. Under these circumstances, such as during the 1992-1996 Civil War when Afghanistan fell into a state of anarchy and chaos, the security of every individual and community can be undermined and lead to the destabilisation of the political environment, which in turn leads to the stagnation or depression of the economic development of the country. The wide availability of weapons, and their ease of accessibility, can facilitate the rapidity of such a downward spiralling of circumstances and the re-emergence of overt violent conflict. Children are easily the most important section of any society, and their abuse through weapons training and use in conflict environments as combatants has significant implications for the future mental development of a community and/or society as a whole, especially when weapons are easily accessible.

9:4 – Final Observations

The discussion on the effects of war on children allows us to appreciate the significance that the impacts of the effects of war have on the future of wider society as a whole. When looking at the Afghan conflict we may begin to appreciate the immensity of the problem, which multiple generations have suffered. The abuse of children as child soldiers is only one, albeit significant, aspect of the traumatising of the society. Such societies are also debilitated by the many thousands of adults pursuing the only occupation that they have ever known since their childhood, many of which were trained during their childhood. However, it is a testimony to the endurance and importance of the Afghan culture in its ability to facilitate a form of compartmentalisation of its warrior culture that Afghan society is beginning to function with a degree of *normality* again, in certain areas, but it does not reduce the immensity of the destruction that Afghan society has faced over the past three and a half decades.

The long-term effects of war trauma may provide an essential understanding as to how weapons proliferation facilitates the re-emergence of conflict. The traumatic experiences suffered by combatants can lead to behavioural problems due to their inability to acclimatise to a post-war environment where they may effectively be sidelined as civil society begins to take responsibility for itself. Combatants who have been both the purveyors and recipients of violence may represent an extreme aspect of the desensitisation of violence, the long-term effects of which may not only involve those that have been directly involved in violent and traumatic experiences or have faced bereavement. Evidence has been gathering, through long-term studies, of the effects of transgenerational transmission of violent and abusive behaviour, especially through the childrearing methods employed by abused or traumatised parents and adults in authority positions. However, given the ubiquitous experiences of violence that a child may have undergone throughout his/her childhood it is still difficult to determine whether violent experiences lead to short-term, temporary or long-term (through transgenerational transmission) effects on how violent relationships are represented intrapsychically, and in what way children whose violent experiences have been traumatic, which have interfered with their basic perceptions of trust, can be helped to cope with and resolve their deeply felt issues. The long-term traumatic effects on Afghan society may not surface until a modicum of peace and stability develops. However, such traumatic experiences will no doubt make it difficult to return to a peaceful society.

**The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the
Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics**

PART IV

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

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CONCLUSION

10 – Centrality of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Afghan conflict: multifaceted, multi-dimensional, and one of the longest running conflicts in the contemporary era. Yet, there is no clear sign of its abatement. The country has been in a state of socio-political, economic, cultural and strategic upheaval for over three and a half decades, rationalised by geostrategic competition down to street corner turf wars between contending criminal gangs, warlords, and militant clerics. Nevertheless, the common denominator between all these different contending parties and individuals at the international, regional, national and local levels has been their acquisition, possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in their various forms to achieve their respective goals. Although, when factoring in the pursuit of international, regional and national concerns by the contending parties, the use of major conventional weapons cannot be discounted either. Therefore, *the relative effects of both SALW and major conventional weapons may be difficult to differentiate in a highly fluid and insecure environment where both categories of weapons are being used seamlessly.* While appreciating this factor, however, given that the different phases of the Afghan conflict have largely been unconventional and asymmetric in nature, the vast majority of weapons used by most parties have been SALW.

10:1 – Introduction

Traditionally, the relative ease of acquiring information about conventional weapons transfers in comparison to SALW transfers and movements had facilitated comparatively greater focus of attention on the former than on the latter; which, in addition, was blighted by weak and often contradictory information emerging due to the difficulty in acquiring credible statistical data, as was pointed out in the literature review and throughout this study. Cognizant of the prevailing issues in the verification of accurate data, the focus of this study was not to account for every SALW diffused into Afghanistan, but to provide a *holistic* narrative of the processes, methods, techniques, and resources used in the financing, acquisition, transportation, possession and use of SALW into the country. Furthermore, the effects of the use of SALW, both direct and indirect, could not have been appreciated without evaluating the degree of entrenchment of the self-perpetuating mechanisms that were used for their proliferation in Afghanistan; which, as is discussed in chapters eight and nine, assist in further protracting the conflict, and anchoring such processes in a circular perpetuation of mutually dependent interests and conflict. Fundamentally, *the accumulation of SALW further reinforces their effects on the tensions and stresses in the relationships within and between contending, associated, and unaligned parties, within existing and latent conflict environments; thereby, contributing to the eruption, escalation, prolongation, and intractability of violent conflict, as well as its re-emergence in the post-conflict termination environment.*

10:2 – Revisiting the Hypothesis

From the outset, this study attempts to accomplish some very difficult propositions; which, from the surface seem possible due to the work that had already been conducted on the proliferation of SALW, albeit, superficially. However, in examining the central objective of this study, that is, to identify how the mass diffusion of SALW directly and indirectly assists in the exacerbation of the conflict in Afghanistan, the magnitude of this study pronounced itself. Fundamentally, was the hypothesis resolutely answered through the course of the study?

The hypothesis states:

The mass proliferation of small arms and light weapons assists the exacerbation of the conflict in Afghanistan.

The hypothesis provides an assumption that a correlation exists between the wide-scale diffusion of SALW and the worsening of the conflict in Afghanistan. As explained above and in the preceding chapters, there is an inherent difficulty in divorcing the individual impacts and effects specific to the proliferation of SALW from those impacts and effects of major conventional weapons that are usually used in-sync with the former, as well as the macro-scale geostrategic, regional, national and local imperatives of the conflicting parties throughout the Afghan conflict.

As a consequence of the realisation that an absolute validation of the hypothesis is not possible because of the pertinent issues involved, the discussions provided in the preceding chapters essentially set out to provide a better understanding of the complexity of the protraction of conflicts, through their diverse contentions of ideas, beliefs, values and interests; which, in this case, were confined within the particular geographical boundaries, and historical, socio-cultural and strategic contexts of Afghanistan.

With respect to the eruption and propagation of conflict, determining the effects of the mass diffusion of SALW within Afghanistan, and to that extent, any given environment within which they have been introduced, is explained through an appreciation of the intrinsic and dynamic processes involved within conflicts. This is appreciated through the introduction of the concept of the *acceleration* of conflict (the rate of increase in the intensity of a conflict) and how the introduction of SALW at significant points at which the conflict is susceptible may contribute to raising the conflict to a higher degree of intensity.

In addition to elaborating upon the direct effects of the possession and use of SALW, through their physical and psychological impacts on individual and collective behaviour, the indirect effects of the excessive accumulation and availability of SALW are also highlighted, which significantly contribute to the dynamics of conflict through the institutionalisation and militarisation of the social environment within which they are introduced, leading to the promotion of violent alternatives to negotiation, which would invariably require compromising particular interests; the lowering of the threshold of violence; encouraging criminal activities, leading to the weakening of law and order, and hence, amplifying social insecurity; increasing the numbers of civilians arming themselves due to their lack of security; emboldening the disaffected, whose legitimate

grievances are not being met by the appropriate authorities; and hence, facilitating the entrenchment of ‘cycles of violence’, which are extremely difficult to be extricated from.

10:3 – Findings and Deductions - Answering the Research Areas

In order to concisely and comprehensively answer the central hypothesis of this study, a number of research questions that are intrinsic to the fulfilment of this study were prepared so as to break down the immensely complex subject matter at hand and more clearly concentrate on the pertinent issues that need to be explained, discussed and evaluated; thereby, providing enhanced clarity to the subject matter.

10:3:1 – The Dynamics of Conflict, with Specific Reference to the Concepts of Escalation and its Acceleration

In validating the hypothesis, the notion of escalation is discussed to provide an introduction to the concepts of the acceleration and deceleration of conflicts, and how the influx or reduction of SALW may affect the intensity and general course of a conflict, as illustrated within the conflict ladder (see, Appendix III, Figure 2.1 – *Ladder of Conflict*; and, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 – *Acceleration and Deceleration 1 & 2*). All conflicts undergo varying intensities of non-violent and violent actions that may lead to escalatory processes to higher levels of divergence of interests and goals, greater polarisation of relative inter-party positions, and hence, changes in intensities of conflict. In this respect, an evaluation of the infusion of large quantities of SALW into Afghanistan and the role and impacts they may have on the escalation and/or de-escalation of existing conflicts are analysed by understanding the processes of the empowerment of individuals and collectives.

The influx of SALW into a conflict environment within which the conflict thresholds have been reduced due to the extensive polarisation of contending parties and the reduction in the threshold of violence through its institutionalisation within society, may catalyse an increase in the intensity of action-reaction processes between contending parties by providing an advantage to one or more parties over their adversaries; which, may induce a recalculation of relative strengths through their empowerment from increased firepower and, therefore, provide impetus to the party(s) being armed to utilise their relative advantages by escalating the conflict to a higher intensity with the aid of the added SALW. *The larger the relative strengths in SALW, the greater the perception of relative advantage when all other variables are deemed equal.* This may, in turn, induce an increased acceleration of the conflict through a greater relative employment of SALW over a defined period of time. Conversely, the same is true for the successful removal of SALW from the conflict environment; whereby, *the greater the inter-party reduction in SALW, the less the relative insecurity between the contending parties, especially when they mutually agree to reduce firepower; and, therefore, the greater the deceleration of the conflict within a defined period of time.*

The determination of the rate of change in the intensity of the conflict, or its acceleration, is unique to and dependent upon the particular socio-cultural, political and geographical environment of the conflict; and therefore, *the ‘critical mass’ of weapons required for the acceleration or deceleration of the conflict would be dependent upon the unique characteristics of the particular conflict.*

10:3:2 – The Nature of Violence within the Structural Organisation of Afghanistan’s Multicultural Society

It is the nature of violence that is particularly significant to the study of conflict, and in this respect, the effects that are encountered by the individual and society through the experience of violence from the possession and use of SALW. In this respect, the preceding chapters provide a discussion on the institutionalisation of violence and the entrenchment of cycles of violence within protracted conflicts, which are significantly contributed to through the introduction of SALW. *This study finds that conflict intractability is contributed to by the social acceptance of violence as a regular form of human interaction through its socio-cultural desensitisation, and development as a social norm; thereby, facilitating the erosion of values and norms that are pacific in nature, and hence, encouraging the emergence of cultures of violence, which are further reinforced through the transgenerational transmission of traditions, cultural and behavioural norms that encourage a perception of the acceptance of violence in various forms.* This is illustrated within this study by the acceptance of the use of violence in martial societies, such as the Pushtun, whose tribal defensive structural organisation is rationalised because of the use of violence through incessant invasions into their territories throughout history, as is explained in chapter three.

10:3:3 – The Structural Mechanisms that have Developed to Consolidate a Highly Defensive Capacity for Afghanistan

The development of regulatory codes of conduct in tribal structural organisations through patrilineal segmentation were consolidated over hundreds, if not thousands, of years, from the definition of the responsibilities and freedoms associated with the basic micro-level residential group up to the macro-level ethnic group; wherein which tribal institutions, such as the Pushtun jirgah and hujrah, incorporate inbuilt deterrence laden codes of conduct to regulate the eruption, continuation and resolution of conflicts, by providing an avenue to redress concerns and grievances. Furthermore, this study discusses differences in the perceptions that have evolved towards weapons within and between different structurally organised societies, and how this may affect the way their societies behave and react towards the possession and use of SALW; and by extrapolation, the relative effects that the use of SALW by them or against them have upon them as individuals and as collectives. Therefore, *this study finds that it is imperative to appreciate the historical evolution of the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity, and how that may affect the development of culturally reinforced regulatory structures in relation to the possession and use of SALW; such as the ramifications of the development of the defensive structural organisation of tribal societies through unrelenting invasions and conflicts by parties both external and indigenous to Afghanistan, and their incorporation of regulatory codes of conduct, which impact upon the way individuals and communities may perceive, behave, react and be affected by the possession and use of SALW.*

10:3:4 – The Significance of the Possession of Firearms in Afghan Society and how it may be Structurally Legitimated through the Development of the Warrior Archetype

This study discusses the development of the defensive structurally organised society and the evolution of the archetypal warrior male that continue to be symbiotic in nature, as one could not entirely exist without the

other. Furthermore, the cultural traits that developed for the consolidation of the tribe also developed for the warrior in Afghan society. In fact, these cultural traits also dictate the perceptions that people have towards the possession and use of firearms through the codes of conduct that have been entrenched within the individual's and collective's social consciousness. Tribal societies, such as the Pushtun, bestow a high degree of status and affinity upon the possession of weapons as part of the uniform of the archetypal warrior; where, skill in the use of firearms and other weapons is deemed as the epitome of the warrior. *Therefore, this study underscores the development of the warrior ethos and how it assists in the inculcation of culturally orientated regulatory mechanisms for the control of weapons and violence through the codification of rules pertaining to conduct and behaviour.*

10:3:5 – The Geostrategic Causes of the Proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan from the Fall of the Monarchy in 1973 until 2001

The proliferation of SALW in Afghanistan is intricately linked to the socio-political and strategic developments of its international and regional environment due to the unremitting flux of invasions, migrations and trade. The recent invasions of Afghanistan, rationalised through geostrategic and regional concerns, illustrate the multi-dimensional complexity of the protracted Afghan conflict. *Therefore this study finds that there is an intrinsic difficulty in irrefutably assigning causal effects to the proliferation of SALW on the protraction of the conflict, since the socio-political, economic and strategic willingness of the variegated external and indigenous contending parties to go to any length to outwit and out-resource each other to achieve their strategic interests significantly contributed to and continues to contribute to the intractability of the conflict.*

10:3:6 – The Processes, Methods, and Means Employed for the Weaponisation of Afghanistan from their First Use and Introduction into the Region in April 1526¹ until 11 September 2001

The weaponisation of Afghanistan is a primary element of discussion and analysis in this study. All the chapters on the *Weaponisation of Afghanistan* identify and concentrate on the developments that facilitated the growth, use, and diffusion of firearms into the cultural consciousness of Afghanistan's indigenous population. *This study, therefore, concentrates upon providing an understanding of the historical processes, mechanisms, techniques, and methods that helped develop the indigenous production capacity, trade, transportation, as well as the geostrategic rationale for the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan.* Furthermore, this study specifically analyses the processes and mechanisms involved in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arms pipeline through *Operation Cyclone*; while highlighting associated financial and logistical problems; the relationship between narcotics production and trafficking and the SALW trade; the deep seated corruption; the routes used to transport the SALW; the *self-perpetuation of the networks*, processes and methods that were used in the diffusion of these SALW, and how they may have become entrenched and enmeshed within the social consciousness of the Afghans, and hence, the resulting protraction of the Afghan conflict.

10:3:7 – Direct and Indirect Impacts of the Mass Proliferation of SALW on Afghan Society

The essence of this study, as it is stated in its hypothesis, sets out to analyse the effects of the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan. As such, chapters eight and nine elaborate upon the direct and indirect effects, respectively; which stipulate that the mere possession of SALW may induce perceptions of empowerment, depending upon the socio-political and cultural context, and therefore, encourage one or more parties to pursue a course of action which they would not have otherwise followed, whether for the use of force or resolution of conflict. *This study finds that conflict escalation is heightened due to the polarisation effect by the hardening of positions afforded through the possession and empowerment of firearms; where, the greater the availability of SALW within a given conflict environment, the greater the likelihood of resultant violent clashes as emotions are heightened through the entrenchment of in-group out-group processes and the consolidation of the parties involved in the conflict.* This has been especially true for the historically constant rivalry between the central government and the rest of Afghanistan's variegated social groups; where the diverse ethno-cultural and tribal populations were perpetually involved in military engagements and civil wars for regional autonomy with all the leaders of Afghanistan's central government since its inception, *which significantly contributed towards political destabilisation, constraining the government's ability to centralise power.*

In addition, this study analyses the broad indirect effects of the proliferation of SALW on civil societies, socio-political and economic development, law and order, *militarisation of society*, general degradation of human security, growth of criminality, and abuse of vulnerable sections of society, especially children, the elderly and women. In respect to the latter, a disturbing aspect of the *institutionalisation of violence* is the emergence of child combatants in conflict environments. The use of child combatants in conflicts is also discussed through the use of participant observation during the field research component for this study. *Furthermore, this study finds that the indirect effects of the wide-scale access of SALW by one of more parties may induce a heightened level of insecurity in an adversarial, or even neutral party, which may acquire their own SALW; resulting in a conflict spiral and arms race through a relative security dilemma.*

10:4 – Contributions and Personal Observations

The study of SALW has come a long way since they were merely classified as instruments of violence, without recognising the immense consequences that they may cause, due to the overwhelming strategic concentration on the challenges of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War, which was dominated by weapons of mass destruction and major conventional weapons because of the perception that they were fundamental instruments of strategic leverage and balance of power. Consequently, *SALW were not only overlooked, they were actively supplied to the many contending parties within the numerous proxy conflicts between the superpowers throughout the Cold War era without a thought for their far-reaching effects in the immediate and future socio-psychological and political environments.*

Afghanistan, with all its suffering and sacrifice, being superseded by the strategic interests of the victor of the superpower contest during the Soviet occupation phase of the Afghan conflict, was immediately relegated to

history upon the ignominious defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989. That is, until 11 September 2001 was recognised as the blowback event for the empowerment of the Afghan Mujahideen through financial and arms assistance during the 1980s. Furthermore, there was growing recognition that many of the Cold War conflicts were ignited as a result of the catalytic interference of the superpowers in regional and local matters; the latter, largely being a consequence of simmering latent conflicts stemming from the inadequate delineation of boundaries and resource allocations in the period of decolonisation by the colonial powers of the day, which were fuelled by the indiscriminate arming of contending parties for the vested and strategic interests of the Cold War foes, the West and the Warsaw Pact.

The eruption of local and regional conflicts after the Cold War brought about a search for answers that were not available from the hitherto available understanding of the dynamics of the Cold War and which could not explain the rationale behind these new conflicts, such as the inter-ethnic slaughter in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. As the search for understanding and answers grew, research on the SALW grew. However, hitherto, with the exception of peripheral studies on the conflict in Afghanistan that focus more on the geostrategic, regional and local concerns of the contending parties in the Afghan conflict, such as security sector reform, little research had been commissioned and conducted on the process of the weaponisation of Afghanistan. This study is, therefore, *the first of its kind, as it contributes to the existing body of knowledge with a comprehensive historical and contemporary description and analysis of the strategic rationale, processes, methods, and means employed for the indigenous manufacture, acquisition, transportation, trade and mass diffusion of SALW into Afghanistan* from their first en-masse employment in battle in the region, during Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur's (b. 1483 – d. 1530) invasion of India from Kabul in April 1526, until 11 September 2001, which has become an infamous date on the modern calendar associated with the sublime event, the first attack on the US mainland by a foreign entity, Al Qaeda.

In addition to providing the first comprehensive account of the weaponisation of Afghanistan, this study has also produced the *first comprehensive study of the effects of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the dynamics of conflict in Afghanistan*, by providing an understanding of the rationale behind the protraction of the conflict. In this respect, this study, therefore, *contributes to enhancing the body of available literature within this niche area of learning*. Furthermore, *this study briefly introduces the concepts of acceleration and deceleration of conflict*, and how understanding such aspects of conflict escalation and de-escalation may provide opportunities for significantly changing their course by appreciating at which point within the conflict to initiate cease fires or the termination of violent actions, which may encourage the prospects of conflict resolution.

The added advantages gained by the author's experiences within the conflict environment on numerous occasions through prolonged exposure of the conflict in Afghanistan, by *physically witnessing* the use of immense violence with SALW in combat and in and around non-combat environments, as well as the general ravages of war by *experiencing the dangers involved*, has facilitated a thorough understanding of the ground realities in Afghanistan that has benefited this study and the questions that arose as a result of those

experiences. This is especially so because much of the in-depth academic research that is currently being undertaken does not arise from a thorough and in-situ physical grounding of the socio-cultural, political, strategic, economic, psychological and physical issues and problems being faced by those individuals and people within the areas, countries, and regions affected by the mass diffusion of SALW that are being studied; therefore, substantially reducing the intrinsic understanding that may evolve within the period of deep introspection that a researcher may undergo as a result of his/her experiences within the environment being studied. In this respect, the personal development and growth of the researcher that has undergone a prolonged period of deep introspection, does provide greater depth to the understanding imparted upon the subject matter being studied, as is the case for this study.

The contribution provided by the field research component of this study was greater than the many interviews and periods of participatory observations that were conducted, since they were an eye-opener to the uncertainties, disorders, extremes, dynamics and complexities of human behaviour within the conflict environment, which can rarely be conceived of within non-conflict environments. Witnessing young children firing weapons, killing, being injured, facing the deaths of their friends and colleagues, suffering immense trauma as individuals or as collectives, and even personally experiencing their deaths, cannot be explained in words. However, such experiences often demanded answers to questions that were not readily available, yet provided further avenues for research; thereby, adding to the existing understanding, or contending and even negating the author's existing paradigms to the benefit and enhancement of this research study.

10:5 – Limitations on Research

Although perfection is sought after, and is an admirable endeavour, it is rarely possible to achieve in the social sciences; since the study of human behaviour is itself subject to interpretation and intelligent speculation. As such, although the contributions to this study may be manifold, its very nature had inherent self-limiting constraints imposed upon it, which provided boundaries to the fulfilment of the research study. The study of the humanities is not an exact science, and cannot provide absolute and irrefutable conclusions, in contrast to the natural sciences. For example, when studying the weaponisation of Afghanistan, the author was asked on numerous occasions as to the exact quantity of SALW that had been diffused into the country. *The scale of the proliferation of SALW, the numbers of actors or contending parties, the innumerable variables involved, the characteristic durability of such weapons, the lack of accountability of the arms manufacturers, traders and traffickers, and the unrestricted flow of SALW through the porous borders of Afghanistan severely restricted and even negated credible estimates for this conflict.* Consequently, and as mentioned on several occasions in the preceding chapters, *such figures or estimates are **not** provided within this study, and those that are provided in other research papers must be treated with **caution**, unless they have been derived through rigorous scientific testing, which is, in itself, near impossible within the current conditions of the Afghan conflict, and may continue to be unfeasible in the future.*

In respect to the above, *an absolute correlation between the mass proliferation of SALW and their effects on the dynamics of conflict may also **never** be realised and distinctly relegates limited causal models, given the*

immense quantity of variables, actors, triggers, drivers, sources of conflict, vested interests, geographical impediments, socio-economic conditions, politically divisive factors, historical and cultural factors, structural and systemic dynamics and disparities involved in the Afghan conflict, and by extrapolation, any other conflict. This is especially so because SALW are but a *single factor* amongst *innumerable* others that may contribute to the escalation of a conflict, albeit, a significant one; and, as such, *cannot* be denoted as the sole cause of the Afghan conflict, *nor can we stipulate that they may independently lead to the escalation of specific aspects of any conflict without investigating all the contributory factors*. Undoubtedly, such an undertaking, given the highly fluid nature of the Afghan conflict, would be *immensely difficult*. It is for this reason, having understood the extreme complexity of the Afghan conflict, as outlined in the preceding chapters, that a contextual analysis to understanding the impact of SALW on the escalation dynamics of the Afghan conflict is elaborated upon, and by extrapolation, the impact of SALW on the escalation dynamics of violent intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

Research studies such as the one concluded here are also constrained due to the limited resources available, in terms of time and finances. In an ideal world, such constraints would not exist, however, as a self-financed doctoral researcher, financial and time constraints were greatly multiplied. Moreover, this study was further limited to 11 September 2001 because of the dire security situation that had developed within Afghanistan after the US-led NATO/ISAF invasion of the country, which made it unfeasible to sincerely explore the weaponisation processes and mechanisms up to the present due to the increased threat to the health, safety, and life of the author. Furthermore, within the period studied, especially the 1990s, the researcher was inherently limited from personally investigated all avenues of SALW proliferation, especially those by the Northern Alliance because of his origins as a Pushtun, which would have imposed undue constraints on his abilities to conduct impartial research as well as reducing his personal security to a minimum. In this respect, the author's ability to freely research was also restricted by his hosts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as discussed earlier. Nevertheless, within those confines, the author was still able to exceptionally address the foremost aspects of this study.

10:6 – Future Research and Recommendations

10:6:1 – Future Research

The findings produced, as well as the limitations imposed upon this study, provide many avenues for future research. Due to the scope of this study, and as a consequence of it, one of the most pertinent issues that arose was the necessity further study on the *conflict de-escalation* processes in Afghanistan. By appreciating the socio-cultural regulatory mechanisms inbuilt within certain sections of the Afghan society, and the complex relationships that may exist between the mass proliferation of SALW and the multifarious macro and micro-scale dynamics of the Afghan conflict, an appreciation of the feasibility of positively utilising windows of opportunity for the encouragement of the *deceleration* of violent conflict may provide ample grounds for future study. Therefore, while *acceleration* and *deceleration* are concepts that have been briefly introduced here, there is a necessity for further exploration and enhancement of these concepts.

The mass proliferation of SALW has been highlighted in this study, however, due to its limited scope, the prospects of the feasibility of a concerted *disarmament* process was not fully discussed; which, from the findings discussed above, is absolutely intrinsic to any future resolution of the conflict. The brief tenure of the Taliban in government, however, did see a limited disarmament process come in to fruition, albeit, for the regime's inherent strategic interests rather than the wide-scale benefit of the future resolution of conflict in Afghanistan. As such, *a more detailed discussion and analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of that disarmament process may provide an opportunity for further study.* Moreover, the means with which the Taliban secured their limited but successful disarmament may also be discussed; for example, *is an incentivised approach to disarmament possible or not, given the socio-cultural and structural differences with Afghan society?* Furthermore, what kinds of socio-psychological controls are possible within such a heterogeneous society, and what will be the feasibility and effectiveness of regulating the flow of arms through policing, law enforcement, and border security, given the presence of a border dispute with Pakistan over the *Durand Line*; since, the physical demarcation of the border negates Afghanistan's long held claim on the Pushtun territories now encompassed with Pakistan.

Another important aspect of this study that has come to the fore is the notion of the *transgenerational transmission of violence*, especially with regards to children. Given time restrictions and the scale of this study, a more in-depth analysis of this aspect was not given justice. As such, a host of future research studies may be conducted on the effects of the transgenerational transmission of violent and abusive behaviour, and the behavioural responses of children to the possession and use of SALW. However, it may be recognised that long-term studies on the traumatic effects on Afghan society may not be realised until a modicum of peace and stability develops.

10:6:2 – Recommendations

The departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 may not bode well for the termination of the protracted conflict. The current pledges of financial support for the security sector and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan may be directly impacted. Whether war weariness overcomes the perceived rationales that the different adversarial parties maintain to continue engaging in violence conflict, or whether their common dispositions towards ending the conflict are greater, may be determined by the geostrategic effort to contain the indigenous parties and to prevent the collapse of Afghanistan into further phase of turmoil and civil war, which will cause further serious security concerns for regional countries and beyond. Although only speculative, once the major troops contributing countries have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the rationale for successively funding the security sector and the reconstruction of the country may be superseded by more immediate and pertinent geostrategic issues that threaten their strategic interests, such as the developing situation between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and resurgent Russia on the other. Therefore, *the security concerns emanating from Afghanistan may well be relegated by the international community because emergence of new threats within the fluid global security environment.*

Given the current impasse between the contending parties, the immediate cessation of violent conflict and hostilities is unlikely to occur without a concerted effort, which may only arise from a *two-track approach* that includes a *simultaneous, symbiotic and mutually reinforcing effort of an internal peace process*, involving all indigenous contending parties, *to cease violent actions and engage in a constructive dialogue for mutual benefit in-sync with a regional peace process*, which includes all of Afghanistan's neighbours and those states with significant vested and strategic interests in the country, *to cease external interference into the internal affairs of Afghanistan*. It will be observed at this point, and in particular reference to the latter track, where an external party may induce an internal party(s) to acquire SALW and/or re-engage in conflict due to the shift in the balance of power that has occurred because of the peace process, or for the perceived short-sighted interests of the external and/or internal party(s), that *the infusion of a significant quantity of SALW may well upset an inter-party balance that may have been achieved through a thorough disarmament campaign leading to a retaliatory rearmament campaign by opposing parties, which may trigger another phase of conflict*. The prospects for peace in Afghanistan, are therefore, understandably *difficult* to achieve. However, it may be considered from the history of external interference in the affairs of Afghanistan that pursuing and attaining a peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict would be in the best interests of all national, regional and international stakeholders. Nevertheless, as is often the case, short-sighted and immediate vested interests have often been deemed more significant than mutual long term prosperity. Afghanistan, has, unfortunately borne the brunt of such human fallibilities.

10:7 – Final Thoughts

The discussion throughout this study was based upon the necessity for a consolidated understanding of the weaponisation of Afghanistan and the impact this has had on the dynamics of conflict therein; especially in relation to the protraction of the Afghan conflict. Nevertheless, throughout the course of discussion within the preceding chapters, *there is an overwhelming disposition towards the argument that there is a correlation between the mass infusion of SALW and the exacerbation of conflict in terms of its protraction and sustainability*; especially if the critical mass of weapons that are infused within the conflict environment are directed at a particular moment and location where they can affect the *balance* of an existing equilibrium in the favour of one or other of the conflicting parties, thereby leading to the escalation of the conflict. Hence, *the mass availability of SALW within Afghanistan has had a tendency to facilitate the eruption of disputes through the process of individual to collective empowerment*. Nevertheless, due to the immense innumerability of the variables at play within the conflict environment, disassociating such variables from SALW to measure their direct impact is *not* reasonably possible. Furthermore, it may also not be possible to identify a standardised significance level for the variables involved in conflicts due to the uniqueness of the balance of variables in every conflict; for example, in many conflicts, macro-level geo-strategic and national decisions have been more significant in the propagation and/or termination of a conflict than micro-level internal conflict dynamics, such as the infusion of large quantities of SALW. However, distinguishing between micro-level and macro-level conflict variables is also fraught with difficulty in Afghanistan, since small scale disturbances involving firearms in tribal societies, such as the Pushtun, may result in an explosion of violence as the conflict escalates, due to the cultural norms governing the regulation of violence in Pushtun

society and the necessity to maintain deterrence through the employment of *badal* as a cultural regulatory mechanism, which, if infringed, may result in the mushrooming of blood feuds that can widen in scope to incorporate whole tribes and even extend beyond ethnicities to escalate to national level conflicts, especially when ethnic and sectarian fissures already possess vulnerable breaking points. Furthermore, *the massive firepower afforded by widely available SALW also aggravates the escalation of disputes and conflicts by accelerating them beyond the ability of the Hujrah and Jirgah to calm the situation down enough for cool heads to de-escalate the conflict.*

At the individual level, war weariness is an important reason for many combatants to disarm and demobilise. However, the alternative opportunities afforded to an individual who has been empowered with weapons are much greater than those for an individual who has no empowerment through such means. There are few options that can replace this empowerment in a war-torn country with a devastated economy in an insecure environment. With over three and a half decades of conflict, many combatants, especially from the younger generation, rarely have any other skills with which to acquire employment. *The empowerment afford by the availability of easy to use weapons is the determining factor as to whether or not a society can begin to rebuild itself and its security, regardless of whether hostilities have officially ceased.*

When looking forward, into the future, the permanent cessation of hostilities is, conceivably, the most crucial aspect of the peaceful resolution of conflict in Afghanistan. However, in sum, the mass availability of SALW within Afghanistan is unlikely to change until a broad-based government that reflects the ethnic, cultural, sectarian, and ideological diversity of Afghanistan is successfully installed through a negotiated settlement between all indigenous conflicting parties without external interference. Unfortunately, the argument is circular; since, without a concerted effort to reduce SALW from the visual horizon of the individual's and society's social consciousness, a cessation of hostilities is very far away, and this is, furthermore, a tall order for a region that has had an historical relationship with perpetual external interventions and invasions, and internal disunity.

The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics

APPENDICES

The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics

APPENDIX I

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

APPENDIX I

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

SECTION A

THE WORK UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS ON SALW

1:1 – The Disarmament Commission

Guidelines were adopted for international arms transfers, in spring 1996, which focused on the illicit trade in arms. Generally, the guidelines indicated that “States should ensure that they have an adequate system of national laws and/or regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over armaments and the exports and imports of arms in order, among other goals, to prevent illicit trafficking”¹. The Disarmament Commission has outlined a number of international initiatives which include: establishment of verifiable end-user certificates; the sharing of customs information; border control and law enforcement co-operation; the compliance of UN arms embargoes; the development of legislative and administrative import and export controls; and participating in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

1:2 – The Economic and Social Council’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

This commission’s area of operation is the facilitation of the exchange of data on civilian-owned firearms regulations at national, regional and international levels, and the establishment of a database on firearms regulations. A set of recommendations has been produced by a group of international experts from the police, military customs, and representatives of criminal justice institutes. The recommendations were based upon the information provided by 53 member states of the UN, and a number of other non-governmental organisations (NGO) and Inter-Governmental bodies, including the World Customs Union, the World Health Organisation, and Interpol.

1.3 – The Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms

This is probably the most significant effort to define the problem of the proliferation of SALW. At its 50th session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a UN group of experts to conduct a study on SALW. Canada co-sponsored the resolution setting up the study, which was initiated by Japan. The panel’s mandate includes the identification of the types of SALW used in the conflicts in which the UN is dealing with; the nature, causes and effects of the excessive and destabilising transfers of SALW; and the ways and means by which to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilising accumulations of SALW².

¹ Guidelines for International Arms Transfers in the Context of General Assembly Resolution 46/36H of December 1991, reprinted in Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Session: Report of the Disarmament Commission, A/51/182, July 1st, 1996, pp. 64-69.

² ‘New Canadian Study on the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons’, *Canadian Disarmament Digest*, April 10, 1996.

1:4 – Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division of the United Nations

The office is based in Vienna and is cooperating with the UNOJUST program, which is sponsored by the National Institute of Justice of the US Department of Justice and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the US Department of State.

1:5 – Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute of the United Nations (UNICRI)

With its headquarters in Rome, UNICRI's mission ranges from research, training, committing to field activities, and collecting and disseminating information, to the formulation and implementation of improved policies in the field of crime prevention and control. In association with ECOSOC, UNICRI participated in the '*UN Study of Firearms Regulations*'.

1:6 – *The United Nations European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control*

Based in Helsinki, the Institute has established a clearing house for international projects in the field of crime prevention and justice involving Central and Eastern European countries. It holds a data bank for which it requests information on relevant planned or current collaborative training and technical assistance projects in the region. Although limited, the Institute did provide some effort with ECOSOC's firearms survey.

SECTION B

WORK UNDERTAKEN BY INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS ON SALW

1:7 – The Council of Europe (CoE)

With its headquarters in Strasbourg, France, has been working in the unification of Europe since 1949. The CoE has several regional initiatives being undertaken to fight corruption and international organised crime, including the illicit traffic in weapons.

1:8 – The European Union (EU)

The customs and police are cooperating in curbing the drugs trade and illegal human traffic. Due to Article 223 of the European Community's Treaty of Rome, which denotes the sovereignty of states over legitimate defence activities, very few references to illicit traffic in arms were made. However, in June 1997 the EU passed the Dutch inspired '*EU Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms*' (EU Resolution EU/9057/97 DG E/CPSP IV) in the Treaty of Amsterdam. This initiative was a response to the UN General Assembly resolution 50/70B, which calls for all UN member states to strengthen their collective efforts to prevent and combat illicit SA & LW trafficking.

1:9 – Interpol (ICPO)

The organisations efficiency is dependent upon the respect for the national sovereignty, the police forces work within their own national boundaries and in accordance with their own national laws. A key point of co-operation amongst national police forces is the effort to thwart the illicit arms trafficking.

1:10 – G-8 (Group of Eight)

During the Denver Summit of the G-8 (formerly the G-7) industrialised economies - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - on 20-22 June 1997, the respective leaders agreed upon the threats posed by transnational crime and terrorism, and produced a communiqué to that extent. A commitment was made to "promote cooperation among law enforcement agencies, to strengthen document security and improve strategies to combat illegal alien smuggling, and to prevent illegal trafficking in firearms"³.

1:11 – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO):

Even though NATO adopted a formal position on the transnational proliferation of nuclear materials in Turkey in 1994, no publicly available NATO documents on the proliferation of SA & LWs are available. However, affiliated monitoring branches, such as NIMIS, do exist as technical analysis centres supporting military, government, industry, and academic institutions in defence programs. NIMIS has an online facility dedicated to the diffusion of relevant information. It also develops and maintains eleven databases containing

³ *Denver Summit of the Eight, Communiqué, Denver, June 22, 1997. Transnational Organised Crime (Para 39); and, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (Para 80). Full document can also be found on < <http://www.g8denver.org/news/062297.html> >. Accessed on 08 December 2013.*

a whole range of more than 25,000 documents up to and including those with security classifications of 'CONFIDENTIAL'.

1:12 – Organisation of American States (OAS):

The OAS is involved in two organised efforts relating to the curbing of illicit traffic in the Western Hemisphere:- A group of experts under the auspices of the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) developed a set of *'Model Regulations to Control the Movement of Firearms, Ammunition, and Firearms Parts and Components'* during November 1997 in Lima, Peru. These encouraged regulation and licensing of firearms transfers; the OAS Permanent Council completed the *'Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials'* on the initiative of the Mexican Government. Twenty-eight states signed the treaty once it was open for signature at the headquarters of the OAS in Washington DC on November 14 1997. The treaty calls for the establishment of state-level advisory committees, with responsibilities for promoting data exchange (on production, export and import of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials), further standardisation of laws on import/export, encouraging coordinated investigations, and developing communications systems.

1:13 – The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The OECD represents the industrialised, market-economy countries. The ministerial council meeting, held on 26-27 may 1997, formally acknowledged the illicit sale in SA & LWs. This acknowledgement can be found in the *'DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-operation'*.

1:14 – The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control and Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, headquartered in Paris, was established in Vienna in July 1996. The Arrangement has thirty-three members, including most of the major arms suppliers. The Arrangement's mandate contributes to regional and international security by: promoting transparency in arms transfers among participating states; ensuring that transfers of relevant items do not contribute to excessive and destabilising accumulations of arms; complementing existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction; and, reducing the need for states to acquire advanced weapons or technologies. Although the Wassenaar Arrangement does not focus on the SA & LWs problem, it has discussed several initiatives on illicit SA & LWs traffic and measures to curb their flow to conflict zones, especially Mali and Afghanistan.

The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics

APPENDIX II

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CHAPTER ONE

TABLE 1:1 – Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons Categories

Fire-Arms	Missile Launchers and Mortars	Ammunition and Projectiles	Explosives
Revolvers and Self-Loading Pistols	Hand-Held Under-Barrel and Mounted Grenade Launchers	Cartridges (rounds) for Small Arms	Anti-Personnel and Anti-Tank Hand Grenades
Rifles and Carbines	Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers	Rocket Propelled Grenade Shells	Anti-Personnel Mines
Sub-Machine Guns	Portable Launchers of Anti-Tank Missiles and Rocket Systems	Shells, Missiles for Light weapons	Anti-Tank Mines
Assault Rifles	Portable Launchers of Anti-Aircraft Systems	Mobile Containers with Missiles	Explosives, e.g. C4, Semtex,
Light Machine Guns	Mortars of Calibres up to 100 mm Inclusive	Shells for Single Action Anti-aircraft and Anti-tank Systems	
Heavy Machine Guns			
Portable Anti-Aircraft Guns			
Portable Anti-Tank Guns, Recoilless Rifles			

CHAPTER TWO

TABLE 2:1 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Political, Ethnic and Religious Orientation

<u>Group</u>	<u>Political Orientation & HQ</u>	<u>Religious Orientation & Links</u>	<u>Ethnic Composition</u>	<u>Numerical Strength</u>
<u>Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) (Hekmatyar)</u>	<u>Radical Islamist</u> Advocate Theocracy Ruled by Clergy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Linked to Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan) and Ikhwan-i-Muslimeen (Egypt)	Majority Pushtun Small Non-Pushtun Element Outside Tribal Areas	Cadre: ≈2,500 Total: ≈20,000
<u>Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) (Khalis)</u>	<u>Islamist</u> Advocate Theocracy Ruled by Clergy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Linked to Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan) and Ikhwan-i-Muslimeen (Egypt)	Mostly Eastern Pushtun Tribes and Tribal Northern Pushtun	Cadre: ≈2,500 Total: ≈17,000
<u>Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)</u>	<u>Islamist</u> Advocate Theocracy Ruled by Clergy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Linked to Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan) and Ikhwan-i-Muslimeen (Egypt)	Turkic: Mostly Tajik, Uzbek, and Some Turkomen Strong Pushtun Element	Cadre: ≈5,000 Total: ≈30,000
<u>Harakat-e-Inqalaab-e-Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement)</u>	<u>Islamic Moderates & Traditionalists</u> Advocate Conservative Islamic Government HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Deobandi Islam Linked to Jamaat-i-Ulema-Islam (Pakistan: esp NWFP)	Pushtun: Mostly Ahmedzia Pushtun, and other Durrani Tribes also	Cadre: ≈2,000 Total: ≈20,000
<u>Mahaz-e-Melli-e-Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan)</u>	<u>Islamic Moderates Nationalist Monarchists</u> Advocate Secular Govt and Return of the Monarchy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Qadiri Sufi Islam	Majority Pushtun, Many Ex-Afghan Army Officers	Cadre: ≈2,500 Total: ≈18,000
<u>Jabha-e Nejat-e-Melli (National Liberation Front)</u>	<u>Islamic Moderates Nationalist Monarchists</u> Advocate Return of the Monarchy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Naqshbandi Sufi Islam	Pushtun: Traditional and Tribal	Cadre: ≈1,500 Total: ≈4,500-6,000
<u>Ittehad-Islami (Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan)</u>	<u>Islamist</u> Advocate Theocracy Ruled by Clergy HQ: Peshawar	<u>Sunni</u> Wahabi Islam Linked to Saudi Wahabis	Majority Pushtun	Cadre: ≈1,000 Total: ≈6,000
<u>Sepah-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards)</u>	<u>Islamic Conservatives</u> Pro-Iranian Pro-Khomeini HQ: Qum, Iran (1981)	<u>Shia</u>	Majority Hazara, and some Shia Tajik element	Cadre: ≈5,000 Total: ≈9,000
<u>Hezbollah (Party of God)</u>	<u>Islamic Conservative</u> Pro-Iranian, Pro-Khomeini, Hizbollah Affinities HQ: Qum, Iran (1981)	<u>Shia</u>	Farsiwan, Tajik, Hazara, and other Shia Ethnicities	Cadre: ≈2,000 Total: ≈5,000
<u>Sazman-e-Nasr (Victory Organisation)</u>	<u>Islamic Conservative</u> Independent HQ: Quetta, Pakistan	<u>Shia</u>	Majority Hazara Shia, and some Support from Uzbek Sunni in North Hazarajat	Cadre: ≈1,700 Total: ≈5,000
<u>Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic Movement)</u>	<u>Islamic (Traditional)</u> Pro-Iranian, Pro Khomeini, HQ: Qum, Iran (1979)	<u>Shia</u>	Shia Hazara and Shia Cross-Ethnic Dari Speakers in North Afghanistan	Cadre: ≈3,000 Total: ≈3,000
<u>Al-Shura-e-Ittifaq (The Council of the Union)</u>	<u>Islamic (Traditional)</u> Advocate Theocracy Ruled by Clergy in Autonomous Hazarajat HQ: Bamian (1979)	<u>Shia</u>	Majority Hazara	Cadre: ≈5,000 Total: ≈10,000

TABLE 2:2 – The Major Mujahideen Groups 1978-1992 – Patrons & Political & Military Leadership⁴

<u>Group</u>	<u>Patrons & Allocation of CIA-ISI Aid</u>	<u>Strongholds & Bases of Operations</u>	<u>Political Leader(s)</u>	<u>Military Leaders</u>
<u>Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) (Hekmatyar)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, and Individual Arab Donors 18-20%</i>	<i>Balkh, Bamiyan, Farah, Fariab, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunar, Laghman, Nangahar, Paghman, Paktia, Uruzghan</i>	<i><u>Gulbuddin Hekmatyar</u> State Educated Intelligencia</i>	
<u>Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) (Khalis)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, Egypt, Turkey, Britain, and Individual Arab Donors 13-15%</i>	<i>Balkh, Farah, Fariab, Kabul (Abdul Haq), Logar, Nangahar, Paghman Hills, Paktia (Haqqani),</i>	<i><u>(Mawlawi) Younus Khalis</u> State Educated Intelligencia, Tribal Pushtuns Linked to Family, & Ulema</i>	<i>Jalaluddin Haqqani, Abdul Haq</i>
<u>Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Kuwait, China, Egypt, Turkey, Britain, and Arab Donors 18-19%</i>	<i>Badakshan, Baghdis, Baghlan, Balkh, Farah, Herat (Khan), Jowzjan, Kabul, Panjshir Valley (Masood), Samanghan,</i>	<i><u>(Professor) Burhanuddin Rabbani</u> Mostly Tajik State Trained Ulema and Secular Trained Intelligencia</i>	<i>Ahmad Shah Masood, Ismail Khan, Zaibullah</i>
<u>Harakat-e-Inqalaab-e-Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, Egypt, Turkey, Britain, Pakistani Islamist Groups, and Individual Arab Donors 13-15%</i>	<i>Southern and Western Afghanistan – Farah, Helmand, Herat, Kandahar, Uruzghan, Herat, Tribal Areas</i>	<i><u>Nabi Mohammadi Nabi</u> Independent Tribals, Ulema and Mawlawis</i>	
<u>Mahaz-e-Melli-e-Islami (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, Egypt, Turkey, Britain, and Individual Arab Donors 10-11%</i>	<i>Kandahar, Logar (Amin Wardak), Maidan Valley, Nimroz, Paktia</i>	<i><u>(Pir) Sayyed Ahmed Gailani</u></i>	<i>Amin Wardak, Haji Latif, Rahatullah Safi, Mohammad Nassim</i>
<u>Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Melli (National Liberation Front)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, and Individual Arab Donors 3-5%</i>	<i>Kandahar, Kunar</i>	<i><u>Sibghatullah Mujaddidi</u></i>	
<u>Ittehad-Islami (Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan)</u>	<i>USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, China, and Especially Individual Arab Donors 17-18% (Mostly Arab Aid)</i>	<i>Kabul, Paktia</i>	<i><u>Abd al-Rab Rasul Sayyaf</u></i>	
<u>Sepah-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards)</u>	<i>Most Iranian Backed Party since 1984</i>	<i>Bamiyan, Helmand, Herat, Ghazni, Ghor, Jowzjan, & Parwan</i>	<i><u>Sheikh Muhammad Ali Akbari & Mohsen Rezai</u></i>	
<u>Hezbollah (Party of God)</u>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Ghor, North Helmand, & West Herat</i>	<i><u>Sheikh Wusiqi & Ali Zahedi</u></i>	<i>Qari Ali Ahmad Darwazi, aka, Qar Yakkashta</i>
<u>Sazman-e-Nasr (Victory Organisation)</u>	<i>Iran, until support was withdrawn</i>	<i>Balkh, Bamiyan, Ghazni, Ghor, Kabul, Parwan, Wardan</i>	<i><u>Council of 'Four' Persons Esp, Sheikh Abdul Mazari</u></i>	
<u>Harakat-e-Islami (Islamic Movement)</u>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Balkh, Bamiyan, Fariab, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Parwan, Samangan, Wardak – Most Active Shia Party</i>	<i><u>Muhammad Asif Mohsini</u></i>	<i>Muhammad Anwari</i>
<u>Al-Shura-e-Ittifaq (The Council of the Union)</u>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Ghazni</i>	<i><u>Sayed Ali Beheshti</u></i>	<i>Muhammad Hasan, aka, Sayed Jaglan</i>
<u>Hizbe-Wahdat (1998)*</u>	<i>Iran</i>	<i>Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Fariab, Ghazni, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Parwan, Samangan, Wardak</i>	<i><u>Sheikh Abdul Mazari</u></i>	

⁴ Table 6:1 & 6:2 - Jalalzai (1999), pp. 87-99; Gohari (2000), pp. 10-25; Urban (1990), App IV, pp. 328-332. Many secondary sources used are noted throughout the chapter. * *Hizbe-Wahdat* formed in 1988 at the behest of Iran from eight parties: *Harakat-e-Islami*; *Sazman-e-Nasr*; *Sepah-e-Pasdaran*; *Hezbollah*; *Da'wat* (Invitation); *Nahajat* (Progress); *Nehror Islami* (Islamic Strength); and, *Jabha Motabed* (United Front).

TABLE 3:1 – General Demographics of Afghanistan

Afghanistan: General Description	Afghanistan is a mountainous country situated in southern Central Asia, bordering Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China; with an area of approximately 251,700 square miles.
2010 Total Population ⁵	Approximately 31,412,000
Population Distribution ⁶	Rural: 77% Urban: 23%
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)	Since 1980, Afghanistan has had one of the world's largest recorded refugee populations. During the Soviet occupation, 2 million were internally displaced and 6 million refugees fled the country ⁷ . In 2012, 2,700,000 remain refugees outside Afghanistan, and 425,000 remain internally displaced ⁸ .
GDP Per Capita in 2011 ⁹	US \$ 542.9 (2011) ¹⁰ ; GDP PPP - US \$1,000
Percentage of labour force by occupation ¹¹	Agriculture – 78.6%; Industry – 5.7%; Services – 15.7% (FY 08/09 est.)
Export Commodities ¹² .	Opium, fruits & nuts, hand-woven carpets, wool, cotton, hides & pelts, & precious gems.
Number of Telephone Lines – Landlines ¹³	13,500 (2011)
Number of Telephones – Mobile Cellular ¹⁴	17,558,000 (2011)
Adult Literacy Rate (15yrs & older) 2005-2009 ¹⁵	Overall: 26% Female: 13% Male: 39%
Youth Literacy Rate (15 to 24 yrs) 2005-2009	Overall: 39% Female: 24% Male: 53%
% Population with access to safe drinking water ¹⁶	Overall: 48% Urban: 78% Rural: 39%
% Population with access to safe sanitation	Overall: 37% Urban: 60% Rural: 30%
Life Expectancy at Birth, 2010 ¹⁷	Female: 50 years Male: 47 years
Under 5 Mortality Rank ¹⁸	2 (189 being the best rank attained, with 196 countries and territories) 257
Infant Mortality Rate, Under 5 ¹⁹	of every 1000 children born die before reaching age 5.
The Maternal Mortality Ratio ²⁰	For every 100,000 live births, 460 mothers die.

⁵ The Central Statistics Organisation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. See, < <http://www.cso.gov.af/demography/population.html> >. The population provided is not based upon a comprehensive census, and is an extrapolation of information obtained from the Population Division and Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat, *Indicators on Population*. Estimates vary from organization to organization, and must be evaluated critically due to the high degree of subjectivity imbued within the information produced from the highly divisive and diverse ethnic composition of the AFGHAN population. Some estimates that are widely exaggerated and range as high as 31.412 million, see, < http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Sorting-Tables/tab-sorting_population.htm > or < <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/default.htm> >; for example, the United Nations estimates the Afghan population as 27,208,000 as at 2008 < <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx> >. A 2010 estimate by the reputable Encyclopedia Britannica puts the population at 26,290,000 < <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan> >. However, some of the sources that are used by the encyclopedia have wide variations within their estimates. The source used in Table 3.1 is the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, < http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Sorting-Tables/tab-sorting_population.htm >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

⁶ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, < http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Sorting-Tables/tab-sorting_population.htm >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

⁷ John F. Burns, "Afghan Capital Grim as War Follows War", *New York Times*, 5 February 1996.

⁸ 2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Afghanistan. < <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6&submit=GO> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

⁹ CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, 2013. Figures show estimates of GDP Per capita on a Purchasing Power Parity basis as at 1 July 2011. < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁰ World Bank Group, Per Capita GDP (current US\$) for 2011, World databank, World Development Indicators (WDI). < <http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=afghanistan+per+capita+gdp&language=EN&format=html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹¹ CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, 2013. Percentage of Afghanistan's labour force by occupation. < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹² CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, 2013. Export Commodities. < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹³ CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, 2013. Number of Telephone Lines–Landlines. < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁴ CIA World Factbook – Afghanistan, 2013. Number of Telephones–Mobile Cellular. < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁵ UNESCO and UNICEF 2012, *Asia-Pacific - End of Decade Notes on Education for All: EFA Goal 4 Youth and Adult Literacy*, Statistical Annexes, Annex 3: *Adult and Youth Literacy Rates - Data Collected by the UIS-AIMS Unit*, Data Collection Reference Date 2008, p. 65. < <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/002184/218428E.pdf> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013. See also, United Nations Statistics Division, UN Data at < <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A49> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁶ UNICEF, *Factsheet - WASH: Water, Sanitation & Hygiene*, Afghanistan Country Office, November 2011. < http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/ACO_WASH_Factsheet_-_November_2011.pdf >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁷ World Health Organisation, Afghanistan Health Profile, Mortality and Burden of Disease, Life Expectancy at Birth (years), Selected Indicators 2010 (Data for 2009, but last updated May 2012), p. 1. < <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁸ UNICEF, *State of the World's Children 2009*, Under Five Mortality Rankings p. 117. < <http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/docs/SOWC09-FullReport-EN.pdf> > or, < http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/docs/SOWC09_all_tables.pdf >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

¹⁹ UNICEF, *State of the World's Children 2009*, Infant Mortality Rate, Under 5, Table 1 – Basic Indicators, p. 118. < <http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/docs/SOWC09-FullReport-EN.pdf> > or, < http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/docs/SOWC09_all_tables.pdf >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

²⁰ World Health Organisation, Afghanistan Health Profile, Mortality and Burden of Disease, Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births), Selected Indicators 2010 (last updated May 2012), p. 1. < <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf> >. Accessed on 23 January 2013.

CHAPTER FIVE

Table 5:1 – Major South Asian Recipients of US, USSR, & West European Arms, 1975-1979 (US\$ Million)²¹

Recipient	Total – (All Suppliers)	USSR	USA	France	U.K.	West Germany	Italy
South Asia	3,600	2,300	220	360	130	10	20
<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>470</u>	<u>450</u>	---	---	---	---	---
India	2,200	1,800	40	40	100	10	20
Pakistan	875	20	180	320	20	---	---
Others	35	30	---	---	10	---	---

²¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979* (1982). Includes Deliveries of Arms and Ammunition, and Related Equipment, Excludes Services and Construction.

CHAPTER SIX

Table 6:1 – Soviet Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers used in the Afghan-Soviet War²²

Characteristic	RPG-7	RPG-16	RPG-18	RPG-22
Warhead Calibre (mm)	85	58.3	64	72
Armour Penetration (mm)	330	Upto 375	Upto 375	Upto 400
Grenade	Rocket Assisted Heat	RAH	RAH	RAH
Weight Kg	7.9 (empty)	10.3	2.7 grenade and launcher	---
Rate of Fire (rd/min)	4-6	4-6	N/A (Disposable Weapon)	---
Range (m)	300-500	500-800	200	250

²² The Soviet Army: Troops, Organisation and Equipment, FM 100-2-3 (Washington D.C.: GPO: 1984), pp 5, 72-75.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Table 7:1 – The Most Common Small Arms and Weapons in use in Afghanistan²³

Pistols	7.62 mm Tokarev; (Home-made hand guns and numerous pistols from are also present)
Sub-Machine Guns	7.62 mm PPSH41; 7.65 mm CZ; vz-61.
Rifles	7.62 mm Simonov SKS; 7.62 mm AK-47; 7.62 mm AK-74; 7.62 mm AKM/s; 7.62 mm Type 56/56-2 (Chinese); 7.62 mm SVD (Sniper Rifle)
Machine Guns	7.62 mm RPD; 7.62 mm RPK; 7.62 mm PK (GPMG); 12.7 mm DShK and 14.5 mm ZPU-1/2 (Heavy Machine Guns – Non-Man Portable).
Close Support Weapons	30 mm AGS-17; RPG-7/Type 63 Rocket Launchers and Type 69 Rocket Launcher (Chinese).
Mortars and Rockets	82 mm M37; 107 mm M38; 120 mm M1943; 160 mm M1943; 107 mm Single-Barrelled Rocket Launcher (Chinese).
Anti-Tank Weapons	73 mm SPG-9; 82 mm RCLB-10; Snapper ATGW.
SAM	SA-7 ‘Grail’ Man-Portable SAM; FIM-92A Stinger SAM (The location of these weapons is unknown, and the missiles’ lifespan has most probably expired)

²³ *Jane’s World Armies*, Issue 5, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 1999) Afghanistan Section; and, *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2002 Edition, April – September 2002, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 2002) pp. 52-55. This is a general list and is not exhaustive. This table has been adapted from information provided by numerous sources given throughout this chapter. A number of other weapons that were found to exist in Afghanistan through my numerous visits and contacts with Arms Dealers producing weapons and retailing a variety of different weapons in arms workshops in the Tribal Areas across the Afghan-Pakistan border.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Table 8:1 – Results from the ICRC Prospective Cohort Study on the Circumstances around Weapon Injury in Cambodia after the Departure of the UNTAC Peacekeeping Force – Data on Weapon Injuries by Context, Combatant Status and Weapon Type²⁴

	Non-Combat Injuries				Combat-Related Injuries			Totals		
	Civilian		Military							
Weapon Type	Interpersonal Violence	Accident	Interpersonal Violence	Accident	Total Non-Combat	Civilian	Military	Total Civilian	Total Military	Overall Total
Mine	3	11	1	21	36	96 u	185 w	110	207	317 j
Fragment	17	41	0	18	76	123 t	63 z	181	81	262 k
Firearm	80 o	10 p	15 q	14 r	119 s	34	99 x	124	128	262 l
Other	18	3	0	6	27	1	4	22	10	32 m
Total	118 a	65 b	16 c	59 d	258 e	254 f	351 g	437 h	426 i	863 n

²⁴ Adapted from Table 3, 'Number of Weapon Injuries by Context, Combatant Status, and Weapon Type', in Meddings, David R., and O'Connor, Stephanie M., 'Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia After Departure of a Peacekeeping Force: Prospective Cohort Study', *British Medical Journal*, Volume 319, 14 August 1999, p. 414. Also found in International Committee for the Red Cross, *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, ICRC publication 1999, ref. 0734, Table 2. p. 11. < <http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/global-trade-in-small-arms.pdf> >. Accessed on 22 May 2012.

Table 8:2 – Results adapted from the ICRC Prospective Cohort Study on the Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia after the Departure of the UNTAC Peacekeeping Force - In terms of Percentages of Important points by Context of Combat Status (results are rounded to the nearest percent – highlights relate to highlighted letters in Table 8.1)²⁵

All Injuries	Non-Combat Injuries	Combat Injuries
59 % of people injured were civilians or did not sustain their injuries in a combat related environment (c+d+h)	30 % of people sustained their injuries in a non-combat environment (a+b+c+d)	78 % of civilians with intentionally targeted combat injuries (this exempts landmines), were injured by fragmenting munitions (t)
51 % of people injured were civilians (h)	71 % of all people with non-combat injuries were civilians (a+b)	42 % of all people with combat injuries were civilians (f)
37 % of all those injured were injured by mines (j)	67 % of people with non-combat injuries from firearms were civilians injured as a result of interpersonal violence (o)	46 % of all to combat injuries were from mines (u+w)
46 % of all non-combat injuries were as a result of firearms (s)	79 % of non-combat injuries to military staff resulted from accidents (d)	60 % of military staff with combat injuries were injured by firearms (x) and 38 % by fragmenting munitions (z)

²⁵ Meddings, David R., and O'Connor, Stephanie M., 'Circumstances Around Weapon Injury in Cambodia After Departure of a Peacekeeping Force: Prospective Cohort Study', *British Medical Journal*, Volume 319, 14 August 1999, p. 413. Table 8.2 adapted from information taken from Important Points in Table 3.

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CHAPTER TWO

FIGURE 2:1 – Ladder of Conflict





FIGURE 2:2 – Johan Galtung’s Conflict Triangle²⁶



²⁶ Reproduced from, Galtung, J., 'Conflict as a way of life', in, Ferrman, H (Ed.), *Progress in mental health* (London: Churchill: 1969).

FIGURE 2:3 – The Social Conflict Cycle²⁷



²⁷ Reproduced with Additions from Miall, H., Ramsbottom, O., and Woodhouse, T., *Contemporary conflict resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (Cambridge: Polity Press: 1999).

FIGURE 2:4 – Conflict Interactions




FIGURE 2:5 – Key to Conflict Interactions





FIGURE 2:6 – The Conflict Curve



**FIGURE 2:7 – The True Conflict Curve:
Factors Favourable and Unfavourable to Escalation**




FIGURE 2:8 – A Simplified Mathematical Explanation of the Processes of Escalation and De-escalation on the Conflict Curve²⁸

The *Intensity* at any given point on the *Conflict Curve* is defined as:

$$\text{Intensity} = \Psi - \Phi = \Omega$$

Therefore, the *Intensity* of the conflict in *Time* (T) and at *Point* 'W' is defined as:

$$\Omega W = \Psi W - \Phi W$$

The *Escalation* of a conflict measured between two points in *Time* (T) is defined as:

$$\text{Escalation} = \frac{\Omega X - \Omega W}{TX - TW} = E$$

Where, 'W' and 'X' represent two arbitrary points in time along the conflict curve

Where there is *Negative Escalation* (-E), it is then defined as:

$$-E = D$$

and,

$$D = \text{De-escalation}$$

28 Key of symbols for Figure 2.8.

- T = Time. 'W', 'X', 'Y', and 'Z' represent arbitrary points in 'Time' along the conflict curve.
- E = Escalation of the Conflict measured by Change in Intensity (Ω) between two points in Time (T)
- Ψ = Factors, Elements, Conditions, Actions and Reactions, Conducive and Favourable to an *Increase* in the Intensity and Escalation of a Conflict
- Φ = Factors, Elements, Conditions, Actions and Reactions, Conducive and Favourable to the *Decrease* in Intensity, or Diffusion, De-escalation and Resolution of the Conflict
- Ω = Conflict Curve Representing the Intensity of the Conflict at any given point in time. Not to be confused with 'resistance' in physics
- D = De-escalation of the Conflict measured in the Change in Intensity (Ω) between two points in Time (T)
- A = Acceleration of the Conflict
- = No Overt Conflict Exists: the Parties Have Not Set Goals in Order to Pursue Contentious Issues
- π = The Point along the Conflict Curve where the Factors for and Against Escalation are in a State of Equilibrium. Below this Point, the Greater the Factors Favourable to De-escalation, the Greater the Stability of the Relationship between Parties. Above this Point, the Greater the Factors Favourable to Escalation, the Greater the Intensity of the Relationship between Conflicting Parties

FIGURE 2:9 – Acceleration & Deceleration (1)

As a conflict intensifies, one or more of the thresholds [as noted in **Figure 2.1** ‘Ladder of Conflict’] may be surpassed, or jumped over. In this respect, the progression of the conflict is rarely linear; in fact, the rate of the increase in the intensity of the conflict becomes progressively greater. In other words, a conflict can accelerate from one intensity to another. The reverse is also true for the deceleration of a conflict.

For example, a conflict may be proceeding at a certain rate (r), 2 intensity units (Ω) per one time unit (t) (where, $r = \frac{2\Omega}{t}$), between certain thresholds in the conflict, in either direction of the conflict, or towards a higher intensity or a lower intensity of conflict.

1) A decision, action, or reaction may intensify the conflict from, **i**) threshold ‘A’ to threshold ‘B’, and **ii**) continue to threshold ‘C’ at a given rate (in movement units (m) and time units (t) (where, $r = \frac{m}{t}$). At threshold ‘C’, a decision, incident, event, action or reaction [dependent upon the circumstances or as a result of the initial steps, ‘i’ and ‘ii’] may, **iii**) directly affect a higher or lower threshold, such as threshold ‘A’, which in turn affects all higher or lower thresholds. Therefore, this could lead to the compression or expansion of the thresholds, or acceleration or deceleration of the conflict respectively.

2) The event at threshold ‘C’ may indirectly affect threshold ‘A’ by, **a**) affecting threshold ‘B’, which in turn has, **b**) an effect on threshold ‘A’. A subsequent cycle may be established in which any event at threshold ‘C’ may affect, directly or indirectly, threshold ‘C’ itself, where ‘iii’ leads to ‘i’ and then to ‘ii’. This can continue as a spiraling effect, towards a greater or lesser intensity in the procession of the conflict, by accelerating or decelerating the conflict.




FIGURE 2:10 – Acceleration & Deceleration (2)

A conflict is not static; it varies in time according to the circumstances and the choices made at each and every point. The decisions made have differing and varying quantitative and qualitative impacts on the course of the conflict. These decisions can both escalate a conflict, or de-escalate it. The rate at which conflicts escalate or de-escalate also varies according to the decisions made and the circumstances at hand. For example:

Figure 2.10.a





Figure 2.10.a: We can see that, although constantly escalating throughout the conflict, the conflict escalates at a slower pace at points 1, 2, & 4, and a higher pace at point 3. At point 3, the conflict is accelerating to a greater intensity. At point 4 the conflict has a lower acceleration than point 3.

Figure 2.10.b: The escalation steps between thresholds also expand and contract, showing the relaxation or increase of barriers and constraints leading to successive thresholds. It is evident that the most optimal points to introduce conflict resolution proposals would be at 1A, 1C, 2B and even at 4A in order to take advantage of the lower intensity of the conflict. Conversely, conflict resolution process may be most needed at 1B, 1D, 2A, 2D, 3ABCD, 4C, and 4D, where the barriers to the succeeding thresholds are so close that they may even have broken down completely, as between the thresholds at 3ABCD and 4D.

Figure 2.10.b



The conflict thresholds compress and expand throughout the course of the conflict. This is also true of the escalation steps between the thresholds. The widest periods between thresholds and escalation steps represent the optimal points at which to push forward conflict resolution proposals and solutions. At points where the thresholds are most compressed the conflict may be *accelerating*, where the rate and intensity of the conflict is increasing. At points where the thresholds are widest the conflict may be *decelerating*, where the rate and intensity of the conflict is decreasing. The conflict curve illustrates that conflicts rarely follow a linear or constant path.

FIGURE 2:11 – Linear Conflict Intensity Curve




FIGURE 2:12 – Non-Linear Conflict Intensity Curve




FIGURE 2:13.a – State of Tension

1)






Figure 2.13.1 – A stable positive relationship exists between Party ‘A’ and Party ‘B’. There is sufficient leeway for the resolution of any conflict of interests or incompatible goals in their earliest stages.

2a)




Figure, 2.13.2.a – The relationship begins to polarise as parties move further apart and tension forms as a result of actions that are perceived as threats or detrimental to the party’s interests, by each party against their opposition. At this point, conflict resolution processes are difficult to implement, with the increased tension acting as a restraint to productive communication between the conflicting parties. The relationship between the parties becomes progressively negative.

2b)




Figure, 2.13.2.b – External involvement may apply pressure upon the conflictual relationship either in support of one or other of the parties involved in the conflict, hence, further antagonising the tense relationship (see 3a), or acting as a mediating force to bring the parties to a mutual understanding and enforcing a conflict resolution process (see 3b).

FIGURE 2:13.b – State of Tension



CHAPTER THREE

FIGURE 3:1 – Royal House of Afghanistan – Lineage Tree²⁹



²⁹ This diagram was adapted with own additions from < <http://www.afghanmagazine.com/afghanhistory/rovalfamilies.pdf> >. Accessed on 11 January 2013.

FIGURE 3:2 – Boundaries of Social Stratification and Self-Maximisation in Afghanistan




FIGURE 3:3 – Structure of a Patrilineal Segmentary Society




FIGURE 3:4 – Patterns of Conflict Relations amongst Residential Units




FIGURE 3:5 – Patterns of Co-operative Relations amongst Residential Units




FIGURE 3:6 – Conflicts and Co-operation amongst Tribes






FIGURE 3:7 – Socio-ethnic Structure of Hazara Society³⁰



³⁰ Adapted with own additions with information from, Mousavi, Syed., *The Hazaras of Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1998).

FIGURE 3:8 – Sodality Bonds between the Major Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan



CHAPTER SEVEN

FIGURE 7:1 – The Arms Manufacturing Process in ‘Darra Adam Khel’



FIGURE 7:2 – Indigenous Small Arms Production in Darra Adam Khel and FATA




FIGURE 7:3 – The Halawa System of Arms Dealing




FIGURE 7:4 – A Smuggling Route across the Pak-Afghan Border³¹



³¹ Relief Base Map of the Peshawar-Jalalabad Region adapted from a 'Tactical Pilot Chart' accessed at <<http://www.security.org>>.

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FIGURE 8:1 – Game Theory - Possible Outcomes of an Arms Race between Two Parties.






FIGURE 8:2 – Annual Incidence of Weapon Injuries during Conflict (1991-1995) and Post-Conflict (1995-1997) Periods in Kandahar³².



³² Information Derived from Figure 3, 'Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict', *International Committee for the Red Cross*, 1999, ref. 0734.


**FIGURE 8:3 – Firearms Possession and Intentional Firearms Deaths
Amongst Fifteen Industrialised Countries³³**



³³ International Committee for the Red Cross, 'Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict', *ICRC publication, 1999*, ref. 0734, p. 10. Taken from, Cukier, Wendy., 'Firearms regulation: Canada in the international context', *Chronic Diseases in Canada*, April 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 25-34. The diagram can also be found in, Cukier, Wendy., and Chapelaine, A., 'Global trade in small arms: health effects and interventions', Working Paper, *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and SAFER-Net* [online document], March 2001. < <http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/global-trade-in-small-arms.pdf> >. Accessed on 30 May 2012. Also see, Cukier, Wendy., Collins, C., and Chapelaine, A., *Globalization of small arms/firearms, responses to globalization: Rethinking equity in health*, World Health Organisation, Geneva, July 12-14th 1999.


CHAPTER NINE

FIGURE 9:1 – The Global Potential Opium Production, 1997-2011, Metric Tons³⁴.




³⁴ UNODC, 'The global Afghan opium trade: A threat assessment 2011', (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.11.XI.11) *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* [web document], July 2011, Figure 12, p. 26. < http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf >. Accessed on 01 August 2012.).

FIGURE 9:2 – Improvements in Afghanistan’s Security Compared to a Year Ago, 2004³⁵.




³⁵ HRRAC, 'Take the guns away: Afghan voices on security and elections', *Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC)* September 2004, p. 3.

FIGURE 9:3 – Potential Total Value of Opium Cultivation as Compared to Wheat Production³⁶.




³⁶ Adapted from data in, The Senlis Council, *Helmand at war: The changing nature of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan and its effects on the future of the country*, Helmand_Report, The Senlis Council, Security and Development Policy Group, London, June 2006, p. 16.

FIGURE 9:4 – Areas under Insurgent (esp. Taliban) or Government/NATO Control and Principle Security Threats in Helmand Province during May 2006³⁷.



³⁷ The Senlis Council, *Helmand at war: The changing nature of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan and its effects on the future of the country*, Helmand_Report, The Senlis Council, Security and Development Policy Group, London, June 2006, p. 18, & p. 32.

FIGURE 9:5 – Outcomes of Traumatic Stress Reactions and Bereavement Reactions³⁸



³⁸ Raphael, B, 'Interaction of trauma and grief', in, Black, D., and Newman, M., et al, *Psychological trauma: A developmental approach* (Glasgow: Bell and Bain Ltd: 1997), pp. 31-43, p. 41.

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CHAPTER TWO

Author travelling on a smuggling route towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar - 1999



PLATE 2:1 – The smuggling route, looking towards Afghanistan from the Vale of Peshawar, May 1999.



PLATE 2:2 – Rear view of the smuggling route from the Vale of Peshawar, May 1999.


CHAPTER THREE

PLATE 3:1 – Extent of the Achaemenid Dynasty : 530 to 323 BC³⁹




³⁹ The Persian Achaemenid Empire 500BC. < http://www.worldhistorymaps.info/images/Persia_500bc.jpg >. Accessed on 25 January 2012.

PLATE 3:2 – Persian Political Division - Satrapies (Provinces)⁴⁰




⁴⁰ The Persian Achaemenid Empire C 500 BC - Territorial Expansion. < <http://sitemaker.umich.edu/mladjov/files/persia500bc.jpg> >
Accessed on 25 January 2012.



⁴¹ Campaigns of Alexander the Great. < <http://www.bible-history.com/maps/Map-Campaigns-Alexander-the-Great.jpg> >. Accessed on 25 January 2012.

PLATE 3:5 - Safavid Persia in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 1501-1722A.D.⁴³



Chapter 1⁴³ The Safavid Empire or Safavid Dynasty 1501-1722. < <http://www.zonu.com/images/0X0/2010-01-05-11618/El-Imperio-Safavida-o-Dinastia-Safawi-1501-1722.png> >. Accessed on 25 January 2013.

PLATE 3:6 – Ethnolinguistic Groups in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan⁴⁴




⁴⁴ Friedman, George., *WikiLeaks and the Afghan War*, Stratfor Global Intelligence, Afghanistan and Pakistan Ethnicity, 27 July, 2010. < http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100726_wikileaks_and_afghan_war >. Accessed on 26 January 2013.

PLATE 3:7 – The Afghan-Pakistan Border Region along FATA⁴⁵



⁴⁵ Informed Comment, Thoughts on the Middle East, History and Religion, Maps of the Middle East and Muslim World, *Pakistan: Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and FATA*, www.bbc.com [online news]. < <http://www.bbc.com> >. Accessed on 26 January 2013.

PLATE 3:8 – The First Homeland of the Uzbek Tribal Confederation c.a. A.D. 1400⁴⁶



⁴⁶ Allworth, Edward A., *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present* (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press: 1990), p. 32, Fig 1.1, p. 7. Other sources: Akhmedov, B.A., *Gosudarstvo kochevykj Uzbekov*, 1965; *Hudud al-'Alam* trans. Minorsky, 1970; and, Barthold, W., *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions* (Gibb: 1958).

CHAPTER SIX

Armoured Vehicles Used by the Soviets and Passed on to the Mujahideen and Taliban

**PLATE 6:1 – The Road from Kabul, APC provides a ride. Author is seated adjacent to the turret
(Face of second party blurred to protect his identity)**



CHAPTER SEVEN



PLATE 7:1 - People Openly Carry Weapons in the Streets

DARRA ADAM KHEL ARMS STORES and ASSORTED WEAPONS



PLATE 7:2 - A Typical Arms Store in 'Darra Adam Khel'. Karim Masoud (middle) and arms dealers.




PLATE 7:3 - AK-47 Kalashnikov frames including, gas chamber, barrel, and trigger guard.



PLATE 7:4 - Darra Arms Store. Note numerous AK-47 'Darra' copies available for sale to any person with money.



PLATE 7:5, Darra Arms Store. Note the availability of M16 assault rifles, AR-15 rifles, 12-bore shotguns, folding stock Kalacovs, magazines, and general military equipment.



PLATE 7:6, Sajid Khans's arms dealership, inside the store. A variety of weapons ranging from an old Lee Enfield 0.303 to 12 bore pump-action shotguns, bolt action hunting rifles, & folding- stock AK-47 assault rifles are available.



PLATE 7:7, Sajid Khans's arms dealership, inside the store.



PLATE 7:8, An arms dealer selling an array of weapons to two openly armed tribesmen in a Khyber Agency Barra adjacent to Peshawar

**VARIETY of WEAPONS PRODUCED & SOLD in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL'
& the BARRAS of the FATA**



PLATE 7:9, Improvised, hand-crafted, handgun made in 'Darra Adam Khel'.



PLATE 7:10, Extending Stock Heckler Kock MP5 Sub-Machinegun.



PLATE 7:11, G-3 Assault Rifle



PLATE 7:12, M16 Assault Rifle



PLATE 7:13, Pump Action Shotgun



PLATE 7:14 AK-47 Derivative



PLATE 7:15, AK-47 Derivative



PLATE 7:16, Assault Rifle

WEAPONS OWNED by the RESIDENTS of the KHYBER AGENCY, FATA



PLATE 7:17.



PLATE 7:18 AK-47 Derivative

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – THE WORKSHOPS



PLATE 7:19 - The Weapons Workshops - Next to a Girls School



PLATE 7:20, The Weapons Workshops - The Back Streets



PLATE 7:21 - The Weapons Workshops - The Back Streets 2




PLATE 7:22, The Weapons Workshops - The Back Streets 3 - Workers Lodges

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – THE ARMS STORES



PLATE 7:23, Typical View of the Main Road in *Darra Adam Khel*




PLATE 7:24, View of Typical Shop Fronts on the Main Road in *Darra Adam Khel*



PLATE 7:25, Poster of Sikh Leaders pinned on a door of one of the shops in Darra

THE ARMS PRODUCTION PROCESS - MANUFACTURING



PLATE 7:26, The Weapons Workshops - B - The Process 1 – Handcrafting



PLATE 7:27, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Handcrafting 2

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – MACHINERY



PLATE 7:28, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - The Machinery

**The PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL'
MAKING the WOODEN STOCKS, HANDLES**



PLATE 7:29, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Wooden Stock 1



PLATE 7:30, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Wooden Stock 2



PLATE 7:31, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Wooden Stock - Painting and Varnishing 1



PLATE 7:32, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Wooden Stock - Painting and Varnishing 2



PLATE 7:33, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Wooden Stock - Painting and Varnishing 3

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – MAKING THE BARREL



PLATE 7:34, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel



PLATE 7:35, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel




PLATE 7:36, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel




PLATE 7:37, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel



PLATE 7:38, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel - Drilling



PLATE 7:39, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel - Drilling




PLATE 7:40, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel - Boring



PLATE 7:41, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Barrel - Boring

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – MAKING THE BREACH HOUSING



PLATE 7:42, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 1




PLATE 7:43, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 2



PLATE 7:44, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 3




PLATE 7:45, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 4



PLATE 7:46, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 5



PLATE 7:47, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 6



PLATE 7:48, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Breach Housing 7

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – THE MAGAZINE



PLATE 7:49, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Making the Magazine 1



PLATE 7:50, A comparison between a new 'Darra' copy (top), Original Soviet, and Original Chinese magazines.

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – FINAL PRODUCT




PLATE 7:51, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - The Final Product

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS in 'DARRA ADAM KHEL' – INSPECTION




PLATE 7:52, The Weapons Workshops -Karim Masoud inspects the Final Product



PLATE 7:53, The Weapons Workshops - Group Inspection of the Final Product

AK-47 COMPARISONS



PLATE 7:54, A comparison between the much recognised AK-47 (top) and the folding stock Kalacov (bottom) derivative made in 'Darra'. There is relatively little outward difference between the weapons.

TESTING



PLATE 7:55, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - The Final Product - Test Firing



PLATE 7:56, The Weapons Workshops - The Process - Conditions

DRUGS AND ARMS – DARRA ADAM KHEL



PLATE 7:57, Darra Arms Shop Owner, Haybat Khan (middle) with the narcotics dealer (left), in front of the narcotics dealer's shop, along the main road of 'Darra Adam Khel'.



PLATE 7:58, Haybat Khans's arms dealership (left) adjacent to a narcotics dealer's shop, along the main Darra road.



PLATE 7:59, A Sales Counter in one of the many shops, along the main road, openly selling narcotics in Darra Adam Khel. Note how the counter is packed with blocks of Hashish, (1 lbs in weight - approx, 500 grams).



PLATE 7:60, narcotics being displayed in and on top of a sales counter in one of the many shops, along the main road, openly selling narcotics in Darra Adam Khel. Displayed here are one imperial pound (1 lbs) blocks (approx, 500 grams) of Hashish retailing at about £5 Sterling each. Photo taken in Darra Adam Khel, (December 2003).

DRUGS AND ARMS – ‘BARRA’, KYBER AGENCY, FATA



PLATE 7:61, a narcotics dealer's shop in the Khyber Agency 'Barra', FATA.



PLATE 7:62, an arms merchant selling an array of small arms, explosives, fragmentation grenades, and ammunition (for both small arms and heavier weapons) alongside narcotics (a large block of hashish) in Khyber agency 'Barra', FATA, adjacent to Peshawar.



PLATE 7:63, small arms and narcotics on display in a *'Barra'* arms merchant's shop.



PLATE 7:64, a narcotics dealer in the Khyber Agency *'Barra'*. Note the sheepskin and goatskin fur sacks in the cages, which contain a potent form of hashish (scunk) and aid its maturation with a distinct aroma.



PLATE 7:65, a block of opium resin being weighed in a shop openly selling narcotics, adjacent to an arms dealer shop.. The block measures approximately 20 centimetres across. A small bottle containing Cocaine ($C_{17}H_{21}NO_4$) is given for size comparisons. Also note the metal cage behind the scales where a potent form of Hashish (*Skunk*) is being matured inside sheepskin or goatskin sacks.



PLATE 7:66, a block of opium resin and a small bottle of Cocaine ($C_{17}H_{21}NO_4$) sold overtly.



PLATE 7:67, Haybat Khan, an arms dealer.

THE ANTI-NARCOTICS FORCE – KOHAT



PLATE 7:68, The Anti-Narcotics Compound, Kohat. The author alongside narcotics stored in the fortified compound. The Combined storage of large sacks of hashish and opium, and smaller sacks of processed heroin produced an overpowering and pungent odour.



**PLATE 7:69, Original RPG-7 launcher seized by the Anti-Narcotics Force, Kohat District.
Displayed by Alam Zaib.**



Plate 7:70, An infantry support light machine gun seized by an Anti-Narcotics Force raid, Kohat District.

ARMS in the FATA



PLATE 7:71, a RPG-7 launcher, these are readily available in the FATA.



PLATE 7:72, Tribesmen discussing the availability of arms in the FATA.

The FRONTLINES and ROAD to KABUL.



PLATE 7:73, The Frontlines - The Shomali Plain, North of Kabul, July 1999



PLATE 7:74, The Frontlines – Buildings Used by Combatants for Accommodation (a)



PLATE 7:75, The Frontlines – Buildings Used by Combatants for Accommodation (b)



PLATE 7:76, The Frontlines – Buildings Used by Combatants for Accommodation (c)



PLATE 7:77, The Frontlines – Shipping Container used as Emergency Shelter & Bunker, July 1999



PLATE 7:78, The Frontlines – Trenches are dug to provide Protection on High Ground, July 1999



PLATE 7:79, The Frontlines – This Mortar is an example of one of the most Effective Weapons used, July 1999



PLATE 7:80, The Frontlines – a Young Talib, Tahir, Practices at Mortar Targeting, July 1999



PLATE 7:81, The Frontlines – Some of the Weapons used by Combatants being Carefully Displayed for the Camera, July 1999



PLATE 7:82, The Frontlines – The Author Test Firing an AK-47 into the Hills, July 1999

The ROAD to and from KABUL




PLATE 7:83, Departure from Jalalabad. The Author holding a can of pepsi (centre), August 1997



PLATE 7:84, the Road to Kabul, the Jalalabad-Kabul Highway was Literally Destroyed during the Afghan-Soviet War, August 1997.

The Weaponisation of Afghanistan and the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation on Conflict Dynamics

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CHAPTER ONE

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- ³ Dupree, Louis., *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press: 1980), p. 334.
- ⁴ The overthrow of King Zahir Shah in July 1973 induced renewed interest and a perception of superpower competition in Afghanistan due to the fast changing and fluid political circumstances, which provided the superpower camps an opportunity to take advantage of the political uncertainty in the country through arms assistance to influence the political leadership's future direction. See chapter five, the Weaponisation of Afghanistan – 1973-1979.
- ⁵ Please refer to section 1:5:4:1 – Data Collection; and, 1:5:4:2 – Verification, Validity and Objectivity, for more information on the significance of data collection and the methods used therein.
- ⁶ Establishing secure relationships with a variety of actors and parties in Pakistan took many months of prior planning, to gain access through various conduits and intermediaries through which the author was able to eventually create relationships with individuals within the aforementioned parties, groups and organisations. Some of these were enabled through contacts with the author's family and friends in both Pakistan and the United Kingdom. In relation to the Taliban, direct contact was made through the Taliban government's diplomatic missions based in Islamabad and Peshawar, Pakistan, and also through 'Harakat al-Ansar' (a Kashmir based militant organisation) contact for which was assisted by close family. Once initial contacts were established, a deliberate effort was made to ensure that they remained secure by maintaining constant and regular communication throughout the period of field research. Some quantity of ingenuity, as well as personal risk was taken to make contact with the Northern Alliance, although, it was difficult to maintain regular contact due to security concerns. Throughout this period, it was essential to maintain high ethical standards in relation to the security of the contacts made and the methods that were used to ensure the maintenance of contact so as not to endanger the lives of the people that the author was in touch with, as well as the author's life.
- ⁷ See section 1:5:4:3 for a more detailed account of the field research conducted and the ethical issues encountered as a consequence of such research.
- ⁸ Two significant authorities on Afghanistan stand out in this respect. Namely, Dr Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat and Dr Azmat Hayat, who later became the Vice Chancellor of the University of Peshawar.
- ⁹ The Cold War officially ended on 03 December 1989 during the Malta summit between Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and US president George Bush Sr. Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's press spokesman's announcement that "we buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean". See, Beschloss, Michael R., and Talbot, Strobe., *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company: 1993), p. 152.). The decision was taken "aboard a Soviet ship docked at Malta's Marsaxlokk harbour". See 'A day that shook the world: Cold War officially ends', *The Independent* [online newspaper], 03 December 1989. <<http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/history/a-day-that-shook-the-world-cold-war-officially-ends-2149069.html>>. Accessed on 03 January 2014.
- ¹⁰ Karp, A. (1995), 'Small arms: The new major weapons', in Boutwell, J., Klare, M.T. and Reed, L.W. (eds) (1995), *Lethal commerce: The global trade in small arms and light weapons* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences), p. 17.
- ¹¹ Bloomfield, David., and Reilly, Ben., 'The changing nature of conflict and conflict management', *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, Vol. 7, No. 28, 1998, p. 9.
- ¹² International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) [web page] <<http://www.icbl.org/intro.php>>. Accessed on 04 November 2013.
- ¹³ Ibid, ICBL.
- ¹⁴ It would be imprudent to note all the available literature on the trade in conventional weapons, since, this, itself, would require more than the wordcount space available to this study alone. The arms trade is, itself, further subdivided into countless additional subdivisions, each with a multitude of published literature lining the shelves of libraries and computer databases; and, most of which are far beyond the scope of this study. Such sections may range from end-user certificates and customs import controls to how weapons are transported through difficult terrain, whether overtly or covertly, or how the arms trade is protected by vested interests and/or regulatory structure.
- ¹⁵ Malhotra, Aditi., 'Globalisation and the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons', *Eurasia Review* [Online Journal], 15 January 2011. <<http://www.eurasiareview.com/15012011-globalisation-and-the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons/>>. Accessed on 05 November 2013.
- ¹⁶ Druzin, Heath., Fearing post-2014 environment, 'Afghans buy up weapons', *Stars and Stripes* [online magazine], 05 December 2012. <<http://www.stripes.com/news/fearing-post-2014-environment-afghans-buy-up-weapons-1.199416>>. Accessed on 05 November 2013.
- ¹⁷ An analogy of the rate comparable to genetic evolution.
- ¹⁸ A few of the more prolific private organisations producing literature on SALW are: Human Rights Watch, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), Control Arms Campaign, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and Small Arms Survey. Supra-governmental organisations also publish, of which the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has been the most prolific.
- ¹⁹ See section 1:3 – Literature Review, for a comprehensive account of the literature available on the subject matter of this study.
- ²⁰ A list of publications dealing with SALW can be found on the agency's website. See, UNIDIR [web page] <<http://www.unidir.org/publications/weapons-of-societal-disruption>>. Accessed on 06 November 2013.
- ²¹ 'Weapons of societal disruption – Research Project – Disarmament and Conflict Resolution', *United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)* [web page], <<http://www.unidir.org/programmes/weapons-of-societal-disruption/disarmament-and-conflict-resolution>>. Accessed on 08 July 2013.
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- ²³ Ibid, Gamba, 1995, p. xi.
- ²⁴ Ibid, Gamba, 1995, p. xiv.
- ²⁵ In relation to the dynamics of conflict and the concepts of escalation and deceleration, the execution of a disarmament process may be judged feasible when a window of opportunity arises during a point at which the conflict is de-escalating or decelerating. These are concepts that will be elaborated upon in the conflict theory section of chapter two.
- ²⁶ A weapons reduction initiative sounds perfectly reasonable in theory; however, in the practical realities of the protracted Afghan conflict, such endeavours are extremely difficult to implement; especially given the mass diffusion of SALW in Afghanistan over the past three decades.

- ²⁷ This may be synonymous to a non-interference pact between all the regional countries that can or may interfere by supporting one party over another, as they have done during the Afghan civil war from 1978 until 2001, and even beyond. Practical realities have continued to suggest that announcing such an approach is only the very beginning of a very long and difficult conflict termination process.
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- ²⁹ United Nations General Assembly, A/Res./no49/75D, 15 December 1994.
- ³⁰ Peters, Ann., *The inhumane weapons convention and the 1995-1996 review conference*, ISIS Briefing Paper, No 4, April 1996. ISIS [web document]. < <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/bp-4.pdf> >. Accessed on 08 December 2012. The work on SALW by the UN has generally taken place within: The Disarmament Commission; The Economic and Social Council's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; The Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms; Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division of the United Nations; Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute of the United Nations (UNICRI); and, The United Nations European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Also see, Appendix I, Section A – The Work Undertaken by the United Nations on SALW.
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- ⁴³ Non-state actors (NSA) do not have a legitimate claim to represent a State, although, they may have acquired territory from an existing State, with which they have contentions. A fundamental attribute of conflicts involving NSAs is their asymmetric nature, such as violent political action, insurgency, separatism while using guerrilla strategies and tactics, and terrorism. The militarily weaker NSA has a propensity to use strategies and tactics designed to exploit the critical vulnerabilities, weaknesses and centres of gravity of the militarily larger State.
- ⁴⁴ Examples of prominent NSAs include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); 'Sendero Luminoso', Shining Path, or Communist Party of Peru; the Irish Republican Army (IRA); and more recently, Al Qaeda; the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan; and, the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (PKK), the Kurdish Workers Party; or one of the most successful being the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).
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- ⁴⁹ The NGOs that have hitherto been accessible are include: The British American Security Information Council (BASIC); Italian Academy for Advanced Studies at Columbia ; American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER); Earth Visions International; The United States Institute of Peace (USIP); Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC); Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT); Mennonite Central Committee; National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament; Federation of American Scientists. Human Rights Arms Watch; Defence and Arms Control Studies Program (MIT); Arms Transfer Working Group; Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament; Physicians for Global Survival; Joint Consultative Group (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); Centre for Peace and Conflict Research; Centre for Strategic and International Security; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Norwegian Institute for International Affairs; Canadian Centre for Global Security; Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament; Brookings Institute; Centre for Defence Studies; American Academy of Arts and Sciences; World Watch Institute; OXFAM; and, Saferworld. Finally, the Monterey Institute of International Studies - Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies may be further divided into: a) East Asia Non-Proliferation Project (EANP); b) International Organisations and Non-Proliferation Project (IONP); c) Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project (MTP); d) Newly Independent States Non-Proliferation Project (NISNP); and, e) Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC).
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CHAPTER TWO

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- ⁸⁹ In 1973, the monarchy was abolished through a coup d'etat and a democratic republic was formed (a *Systemic Conflict*); in 1978, a coup d'etat by the PDPD led to the formation of a Socialist State and resulted in the eruption of a civil war (a *Systemic Conflict*, but also a *Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Conflict*); in 1979, a full scale armed invasion by the USSR [it was stated by the Soviet Union that this was an armed intervention, however, it can also be seen as an inter-state war because the vast majority of the population of Afghanistan had a legitimate government overthrown by a Soviet backed regime. This government failed, and as a result the Soviet Union intervened to keep it in power against the wishes of the Afghan people. In the initial stages, there was no recognised government or state authority that could represent the Afghan population. That is, until later, when an internationally recognised '*government in-exile*' was established by the Mujahideen '*Group of Seven*' fighting in Afghanistan to defeat the USSR, they received international recognition and military support from the West and the Non-Aligned State (a type of *Inter-State Conflict*, but also, a *Proxy War*)]; in 1989, the defeat and withdrawal of the USSR and the continuation of the Soviet backed communist regime through the retention of the seat of government, in Kabul, by the Communist PDPDA, with massive support from the USSR, led to the continuation of the conflict with the government in-exile (a revolutionary war in the form of a civil war, and the beginnings of an ethnic conflict due to the political machinations and the formation of ethnic tension by the PDPDA leader, Najibullah); from 1992 to 1996, the establishment of an *Interim Government* by the former *Government in-exile*, after the defeat and surrender of the Communist regime, broke down due to internal and external pressures and resulted in fighting between the Mujahideen factions (an *Inter-Factional Civil War* and *Regional Proxy War*, *Warlordism* and *Partial Ethnic Conflict*); from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban takeover; from 2001 to the present, U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and backing of the present regime (*External intervention*, *Warlordism*, and *Inter-Factional Fighting*). The penultimate period is significant here because several interpretations are possible: a) as a *Revolutionary-Ideology Conflict* due to the Taliban's motivation to create an Islamic State; b) as an *Identity-Secession Conflict* in which the majority ethnic group (the Pushtun, represented in large part by the Taliban) try to regain a hold of power from the minority parties (especially the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, led by Ahmad Shah Masood and Prof Burhanuddin Rabanni of the *Jama'ati-Islami*, and Dostum respectively); c) as an *Inter-Factional Conflict* perpetuated by the interests of warlords; and, d) as an *Inter-State Proxy War* by the external neighbouring, regional, and extra-regional states (Pakistan vs. India, Pakistan vs. Iran, Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, India, Russia and Uzbekistan) playing out their rivalries on Afghan soil. See, Rais, Rasul B., *War without winners: Afghanistan's uncertain transition after the cold war* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1997).
- ⁹⁰ Zedong, Mao., *Selected works of Mao Tse Tung (1893-1976): Vol 1-5*, Translated from Chinese (Peking [Beijing]. (Oxford: Pergamon: 1978). For further insight of the Mao Tse Tung's role in the Chinese struggle for independence, see, Howard, Roger., *Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese people* (Oxford: Pergamon: 1978). Fitzgerald, C.P., *Mao Tse Tung and China* (Harmondsworth: Penguin: 1977). Gungwu, Wang., *China and the world since 1949: The impact of independence, modernity and revolution* (London: Macmillan: 1977)
- ⁹¹ Felson, Richard B., 'Blame analysis: Accounting for the behaviour of protected groups', *The American Sociologist*, Volume 22, Issue 1, Spring 1991, pp. 5-23.

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- ⁹⁴ Bandura, Albert., 'Selective moral disengagement: The exercise of moral agency', *Journal of Moral Education*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2002, pp. 101-119. Also see, Borum, Randy., *Psychology of terrorism* (Tampa: University of South Florida: 2004).
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- ⁹⁶ Woolf, Linda M., and Hulsizer, Michael R., 'Psychosocial roots of genocide: Risk, prevention, and intervention', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 101-128.
- ⁹⁷ Vasquez, John., 'Why global conflict resolution is possible: Meeting the challenge of the new world order', in, Vasquez, J., Johnson, J., Jaffe, S., and Stamato, L. (Eds.), *Beyond confrontation: Learning conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 1995), p. 137. pp. 131-153.
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- ⁹⁹ Boulding, Kenneth E., *National images and international systems* (New York: Irvington Publishers: 1993). See, Ramsbotham, Oliver., Miall, Hugh., and Woodhouse, Tom., *Contemporary conflict resolution*, 3rd Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). Also see, Boulding, Kenneth E., 'Conflict and defense: A general theory', 1962. Also see, Boulding, Kenneth E., 'Towards a pure theory of threat systems', *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1963, pp. 424-434.
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- ¹³⁴ Azar, Edward E., and Burton, John W. (eds.), *International conflict resolution: Theory and practice* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books: 1986).
- ¹³⁵ Curle, Adam., *Making peace* (London: Tavistock Publications: 1971).
- ¹³⁶ Miall, 1999, Op. Cit. Note 1, pp. 156-7.
- ¹³⁷ The change in the context of the conflict: be it social, economic, political, local, regional, or international, may have dramatic effects upon the conflict, either escalating and prolonging it or de-escalating and reducing it. For example, the end of the Cold War resulted in the ending of many regional and local conflicts, but also aided the development of new and deep-rooted conflicts. The break up of the USSR (1991) took away the cover of unity in the Balkans and aided the development of increased tension and war.
- ¹³⁸ If the structure of the relationships between the parties is the root cause of the conflict, then, for the conflict to be resolved, a transformation of that relationship is necessary. Many revolutions, civil wars and potential future conflicts are and will be based upon those foundations.
- ¹³⁹ The adoption of a different perspective, for example, the change from communism and state control to free market economics contributed to the end of the Cold War. This can occur because of redirection through the redefinition of goals, a change in the leadership, the development of new values and goals due to the experiences gained from the conflict itself or even through intra-party conflict. The latter may lead to a split in the party and even the resolution of the conflict if the peace-seeking faction is the stronger.
- ¹⁴⁰ The goals and issues being contested, and the stances being taken on them, may change. Hence, either more drastic stances or goals may develop leading to escalation, or existing stances and goals are abandoned in favour of more conciliatory approaches leading to the resolution of the conflict.
- ¹⁴¹ Transformation of the mindset of individuals and groups through understanding their own and their opponent's circumstances may lead to the transformation of the conflict.
- ¹⁴² Galtung, J., *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilisation* (London: Sage: 1996).
- ¹⁴³ 'The commander's war', *The Washington Post*, 21 September 1999, A16, quoting General Wesley Clark upon his escalation of the bombing campaign against Serbia to prevent it from further attacks on Kosovan civilians..
- ¹⁴⁴ Smoke, Richard., *War: Controlling escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1977), pp. 23-26.
- ¹⁴⁵ Origin of the English word escalate, *Edenics, where language began* [web page]. < <http://www.edenics.net/english-word-origins.aspx?word=ESCALATE> >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
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- ¹⁴⁷ Clausewitz, Carl von., *On war*, Vol. I, Translated by Col. J.J. Graham, seventh impression (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc: 1962).
- ¹⁴⁸ For further information, please refer to section 1:1:5:3 – Conflict Dynamics (literature review on conflict escalation).
- ¹⁴⁹ Oberschall, Anthony. *Group violence: Some hypotheses and empirical uniformities*, Presentation of a paper at the American Sociological Association, 1969. These observations can also be found in another paper by Anthony Oberschall, 'Group violence', *Law and Society Review*, 5, No 1, August. Oberschall also has an interesting chapter, 'Group violence', in his book, *Social conflict and social movements* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc: 1973), pp 324-345.
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- ¹⁵³ Gallo, Giorgio., 'Conflict Theory, Complexity and Systems Approach', *Systems Research and Behavioural Science*, Vol. 30, Issue 2, March/April 2013 (DOI: 10.1002/sres.2132), pp. 156–175. Article first published online in Wiley Online Library: 24 SEP 2012. < <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sres.2132> >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
- ¹⁵⁴ Cognitive Dissonance Theory. In a conflict, individuals and groups try to find a degree of consistency with what they actually do and what they should do. In other words, try to follow through action the paths set to acquire a goal rather than digress or be diverted. In doing so,

they try to avoid conflicting or disharmonious obstacles, such as, alternative attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of the world and its norms. The disharmony, itself, is distracting (cognitive dissonance) and may cause conflict (by conflict, in this context, I mean, the conflict within the subjective universe rather than interpersonal or inter-group conflict) with the methods or actions chosen in order to follow particular goals. In individuals, the mind is able to shut out such cognitive dissonance in order to avoid anxiety that can cause great discomfort. Therefore, once a certain action is committed, the individual tries to justify it within his/her mind. This justification is based upon a comparison with the desired goal or cause, and is successful if the individual believes that the goal or cause is much more important than the action committed. For example, to kill another person in order to save one's own life. The conflict sets in when the justification cannot be made. For example, the threat by the other party was not so great to one's vital interests, values, beliefs or physical person. Therefore, the action committed was out of balance and not proportional to the threat, and hence, not necessary. This, however, depends upon each individual's perceptions of their own interests, norms, values, causes, and goals. It goes without saying that, in order to commit harm or violence to other humans, the goal must be important. It becomes more important if the action is justified, and hence, committed again, giving the goal further value and importance. The greater the value or importance of the goal, the greater the extreme actions that can be justified. Within stressful or threatening environments and situations, individuals have been found to protect their cognitive consistency more. Researchers have found that, within very high stress environments, individuals simplify their own perceptions of reality [See: Lazarus, Richard. S., *Psychological stress and the coping process* (New York: McGraw-Hill: 1966)]. Hence, for conflict to occur, a very high degree of inconsistency between causes and action is needed. During international crises, this process of simplifying the reality of the situation often comes into play. The resultant being, that the complexity of the situation is lost, and the possibility and urgency for finding alternatives is narrowed. A fuller discussion on the effects of cognitive dissonance during intense international conflicts can be found in, Robinson, P.S., *The politics of international crisis escalation: Decision-making under pressure* (London: Taurus Academic Studies: 1996). Further references on cognitive dissonance can be found in, Festinger, Leon., *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson: 1957). Abe el son, et al, *Theories of cognitive consistency: A source book* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co:1968). Feldman, S., *Cognitive consistency: Motivational antecedents and behavioural consequences* (New York: Academic Press: 1966). For a good summary of cognitive consistency as it relates to foreign policy, see: Steinbruner, J.D., *Cybernetic theory of decision New dimensions of political analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1974).

¹⁵⁵ **Entrapment.** Conflict escalation can be contributed to by the process of *Entrapment*, whereby, the commitment to a previously chosen course of action is escalated by a party in order to justify all investments and actions hitherto made in the pursuit of its causes. By escalation, I mean, more energy, money, time, and other resources are deemed justified in pursuit of the goal. Brockner, J., and Rubin, J.Z., in, *The social psychology of conflict escalation and entrapment* (New York: Springer-Verlag: 1985) identify three characteristics of situations leading to entrapment: a) The increased outflow of resources must be regarded as investments or expenses. Therefore, in committing to the goal, a party views itself as protecting an investment and avoiding extra expense. But, it must protect the investment with more expense. b) As the investment of additional resources increases with time, the associated costs of continuing also increases, but, so does the perceived proximity of the goal. Hence, the dilemma between continued commitment and withdrawal increases. Finally, c) when total commitment as opposed to total withdrawal is preferred by the circumstances, the party must perceive that those pressures that may restrain continued involvement are easily offset by the motivations for obtaining the interests and goals. A simple example can explain this concept. A person is waiting in a bus queue. Time is passing by, the bus is late and the person is late for an appointment. Still, the person persists, since s/he has been waiting for some time, and to leave the queue would have meant that the time spent in the queue up to that point has been wasted, yet, the person perceives that the bus should come any time soon. But, the pressure to walk away and not waste further time also increases. The person is trapped in a dilemma of whether to wait longer or leave the queue.

¹⁵⁶ **Selective perception.** If the behaviour of the *opposition* fits the expectations of the *party*, it is accepted. But if it does not, it is discounted. For example, if a person expects a rival to act in an antagonistic way, to be conciliatory would be regarded as uncharacteristic, and hence, discounted.

¹⁵⁷ **Emotional action-response.** As described earlier, the arousal of anger and fear cause disorganisation in a person's cognitive ability, and hence, the perception of the situation.

¹⁵⁸ Pruitt, D.G., and Gahangan, J.P., *Campus crisis: The search for power*, in, Tedeschi, J.T. (Ed), *Perspectives on social power* (Chicago: Aldine: 1974), pp. 349-392.

¹⁵⁹ Many theorists have written about this model. One of the most notable for expounding and evaluating the model is, Osgood, C.E., *An alternative to war or surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press: 1962). And, Richardson, Lewis Fry., *Arms and security* (Chicago: Quadrangle: 1967).

¹⁶⁰ Burton, J.W., *Peace Theory* (New York: Knopf: 1962).

¹⁶¹ Coleman, J.S., *Community Conflict* (New York: Free Press: 1957).

¹⁶² Schumpeter, J., *The sociology of imperialism* (New York: Meridian Books: 1955).

¹⁶³ Although the previous two models are important for the understanding of conflict dynamics, more emphasis will be placed on the *structural changes model* due to its relevance to the inducement of the re-eruption of conflict through the effects of the proliferation of small arms.

¹⁶⁴ When negative attitudes and perceptions take hold, the opposition tends to be viewed as dishonest, distrustful, selfish and inhumane (Struch and Schwartz: 1989). This is true of all parties in a conflict, as the party views the opposition, the opposition is likely to view the party in the same light (White: 1984). Negative attitudes and perceptions facilitate escalation and restrain conflict resolution processes in a number of ways. i) Blaming the opposition for the party's own negative experiences and history becomes easier. Blame, itself, encourages grievance formation, and hence, escalation. Therefore, by extrapolating, negative attitudes and perspectives encourage escalation. ii) The view of the opposition as distrustful brings the party to view the opposition's actions with scepticism, and hence, threatening (Pruitt: 1965). iii) The willingness to retaliate is significantly increased if the opposition is viewed in a negative light. For an example of this process, see the studies on southern US white attitudes and violence against Afro-Americans in, Rogers, R.W., and Prentice-Dunn, S., 'Deindividuation and anger-mediated aggression: Unmasking regressive racism', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1981, No 41, pp 63-73. Retaliation is a very significant process in escalation. iv) Communication breakdown occurs as people avoid those that they perceive in a negative light or dislike. Polarisation of the parties' attitudes encourages the breakdown of communication. As Coleman (1957: p. 11) notes, "as controversy develops, associations ... wether between persons on opposing sides." When we like another person, we seek to make better contacts and improve relationships. Alternatively, when we dislike another person, we tend to put distance between them and ourselves. v) White (1984) notes how negative attitudes and perceptions reduce the empathy of a party with another party. As the party begins to dislike its opposition, it does not feel secure with trying to understand the negativity of the opposition that the party has actually projected onto the opposition. Hence, the willingness to understand the opposition is reduced. Therefore, understanding the conflict spiral is reduced as a consequence, alongside increased misunderstanding and the encouragement of escalation. If the party is willing to understand that the opposition's actions are reactions to the party's own behaviour, then the party could move towards reducing or changing its own behaviour as a form of self protection, and hence, act as escalation limitation. vi) Negative attitudes and perceptions produce zero-sum thinking, especially in very polarised camps. This leads to the party perceiving that there is no alternative except to use contentious behaviour to achieve victory, since the only alternative would be to lose. vii) In extreme cases of negative attitudes and perceptions, the opposition comes to be viewed as a 'diabolical enemy' (White: 1984). There is very little communication, if none at all. Escalation with very extreme tactics, becomes the norm. The opposition is blamed for virtually everything that goes wrong. There is a large body of literature on negative attitudes and perceptions in relation to the formation and development of conflict. I have found that the following selection has helped developed my understanding of conflicts, and in particular the processes involved in escalation. Struch, N., and Schwartz, S.H., 'Inter-group aggression: Its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias',

- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1989, No 56, pp364-373. Pruitt, D.G., 'Definition of the situation as a detriment of international action', in, Kelman, H.C. (Ed), *International behaviour: A social-psychological analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston: 1965), pp. 391-432.
- ¹⁶⁵ Deindividuation occurs when a person is only seen as a part of a group and not as an individual. When this is done, and the group is seen through negative attitudes and perceptions or as the opposition, it then becomes easier to act aggressively against the opposing person. Deindividuated people also tend to become dehumanised. They are solely seen as the opposition rather than as individual beings with human characteristics. It therefore follows that the individuated become less protected by the social norms and inhibitions governing aggressive behaviour that may be applied to those within one's own party. A more detailed study on deindividuation can be found in an article by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981). A number of studies have been conducted on the processes of dehumanisation. Notable ones include, Schwartz, S.H., and Struch, N., *Values, stereotypes and intergroup antagonism*, in, Bar-Tal, D., Grauman, C.R., Kruglanski, A.W., and Stroebe, W. (Eds), *Stereotypes and prejudice: Changing conceptions* (New York: Springer-Verlag: 1989), pp151-167. Kelman, H.C., and Hamilton, V.L., *Crimes of obedience: Towards a social psychology of authority and responsibility* (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press: 1989). Edward, J., Ruskin, N., and Turrini, P., *Separation-individuation: Theory and practice* (New York: Gardener Press Inc: 1981). Lowe, E.J., *Kinds of being: A study of individuation, identity and the logic of sortal terms* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd: 1989).
- ¹⁶⁶ I have already touched upon this subject area. Please refer back to section 3:2:6 – Hostility.
- ¹⁶⁷ If the parties are components of the same nation, then the nation is the community. But, we may even extend this to the parties outside the nation that have associations with the conflicting parties. To expand, if the parties are themselves nations, then the community is global.
- ¹⁶⁸ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 121.
- ¹⁶⁹ Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim., *The evolution and growth of communism in Afghanistan: 1917-1979, an appraisal* (Karachi: Roal Book Company: 1997), pp. 404-405.
- ¹⁷⁰ Bradsher, Henry S., *Afghan communism and Soviet intervention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), pp. 93-100.
- ¹⁷¹ Gamson, W.A., and Modigliani, A., *Untangling the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown: 1971).
- ¹⁷² Colaresi, Michael P., Rasler, Karen., and Thompson, William R., *Strategic rivalries in world politics: Position, space and conflict escalation*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- ¹⁷³ Kissenger, Henry., *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster: 1994), p. 733, 743.
- ¹⁷⁴ O'Balance, Edgar., *Afghan wars 1839-1992: What Britain gave up and the Soviet Union lost* (London: Brassy's: 1993).
- ¹⁷⁵ A study by Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Moaz found that, between 1816 and 1976, of the 960 disputes that were militarised, 22% of multiparty conflicts escalated to war while for the two party conflicts only 5% escalated to war. See, Gochman, C.S., and Moaz, Z., 'Militarised interstate disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, patterns, and insights', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 28, December 1984, pp 585-616.
- ¹⁷⁶ Burhannudin Rabbani was to hand over power to another transitional government on the 28th October 1992. After this date, the Hizb-i-Islami perceived the Rabbani government as non-existent. However, the Rabbani government's refusal to leave led to the collapse of the power sharing scheme with the Hizb-i-Islami, and hence, the Civil War. See, Matinuddin, Kamal., *The Taliban phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1999), p 10.
- ¹⁷⁷ Humphreys, Macartan., Posner, Daniel N., and Weinstein, Jeremy M., 'Ethnic identity, collective action, and conflict: an experimental approach', *unpublished*, Harvard University and UCLA (2002). < <http://www.international.ucla.edu/CMS/files/Ethnic%20ID.%20Collective%20Action%20and%20Conflict1.pdf> >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
- ¹⁷⁸ Horowitz, Donald L., *Ethnic groups in conflict*, 2nd Edition (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press: 2000).
- ¹⁷⁹ I made reference to the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan in an earlier section, see note 9.
- ¹⁸⁰ Matinuddin, 1999, Op. Cit. Note 176.
- ¹⁸¹ The denoting of party and opposition does not indicate in any way the relative strengths and weaknesses of one or the other of the parties involved in the conflict, nor does it in any way place more emphasis or favour upon the interests or goals of one or the other parties involved in the conflict. Also, I would like to add that denoting a party as the opposition is not in any way its derogation within the argument that I will proceed to discuss. This is especially so in respect to the in-group out-group processes and dynamics of polarisation involved in the process of conflict escalation, that I will discuss further in this section, in which part of the out-group processes involve the psychological exclusion of another party as the opposition.
- ¹⁸² The tactics, in themselves, cannot be construed as being malignant or destructive. Rather, it is the end to which they are used that may induce them to become damaging. Nevertheless, I have put them in the order of the 'greater willingness of the party to induce the opposition to its own will'. In short, along a spectrum of lesser to greater tactics. That is, lesser tactics employed by the party produce consequences that are favourable or neutral to the opposition. Greater tactics are designed to produce costly consequences upon the opposition. To put it another way, whilst ingratiation is a lesser tactic than guilt trips, threats to impose unfavourable consequences are lesser tactics than irrevocable commitments.
- ¹⁸³ Jones and Wortman [Jones, E.E., and Wortman, C., *Ingratiation: An attributional approach* (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press: 1973)] define *ingratiation* as "a class of strategic behaviours illicitly designed to influence a particular other person [or own group] concerning the attractiveness of one's personal attractiveness" (p.2). The idea being, to make the opposition feel comfortable with the party in order for the party to exploit the opposition without its knowledge. However, this tactic is unusual in a conflict setting, since both parties have achieved recognition of their incompatible goals. In such a setting, if the party wished to ingratiate the opposition, the opposition would more likely than not feel suspicious of the motives of the party. Successful ingratiation does depend upon the ability to manipulate through charm and guile.
- ¹⁸⁴ In his book, *The theory and practice of gamesmanship: The art of winning without actually cheating* (New York: Holt: 1948), Stephen Potter notes that the essence of effective gamesmanship is to act in a way that is antithetical to the opposition's behaviour. That is, to decrease the tempo when the opposition increases it, and vice versa, in order to cause a distraction and break the opposition's rhythm. For example, to ask for more time, or make quick judgements when the opposition believes that the party is taking its time. All these actions must foster the idea that they are done to help the opposition.
- ¹⁸⁵ Successful guilt trips make the other feel guilty for acting, or even when not acting, in a certain way. For example, if a minority group (the party) feels that it has been wronged it may, with the aid of media coverage, produce continuous coverage of other, but related, issues, thereby causing its opposition (here, the majority) to feel guilty for having done something wrong even though the party may not have overtly declared that it has been wronged in such a way. The idea being, to make the other feel that a wrong has been done without actually suggesting it. Therefore, having deniability on its side. A good point of reference for experimental research concerning this tactic can be found in a review by, Vangelisti, A.L., Daly, J.A., and Rudnick, J.R., 'Making people feel guilty in conversations: Techniques and correlates', in, *Human Communication Research*, 1991, 18, pp. 3-39.
- ¹⁸⁶ This tactic is applied to the opposition in order to persuade a reduction in their aspirations. In other words, to give up some of its goals with the sole aid of logical persuasion. For further discussion see, Zimbardo, P.G., and Leippe, M.R., *The psychology of attitude change and social influence*, (New York: McGraw-Hill: 1991).
- ¹⁸⁷ Threats can be used in two different ways. Firstly, to commit to being harmful to the opposition if it does not act in a certain way. This can include either violent or non-violent methods. For example, as to the latter, the use of the law, sanctions, or both. In this way, threats are used as assertions of intention. Secondly, as a perceived or actual detriment to the opposition's values or interests. See later for further discussion on this subject.

- ¹⁸⁸ This is a party's commitment to a certain course of action to fulfil desired objectives regardless of the opposition's efforts to stop the party. That is, until the opposition gives way to the party's objectives. The game of Chicken illustrates this, for example, two cars heading towards each other on a collision course unless one gives way. If one of those cars cannot physically change its direction due to intentional fixing of the steering wheel or column, then it is irrevocably committed to collide unless the other car gives way. The locus of control is therefore in the hands of the opposition.
- ¹⁸⁹ This sequence may also be seen as a softening up process by the party to make the opposition appreciate the lesser tactics rather than endure the greater tactics.
- ¹⁹⁰ Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1986, Op. Cit. Note 83, p. 119.
- ¹⁹¹ Bartos, Otomar J., and Wehr, Paul., *Using conflict theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2002), pp. 98-121.
- ¹⁹² Hamo, Yoram., and Heifetz, Aviad., 'An evolutionary perspective on goal seeking and escalation of commitment', *Social Science Working Paper 1109*, California Institute of Technology, January 2001. < www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1109.pdf >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
- ¹⁹³ Lewis, I.M., *A pastoral democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the northern Somalian of the Horn of Africa* (London: Oxford University Press).
- ¹⁹⁴ Winter, David G. 'Enhancement of an enemy's power motivation as a dynamic of conflict escalation' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1987, p. 41.
- ¹⁹⁵ Inter-party relationships also have factors which foster stability or instability. For example, some conditions encourage stability by decreasing the willingness to use harsh measures, such as inter-party bonds (kith and kin relationships, tribal history and bonds) or inter-dependence on a mutual level (symbiotic relationships or complementary relationships). Other conditions that encourage stability may include the mutual acceptance of the authority of conflict resolving institutions, organisations, or third party mediators (rulings from the tribal 'Jirga' system, in Afghanistan and the NWFP of Pakistan, is binding on all tribes within the system). On the other hand, certain conditions also encourage or facilitate instability, such as harsh reactions to provocations. Amongst the Pushtun, a core element of the code of conduct is that of 'Badal' (Pushto: revenge). In a situation of provocation an individual or group may react harshly due to the authority of this code. However, as will be discussed later, such a code is also a source of stability due to its deterrent capabilities in tribal environments.
- ¹⁹⁶ Kriesberg, 1998, Op. Cit. Note 86, p. 123.
- ¹⁹⁷ This consideration is inclusive of the issues that are being contested, the formation of the goals, and the goals themselves. The path that the conflict takes does depend upon what the parties want and how willing they are to pursue that which they want. The path taken to achieve the goal may differ considerably depending upon the variations in ideology, personality of the leadership and membership, past experience, and the interests of the parties.
- ¹⁹⁸ Predispositions, values, the capacity to pursue a conflict. These are just some of the characteristics. Parties that want to make choices on following their goals must compare their own characteristics with those of their adversary. A party's ideology may permit a certain course of action and not another, or this might be the case for the adversary and not for the party. Choices may be made so as to exploit another's unwillingness or incapacity to pursue a certain course of action, and vice versa.
- ¹⁹⁹ The relationships, the established socio-economic, political and cultural dynamics and interactions between the parties also affect the choice of direction or pursuit of contending goals. For example, the degree of integration between parties, their perceptions of each other, and the degree of symmetry or asymmetry in resources.
- ²⁰⁰ The choice of strategy is affected by the social context of the conflict. Within a system that has an institutionalised judicial, legislative and executive capacity, contending parties have both restrictions placed upon them and avenues available when considering particular courses of action. This is especially so in popular and pluralistic participation orientated societies. On a national scale, international institutions or other countries may have cause to be regulators of conflicts between parties and their choice of goals and methods of pursuit. The social context may also have shared or opposing ways of thinking. For example, agreements on the rights of minorities or general human rights, the legitimacy of the use of violence such as gunboat diplomacy, or a mutual understanding, or not, of national sovereignty. As to the latter, the norms employed by the parties external to the actual conflict may affect the choices made in the pursuit of goals. For example, in order to avoid the spillover effect of conflict, neighbouring countries may adopt a stance of aggressive diplomacy to resolve the dispute, or even back one or more of the parties in the pursuit of their goals. Since, that is, this may be positively feasible for the external party. Lastly, the systemic features of the environment in which the conflict is being pursued do affect the availability of courses of action. This relates more to the balance of power in the overall system that the parties may be subject to and the balance of resources as a result.
- ²⁰¹ Uyangoda, Jayadeva., 'Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing dynamics', *Policy Studies*, Vol. 32, East-West Centre, Washington D.C., 2007, pp. 19-25. < www.eastwestcenter.org/download/3250/32178/PS032.pdf >. Accessed on 06 December 2013. Also see, After the war in Sri Lanka, *Politically Speaking*, Bulletin of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Winter 2009-2010, p. 1. < http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/dpa_ps_2009_winter.pdf >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
- ²⁰² Katzman, Kenneth., 'Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns', *Congressional Research Service*, RL30588, 15 November, 2001. < <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7654.pdf> >. Accessed on 06 December 2013. Also see, Katzman, Kenneth., 'Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy', *Congressional Research Service*, RL30588, 23 October 2013, pp. 18-19. < www.fas.org/spp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf >. Accessed on 06 December 2013.
- ²⁰³ Key of symbols.
- T = Time
- E = Escalation of the Conflict measured by Change in Intensity (Ω) between two points in Time (T)
- Ψ = Factors, Elements, Conditions, Actions and Reactions, Conducive and Favourable to an Increase in the Intensity and Escalation of a Conflict
- Φ = Factors, Elements, Conditions, Actions and Reactions, Conducive and Favourable to the Decrease in Intensity, or Diffusion, De-escalation and Resolution of the Conflict
- Ω = Conflict Curve Representing the Intensity of the Conflict at any given point in time, not to be confused with 'resistance' in physics.
- D = De-escalation of the Conflict measured in the Change in Intensity (Ω) between two points in Time (T)
- A = Acceleration of the Conflict
- \square = No Overt Conflict Exists: the Parties Have Not Set Goals in Order to Pursue Contentious Issues
- π = The Point along the Conflict Curve where the Factors for and Against Escalation are in a State of Equilibrium. Below this Point, the Greater the Factors Favourable to De-escalation, the Greater the Stability of the Relationship between Parties. Above this Point, the Greater the Factors Favourable to Escalation, the Greater the Intensity of the Relationship between Conflicting Parties
- ²⁰⁴ Tedeschi, James T., 'Threats and promises', in, Swingle, P. (Ed), *The structure of conflict* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press: 1970), pp. 155-192.
- ²⁰⁵ Pruitt, D.G., and Snyder, R.C (Eds.), *Theory and research on the causes of war* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall: 1969).
- ²⁰⁶ Threats are highlighted by their negative consequences and can be seen when the party informs the opposition that it will cause physical damage to territory 'A' unless the opposition agrees to some form of power sharing with the party. The threat makes it clear that not sharing power will result in negative consequences.
- ²⁰⁷ Promises are highlighted by their positive consequences and can be seen when the party tells the opposition that it will pass over to them the power of authority over territory 'A' if the opposition also builds up the infrastructure of territory 'A'.

- ²⁰⁸ For a more detailed discussion on these distinctions, see, Lewicki, R.J., and Rubin, J.Z., *Effects of variations in the informational clarity of promises and threats upon interpersonal bargaining*, Proceedings of the 81st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1973a, 8, pp. 137-138; Rubin, Jeffrey Z., and Lewicki, Roy J., 'The Three Factor Experimental Analysis of Promises and Threats', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 1973b, 3, pp. 240-257; and, Rubin, J.Z., Lewicki, R.J., and Dunn, L., *Perception of promisors and threateners*, Proceedings of the 81st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1973c, 8, pp. 141-142; and, Levinger, G., *The limits of deterrence: An introduction*, Journal of Social Issues, 1987, 43, pp. 1-4.
- ²⁰⁹ Threats that are successful are used in order to avoid costs. A threat is a gamble that rides upon the *party's* credibility and willingness, but which can save the *party* the costs of using its power and resources. The use of actual brute force (without the threat) can reinforce the *opposition's* resistance to the party, whilst threats can allow time for reflection and compliance. See, Schelling, T.C., *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 1966).
- ²¹⁰ Black, T.E., and Higbee, K.C., 'Effects of power, threats and sex on exploitation', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1973, 27, pp. 328-388; Bonoma, T.V., and Tedeschi, J.T., 'Some effects of source behaviour on target's compliance to threats', *Behavioural Science*, 1973, 18, pp. 34-41; and, Mogy, R.B., and Pruitt, D.G., 'Effects of threatener's enforcement costs on threat capability and compliance', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1974, 29, pp. 173-180.
- ²¹¹ Pruitt, D.G., and Carnevale, P.J., *Negotiations in social conflict* (Buckingham: Open University Press: 1993).
- ²¹² Rubin and Lewicki, 1973b, Op. Cit. Note 208. Also see, Rubin, Lewicki, and Dunn, 1973c, Op. Cit. Note 208.
- ²¹³ Taylor, S.E., 'Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The mobilisation-minimalisation hypothesis', *Psychological Bulletin*, 1991, 110, pp. 67-85.
- ²¹⁴ Siverson, Randolph M., and Diehl, Paul F., 'Arms races, the conflict spiral, and the onset of war', in, Midlarsky, M.I. (Ed.), *Handbook of war studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman: 1989).
- ²¹⁵ The significance of the threat factor of small arms will be discussed in greater detail in succeeding chapters.
- ²¹⁶ Mummendey, Amelie., and Mummendey, Hans Dieter., 'Aggressive Behaviour of Soccer Players as Social Interaction', in, *Sports Violence* (New York: Springer-Verlag Inc.: 1983), pp. 111-128.
- ²¹⁷ Felson, Richard B., 'Patterns of aggressive social interaction, in, Mummendey, Amelie. (Ed.), *Social psychology of aggression: From individual behaviour to social interaction* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Inc.: 1984), pp. 107-126.
- ²¹⁸ Tedeschi, James. T., and Felson, Richard. B., *Aggression and violence: Social interactionist perspective* (Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association: 1993). Aggression is a subject matter that has a multidisciplinary approach. Not one field can adequately evaluate aggression without recourse to other disciplines. Its understanding involves readings over a range of numerous topics. For example, biology and biochemistry sheds light on hormones, brain centres, and medical conditions amongst many others areas that are involved in aggression, whilst the social sciences and humanities related disciplines provide an understanding through the frustration aggression theory, the effects of the mass media, the influence of power and authority, learning theory, retribution and revenge, domestic violence, sports competition tactics, personality and psyche factors, cognitive processing, social conflict, criminal behaviour, motivation, defence and offence tactics, responsibility, and so on. The list is very long.
- ²¹⁹ Anderson, Craig A., and Bushman, Brad J., 'Human Aggression', *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 53, 2002, pp. 27-51. < <http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/caa/abstracts/2000-2004/02AB.pdf> >. Accessed on 08 December 2012.
- ²²⁰ A number of studies have shown that aggression has been perceived in a negative light, and often as a threat, by the party that is the object of the aggressive behaviour. For further general discussions and experimental conclusions see, Averill, J.R., *Anger and aggression on emotion* (New York: Springer-Verlag: 1982). A more specific discussion on the effects of aggression can be found in the following article, Mummendey, A., Linneweber, V., and Loscheper, G., 'Actor or victim of aggression: Divergent perspectives – divergent evaluations', in *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1984, 14, pp. 297-311.
- ²²¹ David Singer has noted that the Threat within the in context of international politics "arises out of a situation of armed hostility in which each body of policy makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; further, each assumes that such designs will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem to outweigh estimated losses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its national security, and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. To state the relationship in quasi-mathematical form; THREAT PERCEPTION = ESTIMATED CAPABILITY X ESTIMATED INTENT." Singer, J.D., 'Threat Perception and the Armament Tension Dilemma', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1958, Vol 2, No 1, pp 93-94.
- ²²² Tedeschi and Felson, 1993, Op. Cit. Note 218. Tedeschi and Felson have done a number of other notable studies on aggression, including, Tedeschi, James.T., and Felson, Richard. B., *Violence, aggression and coercive action* (Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association: 1994).
- ²²³ Patterson, G.R., *Coercive family processes* (Eugene, Oregon: Castalia: 1982).
- ²²⁴ Berkowitz, L., *The concept of aggressive drive: Some additional drive; some additional considerations*, in Berkowitz, L. (Ed), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol 2 (New York: Academic Press Inc: 1965), pp 301-329.
- ²²⁵ Feshbach, S., *Aggression*, in, Mussen, P.H. (Ed), *Charmichael's manual of child psychology*, Vol 2 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc: 1970), pp159-259.
- ²²⁶ Discussions on the use of aggression as a tactic can be found in, Pruitt, Dean. G., Mikolic, Joseph. M., Peirce, Robert. S., and Keating, Mark., *Aggression as a struggle tactic in social conflict*, in, Tedeschi, James. T., and Felson, Richard. B., *Aggression and violence: Social interactionist perspective* (Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association: 1993), pp 99-118.
- ²²⁷ Further reference and discussion on subject of aggression will be made in succeeding chapters within their particular contexts. For example, the affects of tribal organisation in controlling aggression in a patriarchal society, and the impact of aggression on the proliferation of SALW.
- ²²⁸ Averill, J.R., 'Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories of emotion', *American Psychologist*, 1983, 38, pp 1145-1160.
- ²²⁹ Klein, Renate., Bierhoff, Hans Werner., and Kramp, P., 'Evidence for the altruistic personality from data on accident research', *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1991, p. 263-280. The Article Discusses Responses to Achievement Situations and the Mediation Function of Perceived Fairness .
- ²³⁰ Tedeschi and Felson, 1994, Op. Cit. Note 222.
- ²³¹ Ibid, Tedeschi and Felson, 1994, pp. 234.
- ²³² White, R.K., *Nobody wanted war: Misperception in Vietnam and other wars* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday: 1968).
- ²³³ The energising function of anger has been widely recognised and explained by the activation of the sympathetic nervous system. Radford. J., and Govier, E (Eds.), *A textbook of psychology* (London: Sheldon Press: 1980).
- ²³⁴ See chapter nine, section 9:2:2 - *Institutionalisation of Violence*.
- ²³⁵ Zillmann, D., Johnson, R.D., and Day, K.D., 'Attribution of Apparent Arousal and Proficiency from Sympathetic Activation Affecting Activation Transfer to Aggressive Behaviour', *The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 1974, 10, pp 503-515. More information on retaliatory behaviour can be found in, Zillmann, D., Bryant, J., Cantor, J.R., and Day, K.D., 'Irrelevance of Mitigating Circumstances in Retaliatory Behaviour at High Levels of Excitation', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 1975, 9, pp 282-293.
- ²³⁶ Adolf Hitler engineered a diplomatic crisis in Czechoslovakia, claiming that the German peoples in the Sudetenland were being mistreated, and consequently adopted a war stance. This led to a high state of tension between the European nations, and resulted in the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain) persuading the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland to Germany at the Munich Conference in September 1938. This conference was also attended by the Italians and the French. See, *Encyclopaedia Britannica: 15th Ed* (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica: 1997), Section. *Germany*, pp. 39-132.

- ²³⁷ Thompson, Della. *Oxford concise English dictionary*, 9th Edition (Oxford: University of Oxford Press: 1998).
- ²³⁸ Gould, J., and Kolb, W.L., *A dictionary of social sciences* (London: Tavistock Publishers: 1964), p 718.
- ²³⁹ Pruitt and Snyder, 1969, Op. Cit. Note 205, p 59.
- ²⁴⁰ Pressures to limit the conflict and contain it within certain boundaries may be imposed upon the conflicting parties by external parties. This may be the case when the conflict threatens the security of the external parties or breaking of internationally recognised taboos, such as the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- ²⁴¹ Goldman, Kjell., *Tension and détente in bi-polar Europe* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs: 1974), p 9.
- ²⁴² Ibid, Goldman, 1974.
- ²⁴³ Lomax, B., *Hungary 1956* (London: Allison and Bushby: 1976). See also, Cox, T. (Ed), *Hungary 1956: Forty years on* (London: Frank Cass: 1997); and, Gereben, I.B., *Defiant voices: Hungary 1956-1986* (Centre Square: Pa. Alpha: 1986).
- ²⁴⁴ Kolko, G., *Vietnam: Anatomy of a war: 1940-1975* (London: Allen and Unwin: 1986). See also, Berbar, H., *Vietnam: Post-War* (Selangor Dar ul Ehsan, Malaysia: Delta: 1994); and, Marr, D.G., and White, C.P. (Eds), *Post-war Vietnam: Dilemmas in socialist development* (Ithaca, NY: Sb South East Asia Program: Cornell University: 1988).
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- ²⁴⁷ Bush says it is time for action, CNN, November 6, 2001. < <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html> >. Accessed on 20 December 2012. Also see, 'You are either with us or against us', CNN, November 6, 2001. < <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/> >. Accessed on 20 December 2012.
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- ²⁵² Zillmann, Dolf., *Hostility and aggression* (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Association Inc: 1979), pp. 33-34.
- ²⁵³ Latin search results for: hostis, Latin Dictionary [online dictionary]. < <http://www.latin-dictionary.net/search/latin/hostis> >. Accessed on 17 December 2012.
- ²⁵⁴ Saul, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 249, p 17.
- ²⁵⁵ Draculic, S., *Balkan Express* (London: Hutchinson: 1993).
- ²⁵⁶ Small, Melvin and Singer, J. David., *Resort to arms: International and civil war, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage: 1982), pp. 205-206.
- ²⁵⁷ This study is interested in violence between humans only, not of violence between animals (meaning, all animals excluding humans – homo sapiens), nor of environmental violence through storms, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes or other such natural phenomenon.
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- ²⁵⁹ Fowler, H.W., and Fowler, F.G. (Eds), *Oxford English dictionary: Ninth edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1998).
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- ²⁶¹ Galtung, Johan., 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969, 3, p 168. Edna MacDonagh, in, *Violence and Political Change* Based on a paper delivered at King's College London, Under the Auspices of the Irish School of Economics (Dublin: Catholic Institute for International Relations: February 1978), notes that the definition of violence can be extended to particular types of psychological degradation of people (for example, brainwashing and psychological torture), and the social or structural destruction of people (for example, institutional violence).
- ²⁶² It is noteworthy to mention that the severity of the violence is important. For example, if the violence threatens the vital interests of the receiving party, retaliation may seem to be the only available option, as in a calculated proportional response. On the other hand, the limited use of violence, with clearly defined goals and the availability of credible alternatives for mutual accommodation, is less likely to produce retaliation. The nature of the violent action does matter, as does its relationship to the cultural and institutional sensitivities and norms of the receiving party.
- ²⁶³ O'Balance, 1993, Op. Cit. Note 174. See also, Fullerton, John., *The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan* (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd: 1983); Bhasin, V.K., *Soviet intervention in Afghanistan: Its background and implications* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company Ltd: 1984).
- ²⁶⁴ Tribal (at times patrimonial) culture has its own value set. It usually breeds higher tolerance for pain and suffering. Fatalism was intrinsic in the typical Afghan mindset.
- ²⁶⁵ Endemic violence that is extant in the disparities in equality in the social structures, and distributive injustice. The quality of life varies greatly between individuals or groups of people. Institutionalised violence is a sub-category of this structural violence. For example, the repression of free speech through the use of direct violence by the law-enforcement services.
- ²⁶⁶ Ideological, religious, or linguistic symbols that legitimise direct or structural violence, for example, myths and legends, concepts of the 'chosen people' or the 'superior race'. Cultural violence involves a process of dehumanisation of the opponent, and hence, the legitimation and justification for the oppression of others. As was the case in the recent Conflict in Kosova (1999), where the Serbs legitimised their use of excessively violent tactics and torture for the defence of the Serbian homeland. The same is true for Russian actions in the Chechen Conflict (1999 – present).
- ²⁶⁷ Wijeyaratne, Surendrini., *Afghanistan: A study on the prospects for peace*, discussion paper, Canadian Council for International Co-operation [online document], March 2008. < http://www.ccic.ca/files/en/what_we_do/002_peace_2008-03_afghanistan_study.pdf >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁶⁸ Eysenck, H.J., 'The origins of violence', *Journal of Medical Ethics*, Vol. 5, 1979, pp. 105-107. < <http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC1154734/pdf/jmedeth00164-0007.pdf> >. Accessed on 17 December 2012; Ferguson, Christopher J., and Beaver, Kevin M., 'Natural born killers: The genetic origins of extreme violence', *Aggression and Violent Behaviour*, Vol. 14, 2009, pp. 286-294. < <http://dieoff.com/Biology/NaturalBornKillers.pdf> >. Accessed on 17 December 2012; and, Richerson, Peter J., and Boyd, Robert., 'Culture is part of human biology: why the superorganic concept serves the human sciences badly', in, Maasen, S., and Winterhager, M. (Eds.), *Science studies: Probing the dynamics of scientific knowledge* (Bielefeld: Verlag: 2001). < <http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Richerson/CultureIsBiology.pdf> >. Accessed on 17 December 2012.
- ²⁶⁹ Machiavelli, Niccolo., *The Prince*, 2nd Ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1998).
- ²⁷⁰ Hobbes, Thomas., *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics: 1985, originally published in 1651). It can also be found at: < http://gluecksmann.de/Links_A-E/Hobbes_Leviathan.pdf >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁷¹ Ibid, Hobbes (1651: 1985), p. 190.
- ²⁷² Barnard, Alan., and, Spencer, Jonathan., *Encyclopaedia of social and cultural anthropology* (London: Routledge: 1996), pp. 559-560.
- ²⁷³ Bargh, John A., 'Unconscious behavioural guidance systems', Agnew, C., Carlston, D., Graziano, W., and Kelly, J. (Eds.), *Then a miracle occurs: Focusing on behaviour in social psychological theory and research* (New York: Oxford University Press: 2009). Also see, von Hippel,

- William., and Trivers, Robert., 'The evolution and psychology of self-deception', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, Vol. 34, 2011, pp. 1–56. < <http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/HomePage/Faculty/Swann/docu/brooks-swann.pdf> >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁷⁴ van den Noort, Maurit., Bosch, Peggy., and Hugdahl, Kenneth., 'Understanding the unconscious brain: Evidence for non-linear information processing', in, *Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Stresa, Italy*. 2005. < <http://www.psych.unito.it/csc/cogsci05/frame/poster/2/f398-vandenoort.pdf> >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁷⁵ Freud, Sigmund., *The interpretation of dreams* (London: Allen and Unwin: 1938). Originally published in 1900.
- ²⁷⁶ Ibid, Freud, 1938.
- ²⁷⁷ Panhuysen, Geert., 'The relationship between somatic and psychic processes: lessons from Freud's project', *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 843, No. 1, 1998, pp. 20-42. < <http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~steve/panhuysen.pdf> > Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁷⁸ Freud, Sigmund., *Beyond the pleasure principle*, translated by C. J. M. Hubback (London, Vienna: Intl. Psycho-Analytical: 1922). Also available via: < <http://www.bartleby.com/276/> >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁷⁹ Faulkner, Joanne., 'Freud's concept of the death drive and its relation to the superego', *Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 9, 2005. < <http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol9/Freud.html> >. Accessed on 18 December 2012.
- ²⁸⁰ Ibid, Faulkner, 2005.
- ²⁸¹ Freud, 1938, Op. Cit. Note 275.
- ²⁸² Ritzer, G., and Goodman, D. J., *Sociological theory*, Sixth Ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill: 2003); and, Ritzer, G., *Classical sociological theory*, 2nd Edition. (New York: The McGraw Hill Companies Inc.: 1996). Also see, Saalmann, Gernot., *Classical sociological theories*, Lectures at the Department of Sociology, University of Pune, Summer 2010. < http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/7907/pdf/ClassicalTheories_Numbers2.pdf >. Accessed on 20 December 2012.
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- ²⁸⁵ Anastasiu, Ionuț., 'Family and school understood as agents of socialization', *Euromentor Journal-Studies about Education* Vol. 2, 2011, pp. 38-43. < http://euromentor.ucdc.ro/2011/en/familyandschoolunderstoodasagentsofsocializationionutanastasiu_2.pdf >. Accessed on 20 December 2012.
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- ²⁸⁸ Widom, C.S., 'Does violence beget violence?: A critical examination of the literature', *Psychological Bulletin*, No 106, 1989, pp. 3-28. A more detailed discussion of this subject in relation to socialisation in Afghanistan will be given in chapter two when we look into family, tribal and cultural structures of socialisation.
- ²⁸⁹ Ross, Mark Howard., *The culture of conflict* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press: 1993). By Spartan I refer to the socialisation of young Spartan citizens (Greek City States 600 B.C. to 300 B.C.) who idealised the warrior image, and hence, the ability to be violent. Their upbringing was intensely severe when compared to the liberal attitudes of childrearing in present times. Many children would die as a result of this upbringing, especially through the severe punishments that were inflicted on those displaying behaviour unbecoming of the ideal Spartan archetype. Such punishments would invariably include flogging, solitary confinement, extreme physical exertions and regular beatings. The trial period would start from as early as 8 to 9 years of age and end at the satisfactory crossing into adulthood, when accepted by the Council of Peers, as a full citizen of the city state of Sparta. Peers were only those of 'pure' Spartan Blood (this depended upon the ancestral line established when the Spartan city state came in to being), and passing into the circle of peers was only possible for the sons of peers. For further discussion on Spartan childrearing methods, see, Hooker, J.T., *The ancient Spartans* (London: Dent: 1980); Powell, A., and Hodkinson, S., *The shadow of Sparta* (London: Routledge, for the Classic Press of Wales: 1994); Fitzhardinge, F.L., *The Spartans* (London: Thames and Hudson: 1980); Forrest, W.G., *The history of Sparta: 950-192 B.C.* (London: Duckworth: 1980); and, MacDowell, D.M., *Spartan Law* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic: 1986).
- ²⁹⁰ Ibid, Ross, 1993.
- ²⁹¹ Bamberger, Joan., 'The myth of matriarchy: Why men rule in primitive society', in, Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist., and Lamphere, Louise. (Eds.), *Woman, culture, society* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press: 1974), pp. 263-80. < <http://www.classics.ucsb.edu/mythF09/Bamberger.pdf> >. Accessed on 20 December 2012.
- ²⁹² Inkeles, A., and Levinson, D., *National character: The study of modal personality and socio-cultural systems*, in Lindzey, G. (Ed), *Handbook of social psychology*, Vol 2 (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley: 1954), pp 977-1020.
- ²⁹³ Kriesberg, 1998, Op. Cit. Note 86, pp. 129.

CHAPTER THREE

- ¹ Some scholars take exception to the *periodisation* approach to the study of history; for example, Thapar, Romila., *Time as a metaphor of history: Early India* (New Delhi: 1996).
- ² Streets, Heather., *Martial races: The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2004). The final chapter is particularly insightful, 'Representation versus experience: Life as a 'martial race' soldier', pp. 190-224.
- ³ For an elaborate discussion on Nang and Qalang socio-cultural values see, section 3:4:3 – *The Dynamics of the Distribution of Land and Power*; and, section 3:4:4:1 – *The Pushtun*.
- ⁴ For an elaborate discussion of the social significance of the development of the archetypal male in Afghan society, see section, 3:4:3 – *The Dynamics of the Distribution of Land and Power*.
- ⁵ Malik, Aqab M., 'Jihad: Conflict resolution or its anti-thesis', *Strategic Studies Journal*, Vol. 32, Issue 2/3, September 2012, p. 203.
- ⁶ Hobbes, Thomas., *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics: 1985), First part, Chapter 13, p. 62.
- ⁷ *The new encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th Edition (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc: 2002), Vol. 11, p. 918.
- ⁸ With respect to our understanding of the tribe, we must be aware of the nature of the concept of *tribe* in modern Afghanistan within which many forces are involved in the day to day functioning of society. Anthropologists have pointed out the detrimental effects of this concept in rendering the complex and fluid ethnographic reality of such societies as static. Nevertheless, we cannot underestimate the importance of the tribe and its impact on the development of Afghanistan. In fact, the *tribe* has been intrinsic to the evolution of the modern State of Afghanistan.
- ⁹ Rowthorn, Robert., and Andrés Guzmán, Ricardo., and Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos., 'The economics of social stratification in premodern societies', *Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 35567*, 28 November 2011, posted 26 December 2011, pp. 2-5. < http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35567/1/MPRA_paper_35567.pdf >. Accessed on 15 December 2013.
- ¹⁰ Jean de Arc, Chand Bibi, and Razia Sultana are all exceptions and were not the norm. See, Sharma, Bharti., *Political empowerment of women: a literary reflection*, Department of English, University of Delhi. < <http://manak.org.in/wp-content/uploads/pdf-manak/Political%20Empowerment%20of%20Women%20A%20Literary%20Reflection.pdf> >, accessed on 23 January 2013. Also see, Shabbir, Sajida., 'Struggle for Muslim women's rights in British India (1857 – 1947)', *Pakistan Vision*, Volume 12, No. 2, December 2011, < http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Article-1_V_12_No_2_Dec11.pdf >, accessed on 23 January 2013. And, Rajivan, Anuradha., Borsatti, Elena., and Kohli, Rohini., et al, 'E-Discussion: gender - overcoming unequal power, unequal voice: Folklore and historical stories', Asia Pacific Human Development Network, Human development Report Unit, *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)* [online document], Colombo, December 2009, pp. 127-151, < http://hdr.undp.org/ext/HDRU/pdf/e-Discussion_-_24-02-2010.pdf >, accessed on 23 January 2013.
- ¹¹ Mayer, S.R.T., and Paget, J.C., *Afghanistan: Its political and military geography and ethnology* (London: George Routledge and Sons: 1879), p. 63. In Afghan tradition, a *lashkar* (tribal raiding party) includes the males (the warriors), the family, and all the animals belonging to them.
- ¹² See section 3:4:4:1 for a discussion on the nature of warrior cultures as exemplified by the differences between Nang and Qalang Pushtun Societies.
- ¹³ Hoig, Stan., *Tribal wars of the southern plains* (London: University of Oklahoma Press: 1993), p. 20.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*, Hoig, 1993, p. 22. For example, the Twarigh (Berbers) of Sahara.
- ¹⁵ Hamilton, Terrick., *1781-1876 - Antar: A bedoueen romance* (London: J. Murray: 1819-1820).
- ¹⁶ Hoig, 1993, Op. Cit. Note 13, p. 13.
- ¹⁷ Yellow Emperor, in, *The Columbia encyclopedia* [online encyclopedia], Sixth Edition (2008). < http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Yellow_Emperor.aspx >. Accessed on 15 December 2013.
- ¹⁸ King, Winston L., *Zen and the way of the sword* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1993).
- ¹⁹ Rowthorn, et al, 2011, Op. Cit. Note 9.
- ²⁰ Galton, David J., 'Greek theories on eugenics', *Journal of Medical Ethics*, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 263-267. < <http://jme.bmj.com/content/24/4/263.full.pdf> >. Accessed on 19 November 2013.
- ²¹ Green, Peter., *The Greco-Persian Wars* (Berkeley, CA: London University of California Press: 1996).
- ²² Serczyk, W., 'The Commonwealth and the Cossacks in the first quarter of the seventeenth century', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978. Also see, Subtelny, O., *The Mazepists: Ukrainian separatism in the early eighteenth century* (Boulder, Colo: 1981); and, Gordon, L. *Cossack Rebellions: Social turmoil in the sixteenth-century Ukraine* (Albany: 1983).
- ²³ In this chronological history of Afghanistan, the presently delineated region are difficult to isolate from the contiguous regions that comprise people of related ethnicities, with similar cultural affinities, which share a similar history due to the complexity of the migration patterns of the different population groups and their interlacing timelines of significant events within the Central Asian, South Asian and the Persian territories. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, this region is discussed as a geographical and cultural whole.
- ²⁴ *The new encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia*, 15th Edition (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc: 2002), Vol 13, pp. 31.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*, *Britannica Macropaedia*, 2002.
- ²⁶ Dupree, Louis., *Afghanistan* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1980). Dupree (1980) speculates that Neanderthal occupation occurred as early as 50,000 years ago, and notes that Northern Afghanistan may have been part of the "zone of the domestication of the wheat/barley, sheep/goat/cattle complex, the Neolithic Revolution which gave man control of his food supply about 11,000 years ago, which led ultimately to the urbanisation of the civilisations of the Nile Valley, The Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and the Indus Valley", pp xvii-xviii.
- ²⁷ The areas that now comprise Afghanistan were known by different denotations throughout history. For much of the past two millennia the whole region was known as Khorasan. Mirza Moorad Alee Beg (*The battle of Panipat: A legend of Hindoostan* (Bombay: Ranina's Union Press: 1884) p. 6) acknowledges that a number of provinces including, Herat, Balkh, Kabul, Northern Baluchistan, Badakhshan, Kandahar, Mahshed, Nishapur, and much of the present NWFP were lumped together and singularly known as Khorasan. Ahmad Shah Durrani aggregated this whole region into his empire and was known as '*Badshah-e-Khorasan*' (Emperor of Khorasan). The title was given to successive monarchs upto and including Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk (1803-09 and 1839-42 A.D.).
- ²⁸ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 26, p. 278.
- ²⁹ *Ibid*, Dupree, 1980, pp. 282-283.
- ³⁰ In 998 AD, Mahmood the Great of Ghazni was to extend Ghaznavid control to the whole of the Punjab and mounted numerous raids into Central India defeating local dynasties and sacking Delhi. Mahmood's destruction of Hindu Idols in Delhi has persisted until present times, and has even been used by the Taliban to legitimate their destruction of the two famous statues of Buddha in Bamiyan.
- ³¹ Fraser-Tytler, W., *Afghanistan*, 3rd Ed. revised by M. Gillett (London: 1967).
- ³² Highlander Pushtun tribes rallied under the banner of Jalal ad-Din, the son of Khwarezm Shah Sultan 'Alā'ad-Din Muhammad, who had defeated the Ghurids and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongols under Kutikonian. This was one of the very few times that the Mongols had ever been defeated. In the ensuing siege of Bamiyan to avenge the defeat, by Ghengis himself, his grandson, Mutugen, was killed. When the city fell, Ghengis ordered the total destruction of Bamiyan. The citadel was completely razed to the ground. Its whole population - men, women and children - put to death. Following the death of Genghis Khan (d. 1227 A.D.), Mongol control of Afghanistan

- persisted until the end of the fourteenth century. While some local chiefs acknowledged the remaining Mongol princes as suzerains, others succeeded in establishing independent principalities until Tamer-lane (Timur-i-lang: 1335-1405 A.D.) re-conquered most of Afghanistan. In 1504 A.D., Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur (1526-1530 A.D.), a descendant of both Genghis and Timur, made his capital in Kabul, and successfully launched an invasion of India, where he established the Mughal Empire after defeating Ibrahim Lodi (1526 A.D.), the last of the Lodi Pushtun kings of India.
- ³³ Hobbes, 1985, Op. Cit. Note 6.
- ³⁴ Josif, Harold., *Political stability on the northwest frontier of South Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute: August 1951), p. 35.
- ³⁵ Boyle, John Andrew., *Cambridge history of Iran: Vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1968).
- ³⁶ Singh, Ganda., *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of modern Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House: 1959).
- ³⁷ *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia*, 15th Edition (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc: 2002), Vol XIII, p. 33.
- ³⁸ Noelle, Christine., *The state and tribe in nineteenth century Afghanistan: Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863)* (Richmond: Curzon Press: 1997), p. 230.
- ³⁹ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 26, p. 332.
- ⁴⁰ Ghubar, G., *Ahmad Shah baba-yi-Afghan* (Kabul: 1943), pp. 85-90; Singh, 1959, Op. Cit. Note 36, p. 27; and, Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 26, pp. 336-337, chart 22.
- ⁴¹ Ferrier, 1858, Op. Cit. Note 37, pp. 72-73. On many occasions, Ahmad Shah was able to defeat and rout his opponents, capturing artillery and arms in bulk, and those from the fallen.
- ⁴² Ahmad Shah entered India on eight occasions, from outright invasions to the call of aid by the Mughal Shahs, who were constantly being harassed by the martial Marathas. On his fifth invasion, Ahmad Shah returned to reoccupy the Punjab which had expelled his son Timur Khan from Lahore. Power was restored by the Shah's powerful army, which subsequently turned to Delhi to defeat the Marathas. With victory, he returned to Kandahar. Kandahar was a constant worry for the Shah. His cousins and kinsmen constantly posed a treat to his rule. On one occasion, he found that his nephew, Luqman Khan, Governor of Kandahar, had declared independence. He was executed forthwith.
- ⁴³ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 26, pp. 336-337; and, Noelle, 1997, Op. Cit. Note 38.
- ⁴⁴ Poullada, Leon., *Reform and rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah's failure to modernise a tribal society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1973), p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ Dalrymple, William., *Return of a King: The battle for Afghanistan 1939-1842* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing: 2013), p. 431.
- ⁴⁶ Sir Mortimer Durand gives an account of the negotiations between himself and the Amir as to the delineation of Afghanistan, especially the eastern border with India. However, as can be noted from his address, Durand states that the no force was placed upon the Amir who chose the border of his own free will. See, Durand, H. Mortimer., *The Amir Abdur Rahman Khan*, Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, London, November 6, 1907. We can compare Durand's account with that of the Biography of the Amir: SEE – Stephen Wheeler, *The Ameer Abdur Rahman* (London: Bliss, Sands and Foster: 1895).
- ⁴⁷ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 26, pp. 417-429.
- ⁴⁸ Ahmed, Akbar S., *Millennium and charisma among Pathans: A critical essay in social anthropology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1976), p. 1.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, Ahmed, 1976, p. 3.
- ⁵⁰ Leach, E.R., *Political systems of highland Burma: A study of Kachin social structure*, LSE Monograph 44, (London: University of London: 1954), p. 10.
- ⁵¹ For a more detailed analysis and evaluation of the concept of 'social action' and its relationship to tribally based society within the Islamic sphere of influence, as espoused by Max Weber, see Turner, Bryan Stanley., *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study* (London: Routledge: 1998), pp. 39-41, and, pp. 69-71.
- ⁵² Sahlins, Marshall D., *Tribesmen* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc: 1968).
- ⁵³ Pennell, T.L., *Among the wild tribes of the Afghan frontier: A record of 16 years close intercourse with the natives of the Indian marches* (London: Seeley and Co Ltd: 1909), p. 30.
- ⁵⁴ Gregorian, V., *The emergence of modern Afghanistan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1969), p. 162; and, Canfield, Robert LeRoy., *Faction and conversion in a plural society: Religious alignments in the Hindu Kush* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan: 1973), pp. 99-103.
- ⁵⁵ The term 'Nation' has been omitted due to the recognition that there are numerous nations that exist within Afghanistan.
- ⁵⁶ Pennell, 1909, Op. Cit. Note 53, p. 146.
- ⁵⁷ Some revolutions, even though characteristic of Afghan history, are hard to explain even by Afghan standards; for example, Baccha Saqqao, the bandit, when he overthrew the legitimate government of Amanaulah Khan in 1929. I may be noted that Afghanistan society is ridden by fatalism and sees this phenomenon as an essential part of life. Fatalism was prevalent when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, since many Afghans simply accepted death at the hands of Soviets as a fait accompli, which in turn made recruitment for jihad near automatic.
- ⁵⁸ Lindholm, Charles., *Frontier perspectives: Essays in comparative anthropology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001), p. 122.
- ⁵⁹ Service, Elman R., *Primitive social organisation: An evolutionary perspective* (New York: Random House: 1971), p. 116.
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- ⁶² Service, 1971, Op. Cit. Note 59, p. 13.
- ⁶³ Ibid, Service, 1971, p. 117.
- ⁶⁴ Barth, F., 'Pathan identity and its maintenance', in, *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organisation of cultural differences* (London: Allen and Unwin: 1969), p. 134.
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- ⁸⁹ Lloyd, P.C., *Classes, crises and coups* (London: Paladin: 1971), p. 73.
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- ¹¹² Ahmed, 1976, Op. Cit. Note 48, p. 36.
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CHAPTER FOUR

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- ⁵⁹ Matthee, Rudolph P., *The politics of trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1999), p. 77.

- ⁶⁰ Melville, 1996, Op. Cit. Note 16, p. 392.
- ⁶¹ Srivastava, 1970, Op. Cit. Note 24, p. 13.
- ⁶² Ibid, Srivastava, 1970, p. 21.
- ⁶³ Egerton, 1896, Op. Cit. Note 34, p. 63.
- ⁶⁴ This is the translation of the biography of Emperor Akbar, *Ain-i-Akbar*, from the original by Abu Al-Fazl Ibn Mubarak. See, *Abu Al-Fazl Ibn Mubarak: The Ayin Akbary, or the institutes of the Emperor Akbar*, Translated by Francis Gladwin (London: William Richardson: 1777).
- ⁶⁵ The diffusion was also contributed to by the Mughal practice of allowing nobles to keep military contingents (*panj hazari* = 5,000 soldiers etc.) that joined the royal armies during campaigns. One still comes upon cannon shots made from stone in Islamabad surrounds that which abounded in Mughal *jagirdars*' fortresses, showing the degree of diffusion.
- ⁶⁶ Ferrier, 1858, Op. Cit. Note 43, pp. 72-73. On many occasions, Ahmad Shah was able to defeat and rout his opponents, capturing artillery and arms in bulk, and also those from the fallen.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, Ferrier, 1858, p. 79.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, Ferrier, 1858.
- ⁶⁹ Singh, 1959, Op. Cit. Note 48, p. 358.
- ⁷⁰ Sen, S.N., *Military system of the Marathas* (Central India: Longmans: 1958), pp. 101-102.
- ⁷¹ Wilks, *Historical sketches of the south of India* (London: 1810), Vol II, p. 219.
- ⁷² Ibid, Wilks, 1810, pp. 264-265.
- ⁷³ Irvine, 1903, Op. Cit. Note 35, p. 105.
- ⁷⁴ Fitzclarence, Frederick. (Lt. Col), *Journal of a route across India, Through Egypt to England: In the latter end of the year 1817, and the beginning of 1818* (London: John Murray: 1819), p. 256.
- ⁷⁵ Durrani, A.M.K., *Multan under the Afghans (1752-1818)* (Multan: Bazme Saqafat: 1981), p. 79. Ferrier, 1858, Op. Cit. Note 43, p. 96.
- ⁷⁶ Bellew, H.W., *Journal of the mission to Afghanistan in 1957, under Major (Now Colonel) Lumsden; with an account of the country and people* (London: Smith, Elder and Co: 1862), p. 42.
- ⁷⁷ Varma, B., *English East India Company and the Afghans: 1757-1800* (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak: 1968).
- ⁷⁸ Lal, Mohan., *Life of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul*, Two Volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1978) original printed in 1846, p. 240. Mohan Lal accompanied the British Mission to Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the Second Afghan-Anglo War (1839-1842), to re-establish diplomatic relations with Dost Mohammad. This publication is a result of his personal observations.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, Lal, 1978, p. 241. Longer ranges matter in open country like Afghanistan rather than forested / farmed English countryside.
- ⁸⁰ Vogelsang, William., *The Afghans* (Oxford: Blackwell: 2002), p. 258.
- ⁸¹ Dupree, Louis., *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press: 1980), p. 405.
- ⁸² Vogelsang, 2002, Op. Cit. Note 80, p. 258.
- ⁸³ O'Ballance, 1993, Op. Cit. Note 1, p. 32.
- ⁸⁴ Noelle, Christine., *The state and tribe in nineteenth-century Afghanistan: The reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, 1826-1863* (London: Routledge: 1997), p. 259.
- ⁸⁵ Lal, 1978, Op. Cit. Note 78, p. 240.
- ⁸⁶ Elphinstone, Mountstuart., *An account of the Kingdom of Caubul* (London: Oxford University Press: 1972), first published in 1815, two volumes. Vol II, p. 268.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid, Elphinstone, 1972, p. 270.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid, Elphinstone, 1972, pp. 273-274.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid, Elphinstone, 1972, p. 273.
- ⁹⁰ Khan, Sultan Mahomed., *The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan*, Two Volumes (London: John Murray: 1900), Vol II, p. 51.
- ⁹¹ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II.
- ⁹² Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 55.
- ⁹³ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 53.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 190.
- ⁹⁵ Khan, Sultan Mahomed., *The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan*, Two Volumes (London: John Murray: 1900), Vol I, p. 212.
- ⁹⁶ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 81, p. 418.
- ⁹⁷ Khan, 1900, Vol I, Op. Cit. Note 95, p. 202.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol I, p. 204.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol I.
- ¹⁰⁰ Field, Claud., *With the Afghans* (London: Marshall Brothers Ltd: 1908), p. 9.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, Field, 1908.
- ¹⁰² Khan, 1900, Vol II, Op. Cit. Note 90, pp. 19-20.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 23.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II.
- ¹⁰⁵ Black, Cyril., and Dupree, Louis., *The Modernisation of Inner Asia* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe: 1991), p. 102. Also see, Gregorian, Vartan., *The emergence of modern Afghanistan: Politics of reform and modernisation 1880-1946* (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press: 1969)
- ¹⁰⁶ Overby, Paul., *Amanullah: The hard case of reform in Afghanistan*, Occasional Paper No. 31, the Afghanistan Forum, New York, 1992, p. 11.
- ¹⁰⁷ Khan, 1900, Vol II, Op. Cit. Note 90, pp. 26-27. Own highlights.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 30.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 29.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 30. It is interesting to note that the Maxim and Gatling guns were used to devastating effect in order to subdue the restless and independent Pushtun tribes residing on the 'British' side of the newly defined North West Frontier Province border areas.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 34.
- ¹¹² Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II.
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- ¹¹⁴ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 57.
- ¹¹⁶ O'Ballance, 1993, Op. Cit. Note 1, p. 50.
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- ¹³⁰ Hobbes, Thomas., *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics: 1985).
- ¹³¹ Bellew, 1862, Op. Cit. Note 76, pp. 41-43. Own additions.
- ¹³² Elphinstone, 1972, Op. Cit. Note 86, pp. 22-23.
- ¹³³ Bellew, 1862, Op. Cit. Note 76, p. 116.
- ¹³⁴ Adamec, 1967, Op. Cit. Note 122, p. 78.
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- ¹⁴⁸ Ibid, Bilgrami, 1972, p. 120. See, Appendices XVI (b) Article 10 of the "Articles of Agreement Between Ameer Dost Muhammad Khan on his own part and Sir John Lawrence and Lt. Col. H.B. Edwards on the part of the Honourable East India Company, made at Peshawar on January 26, 1857", pp. 313-315. *lakh* = hundred thousand.
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- ¹⁵⁴ Also known as, Richard Southwell Bourke, 6th Earl of Mayo
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- ¹⁶² Malhotra, 1982, Op. Cit. Note 159, p. 44.
- ¹⁶³ Bilgrami, 1972, Op. Cit. Note 147, p. 188.
- ¹⁶⁴ Ibid, Bilgrami, 1972, APP XIX, pp. 323-326.
- ¹⁶⁵ Fraser-Tytler, 1958, Op. Cit. Note 127, p. 145.
- ¹⁶⁶ Bilgrami, 1972, Op. Cit. Note 147, p. 195.
- ¹⁶⁷ Revolts did not necessarily originate from obvious opponents. For example, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's paternal uncle, the Viceroy of Afghan Turkestan Ishak Khan, secured vast amounts of government funds and arms to defend the northern border against Russian attack; however, instead, he fielded a 20,000 to 24,000 strong army against the Amir on 29 September 1888 (see, Khan, 1900, Vol I, Op. Cit. Note 95, p. 268.). The Amir states: "Having not the slightest idea of his disloyalty, I placed the best rifles and arms to be got at Turkestan under his disposal, because he was on the frontier of Russia, and I thought it wise to keep the largest stores of every kind there... I did not know then that my own weapons and money would be used against myself, and the bullets from the best breech-loading guns and rifles which I had placed in his hands would be fired at my own breast" (Khan, 1900, Vol I, Op. Cit. Note 95, pp. 262-263.). The rebellion was duly dealt with.
- ¹⁶⁸ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 81. Dupree's assertions that the Amir was forming a nation-state are contrary to the actual multi-ethnic and racial makeup of the country, since the term Nation-State signifies the unification of a territory controlled by a single racial element, which cannot be the case in Afghanistan.
- ¹⁶⁹ Bilgrami, 1972, Op. Cit. Note 147, p. 202.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Bilgrami, 1972.
- ¹⁷¹ Adamec, 1967, Op. Cit. Note 122, p. 26.
- ¹⁷² Ibid, Adamec, 1967, pp. 51-52.
- ¹⁷³ See effects of SALW proliferation on conflict dynamics in chapters eight and nine.
- ¹⁷⁴ Mousavi, S.A., *The Hazaras of Afghanistan* (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press: 1998), p. 126.
- ¹⁷⁵ Ibid. Mousavi, 1998. Also see, Khan, 1900, Vol I, Op. Cit. Note 95, p. 283.
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- ¹⁷⁹ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 57, own addition.

- ¹⁸⁰ Ibid, Khan, 1900, Vol II, p. 191, own addition.
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- ¹⁹¹ Adamec, 1974, Op. Cit. Note 126, pp. 15-41.
- ¹⁹² Arghandawi, 1989, Op. Cit. Note 140, p. 333. Also see, *Proposed Treaty Between the Amir of Afghanistan and German Mission: Extracts from the Fredrich Seiler's Shorthand Diary*, May 23, 1916.
- ¹⁹³ Dupree, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 81, p. 434; and, Adamec, 1967, Op. Cit. Note 122, p. 94. Heathcote, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 55, p. 167, notes that the Amir demanded a total of 50,000 rifles as opposed to the sum declared by Dupree (1980) and Adamec (1967).
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- ¹⁹⁵ Adamec, 1974, Op. Cit. Note 126, p. 40.
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- ²⁰⁰ Ibid, Adamec, 1974. Also see, Ganjoo, Satish., *Soviet Afghan relations* (Delhi: Akashdeep Publishing House: 1990), p. 15.
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CHAPTER FIVE

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CHAPTER SIX

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CHAPTER SEVEN

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- ³⁸ Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali was the architect behind the establishment of the Central Asia Economic Bloc with the aid of a land-link through Afghanistan. The oil and gas pipeline was to be only one of the many links that were to be made. Author's interview with former Foreign Minister, Pakistan, Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali, Lahore Residence, 4 to 11 May 1999.
- ³⁹ Rashid, Ahmed., *Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris: 2001a), pp. 184-185.
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- ⁴¹ The trucks were the property of the National Logistics Cell set utilised by Major General @ Naseerullah Babar to facilitate the opening-up of Central Asia's vast potential. See, *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 4/1994.
- ⁴² According to Davis, the third warlord, Naqibullah, a Jamiat commander, was given a massive bribe to secure his cooperation with the compliance of President Rabbani in Kabul. Davis, Anthony., in, 'How the Taliban became a military force', in, Maley, William., *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban* (London: C Hurst & Co Ltd.: 2001), p. 50. Rasanayagam (2003) notes that Naqibullah received instructions from Kabul not to oppose the Taliban and surrender his weapons. See, Rasanayagam, Angelo., *Afghanistan, A modern history: Monarchy, despotism or democracy? The problems of governance in the Muslim tradition* (London: I. B. Tauris: 2003), p. 146.
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- ⁷² *Harakat ul-Ansar* changed its name to *Harakat ul-Mujahideen* after the U.S. State Department listed it as a terrorist organisation with links to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. See, Gul, 2002, Op. Cit. Note 54, pp. 101-103.
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- ⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, pp. 46-47, p. 28.
- ⁷⁷ Ahmed Rashid (2001a, Op. Cit. Note 39, p. xiv) also corroborates this view, noting that about 10,000 of the fighters engaged in combat during the 1999 summer offensive were Pakistani. However, Goodson (2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 82), notes that a lower number of 5-8,000 Pakistanis were used during the offensive.
- ⁷⁸ *Jane's Sentinel*, May-October 2000, Op. Cit. Note 67, p. 34.
- ⁷⁹ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2001 Edition, November 2001-April 2002, (Coulson, Surrey: Jane's Information Group: 2001), p. 51.
- ⁸⁰ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2000 Edition, November 2000-April 2001, (Coulson, Surrey: Jane's Information Group: 2000), p. 35.
- ⁸¹ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 26.
- ⁸² U.N. Secretary-General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/633-S/2000/1106, 20 November, 2000, p. 13.
- ⁸³ Goodson, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 84.
- ⁸⁴ Fisk, Robert., 'Circling Over a Broken, Ruined State', *Independent* (London), 14 July 1996.
- ⁸⁵ Griffin, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 12, p. 204.
- ⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 32.
- ⁸⁷ Goodson, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 148. Although a logical argument, Ukraine's support for the Taliban is in marked contrast to its support for Masood's UF before the fall of Kabul. However, they may have reassessed their position when the Taliban took Kabul and marginalised Masood. In addition, the proverb '*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*', derived from Kautilya's doctrine (*Arthashastra* (Mysore: Wesleyan Division: 1923), p. VI:2.), may ring true in Ukraine's situation when considering Russia's increasing support for the UF after 1996.
- ⁸⁸ Rashid, 2001a, Op. Cit. Note 39, p. 176.
- ⁸⁹ Bergen, Peter. L., *Holy war inc: Inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden* (London: Phoenix-Orion Books Ltd: 2002), pp. 108-129. Also see, Gunarathna, Rohan., *Inside Al Qaeda: Global network of terror* (Islamabad: Vanguard: 2002), p. 46.
- ⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1189 on International Terrorism, 13-08-1998, Resolution 1189 (1998), S/RES/1189 (1998), *US Department of the Treasury* [web document]. < <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/1189.pdf> >. Accessed on 25 February 2012. Article 1 reads: the Security Council "*Strongly condemns the terrorist bomb attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 which claimed hundreds of innocent lives, injured thousands of people and caused massive destruction to property*".

- ⁹¹ Maley, 2002, Op. Cit. Note 47, p. 123.
- ⁹² Gunarathna, 2002, Op. Cit. Note 89, p. 209. Twenty one members of ‘*Harakat-ul-Mujahideen*’ were killed by the strikes.
- ⁹³ Presidential Documents, Executive Order 13129 of 4 July 1999, ‘Blocking property and prohibiting transactions with the Taliban’, Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 129, Wednesday, *United States Government Printing Office* [web document], 7 July 1999, < http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1999_register&docid=fr07iv99-146.pdf >. Accessed on 25 February 2012.
- ⁹⁴ Paragraph 13, UNSC Resolution 1214 on Afghanistan, Adopted on 08-12-1998, S/RES/1214, (1998), *Security Council Report* [web document]. < <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20SRES1214.pdf> >. Accessed on 25 February 2012.
- ⁹⁵ The Resolution specifically named Osama bin Laden (paragraph 2), and decided that from 14 November 1999 (paragraph 3) a number of economic sanctions would be imposed freezing funds and assets and any other undertakings (paragraph 4), as defined by paragraph 6. See, UNSC Resolution 1267 on Afghanistan, 15-10-1999, S/RES/1267 (1999), *Government Offices of Sweden* [web document]. < <http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/11/02/56/131c745c.pdf> >. Accessed on 25 April 2012.
- ⁹⁶ UNSC Resolution 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan, 19-12-2000, S/RES/1333, *US Department of State* [web document], 19 December 2000. < <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/5265.pdf> >. Accessed on 20 February 2012.
- ⁹⁷ The October 1999, Resolution 1267, established economic Sanctions. This was later reinforced on 19 December 2000 in UNSC Resolution 1333, co-sponsored by the United States and Russia, to isolate the Taliban in retaliation for their sanctuary of insurgents and militants targeting Russian and U.S. interests. The resolution imposed a ban on arms and munitions, spare parts and equipment sales by U.N. Member States.
- ⁹⁸ *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2001 Edition, November 2001-April 2002, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 2001), p. 34.
- ⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, pp. 30-31.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 31. See note 135, Human Rights Watch interview with diplomatic sources in Islamabad, July 1999.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 23.
- ¹⁰² *Jane’s world armies*, Issue 5, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 1999) Afghanistan Section; and, *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2002 Edition, April – September 2002, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 2002) pp. 52-55.
- ¹⁰³ The UF was centered on the ‘*Jamiat-i-Islami*’, but, in addition, has contained a varying combination of the following factions: ‘*Hizb-i-Wahdat*’; ‘*Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan*’; ‘*Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan*’; ‘*Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*’; and occasionally, Hekmatyar’s ‘*Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan*’.
- ¹⁰⁴ ‘Amnesty International’s position on arms transfers and military aid to Afghanistan’, October 2001, AI Index: ACT 30/033/2001, Distr: SC/CC, p. 2, *Amnesty International* [web document]. < <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/033/2001/en/a9e49912-d8d4-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/act300332001en.pdf> >. Accessed on 27 February 2012.
- ¹⁰⁵ Rashid, 2001b, Op. Cit. Note 49, p. 5.
- ¹⁰⁶ Keddie, Nikki R., and Matthee Rudi., *Iran and the surrounding world: Interactions in culture and cultural politics* (London: University of Washington Press: 2002), p. 347.
- ¹⁰⁷ ‘Whitehouse confirms Iranian military build-up’, 5 September 1998, Web posted at: 10:13 p.m. EDT (0213 GMT), *CNN* [online news]. < <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9809/05/afghanistan.iran/index.html> >. Accessed on 27 February 2012.
- ¹⁰⁸ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1193 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3921st meeting, on 28 August 1998*, 28 August 1998, S/RES/1193 (1998), *UNHCR* [web page]. < <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16f14.html> >. Accessed 27 February 2012. Paragraph 8 reads: the Security Council “*Condemns also the capture of the Consulate-General of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Mazar-e-Sharif, and demands that all parties and, in particular the Taliban, do everything possible to ensure safe and dignified passage out of Afghanistan of the personnel of the Consulate-General and other Iranian nationals missing in Afghanistan*”.
- ¹⁰⁹ Bowersox, G., and Chamberline, B., *Gemstones of Afghanistan* (Tucson, AZ: Geoscience Press, Inc.: 1995).
- ¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 34. Prior to the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif and Sherbighan, Dostum’s Junbish was exporting its limited gas resources to Russia and the Central Asian Republics.
- ¹¹¹ According to Goodson (2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 148), Ukraine was mentioned as having provided funding for the Taliban, however, in light of the arguments that Griffin (2001, Op. Cit. Note 12, p. 14) espouses, the likely scenario may have been that Ukraine was indeed funding Masood, but after the fall of Kabul, their position may well have been reassessed.
- ¹¹² Davis, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 42, p. 60.
- ¹¹³ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 36.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid. Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 39.
- ¹¹⁵ Rasanayagam, 2003, Op. Cit. Note 42, pp. 168-169.
- ¹¹⁶ Goodson, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 165.
- ¹¹⁷ Griffin, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 12, p. 45.
- ¹¹⁸ Jalalzai, 1999, Op. Cit. Note 1, p. 124.
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- ¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 37.
- ¹²¹ Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2001.
- ¹²² Jalalzai, 1999, Op. Cit. Note 1, p. 259.
- ¹²³ Ibid, Jalalzai, 1999.
- ¹²⁴ U.N. Secretary General, *The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security*, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1997/894, 14 November 1997, para. 18.
- ¹²⁵ Khalilzad, Zalmay., ‘Anarchy in Afghanistan’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 50-51.
- ¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, p. 40.
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- ¹²⁸ Saat, J.H., ‘The Collective Security Treaty Organisation’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, *Ministry of Defence UK* [web document], February 2005. < [www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/ca/05\(09\)-JHS.pdf](http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/ca/05(09)-JHS.pdf) >. Accessed on 13 February 2013.
- ¹²⁹ Fisk, 1996, Op. Cit. Note 84.
- ¹³⁰ Risen, ‘Russians back in Afghanistan’, *New York Times*, 27 July 1998.
- ¹³¹ For a more in-depth account of the use of the Kuliob military base in Tajikistan, see, Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Op. Cit. Note 27, pp. 40-45.
- ¹³² Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 43.
- ¹³³ Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2001, pp. 44-45. Also see, Appendix I, for a further detailed account of the use of Osh as a transshipment point for Iranian arms deliveries to the United Front.
- ¹³⁴ *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: South Asia*, 2002 Edition, October 2002 – May 2003, (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group: 2002) p. 48.
- ¹³⁵ Inter-Republic Memorial Society, *Tajikistan: In the wake of civil war*, A Human Rights Watch Short Report, December 1993.
- ¹³⁶ Goodson, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 166.

- ¹³⁷ It is interesting to note that the drugs that were smuggled north from UF territory were harvested by the population under the control of UF forces. No doubt, elements within the UF had vested interests in the continued illegal export of narcotics. This may continue to be the case in the present day, albeit, to a lesser extent.
- ¹³⁸ Goodson, 2001, Op. Cit. Note 7, p. 166. Afghan-Uzbeks, constituting some 6 percent of the total Afghan population, preponderate in many northwestern provinces bordering Uzbekistan, especially in areas of Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Samangan, and Sar-i Pol provinces.
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- ¹⁵² Pakistan Census, 1998, Op. Cit. Note 149.
- ¹⁵³ *Deweaponisation: Problems challenges and viable strategy*, National Institute of Public Administration Lahore (NIPA), Syndicate Research Paper, 1 September 2001, p. 12.
- ¹⁵⁴ Author's interview with Major (Retd) Saifullah Babar (former ISI officer), at his Peshawar Residence, 01 February 2012. Also see, Fullerton, 1984, Op. Cit. Note 146, p. 77.
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- ²¹⁶ Fukuyama, 1980, Op. Cit. Note 214. The prices given to a foreigner may well have been exaggerated slightly by the 'Darra' gun merchants, as compared to those given to locals and the Mujahideen.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

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CHAPTER NINE

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- ²⁴¹ Machel, 1996, Op. Cit. Note 219, p. 7.

CHAPTER TEN

¹ Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur's (b. 1483 – d. 1530) invasion of India from Kabul, and the defeat of the Pushtun (Afghan) Sultan, Ibrahim Lodhi (r. 1517 – 1526), on the plain of Panipat in April 1526, led to the establishment of the Mughal Empire. However, this was also the first recorded wide-scale strategic use of small arms originating from Afghanistan, with the exception of those Afghan territories lying within Safavid Persia. Further discussion, see section 4:2:2 – Firearms and Eastern Empire Building.

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