


What is happening in Tajikistan?

Up-to-date information on recent events in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) and their historical background

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<http://www.roof-top.info>

This report documents the crackdown on civil society in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) of Tajikistan since November 2021 and provides context information on its historical background. It is mainly based on sources in English, Tajik and Russian languages which are available online.

The document will be further updated on a regular basis. Please find updated versions and additional information under <https://wechange.de/project/roof-top-info/>.

It forms the basis of a story map which documents the crackdown on civil society in GBAO and its historical background: https://umap.openstreetmap.fr/en/map/crackdown-on-civil-society-in-gbao-tajikistan_812355.

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1. Executive summary

Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) is a remote high mountain region in Eastern Tajikistan. After various purges and crackdowns on dissenters in other parts of the country in the 2000ies, GBAO was the only region with a vibrant civil society and a certain degree of freedom of expression and assembly. Most of its population are indigenous Pamiris who form an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority. Khorugh, the main town of GBAO, was the scene of violent clashes and demonstrations against suspected human rights violations by security forces in 2012, 2014 and 2018.

On November 25, 2021, security forces extrajudicially killed a local villager. When demonstrators demanded accountability from the regional authorities in Khorugh, gunfire by security forces led to two further civilian casualties. The demonstration dissolved on November 28, 2021, after the authorities had made concessions. In the following, however, most of these concessions were not implemented. Whereas no serious investigation into the killing of civilians took place, ignoring the demands by civil society representatives, the authorities launched a propaganda campaign, criminal prosecution against demonstrators for alleged petty crimes and arbitrary arrests with the purpose of intimidation. The internet blockade, which continued until March 2022, and the increased military presence in the region further increased the discontent among the local population and alienated it from the central government. Preparations for a military operation were made in January and February 2022 but the conflict was frozen in March 2022.

In May 2022, the authorities and security forces used protest events as a pretext for a massive, comprehensive, coordinated, violent and multi-level crackdown on dissenters, informal powerbrokers and random residents, as well as civil society activists. When a crowd of protesters was marching towards the main square of Khorugh on May 16, 2022, they clashed with security forces. At least one civilian was fatally shot by security forces in Khorugh the same day. On May 17, 2022, protesters in Vamar (Rushan district) blocked the road to prevent military reinforcement from reaching Khorugh. The following morning, security forces opened fire at the protesters. After breaking the blockade of the road, they cracked down on the local community, detaining, torturing and executing residents. There was a minimum of 21 civilian casualties and the number of detained or forcibly disappeared persons is still unknown. On May 22, 2022, community leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov was assassinated by security forces in Khorugh.

Afterwards, the security forces cracked down on civil society in GBAO, not only eliminating actual and potential independent leaders, but also intimidating active and critical residents. They systematically detained and tortured informal powerbrokers of different categories, activists, civil society representatives, journalists and businesspeople, as well as intimates and relatives of key powerbrokers. Most of the detainees were sentenced to long prison terms in unfair trials behind closed doors and on fabricated charges. Natives of GBAO were harassed in Dushanbe. Civil society activists from GBAO in the Russian Federation were deported, extradited or abducted to Tajikistan and detained there.

Subsequently, the authorities ousted organizations affiliated to the Aga Khan Development Network and dismantled their role in providing public infrastructure and services. At the same time, long-term trends of forcible assimilation, suppression of cultural pluralism and ethnic identities, restrictions on the use of Pamiri languages and the practice of Ismaili faith were accelerating. Political repression, ethnic persecution, lack of perspectives and attempts of demographic engineering led to an exodus of significant parts of the indigenous population and might turn out to have ethnocidal effects.

2. Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO)

The Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) with its approximately 250,000 inhabitants is located in the Eastern part of the Republic of Tajikistan. It is characterized by high mountain topography and low population density. It borders Kyrgyzstan to the north and the People's Republic of China to the east, while the Panj River forms the border with Afghanistan to the south and west. Khorugh, the capital of GBAO, officially has a population of about 30,000 and is located at about 2,000 meters above sea level at the confluence of the Gunt River and the Panj River. It is connected to the capital Dushanbe by an only partially paved road (about 600 km) and has no regular flights.

Four of the seven districts of GBAO and the city of Khorugh are populated by the religious and linguistic minority group of the Pamiris who adhere to the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam and speak various Pamiri languages (Shughni and others). The Ismailis regard the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader. Before the 2021/22 crackdown, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) had played a key role in administering international development funds, provided basic services in education, health, urban and rural development but also depoliticised the population¹.

Due to the absence of any significant industry and constraints posed by the climate and geography for agricultural development, youth unemployment is high, and the population is very dependent on labour migration to Russia and other countries². GBAO had become a major tourist destination in Tajikistan prior to the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic and is a transit region for the import of goods from China. One of several Tajik routes for drug trafficking from Afghanistan runs through GBAO.

¹ <https://www.akdn.org/where-we-work/central-asia/tajikistan>. In September 2018, for example, a campus of the University of Central Asia (UCA), founded by AKDN, was opened in Khorugh: <https://www.akdn.org/our-agencies/university-central-asia>. The Aga Khan advocated a policy of non-interference in the political affairs of the host country and loyalty to its authorities. To gain the authorities' approval for its presence in Tajikistan and its development work in GBAO, it maintained good relations with the regime and staffed leadership positions of the AKDN organizations with influential locals who were well-networked within the state apparatus. In cases of public protests against human rights violations, AKDN officials often calmed down and appeased protesters and the general population and called for peace and loyalty to the authorities on behalf of the Aga Khan. For critical analyses of the depoliticising role of AKDN, see <http://thesigers.com/analysis/2012/11/27/the-dictatorship-of-civil-society-in-tajikistan.html> and <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>.

² A CABAR.asia article published in February 2022 emphasized that socio-economic factors were fuelling the conflict: <https://cabar.asia/en/what-explains-the-endless-protests-in-gbao>.

3. Context of the conflict

3.1. Historical background

The territory of present-day GBAO was a central hub for the ancient Silk Road and has been at the centre of power wars for influence in Central Asia since the time of the “Great Game” between Great Britain and Russia in the 19th century. During the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), the field commanders in GBAO sided with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) against the government; this led to ethnically motivated persecution of Pamiris in Dushanbe and other parts of the country, as well as a supply crisis in GBAO³. The civil war ended with a peace agreement in 1997 which included a power-sharing deal to integrate former UTO field commanders into the administration and security forces⁴. In the new constitution which was adopted in 1994, GBAO retained its status as a formally autonomous region⁵.

However, during consolidation of power by President Emomali Rahmon, almost all former leading members of the UTO were successively liquidated or otherwise politically silenced⁶. The increasingly authoritarian character of the political system manifests itself, among other things, in more restrictive measures against

³ Soon after the independence of Tajikistan, politics turned violent and civil war broke out in May 1992 as a result of turbulent months with demonstrations, dubious elections and power struggles within and between different regional clans and political groups. The government was dominated by groups from Khujand and Kulyab areas, whereas ideologically diverse political and military groups from the underrepresented Gorno Badakhshan and Gharm areas formed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Fighting was most intense in 1992-1993 but continued for five years. Natives of GBAO were targeted for ethnic cleansing in Western Tajikistan and many of them found refuge in the Pamirs. The road from Dushanbe to Khorugh was blocked by warring factions. The Aga Khan Foundation organized the delivery of humanitarian aid to GBAO via Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Murghab, saving people in the Pamirs from starvation and starting to integrate Ismaili believers in post-Soviet Tajikistan into the global Ismaili *jamat*. See <https://www.c-r.org/accord/tajikistan/tajik-civil-war-causes-and-dynamics>. For an interpretation of the civil war as staged by Russia and its allies to prevent the democratization of Tajikistan, see <https://ozodandishon.org/2023/05/05/моя-жизнь-разделена-пополам>. See also Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013; Epkenhans 2016.

⁴ After an UN-brokered peace process, President Emomali Rahmon and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, met in Moscow on June 27, 1997. They signed a General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. In the Protocol on the guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement, which had been signed in Tehran on May 27, 1997, they agreed to “reserve for representatives of the Opposition (UTO) thirty (30) per cent of posts in the executive power structures”: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/accords/Tajik_Final_Accord_with_annexes.pdf.

⁵ The constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was adopted in a referendum in September 1994. In Article 7, it guaranteed the status of Gorno Badakhshan as an autonomous region, whereas chapter 7 (Articles 81-83) specifies its privileges: <https://mfa.tj/en/main/tajikistan/constitution>. Due to its remoteness and the weakness of the state institutions, GBAO maintained a certain degree of informal autonomy throughout the 2000s and much of the 2010s, which allowed a relatively vibrant civil society to thrive: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gorno-badakhshan-mamadboqirov-tajikistan-pamir-mountains/>

⁶ President Rahmon, who became increasingly paranoid in his intention to monopolize and consolidate political and economic power in the hands of his family, and the power elite around him regularly cracked down on (former) opponents, disguising assassinations and bloodsheds as “anti-terror” or “anti-crime” operations. For example, in September 2015, Abduhalim Nazarzoda was killed during a shootout in Romit Gorge. He had been one of the field commanders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the civil war and had later served as Deputy Minister of Defence. When security forces attempted to arrest him in Dushanbe, he and his supporters fought back. Massive clashes in Dushanbe, Vahdat and Romit Gorge left dozens of people dead on both sides: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/regional-relations/attack-on-the-opposition-in-tajikistan-afghan-concerns-and-comparisons/>. After the killing of Nazarzoda, GBAO was the only region of Tajikistan with influential power brokers who did not subordinate to the power pyramid under President Rahmon.

NGOs, critical journalists and citizens, in a ban on the main opposition party (Party of Islamic Renaissance) in 2015, pressure on independent media and internet censorship⁷.

In remote GBAO, however, the groupings around President Rahmon, who emerged as a winner in the civil war, were able to fully assert their monopoly on political and economic power to a lesser extent than elsewhere. Some of the former UTO field commanders retained a certain informal influence, particularly in the regional capital of Khorugh, based on their reputation as defenders of the region during the civil war, their control over weapons and groups loyal to them, and their income sources from illicit trade with Afghanistan⁸. They maintained heroic status, particularly among sections of the youth, because they exploited a widespread sense of resistance to undemocratic external rule for their own purpose.

3.2. The 2012 events

The efforts of the central government to eliminate the former UTO field commanders as political and economic actors and impose its own monopoly on power in GBAO culminated in a massive attack by government forces on their respective strongholds in Khorugh on July 24, 2012, which the authorities called “special military operation”⁹. The attack led to day-long violent clashes inside the city with dozens of casualties¹⁰ which could only be ended through the mediation of the Aga Khan. It resulted in further alienation of the traumatized people of Khorugh from the central government¹¹. After the assassination of Imomnazar Imomnazarov, one of the former UTO field commanders on August 22, 2012, there were massive

⁷ See Human Rights Watch’s report on events in Tajikistan in 2019 (<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/tajikistan#>), 2020 (<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/tajikistan#>) and 2021 (<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/tajikistan>).

⁸ In March 2018, the International Crisis Group presented an analysis of the security and human rights situation in GBAO, which also highlights the role of the former field commanders of the UTO and their social base: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/tajikistan/b87-rivals-authority-tajikistans-gorno-badakhshan>. Bruce Pannier analyses the relationship between the central government and the population of GBAO: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-s-unconquerable-gorno-badakhshan-region/29541931.html>.

⁹ The pretext for the military operation was the alleged killing of Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the GBAO branch of the State Committee for National Security. He had been attacked and died on the way from Ishkashim to Khorugh on July 21, 2022. There are different versions of his death and it is unclear whether he was killed intentionally. The authorities blamed Tolib Ayombekov, one of the former field commanders of the UTO, for being behind the killing: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20120723/disquiet-felt-khorog-additonal-security-forces-sent-region>.

¹⁰ For a list of civilian casualties of the July 2012 events, see <https://t.me/pamirinside/606> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/1013>. The most prominent victim was Sabzali Mamadrizoyev, the chair of the Party of Islamic Revival in GBAO. On July 23, 2012, on the eve of the attack, during a demonstration against the military build-up, he gave a speech and criticized the living conditions in the region. He was detained by security forces, taken to the base of the border guards, heavily beaten and finally killed with a gunshot: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20120730/irp-confirms-murder-leader-irp-s-organization-gbao>.

¹¹ Lola Olimova published first analyses already in the days after July 24: <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/unprecedented-clashes-southeast-tajikistan> (25.07.2012), <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uneasy-truce-holds-tajikistans-southeast> (26.07.2012), <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/tajik-rebels-lay-down-arms-badakhshan> (31.07.2012). German journalist Marcus Bensmann visited Khorugh a few weeks after the violent conflict in July 2012: <https://www.nzz.ch/blutige-abrechnungen-im-pamir-1.17516099>, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/unruheherd-tadschikistan.799.de.html?dram:article_id=219011, <http://www.taz.de/!5085518/>. Joshua Kucera analysed the events of July 2012 (<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/the-tajiks-who-fight-their-own-government/277336>) and the diplomacy of the Aga Khan between the Tajik central government and the Ismaili population of Khorugh (<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013828121815583542.html>). For summaries of the July 2012 events, see <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31957536.html>, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5013def92.html>. For a compilation of links to sources and articles about the events in July and August 2012, see <https://ismailimail.blog/2012/07/28/conflict-in-khorog-links-to-various-sources-and-analysis-on-recent-events-in-tajikistan/>.

demonstrations in Khorugh which ended after intermediation by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF)¹². Human rights violations during and after the attack¹³ were not adequately addressed by the authorities¹⁴.

3.3. The 2014 events

An amateurishly executed and bloody attempt by security forces to arrest or liquidate Munavvar Shanбиеv and two other influential residents of Khorugh in the city centre during rush hour on May 21, 2014, led to the death of one of the attacked persons and one policeman on the spot¹⁵. In an immediate reaction, an angry crowd set fire on the police headquarters and two other governmental buildings in Khorugh¹⁶. Political demands against arbitrary violence by security forces were expressed in a peaceful demonstration on the main square of Khorugh that lasted several days. On May 31, 2014, protesters and authorities signed an agreement which included a joint investigation of the May 21, 2014, events¹⁷ and was only half-heartedly implemented by the authorities. On June 16, 2014, security forces arrested Alexander Sodiқov, a Canadian-Tajik researcher while he was interviewing a representative of civil society in Khorugh, implicitly blaming Western governments for internal unrest¹⁸.

3.4. The 2018 events

In August 2018, Khorugh residents gathered for a rally to protest the treatment in prison of two men from Khlebзavod neighbourhood of Khorugh who had been detained and sentenced in 2012 after the July events¹⁹. Several weeks later, in mid-September 2018, President Rahmon visited Khorugh. He blamed the provincial

¹² <https://www.rferl.org/a/former-tajik-opposition-field-commander-in-badakshan/24684382.html>.

¹³ Monitoring of human rights violations during the 2012 military operation by government forces in Khorugh was conducted in late 2012 / early 2013 by a group of Tajik civil society organisations that either cooperate with or are part of the Civic Solidarity Platform and supported by the Warsaw-based Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. The monitoring report is available under https://civicsolidarity.org/sites/default/files/monitoring_report_en_final.pdf (English) and https://notorture.tj.org/sites/default/files/articles/2015/files/monitoring_ru11_09.pdf (Russian).

¹⁴ In its concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tajikistan under the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee concluded in its 3635th meeting in 2019: "25. The Committee regrets that the State party provided no information on the outcome of investigations (see CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2, para. 10) into the killing and injuring of civilians during the security operation in Khorugh city in July 2012, nor on any compensation awarded to victims or their families. 26. The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation (CCPR/C/TJK/CO/2, para. 10). The State party should take expeditious measures to ensure that those responsible for the killing and wounding of civilians during the security operation in Khorugh city are identified, prosecuted and convicted and that victims and their families are provided with full reparation, including adequate compensation." (English version: <https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/TJK/CO/3>, Russian version: <https://undocs.org/ru/CCPR/C/TJK/CO/3>).

¹⁵ The local resident killed on the spot was Sobir Faizulobekov. The policeman probably was killed by friendly fire. Another local resident, Feraydun Abdurasulov, surprisingly and suspiciously died in hospital even if he had been recovering well. For a list of those who died during the attack in its aftermath, see <https://t.me/pamirinside/606> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/1013>. A surveillance video shows the chaotic attack by security forces on the car: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISQH81uPsOY>.

¹⁶ <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12986-riots-in-tajikistans-gbao-raises-fears-of-broader-destabilization.html>. For an account of the May 2014 events and the role of informal organizations, see Levi-Sanchez 2021.

¹⁷ For the content of the agreement, see <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20140602/protocol-agreement-settlement-situation-gbao-signed-khorog-may-31>. Oppositional politician Alim Sherzamonov, who spoke on behalf of the protesters, later went into exile. Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva was among those who facilitated dialogue between civil society and the authorities and represented civil society in the joint investigation group.

¹⁸ Sodiқov was doing his PhD at University of Exeter. He was arrested and forcibly disappeared when interviewing Alim Sherzamonov, one of the key figures of the May 2014 protests:

<https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20140620/international-organizations-urge-tajik-authorities-provide-information-sodiқov-s-disappearance>. He was released in July 2014 after international pressure.

¹⁹ <https://fergana.media/articles/102296/>. Tolib Ayombekov and others entered the building of the regional administration to negotiate with the Governor.

government and security forces in GBAO for an allegedly deteriorating security situation in Khorugh²⁰. He gave them a one-month ultimatum to deal with a “handful of criminals”, by which he apparently meant former UTO field commanders. He also gave permission for the military to be deployed. Subsequently, many high-ranking officials in both the provincial government and the security forces in GBAO were replaced²¹.

President Rahmon appointed Yodgor Fayzov as the new governor on October 1, 2018. Fayzov was an Ismaili from GBAO who had made a career within the Aga Khan Foundation, had taken on a mediating role as its highest representative in Tajikistan during the 2012 events and was respected by many the local population²². At the same time, however, the massive military presence in Khorugh was maintained, and the alleged threat to law and order posed by organized crime in GBAO, as well as a staged disarmament campaign, was conspicuously strong and uniform theme in the pro-government media²³. It was also adopted by Fayzov, though with a more conciliatory tone²⁴. Informal authorities were coerced to sign an agreement confessing misdemeanour and promising not to meddle into politics²⁵.

Against the background of increasing discontent with the militarization of the town, a demonstration against the massive presence of security forces in the city took place on November 6, 2018, after a police officer had non-fatally shot a local resident²⁶. In the following, the situation calmed down superficially.

3.5. Developments after 2018

The establishment of the Inter-agency committee on the enforcement of law and order in GBAO under General Abdurahmon Alamshozoda in September 2018 resulted in a wave of arrests²⁷, particularly of young male Pamiris, leading to repeated demonstrations and clashes between the Tajik-dominated security forces and Pamiri civilians²⁸. Moreover, three military checkpoints remained in place in central Khorugh, visibly demonstrating the military presence in the city.

²⁰ The official text of the speech is published under <http://www.president.tj/ru/node/18426>. The actual speech significantly differed from the official one: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29493714.html>.

²¹ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29495746.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29498252.html>. For example, Alisher Mirzonabot, the deputy head of the State Committee of National Security, was appointed as first deputy governor of GBAO: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20180918/zamnachalnika-ugknb-tadzhikistana-po-gbao-naznachen-pervim-zamestitelem-glavi-oblasti>.

²² <https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/power/20181002/the-head-of-the-region-changed-in-the-gbao>.

²³ An outline of the events is provided by two articles on Eurasianet: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-what-is-going-on-in-the-pamirs> and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-pamir-gun-amnesty-masks-underlying-unease>. In October 2018, the State Committee for National Security released a propaganda video which was broadcasted on state TV and described the allegedly dramatic situation with organized crime, trafficking of narcotics and illegal weapons: <https://asiaplustj.info/news/tajikistan/security/20181011/gknb-tadzhikistana-razyasnil-chno-proishodit-v-gbao>.

²⁴ <https://khover.tj/rus/2018/10/chitajte-razmyshlyajte-sdelajte-svoi-vyvody-vystupleniya-i-o-predsedatelya-gbao-yo-fajzova-byvshego-predsedatelya-goroda-horog-a-mahtobshozoda-zamestatelya-predsedatelya-vanchskogo-rajona-omardo/>.

²⁵ They also travelled to Dushanbe upon invitation by people close to the authorities. Many rumours were circulating about this trip which discredited them and made them lose credibility among the local population. For summaries: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-shots-fired-in-khorog-rallies-planned> and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-rally-in-pamirs-ups-the-ante-in-confrontation-with-government>.

²⁶ <https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/node/260839>, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-shots-fired-in-khorog-rallies-planned> and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-rally-in-pamirs-ups-the-ante-in-confrontation-with-government>.

²⁷ The first action taken by the security forces after the President’s speech was the selective enforcement of traffic rules in Khorugh: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29497979.html>.

²⁸ In January 2019 in Khorugh: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-new-arrest-threatens-stability-in-the-pamirs>. In May June 2020 in Rushan district: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-arrests-spark-fresh-unrest-in-pamirs>, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-people-power-forces-rare-climbdown-in-pamirs>). For a polemical critique of the work of the inter-agency committee, see <https://pamirinside.org/обращение-ятимову-с-с-от-имени-всемирн>.

The situation was further destabilised by the collapse of the elected government in Afghanistan and the takeover by the Taliban in August 2021. The Tajik government reacted to the attempts by people to flee Afghanistan with a strict policy of sealing the border and repatriating refugees. Alleging the danger of infiltration of armed groups from Afghanistan, the government further strengthened the military presence²⁹, which had a negative impact on the fragile domestic political situation in GBAO.

²⁹ <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-urges-calm-between-ally-tajikistan-afghanistan-2021-09-30/>.

4. November 2021 protest and subsequent repression

The suspected extrajudicial killing of a resident of Tavdem village on November 25, 2021, and the intransigent and violent reaction of the authorities and security forces to subsequent protests in Khorugh marked the beginning of an uneasy and ambivalent phase of activation and mobilization of civil society on the one hand, and intimidation, repression, militarization of Khorugh but avoidance of open violence by the security forces on the other hand.

4.1. Events in Tavdem and Khorugh on November 25-28, 2021

On November 5, 2021, President Rahmon decided to remove popular Governor Fayzov and replace him with Alisher Mirzonabot, the Mayor of Khorugh who had made much of his career in the domestic intelligence agency³⁰. At the same time, an increased military presence in addition to the existing military checkpoints in the city centre was once again becoming observable in Khorugh.³¹

On November 25, 2021, Gulbiddin Ziyobekov, a young man from the village of Tavdem in Roshtkala district (approximately 20 kilometres east of Khorugh), was asked by State Committee for National Security officials to meet close to the main road in Tavdem. Ziyobekov was accused of coercing an official in February 2020 who had allegedly harassed a local girl from Tavdem sexually³². When security forces arrived in two vehicles and surrounded Ziyobekov, he tried to flee across the nearby bridge. Security forces injured him with gunfire, dragged him to the road, probably tortured and killed him inside their van³³.

³⁰ <https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/power/20211105/gbao-governor-yodgor-fayzov-dismissed>.

³¹ On November 14, 2021, a conflict between young Pamiris from the circle of the community leader Mamadbokirov and traffic police at a checkpoint was allegedly part of an attempt to detain Mamadbokirov: <https://bomdodrus.com/2021/11/17/eshhe-odna-trevozhnaja-noch-v-horoge-cto-budet-s-mestnym-liderom-mamadbokirom-video/>.

³² In spring 2020, then-Governor Fayzov had arbitrated the case, averting Ziyobekov's arrest: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-testy-demonstrations-in-the-pamirs-drag-into-third-day>, <https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211125/protest-rally-held-in-khorog-following-killing-of-resident-of-roshtkala-district-by-law-enforcement-officers>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/56>.

³³ The state news agency Khovar alleged that security forces shot Ziyobekov in self-defence when he fired a gun: <https://khovar.tj/2021/11/markazi-matbuoti-prokuraturai-vmkb-habar-medi-ad/>. Eyewitnesses, however, said that Ziyobekov was unarmed: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-testy-demonstrations-in-the-pamirs-drag-into-third-day>, <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211202/the-mother-of-the-guy-killed-by-security-officers-in-gbao-intends-to-get-a-meeting-with-the-president>. According to journalist Anora Sarkorova (<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/661>), Ziyobekov was asked by a State Committee for National Security official to come to a meeting place in Tavdem on the main road from Khorugh to Roshtkala. When gunmen of the Alpha special forces under the State Committee for National Security arrived on two vans at around 11 am, he tried to escape across the nearby pedestrian bridge over Shokhdara River (37°23'26.21"N 71°39'40.86"E). The Alpha gunmen opened fire and injured him, hauled him back to the meeting point and murdered him inside the van. Two bystanders were injured by the security forces with gunfire when criticizing their actions. This account is confirmed by various photos and videos: One video shows a trail of blood on a bridge: <https://youtu.be/MvSKNRCsblA>. Another video shows people with camouflage uniforms standing on that bridge and dragging a body which is still alive <https://youtu.be/SOZ4DWAZP64>. Pictures of Ziyobekov's corpse show both bullet wounds and extensive hematomas on the head and the torso: <https://t.me/pamirinside/356>, <https://t.me/pamirnews04/2722>. For a summary in Russian, see https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20211225/segodnya-mesyats-sobitijam-v-horoge-cto-izmenilos-i-cto-budet-dalshe?g_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. A comprehensive reconstruction of events by Radio Ozodi based on interviews with eyewitnesses suggests that security forces opened gunfire at Ziyobekov when he was trying to flee across a bridge and that the evidence of him being armed and shooting at security forces was fabricated by the authorities after the event: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31592468.html>. Journalist Anora Sarkorova alleges that the assassination of Ziyobekov had been planned in advance, arguing that security forces around Tavdem had been reinforced, that Ziyobekov was killed the day before his appointment at the state attorney's office when he was

As a reaction, a four-days protest by residents of GBAO began in front of the regional administration building in Khorugh³⁴. They initially demanded, among other things, an investigation into the circumstances of Ziyobekov's death, the withdrawal of most of the military stationed in Khorugh, the dismantling of the military checkpoints in Khorugh, and the removal of the newly-appointed Governor Mirzonabot³⁵. Two protesters were killed and seventeen were injured when security forces fired into the crowd on the main square on November 25, 2021³⁶. Reacting to the demonstration, the authorities immediately blocked the internet connection in GBAO on November 25, 2021.

The former UTO field commanders did not play a prominent role in the demonstration and remained largely absent from recent events. Instead, young representatives of the local population, demanding from the security forces to follow the rule of law and observe human rights, organized themselves as the "Commission of 44" and intermediated between the authorities and the protesters. The lawyer Faromuz Irgashev was chosen as the spokesperson of the Commission of 44³⁷.

Tajikistani citizens from GBAO in the diaspora held various solidarity rallies in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, London, Bonn, Vienna, New York, Atlanta and other cities after the demonstration in Khorugh began. They also appealed to international organizations. In an online petition with more than 15,000 signatures, they demanded punishment for those responsible for the deaths in Tavdem and Khorugh, demilitarization of Khorugh, and decentralization and democratization of the regional administration³⁸.

expected to testify in his own case, and that his antagonists had later been promoted:

<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/662>. For photos of the scene, see the video under <https://t.me/pamirinside/1511>. Torture and extrajudicial killing in detention, done with impunity, are not uncommon in Tajikistan. In Kulyab city in Southwest Tajikistan, for example, Abdukakhkhor Rozikov was detained on January 02, 2023, and his corpse was full of traces of torture when it was handed over to his relatives several hours later: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/767>, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-apparent-jail-torture-death-sparks-rare-show-of-dissent>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32207299.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32246344.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32346881.html>. In July 2023, three former policemen were convicted for allegedly being involved in the killing of Rozikov: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32531514.html>.

³⁴ According to one source, the security forces took Ziyobekov's corpse to the mortuary, some acquaintances of Ziyobekov beat a government official at the mortuary and then took the corpse to the main square of Khorugh in front of the city administration (37°29'35.57"N 71°33'12.28"E).

³⁵ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211126/protest-rally-ongoing-in-khorog-who-did-gbao-governor-said-and-what-rally-participants-want>. For videos of the demonstration scene, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGNmExvfQk8> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/1511>.

³⁶ The city administration building was protected by OMON special forces under the Ministry of the Interior. When the protesting crowd was approaching the building, they fired into the crowd in the early afternoon (starting at around 2 or 3 pm). The casualties among the protesters were Tutisho Amirshoev (<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/58>) and Gulnazar Murodbekov (<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/59>). For a detailed account, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/661>. In February 2022, the Minister of the Interior avoided any substantial statement on the incident: <https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/laworder/20220204/interior-minister-neither-confirms-nor-denies-use-of-firearms-by-security-forces-against-protesters-in-khorog>.

³⁷ Irgashev had tried to stand in the 2020 Presidential elections but had not been registered as a candidate by the Central Election Commission: <https://eurasianet.org/interview-with-tajikistans-would-be-youthful-change-candidate>.

³⁸ <https://www.change.org/p/united-nations-calling-for-human-rights-in-gbao-tajikistan>. Several human and civil rights organizations in Tajikistan also issued an appeal on November 28, 2021, expressing their concern about the events in Tavdem and Khorugh and calling for a thorough investigation into the circumstances that led to the death and injury of civilians: <https://notorturetj.org/sites/default/files/news/files/eng1.pdf>. On the same day, a group of Tajiks in the diaspora published a resolution criticizing human rights violations and calling on the international community: <https://pamirinside.org/выходцы-из-таджикистана-провели-всем>.

On November 27, 2021, Governor Mirzonabot was injured when he went out to give a speech to protesters and stones were thrown at him, and security forces fired into the crowd again³⁹. On November 28, 2021, the demonstration dissolved when the government made concessions and rumours circulated that Governor Mirzonabot would be removed from office⁴⁰. A core group of civil society representatives from among the Commission of 44 was tasked to investigate the death of Ziyobekov and the subsequent events in Khorugh jointly with the authorities and to further negotiate with the authorities⁴¹.

4.2. Developments after November 29, 2021

4.2.1. Temporary investigation efforts

Since the dissolution of the demonstration, the concessions made by the authorities to calm down protesters have not been implemented. The joint investigations into the killings of Ziyobekov in Tavdem and demonstrators in Khorugh by the authorities and civil society representatives led into a deadlock. The Commission of 44 criticized government agencies for obstructing any serious investigation. On December 17, 2021, they suspended their participation in the joint commission temporarily in reaction to the premature condemnation of individual citizens by the authorities and undue interference in the investigation⁴². In

³⁹ See <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-testy-demonstrations-in-the-pamirs-drag-into-third-day> and <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/laworder/20211127/glava-gbao-vishel-k-mitinguyutshim-v-horoge-vozmohno-on-ranen>. For an eyewitness account of the events on November 27, 2021, see <https://globalvoices.org/2022/04/11/blood-tears-and-anger-in-khorog/>.

⁴⁰ Among the concessions confirmed by the government the following day were assurances that those responsible for Ziyobekov's death would be held accountable, while rumours about the removal of Governor Mirzonabot were denied. The government was not quoted in the media with any further promises: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211129/protest-rally-in-khorog-ends-what-did-the-authorities-and-the-protesters-agree-on>. According to other sources, the authorities agreed on an amnesty to protesters: <https://eurasianet.org/standoff-in-eastern-tajikistan-ends-peacefully> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31590252.html>. In February 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova published a Russian translation of the alleged agreement between the Minister of the Interior and representatives of the protesters: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/862>.

⁴¹ For a summary of the events based on media reports in Russian, see <https://mediazona.ca/article/2021/12/03/pamir>. In February and March 2022, a CABAR.asia article (<https://cabar.asia/ru/chem-obyasnyayutsya-neskonchaemye-protesty-v-gbao>), a podcast of Radio Liberty (<https://www.rferl-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.rferl.org/amp/tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan-majlis-podcast/31701484.html>) and an article on Radio Ozodi (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31758315.html>) analysed the reasons of the conflict and the particularities of the situation in 2021/22.

⁴² In particular, the civil society representatives criticized the GBAO public prosecutor for interfering with the work of the joint commission: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211217/representatives-of-civil-society-suspends-participation-in-commission-on-investigating-khorog-events>. On December 22, 2021, a spokesperson of civil society representatives told Radio Ozodi that the prosecutors in their investigation were focusing more on alleged wrongdoings by protesters than on the killing of Ziyobekov which had triggered the demonstration: <https://www.ozodi.org/a/31621624.html>.

January 2022, the authorities discontinued the joint investigation and cooperation with civil society representatives⁴³. Written complaints by the Commission of 44 were ignored by the authorities⁴⁴.

4.2.2. Governmental propaganda campaign and coerced statements

At the same time, the authorities launched a propaganda campaign to distract from the suspected human rights violations by security forces and discursively criminalize protesters. On December 9, 2021, the state-owned TV channel Badakhshan broadcasted a film which presented the government narrative of the events causing an outrage among many local citizens⁴⁵. Since then, local citizens have been coerced by security forces to make statements in support of the authorities which have continuously been broadcasted on TV Badakhshan, blaming citizens of Khorugh and requesting the authorities to act⁴⁶. State employees are most vulnerable to coercion, fearing to lose their jobs, but also applicants for state services and private business

⁴³ On January 10, 2022, Faromuz Irgashev informed Radio Ozodi that the GBAO public prosecutor had told him and other representatives of GBAO civil society that the Commission of 44 was extralegal, should not play any role in investigations of events on November 25, 2021, and had no right to communicate with the public: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31647588.html>. According to the same source, investigators from the office of the military prosecutor, who are tasked with investigating the killing of Ziyobekov, had discontinued communication with civil society representatives. On January 15, 2021, the surprising announcement was made that investigators had met with civil society representatives and that the investigation would be continued: <https://t.me/pamirinside/313>. However, a few days later, the civil society representatives ceased cooperation with the investigative commission, claiming that investigation had been biased and one-sided, and formulating several demands to be met before resuming cooperation: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20220119/group-44-stops-cooperating-with-investigative-commission-in-gbao>. For an assessment of the investigation process by Ziyobekov's mother and civil society representatives, see also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31681132.html> and <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/20220203/pochemu-predsedatel-gbao-ne-prinimaet-materei-pogibshih-i-gruppu-44>.

⁴⁴ According to a post on the Telegram channel of Pamir Daily News, the Commission of 44 addressed the head of the investigation commission and the general prosecutor in February 2022, but neither of them reacted to their letters: <https://t.me/pamirinside/609>. A joint press conference on April 19, 2022, the GBAO prosecutor made no mention of the killings of Ziyobekov and the demonstrators in Khorugh when presenting the November 2021 event: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31812479.html>. In a letter to Ziyobekov's mother, Governor Mirzonabot, contradicting the editorial policy of TV Badakhshan, declared that Ziyobekov could not be regarded as a criminal, considering that there had not been any sentence: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31837257.html>. On May 3, 2022, the Commission of 44 expressed doubts whether the circumstances of the killing of Ziyobekov would actually be revealed, considering that the investigators had left Khorugh: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31832611.html>.

⁴⁵ Former GBAO Governor Yodgor Fayzov elaborated in detail on wrongdoings by Tavdem villagers connected to the initial accusations against Ziyobekov without mentioning his killing. The demonstration in Khorugh was interpreted as organized by a criminal group from Khorugh city and Roshtkala district for criminal and selfish purposes. The film (in Tajik language) is available under <https://youtu.be/kJ-8C28S1ZE>. Detailed summaries and analyses of the film (in Russian language) can be found under https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20211210/bivshii-glava-gbao-yodgor-fayzov-rasskazal-s-chego-nachalsya-miting-v-horoge?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 and <https://newreporter.org/2021/12/15/ugroza-nacionalnoj-identichnosti-na-goskanalax-tadzhikistana-vyshel-film-promiting-v-xoroge/>. An Eurasianet author interprets the film in combination with the disconnection of internet in GBAO as an attempt by the authorities to crack down on alternative narratives, see <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-authorities-go-back-on-their-word-in-deal-with-gbao-residents>.

⁴⁶ On the methods of coerced statements see <https://pamirinside.org/как-бюджетников-из-гбао-заставляют-да>. In an ASIA-Plus article, two school teachers describe the circumstances under which they were coerced to read out statements: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220120/two-female-teachers-from-gbaos-roshtkala-district-say-they-were-forced-to-condemn-the-khorog-rally#article-likeblock>. According to a CABAR.asia article, many state employees have quit their jobs to avoid making coerced statements: <https://cabar.asia/en/?p=51099>. A letter to the editor of Pamir Daily News describes how applicants for public services are coerced to give statements: <https://pamirinside.org/в-чем-цель-выступлений-на-тв-бадахшон>. Some statements are shown in the following video: https://youtu.be/yDjXn9i1C_E. An unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in early 2022 concluded that the coerced statements were “a means to intimidate the population of GBAO into coercion”.

owners are reported to have been pressured. The coerced statements defaming other community members are reported to have a highly detrimental impact on social trust, social relations on family and community levels, and psychological well-being of citizens⁴⁷. In the framework of the propaganda campaign, regionalist identities reappeared in public discourse⁴⁸ and the territorial integrity of GBAO was put into question⁴⁹.

4.2.3. Prosecution and intimidation

Simultaneously with the propaganda campaign, the authorities proceeded with intimidating and prosecuting protesters. On December 9, 2021, an article in a governmental newspaper announced the start of investigations against protesters by the public prosecutor⁵⁰. Many people who had taken part in the demonstration on November 25-28, 2021, were summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security⁵¹. A travel ban was imposed on some of them⁵², criminal cases were started against 13 of

⁴⁷ <https://pamirinside.org/в-чем-цель-выступлений-на-тв-бадахшон> and <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220120/two-female-teachers-from-gbaos-roshtqala-district-say-they-were-forced-to-condemn-the-khorog-rally>.

⁴⁸ In the film broadcasted on December 9, 2021, a driver from Kulyab complained about the blocked road in Khorog during the protests and threatened that Kulyab people might also harass GBAO drivers: <https://newreporter.org/2021/12/15/ugroza-nacionalnoj-identichnosti-na-goskanalax-tadzhikistana-vyshel-film-promiting-v-xoroge/>. Several days later, indeed, drivers from GBAO were harassed in Kulyab by people who complained about harassment of a Kulyabi driver in Rushan district (GBAO): <https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211211/ochevidets-v-kulyabe-zhiteli-ostanavlivali-mashini-sleduyutshie-v-gbao-i-ugrozhalim-v-mvd-eto-otritsayut>. In many of the statements broadcasted subsequently, the population of Khorugh (the youth, in particular) was depicted as criminal and hostile to people from other regions of Tajikistan. For a description of the impact of the propaganda campaign on interregional prejudices and discrimination of GBAO residents, see the article by Anora Sarkorova on February 18, 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/500>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/501>.

⁴⁹ On December 25, 2021, Pamir Daily News reported that a member of the GBAO Regional Council from Darvaz district (North-east GBAO) had raised the option of Darvaz and Vanj districts leaving GBAO, referring to frequent political unrest in Khorugh, alleged harassment of people from Darvaz and Vanj in Khorugh and cultural proximity to the state capital Dushanbe: <https://pamirinside.org/на-сессии-областного-совета-гбао-дену>. This triggered a heated discussion on the Telegram channel of Pamir Daily News and a letter by diaspora Tajiks from Vanj district in support of the unity of GBAO: <https://pamirinside.org/выходцы-ванджа-и-язгуляма-ответили-де>. A Radio Ozodi article interpreted the speech, as well as other statements by people from Darvaz and Vanj districts broadcasted on regional TV, as part of a wider campaign, quotes critical comments by interlocutors from different districts of GBAO and suggests that the fragmentation of GBAO might be intended to contribute to a weakening of the symbolic autonomy of the region: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31631428.html>. On February 10, 2022, the head of the Centre for Strategic Research of Tajikistan declared that changes in the administrative division of the country were not in the public interest: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31695859.html>.

⁵⁰ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211210/tajik-chief-prosecutors-office-launches-investigation-into-recent-events-in-khorog>.

⁵¹ https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20211225/segodnya-mesyats-sobitijam-v-horoge-chto-izmenilos-i-chto-budet-dalshe?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. In a later ASIA-Plus article, Ziyobekov's mother informed the public that criminal proceedings against her other son, various relatives and other people from her village had been initiated: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20220118/the-people-are-not-to-blame-for-feeling-my-pain-says-gulbiddins-mother>.

⁵² On December 22, 2021, Radio Ozodi reported that 66 persons from Khorugh and Roshtkala district of GBAO, many of whom had taken part in the demonstration on November 25-28, 2021, had been banned from leaving Tajikistan: <https://www.ozodi.org/a/31621624.html>.

them⁵³ and six persons were sentenced to prison terms for cutting trees⁵⁴. In early-February 2022, an eyewitness of the killing of Ziyobekov in Tavdem was arrested⁵⁵.

In cooperation with Russian law-enforcement, the Tajik authorities started prosecuting prominent youth representatives from GBAO staying abroad⁵⁶. Most prominent are the cases of Chorshanbe Chorshanbiev⁵⁷,

⁵³ During the November protests, trees had been cut to block some roads and to prevent a potential invasion of the town by military forces: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31633215.html>.

⁵⁴ According to a CABAR.asia article, five persons were sentenced to four years and one person to one year in prison for felling trees to cut the Dushanbe-Khorog road during the protests on November 25-28, 2021: <https://cabar.asia/en/?p=51099>.

⁵⁵ Dilovar Khurramov had been a key source to Radio Ozodi reports about the circumstances of the killing of Ziyobekov by security forces on November 25, 2021. Radio Ozodi reported on February 17, 2022, that he had been arrested two weeks before: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31708782.html>.

⁵⁶ In early January 2022, Khorugh youth representatives Sodik Amadbekov and Gulaoz Gulaozov were arrested when arriving at Dushanbe airport: <https://pamirinside.org/двоих-жителей-хорога-задержали-в-аэро>.

⁵⁷ The well-known Mixed Martial Arts fighter and blogger from Khorugh Chorshanbe Chorshanbiev was deported or extradited by the Russian authorities and arrested upon arrival at Dushanbe airport in late-December 2021: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/laworder/20211231/tajik-mma-fighter-extradited-from-russia-to-tajikistan-faces-charge-of-inciting-regional-enmity-and-riots>. His arrest might have been triggered by a public statement in support of the protests in Khorugh on the November 25-28, 2021:

<https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220107/kto-takoi-chorshanbe-chorshanbiev-i-chem-on-izvesten> and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-mma-fighters-pro-pamiri-remarks-land-him-behind-bars>. The expert opinions to be obtained in the framework of the criminal proceedings were contested by Chorshanbiev's lawyers:

https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/laworder/20220124/advokati-chorshanbieva-osporili-ekspertizu-video-dolzni-izuchit-psiholog-i-lingvist-russkogo-yazika-a-ne-politolog?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. On February 11, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that charges of publicly calling for a violent change in the constitutional order of Tajikistan had been brought against him: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31698959.html>. In March 2022, court hearings were held with journalists being excluded and the court decided that new expert opinions had to be obtained:

<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31752606.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31775798.html>. On May 13, 2022, a district court in Dushanbe convicted Chorshanbiev of an alleged appeal to violently change the constitutional order and sentence him to 8.5 years of imprisonment: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31848493.html>,

<https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220514/tadzhikskogo-boitsa-mma-chorshanbe-chorshabieva-prigovorili-k-85-godam-tyurmi>. Chorshanbiev's lawyers considered the sentence unjustified and appealed:

<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31861142.html>. It was confirmed by the court of appeal on June 29, 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31926839.html>.

Amriddin Alovatshoev⁵⁸ and Salam Imomnazarov⁵⁹. There were also numerous reports of measures to intimidate community organizers in the diaspora⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ Amriddin Alovatshoev is a prominent community organizer among the Tajik diaspora from GBAO in Russia and one of the main organizers of the demonstration in front of the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow in solidarity of the protest in Khorugh in November 2021. He was arrested in Russia on January 11, 2022 (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31652682.html>) and disappeared afterwards. Only on February 2, 2022, the public prosecutor confirmed that he had been extradited to Tajikistan but his whereabouts remained unknown and he did not have access to a lawyer and to communication with the outside world (<https://t.me/pamirinside/309>, <https://pamirinside.org/выходцы-из-гбао-запустили-в-социальны>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31667105.html>, <https://fergana.ru/news/124812/>, <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/node/308131> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31682894.html>). On February 6, 2022, the exiled Tajik oppositional figure Alim Sherzamonov wrote in a Facebook post that Alovatshoev had been tortured: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=4736145816506133&set=a.684880301632725>. On February 7, 2022, the Civil Society Coalition Against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan and the International Partnership for Human Rights expressed concerns that Alovatshoev was under risk of being tortured and detained under inhuman conditions: <https://notorturetj.org/news/tadjikistan-amriddin-alovatshoev-nahoditsya-pod-riskom-primeneniya-pytok>. The same day, Human Rights Watch called out the “enforced disappearance” and demanded that the authorities should “immediately ensure and verify that Alovatshoev has access to a lawyer of his own choosing, has been brought before an independent court to determine the legality of his detention, and is receiving his full due process rights, including contact with his family and medical treatment” and Alovatshoev “should be released pending a fair trial on any credible charges” (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/07/tajikistan-restore-internet-autonomous-region>). A video recording of him was published by the authorities in February 2022. According to Pamir Daily News, an anonymous oral surgeon in Europe had identified traces of physical violence: <https://pamirinside.org/эксперт-уверен-на-200-что-по-отношению-к>. On February 17, 2022, the Civil Society Coalition Against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan announced that the lawyer hired by them had not been able to clarify the whereabouts of Alovatshoev: <https://notorturetj.org/news/advokat-lishen-dostupa-k-svoemu-podzashchitnomu-alovatshoevu-amridiinu>. On April 29, 2022, Alovatshoev was convicted of alleged hostage-taking and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31827062.html>. A relative and several civic groups criticised the sentence and announced appeals: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31836352.html>. On June 10, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that Alovatshoev had allegedly refrained from appealing against the sentence but also raised doubts about the circumstances under which this decision had been taken: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31892533.html>.

⁵⁹ Salam Imomnazarov is the son of Imomnazar Imomnazarov, a former UTO field commander who had his stronghold in the neighbourhood UPD in southeastern Khorugh and was assassinated in August 2012 in the aftermath of the July 2012 clashes. He was arrested at Dushanbe Airport when returning from Türkiye in February 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/507>. According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, the news about his arrest heated up the situation in Khorugh on February 19, 2022: <https://t.me/anserenko/3625>. In April 2022, he was still in pre-trial custody: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31781368.html>. He was sentenced to 16 years in prison for alleged drug-trafficking: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1025>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31999266.html>.

⁶⁰ Oraz Vazirbekov’s, a prominent community organizer among the Tajik diaspora from GBAO in Russia, one of the co-organizers of the demonstration in front of the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow in November 2021 and a citizen of the Russian Federation, published a video statement on February 10, 2022, announcing that he had received information about the Tajikistan security agency had targeted him to get either kidnapped or killed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9vK-5ch-cE>. For a summary of the video statement, see <https://pamirinside.org/ораз-вазирбеков-если-случайно-окажусь>. On February 16, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that various community organizers from GBAO in Moscow had allegedly received intimidating and obscure phone calls from Russian security forces: <https://t.me/anserenko/3616>. On March 2, 2022, Ramzi Vazirbekov, who is a citizen of the Russian Federation, announced on his Facebook page that he feared being kidnapped by the Tajikistan security agency from the territory of the Russian Federation: <https://pamirinside.org/активист-из-гбао-в-москве-рамзи-вазир>. On March 9, 2022, a source of Serenko reported efforts by the Tajikistan security agency to place its agents within the Tajikistani diaspora from GBAO in Russia: <https://t.me/anserenko/3763>, and to blackmail Tajikistani activists in Russia: <https://t.me/anserenko/3762>. On May 10, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that members of the diaspora from GBAO were pressured to incriminate Vazirbekov: <https://t.me/pamirinside/633>.

The establishment of a surveillance infrastructure, with surveillance cameras along the main roads, in and around governmental buildings and surveillance drones regularly flying above Bar Khorugh, further contributed to an atmosphere of intimidation and anxiety⁶¹.

4.2.4. Internet blockade from November 2021 to March 2022

Internet access was blocked in Khorugh and the neighbouring districts of GBAO from November 25, 2021, onward. This had serious implications for the education, banking and economic spheres and undermined the confidence of parts of the civilian population in promises made by the authorities⁶². The regional authorities justified the internet blockade with the alleged fear that “certain groups in Europe” might instigate further conflicts⁶³, whereas the Communications Service Agency presented it as an effort to fight “information terrorism”⁶⁴. On February 7, 2022, Human Rights Watch demanded that the authorities “should immediately restore full internet connectivity”, referring to national and international law⁶⁵. The internet connection in GBAO was restored⁶⁶ only on March 21, 2022.

4.2.5. Public statements by civil society representatives and the authorities

On December 16, the civil society representatives (Commission of 44) published a video statement underlining the importance of observance of the law and procedures of the criminal code during investigations and condemning the broadcasting of the abovementioned film on TV Badakhshan⁶⁷. They

⁶¹ The installation of surveillance equipment was reported by the Minority Rights Group: <https://minorityrights.org/2022/05/20/tajikistan-crackdown/>. Drones were used for surveillance of Bar Khorugh at least from February 2022 onward: <https://t.me/anserenko/3584>.

⁶² Regarding the situation with the internet connection and the problems for local citizens resulting from, see various ASIA-Plus articles: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211130/internet-still-remains-inaccessible-in-gbao> (November 30, 2021), <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211207/lack-of-internet-access-causes-serious-problems-for-residents-of-gbao> (December 7, 2021). On December 10, 2021, internet access was restored in the three districts of GBAO which are remote from Khorugh: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211210/internet-reappeared-in-gbao-but-not-throughout-the-whole-territory-of-the-region>. The negative impact of the internet disconnection on students applying for studies abroad, on students attending online courses, on the banking system, on the health system, on small and medium enterprises and other spheres of daily life are described in two ASIA-Plus articles (<https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/20211214/khorog-entrepreneurs-complain-about-inaction-of-local-authorities> and http://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20220104/kak-stradaet-biznes-v-horoge-bez-interneta?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186), a Radio Ozodi article (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31619474.html>), an open letter by diaspora Tajiks to the Communication Service under the Government of Tajikistan and the mobile operators (<https://pamirinside.org/уроженцы-гбао-проживающие-за-рубежом>, English summary under <http://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211223/natives-of-gbao-studying-and-working-abroad-apply-to-tajikistans-communication-service-agency>), as well as an analysis of the situation submitted by a local resident: <https://pamirinside.org/анализ-ситуации-в-гбао-из-уст-местного>. In late-February 2022, a CABAR.asia article described the impact of the continuing internet blockade on daily life, education and business: <https://cabar.asia/en/internet-shutdown-has-made-life-very-difficult-in-gbao>.

⁶³ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20211227/gbao-authorities-tell-why-internet-has-not-yet-been-restored-in-the-region>.

⁶⁴ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220131/by-shutting-down-the-internet-we-are-fighting-information-terrorism-says-tajik-official>.

⁶⁵ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/07/tajikistan-restore-internet-autonomous-region>.

⁶⁶ <https://www.asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220322/access-to-internet-restored-in-gbao-but-local-residents-complain-about-slow-internet-speed>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31762925.html>.

⁶⁷ The video (in Tajik) is available under https://youtu.be/neeG1_LFfg. According to the civil society representatives, the broadcasting of the film hindered the investigation and reconciliation process by calling Ziyobekov a criminal ahead of the court procedure, and by not mentioning the two other deaths and injuries which resulted from the use of firearms against demonstrators. They emphasized the principle of impartiality of the investigation process and called for the observance of the agreement to not reveal details of the investigation process prior to its completion.

released additional video statements on December 19, 2021 (to Rustam Emomali, the chair of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Tajikistan⁶⁸), and on January 16, 2022 (to President Rahmon⁶⁹). In these statements, they warned that peace and unity were undermined in Khorugh and in GBAO by security forces and authorities. They asked Rustam Emomali and President Rahmon to intervene and take the security situation in the region under their close control. On December 30, 2021, the Commission of 44 requested 30 minutes of airtime on TV Badakhshan for an address to the population, referring to freedom of speech⁷⁰, which was orally rejected by the head of the responsible state agency one month later⁷¹. On February 11, 2022, they addressed the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in a video appeal⁷².

President Rahmon gave his annual speech to both chambers of Parliament on December 21, 2021, without mentioning recent events in Khorugh and GBAO⁷³. In early January 2022, peaceful demonstrations and riots in Kazakhstan triggered a violent crackdown by security forces and the deployment of military forces by the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In this context, President Rahmon highlighted the alleged existence of sleeper cells of international terrorism in Central Asia to his colleagues in other CSTO member states.

⁶⁸ The video (in Tajik) is available under <https://t.me/pamirinside/248>.

⁶⁹ The video (in Tajik) is available under https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glZftwt_MO4. It is summarized in an ASIA-Plus article (in English): <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20220117/gbao-civil-society-activists-ask-the-president-to-take-the-situation-under-his-personal-control>.

⁷⁰ <http://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211230/representatives-of-gbao-civil-society-request-30-minutes-of-airtime-on-regional-tv-station-for-their-statement#article-likeblock>

⁷¹ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220209/head-of-the-committee-for-tv-and-radio-broadcasting-says-they-will-never-give-air-to-group-44>.

⁷² The speaker in the video appeal emphasized that the Commission of 44 had “made several written appeals through the state power vertical” and demanded “1) complete, comprehensive, independent investigation into the killings of three residents of GBAO, the use of lethal force against demonstrators and fair punishment of those responsible 2) ensuring further security of citizens, preventing violations of law and extrajudicial killings of citizens in future 3) withdrawal of armed forces from Khorog, due to which schoolchildren, pensioners, youth cannot move freely and safely 4) providing access to internet”: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1033776230817454>.

⁷³ The political expert Amiri Zamon assumes this was an attempt to play down the significance of the events. However, he also highlights that the ignorance of the problems in GBAO might have further negative impact on local people's trust in the authorities and extend the period of uncertainty: http://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/20211222/o-chem-ne-skazal-prezident-tadzhikistana-v-svoem-poslanii-parlamentu?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186.

4.2.6. Preparation of military operation in January and February 2022

Public threats by officials, an increased presence of military and security forces in the region, as well as other signs of preparations for a military operation⁷⁴ provoked fears of a military crackdown from early January 2022 onward⁷⁵.

The authorities put the spotlight on Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, presumably to justify a military operation, to detract attention from the November 2021 events, to evade the demands of civil society and to use the opportunity for settling old scores. Mamadbokirov was one of the former UTO field commanders and a controversial figure in Khorugh⁷⁶. He had not played a major role in the November 2021 events and the subsequent demands by civil society for accountability and rule of law⁷⁷.

Criminal proceedings against him for allegedly beating up a state official were launched on February 2, 2022⁷⁸. On February 4, 2022, the GKNB chair announced a special operation to arrest or liquidate Mamadbokirov in

⁷⁴ At an assembly in Khorugh on January 10, 2022, various officials depicted the security situation in Khorugh as dire and publicly targeted Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, other former UTO field commanders and additional GBAO residents as alleged lawbreakers. The Secretary of the Security Council of Tajikistan, Nasrullo Makhmudzoda, drew parallels between events in GBAO and the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan. A video of the speeches of Governor Mirzonabot and representatives of the central government is available under https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrlhEU_Qx8I. Some of the speeches, as well as reactions by civil society representatives, are summarized in a Radio Ozodi article: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31652149.html>. The Russian political scientist and Afghanistan expert Andrey Serenko warned of a potential military operation on January 10, 2021. At that time, he assumed that it might be based on a staged incident on the Tajik-Afghan border:

<https://t.me/anserenko/3329>. Serenko mentioned the provision of blood reserves to military facilities as a sign of the preparation for violent conflict: <https://t.me/anserenko/3358>. Apart from that, additional security forces and military equipment were sent to Khorugh: <https://t.me/pamirinside/387>.

⁷⁵ Analyses about the situation in mid-January 2022: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-isolated-pamiris-fear-looming-security-crackdown> and <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/security/20220120/residents-of-gbao-fear-looming-security-crackdown>. Analysis about the situation in early February 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31690634.html> and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-government-reverts-to-hard-line-with-pamiri-informal-leaders>.

⁷⁶ As one of the former UTO field commander who have not been eliminated by the authorities yet, he is at odds with the central government and ill-famed for questionable cross-border business practices, but can still claim significant, though decreasing authority among certain segments of the population of GBAO and depict himself as a defender of the autonomy of the region. His influence is based on clan-like mechanisms in which violence against opponents is considered a legitimate means of enforcing demands. His stronghold is the neighbourhood Bar Khorugh in north-eastern Khorugh. The authorities had attempted to arrest Mamadbokirov on different charges in the past but without success. For details about the so-called “informal authorities”, see Chapter V of the International Crisis Group report published in 2018: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/tajikistan/b87-rivals-authority-tajikistans-gorno-badakhshan>. In March 2021, Radio Ozodi reported about a possible attempt to poison him: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31127764.html>. In November 2021, Bomdod reported about a possible attempt to detain him: <https://bomdodrus.com/2021/11/17/eshhe-odna-trevozhnaja-noch-v-horoge-cto-budet-s-mestnym-liderom-mamadbokirov-video/>.

⁷⁷ Like other former UTO field commanders, Mamadbokirov had been a key stakeholder in the 2012 clashes and important in mobilizing people in subsequent events. However, he did not play a major role in organizing the protests on November 25-28, 2021. Subsequently, he was not among the civil society representatives who called on the authorities to abide by the rule of law and ensure human rights in the investigation of the November 2021 events and beyond.

⁷⁸ On January 31, 2022, the Head of the Education Directorate of GBAO declared on TV Badakhshan that two days before, Mamadbokirov had beaten him and insulted him as a person from Vanj district, which was denied by Mamadbokirov himself. See <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/laworder/20220202/nachalnik-upravleniya-obrazovaniya-gbao-bokir-izbil-menya-bokir-ei-bogu-vryot>. The statement by Navruzov broadcasted on TV Badakhshan on January 31, 2022, can be found under <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0n6G5LuPyqM>. On February 2, 2022, the GBAO general prosecutor announced that criminal proceedings had been started against Mamadbokirov because of that incident and TV Badakhshan broadcasted surveillance videos allegedly showing him beating another individual. See <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/laworder/20220202/v-otnoshenii-mahmadbokira-mahmadbokirova->

the nearby future⁷⁹, followed by several days of high presence of security forces and tension⁸⁰. Khorugh residents were coerced to sign extralegal documents⁸¹. Infighting within the state apparatus and the security

[vozvuzhdeno-ugolovnoe-delo-po-chetiryom-statyam](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iT-WDbhBIQ). The TV Badakhshan broadcast with the fragments of surveillance videos which allegedly show Mamadbokirov beating the official is available under <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0iT-WDbhBIQ>. Mamadbokirov can clearly be identified when walking along a corridor and knocking a door. In another fragment, an unidentifiable person dressed differently enters a building. The fragments showing how one person beats another on a corridor are in bad quality and none of the individuals can be clearly identified.

⁷⁹ <https://t.me/pamirinside/391>. See also <https://knews.kg/2022/02/06/v-horoge-snova-nespokojno-tadzhikskie-siloviki-gotovyat-spetsoperatsiyu-po-poimke-odnogo-iz-neformalnyh-liderov-gornogo-badahshana/>.

⁸⁰ On February 5, 2022, soldiers were patrolling the streets of Khorugh and attempted to occupy strategic positions in the surroundings of Mamadbokirov's house: <https://t.me/pamirinside/396>. The same day, negotiations were being held but without results: <https://t.me/pamirinside/396>. There were different versions whether the authorities demanded the surrender of Mamadbokirov and/or other individuals: <https://t.me/pamirinside/398>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31690064.html>, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220207/chtoproishodit-v-horoge-pryamo-seichas?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. According to Radio Ozodi article, clerics from Khorugh met with the Minister of the Interior and warned that an attempt to solve the problem by force would further worsen the situation: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31690064.html>. According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, Mamadbokirov refused any bargain: <https://t.me/anserenko/3551>. Residents of Khorugh were fearing a violent escalation and organizing night vigils: https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220207/chtoproishodit-v-horoge-pryamo-seichas?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. On February 6, 2022, Mamadbokirov addressed the population in a video statement, criticizing injustice and lawlessness of officials in GBAO: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hH6sbxXc4F8> (English translation: <https://zindoniyon.com/2022/02/09/statement-of-mamadboqir-mamadboqirov-about-injustice-and-lawlessness-of-officials-in-gbao/>, Russian translation: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1325>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1326>). The same day, the mayor of Khorugh asked Mamadbokirov to surrender to the authorities and criminalized public assemblies and statements by civic activists: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/20220208/mer-horoga-predlozhit-mahmadbokirovu-sdatsya> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31691324.html>. From February 11, 2022, onward the security forces and infrastructure in Khorugh were further reinforced and provocative behaviour by security forces was reported: According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, the number of security forces at each of the three checkpoints in Khorugh (Selkhoztekhnika in northwestern Khorugh, city centre, UPD in southeastern Khorugh) were doubled: <https://t.me/anserenko/3584>. On February 12, 2022, snipers occupied positions in the mountains around Khorugh and the barricades at the checkpoints in town were reinforced with sandbags: <https://t.me/pamirinside/461> and <https://t.me/anserenko/3594>. On February 16, 2022, a source of Serenko reported that an additional checkpoint had been set up on the bridge between Bar Khorugh and UPD in eastern Khorugh and that the use of reconnaissance drones by security forces had been intensified: <https://t.me/anserenko/3615>. On February 17, 2022, it reported that employees of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) had cruised through the streets of Khorugh the night before and tried to provoke local youth with loud music: <https://t.me/anserenko/3617>.

⁸¹ Police and traffic police coerced state employees as well as drivers of shared taxis and public transport to sign a document which demanded a special military operation against "organized criminal groups in Khorugh": <https://t.me/pamirinside/462>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/461> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31701221.html>. Residents of Khorugh were also coerced to sign an extralegal form according to which they would not take part in illegal demonstrations, night vigils or actions to protect any "leaders of organized criminal groups". For a photo of the form which had to be signed, see <https://t.me/pamirinside/488>. For a short summary in Russian, see <https://t.me/pamirinside/489>. The document threatened the signatories with criminal proceedings. According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, it was employees of state institutions who were affected by the coercive efforts of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB): <https://t.me/anserenko/3615>. According to Pamir Daily News, parents of high school students were also affected, and local authorities were involved in the coercion efforts: <https://t.me/pamirinside/492>.

forces accompanied the repression efforts in GBAO⁸², whereas civil society activists addressed the Presidents of Tajikistan and the Russian Federation, as well as the international community⁸³.

4.2.7. Frozen conflict and continuing intimidation

The conflict was frozen by the authorities in the second half of February. Whereas the military checkpoints remained unchanged⁸⁴, the propaganda campaign by the authorities ceased only temporarily⁸⁵ and threats with criminal proceedings continued⁸⁶, there was no further escalation of the conflict⁸⁷. The silence was broken on March 4, 2022, when unknown people in civilian clothes attempted to stop the car of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov in the city centre of Khorugh and fired gunshots⁸⁸. However, the situation calmed down again afterward⁸⁹.

⁸² On February 18, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported rumours according to which Saymumin Yatimov, the head of the State Committee for National Security who had played a key role in organizing the propaganda campaign and the preparation of the military operation after the November 2021 events, had been dismissed: <https://t.me/anserenko/3621>. On February 19, 2022, Serenko reported rumours that Yatimov was wounded and that Rustam Emomali, the Head of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Tajikistan and son of President Rahmon, might have shot at him or that leading Ministry of the Interior staff might have been involved in an assassination attempt: <https://t.me/anserenko/3628>. A few days later, Sharif Nazarzoda was appointed as new head of police of GBAO. He had formerly served as head of police of the capital city Dushanbe: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20220224/prezident-naznachil-sharifa-nazarzoda-nachalnikom-upravleniya-mvd-gbao>. He was allegedly close to Rustam Emomali, the mayor of Dushanbe and son of President Rahmon: <https://t.me/pamirinside/539>.

⁸³ On February 7, 2022, diaspora civil society activists from GBAO released an urgent call to the international community for immediate action to prevent a military operation in GBAO and to protect its civil population: https://adcmemorial.org/wp-content/uploads/plea_action_needed_to_prevent_new_phase_of_conflict_in_gbao_ii_050222.pdf. Subsequently, diaspora representatives from GBAO in Russia and other countries published video appeals to the President of Tajikistan and the President of the Russian Federation, demanding peace and justice in GBAO. Representatives from Roshtkala district: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIUDBUH5Z_A. Representatives from Ishkashim district in Ekaterinburg: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=tK2LYKc4mfU&feature=share>. Representatives from Ishkashim district in Moscow: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qgtZp6GJq4>. Representatives from Shugnan district in Moscow: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRs7L7hgFog>. Representatives from Murghab district in Moscow: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZnjG7SVEnA>. Representatives from GBAO in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan): <https://youtu.be/4IU2ALPmuD4>. On February 11, 2022, the Commission of 44 addressed the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in a video appeal, demanding a “legal, complete, comprehensive and independent investigation of the killing of three residents of GBAO” on November 25, 2021: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1033776230817454>. Many of the videos were later removed for fears of reprisal.

⁸⁴ <https://t.me/pamirinside/539>.

⁸⁵ <https://t.me/pamirinside/552>.

⁸⁶ <https://t.me/pamirinside/534>.

⁸⁷ According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, referring to an interview by Governor Mirzonabot, President Rahmon had decided to solve the conflict without open violence: <https://t.me/pamirinside/539>.

⁸⁸ This has been reported by various sources: <https://t.me/pamirinside/554>, <https://t.me/anserenko/3731>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31735909.html>. It is unclear whether shots were fired into the air or targeted at the car. Radio Ozodi reported that Mamadbokirov had been lightly injured in the right hand: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31735909.html>. One video allegedly shows the crossing in downtown Khorugh when the shots were fired: <https://t.me/pamirinside/556>.

⁸⁹ <https://t.me/anserenko/3750>, <https://t.me/anserenko/3811>, <https://t.me/anserenko/3867>, <https://t.me/anserenko/3963>.

At the same time, arbitrary arrests and efforts to intimidate the population continued. On March 10, 2022, a member of the Commission of 44, Iftikhor Saidbekov, was arrested and beaten by police in Khorugh⁹⁰. Various other persons were detained under contested circumstances and charges⁹¹.

⁹⁰ <https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/33697-khabari-matbuoti-rvkd-dar-vmkb-2>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31748494.html>. He was condemned to ten days in prison for allegedly insulting policemen: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31763323.html>.

⁹¹ Among them were eight individuals arrested around March 16, 2022, when walking in the streets of Khorugh at night, subjected to torture and forced to record video statements, probably to intimidate local youth and deter them from holding night vigils (<https://t.me/anserenko/3769>), Tutiye Amirshoev, a cousin of one of the two persons killed by security forces in Khorugh on November 25, 2021, in March 2022 (<https://t.me/pamirinside/589>, sentenced to 8 years in prison in June 2022: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/199>), the blogger Khushruz Jumaev on March 20, 2022 (<https://t.me/pamirinside/593>), Manuchekhr Sherov on March 31, 2022 (<https://t.me/pamirinside/604>), and Khurshedsho Sultonshoev on April 12, 2022 (<https://t.me/pamirinside/613>). For a comprehensive list of those arrested and convicted in the wake of the November 2021 protests until May 9, 2022, see <https://t.me/pamirinside/631>.

5. Multi-level crackdown in May and June 2022

In May 2022, the authorities and security forces used protest events as a pretext⁹² for a massive, comprehensive, coordinated⁹³, violent and multi-level crackdown on dissenters, informal powerbrokers and random residents in Khorugh and Rushan district, as well as civil society activists from GBAO in Dushanbe. The crackdown was based on preparations made, the approaches tested and the security and surveillance infrastructure⁹⁴ built since November 2021. Rather than at dissolving specific protest events, it was clearly

⁹² Journalist Anora Sarkorova alleged in November 2022 that the authorities had been looking for an excuse to launch extensive repression against Pamiris: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/578>. There are indications that external forces, possibly from within the authorities or securities, might have tried to foster, escalate and/or discredit protests by disseminating disinformation. Immediately after the clashes between protesters and security forces in Khorugh on May 16, 2022, the “Military wing of the Tajik opposition” made a self-confident statement on the events which was disseminated via the Telegram channel of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko: <https://t.me/anserenko/4139>. It claimed that its leaders “maintained continuous contact with the organizers of today’s rally in Khorugh” and that two leaders of the organization had taken part in the assembly on May 14, 2022. Using terminology that would ring alarm bells in Dushanbe and Moscow, it alleged that during the assembly on May 14, 2022, “the crowd had wanted to occupy administrative buildings in Khorugh”. The statement was probably either addressed to protesters, emboldening them to go further, or to elite audiences in Tajikistan and/or Russia, discrediting the protest in Khorugh and raising red flags. The “Military wing of the Tajik opposition” had made its existence known only ten days before via the same channel (<https://t.me/anserenko/4139>) and it did not reappear again after May 16, 2022. On May 22, 2022, Serenko, referring to an anonymous source, reported the alleged establishment of an “Army for the Defence of Badakhshan” to retaliate against “war crimes by Tajik security forces”: <https://t.me/anserenko/4414>. According to him, the source had referred to Mossad practices and to negotiations with Shiite leaders in Iraq and elsewhere. Serenko published another post about the “Army for the Defense of Badakhshan” with unrealistically grandiose announcements of the establishment of professional structures and hierarchies: <https://t.me/anserenko/4501>. It is well possible that these announcements were disseminated by a third party to embolden protesters and/or to discredit them.

⁹³ During and after the November 2021 protests, the authorities and security forces had seemed to be surprised by the protests and the emergence of an organized civil society formulating demands and mobilizing support. Their actions often appeared reactive and indecisive. In May 2022, in contrast, they seemed to be well-prepared and highly resolved to crack down even at the price of massive bloodshed, crumbling legitimacy of the regime and international protest. Independent media were silenced shortly before the violent crackdown started. The crackdown on protesters on the ground was coordinated with the crackdown on informal powerbrokers in Khorugh and civil society activists in Dushanbe who were blamed for these very protests. When protests started in Khorugh on May 16, 2022, security forces seemed to be well-equipped with riot police assets, in contrast to November 25, 2021. The bloodshed in Vamar on May 18, 2022, apparently served the purpose of intimidating protesters in Khorugh and delivering the message that the security forces were not hesitant about the use of naked violence. After cracking down on protesters in Vamar and clearing the road to Khorugh, security forces immediately used the opportunity for an extended crackdown, systematically detaining or forcibly disappearing residents with a record of political opposition, participation in protests and authority among male youth. On May 19, 2022, a source of Russian political scientist allegedly reported from inside a Tajikistani military unit that soldiers from GBAO, in contrast to soldiers from other regions, were neither deployed to GBAO nor allowed to be armed, and that officers were monitoring them closely. On May 25, 2022, sources of Pamir Daily News alleged that at least in some cases, Tajikistani citizens from GBAO serving in the army had been disarmed (<https://t.me/pamirinside/837>). Both reports mutually confirm each other and indicate not only a high sense of regionalist thinking and distrust to people from GBAO within the security forces, but also to a significant degree of planning and anticipation of risks. There are also unconfirmed reports that an official of the State Committee for National Security, Samariddin Chuyanzoda, visited Kabul on May 14, 2022, i.e. shortly before the crackdown in GBAO, and held talks with the Taliban (with whom the Tajikistani authorities did not have any formal contacts at that time), possibly to prevent them from accepting refugees from GBAO: <https://t.me/pamirinside/912>.

⁹⁴ At the time the crackdown started, Khorugh was heavily militarized and securitized, resulting from a build-up of military, national guards (under the Ministry of Defence), border guards (under the State Committee for National Security), OMON special forces (under the Ministry of the Interior) and Alpha special forces (under the State Committee for National Security). Operations were coordinated from the main building of the State Committee for National Security (37°29'33.24"N 71°33'0.31"E) in downtown Khorugh. The border guards base in UPD neighbourhood of Khorugh (37°29'26.15"N 71°33'37.27"E) allegedly hosted around 2,000 members of security forces and includes an investigation and detention prison allegedly built with Chinese funding and operating since 2018. The national guard

aimed at decapitating and suppressing civil society. It was probably backed by Russia⁹⁵ and silently approved by China⁹⁶.

base in Selkhoztekhnika neighbourhood of Khorugh (37°29'40.13"N 71°31'16.20"E) close to the airport hosted several thousands of members of security forces and four helicopters (of which only one was permanently based in Khorugh). The Ministry of the Interior runs an investigation prison opposite the hydropower plant of Khorugh (37°29'2.84"N 71°35'15.02"E). Additional camps around the airport hosted several hundreds of Alpha and OMON members (37°30'40.15"N 71°30'31.14"E and 37°29'39.14"N 71°31'6.19"E). Camps of Alpha and OMON forces were located in the mountains in Bar Khorugh (tent above the road to Roshtkala: 37°28'54.29"N 71°35'13.15"E, containers close to the Botanical Garden, from where surveillance drones were flown over Bar Khorugh: 37°28'57.88"N 71°35'50.31"E, observation point in the mountains north of Bar Khorugh: approximately 71°35'50.31"E 71°34'26.88"E). Alpha and OMON forces with sniper guns also had observation points around downtown Khorugh (tent in the mountains north: approximately 37°29'45.62"N 71°32'50.32"E, 13th floor of a multi-storey building on the main crossing: 37°29'30.52"N 71°32'51.50"E). On the roads from Khorugh to Ishkashim (37°27'36.14"N 71°30'53.49"E), Roshtkala (37°27'49.73"N 71°36'19.35"E) and Dushanbe (37°29'41.61"N 71°31'20.36"E), checkpoints with OMON forces had been established in 2018, on the road to Murghab the regular traffic police checkpoint (37°31'28.53"N 71°36'16.21"E) had been reinforced with OMON forces and was further reinforced with Alpha forces in May 2022. Inside the city, two OMON checkpoints had been established in 2018 and were reinforced with Alpha forces in May 2022: on the main crossing (37°29'28.44"N 71°32'53.42"E) and in UPD neighbourhood (37°29'20.15"N 71°33'40.37"E). On May 14, 2022, a third OMON checkpoint was established in Chinak neighbourhood between downtown Khorugh and Bar Khorugh (37°29'37.03"N 71°33'49.79"E). The Minority Rights Group (MRG) witnessed a "heavy military build-up" already before May 2022: <https://minorityrights.org/2022/05/20/tajikistan-crackdown/>.

⁹⁵ Since the 19th century, many people in the Pamirs had considered Russia as their protector and had felt close ties with Russia. In the light of Tajikistan's dependence on security and economic cooperation with Russia (border with Afghanistan, labour migration and migrants' remittances), the Tajikistani authorities would hardly have been able to crack down on civil society in GBAO without backing from Russia. When natives of GBAO rallied in front of Tajikistan's embassy in Moscow on November 25, 2022, this protest seemed to have been sanctioned by the Russian authorities, which indicates that they had not thrown their full support behind the Russian security forces at that point: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211126/hundreds-of-people-gather-to-a-protest-at-the-tajikistan-embassy-in-moscow>. On May 13, 2022, on the eve of the community assembly in Khorugh and with new protests in GBAO looming, Tajikistan's President Rahmon and Russia's President Putin had a phone call upon the initiative of the Tajikistani side to discuss "the current situation along Tajikistan's common border with Afghanistan", among others: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220516/tajik-russian-leaders-hold-phone-talks-to-discuss-cooperation>. Only three days later, when the Tajikistani security forces were cracking down on the protest march from Bar Khorugh to downtown Khorugh, President Rahmon was in Moscow for the summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and met President Putin: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220517/tajikistan-will-continue-to-contribute-to-ensuring-security-in-csto-area-of-responsibility-says-rahmon>, <https://dushanbe.mid.ru/-/o-vstrece-v-v-putina-s-prezidentom-tadzikistana-e-rahmonom-g-moskva-16-maa-2022-goda>. It is highly probably that at that occasion, he got green light from President Putin for the crackdown against the background of Russia's war against Ukraine and its international isolation. In reaction to the violent crackdown in Vamar on May 18, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly adopted the propaganda narrative of Tajikistan's authorities: <https://ria.ru/20220518/obostrenie-1789319255.html>. On President Rahmon's position to extort concessions from Russia as one of the few remaining allies of President Putin, see <https://eurasianet.org/was-tajik-leaders-rant-at-putin-defiance-or-a-plea-for-greater-dependence>. Tajikistan was the destination of President Putin's first trip abroad after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in June 2022: <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220629/what-rahmon-and-putin-talked-about-in-dushanbe>. For background information on the historical relationship between Russia and the Pamiris, the unwillingness or inability of the Russian Federation to intermedicate in 2022 and its "defection in the Pamirs", see <https://cabar.asia/en/the-role-of-russia-in-the-pamirs-an-actor-or-an-observer>.

⁹⁶ China has security interests in GBAO which is bordering both Afghanistan and its restive Xinjiang province. It built a military troop and stationed troops in eastern GBAO in the mid-2010s: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html. On the long-term trends of increased security cooperation between China and Tajikistan, see <https://eurasianet.org/china-stepping-up-military-cooperation-with-tajikistan>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32140156.html>. The propaganda narrative of Tajikistan's authorities depicting protesters as extremists, terrorists, criminals and a risk to trade (crucial road between China's Kashgar and Dushanbe via Khorugh) are designed to resonate with Chinese security concerns, and the approaches of

5.1. Protest in Khorugh on and after May 16, 2022

In an atmosphere of sustained repression, intimidation, desperation and perceived hopelessness, several hundreds of residents of Khorugh and surrounding districts gathered for an assembly in Khorugh on May 14, 2022, which had been organized by an anonymous group of people⁹⁷. They requested the dismissal of Governor Mirzonabot and the release of those who had been arrested in connection with their participation in the November 2021 protests⁹⁸. In case these demands were not met by the authorities, they announced public protests. The authorities reacted with intimidation efforts to prevent citizens from gathering for protests⁹⁹ and reinforcement of the military infrastructure¹⁰⁰, whereas diaspora civil society activists addressed the international community¹⁰¹.

In the evening of May 16, 2022, when protesters were marching from Bar Khorugh (North-eastern Khorugh) to the main square in the city centre of Khorugh, security forces blocked the road in Chinak neighbourhood and started firing at them with rubber bullets and teargas¹⁰². The same day, Zamir Nazarshoev was killed by security forces in the city centre under contested circumstances¹⁰³. Subsequently, the internet connection

Tajikistan's security forces in suppressing and surveilling the population in GBAO resemble Chinese approaches in managing its minority populations in Xinjiang. Work on the rehabilitation of the road between Kalaikhumb and Khorugh by a Chinese company started in June 2022, instantly after the crackdown in GBAO:

<https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-as-dust-settles-on-pamir-conflict-chinese-roadworks-begin>. GBAO Governor Mirzonabot went for an official visit to China in June 2023: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2164>.

⁹⁷ According to unconfirmed reports, Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov and other community leaders were among those organizing the assembly. It took place in Bar Khorugh (north-east Khorugh, 37°29'17.24"N 71°34'39.17"E).

⁹⁸ <https://t.me/pamirinside/641>. See also <https://www.theeast.media/post/what-is-happening-in-khorog-again>. The text of an appeal published by Pamir Daily News included additional demands allegedly approved by the participants of the assembly. Among them were long-standing demands: accountability of those responsible for the killings on November 25, 2021, end of the militarization of GBAO, rule of law, cessation of the intimidation and blackmailing of people from GBAO in the diaspora, compensation for the families of those killed by security forces in 2012, 2014, 2018 and 2021, termination of the informational isolation of GBAO, withdrawal or dismissal of the GBAO Governor, expression of the will of the people through local and regional deputies, prevention of governmental interference in religious affairs: <https://t.me/pamirinside/644>.

⁹⁹ According to Pamir Daily News, the civilian authorities launched efforts to discredit the protest and to prevent residents from gathering for protest events (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31853011.html>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/642>), the GBAO prosecutor threatened potential protesters with punishment (<https://t.me/pamirinside/643>).

¹⁰⁰ On May 16, 2022, armoured military and police vehicles were displayed in Khorugh town: <https://t.me/anserenko/4234>. Intensified activity in one of the military barracks of Khorugh and movement of troops in town were observed: <https://t.me/pamirinside/649>. At the same time, however, the head of the Ministry of the Interior in GBAO also tried to get in touch with the protesters to explore chances for negotiations: <https://t.me/pamirinside/649>.

¹⁰¹ A plea by diaspora civil society activists from GBAO to the international community was published by Pamir Daily News: <https://pamirinside.org/call-to-the-international-community-for-an-urgent-action-to-prevent-another-violent-clash-in-gbao-tajikistan/>, <https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/new-escalation-in-the-gbao-tajikistan/>.

¹⁰² Pamir Daily News published a video of the protesting crowd on the way from Bar Khorugh to the main square in the city centre of Khorugh (<https://t.me/pamirinside/655>) and of the shooting (<https://t.me/pamirinside/657>). See also <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-at-least-one-killed-in-pamirs-unrest> and https://www.ng.ru/cis/2022-05-17/5_8437_pamir.html. The dispersal of the protesting crowd took place at a checkpoint which had been established in Chinak neighbourhood on May 14, 2022 (37°29'36.51"N 71°33'49.69"E).

¹⁰³ The killing happened in Gulaken neighbourhood close along the main road (37°29'29.88"N 71°32'37.30"E).

According to various sources, Zamir Nazarshoev was killed by live ammunition in the evening of May 16, 2022:

<https://t.me/pamirinside/667>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4255>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31853271.html>. The Ministry of the Interior in a press release blamed Nazarshoev for attacking police officers:

<https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34065-vazorati-kor-oi-dokhil-khabar-medi-ad-2>. Radio Ozodi referenced this source but emphasizes that several other sources contested this version and claimed that Nazarshoev had died under different circumstances: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31854152.html>. According to unconfirmed rumours, Nazarshoev had been shot by soldiers after throwing a stone at them and/or addressing them verbally. A source of political scientist Andrey Serenko alleged that Nazarshoev had been shot by a gunman without any provocation:

was disabled, additional troops were brought into town and the roads to the main square were blocked by the military¹⁰⁴. Nevertheless, crowds gathered in various neighbourhoods of Khorugh during the night and the following morning¹⁰⁵. The town continued to be paralyzed and blocked by military from May 17, 2022¹⁰⁶, onward with the intention to prevent people from gathering in the city centre¹⁰⁷.

By May 19, 2022, protesters in Khorugh were blocking several roads in the town to prevent security forces from moving in and cracking down. At the same time, most people in Khorugh, imprisoned in their neighbourhoods, were reported to be living in anxiety and psychological stress, with dramatically increasing food prices creating an additional burden.

On May 20, 2022, protesters agreed to remove barricades after long negotiations and concessions by the authorities and security forces¹⁰⁸. The road blockade in Bar Khorugh was removed only on May 21, 2022¹⁰⁹.

5.2. Violent crackdown in Vamar (Rushan district) on May 18-19, 2022

On May 17, 2022, people from Rushan district gathered for protests in front of government buildings and started blocking the road in Vamar (Rushan district, 60 km north of Khorugh) to prevent a convoy of military

<https://t.me/anserenko/4275>. An unpublished situation (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists refers to eyewitness reports according to which Nazarshoev was shot by security forces driving by when sitting by the road and having a stone (paragraph 13).

¹⁰⁴ A video published on the Telegram channel of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko shows military troop transporters driving through the city centre: <https://t.me/anserenko/4245>. Another post mentions the blocking of the roads and bridges leading to the main square of Khorugh: <https://t.me/anserenko/4246>.

¹⁰⁵ <https://t.me/pamirinside/665>. According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, protest events were also held in other places of GBAO outside of Khorugh: <https://t.me/anserenko/4258>. Crowds continued to gather in the centres of Khorugh neighbourhoods in the morning of May 17, 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/672>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4262>.

¹⁰⁶ The main roads and bridges within the town, as well as the roads connecting Khorugh with the surrounding districts were blocked by military: <https://t.me/pamirinside/672>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4262>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4263>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4269>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4284>. Schools and public entities were closed: <https://t.me/anserenko/4269>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/675>. The internet connection continued to be disabled. According to a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, the Minister of Energy and Water Resources Daler Juma was sent to Khorugh to calm down the situation but was not trusted by the population of GBAO: <https://t.me/anserenko/4268>, and Mamadbokirov refused to negotiate with the authorities as long as the demands of protesters were not fulfilled: <https://t.me/anserenko/4270>.

¹⁰⁷ In the evening of May 18, 2022, the security forces and regional authorities allegedly set an ultimatum and threatened to crack down the protests in the neighbourhoods violently: <https://t.me/pamirinside/710>.

¹⁰⁸ According to Pamir Daily news, the authorities and security forces had promised to release the residents of Vamar and other places in Rushan district who had been detained, and to withdraw the snipers from the mountains around Khorugh and the military equipment from the roads to Khorugh: <https://t.me/pamirinside/757>. Apparently, religious leaders had been involved in the negotiations and persuaded protesters to de-escalate. According to one source, the barricades removed on May 20, 2022, included the blockade of the main road (Pamir Highway) in Chinak neighbourhood (between downtown Khorugh and Bar Khorugh).

¹⁰⁹ Protesters from Bar Khorugh following Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov had blocked the road between Bar Khorugh and UPD close to the bridge across Gunt river. This was the main transit road for trade between China and Tajikistan as the trucks usually avoided downtown Khorugh and went along the road through UPD. Mamadbokirov ordered the road blockade to be lifted on May 21, 2022, when pressure on him was increasing (see the chapter about his assassination).

vehicles from reaching Khorugh¹¹⁰. After negotiations¹¹¹ had failed, security forces started shooting at protesters along the main road in Vamar in the morning of May 18, 2022¹¹². Some protesters bled to death because security forces did not allow anybody to approach them and take them to the hospital¹¹³. The security forces also used air support to fire at fleeing protesters from helicopters¹¹⁴. The Ministry of the

¹¹⁰ <https://t.me/pamirinside/676>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4278>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/684>. A video which allegedly shows the military convoy passing a checkpoint on the way to Khorugh was published by journalist Anora Sarkorova: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1307>. According to one interlocutor from GBAO, protesters were gathering in front of the district administration (37°56'45.92"N 71°33'48.44"E), in front of the police district headquarters (37°56'49.72"N 71°33'27.89"E) and the State Committee for National Security district headquarters (37°56'50.34"N 71°33'26.11"E) and blocking the road west of Vamar (37°56'58.19"N 71°32'48.12"E). First small-scale protests might already have started in the evening of May 15, 2022. In February 2024, Anora Sarkorova published an anonymous eyewitness account of the situation in Vamar on May 17, 2022 when allegedly hundreds of security officers were gathering in the town: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1613>. She also published a photo which might show security officers in downtown Vamar: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1612>.

¹¹¹ The authorities seem to have attempted to persuade the protesters to open the road. In an interview with Radio Ozodi, an eyewitness mentioned that dozens of protesters who had gathered on May 17, 2022, and that the district chair, his deputy and elders/ veterans had tried to talk to them: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html>. Another eyewitness interviewed by Radio Ozodi explained that the protesters had demanded a guarantee that there would not be any violent crackdown in Khorugh, though without success. A post by Pamir Daily News mentioned that they had tried to coerce a former community leader now based in the Russian Federation to intermedicate:

<https://t.me/pamirinside/685>. For maps of the protests and the crackdown in Vamar, see https://umap.openstreetmap.fr/en/map/crackdown-on-civil-society-in-gbao-tajikistan_812355 and <https://telegra.ph/file/a42603627c9d2ea413284.jpg>.

¹¹² On May 18, 2022, at 7.54 am Dushanbe time, Pamir Daily news reported about shooting in Vamar (<https://t.me/pamirinside/686>) which had allegedly started at 7 am (<https://t.me/pamirinside/687>). For summaries, see also <https://t.me/anserenko/4290> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31855884.html>. According to a situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists, at 4 am a convoy with special forces (OMON under the Ministry of the Interior and Alfa under the State Committee for National Security), coming from Khorugh, arrived at Vamar (paragraph 16). The crackdown started at 7 am, with security forces opening the fire on the ground and from a helicopter (paragraph 17). According to one interlocutor from GBAO, the violent crackdown started in front of the police district headquarters in downtown Vamar, when one officer of the Alpha special forces offended protesters during negotiations and was shot by somebody in the crowd, security forces started firing into the crowd and a small number of protesters in the mountains possibly fired at security forces. Security forces continued shooting at protesters along the main road in Vamar for around two hours. Once the situation had escalated in downtown Vamar, they also started shooting at protesters at the road blockade in the Western outskirts of Vamar. See also the account of an eyewitness interviewed by Radio Ozodi: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32417339.html>.

¹¹³ This was suggested by various reports: <https://t.me/pamirinside/724>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html>.

¹¹⁴ The involvement of a helicopter was reported by Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko. According to his sources, security forces fired from a helicopter (<https://t.me/anserenko/4290>). This was confirmed by an interlocutor from GBAO according to which security forces on two Mi-8 helicopters came from Khorugh and were shooting at protesters who tried to escape to the mountains and hit a group in the gorge north of Vamar, killing several individuals and injuring others (approximately 37°57'6.83"N 71°33'30.94"E). The same account said that another group of protesters managed to flee to a shepherd shelter further north in that gorge. According to a situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists, snipers were landed from a helicopter and targeted protesters who were escaping to the mountains (paragraph 17). One unverified video (possibly taken from a place close to the road between Vamar and Derzud) shows a helicopter flying above a mountain valley and firing: <https://twitter.com/PeaceForPamir/status/1549005436627701762>. One video showed the search of two bodies of protesters who had allegedly been shot from a helicopter: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/353>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/354>. There had also been reports about mortar fire (<https://t.me/pamirinside/733>). See the account of an eyewitness interviewed by Radio Ozodi: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32417339.html>. Other allegations about fire from a helicopter (<https://t.me/anserenko/4298>) and the downing of a Tajikistani military helicopter by Taliban fighters (<https://t.me/anserenko/4294>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4295>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/698>, <https://ria.ru/20220518/tadzhikistan-1789239722.html>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/706>) have not been confirmed.

Interior later announced a so-called “anti-terror operation” in GBAO¹¹⁵. The crackdown in response to the blockade of the road led to casualties among both protesters and security forces¹¹⁶.

Even after the blockade of the road was broken¹¹⁷, the crackdown continued. Various social media posts based on eyewitness reports indicate that security forces searched houses, checked and seized mobile phones¹¹⁸, detained residents, forced detainees to redress in military uniform, tortured some of them to

¹¹⁵ <https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34085-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-2>, <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/05/press-tsentr-mvd-soobshhaet-v-rushanskom-rajone-nachalas-antiterroristicheskaya-operatsiya/>. It was quoted by various media: <https://eadaily.com/ru/ampnews/2022/05/18/v-gbao-tadzhikistana-nachalas-antiterroristicheskaya-operatsiya-mvd>, <https://ria.ru/20220518/tadzhikistan-1789152086.html>.

¹¹⁶ The Ministry of the Interior and the news agency Khover reported the death of one member of the security forces and eight protesters (allegedly armed members of a criminal or terrorist group): <https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/tj/ruydodho/34083-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t>, <https://khover.tj/2022/05/ajni-ol-vaziyat-dar-r-shon-orum-ast-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-habar-medi-ad/>. This was uncritically quoted by various media: <https://ria.ru/20220518/tadzhikistan-1789234288.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31856629.html>, <https://fergana.media/news/126183/>. On May 19, 2022, the state news agency Khover released a more detailed statement, elaborating on the government narrative of events in Vamar and alleging that armed protesters, among them Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov, had been positioned in the mountains above Vamar and shot at administrative buildings and security forces: <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/05/press-tsentr-ministerstva-vnutrennih-del-respubliki-tadzhikistan-soobshhaet-2/>. A situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists mentioned reports about 28 casualties during the heavy shooting, with many bodies still missing (paragraph 17) but was silent about casualties among the security forces. An interlocutor from GBAO assessed the number of civilian casualties during the shooting between 19 and 25. Apart from the official press releases by government agencies (see above), at least two posts in social media suggest that there were casualties among the security forces as well: <https://t.me/pamirinside/699>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/724>. The actual presence of weapons on the side of the protesters was denied by a source of Andrey Serenko: <https://t.me/anserenko/4346>. Interviewees of Radio Ozodi informed the journalists about several sticks in the hands of protesters and deer rifles in the hands of two protesters but emphasized that they had not seen any further weapons: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html>. See also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32417339.html>.

¹¹⁷ On May 18, 2022, at 8.52 am Dushanbe time, Pamiir Daily News reported that the road was cleared, and the military convoy was heading on toward Khorugh: <https://t.me/pamirinside/689>. According to journalist Anora Sarkorova, the detention of at least one resident of Vamar happened already at a time when the violent crackdown on protesters was still ongoing: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/68>.

¹¹⁸ Already in the afternoon of May 18, 2022, a source of Andrey Serenko reported that security forces had cut off Vamar from the outside world and were interrogating residents and searching mobile phones: <https://t.me/anserenko/4298>. Eyewitnesses interviewed by journalist Anora Sarkorova a few weeks after the crackdown described how security forces coerced male teenagers between 12 and 17 years to go out on the street where they interrogated and intimidated them rudely, how houses were searched systematically not only in Vamar town but also in Pastkhuf village (around 10 km South-east of Vamar), how ID documents and mobile phones of each resident were checked: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/102>.

death and executed others intentionally¹¹⁹, later placing the corpses in a hospital building¹²⁰. The total number of civilian casualties in and around Vamar on May 18 and 19, 2022, is at least 25¹²¹. The number of

¹¹⁹ Detainees were taken to the compound of the border guards in the south-eastern outskirts of Vamar on the Panj riverbank (37°56'36.18"N 71°33'16.69"E). The extensive compound is the base of the border guards and the Alpha special forces under the State Committee for National Security and covers an area of around 200 m x 100 m. On May 19, 2022, Pamir Daily News, referring to four sources from Vamar, reported that several residents of Vamar had been detained at their homes (probably on May 18, 2022) but had been found dead with fatal bullet wounds at the temples that morning: <https://t.me/pamirinside/733>. This indicates that detainees were executed intentionally, which is confirmed by a source of Andrey Serenko which claims that Shukhrat Rushtov from Vamar was fatally shot after being detained and interrogated by security forces in the morning of May 19, 2022: <https://t.me/anserenko/4343>. It fits to another post of Pamir Daily News, according to which armed security forces had entered houses, arbitrarily detained male residents, seized cell phones and looted: <https://t.me/pamirinside/724>. It is also compatible with an audio message by a woman (<https://t.me/anserenko/4323>, Russian summary: <https://t.me/anserenko/4326>) who alleged that persons injured on May 18, 2022, had been tortured to death by security forces and that corpses with traces of torture (bruises, burns of cigarettes) had been dumped unclothed close to the market of Vamar. This, again, is partly confirmed by a report quoted by Pamir Daily News according to which on May 19, 2022, security forces handed over 17 corpses with traces of torture and injuries to their relatives: <https://t.me/pamirinside/724>. See also an eyewitness report quoted by journalist Anora Sarkorova: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/64>. Radio Ozodi later reported that 21 corpses had been handed over and also quoted sources saying that some of them had traces of torture: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html>, see also <https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan/31862208.html>. An article by journalist Anora Sarkorova published on May 26, 2022, confirmed many of the accounts of detentions, torture and executions and reported additional atrocities: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/62>. She also published detailed information about the death of Alisher Kimatshoev who was murdered in detention: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/68>. A situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists mentioned the number of 17 corpses dumped by the security forces after detention and describes their condition: "Reportedly, many had missing body parts, eyes being cut out, all teeth knocked out, some bodies are hard to be identified, the faces were a bloody mess, the bodies were completely black with traces of stab wounds and burns, some had their skin peeled off." (par. 18) It also mentions allegations that security forces had prevented medical staff with threats from providing medical assistance to injured individuals (paragraph 19). On May 31, 2022, Pamir Daily News reports rumours that uniformed and armed men with Slavic appearance who had not spoken and apparently not understood Tajik language had taken part in the violent crackdown on May 18-19, 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/894>. On June 11, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that some of the detainees had been forced to dress in camouflage uniform during detention and interrogation so that security forces could produce fake videos of uniformed and armed militants: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/144>. According to an eyewitness account published by Sarkorova on September 3, 2022, the security forces purposefully targeted healthy, tall and strong men for torture and execution: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/462>. According to another article by Sarkorova published on September 9, 2022, an OMON commander deployed to the Western outskirts of Vamar advised residents of Derzud village who wanted to enter the town to support their relatives and friends to stay away and to save their own lives because the security forces in their bloodthirstiness were systematically killing people: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/472>. See also the account of an eyewitness interviewed by Radio Ozodi: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32417339.html>. According to journalist Anora Sarkorova, the head of the police in Rushan district tortured and executed several of the victims: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1106>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1447>. In February 2024, Sarkorova published an anonymous eyewitness account on torture and inhumane treatment of detainees from Rushan district: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1604>. For details on individual casualties, see the appendix.

¹²⁰ Most of the corpses were dumped in an old building of the district hospital (37°56'44.47"N 71°33'51.39"E). On May 28, 2022, a video was published which allegedly showed mourning residents of Vamar at the hospital where security forces had dumped corpses on May 19, 2022: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/92>. For an alleged eyewitness report about the detection and recovery of corpses by local residents under supervision by soldiers, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1108>. According to one source, several corpses were dumped in Panj river to hide the traces of torture and had been washed ashore on the Afghan side of the river. Sarkorova mentioned four corpses which had been discovered on the Afghanistani side of Panj river: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176>. However, this cannot be verified and no specific information about the corpses allegedly discovered on the Afghanistani side of Panj river is available. Several corpses in uniforms were officially found on the Afghanistani side of Panj river after an alleged accident in which a car with security personnel was reported to have fallen into the river on May 21, 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909762.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31931366.html>. There seems to be no direct link between this alleged accident and the violent crackdown in Rushan district.

residents who had been detained or forcibly disappeared remained unclear¹²². Systematic looting by security forces was reported as well¹²³. Security forces cut off Vamar from the outside world to prevent the

¹²¹ On May 19, 2022, Pamir Daily News quoted sources in Vamar saying that more than 40 corpses had been found: <https://t.me/pamirinside/733>. The number of 21 killed civilians was confirmed to Radio Ozodi by a source in the division of the Ministry of the Interior in Rushan district (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31860327.html>), which might refer to the 21 corpses which according to a resident had been handed over by the authorities to the relatives (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html>). A situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists reported that 25 corpses had been buried (paragraph 20). Articles by Anora Sarkorova explained that the number of casualties cannot easily be established because many people were still searching for their relatives and the number of persons who had been forcefully disappeared was still unknown: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/35>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/36>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/62>. For rare pictures and a video of corpses at the funeral at Vamar cemetery (37°56'56.66"N 71°33'38.60"E), see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/155>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/145>, <https://t.me/rustamijoni/71>. For information about the circumstances of the funerals, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/168>. For a video and a picture of the graves of nine casualties of the crackdown at Derzud cemetery, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/463>, and at Vamar cemetery, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412>. On June 20, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova published a list of 32 casualties in Rushan district: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176>. Among the 32 persons on the list, there were the five individuals killed in Derzud on May 31, 2022, and two individuals who had committed suicide. This suggests that there were 25 casualties of the violent crackdown on May 18-19, 2022, who are known by name. For a list of casualties, see also <https://t.me/pamirinside/1013> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/1014>.

¹²² The authorities initially reported that 114 persons had been detained: <https://khover.tj/2022/05/markazi-matbuoti-vazorati-kor-oi-dohilii-um-urii-to-ikiston-habar-medi-ad/>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31858587.html>. On May 23, 2022, the Ministry of the Interior published biographies of 19 individuals who allegedly had surrendered to the authorities after the May 18, 2022: <https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/tj/ruydodho/34112-rujkhati-a-zojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand>. Among those 19 individuals were two former district-level leaders of the oppositional Islamic Renaissance Party (which had been prohibited in 2015) in Rushan district, see also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31863489.html>. On May 24, 2022, the Ministry of the Interior published another list of 27 individuals who had been detained in Rushan district: <https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2>. Several portrait photos on the list showed obvious bruises and wounds in the faces. The authorities alleged that the detained individuals were members of so-called “organized criminal groups” whose leaders are claimed to be Kholbash Kholbashev, Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov and Kulmamad Pallaev. Some sources allege that detainees in Rushan district were kept as hostages for blackmailing Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov and protesters in Khorugh (see chapter about assassination of Mamadbokirov). According to the situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists, detainees were forced to read out self-incriminating statements which were broadcasted on state TV (paragraph 22). According to another report in July 2022, more than 200 persons had been arrested in Rushan district, of whom 120 had been fined and more than 90 were in detention, most of them in Dushanbe. On October 10, 2022, the office of the general prosecutor claimed that 109 individuals had been indicted and 77 of them had received their “deserved punishment”: <https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1639-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-485.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32071177.html>.

¹²³ First eyewitness accounts on looting by security forces during and after the violent crackdown on May 18, 2022, were published by journalist Anora Sarkorova on May 26, 2022: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/62>. On June 02, 2022, Sarkorova published additional eyewitness accounts on multiple incidents of looting in private houses, shops and offices in Vamar: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/89>. Looting was also reported in Pastkhuf (around 10 km South-east of Vamar): <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/102>. According to one report, security forces looted fridges and washing machines, among others, and seized dozens of vehicles.

transmission of evidence and dissemination of information about the violent crackdown¹²⁴. Nobody was held accountable for the atrocities¹²⁵.

On May 31, 2022, five residents whom the security forces had been searching after the crackdown in Vamar¹²⁶, among them Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov, who enjoyed a high degree of authority in Rushan district, were killed in Derzud village¹²⁷.

¹²⁴ According to a situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists, mobile communication in and around Vamar was disconnected on May 17, 2022, at around 6 pm (paragraph 15). The mobile phones of detainees were seized, and photo and video evidence of shootings was deleted (paragraph 18). After May 18, 2022, the internet connection remained blocked, but phone communication was sometimes possible. By May 26, 2022, all communication remained blocked (paragraph 30). In an article published on June 06, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova described the measures undertaken by the security agencies to erase evidence of the violent crackdown: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/96>. According to her, activists who had tried to document torture had been beaten. Employees of the local administration and security agencies had systematically visited all houses in town, checked mobile phones and deleted all videos and photos related to the crackdown. Mobile phones of residents were also checked upon departure from GBAO by road. Security forces allegedly seized the mobile phones of doctors in Vamar to prevent them from taking photos of injuries and traces of torture: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/102>. At the funeral of the victims, armed security personnel prevented the use of mobile phones for documentation purposes: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/154>. Sarkorova also reported that the security forces did not allow the relatives to do the traditional washing of the corpses and to open the shrouds in order to avoid them seeing the traces of torture: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/168>. See also <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1108>.

¹²⁵ In September 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova, referring to sources in Rushan district, reported that employees of the General Prosecutor's office had interviewed eye witnesses in June 2022 but omitted key details and the identity of perpetrators in the protocols: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1447>.

¹²⁶ Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov had been a former field commander of the UTO. The authorities had already attempted to arrest him in 2020: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30673346.html>. On May 23, 2022, Radio Ozodi had reported that the whereabouts of him and 20 of his companions were unknown: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31863489.html>. According to the government narrative, Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov and the men around him had been armed during the protests on May 18, 2022, and shot at security forces: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/05/press-tsentr-ministerstva-vnutrennih-del-respubliki-tadzhikistan-soobshhaet-2/>.

¹²⁷ On May 31, 2022, the Ministry of the Interior reported that Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov and four other individuals had been killed, allegedly in the mountains above Derzud village when offering armed resistance, and that one other individual (Kulmakhmad Palaev) had been arrested: <https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2/>, see also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html>. The photos in the press release showed five corpses lying next to each other on grassy and rocky ground and with many weapons put on top of them with one man standing behind them between two uniformed and armed persons. A blood spot on one of the photos indicated that one of the individuals lost much blood on the spot but it is not apparent whether they were killed in battle or escorted to the place in the mountains and executed. Journalist Anora Sarkorova put into question the narrative disseminated by the Ministry of the Interior: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83>. On July 13, 2022, she published a video taken by one member of the security forces: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343>. It shows how they dragged the corpses, put them in a row and draped weapons on them. The building in the background showed signs of a fight (bullet holes). It later drew the attention of the general prosecutor: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31948431.html>. According to one source, the place where Gulomkhaidarov and the other men had hidden was not located in the mountains, as alleged by the authorities, but was an uninhabited house in the valley of Panj river east of Derzud village. This source suggested that the five men had not shot at security forces but killed each other / themselves to avoid detention when the security forces were approaching and storming the house, and that there might have been a conflict in the group (with Pallaev fleeing and surrendering). In December 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova published an assessment by an alleged military expert according to which the weapons displayed on the pictures were too new and too many to be realistically in the possession of local residents: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/703>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/704>. She also published an analysis of which conclusions regarding the security agencies involved in the crackdown could be made on the basis of the video: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/716>.

Whereas state media continued alleging that an “anti-terror operation” against heavily armed assailants had been conducted¹²⁸ and presented pictures of corpses of killed Vamar residents with weapons¹²⁹, the violent crackdown in Vamar sent shockwaves through the population of GBAO and the diaspora. Statements in the social media were full of anxiety, grief, perplexity, imploding trust in the authorities of Tajikistan¹³⁰ and the Russian Federation¹³¹, frustration about the government-controlled media depicting peaceful protesters as “terrorists” and “members of an organized criminal group”, and an increasing degree of constructed ethnic distinctiveness and perceived ethnic suppression¹³². The brutality of the violent crackdown and the subsequent executions was generally understood as a precedent intended to scare dissenters and protesters in GBAO into surrender.

5.3. Crackdown on civil society and media

The news portal Asia-Plus, the most important among the few independent media outlets in Tajikistan, published an announcement on May 17, 2022, according to which it would refrain from reporting comprehensively about events in GBAO due to pressure by the authorities¹³³. Radio Ozodi later identified a pattern that several other media outlets had ceased covering events in GBAO at around the same time as well¹³⁴.

¹²⁸ <https://khovar.tj/2022/05/markazi-matbuoti-vazorati-kor-oi-dohilii-um-urii-to-ikiston-habar-medi-ad/>. In reaction to critical statements about the violent crackdown in Vamar by oppositional politicians Muhiddin Kabiri and Alim Sherzamonov at a OSCE human rights conference in Warsaw (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32055475.html>), the office of the state attorney published its version of events on October 7, 2022: <https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1639-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-485.html>. It was factchecked and contested by journalist Anora Sarkorova: <https://telegra.ph/PROKURORSKAYA-LOZH-O-SOBYTIYAH-NA-PAMIRE-10-18>.

¹²⁹ The regional TV channel “TV Badakhshan” seems to have alleged that Vamar residents killed on May 18, 2022, were armed, and to have presented pictures of their corpses with weapons: <https://t.me/anserenko/4340>.

¹³⁰ Bruce Pannier, an expert on Central Asia, commented that the violence in Vamar had been “the worst since the civil war days” and that “the rift between the Pamiris and the Tajik government is likely now irreparable”: <https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/31866028.html>. For more critical analyses of the violent crackdown in Vamar and the political context, see <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-crisis-gripped-government-opts-to-pick-deadly-fight-in-the-pamirs>, <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan-unrest-violence/31856386.html>.

¹³¹ The statement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on May 18, 2022, reproducing the Tajikistani authorities’ narrative and depicting the protesters in Vamar as “criminal elements and extremists attached to them” (<https://ria.ru/20220518/obostrenie-1789319255.html>), resonated widely among the Tajikistani diaspora from GBAO. Several social media authors interpreted it as a betrayal of the Pamirs by Russia, e.g. <https://t.me/pamirinside/755>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4378>. On May 20, 2022, the Russian news agency RIA distanced itself from the narrative provided by the authorities of Tajikistan, provided context and framed protesters as “Pamiri opposition”: <https://ria.ru/20220520/tadzhikistan-1789567474.html>.

¹³² The number of followers of the subscribers of the two main Telegram channels reporting on events in GBAO (<https://t.me/pamirinside> and <https://t.me/anserenko>) dramatically increased around May 18, 2022, even if internet was blocked in Khorugh and other parts of GBAO. The following statements were forwarded on these two channels and reached a wider audience: <https://t.me/pamirinside/711>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4337>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4338>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4339>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4341>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4344>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4345>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4346>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4347>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4349>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4350>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4352>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4353>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4357>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4358>.

¹³³ <https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220517/asia-plus-statement-regarding-the-situation-in-the-gorno-badakhshan-autonomous-region>. In their announcement, the editorial board reported that they had received warnings from the public prosecutor and other state organs criticising that the coverage of events in GBAO was one-sided and contributed to destabilising the country. They had also threatened with the closure of the media outlet in case this was not corrected. See also the Radio Ozodi article: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31854199.html>.

¹³⁴ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31865912.html>. The article raises the question whether this was the result of governmental censorship or self-censorship. According to it, the authorities had refrained from commenting on the situation.

The same day, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, a renowned journalist and civil society activist, was targeted by the authorities and diaspora activists warned that she was in danger of being persecuted and arrested¹³⁵. After leaving Mamadshoeva's house in Dushanbe where they had interviewed her, several Radio Ozodi journalists were violently attacked by unidentified persons possibly linked to the security forces. Their technical equipment was seized, including the one which contained the interview recording¹³⁶. On May 18, 2022, Mamadshoeva was summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security and detained, and criminal proceedings against her were opened¹³⁷. Her former husband Kholbash Kholbashev was detained on May 18, 2022¹³⁸.

On May 24, 2022, state TV started broadcasting a propaganda film "The failed conspiracy" with self-incriminating statements made by Mamadshoeva and Kholbashev in detention. They "confessed" to have organized the protests in Khorugh and Rushan district together with Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov and Alim Sherzamonov two months in advance and with funding from abroad¹³⁹. Kholbashev was sentenced to life imprisonment in September 2022¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁵ In a press release published by the Ministry of the Interior, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and the exiled oppositional politician Alim Sherzamonov were blamed for orchestrating the protests on May 16, 2022:

<https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34065-vazorati-kor-oi-dokhil-khabar-medi-ad-2>. Diaspora civil society activists addressed the international community with an appeal and warned that Mamadshoeva was "in imminent danger of arrest, which is likely to result in lengthy imprisonment". For background information about Mamadshoeva's biography and the criminal proceedings against her, see <https://mediazona.ca/article/2022/05/23/ulfat> and <https://vkrisis.ru/world/den-zhanny-dark/>.

¹³⁶ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/v-dushanbe-napali-na-s-yemochnuyu-gruppu-nastoyashchego-vremeni/31854850.html>.

The attack was strongly condemned by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty President and CEO Jamie Fly: <https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/rfe-rl-journalists-beaten-in-tajikistan/31855289.html>. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media condemned the attacks as well: <https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/518472>. Neither by July 2022 (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31950021.html>) nor by November 2022, investigations had not led to any results.

¹³⁷ This was reported by Pamir Daily News (<https://t.me/pamirinside/693>), Radio Ozodi (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31856335.html>) and Fergana (<https://fergana.ru/news/126182/>). According to Radio Ozodi, she was charged with alleged public calls for the overthrow of the government:

<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31858681.html>. On May 23, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that her case had been classified as "secret" and her lawyer was not allowed to talk to journalists anymore: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31863660.html>.

¹³⁸ <https://t.me/pamirinside/701>. Kholbashev had been a general of the border guards and is from Rushan district <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31858681.html>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/6>. On May 19, 2022, the authorities blamed him to have orchestrated the protests in Vamar (Rushan district): <https://khover.tj/2022/05/markazi-matbuoti-vazorati-kor-oi-dohilii-um-urii-to-ikiston-habar-medi-ad>.

¹³⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=H6bA57qgaZU>. Diaspora civil society activists from GBAO assumed that they had been subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment in custody. Alim Sherzamonov, an exiled oppositional politician, denied the allegations, convincingly deconstructed some of them and drew attention to traces of violence against Mamadshoeva: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31866669.html> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31868332.html>. Journalist Anora Sarkorova explained in an article that meeting diplomats in coffeeshops and receiving honorary fees for writing articles, which Mamadshoeva had been accused of, was not a crime: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/60>. A Radio Ozodi article published on May 29, 2022, further deconstructed accusations against Mamadshoeva and Kholbashev and their alleged "confessions". Journalist Anora Sarkorova provided evidence that the film had also been shown to lecturers and students of the Dushanbe branch of Moscow State University: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/77>. For a critical analysis of the alleged conspiracy with foreign countries, see <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-activist-faces-prison-over-alleged-plotting-with-us-government>. Articles published in July 2022 highlighted parallels between the authorities of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan blaming unspecified "foreign forces" and "third parties" for instigating protests in 2022:

<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31939290.html>, <https://eurasianet.org/central-asias-deadly-protests-have-much-in-common>.

¹⁴⁰ After a trial behind closed doors in the remand prison of the State Committee for National Security in Dushanbe, Kholbashev was sentenced to life imprisonment on September 21, 2022, allegedly for terrorism and murder: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/517>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32046122.html>. The authorities alleged his case to events

After May 18, 2022, several civil society activists and journalists from GBAO were summoned for interrogation or detained¹⁴¹. On June 06, 2022, eleven journalist organizations and media outlets in Tajikistan in a joint statement demanded the punishment of those responsible for beating up journalists and criticised recent cases of pressure on journalists, referring to the freedom of speech guaranteed in the Constitution¹⁴².

5.4. Assassination of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov in Khorugh on May 22, 2022

In the afternoon of May 22, 2022, the community leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov¹⁴³ was assassinated in Khorugh by gunmen of the Tajikistani special forces¹⁴⁴. He was exposing himself to the security forces by

in Vamar on May 18, 2022, and dozens of detainees from Rushan district were sentenced to prison terms between 1.5 and 18 years in the same trial.

¹⁴¹ At least two other civil society activists from GBAO were summoned for interrogation in Dushanbe on May 18, 2022, as well. On May 24, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported about at least three journalists who had been summoned for interrogation in the context of the Mamadshoeva case: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31865912.html>. Ramziya Mirzobekova, an Asia-Plus journalist who had covered events in GBAO, went public and told Radio Ozodi about her interrogation by the State Committee for National Security, the seizure of her mobile phone and notebook, and the smear campaign in social media against her: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31872937.html>. On May 19, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the blogger Khushruz Juraev (nicknamed “Khushom Gulyam”), who had written about Pamiri history and ethnic identity in his blog, had been detained by the Organized Crime Control Department in Dushanbe:

<https://t.me/pamirinside/744>. According to a situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists, he had worked with the NGO led by Mamadshoeva, spoken out on social media about the November 2021 protests, and already been detained for a day in April 2021. On June 25, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova published an update about his case: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/197>.

¹⁴² <https://mediacouncil.tj/2022/06/06/izhoroti-mushtarakai-sozmonhoi-ruznomanigorii-tojikiston-dar-paji-qazijahoi-ahiri-jomeai-ruznomanigorii-tojikiston/>. For a Russian translation, see <https://bomdodrus.com/2022/06/06/strong-sovmestnoe-zajavlenie-zhurnalistskih-organizacij-tadzhikistana-po-sluhajam-davlenija-na-zhurnalistov-strong/>. For a summary in Russian, see <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31885995.html> and <https://fergana.media/news/126413/>. The statement was published after Tajik journalist and blogger Daler Imomali had been interrogated for several hours and beaten: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31884363.html>.

¹⁴³ Mamadbokirov’s authority had increased again after the November 2021 events as the authorities had ignored and discredited more moderate leaders and exacerbated solidarity with Mamadbokirov by explicitly targeting him as their main foe. For a recap of his life and a discussion of the role he had played in Khorugh and GBAO, see <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31868612.html>.

¹⁴⁴ This was first reported by Pamir Daily News on May 22, 2022, at 5.59 pm Dushanbe time: <https://t.me/pamirinside/804>. According to sources of Radio Ozodi (<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31862351.html>), Eurasianet (<https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-local-residents-say-pamiri-leader-killed-by-government-troops>) and journalist Anora Sarkorova (<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/40>), Mamadbokirov was assassinated by a gunman of the Tajikistani special forces. According to the detailed report on the assassination by journalist Anora Sarkorova, Mamadbokirov left his house in Bar Khorugh (37°29'13.92"N 71°34'43.98"E) to take a walk, insisting to go without company and defenceless. In Boinya neighbourhood (between Bar Khorugh and UPD neighbourhoods, 37°29'5.38"N 71°34'50.12"E), four gunmen of the Tajikistani Alpha special forces went out of a Pickup vehicle, encircled him and opened fire at him without any warning. Mamadbokirov was fatally wounded and died at the spot: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/44>. One accidental passer-by was fatally shot when trying to save him and another person was seriously injured. At 6.18 pm Dushanbe time, the governmental news agency Khovar published the official version and disseminated a press release and announced that Mamadbokirov, who was depicted as “leader of an organized criminal group in the Bar Khorugh neighbourhood”, had been killed at 5.30 pm in a fight between criminal group: <https://khovar.tj/2022/05/iz-oroti-markazi-matbuoti-rayosati-vazorati-kor-oi-dohilii-um-urii-to-ikiston-dar-vmkb/>. For a contextualization of the assassination, see <https://eurasianet.org/explainer-why-tajikistans-pamiris-dont-trust-their-government>. Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko assumes that the assassination of Mamadbokirov had been the core goal of the Tajikistani authorities for quite some time to make President Rahmon feel comfortable about his control of GBAO before starting the power transition process: <https://t.me/anserenko/4447>.

going for a walk, almost certainly knowing that this would result in his assassination¹⁴⁵. One additional person was killed in the process¹⁴⁶.

At the time the funeral ceremony was taking place in Bar Khorugh the following day, security forces continued preventing people from passing the checkpoints inside Khorugh and on the roads to Khorugh¹⁴⁷. The town was encircled by snipers and paralyzed, people were fearing mass arrests in the framework of a continuing crackdown.

As the most influential and most independent community leader, Mamadbokirov had played a key role in protecting residents against state arbitrariness and encroachments. His assassination paved the way for the crackdown on civil society.

5.5. Systematic crackdown on civil society in GBAO and mass detentions

Subsequently, the town remained blocked by security forces. They continued systematically searching houses, dismantling civil society and cracking down on different categories of influential individuals who had expressed criticism of the authorities or had an independent power base, as well as on their close relatives¹⁴⁸: people in Bar Khorugh neighbourhood of Khorugh who had previously been close to Mamadbokirov¹⁴⁹,

¹⁴⁵ Considering that the security forces were hunting him, Mamadbokirov had rarely left his house in Bar Khorugh. All sources agree that he exposed himself to the security forces on purpose when deciding to go for a walk, e.g. <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/44>. They provide different explanations, referring to the Talika by the Aga Khan to the Ismaili community in Tajikistan published on May 19, 2022, and warning of violence (<https://the.ismaili/tajikistan/talika-mubarak-mawlana-hazar-imam-19-may-2022>), an attempt to spare Bar Khorugh a standoff and a violent crackdown like the one which had happened in Vamar, and pressure from the public in Bar Khorugh which had got scared and split after the crackdown in Vamar. Several sources indicate that the authorities and security forces blackmailed Mamadbokirov, threatening him with killing detainees in Rushan district: A situation brief (May 27, 2022) prepared by diaspora civil society activists mentioned that detainees were kept hostage for negotiation with Mamadbokirov (paragraph 18). This is consistent with a post on the Telegram channel of Pamir Daily News on two sources of Pamir Daily News on May 20, 2022, according to which negotiators from the security forces had threatened protesters in Khorugh with killing detained residents of Vamar and other places in Rushan district unless the road between downtown Khorugh and Bar Khorugh was opened: <https://t.me/pamirinside/759>. Another Pamir Daily News post published on May 20, 2022, indirectly indicates that the fate of the detainees in Rushan district was a matter of negotiation between stakeholders in Khorugh: <https://t.me/pamirinside/757>. According to one source, snipers of the Alpha special forces fired several shots at Mamadbokirov's house from the mountains north of Bar Khorugh on May 21, 2022, putting additional pressure on him. For a detailed analysis of sources' accounts of Mamadbokirov's last hours, see <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gorno-badakhshan-mamadboqirov-tajikistan-pamir-mountains/> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1322>. According to sources of Pamir Daily News, a surveillance drone was filming the assassination of Mamadbokirov and the recording was later presented to President Rahmon: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2073>.

¹⁴⁶ <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1324>.

¹⁴⁷ <https://t.me/pamirinside/816>. There were checkpoints at the main crossing, at the main bridge, in Chinak (between downtown Khorugh and Bar Khorugh) and UPD. The roads from Dushanbe / Rushan district, Shugnan district, Roshtkala district, Ishkashim district to Khorugh were blocked. Nevertheless, hundreds of residents gathered for the funeral of Mamadbokirov: <https://t.me/rustamijoni/123>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/231> (with photos and videos in subsequent posts). He was buried at Bar Khorugh cemetery (37°29'18.73"N 71°35'8.48"E).

¹⁴⁸ For example, Russian political scientist reported on June 15, 2022, that the brother of assassinated community leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov had been detained, as well as relatives of detained Tolib Ayombekov: <https://t.me/anserenko/4578>.

¹⁴⁹ On May 25, 2022, according to <https://t.me/pamirinside/835>, checkpoints were reinforced, military equipment and forces were moved around, and helicopters were cruising above the town. In the evening, armed special forces on several trucks and pickup vehicles forcibly entered the neighbourhood Bar Khorugh and demanded the surrender of one individual: <https://t.me/pamirinside/836>. On May 27, 2022, sources of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that security forces were searching for five individuals who had been close to Mamadbokirov: <https://t.me/pamirinside/856>.

informal authorities in Khlebzavod¹⁵⁰ neighbourhood of Khorugh, informal authorities in UPD¹⁵¹ neighbourhood of Khorugh, members of the “Commission of 44”, among them prominent human rights

¹⁵⁰ On May 27, 2022, sources of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that security forces had demanded the surrender of three informal authorities (Khursand Mazorov, Tolib Ayombekov, Munavvar Shanbiev), threatening with a violent crackdown in Khorugh in case of refusal: <https://t.me/pamirinside/856>. On June 11, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that Tolib Ayombekov and Munavvar Shanbiev had been summoned for interrogation and detained: <https://t.me/pamirinside/961>. The same day, the neighbourhood Khlebzavod (South-west Khorugh), the stronghold of Ayombekov, was sealed off by security forces, gunshots were heard and Niyozsho Gulobov was arrested: <https://t.me/pamirinside/959>. The state news agency Khovar confirmed the detentions the same day, labelled the three individuals as “leaders of organized criminal groups” and listed various crimes they had allegedly committed: <https://khovar.tj/2022/06/sitodi-bajniidoravii-tamini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-amiyat-dar-vmkb-habar-medi-ad/>. See <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31893774.html> for a summary in Russian. According to a source of Serenko, the detainees were immediately transported to Dushanbe by helicopter: <https://t.me/anserenko/4565>. On the weapons allegedly found in Ayombekov’s house, see <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-3/>.

¹⁵¹ On June 12, Pamir Daily News reported that security forces had sealed off the neighbourhood UPD (South-east Khorugh), that they were searching houses for the informal authorities Zoir Rajabov and Khursand Mazorov and that gunshots had been heard: <https://t.me/pamirinside/967>. Radio Ozodi, referring to two sources, reported the detention of sports trainer Komron Mamadnazarov and mentioned different rumours about the fate of Rajabov and Mazorov, who had been informal authorities in UPD, following Imomnazar Imomnazarov after his assassination by security forces in 2012: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894630.html>. Pamir Daily News reported rumours according to which Rajabov and Mazorov had committed suicide to avoid detention: <https://t.me/pamirinside/968>. This was confirmed by a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko: <https://t.me/anserenko/4565>. One source reported they had been assassinated by security forces, whereas another said they had blast themselves with hand grenades when surrounded by security forces (37°29'23.32"N 71°33'57.48"E). Pamir Daily News also quoted a source describing that after their death, masked security personnel carried boxes into the house of Mazorov and people with cameras appeared: <https://t.me/pamirinside/968>. Several hours later, the state news agency Khovar alleged that Rajabov and Mazorov had been "neutralized" while offering armed resistance and displayed ten photos of weapons: <https://khovar.tj/2022/06/sitodi-bajniidoravii-tamini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-amiyat-dar-vmkb-habar-medi-ad-2/> (Tajik) and <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-2/> (Russian). On four of the photos, the weapons were draped in a garden, in the remaining six photos, the same set of weapons was draped in a courtyard. See also Radio Ozodi: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894874.html>. One source suggested that they had shot at security forces from an apartment building in UPD and finally blast themselves to avoid detention. According to Khovar, ten persons were detained during the purge in UPD and weapons were found in the houses of Imomnazar Shoishirinov and Muslim Sherzamonov. The latter was the brother of exiled oppositional politician Alim Sherzamonov who considered the arrest to be politically motivated and the weapons to have been planted on his brother: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31895748.html>, <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/tadzhikistane-zaderzhali-brata-oppozitsionera-alima-sherzamonova/31895805.html>.

activists and lawyers¹⁵², participants of the fights with government forces in July 2012¹⁵³, businesspeople in Khorugh¹⁵⁴ and civil society representatives in other districts of GBAO¹⁵⁵. As well, relatives and intimates of influential persons were detained¹⁵⁶. Many of those arrested got long prison terms based on fabricated charges and in trials behind closed doors, without due process of law and access to proper legal defence¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵² On May 29, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that more than ten members of the “Commission of 44” had been summoned for interrogation regarding alleged reception of money from abroad and detained in Khorugh: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31874029.html>. This was confirmed by Pamir Daily News: <https://t.me/pamirinside/864>, whereas sources of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko exaggeratedly alleged that all members of the “Commission of 44” had been detained: <https://t.me/anserenko/4486>. See also <https://fergana.media/news/126298/>. On May 31, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that out of the members of the “Commission of 44” who had been summoned for interrogation, four were still in detention (Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashev, Khursand Mamadshoev and Muzaffar Muborakshoev), and that well-known lawyer Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov had been charged with “participation in a criminal organization”: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html>. On June 07, 2022, Radio Ozodi, referring to three sources in Khorugh, reported that seven members of the “Commission of 44” were in detention, had been charged of receiving funding from abroad, and had been transferred to the remand prison in Dushanbe, among them the prominent lawyers Faromuz Irgashev and Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, and the activists Khursand Mamadshoev, Muzaffar Muborakshoev and Bakhtovar Bakhtiyorov: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html>. In an opinion piece published in Pamir Daily News on June 06, 2022, according to which the authorities were trying to destroy any form of self-organization of Pamiris in Tajikistan and in the diaspora: <https://t.me/pamirinside/928>. The anonymous author drew attention to the tradition of mutual help and collective action required by the harsh living conditions of the Pamirs, and argued that the crowdfunding by Tajikistani diaspora from GBAO to sustain the members of the “Commission of 44” after the November 2021 protests, which the authorities were using to accuse the members of the “Commission of 44” of having received funding from abroad, needs to be understood in the context of this tradition. Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov was the Director of the NGO “Lawyers’ Association of the Pamirs” which had already previously been harassed by the authorities: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20210705/npo-pod-pritselom-nalogovih-organov-ili-kak-granti-okazalis-ne-grantami>. On August 24, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that the Supreme Court of Tajikistan considered the “Commission of 44” as a criminal organization and that some of the members of the “Commission of 44” were charged with participating in a criminal organization (Criminal Code Art. 187): <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32001378.html>. For a summary of the persecution of human rights defenders, see <https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/continuous-crackdown-on-civil-society/>.

¹⁵³ On June 14, 2022, a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that security forces were systematically arresting those who had actively taken part in fighting off government forces in July 2012, even if they had been granted an amnesty at that time: <https://t.me/anserenko/4570>.

¹⁵⁴ On June 10, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that businesspeople who had supported the November 2021 protests with money or food were put under massive pressure by the security forces and threatened with charges of financing of terrorism: <https://t.me/pamirinside/953>. For names of detained businesspeople, see <https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682>. By July 2022, there was also pressure on major commercial entities affiliated to the Aga Khan and fears of confiscation: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-government-puts-the-squeeze-on-aga-khan-linked-entities>. In November, Tolib Abdolbekov, an owner of several shops in Khorugh, was detained: <https://pamirinside.org/в-хоро-ре-задержан-очередной-предприн>. State officials and security forces used the detention of businesspeople to confiscate their property and/or to extract bribes.

¹⁵⁵ One tweet of Bakhtiyor Safarov on June 06, 2022, mentioned the detention of residents of Ishkashim and Vanj districts: <https://twitter.com/Safarov1976/status/1533623916866027520?s=20&t=WwoVvJaHyocaQ1AMRlfgw>.

¹⁵⁶ Most striking is the case of Tolib Ayombekov, a former informal authority in Khlebzavod neighbourhood of Khorugh. After he had been detained himself, at least three sons, two brothers and two nephews were detained and later sentenced to life imprisonment or long prison terms: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32162857.html>. Muslim Sherzamonov, the brother of exiled opposition leader Alim Sherzamonov, was detained and sentenced to 18 years in prison: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31965636.html>. For a systematic analysis of the detention of male relatives of target persons, see a Radio Ozodi article published in July 2023: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32486926.html>.

¹⁵⁷ On June 08, 2022, Radio Ozodi drew attention to the deficit of lawyers in GBAO, where only four lawyers were identifiable, and suggested that those detained in the framework of the ongoing crackdown could realistically not be provided with proper legal defence: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31889220.html>. On June 13, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova mentioned the number of more than 100 detainees from Khorugh and Rushan district brought to Dushanbe and described the legal flaws of the trials: fake accusations, secrecy of process, torture, blackmailing with threats against relatives, denial of access of lawyers to the detainees, denial of information about detainees to relatives:

Some detainees were coerced to read out self-incriminating “confessions” which were broadcasted on TV¹⁵⁸. At the same time, arbitrary verbal, physical and sexual harassment of Khorugh residents by security forces was reported¹⁵⁹. The mass detentions and their arbitrary justification with fabricated charges left the population of Khorugh terrified and in fear.

Internet communication remained blocked throughout GBAO until late June 2022. In mid-June 2022, the authorities put forward the narrative that the assassinated and detained informal power brokers had been leaders of organized criminal groups and involved in drug trafficking¹⁶⁰.

During the night of May 28 to May 29, 2022, a fire on the main market of Khorugh destroyed many shops and caused the partial collapse of the pedestrian bridge across Gunt river¹⁶¹.

<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/156>. This was also partly confirmed by a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko: <https://t.me/anserenko/4578>. On June 25, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported the transfer of additional 20 detainees from GBAO to Dushanbe: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/195>. According to her, detention centres were full due to the high number of detainees from GBAO and the processes continued to have legal flaws. On July 02, 2022, she published articles about legal flaws in processes against activists from GBAO: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/211> and specifically lack of access to lawyers: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/215>. According to one report, lawyers were afraid of defending natives of GBAO, fearing to lose their license or to be accused of extremism. On August 05, 2022, Sarkorova described the corruption scheme behind the trials, with lawyers recommended by the authorities acting as intermediaries and extracting money from the detainees’ desperate relatives: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/393>. For a summary of the legal flaws in the judicial prosecution of activists from GBAO: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-pamiri-activists-imprisoned-en-masse>. On the process of licensing of lawyers and its misuse for marginalising critical lawyers: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/484>. On the conditions in Tajikistani prisons: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/522>. On the long-term trend of increasing frequency of torture: <https://cabar.asia/en/human-rights-in-tajikistan-in-20-years-torture-victims-and-violence-are-on-the-rise>. Throughout 2022, eleven Pamiris were sentenced to life imprisonment: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1341>, <https://pamirinside.org/11-life-prisoners-from-gbao/>.

¹⁵⁸ On June 03, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that detainees were coerced to read out video statements after hours of interrogation: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/156>. She published two videos of detainees reading out texts in Tajik language with difficulty which had been broadcasted on TV Badakhshan: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/157>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/158>. On August 12, 2022, a source of Russian political scientist reported that many detainees from Rushan district had made confessions after detention, which had been publicly broadcasted, and revoked them later, arguing that they had been made under torture: <https://t.me/anserenko/4882>.

¹⁵⁹ On June 12, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova published an article about harassment of residents in Khorugh and described security forces forcefully entering houses and illegally searching them, insulting residents, verbally harassing female residents and beating male residents: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/152>. She compared the actions of the Tajikistani security forces in GBAO to the behaviour of an occupation army in hostile territory. She also mentioned verbal sexual harassment of women in Ishkashim district and detention under fake charges of two men who had tried to defend the affected women. On July 22, 2022, Sarkorova forwarded a message from an anonymous subscriber who described three cases of sexual harassment of bank employees by a State committee for National Security official and emphasized that such cases had become common, particularly among school teachers, but victims rarely reported to anybody: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/359>.

¹⁶⁰ On June 16, 2022, the Inter-agency committee on the enforcement of law and order in GBAO issued a press statement in Tajik: <https://khovar.tj/2022/06/sitodi-bajniidoravii-tamini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-amiyat-dar-vmkb-habar-medi-ad-4/>, and Russian: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-4/>. It alleged to have seized 200 kg of opium belonging to Khursand Mazorov from UPD neighbourhood of Khorugh, who had died during the purge on June 12, 2022, upon information by detained Niyozsho Gulobov from Khlebzavod neighbourhood. The number of plastic bags on the photo (37) is not consistent with the number of plastic bags seized according to the text (8). The press statement continued with listing the community leaders and informal authorities who had been assassinated or detained recently and trying to tie them to organized crime and drug trafficking.

¹⁶¹ Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko posted a picture of the remains of the shops and quoted a source alleging that the fire had been caused on purpose by soldiers after looting a shopping centre and that it had led to the explosion of a gas container: <https://t.me/anserenko/4488>. One picture posted in social media showed the partly

In mid-June 2022, various sources described an atmosphere of terror, shock and anxiety among the population of Khorugh¹⁶².

5.6. Transregional and transnational crackdown on natives of GBAO

After the May 2022 events in GBAO, natives of GBAO arriving at Dushanbe Airport were systematically targeted for harassment or detention by security forces¹⁶³. From late May 2022 onward, security forces targeted residents of Dushanbe with roots in GBAO for interrogation and arbitrary detention, allegedly even for accusations of posting or liking critical comments in social media¹⁶⁴.

At the same time, the Tajikistani security agencies increased the pressure on activists, bloggers and other dissenters living in Russia who were natives of GBAO¹⁶⁵. They received support from the authorities of the

destroyed bridge of which the North-eastern rope had apparently collapsed:

<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/72?comment=1586>. According to the Ministry of the Interior quoted by Radio Ozodi, 14 shops and a market building were destroyed: <https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34147-pozhar-na-tsentralnom-rynke-khoroga>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31873893.html>. A video of the market after the fire was published by the Ministry of the Interior on May 30, 2022: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=4918338128263306>.

¹⁶² On June 14, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported total silence in Khorugh, a population under shock and in anxiety, but full of anger: <https://t.me/pamirinside/975>. The same day, a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported a relatively calm situation in Khorugh: <https://t.me/anserenko/4570>. A similar description of the situation followed on June 21, 2022: <https://t.me/anserenko/4614>. A reportage by Radio Ozodi published in mid-June 2022 gave an impression of the atmosphere of anxiety, as many interviewees were not ready to mention their names or to have photos been taken: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html>.

¹⁶³ Pamir Daily News reported about arbitrary detention (<https://t.me/pamirinside/765>) and harassment (<https://t.me/pamirinside/837>) of Tajikistani citizens from GBAO upon arrival at Dushanbe Airport to prevent them from traveling to Khorugh. On May 30, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported about Tajikistani citizens from GBAO who were forcibly disappeared upon arrival at Dushanbe Airport and about blacklists of Tajikistani citizens from GBAO who were not allowed to leave the country: <https://t.me/pamirinside/882>.

¹⁶⁴ Journalist Anora Sarkorova reported on May 26, 2022, that many Dushanbe residents from GBAO were visited and interrogated by unidentified individuals at home or at work: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/62>. On June 6, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported the detention of a student from Murghab district in Dushanbe by an unidentified security agency: <https://t.me/pamirinside/927>. On June 14, 2022, a source of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that a son of Tolib Ayombekov, who had been detained in Khorugh a few days before, had been arrested in Dushanbe: <https://t.me/anserenko/4570>. On June 16, 2022, Mamadsulton Mavlonazarov was detained in Dushanbe, a retired State Committee for National Security (GKNB) officer and native of GBAO who had openly criticized the current GKNB leadership in social media: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31901645.html>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/994>. Ten days later, he was still under arrest but no accusations were made and nobody had access to him: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31922703.html>. He was sentenced to seven years in prison on September 13, 2022, after a six-days trial: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/480>. On June 17, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that natives of GBAO living in Dushanbe had been arrested for critical comments and likes in social media: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/164>.

¹⁶⁵ On June 17, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that dozens of natives of GBAO living in Russia had received notifications from Tajikistani security agencies that they were accused of serious crimes and required to return to Tajikistan within short periods of time <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/164>. According to Sarkorova, the affected individuals had taken part in video addresses calling for peace and rule of law in GBAO and published in social media comments and photos related to events in GBAO. The notifications included threats of forced deportation from Russia and harsh punishments in case of refused voluntary return. They also contained screenshots of social media comments as evidence of crimes. Sarkorova's post also included a screenshot of a notification: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/165>. According to Sarkorova, there had been more than 20 cases of forcible disappearances of Tajik citizens from Russia and Türkiye since 2006: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/380>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/382>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/383>. For background information on the increasing transnational persecution and the forcible disappearance even of Russian passport-holders from Russia, see <https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/tajikistan-reaches-beyond-its-borders-to-silence-opposition/>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31974831.html> and <https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/05-08-2022-operatsiya/>. On August 19, 2022, Radio Ozodi published a comprehensive article which mentioned various cases of natives of GBAO in Russia who received threats directly or via relatives or persecuted by the Russian authorities:

Russian Federation which detained and deported individuals targeted by the Tajikistani security agencies or tolerated their abduction¹⁶⁶. Most prominent were the cases of two community organizers among the Pamiri diaspora in Russia and citizens of the Russian Federation, Oraz Vazirbekov and Ramzi Vazirbekov, who were forcibly disappeared at an airport in Moscow and taken to Dushanbe on July 29, 2022¹⁶⁷. As a result, many natives of GBAO fled Russia and applied for asylum in Europe¹⁶⁸.

5.7. Wrap-up of the crackdown by the authorities

In mid-June 2022, the Tajikistani authorities started wrapping up and publicly justifying the crackdown. On June 17, 2022, the Inter-agency committee on the enforcement of law and order in GBAO announced the end of the crackdown and declared that the activities of “organized terroristic groups” on the territory of GBAO had been terminated¹⁶⁹.

<https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31995404.html>. On August 18, 2022, sources of Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that a team of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan had arrived to Moscow to detain and extradite natives of GBAO who had spoken out against the crackdown in GBAO: <https://t.me/anserenko/4962>.

¹⁶⁶ On June 11, 2022, Muslim Navruzov (born in Khorugh) was deported from Russia to Tajikistan, one day after Jonibek Jamshedov had been arrested in Moscow for alleged violation of the migration legislation:

<https://t.me/pamirinside/963>. According to the Pamir Daily News post, both individuals had addressed the President of Tajikistan in the video message of diaspora activists from GBAO in Moscow after the November 2021 arrests and were accused of calls for violent turnover of the constitutional order by the Tajikistani authorities.

¹⁶⁷ Pamir Daily News reported on July 30, 2022, that they had disappeared immediately after landing at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport on a flight from Ekaterinburg the evening before: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1126>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377>. Both had previously announced that they feared being kidnapped and did not have any intention to go to Tajikistan voluntarily: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9vK-5ch-cE>, <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/tadjikistan-blokade-pamir/6482417.html> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/551>. Oraz Vafirbekov had been among the main organizers of the protest in front of the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow on November 25, 2022, after the killing of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov:

<https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211126/hundreds-of-people-gather-to-a-protest-at-the-tajikistan-embassy-in-moscow>. Apart from them, also Ruslan Pulodbekov was reported to have disappeared in Moscow: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377>. This happened shortly after the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation had visited his Tajikistani counterpart in Dushanbe on July 25, 2022, and discussed “the prevention of terrorist and extremist crimes”: <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/07/delegatsiya-rossii-pod-rukovodstvom-genprokurora-rf-pribyla-v-tadzhikistan/>, <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/20220725/v-dushanbe-priehal-genprokuror-rossii-igor-krasnov>. On July 30, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that Oraz Vafirbekov and Ramzi Vafirbekov were in Dushanbe: <https://t.me/anserenko/4773>. On July 31, 2022, the authorities published a video allegedly showing Oraz Vafirbekov and Ramzi Vafirbekov explaining that they had come to Tajikistan voluntarily and were ready to answer to the prosecutors’ questions: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjmQyU2tAlk>.

Regarding doubts on the authenticity of the statements: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1130>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/385>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1131>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31967525.html>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4776>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31968771.html>. Various authors expressed their shock about the fact that the Russian authorities had extradited or tolerated the kidnapping of Russian citizens:

<https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/380>, <https://t.me/anserenko/4773>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/385>. For speculations about the possible involvement of Russian security agencies: <https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/05-08-2022-operatsiya/>. On July 25-26, 2022, the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation had visited Dushanbe and met with state officials there: <https://prokuratura.tj/ru/news/1558-zayavlenie-generalnoj-prokuratury-respubliki-tadzhikistan-66.html>, <https://prokuratura.tj/ru/news/1554-participation-at-the-military-parade-in-honor-of-the-70-th-anniversary-of-victory-over-fascism-7.html>.

¹⁶⁸ According to a Radio Ozodi article published on August 19, 2022, more than 200 natives of GBAO who had been living in Russia had made it to Germany: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31995404.html>.

¹⁶⁹ The lengthy press combined unspecific narratives about terrorist groups, organized crime and funding from abroad, pretending that the crackdown had been in the interest of the population of GBAO. According to the security forces, 16 persons had been killed, 220 persons had been arrested, 39 vehicles and hundreds of firearms had been seized in the framework of the so-called “anti-terror operation”: <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-soobshhaet-polnostyu-prekrashhena-deyatelnost-organizovannyh-terroristicheskikh-grupp-na-territorii-gbao/>. Pamir Daily News contested the figures presented in the press release: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1002>.

On June 18, 2022, President Rahmon in a speech in Dangara town assumed responsibility for the crackdown in GBAO, declared that he had given order to “neutralize individuals armed with weapons” and alleged that there had been no alternative¹⁷⁰. On June 19, 2022, Alisher Mirzonabot, who had overseen the crackdown in GBAO as the acting governor of the region since November 2021, was promoted to become the Governor of GBAO¹⁷¹. Like other state officials from GBAO who had played key roles in the crackdown, he was honoured with a medal by the President¹⁷².

The authorities started announcing or launching construction and economic development projects to appease the population of GBAO¹⁷³, e.g. the rehabilitation of part of the road from Dushanbe to Khorugh by

¹⁷⁰ See the press release of the state news agency Khovar: <https://khovar.tj/2022/06/prezident-suporish-dodand-tatbi-i-barnoma-o-oid-ba-rushdi-vmkb-tamin-karda-shavad-dar-minta-ai-az-i-ati-udud-kalontarini-to-ikiston-tara-iyoti-bosurati-so-a-o-peshbin-meshavad/> (Tajik) and <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/prezident-poruchil-obespechit-realizatsiyu-proektov-po-razvitiyu-gbao-samoj-krupnoj-po-territorii-oblasti-tadzhikistana-predrekayut-burnoe-razvitie/> (Russian). For a summary of the GBAO-related part of the speech, see <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31905149.html>. President Rahmon alleged that “small groups” had pretended to speak on behalf of the people of GBAO and provoked “recent events” with foreign guidance and funding through the Party of Islamic Renaissance. He seemed to feel the need to justify the violent crackdown in Vamar on May 18, 2022, alleging that the authorities had tried to solve the blockade of the road by negotiations, but that state representatives had been beaten, security forces had been injured, protesters had had weapons and had been planning to blow up a bridge. However, he also jeopardized the argument about the urgent need for a crackdown by taking a more long-term perspective: “30 years. It was already too late. But they had totally different demands and affairs.” More generally, he justified the decision to crack down violently with the need to guarantee the security of the state. According to Pamir Daily News and journalist Anora Sarkorova, President Rahmon had alleged such crackdowns were a common practice in other countries as well: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1006>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/170>. Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko, in contrast, alleged on June 17, 2022, that President Rahmon’s son and expected successor Rustam Emomali had overseen the crackdown in GBAO, making use of his own life guard militias: <https://t.me/anserenko/4585>. Serenko later speculated that President Rahmon’s speech on June 18, 2022, was an attempt to save his son’s reputation and legitimacy by taking responsibility for the bloodshed himself: <https://t.me/anserenko/4607>.

¹⁷¹ This was reported by Pamir Daily News with reference to Sputnik news agency: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1007>. Governors are not elected but appointed by the President.

¹⁷² On August 25, 2022, President Rahmon honoured key state officials from GBAO who had supported the crackdown with medals on the occasion of Independence Day: Alisher Mirzonabot (GBAO Governor), Riza Nazarzoda (Khorugh Mayor), Daler Jumaev (Minister of Energy and Water Resources), Juma Jumazoda (Head of Shughnan district), Aziz Gayozoda (Deputy): <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/436>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1205>. As well, representatives of the security forces involved in the violent crackdown in Vamar on May 18-19, 2022, received medals from President Rahmon: Sukhrob Raufzoda (major general of the Ministry of the Interior, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/455>), Asliddin Sabzazoda (commander of OMON forces, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/460>). Pamir Daily News published pictures of further security personnel allegedly involved in the violent crackdown in Vamar who received medals from President Rahmon on 30 August 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1229>. For the complete collection of security officers honoured with medals, see <https://www.flickr.com/photos/khadamotimatbuot/albums/72177720301703054>.

¹⁷³ In his speech in Dangara on June 18, 2022, President Rahmon gave order to implement various infrastructure projects in GBAO: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/prezident-poruchil-obespechit-realizatsiyu-proektov-po-razvitiyu-gbao-samoj-krupnoj-po-territorii-oblasti-tadzhikistana-predrekayut-burnoe-razvitie/>. Various groups of officials visited GBAO subsequently: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/v-sootvetstvii-s-porucheniem-prezidenta-rabochaya-gruppa-ministerstva-zdravooxraneniya-i-sotsialnoj-zashchity-naseleniya-tadzhikistana-posetila-gbao/>, <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/v-sootvetstvii-s-porucheniem-prezidenta-rabochaya-gruppa-ministerstva-selskogo-hozyajstva-nahoditsya-s-rabochej-poezdokoj-v-gbao/>. On June 29, 2022, Pamir Daily News published photos of various events showing an increased activity of state officials in interacting with the public in GBAO: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1039>. However, the authors assessed them as “imitation” of activism and highlighted that the state had shown little interest in the development of GBAO throughout the previous decades. On July 02, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the district chair of Shughnan district had handed over a tractor to a peasant on behalf of President Rahmon, promising an unprecedented development of agriculture in the district: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1057>. On July 07, 2022, Eurasianet published an article about the construction projects announced by the authorities in the context of the crackdown on civil society: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-banks-on-gbao-construction-boom-to-soothe-temperers>. On July 10, 2022, a Radio Ozodi article highlighted that investments

a Chinese company and with Chinese funding¹⁷⁴. In mid-June 2022, part of the security forces was withdrawn from GBAO¹⁷⁵, and in June 25, 2022, the internet connection was restored in the region¹⁷⁶. By the end of July 2022, the security forces seemed to have gained full control of the region and eliminated any potential for independent leadership and collective action¹⁷⁷.

into construction projects by the authorities had been common after previous phases of conflict and questioned whether the current promises of an economic boom would actually lead to sustainable development: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31936900.html>. On August 17, 2022, the international forum “Pamir Invest-2022” was held in Khorugh: <https://khorvar.tj/rus/2022/08/mezhdunarodnyj-forum-pamir-invest-2022-predstavlyaet-turisticheskij-potentsial-gbao/>, http://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20220818/v-forume-pamir-invest-2022-prinyali-uchastie-investori-iz-chetireh-stran?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. In this framework, a new governmental centre for support of businesspeople was opened: http://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20220826/vlasti-tadzhikistana-reshili-podderzhat-biznesmenov-gbao?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186. In November 2022, the authorities sent six tractors to Rushan district: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1450>. In December 2022, the reconstructed bridge to the main bazar was opened: <https://khorvar.tj/rus/2022/12/v-horoge-posle-rekonstruktsii-sdan-v-ekspluatatsiyu-peshehodnyj-most/>. In March 2023, buses for public transport were handed over to the Khorugh authorities: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1865>.

¹⁷⁴ On June 23, 2022, the Minister of Transport and the Governor of GBAO symbolically launched the start of the rehabilitation of the road from Kalaikhumb to Rushan, one of the sections of the Pamir Highway between Dushanbe to Khorugh which is in particularly bad condition: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1022>. An Eurasianet article drew attention to the chronological nexus between the crackdown on informal powerbrokers in GBAO and the launch of the Chinese road rehabilitation investment: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-as-dust-settles-on-pamir-conflict-chinese-roadworks-begin>. See also <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20221027/reabilitatsiya-klyuchevogo-uchastka-avtodorogi-dushanbe-horog-kulma-chto-sdelano-za-3-mesyatsa>. For other road construction projects in GBAO agreed upon between Tajikistan and China in March 2023, see <https://khorvar.tj/rus/2023/03/17-novyh-mostov-v-gbao-uskoryat-razvitie-vnutrennej-i-vneshnej-torgovli/>, <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20230328/kompaniya-china-road-obyzalas-postroit-avtodorozhnyyu-infrastrukturu-v-gbao>. For the progress of the road construction works, see https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20230529/azim-ibrohim-proinspektiroval-rekonstruktsiyu-samogo-opasnogo-uchastka-avtodorogi-dushanbe-kulma?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186.

¹⁷⁵ On June 14, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported a drastic reduction of the number of security forces at the checkpoints and a suspiciously passive traffic police avoiding any provocation: <https://t.me/pamirinside/975>. On June 15, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that more than 30 military trucks with soldiers had left GBAO over the previous three days and that soldiers, who had previously checked passengers’ luggage, had been withdrawn from the checkpoints between the districts in GBAO: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31899396.html>. On June 21, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that military forces were leaving GBAO and armed security officers were not placed at the intraurban checkpoints in Khorugh anymore: <https://t.me/anserenko/4614>.

¹⁷⁶ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31915028.html>. The internet connection had been blocked in GBAO partly since the dispersal of the protest in Khorugh on May 16, 2022, partly since the eve of the violent crackdown in Vamar (Rushan district) on May 18, 2022.

¹⁷⁷ On July 31, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko quoted a source in GBAO saying that youth leaders had either been detained or forced to leave the region, that the local population had no other options left to defend their rights but violent resistance, and that GBAO was fully under control of the security forces: <https://t.me/anserenko/4777>. In August 2022, preparations for a visit by President Rahmon to Khorugh on Independence Day were made: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31997901.html>, but the visit did not take place in the end. On the reasons for the cancelation of the trip to GBAO, see <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32203112.html>.

6. Continuing repression after summer 2022

6.1. Coerced return to “normality”

After gaining full control of GBAO and eliminating actual and potential power brokers, the authorities reinforced propaganda efforts¹⁷⁸, put basic efforts into rebuilding symbolic bridges between the state and the population of GBAO¹⁷⁹ and continued to demonstrate efforts to promote economic development¹⁸⁰. At the same time, they attempted to coerce the population of Khorugh to return to an imagined normality and artificially display happiness and folklore traditions¹⁸¹.

¹⁷⁸ On the exacerbated personality cult of President Rahmon in GBAO after the 2022 crackdown, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/827> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/831>. In June 2023, a series of propaganda events took place in GBAO under the slogan “Tajikistan is one – Badakhshan is its pearl”: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/06/tadzhikistan-edin-badakhshan-ego-zhemchuzhina-pod-takim-nazvaniem-v-horoge-proshla-nauchno-prakticheskaya-konferentsiya/>, <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/06/zamestitel-premer-ministra-respubliki-tadzhikistan-matlubahon-sattoriyon-vstretilas-s-soldatami-i-ofitserami-vojskovykh-chastej-horoga/>. In October 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova that in several spots of downtown Khorugh, public radio broadcasts were amplified through loudspeakers day and night: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1506> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1507>.

¹⁷⁹ After an avalanche had hit Khorugh on February 15, 2023, devastating parts of Shosh Khorugh neighbourhood and claiming 13 casualties, President Rahmon in a rare statement condoled the families of those who had been killed: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-avalanche-claims-13-lives-president-extends-condolences>. This was interpreted as an attempt to reach out to the population of GBAO again after the crackdown in summer 2022: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-avalanche-claims-13-lives-president-extends-condolences>.

¹⁸⁰ In August 2023, the annual Pamir Invest Forum took place in Khorugh: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/v-horoge-nachalsya-pervyj-mezhdunarodnyj-biznes-forum-g5/>, <https://pamirinside.org/pamirinvest-2023/>. The same month, President Rahmon reportedly opened various enterprises in Khorugh: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/glava-gosudarstva-emomali-rahmon-v-horoge-otkryl-predpriyatje-po-proizvodstvu-metallicheskih-konstruktsij/>, <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/glava-gosudarstva-emomali-rahmon-v-horoge-sdal-v-ekspluatatsiyu-predpriyatje-po-proizvodstvu-mebeli/>, <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/lider-natsii-emomali-rahmon-v-horoge-sdal-v-ekspluatatsiyu-predpriyatje-po-proizvodstvu-obuvi-i-oznakomilsya-s-vystavkoj-produktsij/>, <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/glava-gosudarstva-emomali-rahmon-v-horoge-dal-start-deyatelnosti-predpriyatija-po-proizvodstvu-stroitelnyh-kamnej-i-oznakomilsya-s-vystavkoj-produktsij-promyshlennyh-predpriyatij-gbao/>. In November 2023, the state news agency Khover reported the announcement of the construction of various manufacturing sites in Khorugh, alleging this was a result of the Pamir Invest Forum: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/11/gody-razvitiya-promyshlennosti-v-horoge-nachalos-stroitelstvo-neskolkih-proizvodstvennyh-predpriyatij/>. In November 2023, the Governor of GBAO opened a privately owned restaurant in Rushan district: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2417>. The same month, he and the governor of Sverdlovsk region (Russian Federation) signed a Memorandum of Understanding about cooperation in the fields of economic development: <https://pamirinside.org/гбао-и-свердловская-область-подписал>. In January 2024, the construction of various workshops and factories was announced in the framework of the visit of the Secretary of the National Security Council: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20240115/plani-po-razvitiyu-horoga-stroitelstvo-novih-predpriyatij-dlya-rosta-promishlennosti>.

¹⁸¹ On August 02, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the authorities were regularly coercing state employees and other dependent residents to sing and dance in front of delegations from other regions of Tajikistan: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1133>. On August 29, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that state employees were regularly forced to gather in the Khorugh stadium on Saturdays and do sports, to participate in “volunteer” activities to clean the town, and to attend concerts: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1227>. Before Independence Day, the authorities organized concerts frequently and coerced state employees, university students and employees of certain nongovernmental organizations to attend them. Those parts of the population who could not easily be coerced by the authorities tended to boycott the concerts, perceiving them as governmental propaganda. The authorities also organized various exhibitions to be recorded for regional TV, coercing employees of companies and organizations to attend, and, according to one source, prompted the mourning population to celebrate weddings. In December 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova published photos of a state-sponsored ceremony on occasion of the Day of Glaciers with apparently coerced participation in Khorugh: <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/12/v-horoge-sostoyalos-shestvie-v-solidarnost-ocherednoj-initsiative-prezidenta-tadzhikistana-emomali-rahmona/>. See also <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/749> and <https://t.me/pamirinside/1615>. On January 22, 2023, Sarkorova published a

In August 2023, President Rahmon visited Khorugh city and Roshtkala without mentioning the 2022 crackdown but avoided Rushan district¹⁸². Residents were allegedly forced to participate in events around the visit¹⁸³. The internet connection, though rehabilitated after the crackdown in May/June 2022, continued to be particularly slow in GBAO¹⁸⁴, and rising prices remained a concern¹⁸⁵.

6.2. Arbitrary law enforcement, unfair trials and imprisonment

At the same time, they also continued to intimidate and threaten residents in more subtle ways¹⁸⁶. The arbitrariness of law enforcement in GBAO continued and residents were reportedly interrogated, fined and detained under various pretexts. This was possibly, at least in part, a result of the disproportionate concentration of security forces interested in extracting fines and bribes¹⁸⁷. The security forces gradually

video of a visit of GBAO Governor Alisher Mirzonabot together with the head of the Department of the Interior in GBAO in the village of Savnob (Rushan district) on August 06, 2022, shortly after the crackdown in Vamar, with residents welcoming them as guests and dancing in front of them: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/809>. For the context of the video, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/807>. In March 2023, the state-sponsored Navruz celebration was held in Bar Khorugh neighbourhood of Khorugh which had played a key role in the 2022 crackdown: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1097>. In May 2023, the Evening of Youth was held: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2084>. In September 2023, Independence Day was celebrated in Khorugh with residents being coerced to participate: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1441>. In November 2023, the President's Day (<https://t.me/pamirinside/2410>) and the Day of the Flag (<https://khovar.tj/rus/2023/11/den-gosudarstvennogo-flaga-v-horoge-otmetili-prazdnichnym-shestviem/>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/2431>) were celebrated with parades.

¹⁸² A visit to Rushan district had originally been planned but was cancelled at short notice, allegedly because of rumours about a planned mourning and protest event: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32557277.html>, <https://pamirinside.org/визит-рахмона-в-гбао-что-не-показали-по>. According to the reports, the visits to Khorugh city and Roshtkala district took place under conditions of animosity of the local population and heavy security measures. For the President's speech in Khorugh on August 18, 2023, see <http://www.president.tj/ru/node/31346>. For a summary of the speech, see <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20230818/emomali-rahmon-bolee-23-milliardov-somoni-investirovani-v-gbao-za-30-let>. For a summary and an analysis of the visit, see <https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/08/21/emomali-rahmon-gbao-visit/>.

¹⁸³ On August 15, 2023, Pamir Inside reported that according to several sources in Khorugh, the State Committee for National Security coerced threatened and pressured residents to participate in events surrounding the visit of the President in order to create the impression of a friendly population: <https://pamirinside.org/rakhmon-in-gbao-2023/>. Similarly on August 18, 2023: <https://pamirinside.org/визит-рахмона-в-гбао-что-не-показали-по>. According to journalist Anora Sarkorova, Governor Alisher Mirzonabot threatened residents with criminal prosecution if they did not participate in events, and relatives of political prisoners were under surveillance during the President's visit: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1430>. Official pictures of the main event with the speech of the President show an indifferent and stony-faced audience: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/khadamotimatbuot/albums/72177720310561222/with/53124326311/>.

¹⁸⁴ <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20231026/vlasti-v-gbao-zhaluyutsya-na-plohu-yu-svyaz-i-internet>.

¹⁸⁵ <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/20231101/v-gbao-obespokoeni-rostom-tsen-na-toplivo-i-vvozom-v-region-nekachestvennogo-benzina>. Specifically about the prices of public transport: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20231109/posle-povisheniya-tsen-na-toplivo-tsen-na-proezda-v-gbao-viroslo>.

¹⁸⁶ On June 21, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko reported that state officials were promising that internet access would soon be provided again but also warned residents that they should not write anything unnecessary in social media to avoid prosecution: <https://t.me/anserenko/4614>. On August 22, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that Governor Mirzonabot was intimidating residents in the framework of his visits to villages, threatening them with a repetition of the violent crackdown in Vamar in case they spoke out and complained openly: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/423>. On November 7, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that according to official sources, in more than 300 cases within nine months, parents had been fined for alleged misdemeanour of their underage children like night walks or use of mobile phones: <https://pamirinside.org/в-гбао-оштрафованы-триста-человек-яко>. On January 12, 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that the chair of the secretary of the Security Council of Tajikistan had accompanied GBAO Governor Alisher Mirzonabot in visiting various small enterprises in GBAO: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/803>.

¹⁸⁷ For example, on May 23, 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that parents had been arbitrarily fined because their children had been in Khorugh City Park at daytime: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1329>. She explained this

targeted new categories of people for prosecution¹⁸⁸. Even if they did not lead to imprisonment, criminal convictions led to the de facto exclusion from public life and the labour market.

On occasion of the first anniversary of the May 2022 events and afterwards, the authorities interfered with the traditional commemoration ceremonies and burial rites and coerced residents to abdicate any signs of mourning and commemoration¹⁸⁹.

Those detained during the purges in May and June 2022 were sentenced to long prison terms one after another on mostly fabricated charges, often in trials behind closed doors¹⁹⁰. As a result, a significant share of the male population of GBAO, in particular of Khorugh city and Rushan district, were imprisoned¹⁹¹. Pamiri prisoners were often imprisoned far away from GBAO, and conditions of imprisonment were described as

arbitrariness with the high density of the security forces in Khorugh, their low salaries and impunity which incentivized them to use the threat of criminal prosecution to extract bribes. In February 2024, Pamir Inside reported that in spite of an extremely low level of criminality in GBAO, the police were pressured to achieve quantitative targets defined from above and to open new criminal cases: <https://pamirinside.org/глава-умвд-по-гбао-заявил-о-снижении-ур->

¹⁸⁸ For example, in February 2024 journalist Anora Sarkorova reported about a Pamiri scholar against whom a criminal case based on Article 307 (1) of the Criminal Code had been opened: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1600>.

¹⁸⁹ According to journalist Anora Sarkorova, the deputy governor of GBAO warned residents of Rushan district on May 16, 2023, not to hold any ceremonies or other actions in commemoration of those killed on May 18, 2022, warning them that the families of the fatalities were under permanent surveillance by the State Committee for National Security: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1268>. On May 23, 2023, Sarkorova reported that residents of Rushan district were threatened with criminal prosecution in case they placed gravestones or prayed at the graves of the victims: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1331>. On May 31, 2023, Sarkorova reported that State Committee for National Security officers had removed the gravestone of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov at nighttime: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1348>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1346>. Probably to avoid similar issues with the commemoration of victims of state violence, the authorities in May 2023 issued new regulations according to which the bodies of alleged terrorists and people killed during so-called “anti-terrorist operations” should not be submitted to their relatives, but be buried anonymously in secret places: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32422208.html>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1335>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1336>. For a summary, see https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2837. In September 2023, Sarkorova reported that security officers in Rushan district had threatened residents with criminal prosecution and torture to coerce them to refrain from wearing mourning and delete commemoration posts on social media: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1444>.

¹⁹⁰ For example, two members of the “Commission of 44” – Shaftolu Bekdavlatov and Khujamir Pirnazarov – were sentenced to 18 years in prison on June 29, 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31922829.html>. Regarding the legal flaws in their process, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/211> and <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/23/tajikistan-autonomous-region-protesters-denied-fair-trials>. For a comprehensive synopsis of publicly available information on detentions and sentences, see the appendix. On February 16, 2023, the Head of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan, Shermukhammad Shokhiyon, confirmed that trials in 109 cases related to the GBAO events had been treated as secret and taken place behind closed doors: <https://ru.azda.tv/v-vierkhovnom-sudie-podtvierdili-zakliucheniie-sotien-badakhshantsiev/>, <https://pamirinside.org/vsrtpodtverdil-yaklzuchenit-pamircev/>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/998>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1005>. For an analysis of the overly broad definition of terrorism in Tajikistani legislation and its negative impact on due process, e.g. due to closed trials, see the analysis by UN experts in January 2023: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gld=27787>.

¹⁹¹ In January 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova published photos of the lists of prisoners in remand prisons and of food delivered to them by their relatives: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/848>. For context information on the photos, see <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/845> and <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/851>. For countrywide statistics on terrorism and extremism charges in 2022, see <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230329/genprokuror-v-2022-godu-97-chelovek-ekstradirovani-v-tadzhikistan>.

harsh¹⁹². While rumours about an imminent release of a certain numbers of prisoners from Rushan district spread in December 2023,¹⁹³ no such release actually materialized.

In many cases, real estate, vehicles and smartphones of detainees were confiscated by security officials and used for private purposes¹⁹⁴.

The electronic and in-person surveillance infrastructure in Khorugh and the villages of GBAO was reinforced¹⁹⁵. The continuing reinforcement of the security infrastructure in Khorugh was reflected in the construction of new or additional buildings for various security agencies¹⁹⁶.

6.3. Crackdown on the organizations of the Aga Khan Development Network

During and after the civil war of the 1990s, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) played a key role in (re)building and maintaining infrastructure in the fields of education, health, microfinance, energy and water supply, disaster relief, community development etc., eventually providing public services which are usually provided by states¹⁹⁷.

After the crackdown on civil society in summer 2022, the authorities gradually ousted the organizations affiliated to the AKDN from GBAO and dismantled facilities established by them¹⁹⁸. In many cases, they used

¹⁹² Catering in detention facilities is so bad that prisoners usually depend on their relatives or acquaintances supporting them with food. In August 2023, Pamir Inside reported that prisoners had had to submit their own bank cards and had been given other bank cards which they could not monitor: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2254>.

¹⁹³ <https://bomdodrus.com/2023/12/25/menjaetsja-politika-opublikovan-spisok-42-osvobozhdennyh-iz-tjuresh-rushancev/>.

¹⁹⁴ This was reported by journalist Anora Sarkorova in February 2023: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/877>. According to her, in many cases the property of detainees was confiscated by police, state attorney or State Committee for National Security officials immediately after detention, without waiting for a trial and sentence. Vehicles were used privately by the same state officials or their relatives. The GBAO state attorney reportedly traded with confiscated vehicles: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/876>. A government source mentioned the confiscation of 39 vehicles by mid-June 2022: <https://khover.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-soobshhaet-polnostyu-prekrashhena-deyatelnost-organizovannyh-terroristicheskikh-grupp-na-territorii-gbao/>. In October 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that real estate owned by a relative of imprisoned Tolib Ayombekov had been confiscated by the city of Khorugh and a hotel was expected to be opened in the premises: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1503>. In November 2023, Pamir Inside reported that a house which had belonged to Tolib Ayombekov had been torn down: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2421>. It is unclear whether both pieces of news refer to the same building.

¹⁹⁵ According to Pamir Daily News, in March 2023 surveillance cameras in the framework of the project “Safe city” were activated in Khorugh, based on Chinese technology and the example of a similar project in Dushanbe: <https://pamirinside.org/bezopasniy-gorod-khorog/>. In February 2024, journalist Anora Sarkorova published eyewitness accounts about how security officers tried to intimidate villagers into cooperation to recruit them as spies, and checked the mobile phones of students of Khorugh State University for illegal social media activities: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1591>.

¹⁹⁶ Two buildings of agencies under the Ministry of the Interior were opened in Khorugh in August 2023: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/08/dlya-sotrudnikov-pravoohranitelnyh-organov-v-horoge-otkryli-novye-obekty/>. Various buildings in the military base in Khorugh, allegedly providing space for 500 soldiers, were opened in December 2023: <https://khover.tj/rus/2023/12/v-horoge-dlya-ofitserov-i-soldat-sdana-v-ekspluatatsiyu-sovremennaya-kazarma/>.

¹⁹⁷ See Stanislawski 2008; Mostowlansky 2018; Aksenova 2022; Mostowlansky 2022.

¹⁹⁸ For a summary on the pressure on institutions affiliated to the Aga Khan, see <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-government-puts-the-squeeze-on-aga-khan-linked-entities> (July 2022), <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-picks-winners-in-pamir-investment-drive> (August 2022), <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-steps-up-nationalization-campaign-against-aga-khan-operation> (July 2023), <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-crackdown-gorno-badakhshan-properties-aga-khan/32520966.html> (July 2023), <https://www.iphonline.org/tajikistan-suppressing-critical-voices.html> (September 2023). On the worsening of the attitude of Tajikistan to the AKDN from October 2021 onward, see <https://pamirinside.org/принц-рахим-ага-хан-встретился-с-главо>. In December 2022, Prince Rahim Aga Khan met with Tajikistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris: <https://t.me/orientalreviewAK/2722>. AKDN did not comment publicly on the crackdown: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32518299.html>.

alleged irregularities in the transfer of property as a pretext to confiscate premises used by organizations affiliated to the AKDN¹⁹⁹. They used audits to put pressure on major enterprises established with the support of the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED)²⁰⁰. In the field of education, two kindergartens were closed²⁰¹, the renowned Aga Khan Lyceum in Khorugh lost its license²⁰², and the further operation of the Khorugh campus of the University of Central Asia was put into question by demands to return the land

¹⁹⁹ In November 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the buildings of the Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), the Mountain Societies Rural Development Programme (MSDSP), the Aga Khan Agency for Habitat and the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) would be confiscated, as well as land allotted for the construction of a Serena Hotel: <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>.

²⁰⁰ In July 2022, the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) and the mobile operator Tcell, were targeted for surprise audits: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-puts-the-squeeze-on-aga-khan-linked-entities>. The Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED) had made major contributions to the establishment of both entities and was the most important shareholder: <https://fmfb.tj/en/shareholders/>, <https://www.akdn.org/publication/aga-khan-fund-economic-development-tcell-tajikistan>. On January 13, 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that the energy provider Pamir Energy, which had also been established with AKFED support, had been forced after state audits to cut the salaries of their employees: <https://pamirinside.org/зарплаты-сотрудников-энергетической>. Pamir Energy later denied that an audit had been the reason of the salary cuts: <https://pamirinside.org/компания-памир-энерджи-опровергла>. On February 06, 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that the security forces had extorted a huge amount of money from AKFED's mobile operator Tcell: <https://pamirinside.org/lycei-aga-khana-mogut-zakryt/>.

²⁰¹ In November 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the two early childhood development centres established by the Aga Khan Education Services (AKES) might be closed: <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>. In February 2023, it was reported that they had actually been closed: <https://pamirinside.org/lycei-aga-khana-mogut-zakryt/>.

²⁰² The Aga Khan Lyceum in downtown Khorugh, which had offered Tajik, Russian and English classes, had been highly renowned and popular as the best primary and secondary school in GBAO. In July 2022, it was reported that the Ministry of Education had revoked the license of the Aga Khan Lyceum: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1117>. These reports proved to be inaccurate but the school was pressured to make changes in its identity and curriculum: <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>. On February 06, 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that the authorities had finally decided to close the Aga Khan Lyceum by the end of the school year: <https://pamirinside.org/lycei-aga-khana-mogut-zakryt/>. In May 2023, it was reported that the school was about to be closed: https://t.me/pamirnews_24/720. Its license was actually cancelled and the Aga Khan Lyceum ceased functioning on 30 June 2023 and the premises would be used for a regular secondary school: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2175>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32488890.html>, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-steps-up-nationalization-campaign-against-aga-khan-operation>. The Ministry of Education later alleged that the Aga Khan Lyceum had not paid enough attention to the teaching of Tajik language: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32529378.html>, <https://pamirinside.org/akl-khorog-closing-reasons/>, <https://asiaplustj.info/news/tajikistan/society/20230801/v-minobrnauki-tadzhikistana-soobtshili-pochemu-bil-zakrit-litsei-aga-hana-v-horoge>. On August 25, 2023, the new director of the school, who had been appointed by the local authorities, alleged that the school fees and the salaries of the teachers would not be changed: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230825/u-bivshego-litseya-aga-hana-v-horoge-novii-direktor>

plot to the state²⁰³. The Aga Khan Medical Centre, which had provided affordable quality healthcare, was confiscated²⁰⁴, as well as the Khorugh City Park²⁰⁵ and the Serena Hotel in Khorugh²⁰⁶.

The crackdown on the organizations and enterprises affiliated to the AKDN did not only have severe economic effects²⁰⁷, but also had a dramatic psychological impact. It destroyed the hope for a better future of the Pamiri communities in GBAO which had been crucially linked to the presence of AKDN and the relatively high quality of public services it provided. In particular, considering the educational aspirations which many parents in GBAO used to have for their children, the closing of the kindergartens and the Aga Khan Lyceum was perceived as a catastrophic signal.

6.4. Pressure on civil society organizations and media

Pressure on media and detentions of journalists and bloggers in Tajikistan continued to increase in Tajikistan as a whole²⁰⁸. The internet portal Pamir Daily News (the predecessor of Pamir Inside) emerged as a key

²⁰³ In July 2023, it was reported that the General Prosecutor's office in GBAO had appealed to the Supreme Economic Court of Tajikistan to cancel the purchase of the land plots above Barkhorugh on which the UCA campus was expected to be built in several phases: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32508162.html>. According to the Radio Ozodi article, security forces attempted to put pressure on former residents of the area who had sold their land plots in the late 1990s to AKDN, encouraging them to file complaints. The court ordered the confiscation of the land: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230808/ekonomicheskii-sud-obyasnil-izyatie-zemli-universiteta-tsentralnoi-azii-v-horoge>. The UCA appealed: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32537664.html>. The High Economic Court declined the appeal in February 2024: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32810452.html>.

²⁰⁴ On January 13, 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that the Aga Khan Medical Centre had been forced after state audits to cut the salaries of its employees: <https://pamirinside.org/зарплаты-сотрудников-энергетической>. In May 2023, it was reported that the Aga Khan Medical Centre in Bar Khorugh was about to be confiscated by the authorities and to be transformed into a military hospital: https://t.me/pamirnews_24/675. The increasing pressure on the medical centre was also reflected by the fact that the GKNB could enforce the use of its morgue: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2008>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/2010>. On October 09, 2023, Pamir Inside reported that the Aga Khan Medical Centre had been officially closed by the authorities: <https://pamirinside.org/nationalisation-of-the-aga-khan-medical-centre-in-khorog/>. This was denied by the Aga Khan Medical Centre: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2345>. On October 14, 2023, Radio Ozodi reported that a court process to nationalize the Aga Khan Medical Centre had begun upon request by the General Prosecutor's office: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32637347.html>.

²⁰⁵ In August 2022, Pamir Daily News and Radio Ozodi reported that the authorities had nationalized Khorugh City Park: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1159> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31982227.html>. The plot of land in downtown Khorugh had been gifted to the Aga Khan in 2003. The Aga Khan Trust for Culture had subsequently redesigned and rehabilitated the park as a public space and recreational area: <https://www.akdn.org/where-we-work/central-asia/tajikistan/cultural-development/khorog-park>. The Aga Khan had inaugurated it in 2009: <https://www.akdn.org/speech/his-highness-aga-khan/inauguration-khorog-city-park>. In November 2022, Pamir Daily News reported about rumours that after considering the high running costs of the park, the authorities had decided to leave it to the Aga Khan Trust for Culture: <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>.

²⁰⁶ In June 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that the Serena hotel in Khorugh, which had belonged to an AKFED company, had been taken over by the GBAO authorities: <https://pamirinside.org/отель-serena-khorog-принадлежавшая-фонду-ара-х/>. See also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32461960.html>.

²⁰⁷ According to an estimate of an anonymous employee of an AKDN-affiliated organization quoted by Eurasianet, it led to the loss of an estimated 300 relatively well-paid jobs: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-steps-up-nationalization-campaign-against-aga-khan-operation>.

²⁰⁸ On June 16, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that the two well-known bloggers Daler Imomali and Abdullo Gurbati had been detained: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31900640.html>. For overviews over their cases, see <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-citizen-journalists-targeted-by-relentless-repression-machine> and <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31913995.html>. On July 04, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that security forces had seized the mobile phones of three civil society activists (two of whom were natives of GBAO) without any legal proceedings and were able to check their correspondence: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31928534.html>. In July 2022, two bloggers Sabkibek Saidamin and Abdusattor Pirmukhammadzod were arrested who had criticized the detention of other bloggers: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31940357.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/chtvo-izvestno-o-massovyh-zaderzhaniyah->

provider of independent information on events in GBAO before and during the crackdown and had thus been targeted by the authorities²⁰⁹. In June 2023, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan, upon request by the General Prosecutor's office, declared Pamir Daily News to be an extremist organization and banned its work inside Tajikistan²¹⁰.

As well, the authorities closed non-governmental organizations or used financial audits and intimidation tactics to force them to self-liquidate²¹¹. This seemed to be part of a comprehensive, country-wide crackdown on political opponents²¹², civil society and suppression of civic initiative²¹³.

6.5. Transnational repression

Transnational repression continued, even outside of the post-Soviet space. In April 2023, one Pamiri activist in Europe reported that a criminal case had been opened against him in Tajikistan under the pretext that he

zhurnalstov-i-blogerov-kritikuyuschih-vlasti-tadzhikistana/31944420.html, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31945525.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31946255.html>. On August 22, 2022, Radio Ozodi reported that the criminal investigation in the case of Daler Imomali had been finished: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31998964.html>. On August 30, 2022, Jamie Fly, the CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), addressed President Rahmon in a letter and criticized "the recent wave of harassment and intimidation" of Radio Ozodi journalists, which had increased after the May 2022 crackdown in GBAO: <https://docs.rferl.org/en-Press/2022/08/31/08790000-0a00-0242-bf96-08da8b6107a3.pdf>. On May 03, 2023, Radio Ozodi published a comprehensive article about detained journalists and the background of their detentions: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/tajik-imprisoned-journalists/32391308.html>. Reporters without Borders addressed the increasing pressure on journalist and the censorship on issues related to GBAO in its 2023 report: <https://rsf.org/en/country/tajikistan>.

²⁰⁹ On June 17, 2022, the online portal Pamir Daily News reported that they had received indirect warnings from the Tajikistani security agencies alleging that they had got funding from abroad and were biased against the authorities in their coverage: <https://t.me/pamirinside/999>.

²¹⁰ The decision by the Supreme Court was made public by the General Prosecutor's office in July 2023: <https://prokuratura.tj/news-tj/2230-fa-oliyati-tashkiloti-pamir-daily-news-dar-ududi-to-ikiston-man-karda-shud.html>. It was subsequently reported by media: <https://pamirinside.org/верховный-суд-таджикистана-объявил-памир/>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32510526.html>, <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20230720/pamir-daily-news-priznan-v-tadzhikistane-ekstremistskim-izdaniem>. Pamir Daily News was subsequently rebranded as Pamir Inside: <https://t.me/pamirinside/2214>. The ban was criticized by the Committee to Protect Journalists: <https://cpj.org/2023/07/tajikistan-bans-pamir-daily-news-as-extremist-organization/>.

²¹¹ In GBAO, where a particular high number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had been registered, the authorities conducted audits to increase pressure and summoned NGO leaders for interrogation, recommending them to close their organizations voluntarily. In February 2023, the Dushanbe-based Independent Centre of the Protection of Human Rights, which had advocated against torture, was closed by a court decision upon recommendation of the Ministry of Justice: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32275719.html>. In May 2023, Radio Ozodi, reported that the pressure on NGOs had increased and that according to five anonymous interlocutors, they had been forced to self-liquidate their NGOs: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32402151.html>. As well, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief reported forced self-liquidation of NGOs after a visit to Tajikistan:

<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/religion/SR-FORB-CV-Tajikistan-EOM-Statement.docx>, p. 8. On August 08, 2023, Radio Ozodi referring to the Ministry of Justice, reported that five NGOs in GBAO had been closed by the authorities on the basis of court orders: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32538999.html>. For a summary of the (self-)liquidation of NGOs in Tajikistan in general, and in GBAO in particular, see <https://www.iphronline.org/tajikistan-suppressing-critical-voices.html>. In December 2023, the head of the EU delegation in Tajikistan criticized that 700 NGOs had ceased functioning: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32725906.html>.

²¹² Seven years after the oppositional Party of Islamic Renaissance had been prohibited in Tajikistan in 2015, the Tajikistani authorities were successful in lobbying the Russian authorities to declare the party a terrorist organization in July 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31959883.html>.

²¹³ Interviewees of Radio Ozodi interpreted the systematic detention and intimidation of journalists and bloggers as part of an effort by the authorities to silence civil society and suppress any civic initiative in the context of the imminent transition of power: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31916847.html>. Bruce Pannier expressed a similar view: <https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/31950885.html>. For a summary on the repression of media, see <https://cabar.asia/en/tajikistan-a-new-round-of-repression-of-media>.

had taken part in a protest event in Berlin²¹⁴. Other Pamiri activists in exile received messages encouraging them to voluntary return to Tajikistan and threatening them with forced return²¹⁵. Transnational repression affected two outspoken Pamiri journalists in exile, Anora Sarkorova and Rustami Joni²¹⁶. The cooperation of Tajikistani security agencies with security agencies in the Russian Federation aimed at detaining and forcibly returning Pamiri activists to Tajikistan continued.²¹⁷

Security forces frequently harassed and detained relatives inside Tajikistan in order to exert pressure on Pamiri activists in exile²¹⁸. At the same time, in the framework of recruitment campaigns, pressure was put on male youth from GBAO to return to Tajikistan and serve in the army²¹⁹.

²¹⁴ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32367503.html>.

²¹⁵ In July, journalist Anora Sarkorova published screenshots of such messages by a police officer under a fake name: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1411>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1412>.

²¹⁶ On June 27, 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova, who is a native of GBAO but lives in Europe, informed the public that the security forces were putting indirect pressure on her by summoning her relatives in Tajikistan for interrogation or taking them into custody (as happened to her mother and brother on June 27, 2022): <https://t.me/pamirinside/1030>, <https://www.facebook.com/anora.sarkor>. This pressure continued in July 2022: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/357>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/358>. On January 7, 2023, Sarkorova published two threatening messages by Gholib Niyatbekov, an advisor of GBAO Governor Alisher Mirzonabot to herself and her husband Rustami Joni: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/785>. In February 2023, a criminal case based on Article 307 of the Criminal Code was opened against Joni, and both his and Sarkorova's relatives in Tajikistan were intimidated: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32286840.html>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1101>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1102>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32333884.html>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1104>. On May 21, 2023, Sarkorova reported that friends and relatives of Joni and hers in Tajikistan had been pressured by the authorities to publish social media posts discrediting her: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1319>. At the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference in October 2023, U.S. Michael G. Kozak mentioned the cases: <https://osce.usmission.gov/warsaw-human-dimension-conference-plenary-session-2-fundamental-freedoms-i/>. In February 2024, Sarkorova's mother was reportedly informed about a criminal case against Sarkorova in Tajikistan: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1557>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32802740.html>.

²¹⁷ In February 2024, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported about a list with around 30 names of Pamiri activists whose forcible return the Tajikistani authorities had allegedly requested from the Russian Federation: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1564>. Equally in February 2024, the independent Russian news portal Mediazona published the wanted list of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation: <https://en.zona.media/article/2024/02/13/wanted>. It included the names of various Pamiris activists and journalists, among them Anora Sarkorova and Rustami Joni (Rustamjon Joniev) and several members of Tolib Ayombekov's family.

²¹⁸ In October 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that the grandmother and aunt of Musharafidin Rzvonshev, a Pamiri activist, had been summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security, intimidating and trying to pressure them to convince Rzvonshev to return to Tajikistan and surrender to the authorities. According to Sarkorova, such summonses of relatives were common but were rarely made public for fear of retribution: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1508>. Pressure on relatives inside Tajikistan was a general mass phenomenon after Tajikistani activists in exile had protested against President Rahmon's visit in Berlin in October 2023: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32622241.html>, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/06/tajikistan-exiled-activists-relatives-detained-over-protest>. Such pressure against relatives in Tajikistan to silence activists in exile is common, as reported by Eurasianet: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-authorities-use-relatives-as-pawns-against-exiled-activists>.

²¹⁹ Political persecution and lack of economic perspectives had forced significant parts of the male youth to leave GBAO. At the same time, military service was abysmally unpopular due to the bad conditions in the army but the GBAO authorities have strong incentives to fulfil the recruitment plan to show their loyalty to the central government. As a result, during the spring 2023 recruitment campaign, state officials in GBAO pressured residents with threats of criminal cases and dismissal from their jobs to coerce male youth to return to Tajikistan and serve in the army, as reported by journalist Anora Sarkorova: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1062>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1064>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1065>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1070>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1122>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1123>, <https://pamirinside.org/priyivniki-khorog-ugroyz/>. Sarkorova also reported the case of one participant of a protest event who was given the choice between imprisonment and military service: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1116>. A similar recruitment campaign followed in autumn 2023: <https://pamirinside.org/в-хороге-впервые-за-30-лет-началась-обла>, <https://pamirinside.org/гбао-в-первый-день-сообщил-о-выполнении>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1449>.

6.6. Anti-Pamiri and other propaganda narratives

When high-ranking representatives of the Government of Tajikistan were asked critical questions by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in April 2023, they outright denied the existence of Pamiris as a distinct group and presented the narrative of rampant crime and lawlessness in GBAO to justify the crackdown²²⁰. Shortly afterwards, the killing of unidentified individuals by security forces in Yazgulom valley (Vanj district)²²¹ was presented as evidence of crime and terrorism in GBAO by the authorities²²².

In social media, fake narratives of the crackdown in summer 2022 were circulated²²³. The campaign of re-naming toponyms in summer 2023 affected extraordinarily many toponyms in Murghab district of GBAO²²⁴.

6.7. Mysterious deaths of security officers and state officials

Throughout 2023, various state officials and security officers were killed or injured in GBAO, several of whom had played a role in the 2021/22 crackdown. In April 2023, the head of GKNB in Khorugh city, who had taken part in the GBAO crackdown, died under mysterious circumstances, allegedly in Porshinev village²²⁵. In July 2023, the head of the Department for Youth and Sports of GBAO died, probably by drowning in Gunt river²²⁶.

²²⁰ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/experts-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-commend-tajikistan-improved>. For comprehensive documentation of the UN CERD session, see https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2647&Lang=en.

²²¹ During a so-called “special operation” of security forces in Yazgulom gorge on April 25-26, 2023, at least two unidentified persons were killed under suspicious circumstances: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1955>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1957>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1961>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1963>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1964>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1176>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1180>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1182>. The authorities framed the incident as fight against terrorists who had allegedly crossed the border illegally: <https://khovar.tj/2023/04/iz-oroti-markazi-robita-oi-amiyatii-kumitai-davlatii-amniyati-millii-um-urii-to-ikiston/?fbclid=IwAR2JuiUeHluGifxMyIPSO9dfaRox34ne2yELg-6uYzKJVUIrGju1KHdIHmQ>. In early-May 2023, the authorities mustered men in Khorugh for unknown reasons: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1216>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1217>, <https://t.me/anserenko/6016>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1993>.

²²² A vague statement by the head of the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan at a CIS conference seemed to confirm the extension of the concept of “terrorism” by the Tajikistani security agencies and their efforts to tie it to external influences: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32732150.html>.

²²³ In August 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that one social media account was spreading the absurd narrative that protesters in Rushan district in May 2022 had been impacted by pills sent by exiled oppositional politician Alim Sherzamonov: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1420>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1419>.

²²⁴ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32533129.html>, <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230822/v-tadzhikistane-pereimenovali-bolee-treh-tisyach-geograficheskikh-obektov>, <https://pamirinside.org/renaming-tajikistan-murgab/>.

²²⁵ Komron Rajabekzoda, the head of the GKNB branch in Khorugh city, died under suspicious circumstances on April 27-28, 2023, allegedly in Porshinev village north of Khorugh: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1183>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1184>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1185>, <https://t.me/anserenko/5997>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1967>. The authorities presented his death as the result of an alleged shootout with drug traffickers: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2023/04/6pogranichnyj-otryad-horog-upravleniya-pogranichnyh-vojsk-gknb-rt-po-gbao-soobshhaet/>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32383312.html>. It is unclear why a high-ranking GKNB officer should have been present during a spontaneous shootout at night outside of his area of responsibility. Rajabekzoda had been involved in the crackdown in GBAO in 2022: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1974>, <https://t.me/pamirinside/1978>.

²²⁶ On July 25, 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported the death of Yusuf Asadbekov, the head of the Department for Youth and Sports of GBAO, mentioning suicide as one of the explanations: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1408>. The following day, she alleged a long-standing conflict between Asadbekov and a deputy mayor of Khorugh: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1410>.

In October 2023, the head of police in Roshtkala district, who allegedly had taken part in the killing of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov, was severely injured by an attacker at night²²⁷.

²²⁷ <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1495>. Saidjafar Ikromzoda had been appointed as head of police in Roshtkala district in November 2021, shortly before Ziyobekov's killing: <https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/informatsiya/novosti-arkhiv/32813-ta-in-gardidani-yak-zumra-kadr-o-ba-vazifa-oi-mas-ulu-ro-barikunandai-vkd-2>.

7. Long-term trends: Imposed homogenization and suppression of cultural pluralism

Following the tradition of Soviet ethnic policies, Pamiris are not recognized as a distinguished ethnic group by the Tajikistani state, in its legislation and by its census²²⁸. Instead, they are counted as Tajiks. The crackdown in May and June 2022 took place against the background of a long-term trend of imposed nation building and cultural homogenization. It showed expression in the suppression of Pamiri language, culture and identity, increased power projection by the central government of Tajikistan in nominally autonomous GBAO, arrogance, corruption of Tajik officials and security personnel deployed to GBAO. This fostered the perception that the crackdown was directed at the Pamiris as a linguistic and religious minority.

7.1. Suppression of Pamiri languages

The Pamiri languages²²⁹ remained excluded from local schools and local media in GBAO during the Soviet period and after independence. While the main teaching language was Tajik²³⁰, children and teachers continued to use Pamiri languages for out-of-class communication at schools. In the last decade this has also been discouraged by the authorities²³¹, based on an ambiguous language legislation²³².

The only regional state TV channel “Badakhshan” broadcasted part of its programme in Pamiri languages after independence. Since the 2010s, it has been broadcasting exclusively in Tajik language. When an interviewee speaks any of the Pamiri languages, it is dubbed in Tajik²³³. After the November 2021 protests, the TV channel degraded into a propaganda tool of the Tajik security agencies. Propaganda videos and coerced defamatory or self-incriminating statements of GBAO residents have dominated the content ever

²²⁸ For example, in the report submitted by Tajikistan in 2020 on the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) submitted by Tajikistan, Pamiris are not mentioned as an ethnic group:

<https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPrICAqhKb7yhsvxV2thnzKtUuUIhXksn5JrJVN%2FFsaQ2TqmkOeo%2B20ugdUSzsugljNu%2F%2FopjXd%2BOGhQOv2IPusUoHxhXLDuI0mBPdU9AerVrlg9Ffs6jmw>. In the meeting of the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in April 2023, the representatives of Tajikistan alleged that the Pamiris were not considered as a minority because they were “true Tajiks”: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/experts-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-commend-tajikistan-improved>.

²²⁹ Pamiri languages include Shughni, Rushani, Bartangi, Wakhi and others which are spoken in Tajikistan (GBAO), Afghanistan (Badakhshan province), China (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) and Pakistan (Chitral district). The authorities of Tajikistan try to reframe Pamiri languages as “Badakhshani languages”, disconnecting them from a broader Pamiri identity: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/804>.

²³⁰ In some cases, teaching was in Russian.

²³¹ An unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in early 2022 mentioned that according to several parents, “their children had been told not to speak in or use Pamiri languages in school”.

²³² The Law on the State Language was adopted in 2009 and defines Tajik as the state language:

<http://www.kumitaizabon.tj/ru/content/zakon-respubliki-tadzhikistan-o-gosudarstvennom-yazyke-respubliki-tadzhikistan>. It explicitly does not regulate the use of language in private communication (Art. 1 par. 2, Art. 4 par. 1) but stipulates the use of Tajik language in the political, social, economic, scientific and cultural spheres (Art. 3 par. 5). Pamiri languages are explicitly mentioned in Art. 4 par. 2 according to which the authorities should provide conditions for their use, protection and development. The law allows exceptions for the use of other languages in the spheres of education (Art. 8 par. 2-3) and media (Art. 12) which the authorities could theoretically make use of to tolerate a wider use of Pamiri languages.

²³³ This was mentioned in an unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in early 2022. Broadcasts in one of the Pamiri languages by a radio station were discontinued in 2014 upon request by the authorities: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-pamir-gun-amnesty-masks-underlying-unease>. On the absence of local or regional media in Pamiri languages, see <https://t.me/rustamijoni/410>.

since. Civil society activists working on the revival and popularization of Pamiri languages were detained and sentenced in the framework of the 2022 crackdown²³⁴.

Whereas the use of Pamiri languages in state institutions had already been prohibited before, it was increasingly restricted in public spaces in Khorugh as well from early 2023 onward²³⁵.

7.2. Suppression of Ismaili religion and Pamiri culture

There are different layers of assimilation and suppression of cultural pluralism. Political and cultural indoctrination in schools and legislation on education is aimed at assimilating youth into an imagined Tajikistani mainstream culture²³⁶, suppressing pluralism and critical thinking. Coercion of adults to read out statements contradicting their actual opinion and incriminating their neighbours have a similar effect of suppressing pluralism and critical thinking. The same applies to the countrywide smear campaign after the November 2021 protests which depicted natives of GBAO as terrorists and criminals.

The majority of natives of GBAO identifies as Ismaili Shiites and consider the Aga Khan as their spiritual leader. Since his first visit to GBAO in the 1990ies, the Aga Khan has built religious institutions and secular development organizations in GBAO and undertaken efforts to socialize the Ismailis of GBAO into the global Ismaili community.

For recent years, there were reports about the suspicion of the authorities towards and increasing state control of Ismaili institutions²³⁷, as well as comprehensive surveillance of places of prayer, worship and

²³⁴ In particular, two activists – Muzaffar Mubarakshoev and the blogger Khushruz Jumaev – who were detained and sentenced had been working on cultural and linguistic projects to promote the writtenness of Pamiri languages and their use in education: <https://t.me/adcmemorial/461>.

²³⁵ Journalist Anora Sarkorova reported on February 5, 2023, that state officials had not been allowed to use Pamiri languages in state institutions, and that she had recently received reports about security officials deterring residents from speaking Pamiri languages in markets, restaurants and other public spaces, intimidating them and threatening them with criminal cases: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/859>. In November 2023, Asia Plus reported that the authorities were fining entrepreneurs in Khorugh for not observing the language legislation when it came to the names of their shops and enterprises: <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20231123/horogskih-predprinimatelei-predupredili-ob-otvetstvennosti-za-narushenie-zakona-o-yazike>.

²³⁶ In October 2022, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that GBAO Governor Alisher Mirzonabot had proposed to build a “volunteer” group of “patriotic” propagandists to do awareness raising among the youth, and to develop cooperation between the army and schools: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/573>. In October 2022, the Parliament amended the Law on Parents’ Responsibilities for the Education and Upbringing of their Children, prohibiting parents to expose their children to “separatist” content, without defining it and thereby providing repressive tools to security forces to interfere in parenting and tradition of Pamiri culture: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32237157.html>. In November 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that a propaganda team commissioned by Governor Alisher Mirzonabot went to villages of GBAO to indoctrinate residents about the alleged achievements of President Rahmon: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1462>. In January 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported patriotic indoctrination of schoolchildren: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/822>. In June 2023, a series of propaganda events took place in GBAO under the slogan “Tajikistan is one – Badakhshan is its pearl”, with some of them focusing on the patriotic upbringing of youth: <https://khorvar.tj/rus/2023/06/v-horoge-obsuzhdyon-vopros-usileniya-ideologicheskoy-deyatelnosti-s-tselyu-realizatsii-polozhenij-zakona-o-patriotizme-grazhdan/>, <https://khorvar.tj/rus/2023/06/doroga-edinstva-pod-takim-nazvaniem-v-horoge-sostoyalsya-festival-molodyozhi-gorodov-i-rajonov-tadzhikistana/>.

²³⁷ Religious institutions (among them, the Ismaili *khalifas*) are controlled by the Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Feasts and Ceremonies (<http://din.tj/ru>) and must report regularly. Summons for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security are common. There was widespread suspicion among natives of GBAO that religious (like the Ismaili Tariqah and Religious Education Board – ITREB) and secular development organizations (like the Aga Khan Development Network – AKDN) were infiltrated by spies reporting to the Tajikistani security agencies and that pressure on these organizations to comply with orders and wishes by the security agencies increased. According to a Radio Ozodi article published on September 6, 2022, the Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Feasts and Ceremonies sent a letter to the regional authorities of GBAO in 2019, warning that ITREB was using English classes as a

gathering²³⁸. This jeopardized the freedom of religion as well as the trust of believers in their religious institutions.

Since the events in November 2021, religious and cultural practice was increasingly constrained by state interference with social events and self-restraints of GBAO residents in reaction to state violence²³⁹. The pervasive surveillance infrastructure in Khorugh²⁴⁰ discouraged social gatherings and compromised the principle of mutual trust which had been characteristic of Pamiri society.

pretext to teach Ismaili religion to children and festive slogans greeting the Aga Khan could be interpreted as an expression of preference of the Aga Khan to the President of Tajikistan: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32021431.html>.

²³⁸ The main place of prayer in Khorugh is the Jamatkhana which was opened in 2018:

<https://worldarchitecture.org/architecture-projects/hgfn/ismaili-jamatkhana-and-centre-khorog-tajikistan-project-pages.html>, <https://the.ismaili/news/jamatkhana-and-khorog-opens-its-doors-jamat>. An eyewitness reported that in February 2022, drones were flying above the building during prayer times and security forces had established a vantage point in Bizmich neighbourhood above the Jamatkhana to conduct surveillance. There were rumours that the building had been bugged. According to eyewitness reports in July 2022, armed personnel of security agencies summoned people for interrogation inside the premises of the Jamatkhana to project their uncontested power even in spiritual places and to scare believers away from the place.

²³⁹ An unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in early 2022 stated that according to interviewees, “social events like weddings or sports events had been disbanded or interfered by authorities” and that there was “a sense of fear of holding activities which brought people together in groups.” Village-level celebrations of the birthday of the Aga Khan on December 13, 2021, were discouraged by the authorities. Interlocutors reported that after the violent crackdown in Vamar on May 18-19, 2022, and in an atmosphere of collective mourning and depression, no wedding ceremonies were held. Weddings are the most important occasions for social gatherings and joint cultural practice. For the same reason, the religious feast *Ruzi nur* on May 24, 2022, was not celebrated. As reported by journalist Anora Sarkorova, at the occasion of the first anniversary of the killing of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov on November 25, 2022, the authorities interfered with traditions and banned his family from holding the traditional commemorative ceremonies: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/669>.

²⁴⁰ An unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in early 2022 drew attention to a “complete state of surveillance” in Khorugh with outdoor and indoor surveillance cameras along main roads and in public spaces and buildings, the coerced installation of cameras in NGO offices and the suspected bugging of private spaces. An eyewitness reported that in February 2022, there were snipers positioned on the 13th floor of a multi-storey building at the main crossing of Khorugh, overlooking the whole city centre. Apart from that, spies of the security agencies are embedded or suspected to be embedded in most organizations and initiatives. According to an eyewitness report in July 2022, multidirectional microphones had been installed in public places in Bar Khorugh.

In summer 2022, the security forces started explicitly cracking down on religious authorities²⁴¹, religious organizations²⁴², religious symbols²⁴³, religious practice²⁴⁴ and education perceived as faith-based²⁴⁵.

²⁴¹ On July 27, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the *khalifa* (local religious authority) in UPD neighbourhood had been summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1120>, <https://t.me/rustamijoni/175>. He was detained and later sentenced to five years in prison:

<https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-badakshan-cleric-five-years/31975340.html>,
https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2782, https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811.

²⁴² On September 5, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the Ismaili Tariqah and Religious Education Board (ITREB), which had trained religious teachers and authorities, had ceased functioning in Tajikistan because of pressure by the State Committee for National Security: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1247>. See also <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32021431.html>, <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-authorities-intensify-war-on-ismailis-other-muslims> and <https://pamirinside.org/lycei-aga-khana-mogut-zakryt/>. It was officially closed in February 2023: <https://pamirinside.org/ugroya-prepodavatelzam-khoroga/>.

²⁴³ During the night of June 12 to June 13, 2022, security forces destroyed the giant Ismaili flag and the letters “Welcome our Imam” carved into the mountains above Khorugh: <https://t.me/pamirinside/969>. The giant green-red Ismaili flag with the yellow crown had been carved into the mountains above Bar Khorugh neighbourhood (North-east Khorugh) in 2007, when the current Aga Khan celebrated his Golden Jubilee (50th anniversary of the beginning of his Imamate). It had measured 35 m x 15 m and had been visible on satellite images (37°29'34"N 71°34'39"E). It was replaced with the slogan “Tajikistan, ahead!” which is connected to President Rahmon, see <https://t.me/anserenko/5017>. The letters “Welcome our Imam” had been written on the mountains east of Khorugh (37°29'24.74"N 71°36'11.87"E) and had measured around 20 m x 20 m. The Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Feasts and Ceremonies had already expressed suspicion of such slogans in letter to the regional authorities of GBAO in 2019: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32021431.html>. In January 2023, state officials allegedly told village elders that the omnipresent portraits of the Aga Khan in private homes had to be removed and replaced with portraits of President Rahmon: https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811.

²⁴⁴ After the crackdown in May 2022, local *Jamatkhanas* (prayer houses) were inspected by security forces and religious education activities were halted: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32021431.html>. In September, the *Jamatkhanas* in UPD and other neighbourhoods of Khorugh were closed and gathering for prayer in private homes, which had been common practice on Fridays, was prohibited: <https://pamirinside.org/власти-таджикистана-продолжают-оказ/>. The only place where collective prayer was allowed was the main *Jamatkhana* in Khorugh, which was under surveillance by the security forces (see above) but did not provide sufficient space for all Ismailis of the town and its surroundings. For an overview over the crackdown on religion, see https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2782 and <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-authorities-intensify-war-on-ismailis-other-muslims>. In a meeting on January 14, 2023, state officials allegedly told village elders that collective prayer in private homes was prohibited and that participants of collective prayers would be fined: https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811. According to the same source, at least two Ismailis had been fined for hosting prayer meetings in their private homes.

²⁴⁵ On July 17, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the tradition of annual summer camps for schoolchildren in GBAO, which had been financed by the Aga Khan Foundation and conducted by the Ismaili Tariqah and Religious Education Board (ITREB), had been discontinued upon request by the authorities: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1105>. According to one source, both volunteer teachers and participants of previous summer camps were summoned for interrogation and intimidated. The Committee on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Feasts and Ceremonies had already expressed suspicion of such education activities in 2019: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32021431.html>. Ethics classes had been taught by volunteer teachers in public middle schools with ITREB support based on an agreement with the Ministry of Education. They had been displaced from public schools around 2020 and their teaching was prohibited in private contexts in summer 2022. On February 8, 2023, Pamir Daily News reported that volunteer teachers who had taught the subject had been summoned for interrogation and threatened with the opening of criminal cases: <https://pamirinside.org/ugroya-prepodavatelzam-khoroga/>. On February 9, 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that the textbook “Ethics and knowledge” was being seized in Khorugh and would later be seized in the districts of GBAO as well: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/872>. As well, the middle school teachers who had taught the “Ethics and knowledge” classes on the basis of this textbook were summoned for interrogation and put under pressure by State Committee for National Security officials: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/872>. In January, 2023, the authorities prohibited travel to London for studies at the Institute of Ismaili Studies: https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811.

Whereas the expression of Pamiri identity was not only denied on the international stage²⁴⁶ and internally²⁴⁷, but also increasingly suppressed, the expression of Tajik chauvinism remained unsanctioned²⁴⁸. This triggered a debate about identity among Pamiris in the diaspora²⁴⁹.

7.3. Imposed changes of the social fabric

Since 2012, the groups in power on the national level systematically displaced local elites – state officials, security personnel, informal authorities, intellectuals and entrepreneurs – through physical elimination, detention²⁵⁰, economic pressure, psychological intimidation and incentivized emigration. This was a result of distrust towards natives of GBAO, obsession with control and material greed. It effectively dismantled the character of GBAO as an autonomous region²⁵¹ and the 1997 peace agreement²⁵².

Individuals from other regions of the country who were aligned with the power pyramid under President Rahmon filled power positions in the state organs and security agencies²⁵³ and took over key businesses²⁵⁴ in

²⁴⁶ During a UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) meeting in April 2023, representatives of the Government of Tajikistan denied the existence of Pamiris as a distinct group:

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/experts-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-commend-tajikistan-improved>. See full documentation under

https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2647&Lang=en.

²⁴⁷ After the UN CERD session in April 2023, a series of probably coerced statements by Pamiri intellectuals were made to deny the existence of a distinct Pamiri identity. For example, on April 29, 2023, the poet Ato Mirkodja, who also has an official position as the deputy chair of the Union of Writers of Tajikistan, in a Facebook post suggested to ban and sanction the expression of Pamir identity:

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0XrHYwjcslFTPoBPgCfGNF2Pfg3ryPmLVEbzDyGRzeKetPjSobj8b2a1HGe73xg6l&id=100090414931467. For comments on the post by Pamiri journalists:

<https://t.me/rustamijoni/377>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1208>.

²⁴⁸ On April 28, 2023, journalist Anora Sarkorova published an example of anti-Pamiri social media posts which had been published with impunity: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1187>, <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1188>.

²⁴⁹ Pamir Daily News published an opinion piece whose autonomous author(s) claimed Pamiris to be a national minority in Tajikistan: <https://pamirinside.org/who-is-pamiris-rus/>. Journalist Sarkorova declared Pamiris to be a distinct nationality separate from the Tajik nationality: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1242>.

²⁵⁰ According to unconfirmed figures, more than 2,000 natives of GBAO were in detention in June 2022:

<https://t.me/anserenko/4578>. This would be around one percent of the population of GBAO. The number of detainees from GBAO transferred to Dushanbe after May and June 2022 is reported to be more than 120.

²⁵¹ In the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is the only region explicitly mentioned in Article 7: <https://mfa.tj/en/main/tajikistan/constitution>.

²⁵² The 1997 peace agreement had been based on power sharing and a 30 percent representation of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in government: <https://www.c-r.org/accord/tajikistan/key-elements-tajikistan-peace-agreement>.

²⁵³ Power positions in the state organs and security agencies are regularly appointed and rotated by the President. State officials and employees of security agencies are incentivised with accelerated career, higher salaries and earlier pension to work in remote GBAO. After the November 2021 protests, when state officials in GBAO were coerced to make derogatory statements on TV or to sign incriminating petitions, many native technical staff quit their jobs.

²⁵⁴ On June 10, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported the harassment of businesspeople who had supported protesters in November 2021: <https://t.me/pamirinside/953>. On June 12, 2022, researcher Susanne Levi-Sanchez listed businesspeople who had been detained: <https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682>. On July 01, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported that the government was nationalizing businesses which had belonged to informal authorities and businesspeople killed or detained during the purges in GBAO in May and June 2022 (e.g. Tolib Ayombekov, Khursand Mazorov, Nasriddin Sabzaliev, Kurbonbek, Salam Imomnazarov):

<https://t.me/pamirinside/1053>. Article 307 (Public calls for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order) and subsequent anti-terror articles allow the confiscation of the property of convicted persons:

https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30397325. According to one report, even the flats of convicted persons in Dushanbe were confiscated and given to regime loyalists. An Eurasianet article published on August 19, 2022, analysed that Sherali Kabir, a manager of the Talco aluminium factory and the Minister of Industry and Innovative Technologies, who managed the business promotion push after the crackdown, was among the strategic economic winners: <https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-picks-winners-in-pamir-investment-drive>. In October 2023, Pamir Inside

GBAO. They were perceived as importing social practices like hierarchy, hypocrisy, kleptocracy and corruption which challenged the traditional culture of egalitarianism and mutual support²⁵⁵. Some of them excessively projected their power over the natives and openly expressed contempt towards them, particularly toward women. Immediately after the crackdown in May and June 2022, urban reconstruction projects were launched which were perceived as a tool to change the social fabric and redistribute wealth²⁵⁶.

In January 2024, for the first time, ethnic Tajiks were appointed as acting district heads of several districts in GBAO in which Pamiris used to form the majority of the population²⁵⁷.

7.4. Demographic engineering

The State Committee for National Security implemented a long-term strategy of demographic engineering. While facilitating and coercing intermarriage between Tajik men from other regions and Pamiri women from GBAO²⁵⁸, they incarcerated a significant share of the male youth or forced them to flee the country²⁵⁹.

Apart from individual persecution, the dire economic situation²⁶⁰ and the general atmosphere of desperation, anxiety and lack of perspectives, which had been exacerbated by the crackdown in May and June 2022,

reported that about planned investments on the territory of the former bread factory which had been confiscated after the detention of Tolib Ayombekov: <https://pamirinside.org/technology-park-in-khorog-instead-of-a-bread-factory/>.

²⁵⁵ In the high mountain region of the Pamirs, the rough living conditions had required dialogue and mutual support to ensure survival. This had created a relatively egalitarian society in which any resident could go to the office of any state official to discuss issues and to influence decision making.

²⁵⁶ In the area east of Khorugh State University (37°29'31.49"N 71°33'13.68"E), houses were demolished in summer 2022. The authorities are planning the construction of multi-storey apartment buildings. Locals fear that the apartments are intended to be facilitate the settlement of people from other regions of Tajikistan. After the fire on the main market in Khorugh (37°29'24.98"N 71°32'16.73"E), the authorities announced the demolition and reconstruction of the whole bazaar area, allegedly concentrating the control over local trade in the hands of one wealthy and influential family which owns the new market in Selkhoztekhnika neighbourhood (37°29'27.19"N 71°31'35.79"E) and is close to Rustam Emomali, the President's son. Parts of the new bazar were opened in June 2022, shortly after the fire on the main market: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/v-horoge-nachal-funktsionirovat-rynok-20-let-gosudarstvennoj-nezavisimosti-respubliki-tadzhikistan/>. In July 2023, the state news agency Khovar reported the construction of multi-storey buildings in Khorugh: <https://khovar.tj/rus/2023/07/v-horoge-stroyat-mnogoetazhnye-zhilye-doma/>.

²⁵⁷ <https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/power/20240217/kto-oni-novie-glavi-raionov-gorno-badahshanskoj-avtonomnoi-oblasti>.

²⁵⁸ President Rahmon allegedly advocated intermarriage in a speech in Khorugh in 2018. Since then, the State Committee for National Security was encouraging it. According to one source, they also used blackmail to coerce Pamiri families to marry their daughters to men from other regions of Tajikistan.

²⁵⁹ In an article on November 07, 2022, Pamir Daily News interpreted the high rate of incarcerated male youth from GBAO as part of a "policy of ethnocide": <https://pamirinside.org/в-гбао-оштрафованы-триста-человек-яко>. The long-term incarceration of male youth from GBAO for petty crimes and on fabricated charges had started in 2018, sped up after November 2021 and again after the start of the crackdown in May 2022. Demographic change did not only result from incarceration itself, but also from the fear of arbitrary detention and persecution which made people flee to Russia, Europe or the U.S. The escape from Tajikistan was often based on financial deals with corrupt officials (so-called "corridor"). The number of asylum applicants from Tajikistan in the European Union increased significantly in 2022 and peaked in autumn 2022, probably as a result of the GBAO crackdown:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZM_custom_6627917/default/line?lang=en.

Radio Ozodi published articles about refugees in Europe in August 2022: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31995404.html>, and June 2023: <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32467285.html>.

²⁶⁰ As highlighted in an unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in GBAO in early 2022, the economic perspectives, which is highly dependent on tourism and cross-border trade, suffered dramatically from the internet blockade and the closure of borders with Kyrgyzstan, China and Afghanistan.

triggered the emigration of individual residents and whole families²⁶¹. Thus, the crackdown contributed to the exodus of a significant share of the indigenous population. In combination of other trends, this affected the composition of the population and its ability to cultivate and hand down traditional culture and knowledge²⁶², and the effects might amount to ethnocide²⁶³.

²⁶¹ Labour migration of mostly male youth as a reaction to economic difficulties had been a common practice in GBAO. However, most labour migrants had left temporarily with the intention to return and build a house in their homeland. The new wave of emigration, in contrast, seems to respond generally to a more comprehensive lack of perspectives and hope. An unpublished report by the Minority Rights Group (MRG) based on interviews conducted in GBAO in early 2022 warned of a “substantial exodus of the population” and highlighted that the emigration of whole families was a new trend in Khorugh and the Eastern Pamirs. Many parents were urging their children to leave and build their future abroad, while whole families were emigrating and many houses and apartments in Khorugh were for sale. On June 10, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported a mass departure of mainly male residents from Rushan district in reaction to the massive repression, intimidation and insult by security forces: <https://t.me/pamirinside/953>. On June 14, 2022, Russian political scientist Andrey Serenko quoted a source forecasting a likely “mass departure of population from GBAO”: <https://t.me/pamirinside/976>. On June 21, 2022, he reported that the number of residents who wished to leave GBAO had increased drastically: <https://t.me/anserenko/4614>. On August 29, 2022, he reported a massive emigration of doctors and teachers due to pressure on state employees: <https://t.me/anserenko/5021>. In an article on November 07, 2022, Pamir Daily News alleged that the authorities purposefully pressed as many criminal charges against natives of GBAO as possible in order to destroy their perspectives and incentivize them to emigrate: <https://pamirinside.org/в-гбао-оштрафованы-триста-человек-яко>. On November 27, 2022, Pamir Daily News reported a “real flight” of the indigenous population from GBAO: <https://t.me/pamirinside/1515>. On August 11, 2023, poet Ato Mirkodja described the effects of the exodus in a Facebook post, using the village of Vuj (Shughnan district) as an example, where only 230 out of previously 530 inhabitants had remained and 20 out of 80 houses were completely deserted: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02HcmQHnKQTNwFxfQBs44LUE9mbw1UKKdwAHW1hGvj2sKcWUU9p83pXcmQV2f2qcGxl&id=100090414931467.

²⁶² This effect was reinforced by restraints on communication between people in GBAO and their family members in the diaspora because of the internet blockade and the general reluctance to speak openly by phone for fear of surveillance.

²⁶³ Some natives of GBAO assume that the exodus of the indigenous population has been purposefully triggered by the authorities. For example, in an article on November 07, 2022, Pamir Daily News alleged that there was “a clear policy of ethnocide”: <https://pamirinside.org/в-гбао-оштрафованы-триста-человек-яко>. Natives of GBAO comparisons between Khorugh and Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region where the authorities demolished the historical old town, replaced it with a modern city centre, promoted the immigration of ethnic Han Chinese, built an extensive system of surveillance and cultural assimilation.

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9. Appendix

9.1. Statements by international stakeholders

9.1.1. International organizations

March 07, 2022	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet	“In Tajikistan, crackdowns continue against the political opposition. Increasing numbers of members of opposition groups have received long-term prison sentences, in trials that failed to comply with due process standards. [...] Violence between security forces and demonstrators in November 2021 in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region has also significantly undermined the human rights situation in the area, creating an environment of fear and repression. I deplore the continued internet shutdown in the region; such shutdowns clearly violate human rights.”	https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2022/03/global-update-bachelet-urges-inclusion-combat-sharply-escalating-misery-and-fear
March 11, 2022	UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues et al.	In a joint communication, various UN Special Rapporteurs bring to the attention of the Government of Tajikistan “information we have received concerning the use of lethal and excessive force against protesters in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO) of Tajikistan followed by the shutdown of mobile internet services and subsequent threats and harassment of the members of the Pamiri minority.”	https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMRResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27142
April 20, 2022	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	Several special rapporteurs in a joint statement emphasized that “disregard of the Pamiri minority grievances by Tajik authorities and the securitization of the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region where they live could lead to a violent conflict if unaddressed”. They requested the Tajikistani authorities to “respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression” and urged them to “immediately implement conflict-prevention measures that meet international human rights standards”.	https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/04/tajikistan-un-experts-sound-alarm-about-tensions-gbao-urge-protection-pamiri
May 18, 2022	OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Teresa Ribeiro	After the attacks on journalists in Dushanbe, she “condemned the attacks on journalists in Dushanbe and expressed her grave worries regarding the safety of media workers in Tajikistan”.	https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/518472

May 19, 2022	Spokesperson for the United Nations Secretary General, Stéphane Dujarric	“The Secretary-General is concerned at the reports of increased tension and violence in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan, including the reported loss of life. He calls for restraint and for all efforts to be made to resolve the current situation by peaceful means. The UN will continue to monitor the situation closely.”	https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/highlight/2022-05-19.html Summary in Russian: https://fergana.media/news/126209/ , https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859503.html .
May 20, 2022	UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Fernand de Varennes	He urged the Government of Tajikistan “to end a deadly crackdown against the Pamiri minority in the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region (GBAO), warning that the use of counter-terrorism operations to quell protests could fuel even wider and more violent trouble”. He highlighted that the government's “heavy-handed response to end protests by the Pamiri minority through arrests, the excessive and unlawful use of force, and the involvement of the military is disproportionate and deeply disturbing”.	https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/05/tajikistan-un-expert-fears-crackdown-against-pamiri-minority-could-spiral https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31861433.html
June 13, 2022	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet	“In Tajikistan, due process standards must be respected in cases of alleged human rights violations against activists, journalists and bloggers. I encourage the government to seek constructive communication with all communities, secure freedom of expression for all and observe its international human rights commitments.”	https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/oral-update-global-human-rights-developments-and-activities-un-human-rights
July 13, 2022	UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders et al.	In a joint communication, various UN Special Rapporteurs brought to the attention of the Government of Tajikistan information about the cases of Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov: “In the communication we expressed our concern over the alleged arbitrary arrest and detention of Ms. Mamadshoeva and Mr. Kholiknazarov, and the charges against them. Additionally, we express further concerns about the videotape released publicly in which she appears to confess under duress to her role in the protests in question. We would also like to express concern over the order that her trial is to be classified and that access to her case material will not be possible, in contradiction with international fair trial standards. We also express concern by the excessive use of force by law enforcement agents in the GBAO region.”	https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMRresultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27423 Summary: https://srdefenders.org/tajikistan-arbitrary-detention-of-ulfathonim-mamadshoeva-manuchekhr-kholiknazarov-joint-communication/
September 12, 2022	Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Nada Al-Nashif	“In Tajikistan, particularly in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, concerns persist about the harassment of human rights defenders and journalists and recent prosecution requests for 25 year or life term prison sentences in some cases, disregarding due process.	https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/09/global-update-statement-nada-al-nashif-un-acting-high-commissioner-human-rights

		I urge investigations into human rights violations or abuses and guarantees to ensure fair trials, in line with international human rights standards.”	
October 07, 2022	OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media	“I am very much concerned about the high number of imprisoned journalists in Tajikistan and the lengthy prison sentences against them. Such practices strongly hinder the work of media professionals in the country, have a strong chilling effect and create self-censorship.”	https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/528150 Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32069817.html
October 04, 2022	UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et al.	In a joint communication, various UN Special Rapporteurs brought to the attention of the Government of Tajikistan information about the cases of Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov and Faromuz Irgashev.	https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMRresultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27560
November 10, 2022	UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	“The Committee is seriously concerned about reports of arrests, detention and trials without due process of human rights defenders, including those working to defend economic, social and cultural rights, in the context of the protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region in November 2021 and May 2022. The Committee is particularly concerned about reports of a lack of transparency regarding their detention and trials, and their lack of access to lawyers during the proceedings.”	https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fTJK%2fCO%2f4&Lang=en Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32139140.html
December 09, 2022	UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders	After her visit to Tajikistan, the Special Rapporteur Mary Lawlor stated in her Preliminary observations and recommendations: “Recent events from November 2021 onwards in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO) have negatively affected the overall situation of freedom of expression, freedom of association and the right to peaceful assembly in the country. [...] My meetings during these past two weeks indicated that the crackdown on independent journalists working on human rights defenders started in 2016, and has reached its lowest point in 2021, following the GBO events.”	https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/12/tajikistan-human-rights-defenders-face-increasing-threats-climate-fear-says Preliminary observations and recommendations: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/defenders/2022-12-08/EoM-Visit-Tajikistan-9Dec2022-EN.docx Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32169587.html Report to the UN Human Rights Council: https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/55/50/Add.1

January 23, 2023	UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism et al.	In a joint communication, various UN Special Rapporteurs addressed “a number of serious human rights challenges in relation to the definition of terrorism contained in the legislation which, in our view, is overly broad; the negative and disproportionate impact of the legislation may have on particular groups, on due process, on the right to liberty and security of person, which may lead to enforced or involuntary disappearances; as well as on the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association”.	https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMRresultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gld=27787
April 20, 2023	UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief	After her visit to Tajikistan, the Special Rapporteur Nazila Ghanea stated in her Preliminary observations and recommendations: “We reached out to a range of religion or belief communities and faith-based actors in GBAO. There was a widespread reluctance to speak and a fear of reprisals. We had first-hand information on the region that was cross checked and strongly confirmed through direct observation on the ground. According to tens of sources, the State Committee on National Security has recently invited heads of some 128 local NGOs to a meeting in GBAO and persuaded or forced them to “voluntarily self-liquidate”. More than 30 of those NGOs, even those working with children, suspended their activities, and more than 10 NGOs have self-liquidated under the pressure.”	https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/04/un-expert-urges-tajikistan-leave-past-behind-and-uphold-freedom-religion-and Preliminary observations and recommendations: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/religion/SR-FORB-CV-Tajikistan-EOM-Statement.docx Summary in English: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/04/un-expert-urges-tajikistan-leave-past-behind-and-uphold-freedom-religion-and Report to the UN Human Rights Council: https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/55/47/Add.1
April 21, 2023	UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Commend Tajikistan on Improved Treatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Ask Questions on Discrimination against the Pamiri Minority and Human Rights Defenders. In their concluding observations, they recommended the Government of Tajikistan to “(a) Carry out, as soon as possible, an impartial and transparent investigation surrounding the events in GBAO since November 2021, in accordance with applicable international standards. (b) Take all the necessary measures to prevent further escalation of	https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/experts-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-commend-tajikistan-improved Full video of the meetings on April 20, 2023: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1v/k1v3evdxml

		<p>violence in the region, including by responding to the grievances of the Pamiri minority.</p> <p>(c) Engage in a constructive and open dialogue with the Pamiri minority.</p> <p>(d) Implement conflict-prevention measures that meet international human rights standards, including measures to protect the Pamiri minority.”</p>	<p>April 21, 2023: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1w/k1wqhs4v8g Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32378234.html Summary records: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSR.2971&Lang=en https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FSR.2972&Lang=en Concluding observations of the Committee: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FTJK%2FCO%2F12-13&Lang=en Summary of concluding observations: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/04/un-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-publishes-findings-argentina General documentation: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2647&Lang=en</p>
May 12, 2023	UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues et al.	In a joint communication, various UN Special Rapporteurs brought to the attention of the Government of Tajikistan information “on the alleged arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and criminalisation of human rights defenders Mr. Daler Bobiev, Mr. Avazmad Ghurbatov, Mr. Zavqibek Sohibov, Mr. Abdusattor Kotibov, Mr. Abdulmajid Rizoiev, Ms. Ulfathonim Mamadshoeva, Mr.	<p>https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMRresultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32524632.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32608521.html</p>

		Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, Mr. Faromuz Irgashov, and Mr. Khushruz Djumaev”.	
May 30, 2023	Human Rights Council Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples	In its draft study on the Impact of militarization on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Draft study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples noted: “It has also been alleged that the land of the Pamiri people residing in the Pamir mountains of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan is under high surveillance and is heavily militarized, with alleged cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture of detainees.”	https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G23/100/26/PDF/G2310026.pdf?OpenElement
July 04, 2023	UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders et al.	In a joint statement, various UN special rapporteurs deplored criminal proceedings against human rights defenders in Tajikistan, among the Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashov and Khushom Gulyam. They stated: “We would like to remind the Government that criminalising the legitimate peaceful work of human rights defenders is incompatible with Tajikistan’s international human rights obligations. Conflating human rights defenders with extremists and terrorists is a very dangerous practice.”	https://srdefenders.org/tajikistan-un-experts-deplore-criminal-proceedings-against-human-rights-defenders-press-release/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32489836.html
October 19, 2023	UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues	In the End of Mission Statement on his country visit in Tajikistan, the Special Rapporteur Fernand de Varennes described “outright hostility and denial [in GBAO] in relation to any inquiry concerning allegations of violations of the rights of members of the Pamiri minority during violent events in the region in 2021 and 2022”, and generally summarized that “the reality on the ground is very far from the lofty principles and statements contained in the <i>National Strategy on Human Rights of the Republic of Tajikistan for the Period Until 2038</i> and associated <i>Action Plan 2023-2025</i> , particularly when it comes to its treatment of certain minorities, and implementation is not just slow, it is yet to begin in key areas.”	https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/tajikistan-un-expert-commends-progress-calls-greater-effort-ensure-rights End of Mission Statement: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/minorities/sr/20231018-Eom-visit-Tajikistan-English.docx Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32645563.html
January 31, 2024	UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	In its concluding observations, the Committee expressed its continuing concerns “about the shrinking civic space for women, including women from religious minorities and women dissenters, women human rights defenders, women journalists, and women online activists, who face violations of their human rights and restrictions on their lawful activities in the State party”.	Summary record: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FSR.2034&Lang=en Full video of the meeting on January 31, 2024:

			https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1n/k1n00cytvq Concluding observations: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FCO%2F7&Lang=en
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9.1.2. Governments and parliaments

May 18, 2022	Russian Federation	“With concern we have taken note of the information from the Tajik authorities about the escalation of tensions in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region, which, as suggested by the reports, were provoked by criminal elements and extremists who joined them”.	https://ria.ru/20220518/obostrenie-1789319255.html
May 18, 2022	European Union France Germany United Kingdom United States	In a joint statement, they expressed “their deep concern about reported internal tensions and violent clashes” in GBAO and urged the Government of Tajikistan “to ensure that law enforcement agencies act in strict compliance with the rule of law and uphold the standards of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms even in security-related crisis situations”.	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tajikistan/joint-statement-developments-gbao_en https://tj.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-developments-in-gbao/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31857576.html
May 20, 2022	Switzerland	“We urge the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan to ensure that law enforcement agencies act in strict compliance with human rights obligations. Tajik authorities must respect freedom of speech and access to information, including access to the internet and the right to peaceful protests. The cause of violence in recent protests are to be investigated and those responsible held to account.”	https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/tajikistan/en/home/news/news.html/content/countries/tajikistan/en/meta/news/2022/May/internal-tensions
May 26, 2022	European Union	In the OSCE Permanent Council, they urged the Government of Tajikistan “to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “to open an investigation into the violent clashes which occurred in GBAO between 16 and 22 May, including on the death of civilians and reports about the alleged acts of torture by the security forces”.	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/osce-permanent-council-no-1375-vienna-26-may-2022-1_en?s=66

May 26, 2022	United Kingdom	In the OSCE Permanent Council, they expressed their concerns about “reports of arrests of, and attacks on, journalists”, and proposed “a thorough and transparent investigation into recent events in Gorno-Badakhshan, with the findings communicated to the international community”.	https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/latest-developments-in-tajikistan-uk-statement-to-the-osce
July 07, 2022	European Parliament	In a comprehensive resolution on the situation in GBAO, the European Parliament “strongly condemns the Tajik authorities’ violent crackdown on protesters, journalists, bloggers, lawyers and activists in November 2021 and May 2022 for expressing their opinion and protesting peacefully” and “urges the Government of Tajikistan to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including people’s right to life, peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of the media, in the GBAO and in the rest of the country”.	https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0293_EN.html PDF of English version: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0293_EN.pdf Summarizing press release: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220701IPR34339/human-rights-breaches-in-hong-kong-brazil-and-tajikistan Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31933536.html GBAO debate in European Parliament: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-07-06-ITM-022-03_EN.html Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31932704.html
August 17, 2022	United States	On occasion of the visit of U.S. Ambassador Pommersheim to GBAO, the U.S. Embassy to Tajikistan stated: “To meet Tajikistan’s development goals in Gorno-Badakhshon, an unimpeded entrepreneurial sector, an active civil society, respect for human rights and rule of law, reliable internet, and independent media are also vital. To harness innovation, young people need to know they can contribute their ideas for the future, including through social media, without fear.”	https://tj.usembassy.gov/statement-on-ambassador-pommersheim-visit-to-gbao/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31994155.html
December 07, 2022	European Union	After the thirteenth annual Human Rights Dialogue between the European Union and Tajikistan, the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a press statement: “Particular attention was dedicated	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tajikistan-13th-human-rights-dialogue-eu-takes-place-dushanbe_en

		to the freedom of expression and access to information offline and online. The EU expressed concern about the working environment for journalists, human rights defenders, as well as civil society more broadly. The EU expressed serious concerns with human rights situation in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, in connection with the events of November 2021 and May 2022 and called for an independent investigation. The EU urged the authorities to uphold the international fair trial standards. Several individual cases were also discussed.”	Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32168941.html
March 20, 2023	United States	In its annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Tajikistan, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. Department of State provided an overview over human rights violations in Tajikistan in 2022, including the crackdown in GBAO and transnational repression, and stated: “The government rarely took steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish government officials for human rights abuses or for corruption. Officials in the security services and elsewhere in the government mostly acted with impunity.”	https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/tajikistan/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32327912.html
April 2023	United States	In its 2023 Annual Report, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom stated: “In 2022, the Tajik government increasingly repressed the country’s Ismaili Shi’a population, who are primarily ethnic Pamiris located in the GBAO.”	https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/2023%20Annual%20Report.pdf , pp. 42-43.
October 03, 2023	United States	At the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, U.S. Ambassador Michael G. Kozak stated on democratic institutions: “We remain deeply concerned about the government’s consistent targeting of civil society and forced liquidation of NGOs in Tajikistan, particularly in the Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous region since March 2022. We continue to urge the Government of Tajikistan to ensure that law enforcement agencies uphold the rule of law and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.”	https://osce.usmission.gov/warsaw-human-dimension-conference-plenary-session-1-democratic-institutions/
October 09, 2023	United States	In a statement made at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, U.S. Ambassador Michael G. Kozak declared regarding Rule of Law: “The United States continues to be concerned about the lack of an independent judiciary or fair trials in Tajikistan, as well as reports of torture and mistreatment in detention, [...]. Under these serious	https://osce.usmission.gov/warsaw-human-dimension-conference-plenary-session-5-rule-of-law-i/

		circumstances, it is crucially important that participating States considering asylum applications from Tajik activists and members of groups targeted by Tajik authorities, such as the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), take into account the danger of arrest and torture or mistreatment upon deportation.”	
October 11, 2023	United States	Desirée Cormier Smith, U.S. Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice, stated at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference: “In Tajikistan, we urge the government to stop pressuring predominantly ethnic Pamiri civil society and NGOs from the Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Region to dissolve their organizations.”	https://osce.usmission.gov/warsaw-human-dimension-conference-plenary-session-7-tolerance-and-non-discrimination-ii/
November 27, 2023	United States	U.S. Senator Ben Cardin, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to President Emomali Rahmon: “I urge you to immediately end the repression of peaceful demonstrators, community leaders, journalists and activists in Tajikistan, as well as all forms of transnational repression that your government is pursuing abroad, including the issuance of Interpol red notices to forcibly repatriate dissidents.”	https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/chair-cardin-to-tajikistan-president-rahmon-end-your-governments-use-of-transnational-repression Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32716708.html
November 27, 2023	European Union	After the tenth annual Cooperation Committee meeting between the European Union and Tajikistan, the European External Action Service (EEAS) stated: “The EU expressed its concern regarding the detention of human rights defenders, independent journalists and bloggers. The EU called on the Tajik authorities to ensure accountability and to bring to justice all those responsible for human rights violations in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBO).”	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-tajikistan-10th-cooperation-committee-held-brussels_en Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32706200.html
December 14, 2023	European Union	After the 14 th round of the annual Human Rights Dialogue between the European Union and Tajikistan, the European External Action Service (EEAS) published a press statement: “The EU expressed concerns about restrictions on freedom of political participation and freedom of expression – especially on increasingly restricted space for civil society and independent media). The EU enquired about the insufficient investigations in human rights abuses by law enforcement agencies during the events in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO) in 2021/22 and reiterated the urgent need to engage with the local population and civil society in view of building trust. The EU raised a number of individual cases of concern and called on the	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tajikistan-14th-human-rights-dialogue-eu_en?s=228 Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32735480.html

		government of Tajikistan to immediately and unconditionally release human rights defenders, journalists and activists that remain imprisoned, highlighting their important role as vital pillars of any democracy and expressing support for their work in Tajikistan. The EU further reiterated its concern over cases of ill-treatment and torture in the country’s detention centres and encouraged Tajikistan to continue its penitentiary reform efforts.”	
January 18, 2024	European Parliament	In a comprehensive resolution on repression against the independent media in Tajikistan, the European Parliament “strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites [...] condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them [...] urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.”	https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0039_EN.html PDF of English version: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0039_EN.pdf Summarizing press release: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240112IPR16782/human-rights-breaches-in-china-sudan-and-tajikistan Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32782964.html Speeches given during the plenary debate on January 17, 2024: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2024-01-17-ITM-021-03_EN.html

9.1.3. Non-governmental organizations

August 09, 2017	Anti-Discrimination Centre (ADC) Memorial	In its Alternative Report on Tajikistan’s implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Connection with the UN CERD consideration of the Republic of Tajikistan’s Ninth to Eleventh Periodic reports for 2012–2015, ADC Memorial assessed: “Because of the Pamiri traits described above, prejudice against them has ethnic, cultural-linguistic, religious, and political dimensions: they are visually and linguistically distinct	https://adcmemorial.org/wp-content/uploads/TajCERDeng3.pdf
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		and are looked on as the “wrong kind of Muslims” and suspected of separatist leanings. Many Pamiri feel like outsiders in the country, and Pamiri are generally more liable to migrate than people in other regions.”	
January 14, 2022	Anti-Discrimination Centre (ADC) Memorial	“It is possible that the excessive use of emergency measures will create risks for conflicts which, if manipulated, could become ethnic in nature. The situation in GBAO requires a response from international bodies, and the authorities in the country should focus on providing economic and cultural support for the region, avoiding repressive measures, and preventing discrimination and violations of the law.”	https://adcmemorial.org/wp-content/uploads/adcmemorial_pamir_communication_un_eng_jan-2022_web.pdf
February 07, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	They requested the Tajikistan authorities to immediately restore full internet connectivity in GBAO and to disclose the whereabouts of forcibly disappeared Amriddin Alovatshoev and to allow a lawyer of his choosing immediate access to him	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/07/tajikistan-restore-internet-autonomous-region
May 18, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	They demanded the Government of Tajikistan to “strictly observe its obligations to respect and protect people’s rights to life, and freedom of assembly and the media in any military or law enforcement operations in Tajikistan’s autonomous region”.	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/18/tajikistan-tensions-escalating-autonomous-region Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31857740.html
May 20, 2022	Minority Rights Group (MRG)	They emphasized that “increasingly systematic human rights violations have given rise to a situation much graver than simply the existence of political tensions, as widely reported”. They draw attention to the “heavy military build-up and installation of comprehensive surveillance infrastructure in the region, which has been readied for use against the population, in case of further protests against human rights violations” in Khorugh since November 2021. They call for “urgent measures by the Tajikistan authorities to de-escalate the situation by restoring and ensuring respect for human rights in GBAO”.	https://minorityrights.org/2022/05/20/tajikistan-crackdown/
May 20, 2022	International Alert	“Frustrations are growing around the military response to events since November 2021, and there is a distinct possibility violence could now escalate further. With the ongoing violence and information blackout, it is imperative that the safety, rights, and lives of civilians are protected.”	https://www.international-alert.org/statements/alert-statement-on-violence-in-eastern-tajikistan/?fbclid=IwAR12hsljQCeiZErGd7lE6XaSYCPA6HRPWkrv9rIOPd5jIYgQxop-ow7E

May 25, 2022	Civil Rights Defenders Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights Poland (HFHR) International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC) Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture (OMCT)	Among other demands, they called the Tajikistani authorities to “cease the violent crackdown and persecution of peaceful protesters and to exercise restraint by upholding their international human rights obligations”, and to “urgently allow international humanitarian and human rights organizations, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to access Rushan to monitor the situation.”	https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/joint-statement_24-May-2022.pdf Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31867304.html
May 26, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	“Tajik citizens in the autonomous region were peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly to protest abuses against their community when the police engaged in excessive force”. The NGO demanded the authorities of Tajikistan to “ensure an effective investigation into police use of force leading to civilian deaths and casualties”, to “immediately end abuses against protesters” and to restore communication.	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/26/tajikistan-stop-abusing-autonomous-region-protesters Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31871360.html
June 03, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	At occasion of the upcoming visit of UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed to Tajikistan, they requested her to urge the authorities to “investigate police use of force leading to the deaths of civilians in May” and call “for the release of Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva”.	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/03/top-un-official-should-focus-rights-central-asia Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31883352.html
June 13, 2022	Genocide Watch	“Ethnic Pamirs in the autonomous oblast of Gorno-Badakhshan are facing increased surveillance, persecution, and detention at the hands of the Tajik government.”	https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-watch-tajikistan Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31938349.html
June 15, 2022	Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders	“The Observatory strongly condemns the arbitrary detention of Manuchehr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashev and Khursand Mamadshoev and urges the authorities in Tajikistan to immediately and unconditionally release them and to put an end to the judicial harassment against them. The Observatory calls on the authorities to put an immediate end to the violence and excessive and unlawful use	https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-arbitrary-detention-of-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov

		of force against peaceful protesters and human rights defenders in Tajikistan.“	
June 22, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	“Tajik authorities should respect freedom of expression and stop preventing journalists from carrying out their professional activities. The country’s regional and international partners should also hold Tajikistan accountable to its human rights obligations.“	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/22/tajikistan-release-bloggers-respect-media-freedom Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909485.html
June 29, 2022	Front Line Defenders	“Front Line Defenders expresses its grave concern at the increased targeting against human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous (GBAO) region, Tajikistan. Front Line Defenders is deeply concerned about the detention of [...] Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and [...] Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and the lack of transparency from the Tajikistani Government regarding the reasons for their detention.”	https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/tajikistan-authorities-should-cease-persecution-human-rights-defenders
July 27, 2022	Reporters without Borders	“Four independent journalists who have been critical of the government are currently being held in Tajikistan on spurious charges of links with extremist organisations. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls for their release and condemns the use of such methods to intimidate the media.”	https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-government-steps-persecution-journalists Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31963757.html
August 01, 2022	International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)	The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) “calls on Tajikistan’s authorities to ensure that those arrested and charged in relation to the recent protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) be immediately guaranteed the right of access to a lawyer. Without access to a lawyer, many people are arbitrarily detained and are likely to face unfair trial.”	https://www.icj.org/tajikistan-detained-protesters-should-be-given-immediate-access-to-lawyers/
August 02, 2022	ADC Memorial	“Отказ властей Таджикистана от диалога с населением ГБАО, многолетняя милитаризация региона, жесткое подавление протестов, отсутствие справедливого расследования и полная непрозрачность следствия и судебных процессов, отсутствие доступа к полноценной адвокатской помощи подсудимых – всё это усиливает депрессивную атмосферу в регионе. [...]Однако сейчас об эмиграции задумываются и те, кто раньше все-таки оставался на родине, несмотря на все трудности.”	https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/presledovaniya-aktivistov-na-pamire-davlenie-pohishheniya-prigovory/
August 11, 2022	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	CPJ President Jodie Ginsberg: “Tajikistan authorities must release Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva and Khushruz Jumayev, drop any charges	https://cpj.org/2022/08/tajikistan-authorities-detain-pamiri-journalists-

		against them, and lift the veil of secrecy in their cases. [...] Pamiri journalists, and all journalists in Tajikistan, must be free to do their jobs amid government actions in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.”	ulfatkhonim-mamadshoeva-and-khushruz-jumayev-for-more-than-2-months/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31986363.html
August 16, 2022	Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)	The CFWIJ “stands in solidarity with Ulfatkhonim [Mamadshoeva]. We ask for the immediate release of Ulfatkhonim and other journalists and drop any charges against them; the Tajikistan authorities must stop prosecuting journalists.”	https://www.womeninjournalism.org/tweets-all/tajikistan-ulfatkhonim-mamadshoeva-face-25-years-in-prison-sentence-after-3-months-of-detention
August 23, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	The statement emphasizes that residents and natives of GBAO detained since May 2022 are “are facing closed, unfair trials”. According to Syinat Sultanalieva, Central Asia researcher at HRW, “the Tajik courts have become a conveyor belt for churning out lengthy prison terms without due process for anyone linked to the May protests [...] The Tajik authorities need to stop this injustice and uphold their international obligations to end wrongful detentions and to ensure fair trials.”	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/23/tajikistan-autonomous-region-protesters-denied-fair-trials Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32000386.html
September 15, 2022	CIVICUS Monitor	“The reporting period saw a serious deterioration in the protection of fundamental freedoms due to a violent crackdown, mainly on protesters, by security forces in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) (an autonomous region in eastern Tajikistan) in November 2021 and, again, in May 2022. As part of this crackdown, dozens of protesters were detained, with widespread reports of torture and ill-treatment, as well as extrajudicial killings of detained protesters. The crackdown was also accompanied by repressive measures targeting the wider population in the region, including months-long shutdowns of the internet and mobile phone networks throughout the region.”	https://www.iphronline.org/tajikistan-civicus-2021-2022.html https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2022/09/12/escalating-tensions-crackdown-human-rights-defenders-journalists/
October 05, 2022	ADC Memorial	“Pamirophobia is not a problem of individual Tajik nationalists, but of the Tajik authorities as a whole. They are not satisfied that the Pamiris consider themselves Pamiris, not Tajiks. The authorities have tacitly banned the Pamiris from speaking their native languages in state institutions. The Pamiris are not allowed to print books, magazines and newspapers in their own languages, despite the language law,	https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/repressions-against-the-pamiris-in-tajikistan-numerous-victims-lawlessness-impunity/ Russian translation: https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/represii-protiv-pamirczev-v-tadzhikistane-

		which obliges the state to create conditions for the development of the Pamiri languages.”	mnogochislennye-zhertvy-bezzakonie-beznakazannost/
October 25, 2022	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	“Tajikistan authorities must provide a complete and convincing response to allegations that jailed journalist Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda has been subjected to severe physical abuse and mistreatment, and that he and other jailed journalists were forced to record false confessions”.	https://cpj.org/2022/10/jailed-tajik-journalist-abdusattor-pirmuhammadzoda-describes-severe-physical-abuse-forced-confession-in-letter/
October 25, 2022	International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) et al.	“Under circumstances that remain unclear, peaceful mass protests against government policies evolved into violence and clashes between security forces and protesters in Kazakhstan, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in Tajikistan and the Republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan earlier this year, resulting in significant loss of life and injury. The authorities of the respective countries employed harsh measures to end the protests and unrest, with widespread allegations of the excessive use of force, arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment, due process violations and other abuses.”	https://www.iphronline.org/central-asia-eu-top-official-urged-to-raise-key-human-rights-issues-during-visit-to-the-region.html
October 31, 2022	Lawyers for Lawyers	“Lawyers for Lawyers calls upon the authorities of Tajikistan (sic!) to: Immediately and unconditionally release Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Faromuz Irgashev and put an end to all acts of harassment against them; Guarantee that all lawyers in Tajikistan who work on cases involving human rights violations or politically-sensitive cases can carry out their legitimate professional activities without intimidation, harassment, improper interference or reprisals”.	https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/state-ment-on-the-arrest-of-the-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-and-faromuz-irgashov/
November 15, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	“The European Union should press for transparency and accountability following multiple violent suppressions of protests in Central Asia during 2022 in the upcoming meeting with foreign ministers from the region, Human Rights Watch said today.”	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/15/eu-press-central-asian-countries-over-rights-violations
December 01, 2022	Minority Rights Group (MRG)	At the UN Forum on National Minorities in Geneva, the MRG representative stated in her short speech that “In Tajikistan, Pamiris are forced to migrate due to intensive securitization and militarization of their homeland. They now face discrimination both in Tajikistan and Russia, where evidence shows that minorities and migrants are targeted for military conscription.”	https://minorityrights.org/2022/12/02/unfmi-recommendations/

December 02, 2022	ADC Memorial	At the UN Forum on National Minorities in Geneva, the ADC representative stated that decades of violation of minority rights in Central Asia have resulted in unprecedented repressions against the Pamiri peoples in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan and against the Karakalpak minority in Uzbekistan.”	https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/adcmemorials-statement-at-the-un-forum-on-minority-issues-december-2-2022-geneva/ Russian translation: https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/zayavlenie-adc-memorial-na-forume-oon-povoprosam-menshinstv/
December 09, 2022	Minority Rights Group (MRG)	In response to the sentence of civil society activist Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, MRG stated: “MRG believes the charges and sentencing form part of a wider attempt by the Tajikistan authorities to dismantle any collective leadership amongst communities in Pamir. The moves are also an attempt to silence voices that might succeed in bringing international attention to the ongoing and widespread human rights violations in the region. [...] The GBAO region has been subjected to widespread militarization and securitization since November 2021. [...] Pamiris have had their livelihoods, right to work, education, access to healthcare and ability to freely practice their culture and religion severely impacted. This clampdown on daily life is leading to emigration and a de-population of this indigenous region.”	https://minorityrights.org/2022/12/09/gbao-sentences/
December 13, 2022	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	After the sentences of journalists Khushruz Jumayev and Ulfatkhonim Mamadsheova, CPJ stated: “The Tajik government has utterly failed to offer any compelling justification for these sentences, and the secrecy surrounding the journalists’ cases is completely unwarranted. Mamadshoeva and Jumayev should be released at once and allowed to work freely.”	https://cpj.org/2022/12/tajikistan-authorities-sentence-2-journalists-to-lengthy-prison-terms/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32175847.html
December 13, 2022	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	After the sentences of civil society activists from GBAO, among them Ulfatkhonim Mamadsheova and Faromuz Irgashev, HRW stated: “The trials of the Gorno-Badakhshan activists were held behind closed doors without access to lawyers or the evidence against them, in violation of fundamental fair trial standards.”	https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/12/tajikistan-long-sentences-autonomous-region-activists
December 19, 2022	Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders	Following the sentencing of human rights defenders Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Manuchekhr Kholiknazarov, Faromuz Irgashev and Khursand Mamadshoev, the Observatory requests “urgent intervention”.	https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-heavy-prison-sentences-for-rights-defenders-from-gorno

December 23, 2022	Front Line Defenders	“Front Line Defenders is deeply concerned about the sentencing of Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva behind closed doors and calls the authorities to put an end to the ongoing judicial harassment against the woman human rights defender and human rights defender. Front Line Defenders additionally calls the authorities of Tajikistan to disclose the full information about the trials of Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva.”	https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/human-rights-defender-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-sentenced-15-years-imprisonment Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32191994.html
December 28, 2022	Reporters without Borders (RSF)	Commenting on the sentences of seven to ten years against four bloggers and journalists in Tajikistan, the Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk of RSF said: “These disproportionate sentences, announced one by one since the start of October, sound the death knell for independent journalists who still dare to express themselves in Tajikistan. [...] The Tajik authorities must stop maintaining a climate of fear that effectively bans the media from taking a critical look at the government. And they must release these journalists.”	https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-10-years-prison-independent-journalists-rakhmons-regime-gags-criticism Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32203961.html
January 12, 2023	Human Rights Watch (HWR)	In its World Report 2023, HRW states: “The government of Tajikistan intensified its crackdown on human rights and fundamental freedoms in 2022, violently repressing peaceful gatherings in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and using trumped-up charges against human rights defenders in retaliation for their professional activities.”	https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/tajikistan Russian version: https://www.hrw.org/ru/world-report/2023/country-chapters/383665
February 21, 2023	Forum 18	“At least two Ismaili home owners in Mountainous Badakhshan were fined one month's average wage each for hosting prayer meetings in their homes. The regime banned such meetings in late 2022. Officials told elders on 14 January in Khorugh not to allow prayers in homes, that local people must remove portraits of Ismaili spiritual leader the Aga Khan, and that study at the London-based Institute of Ismaili Studies is no longer allowed. The regime also banned voluntary lessons for children based on a course from the Aga Khan Foundation.”	https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811
March 11, 2023	CIVICUS Monitor	“The human rights defenders convicted on 9th December were among at least 20 human rights activists and journalists who were arrested as part of a widening campaign against dissenting voices launched by the Tajikistani government in response to mass protests held in GBAO in November 2021 and again in May 2022. Those arrested had all spoken	https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/continuous-crackdown-on-civil-society/

		out about allegations of serious human rights violations characterising the government's so-called 'special' or 'anti-terrorist' operations in the region, which included reports of the disproportionate use of force against mostly unarmed civilians, extrajudicial killings, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detentions and repressive measures targeting civil society and the wider population of GBAO."	
March 16, 2023	CIVICUS Monitor	"Tajikistan has been downgraded from 'repressed' to 'closed' in a new report by the CIVICUS Monitor, a global research collaboration that rates and tracks fundamental freedoms in 197 countries and territories. According to the report, People Power Under Attack 2022, repressive measures taken by the authorities in response to mass protests in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) led to the downgrade."	https://monitor.civicus.org/country-rating-changes/tajikistan/ Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32321220.html
March 20, 2023	ADC Memorial	"The Pamiri are also underrepresented in governance and key administrative bodies which predominantly include the law enforcement agencies in GBAO, as the leadership and the overwhelming majority of staff at security structures in GBAO are from other regions of Tajikistan. [...] Protests in GBAO have repeatedly been followed by a severe response from the authorities of an independent Tajikistan. [...] A large military contingent and a large amount of military equipment, including armored vehicles, is now present in the region. [...] Our sources reported that during inspections, law enforcement officers insulted and humiliated residents, including women, and extorted money from them, which provoked Pamiri to respond."	https://adcmemorial.org/wp-content/uploads/adcmemorial-cerd-109-session-tajikistan-april-2023-eng-final.pdf Summary in Russian: https://adcmemorial.org/wp-content/uploads/adcmemorial_cerd_109-session_tajikistan_april-2023-rus.pdf
March 27, 2023	Amnesty International	"The official government figure in May for those killed in the "anti-terrorist operation" in the GBAO was originally 21, although unofficial sources reported more than double that number. The circumstances of many deaths, in the absence of independent reporting from Tajikistan, prompted allegations of extrajudicial executions. Prominent activists, informal local leaders, poets, religious leaders and journalists were arbitrarily targeted for arrest."	https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/ (pp. 356-358) Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32338850.html
April 03, 2023	International Partnership for	"In Tajikistan, the environment for human rights defenders and civil society activists has deteriorated sharply in recent years. The Tajikistani authorities have threatened, intimidated and prosecuted	https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Tajikistan-Human-rights-defender-Manuchehr-

	Human Rights (IPHR) et al.	NGOs, activists and lawyers in order to get them to drop or refrain from working on issues perceived as politically sensitive. Many groups have been subjected to intrusive inspections of their activities by the Tax Committee, national security services and other state bodies.”	Kholiqnazarov-must-be-immediately-released.pdf Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32347452.html
May 03, 2023	Reporters without Borders (RSF)	“The government closely monitors content disseminated on the radio, television and the internet, and access to official information is extremely limited for the independent media. Journalists who do not succumb to self-censorship are harassed by the secret service and are targets of intimidation and blackmail. Some are officially categorised as “terrorists”. Any reporting on the brutally suppressed protests in Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO), an autonomous region covering nearly half the country, is prohibited and can lead to censorship and arrest. The government has set up troll farms designed to discredit any critical commentary.”	https://rsf.org/en/country/tajikistan Summary in Russian: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32392678.html
June 09, 2023	Forum 18	“President Emomali Rahmon has signed a Decree denying the families of those killed in alleged ‘anti-terrorism operations’ the possibility of, among other things, burying their dead with the religious or other rites they would have chosen or even knowing where they are buried. A human rights defender said this is to ‘publicly threaten that people who protest against the government will die and will not be buried as Muslims’. Another human rights defender, journalist Anora Sarkorova, noted that ‘the authorities are enforcing the Decree violently’.”	https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2837
July 20, 2023	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	In response to the decision by the Supreme Court of Tajikistan to ban the news website Pamir Daily News as extremist, the CPJ stated: “Tajik authorities’ move to ban Pamir Daily News and smear it as ‘extremist’ is a sadly predictable step in the ongoing criminalization of all coverage of the government’s human rights abuses”.	https://cpj.org/2023/07/tajikistan-bans-pamir-daily-news-as-extremist-organization/ Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32512871.html
September 08, 2023	International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR)	“Manuchehr’s continued detention is symptomatic of the ongoing civic space restrictions in Tajikistan, which is one of the world’s most repressed countries. Tajikistan authorities have repeatedly levelled trumped-up charges of “extremism” and “terrorism” against journalists, bloggers and activists who criticise the government.”	https://www.iphronline.org/tajikistan-release-independent-human-rights-defender-joint-appeal-on-independence-day.html Russian translation: https://www.iphronline.org/tadzhikistan-vlasti-dolzheny-nemedlenno-osvobodit-zaklyuchennogo-

			pravozashhitnika-sovmestnoe-obrashhenie-v-den-nezavisimosti.html Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32586115.html
September 21, 2023	Amnesty International	<p>“Since May 2022, the Tajikistani authorities have stepped up their ongoing crackdown on Pamiris, an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority originating from the Pamir mountains in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan. They have arbitrarily detained hundreds of Pamiris, including civil society activists and human rights defenders, and imprisoned over 200 of them after convictions in unfair trials, in a campaign aimed at stripping the local communities of their leadership and dismantling their civil society.”</p>	https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur60/7218/2023/en/ Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32603003.html
September 26, 2023	International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor	<p>“In recent months the authorities have increased pressure on CSOs in GBAO – and in particular those who work on human rights and socio-economic issues. Most alarmingly, security officials have reportedly summoned CSO representatives and threatened them with serious repercussions, such as the instigation of criminal cases against them or their relatives, unless they “voluntarily” close down their organisations. [...] This trend has given rise to concerns that the authorities are seeking to fully suppress and eradicate independent CSO activities in the region. [...] In addition, GBAO authorities have tightened control over institutions related to the Aga Khan Development Network, a private international non-profit working to support poor communities in over 30 countries.”</p>	https://www.iphronline.org/tajikistan-suppressing-critical-voices.html https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/tajikistan-suppressing-critical-voices/
September 27, 2023	International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) et al.	<p>In its briefing paper on Central Asian countries for the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, IPHR highlighted that there had been “no accountability for serious human rights violations perpetrated in connection with the authorities’ response to mass protests that took place in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO)”, and described the subsequent crackdown on independent journalists, NGOs and media outlets in Tajikistan.</p>	https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Joint-briefing-on-key-civic-space-concerns-in-Central-Asia-September-2023.pdf Summary: https://www.iphronline.org/civic-space-under-attack-in-central-asia-ngos-document-key-trends.html
October 10, 2023	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	<p>When relatives in Tajikistan were harassed and detained to take revenge on Tajikistani activists in exile who had protested against President Rahmon’s visit in Germany, HRW stated: “The outrageous</p>	https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/06/tajikistan-exiled-activists-relatives-detained-over-protest

		punishment of relatives as proxy for political activists in exile is fundamentally unlawful and shreds multiple basic international human rights norms and obligations”.	Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32627365.html
January 11, 2024	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	In its World Report 2023, HRW states: “Authorities continued their crackdown on dissenting voices in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) following violent dispersal of peaceful demonstrations in the region in 2021 and 2022. Tajik officials refused to acknowledge the Pamiri people of Gorno-Badakhshan, as a distinct ethnic minority.”	https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/tajikistan Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32778019.html
February 22, 2024	Human Rights Watch (HRW)	Transnational repression looks different depending on the context. [...] Transnational repression may mean that a person’s family members who remain at home become targets of collective punishment, such as the Tajik activist whose family in Tajikistan, including his 10-year-old daughter, was detained, interrogated, and threatened. [...] In June and July 2022, at least seven activists of the Pamiri diaspora were abducted from Russia, including Oraz Vazirbekov, who was reported missing at Moscow’s Domodedov airport on July 29. Vazirbekov reappeared in a televised speech in Tajikistan, in which he said that he had returned to Tajikistan “voluntarily” before his disappearance. Earlier, he had expressed fears of being kidnapped by the Tajik authorities. His current whereabouts are unknown.	https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/22/we-will-find-you/global-look-how-governments-repress-nationals-abroad Russian summary: https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32829178.html
January 18, 2024	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	In its 2023 prison census, the CPJ stated: “Tajikistan continues to be the top jailer of journalists in Central Asia, with seven journalists serving prison sentences of between seven and 20 years – all of them convicted since late 2022. A CPJ visit to the country in late 2023 found that the harsh sentences have exacerbated a pervasive climate of fear and self-censorship among journalists in a media environment already decimated by years of government pressure.”	https://cpj.org/reports/2024/01/2023-prison-census-jailed-journalist-numbers-near-record-high-israel-imprisonments-spike/

9.1.4. Religious authorities

January 17, 2022	Aga Khan	He demanded the Ismailis in and from Tajikistan “to reject any form of violence, disorder, illegal activity, or other actions which are contrary	https://the.ismaili/tajikistan/talika-mubarak-mawlana-hazar-imam-17-january-2022
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		to the laws of the land” and “to support the authorities in restoring peace and order”.	
May 19, 2022	Aga Khan	He emphasized that he was “deeply concerned by the recent renewal of unrest in Gorno-Badakshan (sic!)” and urged the Ismailis in and from Tajikistan “to remain calm, abide by the laws of the land, and reject any form of violence, disorder, illegal activity or other actions that may jeopardise its wellbeing”.	https://the.ismaili/tajikistan/talika-mubarak-mawlana-hazar-imam-19-may-2022

9.2. International media coverage since November 2021

Date	Media outlet	Title	Link	Language
December 3, 2021	Courrier international	Tadjikistan: le Haut-Badakhchan, carrefour de la drogue et des grandes puissances	https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/asia-centrale-tadjikistan-le-haut-badakhchan-carrefour-de-la-drogue-et-des-grandes	French
November 29, 2021	Novastan	Tadschikistan: Tote und Verletzte bei Protesten in Berg-Badachschan	https://novastan.org/de/panorama/tadschikistan-tote-und-verletzte-bei-protesten-in-berg-badachschan/	German
February 4, 2022	The Guardian	'We want the truth': families of ethnic Pamiris killed in Tajikistan call for justice as tensions rise	https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/04/we-want-the-truth-families-of-ethnic-pamiris-killed-in-tajikistan-call-for-justice-as-tensions-rise	English
February 11, 2022	News.ru	Разгневанный Памир	https://news.ru/world/razgnevannyj-pamir/	Russian
February 28, 2022	The Diplomat	In Tajikistan's Pamir Mountains, Tensions Simmer Dangerously	https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/in-tajikistans-pamir-mountains-tensions-simmer-dangerously/	English
March 13, 2022	Voice of America	Памир: жизнь в осаде	https://www.golosameriki.com/a/tadjikistan-blokade-pamir/6482417.html	Russian
March 28, 2022	Nowa Europa Wschodnia	Odcięci od świata	https://new.org.pl/2209,rodacka_tadzykistan_gorski_badachschan.html	Polish
April 11, 2022	Global Voices	Blood, tears, and anger in Khorog	https://globalvoices.org/2022/04/11/blood-tears-and-anger-in-khorog/	English
May 18, 2022	Reuters	Nine killed in clash in eastern Tajikistan	https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tajikistan-starts-anti-terror-operation-near-china-afghan-borders-ria-2022-05-18/	English
May 19, 2022	The Guardian	Twenty-five ethnic Pamiris killed by security forces in Tajikistan protests	https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/19/twenty-five-ethnic-pamiris-killed-by-security-forces-gorno-badakhshan-tajikistan-protests	English
May 20, 2022	IWPR	Protests Reignite in Tajikistan's Restive Region	https://iwpr.net/global-voices/protests-reignite-tajikistans-restive-region	English
May 25, 2022	The Diplomat	Internet Severed Again in Tajikistan's GBAO	https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/internet-severed-again-in-tajikistans-gbao/	English

May 25, 2022	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)	Wer protestiert, ist Terrorist	https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/tadschikistan-viele-tote-bei-protesten-gegen-soziale-probleme-18053723.html	German
May 27, 2022	Rebelión	Tayikistán, tormentas en las montañas	https://rebelion.org/tayikistan-tormentas-en-las-montanas/	Spanish
May 27, 2022	Novastan	Tadjikistan: Des dizaines de personnes tuées dans le Haut-Badakhchan	https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/tadjikistan-des-dizaines-de-personnes-tuees-dans-le-haut-badakhchan/	French
May 28, 2022	Novastan	Dutzende Tote: Tadschikistan reagiert mit Härte auf Proteste in Berg-Badachschan	https://novastan.org/de/politik-und-wirtschaft/dutzende-tote-tadschikistan-reagiert-mit-haerte-auf-proteste-in-berg-badachschan/	German
May 29, 2022	Radio Svoboda	Земля над облаками. Ольга Абраменко – о насилии на Памире	https://www.svoboda.org/a/zemlya-nad-oblakami-olga-abramenko---o-nasilii-na-pamire/31865361.html	Russian
May 29, 2022	ADC Memorial	It is Impossible: Dreams of Peace in Pamir	https://adcmemorial.org/en/articles/it-is-impossible-dreams-of-peace-in-pamir/	English
May 29, 2022	BBC Persian	ریشه رویدادهای خونین اخیر در بدخشان تاجیکستان چیست؟	https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-features-61623716	Farsi
June 01, 2022	The Diplomat	The Pamir Powderkeg	https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/the-pamir-powderkeg/	English
June 01, 2022	Lenta.ru	Усмирение Памира	https://m.lenta.ru/articles/2022/06/01/taj_afg/	Russian
June 01, 2022	News.ru	Кто придет через Памир? Горный Бадахшан может стать путем для террористов	https://news.ru/cis/kto-pridet-cherez-pamir-gornyj-badahshan-mozhet-stat-putem-dlya-terroristov/	Russian
June 03, 2022	The Insider	Буча в таджикском Рушане. Как Рахмон расстрелял памирцев, протестовавших против произвола властей	https://theins.ru/politika/251816	Russian
June 16, 2022	Jungle.world	Aufstand in Pamir	https://jungle.world/artikel/2022/24/aufstand-pamir	German
June 22, 2022	Radio Ozodi	Скорбь, печаль и надежда. Репортаж из Рушана и Хорога после майских событий	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html	Russian

June 24, 2022	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty	Heartbreak And Sorrow: Remote Tajik Region In Mourning After Bloody State Crackdown	https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan-bloody-crackdown/31914045.html	English
June 22, 2022	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty	Fear And Outrage In Pamir: Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Reeling From Brutal State Crackdown	https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan-brutal-crackdown/31910506.html	English
June 27, 2022	Nezavisimaya gazeta	Таджикистану придется выбрать – Россия или США	https://www.ng.ru/cis/2022-06-27/1_8471_tajikistan.html	Russian
June 29, 2022	The Diplomat	Tajikistan Lifts Internet Block on GBAO. What's Next?	https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/tajikistan-lifts-internet-block-on-gbao-whats-next/	English
July 11, 2022	Eurasianet	Central Asia's deadly protests have much in common	https://eurasianet.org/central-asias-deadly-protests-have-much-in-common	English
July 19, 2022	Le Monde	Sanglante répression sur le « toit du monde » tadjik	https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/07/19/sanglante-repression-sur-le-toit-du-monde-tadjik_6135353_3210.html	French
August 03, 2022	The Diplomat	Pair of Pamiri Activists Disappear From Russia and Reappear in Tajikistan	https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pair-of-pamiri-activists-disappear-from-russia-and-reappear-in-tajikistan/	English
August 06, 2022	Vot tak	Операция под прикрытием российских спецслужб. Как в России похищают оппозиционеров из Таджикистана	https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/05-08-2022-operatsiya/	Russian
August 19, 2022	Le Monde	Au Tadjikistan, répression massive contre la minorité pamirie	https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/08/19/au-tadjikistan-repression-massive-contre-la-minorite-pamirie_6138460_3210.html	French
August 20, 2022	Le Monde	Tajikistan authorities carry out large-scale crackdown on Pamiri ethnic minority	https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/08/20/tajikistan-authorities-carry-out-large-scale-crackdown-on-pamiri-ethnic-minority_5994229_4.html	English
August 20, 2022	bne Intellinews	Tajikistan's unprecedented GBAO crackdown threatens a centuries-old culture	https://intellinews.com/tajikistan-s-unprecedented-gbao-crackdown-threatens-a-centuries-old-culture-254070/	English
November 13, 2022	Le Monde	L'Europe inefficace face à la répression au Tadjikistan	https://novastan.org/fr/europe-et-asie-centrale/leurope-inefficace-face-a-la-repression-au-tadjikistan/	French

November 19, 2022	Novastan	Tadjikistan : nettoyage ethnique et répression dans le Haut-Badakhchan	https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/tadjikistan-nettoyage-ethnique-et-repression-dans-le-haut-badakhchan/	French
November 24, 2022	Novastan	Tadschikistan: ethnische Säuberungen und Repression in Berg-Badachschan	https://novastan.org/de/politik-und-wirtschaft/tadschikistan-ethnische-saeuberungen-und-repression-in-berg-badachschan/	German
November 27, 2022	Novastan	Tajikistan: “ethnic cleansing” and repression in the Tajik Pamirs	https://novastan.org/en/tajikistan/tajikistan-ethnic-cleansing-and-repression-in-the-tajik-pamirs/	English
November 22, 2022	Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)	Lange unterschätzt, aber gerissener als alle Rivalen: Ein Gewaltherrscher feiert 30 Jahre an der Macht	https://www.nzz.ch/international/tadschikistan-emomali-rachmon-haelt-sich-30-jahre-an-der-macht-ld.1713124	German
December 02, 2022	The Diplomat	What Tajikistan’s Persecution of Faromuz Irgashev Really Means	https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/what-tajikistans-persecution-of-faromuz-irgashev-really-means/	English
December 02, 2022	Tajik Herald	Tajik secret police execute Pamiris	https://tajikherald.com/tajik-secret-police-execute-pamiris/	English
December 13, 2022	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty	Visit By UN Rights Expert Brings No Letup In Tajikistan's 'Parade Of Horrors'	https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-human-rights-united-nations-lawlor-rahmon-climate-fear/32175075.html	English
December 14, 2022	Radio Ozodi	«Парад ужасов»: правозащитный кризис в Таджикистане и молчание международного сообщества	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32176027.html	Russian
December 15, 2022	The Diplomat	Mary Lawlor on the ‘Climate of Fear’ Among Human Rights Defenders in Tajikistan	https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/mary-lawlor-on-the-climate-of-fear-among-human-rights-defenders-in-tajikistan/	English
December 16, 2022	Voice of America (VOA)	Таджикистан: атмосфера страха и репрессий	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Wbv62AXdcM	Russian
February 09, 2023	OKO.press	Polska wyda Ergasza na tortury? Prześladowanych	https://oko.press/polska-wyda-ergasza-na-tortury-przesladowanych-pamirczykow-traktujemy-jak-oszustow	Polish

		Pamirczyków traktujemy jak oszustów		
March 30, 2023	Nowa Europa Wschodnia	Tadżycki dyktator bryluje na salonach, a uchodźcy z jego kraju są odsyłani do domu	https://new.org.pl/2760,wlodek_pamir_emomali_rahmon_tadzykistan_konflikt.html	Polish
May 18, 2023	AsiaTerra	Убийства в Рушане 18-19 мая 2022 года – история в лицах	http://www.asiaterra.info/etnicheskije-menshinstva/ubijstva-v-rushane-18-19-maya-2022-goda-istoriya-v-litsakh	Russian
May 29, 2023	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty	Civil Society The Biggest Casualty Of Crackdowns In Tajikistan And Uzbekistan's Autonomous Regions	https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-uzbekistan-gbao-karakalpakstan-civil-society/32433142.html	English
June 06, 2023	Global Voices	Reporting from 'the roof of the world': How Pamir Daily News works in Tajikistan	https://globalvoices.org/2023/06/06/reporting-from-the-roof-of-the-world-how-pamir-daily-news-works-in-tajikistan/	English
July 26, 2023	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty	Amid Crackdown In Restive Region, Tajikistan Targets Properties Linked To Aga Khan	https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-crackdown-gorno-badakhshan-properties-aga-khan/32520966.html	English
August 15, 2023	The Diplomat	The Tyranny of Fear in Tajikistan	https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/the-tyranny-of-fear-in-tajikistan/	English
September 21, 2023	The Insider	AI: «Памирцев из Таджикистана, ищущих защиты, нельзя принудительно возвращать на родину или передавать в третьи страны, включая Россию»	https://theins.ru/news/265252	Russian
January 19, 2024	The Zurich	The Story of Tajikistan	https://thezuricher.com/the-story-of-tajikistan/	English

9.3. Analyses by international observers since November 2021

Date	Editor/Author	Title	Link	Category	Language
November 28, 2022	Parviz Mullodzhanov	Парвиз Муллоджанов о ситуации в Хороге	https://pamirinside.org/парвиз-муллоджанов-о-ситуации-в-хорог	Text	Russian
December 29, 2021	Anonymous author	О ситуации в ГБАО. Какое морально-психологическое давление испытывает население региона	https://pamirinside.org/о-ситуации-в-гбао-какое-морально-психо	Text	Russian
February 11, 2022	Subhiya Mastonshoeva	What Explains the Endless Protests in GBAO	https://cabar.asia/en/what-explains-the-endless-protests-in-gbao	Text	English
February 13, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	What Is Happening In Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan?	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan/31701487.html	Audio	English
February 18, 2022	Odil Madbekov	What Are the Causes of Protests in Gorno-Badakhshan?	https://cabar.asia/en/what-are-the-causes-of-protests-in-gorno-badakhshan	Text	English
March 30, 2022	Khojimuhammad Umarov	Development specifics of GBAO: Help from the center and the international community is needed	https://cabar.asia/en/development-specifics-of-gbao-help-from-the-center-and-the-international-community-is-needed	Text	English
May 22, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	What's Behind The Continuing Violence in Gorno-Badakhshan?	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-tajikistan-gorno-badakhshan/31862208.html	Audio	English
May 27, 2022	Central Asia Program	The Reasons Behind a New Wave of Violence in the Pamirs	https://centralasiaprogram.org/reasons-wave-violence-pamirs	Video	English
May 30, 2022	Minority Rights Group	Why Tajikistan's indigenous Pamiri need our attention	https://minorityrights.org/2022/05/12/tajikistan-pamiri/	Video	English

June 01, 2022	Edward Lemon	Tajikistan's Crackdown in the Pamirs: Causes and Implications	https://jamestown.org/program/tajikistans-crackdown-in-the-pamirs-causes-and-implications/	Text	English
June 02, 2022	CABAR.Asia	The role of Russia in the Pamirs: an actor or an observer?	https://cabar.asia/en/the-role-of-russia-in-the-pamirs-an-actor-or-an-observer	Text	English
June 06, 2022	Dimitris Symeonidis	How to Avoid Future Electricity Crises in GBAO?	https://cabar.asia/en/how-to-avoid-future-electricity-crises-in-gbao	Text	English
June 12, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	Tajikistan Hiding Security Operation In Pamirs From The World	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-tajikistan-badakhshan/31894618.html	Audio	English
June 25, 2022	Radio Ozodi	Гапи Озод: Неужели в Рушане не было другого выхода, кроме как операция?	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31914647.html	Video	Tajik / Russian
July 10, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	Violence In Central Asia's Only Two Autonomous Regions	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-gorno-badakhshan-karakalpakstan/31936841.html	Audio	English
July 13, 2022	Kirill Krivosheev	Crises in Central Asia Belie the Region's Ability to Democratize	https://carnegieendowment.org/eurasiainsight/87495	Text	English
July 26, 2022	Aziz Berdiqulov	ECMI Minorities Blog. Events in Tajikistan's Pamir – A Vicious Cycle of Unresolved Conflicts?	https://doi.org/10.53779/SMQP3388	Text	English
August 02, 2022	University of Oxford	Tajikistan: Politics After Civil War	https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/tajikistan-politics-after-civil-war	Video	English
August 03, 2022	Open Democracy	The assassination that shook the Pamir Mountains to the core	https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gorno-badakhshan-mamadboqirov-tajikistan-pamir-mountains/	Text	English
August 14, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	Central Asians Seeking Asylum In Europe	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-asylum-europe/31987321.html	Audio	English

September 26, 2022	Mostowlansky, Till	Dying Dreams in Tajikistan's Global Borderland	https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2022.121.837.277	Text	English
September 28, 2022	ODIHR OSCE	Pamiri ethnic minority facing increasing repression in Tajikistan	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3hvLb95hkY	Video	English
October 05, 2022	ADC Memorial	Репрессии против памирцев в Таджикистане: многочисленные жертвы, беззаконие, безнаказанность	https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/repressii-protiv-pamirczev-v-tadzhikistane-mnogochislennye-zhertvy-bezzakonie-beznakazannost/	Text	Russian
October 05, 2022	ADC Memorial	Repressions against the Pamiris in Tajikistan: numerous victims, lawlessness, impunity	https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/repressions-against-the-pamiris-in-tajikistan-numerous-victims-lawlessness-impunity/	Text	English
October 14, 2022	Zentralasien-Analysen	Berg-Badachschan und Tadschikistans stille Abkehr vom Westen: Blutiges Ende der »ismailitischen Intervention«?	https://laender-analysen.de/zentralasien-analysen/154/berg-badachschan-und-tadschikistans-stille-abkehr-vom-westen-blutiges-ende-der-ismailitischen-intervention/	Text	German
October 23, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	A Terrible Year In Tajikistan	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-tajikistan-crackdown-pannier/32096840.html	Audio	English
November 10, 2022	U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom	The Persecution of Muslims in Tajikistan	https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-spotlight/persecution-muslims-tajikistan	Audio	English
December 04, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	Tajikistan Jails More Pamiris In Gorno-Badakhshan Crackdown	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-gorno-badakhshan-repression/32161079.html	Audio	English
December 15, 2022	Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies	Crackdown on Pamiris in Tajikistan: Domestic, Regional, and Geopolitical Contexts	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B84H-e6irWw	Video	English

December 18, 2022	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	A Talk About Tajikistan With The UN's Special Rapporteur For Human Rights Defenders	https://www.rferl.org/a/mailis-podcast-tajikistan-mary-lawlor-un-human-rights/32182071.html	Audio	English
January 07, 2023	William Roberts	Краткая история репрессий против Памирского этнического меньшинства в Таджикистане	https://pamirinside.org/istoriya-repressiy-protiv-pamircev/	Text	Russian
January 08, 2023	Abubakr Samarkandi	Памирские события. Стратегический провал при тактической победе	https://telegra.ph/Pamirskie-sobytiya-Strategicheskij-proval-pri-takticheskoy-pobede-01-08	Text	Russian
January 26, 2023	ADC Memorial	Five stories about Pamir and the Pamiris	https://adcmemorial.org/en/articles/five-stories-about-pamir-and-the-pamiris/	Text	English
January 26, 2023	ADC Memorial	Пять историй о Памире и памирцах	https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/pyat-istorij-o-pamire-i-pamirczah/	Text	Russian
May 07, 2023	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	A Year Of Repression Against Tajikistan's Pamiris In Gorno-Badakhshan	https://www.rferl.org/a/mailis-podcast-tajikistan--pamiris-gbao-pannier/32400480.html	Audio	English
May 11, 2023	Radio Ozodi	«Заложники своей политики». Почему правительство Таджикистана не смягчает давление на свободу?	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32406054.html	Text	Russian
May 15, 2023	Open Democracy	The last Ismaili khalifa in the mountains of Tajikistan	https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tajikistan-pamiri-gorno-badakhshan-gbao-davlatmirov-ismaili/	Text	English
May 17, 2023	William Roberts	One year since arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders in Tajikistan –	https://pamirinside.org/year-since-arbitrary-arrests-of-pamiri-hrd-eng/	Text	English

May 17, 2023	William Roberts	what has been the international response? Год спустя произвольных арестов на Востоке Таджикистана– какой была международная реакция?	https://pamirinside.org/year-since-arbitrary-arrests-of-pamiri-hrd-rus/	Text	Russian
May 29, 2023	ADC Memorial	Repressions against the Pamiris in Tajikistan: numerous victims, lawlessness, impunity	https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/repressions-against-the-pamiris-in-tajikistan-numerous-victims-lawlessness-impunity/	Text	English
June 02, 2023	William Roberts	Tajikistan’s human rights abuses: Western hypocrisy?	https://pamirinside.org/tajikistans-human-rights-abuses-western-hypocrisy/	Text	English
June 02, 2023	William Roberts	Нарушения прав человека в Таджикистане: лицемерие Запада?	https://pamirinside.org/human-rights-violations-in-tajikistan-hypocrisy-of-the-west-russ/	Text	Russian
July 16, 2023	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	UN Experts Decry Tajik Government's Increasing Rights Violations	https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-pannier-tajikistan-rights/32505690.html	Text	English
July 18, 2023	Open Democracy	Tajikistan’s Pamiris: Persecuted, disappeared, and forgotten by the world	https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tajikistan-pamiri-khorog-persecution/?utm_source=social&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=rss	Text	English
August 21, 2023	Special Eurasia	Emomali Rahmon’s Official Visit to Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region: Why Does It Matter?	https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/08/21/emomali-rahmon-gbao-visit/	Text	English
2023	Crude Accountability	Enforced Disappearances in Tajikistan	https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf	Text	English

October 15, 2023	RFE/RL Majlis Podcast	Tajik Authorities Called Out For Enforced Disappearances, Transnational Repression	https://www.rferl.org/a/32638152.html	Audio	English
December 22, 2023	Carnegie politika	Will the Third Time Be the Charm for Tajikistan's Thwarted Power Transition?	https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91315	Text	English
January 04, 2024	Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)	In Tajikistan, independent media throttled by state repression	https://cpj.org/2024/01/in-tajikistan-independent-media-throttled-by-state-repression/	Text	English
January 17, 2024	ADC Memorial	Reaction of international bodies to the situation in GBAO (Tajikistan) in 2023	https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/reaction-of-international-bodies-to-the-situation-in-gbao-tajikistan-in-2023/	Text	English
January 17, 2024	ADC Memorial	Реакция международных органов на ситуацию в ГБАО (Таджикистан) в 2023 году	https://adcmemorial.org/novosti/reakciya-mezhdunarodnyh-organov-na-situaciyu-v-gbao-tadzhikistan-v-2023-godu/	Text	Russian

9.4.Synopsis of information about individual fatalities in GBAO since November 2021

The following list of identifiable fatalities contains those individuals who have been killed in GBAO by security forces since November 2021 and about whom information is publicly available. It is not a complete list of fatalities, especially when it comes to those who were killed in Rushan district on and after May 18, 2022, but rather a synopsis of what is currently known. Other lists of fatalities have been published by Radio Ozodi²⁶⁴ and journalist Anora Sarkorova²⁶⁵.

The list of information fragments contains pieces of information which cannot be assigned to identifiable individuals (yet). To avoid duplications, they are not included in the main list of identifiable fatalities.

9.4.1. Identifiable fatalities

Date of death	Place of death	Name	Year of birth	Place of residence	Circumstances of death	Publicly available sources
November 25, 2021	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)	Ziyobekov, Gulbiddin	1992	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)	Injured by security forces when trying to escape detention in Tavdem. Still alive when detained. The dead body returned to the relatives in Khorugh the same day was full of haematomas and grazes and had several bullet wounds.	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31592468.html https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20211225/segodnya-mesyats-sobitiyam-v-horoge-cto-izmenilos-i-cto-budet-dalshe?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 https://t.me/pamirinside/356 https://t.me/pamirnews04/2722 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/56 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/366 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/641 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/645
November 25, 2021	Khorugh	Murodbekov, Gulnazar	1977	Redjist (Roshtkala district)	Shot dead by security forces during protest after suspected extrajudicial killing of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/59 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/368 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/666 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/790
November 25, 2021	Khorugh	Amirshoev, Tutisho	1998	Redjist (Roshtkala district)	Shot dead by security forces during protest after suspected extrajudicial killing of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/58 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/368 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/622

²⁶⁴ <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html>, <https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32420225.html>.

²⁶⁵ <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1259>.

						https://t.me/anorasarkorova/665
May 16, 2022	Khorugh	Nazarshoev, Zamir	1992 / 1993	Khorugh	Sitting outside in Gulaken neighbourhood close to the main road. Shot by security forces.	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34065-vazorati-kor-oi-dokhil-khabar-medi-ad-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31854152.html https://t.me/anserenko/4275 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/1
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Nazarbekov / Khusainiev / Asainiev, Todjiddin	1999	Barushan / Dehrushan (Rushan district)	Shot by security forces during crackdown on protesters in Vamar. Received three bullet wounds and died on the spot. His father died on November 29, 2022.	https://t.me/anserenko/4309 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/7 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (16) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/8 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/674 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/679 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1068 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1263
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Sharipov, Ismat	1979 / 1984	Vamar (Rushan district)	Stonemason. Participated in the protests in Vamar on May 17-18, 2022. Was injured during the crackdown on protesters by security forces. Was still able to walk a few meters with support by a nurse. However, security forces prohibited the nurse to take him to the hospital and beat him. Died from a loss of blood. Left his wife with three children. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (2) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/192 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (4) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 8) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/17 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1270
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Kurbonasenov, Mukhiddin	1987	Vamar (Rushan district)	Participated in the protests in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Fled to the mountain gorge north of Vamar during the crackdown. Shot from a helicopter. A video shows how the corpse is inspected by security forces.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (27) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/353 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/354 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (2) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-

					No weapons visible. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 10) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/11 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1280
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Khursandov, Asliddin	1992 / 1993	Vamar (Rushan district)	Participated in the protests in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Fled to the mountain gorge north of Vamar during the crackdown. Shot from a helicopter. A video shows how the corpse is inspected by security forces. No weapons visible. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (29) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/353 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/354 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (6) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 10) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/14 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1279
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Muzrobov / Mizrobov / Quvvatbekov, Ekhsan	1997	Derzud (Rushan district)	Wrestler. Friend of Ardasher Munosibov, tortured together with him in the base of the border guards. Corpse was naked when found, with traces of torture. Buried in Derzud.	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (15) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (2) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (2) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/462 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 14) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/24 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1284

May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Zavkibekov, Nusrat	1984 / 1985	Derzud (Rushan district)	Arrested at his brother's house in Vamar. Shot at the police headquarters but survived. Corpse was naked when found, with traces of torture and broken hand. Buried in Derzud.	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (14) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (3) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (3) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 15) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/23 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1285
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Nasrullobekov / Mirulloev, Munir	1995 / 1996	Derzud / Barzud (Rushan district)	Circumstances of death are unclear. Corpse was naked when found, with traces of torture.	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (19, 25) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 14-15) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/12 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1293
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Nazriev, Shogunbek / Shogun	1967	Vamar (Rushan district)	Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022, but was on the way to meet a friend when the violent crackdown started. Was shot in both legs. Could reach a nearby house but the security forces did not let an ambulance pass. Bled to death. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (4) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (1) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 13)

						https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/19 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1294
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Abutorobov, Ruslan	1992	Vamar (Rushan district)	Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Was detained at home and taken to the police headquarters. His mother found the corpse a few hours later.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (7) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/3 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1276
Probably May 18, 2022		Shirinbekov, Salim	1980	Vamar (Rushan district)	One of the first casualties of the crackdown in Vamar. Circumstances of death unclear.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (1) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 15) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/16 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1292
May 18-19, 2022	Khorugh	Kurbonmamadov, Kurbonmamad	1981	Vamar (Rushan district)	Temporarily staying in Shujand, sold vegetables at market in Vamar. Left the house on May 18, 2022, in the morning to go to Vamar. His corpse was delivered to Shujand on an ambulance on May 19, 2022.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (12) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/4 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1272
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Munosibov, Ardasher	1996	Derzud (Rushan district)	Participated in the protests in Vamar on May 17-18, 2022. Received bullet wound in the leg/foot during the violent crackdown on the protesters. Could not be taken to the hospital in Vamar because of shooting. Went to his home village Derzud and got first aid there. Returned to Vamar to ease his mother. Was pulled out of the car by GKNB staff when entering Vamar and taken to the base of the border	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31859367.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (18) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/318 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (1) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (1) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/462 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-

					guards. Forced to dress Afghan uniform and hold weapons in front of the camera. Heavily tortured physically and humiliated verbally, allegedly by Umed Khamidzoda, the Head of Police in Rushan district. Friend of Ekhsan Mizrobov, tortured together with him. Was disembowelled, his ears were cut off, his fingers and toes were broken, his body was full of grazes and bruises. Executed with a shot into the mouth. His mother lost conscience when seeing his corpse. Buried in Derzud.	d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 8) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1106 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1264
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Gulomshoev, Munavvar	1986 / 1987	Vamar (Rushan district)	Son of sportsman Vakhtdavlat Gulomshoev. Was evacuating injured protesters during the violent crackdown and bringing them to the hospital. Was detained when trying to reach the area under fire by security forces. Many bones broken because of torments. Shot into the head from very near by security forces. Skull was torn apart. Corpse was not recognizable anymore. Left a pregnant wife (8 th month).	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (8) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/181 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 9) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/20 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1271
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Nizokatov / Nazokatov, Alikhon	1997	Vamar (Rushan district)	Trying to evacuate injured protesters, carrying them to the hospital on his back. Arrested by security forces when attempting to take photos and videos of the crackdown and of injuries. Taken to their office and brutally tormented. Corpse was found disembowelled and with devastated face (front teeth beaten out). Security	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/3 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/64 (2) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (9) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/181 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-

					forces dragged his corpse and dumped it in an old building.	d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 8-9) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/6 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1127 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1262
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Murodmamadov / Nurmamadov, Umed	1989 / 1990	Vamar (Rushan district)	Did not take part in the protests in Vamar on May 17-18, 2022. Supported nurses to take injured people to the hospital. Was arrested by security forces and taken to the police office. Beaten severely. Last seen alive on May 18, 2022. The authorities announced him to have disappeared. On June 1, 2022, his relatives identified his corpse on a photo. His nose was broken, one eye was swollen, there were no teeth left in the mouth, the body was full of hematomas. As the face was not recognizable anymore, he had to be identified based on the wound of an appendectomy. His corpse had mistakenly been given to another family and buried in Derushan village.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (30) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/538 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/15 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1286
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Kimatshoev / Qimatshoev, Alisher	1975	Vamar (Rushan district)	Detained by security forces on May 18, 2022, at around 7.30 am. Found dead on May 19, 2022, in a building of the district hospital. Allegedly tortured by the Head of Police of Rushan district, Umed Khamidzoda. Shot into the head or heart. The body was full of grazes, bruises and burns of cigarettes, the front teeth were missing. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/68 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/69 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (5) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (7) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-

						d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 9-10) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/5 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/817 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1106 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1274
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Bayozov, Jumanazar	1967	Vamar (Rushan district)	Detained by security forces in the morning of May 18, 2022, after bringing his wife to work. Kept in detention in the evening, whereas some of his neighbours were released. Was alive and in good condition at that time. His corpse was found on May 19, 2022, in the district hospital. Executed with a shot in the neck. Many traces of beating, there were many bruises and grazes.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/87 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (10) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 9) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/2 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1266
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Amrikhudoev, Yodgor	1984 / 1987	Vamar (Rushan district)	Went to work in a governmental or non-governmental organization on May 18, 2022, in the morning. Was taken from his workplace by security forces under the pretext of checking his document. Taken to the police headquarters. His corpse was found on May 19, 2022, with burns and traits of strokes, as well as bullet wounds. Buried at cemetery of Yemch village.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (28) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/540 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/7 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1267
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Muborakshoev / Mamadnazarov, Nekkadam / Nikkadam	1964 / 1965 / 1969	Dehrushan (Rushan district)	Had returned from Russia four months before and was building a house in his village. Went to the bank (in the district centre of Vamar?) to withdraw money transferred by his daughter from Russia. His family received his corpse from that place (Vamar?). It	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (26) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31909565.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/13 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1290

					was braised/scorched and unrecognizable.	
Probably May 18-19, 2022		Sodikov / Sodiqov, Amonjon	1974	Vamar (Rushan district)	Neighbour of Ismat Sharipov. Participated in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Circumstances of death unclear. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (3) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (5) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 13) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/18 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1110 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1273
Probably May 18-19, 2022		Gulobshoev, Khovar	1977	Derzud (Rushan district)	Circumstances of death unclear. Buried at Derzud cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (11) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (4) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (4) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 13-14) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/21 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1277
Probably May 18-19, 2022		Ozodmamadov, Daler	1984	Dehrushan (Rushan district)	Circumstances of death unclear.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (13) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/22 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1278
Probably May 18-19, 2022		Pallaev, Safdarkul	1968	Barushon (Rushan district)	Circumstances of death unclear.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (32-2) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/30

May 19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Rushtov / Rashtov, Shukhrat	1978	Vamar (Rushan district)	Participated in protests in Vamar on May 17-18, 2022. Detained by security forces and taken to their headquarters on May 19, 2022, in the morning. Interrogated and executed by gunfire. Buried at Vamar cemetery.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1291 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/5 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (6) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/412 (3) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 9) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/9 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1275
May 19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Khushachinov, Khushbakht	1964	Vamar (Rushan district)	Detained and interrogated by security forces on May 18, 2022. Committed suicide by hanging himself the day after ²⁶⁶ .	https://t.me/pamirinside/898 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/142 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (31) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 12) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1289
May 22, 2022	Khorugh	Mamadbokirov, Mamadbokir	1963	Khorugh	Informal authority and community leader in Bar Khorugh neighbourhood of Khorugh. Went for a walk in Boinya neighbourhood. Assassinated by four gunmen of Tajikistani special forces at around 5.30 pm. Allegedly, a surveillance drone was filming his assassination.	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31127764.html https://bomdodrus.com/2021/11/17/eshhe-odna-trevozhnaja-noch-v-horoge-cto-budet-s-mestnym-liderom-mamadbokirom-video/ https://fergana.media/news/124957/ https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34110-zayavlenie-press-tsentra-ministerstva-vnutrennikh-del-respubliki-tadzhikistan https://t.me/pamirinside/804

²⁶⁶ In addition, journalist Anora Sarkorova reported a case of attempted suicide by Aliyor Shonazmiev (born 1976, from Vamar) before interrogation by the security forces. This case is not included in the list because the person survived: <https://t.me/anorasarkorova/149>.

						https://t.me/anorasarkorova/40 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/44 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31862351.html https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-local-residents-say-pamiri-leader-killed-by-government-troops https://t.me/pamirinside/1053 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/231 https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/gor-no-badakhshan-mamadboqirov-tajikistan-pamir-mountains https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/31 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1348 https://pamirinside.org/who-was-mamadboqirov/ https://t.me/pamirinside/2073
May 22, 2022	Khorugh	Davlatmamadov, Khursand	1987	Khorugh	Killed by gunfire from Tajikistani special forces during the extralegal execution of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/44 https://t.me/pamirinside/1014 (65) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/34 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1324
May 27, 2022	Barushon (Rushan district)	Karimov, Rizvon	1967	Barushan (Rushan district)	Knew the hiding place of some of the protesters who had fled to the mountains after the violent crackdown in Vamar on May 18, 2022 (probably Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov and others) and brought them food. Was interrogated by security forces and pressured to disclose their hiding place. Reportedly committed suicide by hanging himself to avoid betraying his friends.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (32) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/439 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 12) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1288

May 31, 2022	Derzud (Rushan district)	Gulomkhaidarov, Yodgor	1974	Derzud (Rushan district)	Field commander of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) under Mirzo Ziyoyev in the 1990ies. Informal community leader in Vamar. Reported on May 23, 2022, to have disappeared. Reported by the Ministry of the Interior to have been killed in the mountains above Derzud village. No reliable account of circumstances of death available. Buried at Derzud cemetery.	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (2) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31863489.html https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83 https://t.me/pamirinside/916 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (20) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (5) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (5) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/25 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1281 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1360
May 31, 2022	Derzud (Rushan district)	Pochoev, Alisher	1976	Vamar (Rushan district)	Reported by the Ministry of the Interior to have been killed in the mountains above Derzud village. No reliable account of circumstances of death available. Buried at Derzud cemetery. Had four children of whom three have become orphans.	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (3) https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (21) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (6) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/350

						https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (6) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 10) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/26 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1269 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1361
May 31, 2022	Derzud (Rushan district)	Mavlododov, Habib	1987	Derzud (Rushan district)	Reported by the Ministry of the Interior to have been killed in the mountains above Derzud village. No reliable account of circumstances of death available. Buried at Derzud cemetery.	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (4) https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (22) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (7) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (7) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 11-12)

						https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/27 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1072 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1282 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1362
May 31, 2022	Derzud (Rushan district)	Pallaev / Palaev, Dokhunda	1969	Vamar / Derzud (Rushan district)	Reported by the Ministry of the Interior to have been killed in the mountains above Derzud village. No reliable account of circumstances of death available. Buried at Derzud cemetery.	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2(6) https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (24) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (9) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (9) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 12) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/29 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1283 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1314 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1364
May 31, 2022	Derzud (Rushan district)	Shekhburov, Jangibek	1992	Vamar (Rushan district)	Labour migrant in Poland. Returned to Vamar for his wedding. Participated in the protests in Vamar on May 17-18, 2022. Reported by the Ministry of the	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-

					Interior to have been killed in the mountains above Derzud village. No reliable account of circumstances of death available. His son was born after his killing. Buried at Derzud cemetery.	shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (5) https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31876653.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/83 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (23) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/311 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/322 (8) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/343 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/411 (8) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/410 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 12) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/28 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1265 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1363
June 12, 2022	Khorugh	Mazorov, Khursand	1972	Khorugh	Informal authority in UPD neighbourhood of Khorugh. According to some accounts, he committed suicide with explosives to avoid detention. According to other accounts, he was assassinated by security forces.	https://fergana.media/articles/102296/ https://t.me/pamirinside/968 https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstv-ennyi-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-2/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894874.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1053 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/32
June 12, 2022	Khorugh	Rajabov, Zoir	1972	Khorugh	Informal authority in UPD neighbourhood of Khorugh. According	https://fergana.media/articles/102296/

					to some accounts, he committed suicide with explosives to avoid detention. According to other accounts, he was assassinated by security forces.	https://t.me/pamirinside/968 https://khovar.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstv-ennyi-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-2/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894874.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32087992.html#/detail/33
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9.4.2. Information fragments about (possibly) additional fatalities

Date of death	Place of death	Name	Year of birth	Place of residence	Circumstances of death	Publicly available sources
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	Kobilov, Yodgor ("Gosha Vamar")			Was reported to have been killed on May 18, 2022. The authorities denied this and presented a video on May 21, 2022, in which he confirmed that he was alive.	https://t.me/anserenko/4307 https://bomdodrus.com/2022/05/21/gosha-vamar-zhiv-vlasti-oprovergli-sluhi-o-ego-smerti-vo-vremja-specoperacii-video/
May 18, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	N.N.				https://t.me/anserenko/4308
May 18-19, 2022	Vamar (Rushan district)	N.N.	1995 / 1996	Vamar (Rushan district)	Injured at the beginning of the shooting. Taken to the GKNB office. The corpse returned to the relatives was full of bruises and had several bullet wounds. Neighbour of Alikhon Nizokatov.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/64
Probably May 18-19, 2022		Tobshoev, Salim	1980		<i>Possibly identical with Shirinbekov, Salim.</i>	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/176 (17)
July 06, 2022	Khorugh	Gulobov, Abdurahim	1956	Bidiz (Roshtkala district)	According to Pamir Daily News, he was arrested by security forces together with his son for allegedly having a hunting weapon in their house. Passed	https://t.me/pamirinside/1082 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31935007.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1455

					away during interrogation, allegedly because of the pressure put on him. According to another source, only his son was arrested. He passed away when trying to meet his son in detention. The authorities did not comment on the reasons of his death.	
September 10, 2022	Khorugh	Khujnazarov / Khujanazarov, Abdumamad		Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Neighbour and friend of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Was visited by the police on September 7 or 8, 2022. Bid farewell to his family on September 10, 2022, announcing that he would not surrender alive to the security forces, prepared his funeral service, and disappeared. His Pickup vehicle was discovered in Panj river. Probably committed suicide. The authorities assumed a car accident.	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/479 https://pamirinside.org/принуждение-к-суициду-или-несчастный/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/09/11/v-horogechishez-abdumamad-hudzhanazarov-sosed-i-drug-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/09/11/prokurat-ura-gbao-protiv-soseda-bokira-ne-bylo-dela-abdumamad-prosto-popal-v-dtp/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/09/23/telo-soseda-i-druga-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-nashli-spustja-11-sutok-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (2)
November 09, 2022	Khorugh	N.N.		Dushanbe	Died from a heart attack after meeting his son in the remand prison in Dushanbe, shocked about his condition.	https://t.me/pamirinside/1455
February 06, 2023	Roshtkala (Roshtkala district)	Ramazonov, Nazardod	1962	Roshtkala	Head of Anjin municipality (Roshtkala district). Summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security several days before his death and pressured to record a video statement with false accusations. Corpse was found hanging in a damaged building behind the district	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/874

					administration building of Roshtkala district.	
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9.5.Synopsis of information about detentions since November 2021

The following list contains those natives of GBAO who were detained by security forces in Tajikistan since November 2021 and about whose detention information is publicly available or has been received from trusted sources. It also includes individuals who were detained elsewhere in Tajikistan but whose detention is related to the crackdown in GBAO. It is not a complete list of detained persons. It includes information from the list of prisoners published by Pamir Daily News²⁶⁷.

The list of information fragments contains pieces of information about individuals who are included in lists of prisoners but about whom no further information is publicly available (yet). To avoid duplications, they are not included in the main list of identifiable fatalities.

9.5.1. Publicly documented detentions in Tajikistan related to the GBAO crackdown

Date of detention	Name	Place of residence	Further information	Art. Crim. Code	Sentence (years)	Publicly available sources
2013	Ayombekov, Okil		Brother of Tolib Ayombekov. Convicted of being involved in the killing of Abdullo Nazarov in 2012 and sentenced to 17 years in prison in 2013. Sentenced to additional 16 years in prison on November 22, 2022.			https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/2012-0813/niat-khovar-tolib-aiembekov-sdalsya-pravookhranitelnym-organam https://rus.ozodi.org/a/high-court-sentenced-17-years-prison-killers-general-nazarov-/24914940.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/24696020.html https://fergana.media/articles/102296/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630

²⁶⁷ <https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/>.

2013	Murodov / Muratov, Hamza		Driver of Tolib Ayombekov. Convicted of being involved in killing of Abdullo Nazarov in 2012 and sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2013. Sentence extended to 30 years on November 22, 2022.			https://fergana.media/articles/102296/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629
Before January 5, 2022	Amadbekov / Akmadbekov, Sodik	Khorugh	Leading figure among sportspersons in GBAO. Arrested upon arrival at Dushanbe Airport. Accused of hooliganism. Forced to make a public statement incriminating the youth of Khorugh and fined on January 5, 2022. Sentenced to two years in prison by Dushanbe district court in May 2022.	237.3 328.1 330.1	2	https://t.me/pamirinside/294 https://t.me/pamirinside/295 https://bomdodrus.com/2022/01/06/dvuh-urozhencev-badahshana-zaderzhali-v-ajeroportu-dushanbe-po-pribytii-iz-turcii/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/01/15/mvd-zhitel-horoga-sodik-amadbekov-sam-dobrovolno-sdalsja-vlastjam-video/ https://t.me/pamirinside/631 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (188)
Before January 5, 2022	Gulayozov, Gulayoz	Khorugh	Leading figure among sportspersons in GBAO. Arrested upon arrival at Dushanbe Airport. Accused of hooliganism. Sentenced to two years in prison by			https://t.me/pamirinside/294

			Dushanbe district court in May 2022.			
Before February 17, 2022	Khurramov, Dilovar	Tavdem (Roshtkala)	Eyewitness of the operation of the security forces during/after which Gulbiddin Ziyobekov was killed on November 25, 2021.	328.2		https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31708782.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (37)
Before February 19, 2022	Imomnazarov, Salam	UPD (Khorugh)	Sportsman and son of Imomnazar Imomnazarov, an informal authority in UPD neighbourhood of Khorugh who was assassinated in August 2021. Arrested upon arrival at Dushanbe Airport. Sentenced before June 24, 2022. Property confiscated.	200.4	16	https://t.me/pamirinside/507 https://t.me/anserenko/3625 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31781368.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1025 https://t.me/pamirinside/1053 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31999266.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (165)
March 05, 2022	Amirshoev, Tutiyo	Rijist (Roshtkala district)	Cousin of Tutisho Amirshoev who was killed by security forces in Khorugh on November 25, 2021. Sentenced on/before June 26, 2022. Reportedly sent to the isolation cell and kept incommunicado in November 2023.		8.5	https://t.me/pamirinside/589 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/199 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (198) https://pamirinside.org/tutiyo-amirshoev-in-shizo/
March 31, 2022	Sherov, Manuchehr	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Surrender requested from Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov in	237.3(a) 330.1	10	https://t.me/pamirinside/398 https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/33821-sherov-manuche-r-baroi-avboshi-oyash-dastgir-shud-2

			February 2022. Detained for allegedly participating in a brawl with security officers in November 14, 2021. Sentenced on April 15, 2022.			https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid02CEjpGKnjbcce3asgQaKiLrCNV4nLbE3zKYJtpw pz4bcUb4beKKdX7sAJSzg7d8wGI https://t.me/pamirinside/604 https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid02fJR5KGbT454Eji1JmUrEpBPwsZap4EpMzd19JfRptXHUCjTpSk7jGkz8wvVi7wUCI https://t.me/pamirinside/631 https://bomdodrus.com/2022/08/24/troe-blizkih-ljudej-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira-poluchili-po-25-let-kolonii-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(102)
April 12, 2022	Sultonshoev, Khurshedsho	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Had been sentenced to nine years in prison in 2010. Surrender requested from Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov in February 2022. Detained for alleged hooliganism, violence and insults of state representatives. Had allegedly insulted and beaten a policeman On November 4, 2020. Sentenced on April 27, 2022.	237.3 328.1 330.1 195 200.3 111.2	18	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/33901-khabari-markazi-robita-oi-am-iyatii-rajosati-kdam-t-dar-vmkb-2 https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid026dqdrd6KYBxRZDTs2tkh3zB76hmEJzJN4KjGDwTPhCi6oAnXNejZmFDoUxf7nxrl https://t.me/pamirinside/398 https://t.me/pamirinside/613 https://t.me/pamirinside/619 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (84)
April 18, 2022	Saidibrogimov, Firuz	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Allegedly surrendered voluntarily after a neighbourhood meeting with the police. Sentenced on May 30, 2022.	237	0.8	https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0f1pKAT8mY6fnaakJes3kytmtEE6pSM1d6uDCzst7JxYgucjmiFkShVTtzi7UGUil https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0PEdjX9tzST5PCbSSVWnb1eYChchTwuuyB2J3VxqM6SUi3WhFwCrbfxLzm6pa3HN2I

						https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (48)
April 12, 2022	Farmonbekov, Shodijon / Shodikhon	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Sentenced to 4 years in prison. Sentenced on April 27, 2022.	111.2 328.1	4.5	https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid026dqdrd6KYBxRZDTs2tkh3zB76hmEJjzJN4KjGDwTPhCi6oAnXNejZmFDoUxf7nxrI https://t.me/pamirinside/631 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (182)
May 18, 2022	Mamadshoeva, Ulfatkhonim	Dushanbe	Journalist and civil society activist. Accused of illegal foreign funding of terrorism and orchestrating protests in Khorugh and Rushan district. Trial started on August 03, 2022, and took place behind closed doors. The general prosecutor demanded 25 years in prison. Sentenced before December 09, 2022 for alleged formation of a criminal group, murder, terrorism, treason and attempted illegal takeover of power. Imprisoned in Nurek. Reportedly seriously sick in February 2024.	179 187 194 305 307	21	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34065-vazorati-kor-oi-dokhil-khabar-medi-ad-2 https://jfj.fund/jfj/ulfathonim-mamadshoeva/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31856335.html https://mediazona.ca/article/2022/05/23/ulfat https://vkrisis.ru/world/den-zhanny-dark/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31858681.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31863660.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=H6bA57qgaZU https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31866669.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31868332.html https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-activist-faces-prison-over-alleged-plotting-with-us-government https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/26/tajikistan-stop-abusing-autonomous-region-protesters https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/arbitrary-detention-of-prominent-human-rights-defender-ulfathonim-mamadshoeva https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31946044.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/352 https://cpj.org/2022/08/tajikistan-authorities-detain-pamiri-journalists-ulfatkhonim-mamadshoeva-and-khushruz-jumayev-for-more-than-2-months/ https://t.me/anserenko/4882 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31989461.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32046122.html

					https://pamirinside.org/холбаш-холбашов-приговорен-к-пожизне https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 41-43) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32169220.html https://pamirinside.org/гражданская-активистка-ульфатхоним https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32170517.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/725 https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-journalist-sentenced-to-21-years-in-prison https://cpj.org/2022/12/tajikistan-authorities-sentence-2-journalists-to-lengthy-prison-terms/ https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-heavy-prison-sentences-for-rights-defenders-from-gorno https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/human-rights-defender-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-sentenced-15-years-imprisonment https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32226992.html https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1822-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-505.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32242339.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32406246.html https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27423 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27560 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (200)
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						https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32656415.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32825906.html
May 18, 2022	Kholbashev / Kholbashov, Kholbash	Dushanbe	<p>Military officer. Former husband of Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva. Life-safer of President Rahmon. Accused of being responsible for the protests in Rushan district. Trial on "Rushan case" started on August 03, 2022, and took place behind closed doors. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, for alleged terrorism and murder. Pleaded not guilty and revoked his confession which had allegedly been made under torture and broadcasted publicly. Was allegedly blackmailed with his children's life.</p>		Life	https://t.me/pamirinside/701 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31858681.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/6 https://khover.tj/2022/05/markazi-matbuoti-vazorati-kor-oi-dohilii-um-urii-to-ikiston-habar-medi-ad https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=H6bA57qgaZU https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31946044.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/352 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/389 https://t.me/anosenko/4882 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31989461.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/517 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32046122.html https://pamirinside.org/холбаш-холбашов-приговорен-к-пожизне https://fergana.media/news/127855/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (1) https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 44-46) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/551 https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-journalist-sentenced-to-21-years-in-prison https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (80)
Before May 23, 2022	Farodbekov / Farhodbekov, Azamjon	Barushan (Rushan district)	<p>Involved in previous conflicts with the authorities. Participated in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022.</p>	307	9.8	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (3)

			Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial.			https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (16) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (24)
Before May 23, 2022	Shukurov, Badavlat	Vamar (Rushan district)	Former employee of the Ministry of the Interior. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group and illegally owning weapons. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	307	15	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (4) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (9) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (27)
Before May 23, 2022	Taygunov, Naim	Vamar (Rushan district)	Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	307	8.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (5) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/531 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (127)
Before May 23, 2022	Sherov, Makhsan / Mahsan	Derzud (Rushan district)	Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group and of beating a state official. Sentenced on September 21, 2022,	307	10.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (7) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (96)

			in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.			
Before May 23, 2022	Khujaazizov / Khujanazarov, Akmal	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1985. Judo trainer. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (8) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (10) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (5) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (6)
Before May 23, 2022	Zarifbekov, Samson	Vamar (Rushan district)	Wrestling trainer. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.		1.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (9) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (169)
Before May 23, 2022	Zamirov, Najib	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1974. Close friend of Kholbash Kholbashev. Did not take part in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group and using violence against state officials. Sentenced on September 21, 2022,	307	10.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (10) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (5) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (129) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (short list 3)

			in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.			
Before May 23, 2022	Kayobekov, Ismoilbek	Pastkhuf (Rushan district)	Born 1979.	187.2	9.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-azojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (2) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (69)
Before May 23, 2022	Zarifbekov, Aflotun	Vamar (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187.2	1.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (11) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (3)
Before May 23, 2022	Davlatbekov, Orzu	Derzud (Rushan district)	Born 1987. Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022, but had previously had a conflict with the head of Rushan district. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced to eleven years in prison on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured. Assumed to be	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (16) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (9) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (145)

			identical with Orzu Lashkarbekov (father's name Lashkarbekovich).			
Before May 23, 2022	Sadonshoev, Yodovar	Derzud (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the "Rushan case" trial. Allegedly tortured.	307	8.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (18) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (205)
	Durmanchaev, Samim	Pastkhuf (Rushan district)		187.2	9	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (168) https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-azojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (7)
Before May 24, 2022	Shodavlatov, Saidabrор	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born in 1975. Relative of Kholbash Kholbashev. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group and illegally owning weapons. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the "Rushan case" trial. Allegedly tortured.	179.3 187.1 307	26	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-azojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (1) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (6) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (162) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (short list 4)
Before May 24, 2022	Ulfatshoev / Ulatshoev, Khaidarbek	Derzud (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of	307	8.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-azojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-

			the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.			soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (4) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (58)
Before May 24, 2022	Dodkhudoev, Suraj	Vamar (Rushan district)	Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187 307	24	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (9) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (8) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (191) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (short list 5)
Before May 24, 2022	Khalilov / Halilov, Nazrullo	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1990. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187.2	8.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (14) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (11) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (137) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (24)
Before May 24, 2022	Tagonshoev / Tavonshoev, Muhiz	Derzud (Rushan district)	Sentenced to eight years in prison on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.		8 or 9.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (15) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (114)
Before May 24, 2022	Farosatshoev, Imomiddin	Vamar (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial.		1.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (18)

						https://t.me/anorasarkorova/526 (16) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (66)
Before May 24, 2022	Kholbashov, Sarbaland	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born in 1971. Brother of Kholbasha Kholbashev. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187	9.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-majisoli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muaiyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (20) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (12) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (170) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (short list 4)
Before May 24, 2022	Pallaev, Khushnud	Vamar (Rushan district)	Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Detained on the street. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.		1.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-majisoli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muaiyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (23) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (13) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/526 (13 continuation) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (86)
Before May 24, 2022	Ismatov, Donish	Derzud (Rushan district)	Nephew of Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov. Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Injured by a gunshot and detained. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal	307	10	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-majisoli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muaiyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (24) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-

			group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.			d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 10-11) https://ru.azda.tv/rodstvienniki-gulomkhaidarova-otpravlieny-v-tiurmu/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/673 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (38)
Before May 24, 2022	Kayobekov / Kiyobekov / Amirbekzoda, Alibek	Pastkhuf (Rushan district)	Born around 1992. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187.2	9.5	https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-ikhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-majisoli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muaiyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (27) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (10)
	Sheraliev, Pahlavon	Vamar (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.		Life	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (3) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (150)
	Tolibov, Navoi		Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	107 307	9.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (4) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (132)
	Ramkhudoev, Tavakal	Vamar (Rushan district)	Relative of Kholbash Kholbashev. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group and illegally owning weapons. Sentenced on		12.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (7) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (192)

			September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.			
	Gulomkhaidarov, Faromuz	Derzud (Rushan)	Brother of Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov. Not involved in any politics. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Transferred to Khujand in January 2023.	187 307	15	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/526 (14) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/671 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/846 https://ru.azda.tv/rodstvienniki-gulomkhaidarova-otpravlieny-v-tiurmu/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (44)
	Farosatshoev, Farosatsho	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1981. Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial.	187.2	10.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/526 (15) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (46) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (25)
	Bodurov, Nekruz	Derzud (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.	187 307	10.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (138)
	Sherov, Azam	Derzud (Rushan district)	Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the “Rushan case” trial. Allegedly tortured.		10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (22)

	Shanbiev, Shanbe	Suchan (Shughnan district)	Did not participate in the protest in Vamar on May 18, 2022. Detained in Derzud (Rushan district) where he was working. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the "Rushan case" trial.		10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (177)
	Sabzaev / Sabzalev, Nurali	Vamar (Rushan district)	Convicted of participating in an organized criminal group. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the "Rushan case" trial. Allegedly tortured.	307	10.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/530 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (140)
	Oshurov / Ashurov, Farid	Rukhch (Rushan district)	Detained after the May 18, 2022, protests in Vamar and taken to the remand prison in Dushanbe. Relatives and friends lost contact with him from that moment onward.			https://t.me/anorasarkorova/869 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (39)
May 18-19, 2022	Unclear number of additional individuals	Rushan district	Detained during the crackdown on protesters in Vamar (Rushan district) and the simultaneous / subsequent purges in			https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-azojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (list of 19 detainees)

		<p>Vamar and other villages of Rushan district. The Ministry of the Interior reported 46 detainees but there were other reports about more than 200 arrests, with 90 persons still in detention by July 2022.</p> <p>Some of those detained during the purges in Rushan district were executed by security forces. If information about them is available, they are included in the list of casualties.</p> <p>The “Rushan case” trial of around 70 detainees started in Dushanbe on August 3, 2022, and took place behind closed doors. Many of the defendants revoked confessions which had allegedly been made under torture and broadcasted publicly. Many of them were sentenced to prison terms between 1.5 to</p>			<p>https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34125-r-jkhati-a-zojoni-gur-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terroristii-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirokdoshta-ki-muajyan-va-dastgir-karda-shudaand-2 (list of additional 27 detainees)</p> <p>https://t.me/anorasarkorova/389</p> <p>https://t.me/anserenko/4882</p> <p>https://t.me/anorasarkorova/517</p> <p>https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32046122.html</p> <p>https://pamirinside.org/холбаш-холбашов-приговорен-к-пожизне</p>
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			18 years on September 21, 2022. The convicted on whom specific information is available are included individually in the list of detentions.			
May 19, 2022	Jumaev, Khushruz (“Khushom Gulyam”)	Dushanbe	Blogger on Pamiri culture, languages and history. Active in NGO “Nomus” (together with Muzaffar Muborakshoev). Supported the “Commission of 44”. Sentenced before December 10, 2022. Reportedly denied access to a lawyer of his choice and tortured after detention. Transferred to Dushanbe prison in April 2023. Had to be operated in November 2023.	187.2	8	https://t.me/pamirinside/744 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/197 https://cpj.org/2022/08/tajikistan-authorities-detain-pamiri-journalists-ulfatkhonim-mamadshoeva-and-khushruz-jumayev-for-more-than-2-months/ https://t.me/pamirinside/1590 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32170517.html https://cpj.org/2022/12/tajikistan-authorities-sentence-2-journalists-to-lengthy-prison-terms/ https://t.me/adcmemorial/461 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32227575.html https://pamirinside.org/whoiskhushom/ https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1822-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-505.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1134 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (87) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1515
Before May 27, 2022	Aknazarov, Aknazar	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Born 1992. Close to Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Sentenced on August 23, 2022.	237.3 328.1 330.1	25	https://bomdodrus.com/2022/02/06/vlasti-trebujut-u-mamadbokirova-vydat-6-svoih-storonnikov/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/08/24/troe-blizkih-ljudej-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira-poluchili-po-25-let-kolonii-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (7)

Before May 27, 2022	Shabonov, Jamshed	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Born 1984. Nephew of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Sentenced on August 23, 2022.	237.3 328.1 330.1	25	https://bomdodrus.com/2022/02/06/vlasti-trebujut-u-mamadbokirova-vydat-6-svoih-storonnikov/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/08/24/troe-blizkih-ljudej-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira-poluchili-po-25-let-kolonii-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (72)
Before May 27, 2022	Zikilobekov, Sino	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Close to Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Sentenced on August 23, 2022.	237.3 328.1 330.1	25	https://bomdodrus.com/2022/02/06/vlasti-trebujut-u-mamadbokirova-vydat-6-svoih-storonnikov/ https://bomdodrus.com/2022/08/24/troe-blizkih-ljudej-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira-poluchili-po-25-let-kolonii-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (186)
Before May 27, 2022	Shabonov, Sobir	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Nephew of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Sentenced around August 23, 2022.		10	https://bomdodrus.com/2022/08/24/troe-blizkih-ljudej-ubitogo-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-bokira-poluchili-po-25-let-kolonii-video/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (187)
May 28, 2022	Irgashev / Ergashev, Faromuz	Khorugh	Lawyer and former deputy of the GBAO regional council. Member of the “Commission of 44”. Unsuccessfully tried to register as a candidate for the 2020 presidential elections. Trial behind closed doors started in Dushanbe on October 19, 2022. General prosecutor requested 30 years in prison. Sentenced before	104 179 187 307	29	https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/2020-0904/vlast-narodu-pochemu-30-letnii-advokat-s-horoga-hochet-stat-prezidentom-tadzhikistana https://eurasianet.org/interview-with-tajikistans-would-be-youthful-change-candidate https://thediomat.com/2020/09/will-emomali-rahmon-have-any-serious-challengers-for-the-tajik-presidency/ https://thediomat.com/2020/09/field-set-for-tajik-election-no-surprises/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-arbitrary-detention-of-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov https://t.me/anorasarkorova/211

			December 09, 2022 for alleged formation of a criminal group, attempted murder, terrorism and organization of extremist activities.			https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32091858.html https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/statement-on-the-arrest-of-the-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-and-faromuz-irgashov/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32157354.html https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/what-tajikistans-persecution-of-faromuz-irgashev-really-means/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/724 https://pamirinside.org/фаромуз-иргашов-осужден-на-30-лет https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32170517.html https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-journalist-sentenced-to-21-years-in-prison https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-heavy-prison-sentences-for-rights-defenders-from-gorno https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1822-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-505.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32242339.html https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27560 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (43)
May 28, 2022	Kholiknazarov, Manuchekhr	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Lawyer, member of the “Commission of 44”, director of the Pamir Lawyers Association. Sentenced to 15 or 16 years in prison before December 10, 2022, for alleged formation of a criminal group	187.2 307(3).2	16	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-arbitrary-detention-of-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/manuchehr-kholiknazarov https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/statement-on-the-arrest-of-the-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-and-faromuz-irgashov/ https://t.me/pamirinside/1591

			and organization of extremist activities.			https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-heavy-prison-sentences-for-rights-defenders-from-gorno https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/human-rights-defender-manuchehr-kholiknazarov-sentenced-15-years-imprisonment https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1822-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-505.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32242339.html https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Tajikistan-Human-rights-defender-Manuchehr-Kholiqnazarov-must-be-immediately-released.pdf https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32347452.html https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27423 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27560 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(103) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32674445.html
May 28, 2022	Mamadshoev, Khursand	Khorugh	Member of the “Commission of 44”, brother of Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva. Sentenced before December 09, 2022.	187.2 307(3).2	16	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-arbitrary-detention-of-lawyers-manuchehr-kholiknazarov https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32170517.html https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-respected-journalist-sentenced-to-21-years-in-prison https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tajikistan-heavy-prison-sentences-for-rights-defenders-from-gorno

						https://www.prokuratura.tj/news-tj/1822-alasai-ayati-mushovara-dar-prokuraturai-general-505.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (83)
May 28, 2022	Muborakshoev, Muzaffar	Khorugh	Member of the “Commission of 44”. Committed to the revival of Pamiri culture and languages. Active in various cultural and linguistic projects and in NGO “Nomus” (together with Khushruz Jumaev and Muyassar Kuhistoni). Sentenced before December 10, 2022.	187 327	29	https://twitter.com/Subhiya2/status/1545818460504182785 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1589 https://t.me/adcmemorial/461 https://adcmemorial.org/en/articles/five-stories-about-pamir-and-the-pamiris/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (125)
May 28, 2022	Bakhtiyorov, Bakhtovar / Bakhtovarsho	UPD (Khorugh)	Member of the “Commission of 44”.		15	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31877006.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31887212.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (29)
Probably around May 28, 2022	Bekdavlatov, Shaftolu / Shaftollu	Roshtkala district	Member of the “Commission of 44”. Sentenced on June 29, 2022, in a trial without a lawyer. Transferred to a prison in Khujand after the sentence, but his relatives were not informed and continued to deliver food and other goods for him to the remand prison in Dushanbe.	305	18	https://t.me/pamirinside/1044 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/201 https://fergana.media/news/126773/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/204 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31922829.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/211 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/518 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/720 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (173)

Probably around May 28, 2022	Pirmamadov / Pirnazarov, Khujamir / Khujamri		Member of the "Commission of 44". Sentenced on June 29, 2022.	305	18	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/201 https://fergana.media/news/126773/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/204 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31922829.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/211 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (82)
May 31, 2022	Palaev / Pallaev, Kulmakhmad	Derzud (Rushan district)	Arrested at the same place where Yodgor Gulomkhaidarov and four other men were killed. Sentenced on September 21, 2022, in the framework of the "Rushan case" trial. Allegedly tortured.		Life	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati-ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji-soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (1) https://www.vkd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34162-khabari-markazi-matbuoti-vkd-t-az-nati-ai-amalijoti-zidditerrorist-dar-no-iyai-r-shon-2 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/525 (2) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (92)
May 31, 2022	Nosiraliev, Safar	Khlebzavod (Khorugh district)	Allegedly surrendered to the police.			https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0aUwq1gvqbHhFofLzSXn8r3mLvxPqsNtnZJZsorTey9fw4bBRmRFeh3e5drYw4k16l https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (161)
June 01, 2022	Aynalishoev, Mirzoshoh	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Influential community leader and politician. Detained on charges of hooliganism.	237.3		https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0mJaNZBkX6DsqqKT3XZZ83hetrxu42AjZiYxNzg7DonNXaHHSRBEzW5MbBTkPSxZPI https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34170-khudi-rorshav-va-ozir-shu6dani-ajnalishoev-ba-militsiya-2 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (112)
June 03, 2022	Kosumbekov, Hakim / Akrizobekov, Akim	Khorugh	Sportsman, close to community leader Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov (assassinated on May 22, 2022). Was tricked and surrendered to		10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/336 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (55)

			<p>the security forces by a relative, a former police officer.</p> <p>Tortured during the first days of detention in Khorugh, requiring first aid. Secret trial without lawyer and without access of relatives. Transferred to Dushanbe.</p> <p>Sentenced around July 01, 2022.</p>			
Probably early June 2022	Shonazarov, Timur / Temur	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	<p>Leading figure among youth in Bar Khorugh. Member of the "Commission of 44". Without access to a lawyer and subject to torture during detention. Sentenced before November 20, 2022, in a trial in Dushanbe.</p>	187.2	10	<p>https://t.me/anorasarkorova/627</p> <p>https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (193)</p>
Probably early June 2022	Azmatbekov, Guloz	Tusyan (Roshtkala district)	<p>Leading figure among youth in Tusyan. Member of the "Commission of 44". Donations to the "Commission of 44" were channelled through him. Accused of funding terrorism. In detention in Dushanbe.</p>			Non-public source

Probably early June	Ozod	Bolnicen (Khorugh)	Driver of Qanoat. Accused of beating the GBAO Governor in 2018. Sentenced to 2.5 years in prison.			Non-public source
June 11, 2022	Ayombekov, Tolib	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Informal authority in Khlebzavod neighbourhood of Khorugh. Key target of the 2012 military operation. Summoned for interrogation and detained in Khorugh, taken to Dushanbe. Property confiscated. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		Life	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34215-sitodi-bajniidoravii-ta-mini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-am-iyat-dar-vmkb-khabar-medi-ad-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31893774.html https://t.me/pamirinside/961 https://t.me/pamirinside/1053 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(196) https://pamirinside.org/technology-park-in-khorog-instead-of-a-bread-factory/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1503
June 11, 2022	Shanbiev, Munavvar	Tem (Khorugh)	Attacked by security forces on May 21, 2014. Summoned for interrogation and detained in Dushanbe. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		Life	https://fergana.media/articles/102296/ https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/security/2014-0522/ministry-internal-affairs-reported-details-incident-khorugh https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34215-sitodi-bajniidoravii-ta-mini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-am-iyat-dar-vmkb-khabar-medi-ad-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31893774.html https://t.me/pamirinside/961 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(117)
June 11, 2022	Gulobov, Niyozsho	Bizmich (Khorugh)	Wounded during purge of Khlebzavod neighbourhood, taken		Life	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34215-sitodi-bajniidoravii-ta-mini-amniyat-va-tartiboti-am-iyat-dar-vmkb-khabar-medi-ad-2

			to hospital and arrested there. In detention in Dushanbe. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.			https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31893774.html https://t.me/pamirinside/959 https://khover.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-4/ https://t.me/pamirinside/1166 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(139)
Before June 12, 2022	Sabzaliev, Nasriddin	Khorugh	Businessman, owner of meat factory in Khorugh. Not detained but confiscation of meat factory is in process.			https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682 https://t.me/pamirinside/1053
Before June 12, 2022	Sheraliev, Kurbonbek	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Businessman, owner of public transport company / fuel company. He was allegedly in contact with Alim Sherzamonov and financed protests. His businesses were confiscated.			https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682 https://t.me/pamirinside/1053
Before June 12, 2022	Qoanoat	Khorugh	Businessman, owner of Atlantic supermarket. In detention in Dushanbe. Allegedly beat up the GBAO Governor in 2018.			https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682

June 12, 2022	Botash	Shosh Khorugh (Khorugh)	Businessman, owner of trade points in the market and of hotels. Not detained but the confiscation of his property has been launched.			https://twitter.com/susile/status/1536069359323463682
June 12, 2022	Shoishirinov, Imumnazar / Imomnazar	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Leading figure among youth in Gulaken. In detention in Dushanbe. Accused of illegally storing weapons and of forming a criminal armed group. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.	32 104 104.2 179 187.1 195 255 306 307(3) 328	Life	https://khover.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-2/ https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid02fwKuXbVmeUNH9q6ztmDvKhGTs25SxPYGbu_vjhK1i17Z9stGXW7WVsrZnqihawXbxl https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894874.html https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (67)
Probably June 12, 2022	Shoishirinov, Umed	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Younger brother of Imumnazar Shoishirinov. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.	188.1 189	14	https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid02bBnkiGJPNKYfAjERehoVW2PzXgZDSeKNESYh_yzwfuJVzFy8fB9vGdZyytwTv9Wqql https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (201)
June 12, 2022	Sherzamonov, Muslim	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Community leader in Bar Khorugh neighbourhood. Brother of oppositional politician Alim Sherzamonov. Sentenced before July 29, 2022.		18	https://khover.tj/rus/2022/06/mezhvedomstvennyj-shtab-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-i-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-gbao-soobshhaet-2/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31895748.html https://www.currenttime.tv/a/tadzhikistane-zaderzhali-brata-oppozitsionera-alima-sherzamonova/31895805.html https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/376 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31965636.html

						https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (120)
June 12, 2022	Mamadnazarov, Komron	UPD (Khorugh)	Sports trainer. Sentenced on/before June 29, 2022.		5	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31894630.html https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://t.me/pamirinside/1046 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (210)
June 12, 2022	Ayombekov, Inoyatsho Anoyatsho ("Bobish")	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Brother of Tolib Ayombekov.		30	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (217)
Before June 15, 2022	Imomnazarov, Imomnazar ("Munjir")	UPD (Khorugh)	In detention in Dushanbe.		11	https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid02j1LdVwiQtVevUK9CCFkKnaSMvYrc3UYx4ajBgXa8Ht4simAW9ApfrsXwDWY4a5Xpl https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (213)
Before June 15, 2022	Firuz	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)				https://t.me/anserenko/4578
Before June 15, 2022	Shirin	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Detained and later released.			https://t.me/anserenko/4578
Before June 15, 2022	Sherdjonov / Sherjanov, Najmiddin	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		Life	https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0c2Vrusp2rWi6vLg4vdzrCk9kRePVETYu3VwqKn7D7nEjcXD18LsqSprFv4pErVKpl https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (130)
Before June 15, 2022	Beknazarov, Beknazar	Khichordev (Khorugh)	Director of Khorugh City Park and sportsman. His father passed away ten days after visiting him in	188.1 237.2	13	https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1220 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (31)

			the remand prison in Dushanbe. His car was confiscated after his detention. Sentenced in February 2023 for alleged hooliganism and mass unrest.			
Before June 15, 2022	Mamadbokirov, Tohir	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Brother of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. In detention in Dushanbe.		28	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29690148.html https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://t.me/pamirinside/1175 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (195)
Before June 15, 2022	Mazorov, Mumtoz	UPD (Khorugh)	Brother of Khursand Mazorov. In detention in Dushanbe. Accused of killing two young men from Khorugh who disappeared in summer 2014 and whose corpses were later discovered after maltreatment and torture. Many people in Khorugh believe that they had actually been killed by security forces.		21	https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (116)
Before June 15, 2022	Mazorov, Ozod		Nephew of Khursand Mazorov. Detained and later released.			https://t.me/anserenko/4578
Before June 15, 2022	Kurbonbekov, Mamadnazar / Mazar	UPD (Khorugh)				https://t.me/anserenko/4578 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (107)

Before June 15, 2022	Nurmamadov, Shamsher	UPD (Khorugh)	Close to Khursand Mazorov. In detention in Dushanbe.			https://t.me/anserenko/4578
Before June 15, 2022	Nurmamadov, Nekzod		Close to Khursand Mazorov. In detention in Dushanbe.			https://t.me/anserenko/4578
June 15, 2022	Jonshoev, Nuralisho	UPD (Khorugh)				https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0aBMzwpn2HSRHjyEYhS83xnnYKf1dP5LffThwpm7W3LnA77A1gEeZBULiuT74tDCDl https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(214)
June 15, 2022	Mamadnazarov, Rakhmonbek ("Kuvvat")	Shosh Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://www.facebook.com/www.dushanbepolice.tj/posts/pfbid0BzeczjVNEUWmKEUhh3uFzEp7wK8yf1pGqjweF95q47BR4Y18wYN2nret3YF3QUydl https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(212)
Before June 16, 2022	Yunoev, Sorbon	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)	Rural community leader in Tavdem, activist and entrepreneur. Sentenced by the GBAO court in Khorugh on August 23, 2022, for religious extremism because he had organized festivities related to the celebration of "Ruzi Nur" (anniversary of the Aga Khan's visit to GBAO on May 25, 1995) in 2020, even if these festivities had allegedly taken place	187.2	10	https://t.me/pamirinside/993 https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-picks-winners-in-pamir-investment-drive https://t.me/pamirinside/1201 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(189)

			with permission by the authorities. He was also convicted because he had criticised public spending on a flagpole in Roshtkala.			
June 16, 2022	Mavlonazarov, Mamadsulton (“Mukhammadi Sulton”)	Dushanbe	Retired officer of special forces, native of GBAO. Expressed open criticism of the State Committee for National Security leadership. Accused of public calls for change of the constitutional order and insult to state officials. Trial started on September 7, 2022. Sentenced on September 13, 2022.	307.2 330.2	7	https://t.me/pamirinside/994 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31901645.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31922703.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1051 https://t.me/rustamijoni/148 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/467 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/480 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32031817.html https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 50-53) https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32227243.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (101)
Before June 24, 2022	Sadonshoev, Muyassar (“Muyassari Kukhiston”)	Khorugh	Poet and camera operator. Committed to the revival of Pamiri culture and languages. Recorded the statements of the “Commission of 44” on video and disseminated them. Sentenced on June 24, 2022.	305	11	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31929887.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/320 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (123)

Before June 24, 2022	Saidbekov, Iftikhor	UPD (Khorugh)	Had already been temporarily detained in March 2022. Helped the “Commission of 44” with video editing and social media. Sentenced on June 24, 2022.	305	10	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/33697-khabari-matbuoti-rvkd-dar-vmkb-2 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31748494.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31763323.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1074 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/320 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (62)
Probably June 2022	Ashrafbekov, Amadbek	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Close to Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Tortured and maltreated in detention. Was in such a bad condition that Adis Tutishoev fainted when he was confronted with him.			https://t.me/pamirinside/1089
Before July 04, 2022	Dustmamadov, Khairimamad (“Khairush”)	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Tortured during detention, taken to hospital, attempted to commit suicide but survived. Trial in Khorugh. Sentenced together with Gulomali Abdurakhmonov.		Life	https://t.me/pamirinside/1069 https://t.me/pamirinside/1152 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (79)
Before July 09, 2022	Tutishoev, Adis	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Amadbek Ashrafbekov had testified against him under torture. Adis fainted when confronted with Amadbek who was in very bad condition due to torture and maltreatment. His			https://t.me/pamirinside/1085 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31936946.html

			father suffered a stroke out of distress. Adis was temporarily released to take care of his father. When security forces wanted to detain him again after two days, he attempted to commit suicide.			
Before July 10, 2022	Shoshanбиеv, Shodi	Suchan (Shugnan district)	Businessman in food supply business. Accused of illegal transfer of funds to Khorugh. In detention in Dushanbe.			Non-public source
July 23, 2022	Abdurakhmonov / Ayombekov, Gulomali	Khorugh	Son of Tolib Ayombekov. Quick trial in Khorugh behind closed doors and without a lawyer. Sentenced on August 05, 2022, for allegedly killing General Abdullo Nazarov in 2012, hooliganism, gun possession and illegal gemstone trade. Two other defendants had already confessed manslaughter in the Nazarov case and been convicted of murder in 2013.		Life	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/399 https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/laworder/20130228/killers-gbao-regional-security-chief-sentenced-long-jail-terms https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (53) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1503

July 23, 2022	Abdurakhmonov / Ayombekov, Khasanali	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Son of Tolib Ayombekov. Convicted of alleged gun possession and hooliganism by a court in Khorugh. Pleaded not guilty.		12	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/402 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (57)
July 26, 2022	Davlatmirov, Muzaffar	UPD / Gulaken (Khorugh)	Khalifa (local religious authority) in UPD neighbourhood. Held the funeral ceremonies of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, Khursand Mazorov and Zoir Rajabov. Summoned for interrogation by the State Committee for National Security on July 26, 2022. Sentenced on August 3, 2022, i.e. one week after the detention, allegedly for public calls to extremist actions.	307(1)	4.5	https://t.me/pamirinside/1120 https://t.me/rustamijoni/175 https://t.me/pamirinside/1138 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31973861.html https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-badakshan-cleric-five-years/31975340.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/391 https://twitter.com/USCIRF/status/1567873360121548806 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (pp. 70-71) https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2782 https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2811 https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tajikistan-pamiri-gorno-badakshan-gbao-davlatmirov-ismaili/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (126)
Before August 02, 2022	Shoismatov, Ikmat / Hikmat	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Sentenced on August 02, 2022.	187	10	https://t.me/pamirnews04/2708 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (59)
Before August 07, 2022	Akbarshoev, Sobir	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Sentenced before August 07, 2022.	307	10	https://t.me/pamirinside/1157 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (216)

Before August 07, 2022	Gulobov, Aslan	Bizmich (Khorugh)	Sentenced before August 07, 2022, for participating in the killing of General Abdullo Nazarov in 2012.		Life	https://t.me/pamirinside/1155 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (19)
Before August 07, 2022	Gulobov, Azim	Bizmich (Khorugh)	Younger brother of Niyozsho Gulobov. Convicted of alleged participation in an organized criminal group and drug trafficking before August 07, 2022. Pleaded not guilty.		18	https://t.me/pamirinside/1156 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (25)
August 13, 2022	Mamadambarov a, Sharofat	Khorugh	Former president of the Ismaili National Council in Tajikistan. Not detained, but extensively interrogated about the Aga Khan Foundation and civil society representatives detained after the May 2022 events.			https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31994584.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1177 https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-picks-winners-in-pamir-investment-drive
Before August 17, 2022	Imomyorbekov, Gulnazar	Shosh Khorugh (Khorugh)	Close to Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov.		20	https://t.me/pamirinside/1175 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (52)
Before September 29, 2022	Pahlavonov, Hamza	Boyne (Khorugh)	Did not return home after interrogation. Accused of participating in a terrorist and extremist organization.	187	10	https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 16) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (56)

Before November 21, 2022	Abdolbekov, Tohir	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Owner of several shops in Khorugh. Former state official and member of the GBAO regional parliament, brother of former Khorugh mayor, relative of Oraz Vazirbekov. Accused of providing material support to protesters and extremism. Sentenced on December 22, 2022, appeal rejected.	209 307.2	6.5	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32141530.html https://pamirinside.org/в-хороге-задержан-очередной-предприн https://pamirinside.org/задержанному-в-хороге-тохиру-абдолбе https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32152203.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32194538.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1625 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32322455.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (209)
Before November 22, 2022	Ayombekov / Abdurakhmonov, Mamadali		Son of Ayombekov. Sentenced to a total of 22 years in prison in several trials, the last of which was on November 22, 2022.		22	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630
Before November 22, 2022	Murodov, Sobir		Brother of Hamza Murodov, the former driver of Tolib Ayombekov, who had been convicted in 2013 of the killing of Abdullo Nazarov. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		10	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145349.html
Before November 22, 2022	Inoyatshoev, Inoyatsho	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		15	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32141530.html

Before November 22, 2022	Sokhibnazarov / Soibnazarov, Muyassar	Gulaken (Khorugh)	Sentenced on November 22, 2022.	237.2 255.1	27 or 30	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32141530.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(122)
Before November 22, 2022	Ayombekov, Mamadamon	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Nephew of Tolib Ayombekov. Sentenced on November 22, 2022.		10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/629 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/630 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(218)
Before February 07, 2023	Kimatshoev, Daler	Rushan district	Indicted on basis of Art. 307(3) Par. 2 Criminal Code, court hearing took place on February 07, 2023.	307(3)	2.5	http://vmkb.sud.tj/barrasii-parvandai-inojat/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1132 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (35)
Before February 07, 2023	Mavdjudaliev, A.A.	Rushan district	Indicted on basis of Art. 347 Par. 1 Criminal Code, court hearing took place on February 07, 2023.	347.1		http://vmkb.sud.tj/barrasii-parvandai-inojat/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1132
Before February 07, 2023	Navruzov, B.P.	Rushan district	Indicted on basis of Art. 347 Par. 1 Criminal Code, court hearing took place on February 07, 2023.	347.1		http://vmkb.sud.tj/barrasii-parvandai-inojat/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1132
April 14, 2023	Ayombekov, Rashid	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Brother of Tolib Ayombekov. Detained in Darvaz district of GBAO. Sentenced on 22 June 2023.	187.2	10	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32368833.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(157) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1370 https://bomdodrus.com/2023/06/23/na-10-let-osuzhden-rashid-samyj-mladshij-brat-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-toliba-ayombekova/

9.5.2. Information fragments about (possible) detentions

Date of detention	Name	Place of residence	Further information	Art. Crim. Code	Sentence (years)	Publicly available sources
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	Abdulnazarov, Kholiqnazar	Barushon (Rushan district)		187 307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (81)
	Abdurakhmonov, Melik	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (110)
	Ahmadbekov, Gulzorbek	Vamar (Rushan district)		187 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (54)
	Akhmadbekov, Ahmad					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (1)
	Akhmadbekov, Khabad	Medon (Roshtkala district)			1.4	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (78)
	Aknazarov, Rustam	Derzud (Rushan district)	Born 1984.	187	8.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (160) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (23)
	Alovatshoev, Samad	Roshtkala district		182	4	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (167)
	Ashrafbekov, Shirinsho	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)			8	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (180)
	Aynalishoev, Naimsho					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (128)
	Azatshoev, Narimon				10	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (131)
	Bakhtibekov, Gofil	Barushon (Rushan district)				https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhatishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-majisoli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm-aror-dorand-2 (10) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (50)
	Bakhtiyorov, Anushervon					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (18)

	Bandishoev, Shorukh	Vamar (Rushan district)		187 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (184)
	Barnoev, Mamadsodik	Rushan district		307	10	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (100)
	Beknazarov, Beknazar	Gulaken (Khorugh)	<i>Possibly identical with Beknazar Beknazarov</i>		9	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (30)
	Bilolov, Jalol	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (70)
	Bilolov, Mamadjalol	Roshtkala district	<i>Possibly identical with Jalol Bilolov</i>			https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (99)
	Bodurbekov, Mirzobek	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (111)
	Bodurkhonov, Saidkhon	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1984.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (163) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (10)
	Chorshanbiev, Mastonsho	Barushon (Rushan district)		187 307	11	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34156-r-jkhati- ishtirokchijoni-a6mal-oi-terroristii-sana-oi-16-18-maji- soli-2022-dar-no-iyai-r-shoni-vmkb-ki-dar-ustu-i-rasm- aror-dorand-2 (7) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (106)
	Chorshanbiev, Ubaid	Tem (Khorugh)			20	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (199)
	Dumamadov, Marodmamad	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (105)
	Durmanchaev, Salim	Vamar (Rushan district)	<i>Possibly identical with Samim Durmanchaev</i>	187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (166)
	Dustamot, Nazokat					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (136)

	Farosatshoev, Pulod	Vamar (Rushan district)			10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (152)
	Fayruzshoev, Rashid			178	11	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (156)
	Galchabekov, Kurbonali					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (93)
	Ganjov, Faromuz	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (45)
	Garibshoev, Garibsho	Vamar (Rushan district)			2.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (49)
	Gulbekov, Kukan	Bogev (Shughnan district)			8	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (91)
	Gulomamadov, Zafar	Barushon (Rushan district)	Born 1988.	187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (207) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (20)
	Ilchibayg	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (65)
	Imomyorbekov, Guljon	Shosh Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (51)
	Imoyatshoev, Imoyatsho	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)		187.2	14	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (68)
	Iskandarshoev, Muminsho					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (115)
	Jumaev, Farzun	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1991	187	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (47) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (14)
	Kayaosov, Suraj	Bizmich (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (190)

	Khisravov, Azam	Derzud (Rushan district)	Born 1987.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (8) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (21)
	Khuponoshoev, Zafar	Gulaken (Khorugh)		195.2	4	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (206)
	Khudobakshov, Faridun			187.2	10	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (42)
	Khursandov, Ibrohim	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1994	187	8.5 or 9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (60) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (18)
	Khushnazarov, Azamat	Barushon (Rushan district)		307 187	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (23)
	Khushqadamov, Shaído	Khorugh		255.1 328.1	2	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (179)
	Kiyobekov / Kayobekov, Amirbek	Pastkhuf (Rushan district)	Born 1967. Probably father of Alibek Kayobekov.	187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (14) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (15)
	Kukanbekov, Ozod	Bizmich (Rushan district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (149)
	Kurbonalishoev, Navsozi	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (133)
	Kurbonmamadov, Musrif	Barushon (Rushan district)	Born 1989.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (4) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (121)
	Mabotkulov / Mabatkulov, Shodibek	Derzud (Rushan district)	Born 1992.	187.2 or 307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (181) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (21)
	Majnunov, Mehrubon	Vamar (Rushan)	Born 1984.	187.2 or 307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (109) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (19)

	Mamadamonov, Mamadamon	Derzud (Rushan district)		307	8	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (97)
Probably June 2022	Mamadbokirov, Akram	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Brother of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Cook and driver of youth guards of Mamadbokirov. Handicapped. In detention in Dushanbe.		8	https://t.me/pamirinside/1175 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (9)
	Mamadgaminov, Muyassar	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (124)
	Mamadrahimov, Ramesh	Derushon (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (154)
	Mamadrahimov, Tolik	Vamar (Rushan district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (197)
	Marodasenov, Umed	Gulaken (Khorugh)		237		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (202)
	Marodmamadov, Khushruz	Porshinev (Shughnan district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (88)
	Mavlododov, Alim	Derushon (Rushan district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (11)
Probably late June 2022	Mazorbonov, Mazorbon	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)	Neighbour of Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov. Heart problems. Accused of storing weapons. In detention in Khorugh.		8	https://t.me/pamirinside/1175 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (108)

	Miralibekov, Orzu	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1980.	187.2	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (147) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (11)
	Mirzoev, Davlatbek	Vamar (Rushan)	Born 2001	187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (36) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (22)
	Mirzoev, Juma	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (76)
	Muborakshoev, Amroz	Barushon (Rushan district)		307 187	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (17)
	Musrifshoev, Amran	Khorugh		237.2 328.2	1.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (15)
	Nasriddinov, Olim			328.2		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (142)
	Nazardodov, Mardak				11	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (104)
	Nematov, Nurullo	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (141)
	Nodalyobov / Nodalibov, Shuhrat	Barushon (Rushan district)	Born 1991.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (185) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (7)
	Nodilyobov, Faridun					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (41)
	Nodirkulov, Moqul	Barushon (Rushan district)		187 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (113)
	Odilov, Shokir	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)		237.2 328.2	3	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (183)
	Odinaev, Shaftoly	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	15	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (175)

	Oshurbekov, Kishkorbek	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (89)
	Oshurov, Oshur	Barushon (Rushon district)			3	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (148)
	Pallazoda, Amir	Shujand (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (13)
	Payshanbiev, Kanoat	Bizmich (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (77)
	Pulodov, Faridun	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)		237.2 328	2.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (40)
	Rahmatulloev, Rakhshon	Derushon (Rushan district)	Born 1984.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (153) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (6)
	Rakhimjonova, Shifo	Khorugh			9	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (211)
	Ravshanbekov, Jonibek	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)			9	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (75)
	Sabdavlatov, Shaftollu	Roshtkala district		187.2	17	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (174)
	Sabzaliev, Shavkat				3	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (178)
	Saidibragimov, Munir	Gulaken (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (118)
	Saidkhonov, Khushbakht	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.7	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (85)
	Saidov, Saiduriddin / Nuriddin	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://mvd.tj/index.php/ru/sobytiya/34116-rujkhati-a-zojoni-guru-oi-mutashakkili-inoyat-va-ekstremist-terrorist-ki-dar-tazo-uroti-sana-oi-15-18-maji-2022-dar-

						no-iyai-r-shon-ishtirok-doshta-bo-ikhtijori-khud-ba-ma-omot-ozir-shudaand-2 (2) https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (164)
	Salomatshoev, Tohir	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1978.	187.2 or 307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (194) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (12)
	Sarmast	Vamar (Rushan district)			4	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (171)
	Sayfulloev, Sayfullo					https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (172)
	Shakarshoev, Umvaydo	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (204)
	Shamsov, Alovatsho		Born 1968	307 187	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (12) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (short list 2)
	Sheraliev, Jamshed	Barjev (Khorugh)	<i>Possibly identical with Jamshed Shabonov</i>			https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (71)
	Sheykhburov, Jangibek		<i>Possibly identical with Jangibek Shekhburov</i>			https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (73)
	Shirinshoev, Atobek	Barushon (Rushan district)		307 187	8.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (20)
	Shodavlatov, Ibroz	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1992	187.2 or 307	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (61) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (16)
	Shodikhonov, Umed	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1985.	187.2	1.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (203)
	Shofakirov, Bakhtiyor			187.2		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (28)

	Shogunov, Landaur	Barushon (Rushan district)		187 307	3	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (94)
	Shohdavlatov, Aziz	Vamar (Rushan district)		187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (26)
	Shoikov, Shamsidin	Bizmich (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (176)
	Shomansurov, Bunyod	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	11,5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (32)
	Shukrikhudoev, Daler	Gulaken (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (34)
	Shurov, Nazarmavlo	Vamar (Rushan district)	Born 1967.	187.2	9.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (135) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/838 (13)
	Suhrobov, Rustam	Gulaken (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (159)
	Tavalloev, Iftikhor	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)			18	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (63)
	Tavalloev, Loiknazar	Tavdem (Roshtkala district)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (95)
	Valdoshov, Nazar	Bar Khorugh (Khorugh)				https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (134)
	Zalinka	Vamar (Rushan district)			7	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (208)
	Zamirov, Orzu	Vamar (Rushan district)		307	10.5	https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (146)

	Gulmirzoev, Fakhridin			187.2		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(220)
	Biyaboniev, Abbos			187.2		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(221)
	Saidbekov, Hakim			187.2		https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(222)

9.5.3. Detentions in and abductions from Russia related to the GBAO crackdown

Date of detention	Name	Place of residence	Further information	Art. Crim. Code	Sentence (years)	Publicly available sources
December 30, 2021	Chorshanbiev, Chorshanbe	Moscow	Mixed Martial Arts fighter and blogger. Assertively emphasized his Pamiri identity. Published video statement in support of protesters in Khorugh in November 2021. Arrested in Moscow on December 03, 2021. Extradited to Tajikistan on December 30, 2021. Sentenced on May 13, 2022. Imprisoned first in Khujand, where the guards had order to provoke him and to create excuses for sanctions. In October 2022, he was transferred to Dushanbe remand	307.2	8.5	https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/laworder/20211231/tajik-mma-fighter-extradited-from-russia-to-tajikistan-faces-charge-of-inciting-regional-enmity-and-riots https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220107/kto-takoi-chorshanbe-chorshanbiev-i-chem-on-izvesten https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-mma-fighters-pro-pamiri-remarks-land-him-behind-bars https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/laworder/20220124/advokati-chorshanbieva-osporili-ekspertizu-video-dolzni-izuchit-psiholog-i-lingvist-russkogo-yazika-a-ne-politolog?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31698959.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31752606.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31775798.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31848493.html https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20220514/tadzhikskogo-boitsa-mma-chorshanbe-chorshabieva-prigovorili-k-85-godam-tyurmi https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31861142.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31926839.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/397 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/554

			prison (closed imprisonment) without due legal procedure. Reportedly repeatedly provoked into fights and punished with solitary confinement.			https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1243 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (33) https://pamirinside.org/chorshanbiev-in-shizo/ https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1585
Before February 02, 2022	Alovatshoev, Amriddin	Moscow	Community organizer among youth from GBAO in Moscow. Arrested in Russia on January 11, 2022. Extradited to Tajikistan and forcefully disappeared. Tortured and forced to make a public self-incriminating statement. Sentenced on April 29, 2022. Consciously decided not to appeal. Urinary bladder system injured after torture. First imprisoned in Vahdat but transferred to Dushanbe remand prison (closed imprisonment) in September 2022.	181.2 182.3 187 189 302.2	18	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31652682.html https://t.me/pamirinside/309 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31667105.html https://fergana.ru/news/124812/ https://asiaplustj.info/ru/node/308131 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31682894.html https://notorturetj.org/news/tadzhikistan-amriddin-alovatshoev-nahoditsya-pod-riskom-primeneniya-pytok https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/07/tajikistan-restore-internet-autonomous-region https://notorturetj.org/news/advokat-lishen-dostupa-k-svoemu-podzashchitnomu-alovatshoevu-amriddinu https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31827062.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31836352.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31892533.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/397 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/522 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32047692.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/554 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (16)
June 9, 2022	Chorshanbiev, Jonibek	Khorugh	Leader of the diaspora community from	307	10	https://t.me/anserenko/4570 https://t.me/pamirinside/1045

			<p>Gulaken neighbourhood of Khorugh in Moscow. Participated in video statement after November 2021 protests in Khorugh. Arrested by Russian police in Moscow on the way home from work. Court hearing on June 10, 2022. Court hearing on the appeal on June 19, 2022. Deported to Tajikistan on June 23, 2022, without any legal basis and apparently upon request by Tajikistan. Detained and indicted in Dushanbe. Tortured to make a "confession". Convicted before October 15, 2022.</p>			<p>https://t.me/anorasarkorova/558 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/718 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (74) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1373 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1374</p>
June 11, 2022	Navruzov, Muslim	Gulaken (Khorugh)	<p>Participated in video statement after November 2021 protests in Khorugh, arrested by police in Moscow and deported to Tajikistan, detained and indicted in Dushanbe.</p>	307	8	<p>https://t.me/anserenko/4153 https://t.me/anserenko/4570 https://t.me/pamirinside/963 https://t.me/pamirinside/1045 https://zindoniyon.files.wordpress.com/2022/09/d096d183d180d0bdd0b0d0bb-d0b0d0b2d0b3d183d181d182d0b8-2022-d091d0b0d180d0bed0b8-d0bdd0b0d188d180-d0b0d0bdd0b3d0bbd0b8d181d3a3.pdf (p. 37)</p>

						https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(119)
July 29, 2022	Vazirbekov, Oraz	Moscow	Important community organizer in the Pamiri diaspora in Russia. Citizen of the Russian Federation. Announced in February 2022 that he feared being kidnapped or assassinated by Tajikistani security forces and that he had no intention to travel to Tajikistan voluntarily. Was forcibly disappeared at Moscow's Domodedovo Airport on July 29, 2022, and taken to Dushanbe. His relatives had not been able to see him by September 15, 2022. Ordered medicine which indicates maltreatment and torture. The attorney was provided by the authorities and did not communicate with the defendant. Though being a citizen of the	187 307.2	16	https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20211126/hundreds-of-people-gather-to-a-protest-at-the-tajikistan-embassy-in-moscow https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9vK-5ch-cE https://t.me/pamirinside/633 https://t.me/pamirinside/1126 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377 https://t.me/anserenko/4773 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjmQyU2tAlk https://t.me/pamirinside/1130 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/385 https://t.me/pamirinside/1131 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31967525.html https://t.me/anserenko/4776 https://fergana.media/news/127192/ https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pair-of-pamiri-activists-disappear-from-russia-and-reappear-in-tajikistan/ https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/05-08-2022-operatsiya/ https://t.me/pamirinside/1204 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32009426.html https://pamirinside.org/родные-вазирбековых-за-два-месяца-ни-р/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32032801.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32093566.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1383 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/602 https://t.me/pamirinside/1438 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32117962.html https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-activist-vazirbekov-prison-16-years/32118861.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1590 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1591

			Russian Federation, he received no visit from the Russian Embassy while in detention in Dushanbe. Accused of public appeals to overthrow the constitutional order and embezzlement. Allegedly tortured. Sentenced on November 5, 2022, after a trial behind closed doors, though pleading not guilty and on the basis of a previous Tajikistani citizenship which he had given up in 2005. Transferred to prison in Khujand on December 28, 2022.			https://en.yorov.org/2022/11/09/buzurgmehr-foundation-condemned-the-verdict-against-pamiri-activist-oraz-vazirbekov/ https://pamirinside.org/ораза-вазирбекова-могут-перевести-в-т https://t.me/anorasarkorova/676 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32205397.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(144) https://zindoniyon.wordpress.com/2023/10/01/%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%80%D3%AF%D0%B7-%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA-%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7/?fbclid=IwAROV9FZZYiBFNFdS_17vDeQCN4EMGofQLvP4C8EORJuJais1rCES5-T5S9g/
July 29, 2022	Vazirbekov, Ramzi (“Ramsess Shogunov”)	Moscow	Important community organizer in the Pamiri diaspora in Russia. Citizen of the Russian Federation. Announced in March 2022 that he feared being kidnapped by Tajikistani security forces. Was forcibly disappeared at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport		13	https://t.me/pamirinside/551 https://t.me/pamirinside/1126 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377 https://t.me/anserenko/4773 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjmQyU2tAlk https://t.me/pamirinside/1130 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/385 https://t.me/pamirinside/1131 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31967525.html https://t.me/anserenko/4776 https://fergana.media/news/127192/

			on July 29, 2022, and taken to Dushanbe. His relatives had not been able to see him by September 15, 2022. The attorney was provided by the authorities and did not communicate with the defendant. Sentenced on November 5, 2022, in a trial behind closed doors. Transferred to prison in Khujand on December 28, 2022.			https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pair-of-pamiri-activists-disappear-from-russia-and-reappear-in-tajikistan/ https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/05-08-2022-operatsiya/ https://t.me/pamirinside/1204 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32009426.html https://pamirinside.org/родные-вазирбековых-за-два-месяца-ни-р/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32032801.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32120926.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32205397.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1328 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(155) https://t.me/anorasarkorova/1616
Before July 29, 2022	Pulodbekov, Ruslan	Moscow	From Parsudj (Roshtkala district). Reportedly close friend of Amriddin Alovatshoev. Detained in Moscow for alleged violations of the migration legislation in late July. Left the prison on July 29, 2022, and disappeared. Possibly taken to Dushanbe.	182 187.2	10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/377 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31972278.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(215)
Before July 31, 2022	Goibnazarov, Parviz	Moscow	From Rijist (Roshtkala district). Friend of Gulbiddin Ziyobekov. Detained in Moscow and sent to Tajikistan. Trial behind closed doors, without any		18	https://t.me/pamirinside/1168 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/470 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/tadzhikistan-urozhentsa-gbao-prigovorili-k-18-godam-kolonii/32024579.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(151)

			lawyer. Convicted of insulting a state official around September 7, 2022.			
Before July 31, 2022	Lashkarbekov, Ruslan	Moscow	From Roshtkala district. Detained in Moscow and sent to Tajikistan. Allegedly injured when jumping from the first floor during detention. Sentenced on September 28, 2022, in a trial behind closed doors.	35.1 182.2	10	https://t.me/pamirinside/1168 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/594 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (158)
Before August 11, 2022	Abdullobekov, Akbar	Bizmich (Khorugh)	Detained in a metro station in Moscow upon request by the general prosecutor of Tajikistan.			https://t.me/pamirinside/1164 https://fergana.media/news/127383/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (4)
August 17, 2022	Gayosov, Maksud	Moscow	Author of Instagram blog “Bobingi” and volunteer activist. Active in social media after November 2021 and May 2022 events in GBAO. Detained in his home in Moscow. Reappeared in Europe in February 2023 and gave an interview to Iron King.			https://t.me/pamirinside/1176 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31994001.html https://fergana.media/news/127383/ https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-picks-winners-in-pamir-investment-drive https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32015409.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3Augl0AnIk
September 1, 2022	Atobekov, Mamadbek	Moscow	From Murgab district. Had been living and working in Russia for			https://t.me/anorasarkorova/475 https://t.me/pamirinside/1244 https://t.me/pamirinside/1245

			eight years. Close friend of Ramzi Vazirbekov. Detained at his home in Moscow for inspection of documents by Russian police who were accompanied by two representatives of Tajikistan. Forcibly disappeared, whereabouts were still unknown on September 11, 2022.			https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32015409.html https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (98)
September 1, 2022	Dildorbekov, Mansur		Detained by Russian police in Moscow. Released the same day.			https://t.me/pamirinside/1244 https://t.me/pamirinside/1245 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32015409.html
September 5, 2022	Mirzoyev / Mirzoev, Komyor ("Komchek Mirzoyev")	Moscow	Blogger from Khorugh, had criticized the performance of GBAO health authorities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Detained in Moscow by Russian security forces together with his flatmates upon request by the Ministry of the Interior of Tajikistan (international arrest warrant) on September 5, 2022. Released in Moscow	305	10 or 18	https://t.me/pamirinside/1249 https://t.me/anorasarkorova/473 https://pamirinside.org/блогер-комёр-мирзоев-освобожден-из-по/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32020990.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32028453.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/550 https://jfj.fund/jfj/komyor-mirzoyev/ https://jfj.fund/jfj/komyor-mirzoyev-4/ https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (90)

			on September 7, 2022, forcibly disappeared immediately afterwards and taken to Dushanbe. Sentenced on October 7, 2022.			
Before November 02, 2022	Mamadyorbekov, Firuz	Bizmich (Khorugh)	Community leader in Bizmich neighbourhood of Khorugh, friend of Tolib Ayombekov. Forced by security forces to leave Khorugh and Tajikistan in summer 2022. Abducted from Sankt Peterburg in late October 2022.			https://t.me/pamirinside/1482
Before November 28, 2022	Alifshoev, Amid	Khlebzavod (Khorugh)	Had lived and worked in Russia for five years. Detained by unidentified masked and uniformed people in his apartment in Moscow, deported to Tajikistan. Legal basis of detention and deportation unclear. No social media activities.			https://pamirinside.org/из-россии-похищен-очередной-уроженец https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32152352.html https://www.currenttime.tv/a/russia-ekstradirovala-gbao-tadzhikistan/32153515.html
November 29, 2022	Muminov, Olimsho	Shujand (Rushan district)	Volleyball player. Participated in the protest event in Vamar (Rushan) on	187	10	https://t.me/anorasarkorova/814 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (143)

			May 18, 2022. Went to Nizhniy Novgorod (Russian Federation) after the crackdown and worked for a construction company there. Disappeared on November 29, 2022, when going for a meeting with his employer, and reappeared in the GKNB remand prison in Tajikistan. Sentenced on January 26, 2023.			
December 01, 2022	Ayombekov, Kurbonjon	Russia	Nephew of Tolib Ayombekov. Tried to leave the Russian Federation after other relatives of Tolib Ayombekov had been detained and to flee to Ukraine. Detained at the border by Russian security forces and extradited to Tajikistan.		8	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32162857.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1547 https://t.me/pamirinside/1551 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/(219) https://bomdodrus.com/2023/06/23/na-10-let-osuzhden-rashid-samyj-mladshij-brat-neformalnogo-lidera-gbao-toliba-ayombekova/
January 26, 2023	Saidgulov, Akram	Khorugh	Detained on the bus from Russia to Mariupol (Ukraine, under Russian occupation) by Russian and Tajikistani security forces. He		10	https://t.me/pamirnews_24/344 https://pamirinside.org/pamiris-prisoner-list-2022/ (8)

			wanted to work there in construction.			
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9.5.4. Journalists detained in Tajikistan without immediate link to the GBAO crackdown

Date of detention	Name	Place of residence	Further information	Art. Crim. Code	Sentence (years)	Publicly available sources
June 15, 2022	Bobiev, Daler („Daler Imomali“)	Dushanbe	Sentenced on October 17, 2022. He denied his guilt in a letter to President Rahmon. His attorney appealed but the decision on the appeal was postponed.		10	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31899800.html https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-government-steps-persecution-journalists https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32070139.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32080531.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32089087.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32092556.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32112559.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32143004.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32145720.html https://t.me/anorasarkorova/569 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32156974.html https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230303/predstaviteli-ombudsmena-tadzhikistana-skazali-cto-proverili-sostoyanie-zdorovya-zaklyuchyonnih-zhurnalistov?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32656415.html
June 15, 2022	Ghurbatov, Avazmad („Abdullo Gurbati“)	Dushanbe	Attacked in May 2020. Sentenced on October 4, 2022. The sentence was criticized by former colleagues of Gurbati and human rights organizations. His attorney appealed.		7.5	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30607059.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31899800.html https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-government-steps-persecution-journalists https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32076691.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32064597.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32065295.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32114120.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32143004.html

						https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32238886.html https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230303/predstaviteli-ombudsmena-tadzhikistana-skazali-cto-proverili-sostoyanie-zdorovya-zaklyuchyonnih-zhurnalistov?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32656415.html
July 8, 2022	Sohibov, Zavqibek („Zavkibek Saidamin“)	Dushanbe	Was denied registration as a candidate for the Parliament of Tajikistan in 2020. Sentenced on November 3, 2022, after a trial behind closed doors.		7	https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30419892.html https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-government-steps-persecution-journalists https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32066592.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32076691.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32115113.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32146808.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32227698.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1687 https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230303/predstaviteli-ombudsmena-tadzhikistana-skazali-cto-proverili-sostoyanie-zdorovya-zaklyuchyonnih-zhurnalistov?tg_rhash=dad9b8f651f186 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026
July 8, 2022	Kotibov, Abdusattor („Abdusattor Pirmukhammad zoda“)	Vahdat	Reported torture and psychological pressure during his detention in the remand prison in Dushanbe in a letter published on October 19, 2022, which had made him read out coerced confessions. Trial suspended in late November 2022.	307.2	7	https://rsf.org/en/tajikistan-government-steps-persecution-journalists https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32064270.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32094477.html https://cpi.org/2022/10/jailed-tajik-journalist-abdusattor-pirmukhammadzoda-describes-severe-physical-abuse-forced-confession-in-letter/ https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32154044.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32183043.html https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32194223.html https://ifex.org/tajikistan-journalist-abdusattor-pirmukhammadzoda-sentenced-to-7-years-in-prison/

			Sentenced on December 26, 2022.		https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32227485.html https://t.me/pamirinside/1688 https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32276061.html https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28026
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