Discourse: An Introduction to van Dijk, Foucault and Bourdieu

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for my parents

Acknowledgments

Contents

Introduction

The 20th century witnesses a radical change in the understanding of the notion of discourse. Famous researchers try to find out how this notion is understood now, after its reorganization in that century, and try to find the reasons for the change in the interpretation of this notion. Their questions provide the incentive for the present inquiry. In this work the achievements of the representatives of three different branches of knowledge, namely linguistics, philosophy and sociology, are critically examined to interrogate the practical concept of Discourse. These paradigm constructing authors are Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Their cumulative influence, as a problematic, raised a postmodern awareness of the process of meaning dislocation. In this way, they make a fundamental contribution to the thematic of Discourse as human self-understanding in the world of social preference and cultural context.

1. The problematic of discourse

The problematic of discourse in the following work embraces the presentation and the explanation of the notion of discourse in the writings by Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The notion is presented initially on the level of inquiry into the separate writings by each of the above-mentioned authors. It thus follows the presentation of the notion of discourse first in the writings by Teun van Dijk, then the object of interest moves to the writings of Michel Foucault, and only then is the approach to discourse in the writings by Pierre Bourdieu examined. Following this method the stress is laid on the presentation of

the intrinsic structure of the work of each thinker and the development of the notion of discourse as it progresses in the course of the analysis of the subject. In order to be able to point out the theoretical implications of their works, first, the characteristic methodology of each of the authors is presented: their attitude toward the object of inquiry, their subject, the research perspective and the material which they analyse. From the methodological point of view what is significant is the kind of philosophical or linguistic tradition that constitutes the background to their work and hence the kind of terminology, notions or analytical devices they use. On the other hand it is important to draw attention to those terms which were to become matters of dispute and were to be advocated or refuted in the argument with their adversaries.

After the methodological analysis, the theories of each of the writers are presented, including their most representative ideas, their reformulation of old problems in their fields of study, and the interpretations that are unique for their approaches and that make them protagonists of a new attitude toward the problem of discourse. It is also vital to comment on the role that the theories of the writers play in their respective branches of science. It is worth noting that the notion of discourse is not always stated *explicite* in their works, as it is in the case of the work of Michel Foucault, who devoted a whole book to the problems of discourse and elaborated it extensively. At times the concept of discourse evolves on the basis of an assumed relation between theory and practice (as it is in the case of Pierre Bourdieu) or it is the outcome of a certain approach to linguistics and ideological issues (as in the case of Teun van Dijk).

The analysis of the writings by each of the above-mentioned thinkers is not organized in chronological order; an attempt is made to indicate the key moments of their theories in the order of discourse, synchronically – in order to be able to grasp all the intricacies and dependencies that would evade a diachronic presentation. Hence, the third (or fourth) subchapter of each chapter involves a discussion on the ideas of each author with a specification of the results of their inquiry with regard to the main subject of this dissertation, namely: discourse. Only then, after the inquiry into the works by van Dijk, Foucault and Bourdieu taken separately, is a comparison of their notions of discourse carried out. In this synthetic part directions of their influences are indicated and conclusions are drawn concerning the dependencies between previously

outlined notions and the advantages and disadvantages of the chosen assumptions are revealed.

2. The thematic of discourse

The thematic assumed in the examination of discourse results from the influence of several theories from different branches of science. In the most general sense, it is shaped by notions of linguistic, philosophical or sociological provenience. More specifically, the thematic embraces the area of semiotics (or semiology) and its definitions of the notion of sign; structuralism, which first came to prominence in the work of the linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959), whose achievements and divisions were developed in other fields, most notably in the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss ([1958] 1968); the field of hermeneutics, with the valuable contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004) and the comparisons of the phenomenological insight with the hermeneutical view represented in the works of Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1994). The hermeneutical perspective on terms like understanding, interpretation or language, as well as insights into the subject of the signifying practices that create the context for the formulation of the basic assumptions of the theories presented here opens up the possibility of finding a language that would account for the representation of theoretical as well as practical purposes of the above-mentioned analyses. The perspective that is projected to account for the notion of discourse in the differentiated fields of linguistics, philosophy and sociology must acknowledge both origins – theoretical and practical (social) – of the meaning of the term *discourse*. A complete analysis of the notion of discourse therefore needs an introduction that outlines the history and origins of this term – which is undertaken in the fifth subchapter of this introduction. The perspective assumed is created in such a way that it is broad enough to encompass such different branches of knowledge as linguistics, philosophy and sociology, yet on the other hand is sufficiently homogenous to consolidate the different arguments into a coherent, complete whole. This is the reason for starting the research from the moment in humanities after the linguistic turn, where the problems of language, understanding, interpretation and discourse are most appreciated and most clearly explicated.

3. On discourse evidence

The works of Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu and the works written by other thinkers to evaluate or develop their contributions, constitute the evidence material of this enterprise. However, in order to fully understand the main works, supplementary background reading was consulted in the areas of structuralism, hermeneutics and semiotics to provide the notions necessary for understanding the main problem of discourse. An explication of these introductory concepts is given in the last subchapter of the introduction.

4. The origin and history of the discourse concept

Discourse is a term that encompasses a broad range of different notions, which have been examined in many disciplines, from diverse points of view, having in mind the different uses for which the term in a given theory was introduced. Its meaning has been developed since the most distant times of rhetoric, through Aristotle's works, *e.g. Peri Hermeneias* ([384–322] 1831–1870), until its most elaborated form in Michel Foucault's writings ([1969] 2011). Nowadays it is accepted that "discourse is a textual phenomenon of a socio-cultural nature" (see Chruszczewski 2009: 1, private communication) and "a text is a singular realization of a particular discourse" (Chruszczewski 2009: 1). In the literature on the notion of discourse the common definitions of discourse state that:

> discourse (is): 1. verbal communication; talk, conversation; 2. a formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing; 3. a unit of text used by linguists for the analysis of linguistic phenomena that range over more than one sentence; 4. to discourse: the ability to reason (archaic); 5. to discourse on/upon: to speak or write about formally; 6. to hold a discussion; 7. to give forth (music) (archaic). (14th century, from Medieval Latin. *discursus*: argument, from Latin, a running to and fro *discurrere*). (Hanks (ed.) 1988, cited in Mills [1997] 2004: 2)

or:

> discourse (is): 1. a conversation, especially of a formal nature; formal and orderly expression of ideas in speech or writing; also such expression in the form of sermon, treatise, etc.; a piece or unit of connected speech

> or writing. (*Middle English*: *discours*, from Latin: act of running about).
> (Gay *et al.* (eds.) 1984, cited in Mills [1997] 2004: 2)

Nevertheless, discourse can be grasped more widely as a form of

> speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and
> categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking
> at the world, an organization or representation of experience – 'ideology'
> in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode
> different representations of experience; and the source of these repre-
> sentations is the communicative context within which the discourse is
> embedded. (Hawthorn 1992: 48, cited in Mills [1997] 2004: 5)

The context within which discourse is embedded always assumes a communicative relation between the speaker and the hearer, and it is this practical relation that governs the conditions for its creation. It can be said also after Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 168–179) that it is only when such conditions are present that the relation toward the Other and the world gives us the space for the appearance of human subjectivity within which communication can arise. As a natural consequence of this, any undertaking in the area of discourse should first give attention to the notions that lie in the background of the concept and condition its form and presentation. Different kinds of discourses are couched in different problems that belong to different areas of study. These fields can overlap as far as the notion of discourse is concerned and they provide its meaning with different supporting terms, all of which should be more or less explained and indicated. At times, thanks to these diverse uses in different fields of science, the main meaning of the term *discourse* can be shifted in the directions given by these branches. This can be observed, for example, in structuralism, where the term's connotation is of a more abstract character and where discourse is treated as the absolute whole that is based on and develops from the internal relations between its elements, and where the particular meaning of a given sign is never independent of the meanings of signs which are related to it within the system. Here to understand the notion of discourse that is specific to structuralism it is worth first considering the notions that are operational for the earlier approaches to meaning: the notions of understanding and interpretation.

4.1. Heidegger and Gadamer: The problematic of interpretation

To understand the notion of discourse that is characteristic for the whole area of hermeneutical philosophy – the prop in our contemporary understanding of the term – it is important to take into account the notions that arise on the basis of this theory, the first to make use of the launching of the deep layers of ontology in practical communication. It would not be without importance to explain here what Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 31) had in mind when he talked about being that should itself be expressed within the discourse (because this has been forgotten), and what he meant when he treated interpretation and understanding not as tools of inquiry into discourse but as the characteristics of an attitude toward the world and Others (Heidegger [1927] 1994: 202–218). In this sense interpretation and understanding are not epistemological terms describing the methods of inquiry into the surrounding world, but they are ontological terms characterizing the very Being of humans, the quality of their Being. Here, the ontological quality of Being is the preliminary condition for its understanding as a social identity.

Another point of view is presented in the theory by Michel Foucault ([1969] 2011). This theory cannot be overlooked, being one that is an important element in the contemporary understanding of the notion of discourse. However, considering the range of the topic and its impact on other theories, this issue is treated separately and one of the main chapters is devoted to outlining the dependencies of Foucault's analysis. In the introductory part, which presents the origin, history and development of the notion of discourse, attention is paid to notions like meaning, understanding and interpretation, which are relevant to the general understanding of the notion of discourse.

The notion of interpretation is part of the denotation of the term *discourse*. It can be understood as a part of the apparatus of cognition. In this sense language is treated as a tool for expressing meaning. The division into the object of expression and the subject that expresses it is rooted in the dualistic thinking engendered by Platonian philosophy. Some thinkers (*i.e.* Jacques Derrida [1967] 1997: 3–73) call this thinking *dualistic* and the whole tradition originating from this Platonian division into Ideas and their phenomena – logocentrism. The emergence of binary oppositions in Plato's theory has left its mark on a whole tradition of thinking including René Descartes ([1641, 1647] 1998: 92–103) and

Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1999: A2 35–60 / B2 94–315). Their division into *res cogitans* and *res extensa* and Thing-in-itself and its phenomena was strongly influenced by Plato's myth about the cave and his theory about Ideas and their appearances. Seeing interpretation in these dualistic terms resulted in the views expressed by Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959), in the linguistic model of understanding by Roman Jakobson (1957), in the views rooted in the romantic tradition (by Wilhelm Dilthey (1958–1982) and Friedrich Schleiermacher ([1838] 1977)), and more recently in the views of Eric D. Hirsch, Jr. (1967) and Paul Ricoeur ([1990] 2003) who also follow this train of thought (Kalaga 1997: 20–25). De Saussure does not talk about the world of reference objects, nevertheless, interpretation is seen in his work as an act of decoding and it is also divided here in the Platonian mode into two elements: signifier and signified – hence we are still in the dualistic tradition.

Interpretation as an epistemological concept assumes the traditional medieval division into *subtilitas intelligendi* and *subtilitas explanandi* – the former is focused on the construction of the meaning, the latter on the explanation of it. The construction of the original meaning always looks for its object, which can best be grasped in the attempt to gain access to the so-called *mens auctoris* – that which the author had in mind while writing the text. Interpretation in this sense is always of secondary importance, being realized as a process additional to determining the main, original meaning of the text. Wojciech Kalaga (1997: 25) explains this division into basic, original meaning and the additional activity of interpretation, stating that "understanding grasps the literal, the unequivocal, monosemic, and visible; interpretation is directed at the double meaning, the hidden, the metaphorical or symbolic." Paul Ricoeur – according to Kalaga (1997: 27) – also draws attention to the ontological dimensions of interpretation, while at the same time retaining its epistemological stance. Interpretation according to Ricoeur (1974: 12, cited in Kalaga 1997: 26) is based on the semantics of the *shown-yet-concealed* – which is the name for the underlying double meaning of symbols. Symbols according to Ricoeur (1974: 12, cited in Kalaga 1997: 26) can be read on two levels, one, more literal and the other, the metaphorical reading. Interpretation is here "unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning" (Ricoeur 1974: 13, cited in Kalaga 1997: 26). It should be remarked here also, after George Lakoff and Mark Johnson ([1980]

2003: 55), that literal meaning is usually based on metaphors which systematically structure our actions and thought. Terms like "wasting time" – which is metaphor, are so tightly accreted with our commonly used literal speech that it is difficult to differentiate them from the plain literal use of language.

Interpretation is a key term in the philosophy of modern thinker Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1962). His view, however, introduces an important shift of accents in philosophy from the epistemological to the ontological dimension: for him it is not so much the way the subject comes to know reality, but the way he exists in it. Interpretation appears to be one of the main attitudes determining the way of being-in-the-world. One of the key elements indicating how the being is realized is its *Sein-zum-Tode*. Only on the condition of experiencing the finality and ultimate possibility of death is it possible to grasp the unity of existence as Care (Kalaga 1997: 32).

For Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 205) understanding and interpretation are not a method but the "ontological foundation of Dasein's existence, an essential ontological trait of man" (Kalaga 1997: 32). Heidegger's method of disclosing the character of Being introduces us into the area of hermeneutics, but it descends from the phenomenological ground: "the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*. The *logos* of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of *hermeneuein*" (Heidegger [1927] 1962, cited in Kalaga 1997: 32). "Authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are made known to Dasein […]" (Heidegger [1927] 1962, cited in Kalaga 1997: 32–33) through this phenomenological hermeneutics. Heidegger underlines that there is no pure, innate understanding of the self. It always results from the struggle with the other: the Other man or the other text. We can also notice that Paul Ricoeur in his article "On Interpretation" agrees with Heidegger by stating that "there is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, texts" (Ricoeur 1989: 374, cited in Kalaga 1997: 26). It is also in agreement with the dialectic of the Master and the Slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* ([1807] 2003: 104–111), where the Self-Knowledge is attained in the physical struggle of work and in such a way the struggle to survive is a form of mediation toward self-understanding. Heidegger notes: "to exist is essentially – to understand" ([1975] 1982: 276, cited

in Kalaga 1997: 33) and he means not only understanding of oneself but holistic understanding of the world as a condition for possessing proper understanding. In the work of Heidegger interpretation is holistic because it is dependent on the context of all relations included in the network creating the total of our Being-in-the-world. Two overlapping characteristics of Dasein are strategic in this regard: Being-in-the-world and Mitsein – Being-with-others, sharing the world with others. Hence "Dasein can understand and interpret an entity only within the framework of the totality of its involvements with other entities" (Kalaga 1997: 40). Encountering the world and Others is the constitutive function of understanding and interpretation; "Understanding cannot project possibilities in a void, but requires a relational and holistic structure" (Kalaga 1997: 34). Being submerged in the discourse, which is not a question of choice but one of the inherent ontological characteristics of humans, is the condition for the appearance of the possibility of understanding. Interpretation is always a projection of a future meaning on the basis of the present orientation within the world. This conviction provides a suitable introduction to one of the inheritors of at least some of Heidegger's ideas: Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 172–207) and his unique notion of understanding which was realized in the form of philosophical hermeneutics.

Gadamerian hermeneutics is another solution to the problem of interpretation and discourse. It has predecessors in the persons of Friedrich Schleiermacher ([1838] 1977), Wilhelm Dilthey (1958–1982) and Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1962) and origins in romantic hermeneutics. Initially the term was used to describe methods of exegesis of sacred texts, but in the 20th century its meaning gained a new epistemological and later, ontological dimension. It was Schleiermacher who first brought to light understanding *itself* as a problem, rather than just the techniques of understanding. It was also Schleiermacher, according to Szulakiewicz (2004: 63), who first noticed the general character of understanding and who tried to incorporate it into a broader theory. According to Craig (ed.) (1998: 385–394), Schleiermacher also observed that "[t]hought and its expression are completely the same." This can later be perceived in the writings of Heidegger ([1927] 1994) as the influential idea that encouraged the latter to formulate his famous theory emphasizing the identity between interpretation and understanding.

The next step toward the creation of a complete theory of understanding was a step undertaken by Wilhelm Dilthey (1958–1982) who transferred the problem of meaning and understanding to a new area of inquiry, called humanistic science. Dilthey's achievement was to formulate the problem of understanding as an epistemological problem; he started to ask questions about the possibility of understanding, not in psychological, but in philosophical mode, though he did not avoid being accused of psychologism. Gadamer also concludes ([1960] 2004: 196) that Dilthey was the first to consciously formulate methodological rules on the basis of hermeneutical thinking, what was earlier thought to be *implicite* by Leopold Ranke (1881–1888) and Johann G. Droysen (1846). Dilthey (1958–1982) also began to treat history as the starting point for hermeneutical analysis based on the rule of the hermeneutical circle, a notion introduced by Schleiermacher ([1838] 1977). This rule assumes that the subject approaches "the whole" of the text or context equipped with the knowledge taken from the fragment, from the acquaintance with the detail, and after enlarging the knowledge of "the whole" in this way he approaches the detail with the introductory knowledge based on the previous generalizations. Proceeding in this way the subject provides itself with a method of supplying a clue to the understanding of the obscured fragments and he also follows the methodological advice given by Schleiermacher when he stated that:

> Not all words and sentences are equally obscure, the relatively transparent supply a clue to the relatively opaque. Again, understanding is a matter of degree. I can roughly understand a text without fully understanding it, and rough understanding enables me to decipher particular parts. (Craig (ed.) 1998: 385–394)

Such an understanding of the task of hermeneutics helped to place the foundation for historical thinking within the framework of hermeneutics – it was achieved by Dilthey (1958–1982), when he tried to understand the continuity of history from the engaged point of view of participant in this history. This also constitutes a point of agreement with the view presented by Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 298–304) who, like Dilthey (1958–1982), sees the progression of history from its inside, and who appreciates the thinking of history that is conditioned by itself alone. Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 248–255) formulated this by saying that humans are thrown into the world and the subject can never obtain independent

access to a knowledge of the world, for his thinking is thinking thrown into and within the world. Thus, the possibility of non-engaged, unaffected, phenomenological thinking cannot be fulfilled. According to Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 196), thanks to Dilthey and his historical school it is also widely accepted that returning to the absolute, originary point of beginning, the zero starting point of knowledge, is not possible, either.

In the wake of the analysis of Dilthey's thought, Gadamer observes ([1960] 2004: 197) that the continuity of history must be presented in noncontinuous, complete forms in order to be understood at all: "The universal context of history lacks the self-containedness that a text has for the critic and that, for the historian, seems to make a biography […] into a complete unit of meaning, a text intelligible within itself" (Gadamer [1960] 2004): 197). Gadamer indicates here that understanding something for Dilthey takes the form of understanding the totalities of meanings, it is isolated from the person who understands it. Gadamer overcomes this problem by introducing onto the scene of conscious understanding moments of prejudice which are productive of the whole process of understanding. It can be further said here that thinking and understanding for Gadamer consist of these moments of pre-understanding which are of a determining character for understanding itself. The appearance of fore-structure of understanding is strictly connected with the Heideggerian ([1927] 1994: 325–375) analysis of the temporality of Dasein. It is from this analysis that Heidegger derives the circular structure of understanding. In the second chapter of *Being and Time* ([1927] 1994: 79) Heidegger outlines the notion of the facticity of Dasein, which through the phenomenological analysis accounts for the modes of being of Dasein as the Being-in-the-world. He states ([1927] 1994: 79) that our being can be thought of only on the basis of Being-in-the-world and our entanglement in the net of the relations in the world. Another feature of the structure of Dasein in Heidegger's work is the structure of "Care" which situates being in a constant struggle to understand the world, which together with Being-in-the-world is the basic, primordial modus of existence ([1927] 1994: 83). The entanglement of the Dasein in the relations within the world, the basic category of throwness-in-the-world resembles the situation of the readers or interpreters of texts, who are trying to situate themselves in the discourse which encompasses them and makes them its own elements. The Heideggerian view ([1927]

1994: 213–215) on the fore-structure of understanding can be of help here. It is not that the subject is in the situation of having direct, unmediated access to things. On the contrary the mediated, deferred way of accessing the Thing-in-itself (which is never given) consists of the fore-havings, fore-sights and fore-conceptions which are the preliminary approach to the subject, but which can also never be dispensed with. As human beings, the subject is in a situation of always having been subsumed into the tradition that surrounds him:

> a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning merges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. (Gadamer [1960] 2004: 269)

This view carries the strong mark of the influence of Heidegger, and Gadamer also stays under his spell when in his writings he emphasizes the phenomenological drive toward the things-themselves. His theory of understanding always assumes the possibility of getting to the "Thing" of a conversation. It is in this respect that Jacques Derrida's ([1972] 2010, [1967] 1997) overcoming of the logocentric discourse that differentiates between objects and subjects of inquiry is particularly noteworthy. Derrida's constant strive to deconstruct logocentric language based on the binary oppositions originating from Plato marks a break with the convention in which Gadamer still perseveres. Heidegger also stays under the charm of the Kantian Thing-in-itself when he states that subjects grasp the positive possibility of the hermeneutical circle

> only when we have understood that our first, last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 153, cited in Gadamer [1960] 2004: 269)

Gadamer approaches Heidegger from his own prejudiced point of view because he excerpts from Heidegger's work the fragments that indicate the intention he himself had. In his essay on Heidegger titled: "Heidegger and the Language of Metaphysics" he underlines that, even if it is true that Heidegger broke with philosophical tradition, to the same

extent he represented "an incomparable renewal of the tradition" (Gadamer [1972] 2007: 347). This statement seems to verify the Gadamerian conviction that humans are always immersed in tradition and that their knowledge and participation in a certain discourse are construed with the help of the process of merging their present knowledge (which arises from being submerged in past knowledge and future expectations) with the "horizons" of the knowledge they encounter. This process of melting of horizons is called by Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 305) the fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*) and is strongly influenced by Hegel's construction of world history ([1807] 2003). The submerging of the sentence that is uttered in the context of that which has already been stated and in the perspective of that which can be further projected about it is in Gadamer's writings the effect of the impact of the Hegelian view that "the meaning of a statement is not exhausted in what is stated" (Gadamer [1997] 2007: 331).

Hegel's dialectic ([1807] 2003) plays a significant role in Gadamer's view and is inherent in his ascribing great importance to the notion of language as something that mediates humans' knowledge about themselves and the world. It should be emphasized that, in the dialectical progress instituted by Hegel, dialectic does not take the form of a methodological undertaking where it becomes the movement performed by thought; on the contrary, dialectic as proposed by Hegel is the movement of things themselves presented in language (Scheibler 2000: 138–139). This stress placed on the ontological value of dialectics without positioning it with regard to humans is similar to Heidegger's giving special attention to the ontic character of the concept of truth. However, for Heidegger determining the concept of truth as assertion was only the preliminary step to disclosing the problem of the ontological difference between the Being and being. Nevertheless some research (Scheibler 2000: 133) suggests that Heidegger, in comparison to Gadamer's grappling with the problem of language and thinking "remained […] at the 'ontic' level" in the sense that Gadamer, besides talking about the general qualifications of understanding, conspicuously points to the relation between knowledge and the speaker – he underlines the fact that language is valid and has its value only within the relation to its enunciator. For Gadamer it is important, to the extent of possessing an ontological dimension, that "something is said to someone" (Scheibler 2000: 133)

and that the value of language is confirmed by virtue of its realization in the communicative dialogue between human beings. Heidegger seemed not to notice this. Although he spoke about the relation toward the Other, he did this in an existentialist sense, not the pragmatic sense grasped by Gadamer. The dialogical nature of all truths in Gadamer's writings is also emphasized by Brice R. Wachterhauser in his work *Beyond Being. Gadamer's Post-Platonic Hermeneutical Ontology* (1999). Together with Gadamer he admits that our "access to truth is rooted in dialogue" and depends on whether "we enter into the process of inquiry with (people)" (Wachterhauser 1999: 181). Language possesses a special value for Gadamer; it is not understood in terms of classical hermeneutics as a tool for expressing a meaning which awaits "ready to be expressed." Language and understanding are comprehended here as ways of being, in which the total appurtenance of being and thought is expressed. Understanding which always happens in the form of language and which is always already an interpretation based on fore-structures and has the character of tentatively assumed projections is in Gadamer's writing planned as something directed to disclose the truth about one's own being. In this sense the part speaks for the whole, and the whole is inherently comprised in the part, because "the individual act of speech, or word, is related to the totality of being, of what can be said but remains hidden" (Scheibler 2000: 138). This statement directs us also to the idea of the speculative character of language which is elaborated in the third part of *Truth and Method*. Gadamer writes here that "the articulation of the *logos* brings the structure of being into language, and this coming into language is, for Greek thought, nothing other than the presencing of the being itself, its *aletheia*" ([1960] 2004: 453). In other words, it is being itself which is given in the infiniteness of its proceedings in language. What is encountered in this approach to language is a representation of the hermeneutical experience, which was propagated by Gadamer. The most vivid characteristic of this experience is that it is never ending, shifting its perspectives with continuous progression along the line of oncoming horizons and their fusions, immersed in the surrounding of traditions and discourses, and its last feature – probably the most striking one, is that these continuously changing perspectives are productive of something that helps the subject to gain knowledge about itself – the phenomenon of disclosing the truth; *aletheia*.

In this movement toward its potentiality, the "beyond being" structure of language is visible, language that tends toward overcoming human finitude on the sole condition of its perpetual self-transcendence: "to possess a language – writes the biographer of Gadamer, Jean Grondin – is in a way to be able to rise above it, to enlarge our horizons whilst remaining in the horizon of possible sayings" (Grondin [1999] 2003: 148). In language – as it is postulated by Gadamer – it is possible to observe the continuous movement from concealment to unconcealment of the truth, only some aspects of which can be grasped. There is no possibility of getting access to the absolute truth on the basis of the Heideggerian and Gadamerian criticism of the phenomenological approach, but there is a strong emphasis on the recurrent revision and mediated expression of the movement of truth which is approachable on the condition of possessing the ability to speak and to be questioned. The truth of language and through it the truth of being emanates in a discourse in the way Platonian Good discloses itself in simultaneous unconcealment and concealment:

> [t]he Good is difficult to comprehend because it cannot be directly comprehended at all. It is never a 'pure presence,' a static Idea, whose intelligible structure can be captured in a carefully articulated theory, but instead it is only given to us indirectly, in the contexts where we discern what is best through dialogical questioning. (Wachterhauser 1999: 180)

This view, so closely related to the views expressed by Gadamer, who dedicated his whole life to examining the Classics, also relates to the Heideggerian struggle to place his inquiry *beyond* metaphysics and its logocentric, dualistic concepts expressing *pure truths*, *pure presences* on the one hand, or the *fictions of truth*, on the other, that is, appearances and phenomena, which were only reflections of real knowledge. We can follow the Heideggerian dissolution of (logocentric) language in his later writings, where he opens the space of being to the "calling of being." This process is called by Heidegger the disclosure of Being. Gadamer never attempted to give himself completely to the infinite, speculative power of language. His appreciation of language was always constrained by the role he accrued for language – language was of greatest value when it was used to communicate something, when it was used in the dialogue between humans, when its main role was fulfilled in conversation. Concerning this constraint, Gadamer describes the rule

that helps to situate every conversation within certain frames: human understanding must accommodate to the conditions in which it is realized and within these frames "the anticipation of perfection" can always be recalled: "In this way a presupposition is formulated which guides all understanding. It says that one can only understand that which represents a perfect unity of meaning" (Gadamer *et al.* 1988: 74). It should be observed here that this *unity of meaning* is somehow extracted from the background consisting of the projected prejudices. With the advantage of the distance of time which is "a positive and productive possibility for understanding" (Gadamer *et al.* 1988: 76), this can be supported as the meaning that is valid and confirmed by research and analysis. Gadamer in his writings, whether they concern the speculative character of language or the hermeneutical character of truth, never allows the discourse on a given subject to be taken over by the dissipating, deconstructing powers that stay hidden in the potentiality of writing. In this regard he stays tied to the emancipating (in the sense of preserving the stable meaning) strength of the Kantian Thing-in-itself. Discourse based on clear divisions and units of meaning, expressed in language, whose characteristic feature is its directing toward the "unsaid," is in this way transferred from the area of pure speculation to the grounds of the praxis of social life and the sphere of practical communication performed by the actors of the social discourse. Seen in this way, the work by Gadamer on understanding, meaning and language is not the conservative proposition that the author of thing-evasive discourse, Derrida, would claim, but it represents a breakaway from pure theory and an opening up of the field, which will be further embraced by Pierre Bourdieu in his perception of practice as an inherent component of the theory of communication. It is just at the point where Gadamer insists on the appropriation of the Thing of conversation, where he notes that "previous projections must be revised to make them conform to the thing" (Grondin [1999] 2003: 81) that he behaves as if he were challenged by meaning, but he, nevertheless, does not allow himself to be conquered by it. The lesson received from Heidegger helped in understanding that the Self should be open to the speaking of Being, but Gadamer never allowed the Heideggerian conviction about the forgetfulness of Being to rule his approach to discourse. The world is given in the form of language,

but Gadamer adds from himself that "it is in speech and speaking with one another that the world and the experiential world of human beings constructs itself" (Gadamer [1999] 2002: 125) and that:

> the integration of the magnificent results […] of modern empirical sciences […] does not come about through the methods of modern sciences and its mode of unwavering self-control. It accomplishes itself in the praxis of social life itself. (Gadamer [1999] 2002: 125)

The research proposed by Gadamer thus examines the particular elements of discourse, beginning with the notions of meaning, its elaboration in the notion of *Bildung*, the epistemological issues of getting knowledge of the world, understanding and its further application, interpretation, truth conditions and historical grounding, aimed at uniting them all in one coherent view, in which ultimately the practice of inquiry with other people and tradition seems predominant. It is this practice-orienting view of discourse that gives the Gadamerian view its unique character and makes it the basis from which the contemporary understanding of the notion of discourse by Foucault and later the practice oriented discourse of Bourdieu were able to arise. Gadamerian theory ([1960] 2004) is an important attempt to organize the notions acquired as a legacy which was further to become the condition for the appearance of a new understanding of the notion of discourse. Gadamerian theory based on the Heideggerian heritage constitutes the influence that indicates the direction of the further reception of the term.

Nevertheless, the criticism that is directed at the Gadamerian theory of interpretation should not be ignored. One of these criticisms comes from Wojciech Kalaga, who in *Nebulae of Discourse: Interpretation, Textuality and the Subject* (1997) indicates that Gadamerian hermeneutics clearly lacks the elaboration of the problem of sign, which is the other pole of the problem that needs to be elaborated to understand discourse. Kalaga (1997: 38) reckons that the sign is "the basic vehicle of discourse" and what follows, in the deciphering of the diverse dimensions interwoven within the field of meaning of the term *discourse*, we should pay more attention to semiotics and structuralism, whose prominent protagonist was Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959). It is important also to identify the common elements between these branches and hermeneutics.

Structuralism whose inauguration is accredited to Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959) (although it was not his conscious intention) is

a theory of signs and a method that was later deployed to elaborate the sociological theories of social practices and formations, *i.e.* Claude Lévi-Strauss, for example, argued that "social relations in 'primitive' societies can be treated as if they were linguistic structures" (Lévi-Strauss [1958] 1968, [1958] 1977, cited in Howarth 2000: 17). Originally de Saussure's theory of language was centered on the notion of language as something that is organized in a system of signs, whose value depends on their relative position with regard to the other signs in a system. Language for de Saussure is "a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty" (de Saussure [1916] 1959: 9). That is why language is something that "belongs both to the individual and to the society" (de Saussure [1916] 1959: 9). Language thus defined consists of the linguistic signs that are further divided into signified (*signifié*) and signifier (*signifiant*). Signified is the Saussurean name for the concept represented by the word, and signifier is chosen to denote the sound-image of the given word. Signified and its signifier are found to be connected arbitrarily through linguistic convention. However de Saussure ([1916] 1959: 114) also points out in his main work that language is organized in such a way that it creates "a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others." Here, as Howarth observes (2000: 20), an inconsistency in de Saussure's work can be found, because a certain paradox appears: on the one hand, each object is attributed a given term by virtue of convention, and on the other hand, the meaning of these terms results from their relative position in a system. Howarth states (2000: 20) that "to explain the paradox that words stand for an idea, but also have to be related to other words in order to acquire their identity and meaning, Saussure introduces the concept of linguistic value." The signification of each term is hence strictly dependent on its linguistic value originating from the position of the sign in a linguistic system. The sign alone does not possess intrinsic value – it receives this by virtue of its relations to other signs, but the word also represents an idea, which is determined by the rules of the discourse in which it is announced. What is important in de Saussure's synchronic system and what provided the inspiration for the creation of another theory of signs and understanding, namely the Derridian theory of deconstruction (Derrida [1967] 1997), is that

the word is not only the sound in speech, but that it is also – just like the written sign within the system of written signs – defined by virtue of phonic differences with regard to the other words distinguished from the stream of sounds. It is these differences that contributed to the shape of de Saussure's theory.

Signifying processes are also at the center of the Derridian ([1967] 1997) theory of meaning. Another similarity of de Saussure's theory to Derridian deconstruction stems from the assumption that "there is no essential core of meaning, contrary to Kant, no fixed universal concepts" (Foley [1997] 2009: 96). However, this point of convergence between the philosophers is also the point of the Derridian departure from the position of structuralism and the incentive for criticism. Derrida disagrees with the conception of language based on the logocentric divisions that are the source of the reified thinking about the idea and its phenomena; essence and existence, outside and inside, exterior and interior. He finds that language construed along the lines of these logocentric divisions still involves metaphysical thinking, which situates the object of the inquiry *vis-à-vis* its subject. Derrida finds that in human understanding of the world nothing of this kind happens. His famous "There is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida [1967] 1997: 158) expressed the idea of textuality, the idea that no clear boundaries exist between the object and its context. Derrida found that everything is a form of texture, and even the traditional subject is merged within the signifying practices which create contexts. A similar view was suggested by Wojciech Kalaga when he proposes a reading of subject as a function of signifying practice: "The subject now is no more than a function of semiosis, or discourse" (1997: 164). Nevertheless, Kalaga proposes a different view of signification and discourse. He notes that:

> the general metaphor I want to propose is that of the text as a nebular and ever mobile structure whose contours disperse into the surrounding field of textuality, yet whose identity is maintained by the force of teleology […] text […] is contradictorily pulled both toward absence (drift) and presence (totalization/teleology). (Kalaga 1997: 155)

We can draw the conclusion here that ultimately discourses are phenomena within which the subject is immersed and from which it takes its determining factors; the subject is produced from within the discourse as a signifying practice and this can also be viewed as

the main characteristic of the term *discourse.* The subject cannot even
be produced actively in a process undertaken by somebody, but rather as
a potentiality included in the powers of discourse. Discourse is an event
that influences the process of creation of an individual interpretation and
self-understanding. It also equips a subject with all the potential rules for
the creation of a signifying trace – which can be the only deferred sign of
its existence. The discourse provides it also with the relevant information
or paradigms of interpretation that make it possible for him to support
his own narration as an indicator of his being the Self.

The factors that influence the subject come both from the exteriority
and from itself – this influence and development can be compared with
the rule of structural coupling that originates in writings by Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987). Cognition in their view is under-
stood as something that results both from the "organism's present state
and its history of structural coupling" (Foley [1997] 2009: 12). "Structural
coupling" is seen here as the engagement in relations with others. This
has consequences for the following changing states of one's development
which are readjusted to the influence of the exterior conditions as well
as to the constantly changing shape (and in this sense also condition)
of its self. This self also reciprocally acts on the directions of further
readjustments. Discourse in these terms can be understood not only as
the "linguistic communication seen as a transaction between speaker
and hearer" – in which form Sara Mills ([1997] 2004: 3) proposes to
understand it, but rather as the area of struggles with the Other, taken
with all its ontological commitments – which is closer to the vision of
Kalaga and finds confirmation in the writings of Foucault ([1969] 2011).
Discourse seen as a result of the processes of individual narrations, of
signifying processes that influence the human history of relations with
other people and as a constant progression of textualization which
retains within it only what is relevant to the whole and seems coher-
ent on the basis of its projections – this discourse is only a hypothesis
drawn on the basis of the many readings of the already classical texts
regarding the problems of meaning, understanding, interpretation and
their relations toward the general problems of epistemology (gaining
knowledge) and self-identity. To make the preliminary remarks on
the notion of discourse complete, we need to proceed from the problems
of understanding and interpretation to the next subchapter dealing in

particular with the history of the notion of discourse that is revealed in different areas of study like functionalism, ethnomethodology or critical discourse analysis.

4.2. Goffman and Halliday: The thematic of social semiotics

The history of the notion of discourse does not amount to the history of the problems of understanding and interpretation; nevertheless, parts of this history originate from or are based on these notions. The problems of understanding and interpretation constitute the background from which most of the research in structuralism and poststructuralism takes its origin. This part of the work presents preliminary explanations of the problem of discourse examined in these areas of research.

The history of the notion of discourse ranging from the interactionism of Erving Goffman ([1974] 1986) to the ethnomethodology and functionalism of Michael A. K. Halliday ([1975] 2014), is placed between the French linguistic theory of discourse with its representatives like Dominique Maingueneau ([2003] 2014), and the theory of Critical Discourse Analysis represented by Teun van Dijk (1998), Norman Fairclough ([1995] 2010) and Ruth Wodak (Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014). As a preliminary step it may also be useful to add some remarks on discourse as presented in the narratology of the French writers, Roland Barthes ([1953, 1972] 2009) and Algirdas J. Greimas (Greimas, Fontanille [1991] 1993).

Among the representatives of interactionism are Erving Goffman ([1974] 1986) and John J. Gumperz (Gumperz, Hymes (eds.) [1972] 1986). However, Gumperz is also considered to be a linguistic anthropologist and together with Dell Hymes ([1972] 1986) contributed to establishing the field of the ethnography of communication. An introductory definition that may serve to situate the ideas of these writers is the statement from symbolic interactionism which claims that: "social reality is created in an ongoing negotiation between the participants in a social situation in a given material setting" (Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 189). The indication to the material setting of the context and the problem of working out the meaning in an "ongoing negotiation" between the participants confirm that this approach realizes the assumptions of the inquiry that underlines the moment of social interaction and of the communicative background. George H. Mead (1863–1931, cited

in Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 190) emphasizes that it is not only meanings that are created in social negotiation; the formation of one's identity is also a social process. He states (Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 190) that "the self is not given by nature; it emerges from interaction with others in the world. Signs and symbols play a central role in the formation of one's identity." In the interactionist view, it is also important to note that attention is shifted from "large and abstract macrototalities" to "the creative and reflexive logic of human practice as the ultimate origin of relationships with others" (Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 190). Following these presumptions Goffman ([1974] 1986) builds his well-known Frame Analysis, in which he tries to organize human experience into frames of different origins. In the introduction he underlines the importance of the frames in which humans situate themselves. By activating different frames we activate different worlds of meaning and in the wake of entering these frames we enter into these different worlds. The possibility of the introduction of these new frames is also the evidence that it is possible to speak about totally different worlds of meanings. These worlds are the result of the initiation of different dictionaries, hence, in each of these different worlds or frames "an object of a given kind can have its proper being" (Goffman [1974] 1986: 2). Thus we have "the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths, the worlds of myth and supernatural beliefs, the madman's world, etc. Each of these subworlds […] has 'its own special and separate style of existence'" (Goffman [1974] 1986: 2). Goffman ([1974] 1986: 48) in his book tries to provide different keys to the understanding of the discourses embraced in different frames. He writes (Goffman [1974] 1986: 48) about the primary frameworks to which we can add frameworks gathered under five headings, namely: make-believe, contests, ceremonials, technical redoings and regroundings. Each of these groups frames different kinds of discourses, in each of which different vocabularies are used. To understand a given discourse, subjects have to have keys to help them to situate themselves within particular discourses. The following chapters of his book present other kinds of frameworks such as: Theatrical Frame, Out-of-Frame Activities or ways of breaking the Frame. Goffman, however, is not satisfied with organizing the entire human experience within a discourse. As a result he also speaks about the manufacturing of negative experience, which usually amounts to

crossing over the commonly known frames of discourse. Goffman writes ([1974] 1986: 378) that when an individual breaks a frame and is conscious of this, his behaviour suddenly changes, and "he is likely to become intensively involved with his predicament; he becomes unreservedly engrossed both in his failure to sustain appropriate behaviour and in the cause of this failure." In other words, the individual loses his reserve and distance completely, and along with it, he loses conscious control over the situation. According to Goffman, the individual in this situation finds that "no particular frame is immediately applicable, or the frame that he thought was applicable no longer seems to be, or he cannot bind himself within the frame that does apparently apply" ([1974] 1986: 379). The subject is expropriated from the particular discourse and he cannot find another one to situate himself in the talk, and when there is no appropriate discourse, there is no appropriate response – and also no appropriate experience. Experience, thus, cannot be determined in known categories and comes into the sphere of the not-explicable. Goffman ([1974] 1986: 380) writes here about the "organizational role of disorganization" and observes that in this situation involvement changes from active to passive. At the same time, however, the individual will still try to fit back into the frame. The organizational function of discourse can also be observed in many examples of conversation illustrated by Goffman ([1974] 1986: 383) on the pages of his book. It is also worth observing that Goffman seems to ignore some aspects of discourse discovered earlier by Foucault ([1975] 1991) in his work on prisons. According to Richard L. Lanigan (1992: 15), Goffman's approach does not sufficiently appreciate the fact that meaning, which is the working force in communication, "exemplifies the distribution of human desire and social power" whereas these two forces are indirectly responsible for the shape of the discourse.

New orientations in ethnography are also visible in writings by John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes ([1972] 1986). Hymes, writing in the volume *Directions in Sociolinguistics. The Ethnography of Communication* about the interaction of language and social life, states that: "Rules of speaking are the ways in which speakers associate particular modes of speaking, topics or message forms, with particular settings and activities" (Gumperz, Hymes (eds.) [1972] 1986: 36). He tries to elaborate "[a] general theory of the interaction of language and social life" and

in doing so he states that it must "encompass the multiple relations between linguistic means and social meaning" (Gumperz, Hymes (eds.) [1972] 1986: 39). Hymes stressed that up to that point linguistics had dealt with the general structure of language and disregarded its social uses as well as the social contexts of its use (Gumperz, Hymes (eds.) [1972] 1986: 40). Hymes tried to work out models of the interactions in languages. He wanted to "explain the meaning of language in human life, and not in the abstract, not in the superficial phrases one may encounter in essays and textbooks, but in the concrete, in actual human lives" (Gumperz, Hymes (eds.) [1972] 1986: 41). In this statement he is close to another representative of the ethnography of communication who tries to discover structure in speech. This is Harold Garfinkel – the advocate of ethnomethodology. In his article "Remarks on Ethnomethodology" Garfinkel ([1972] 1986: 315) distinguishes between the "product" and "process" meanings of common understanding. "Product meanings" assume agreement with regard to the problem of subject, "process" means that different methods of speaking or doing are taken into account. Participants in different interactions have to deal with product and process meaning in order to organize the discourse in which they are engaged. However, Garfinkel states ([1972] 1986: 322) that "in order to describe how actual investigative procedures are accomplished as recognizedly rational actions in actual occasions, it is not satisfactory to say that members invoke some rule […]." Garfinkel indicates that participants in interactions have different, individual methods of solving problems as long as they are engaged in these actions: they can practically detect, demonstrate, persuade, display in different occasions to make "their interactions the appearances of consistent, coherent, clear, chosen, planful arrangements" ([1972] 1986: 323). In every situation where the rationality of their actions should be demonstrated, they make use of different methods taken from different discourses.

Another interesting example of the elaboration of the notion of discourse is the functionalism of Michael A. K. Halliday, an area of study sometimes placed under the heading of sociopragmatics (Halliday [1975] 2014: 264). Halliday's most famous contribution was his division of grammar into three "metafunctions" like: "1) representing ideas about the world ('ideational'), 2) facilitating interpersonal and social interactions ('interpersonal'), 3) integrating these ideas and interactions into

meaningful texts, which must be relevant to their context ('textual')"
(Halliday [1975] 2014: 263). Language, for Halliday, is primarily de-
scribed as social semiotic and such is also the title of one of his main
articles. He (Halliday [1975] 2014: 264–270) identifies the basic elements
of his socio-semiotic theory of language, which are: text, situation,
register, code, the linguistic system and social structure. Halliday states
(2003: 298) that the register, otherwise called linguistic repertoire, of
a community or of an individual "is derived from the range of uses that
language is put to in that particular culture or subculture. There will be
no bureaucratic mode of discourse in a society without a bureaucracy"
(Halliday 2003: 298). He emphasizes that the social functioning of lan-
guage is reflected in the kind of linguistic structures that are in use in
a given society. Furthermore, he claims that there has never been such
a thing as a primitive language; adult speech always represents the same
"highly sophisticated level of linguistic evolution" (Halliday 2003: 299).
We can conclude here that adults make use of the linguistic devices that
belong to the already complete repertoire of a given discourse, and we
have always already to do with a certain discourse when certain vo-
cabulary is used by them. Thus, the vocabulary indicates the space of
discourse; however, it is also the discourse that makes certain words ap-
pear. Halliday states that although we do not have access to the ancestral
types of primitive language, we do have access to the language used by
children and "[i]t may be true that the developing language system of
the child in some sense traverses, or at least provides an analogy for,
the stages through which language itself has evolved" (2003: 299–300).
In cases where we do not have other possibilities of examining "primi-
tive" languages, we can always relate to the only evidence of language
evolution, as it appears during the child's acquisition of language.
A conclusion may be derived here that the examples of child language
acquisition may provide evidence for the development of different stages
of different kinds of discourses used in social embeddings. Another
important notion in Halliday's social semantics is meaning potential and
semantic network can be found to be its statement. Halliday observes
(2003: 326): "A network […] is a specification of meaning potential."
When a mother regulates a child's behaviour, this specification shows
what possibilities are open to her "in the specific context of a control
situation" (Halliday 2003: 326). These possibilities are of a linguistic

character, "they are options in meaning, realized in the form of gram-
matical, including lexical, selections" (Halliday 2003: 327). Semantic
networks represent the "paradigmatic relations" or the paradigmatic be-
haviours that are possible in a given set of circumstances. It can be stated
here that a certain discourse is inaugurated when the choice of a certain
paradigmatic option is made. Access to certain meanings is open, it is up
to the subject to decide which direction of meaning he chooses; certain
discourses follow from this choice of paradigm. Halliday concludes that
"[f]rom the network we can derive a paradigm of all the meaning selec-
tions" (2003: 327) – this means that certain choices invite the selection
of certain meanings, and hence open the way to certain discourses, while
closing it to others. "Selection expressions" are those mechanisms which
launch certain discourses.

Another option for discourse analysis is to be found in the achieve-
ments of the French linguistic theory of discourse represented by Domi-
nique Maingueneau ([2003] 2014), whose approach is sometimes called
enunciative pragmatics and follows in the path indicated by Michel
Foucault. Maingueneau ([2003] 2014: 146) is particularly interested in
"self-constituting discourses" and in his analysis he introduces the con-
cept of the "enunciation scene" where different discourses are analysed.
In his article titled "The Scene of Enunciation" Maingueneau observes
that "the 'situation of enunciation' cannot be a situation of communica-
tion, socially describable, but rather the system where the three basic
positions of enunciator, co-enunciator and non-person are defined"
([2003] 2014: 147). The introduction of co-enunciator is equated with
the introduction of the Other on the scene of enunciation and with him
the category of difference. Relations toward difference can be formulated
as kinds of positions within the scene of enunciation. The actor in a given
discourse also decides to choose a certain "scenography" relevant to his
goals. All these elements constitute a certain discourse. It is not only
what is spoken that is important, but also the context in which the dis-
course is reworked. Maingueneau ([2003] 2014: 151) also speaks here
about the "scenic framework," which can be treated as a clear borrowing
from Goffman.

The part of the contemporary history of the notion of discourse
which is particularly relevant to this research is the Critical Discourse
Analysis. This tradition was created mainly by Teun van Dijk (1998) in
cooperation with Norman Fairclough ([1995] 2010) and Ruth Wodak

(Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014), and the influence of the two latter writers is visible in the writings by van Dijk.

In their article on critical discourse analysis Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer ([2009] 2014) provide a short history of the critical approach to discourse. They point out that a network of scholars grouped under the heading of Critical Discourse Analysis "emerged in the early 1990s, following a small symposium in Amsterdam, in January 1991" (Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014: 3). CDA can be considered as a school or rather a paradigm

> characterized by a number of principles: for example, all approaches are problem-oriented, and thus necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic. Moreover, CDA is characterized by the common interests in de-mystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and *retroductable* investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual). (Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014: 3)

A crucial stage in the emergence of the school was the launching of Teun van Dijk's journal titled *Discourse and Society*.

Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak view "language as social practice" (Fairclough, Wodak 1997, cited in Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014: 5) and consider "the context of language use" to be crucial (Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014: 5). Wodak integrates into her analysis the approaches in sociolinguistics introduced by Pierre Bourdieu ([1977] 2010) or the approaches in the philosophy introduced by Michel Foucault ([1969] 2011). She considers it a challenge to analyze and explain

> the impact of the Knowledge-based Economy on various domains of our societies, […] new phenomena in Western political systems, which are due to the impact of (new) media and to transnational, global and local developments and related institutions […], the relationship between complex historical processes, hegemonic narratives and CDA approaches. (Wodak, Meyer [2009] 2014: 11)

She tries to analyze the language of New Capitalism, its many aspects clearly visible in higher education or in social interaction. Wodak and Meyer ([2009] 2014: 15) give priority to "[r]ecognition of the contribution of all the aspects of the communicative context to text meaning" and they turn attention to "semiotic devices in discourse other than the linguistic ones." Their work is planned to emphasize

the structures of text and context rather than traditional text and talk. Besides the theoretical analysis of text and context, Wodak focuses on particular examples of their realization. In an article titled "Discourses of Exclusion: Xenophobia, Racism and anti-Semitism" she (Wodak [2007] 2014) is concerned with identity politics and with the determination of the rules that help to create "anti-discriminatory guidelines." Wodak ([2007] 2014: 403) makes the reader conscious of discriminatory acts by stating that they are usually built on the basis of the opposition of "us" and "them." She states that: "the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' is the foundation of prejudiced, anti-Semitic and racist perceptions and discourses" (Wodak [2007] 2014: 403). She further carries out an extensive examination of the discursive strategies used to build the positive and negative descriptions of different social groups and discusses the reasons for textual or social abuse of power with regard to them. This manifestation of prejudice, which is often the starting point for the construction of more complicated social ideologies, is also analyzed by Norman Fairclough ([1995] 2010) – the other representative of CDA. In the book titled *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language* he (Fairclough [1995] 2010) presents a complex inquiry into the workings of language, ideology and power, as well as the explications of the reasons for sociocultural change, political discourse or globalization. He deals with discourse particularly on the basis of its technologisation, where the notion of "technologisation of discourse" means "a distinctively contemporary mode of language policy and planning, the application specifically to discourse of the sort of 'technologies' which Foucault […] identified as constitutive of power in modern society" (Fairclough [1995] 2010: 126). Technologisation of discourse is connected with practices of exercising power over less privileged classes, which Fairclough ([1995] 2010: 126) calls "hegemony." This is

> a process of intervention in the sphere of discourse practices with the objective of constructing a new hegemony in the order of discourse of the institution or organization concerned, as part of a more general struggle to impose restructured hegemonies in institutional practices and culture. (Fairclough [1995] 2010: 137)

Technologisation, which includes many methods and mechanisms realized in society, is also the name for the cooperation of different

networks of power "incorporating diverse agents and 'the complex assemblage of diverse forces – laws, buildings, professions, routines, norms'" (Fairclough [1995] 2010: 137). Discourse – in this sense – is for Fairclough ([1995] 2010: 137) "one such 'force' which becomes operative within specific 'assemblages' with other forces." Discourse is here perceived and understood as the outcome of the cooperation of different social and political forces, shaped by different, but coherent, discourse practices involving socially trained specialists and policies of checks, corrections and sanctions. It is the outcome of exercising power over social spheres, where originally perceived social freedom is substituted by a new technological order. Fairclough believes ([1995] 2010: 137) that such understood "technologisation of discourse" has been accelerating in the past years and even interviews or conversations are "composed of sequences of smaller units which are produced through the automatic application of skills" (Fairclough [1995] 2010: 137–138) which may also mean that the independent and free power of creation is disappearing in contemporary technological society. The following conclusion is that subjects receive limited discourses when their discursive practices are also limited.

The last anticipation of the elaboration of the notion of discourse in the main chapters is its rendering by the representative of French narratology: Algirdas J. Greimas (Greimas, Fontanille [1991] 1993). In his book *The Semiotics of Passions. From the States of Affairs to States of Feelings* he, together with Jacques Fontanille ([1991] 1993: xiii), introduce the notion of continuity as one that is irreplaceable in the construction of discourse. This notion is deduced "by means of the body," because it is the body that makes it possible for the human being to identify meanings as coming from one and the same person. It also helps to produce them as coming from a given person in the course of time, the continuity being the result of the workings of the body that lasts in time. Discourse is here the certain outcome of meanings guaranteed by the stable existence of a body as a producer of meanings. The body is treated here not only as the subject who observes and examines the world, which would presuppose the dualistic division into subject and object of examination. The body is treated as one of the accessible objects and in this way Greimas avoids the duality "that comes from the separation of body and soul, world and mind" (Greimas, Fontanille [1991] 1993: xiii). This shift

makes a new way of creating discourse possible by means of continuous narration. Greimas and Fontanille state it in this way:

> This same problem of continuity is encountered at the discursive level where aspectualities and tensions extend beyond rationally and cognitively established categories, where the modulations of sentences and emphases placed on words, the idea that certain verbs express things intensely in order to represent them, constitute phenomena that cannot be accounted for by the rational procedures of a semiotics of action. ([1991] 1993: xiii)

Greimas and Fontanille ([1991] 1993: xiii) propose to examine "the preconditions of signification" which would help in the indication and determination of the area where discourses may appear. They are particularly interested in research on passions as the sphere which has been mostly neglected so far. The examination of this new area reveals the deep level tensions that can have an impact on the shape of significations brought to the surface of discourse. Narration in the work of Greimas and Fontanille ([1991] 1993: xviii) is understood specifically: "[n]arrative unfolding can hence be considered as a segmentation of states, defined only by their 'transformability.'" This understanding assumes the world as being discontinuous, the continuity being introduced only on the condition of possessing a material body. The concept of transformation is important here. It deals with discrete units representing parts of the knowable world. This separation of states enables the construction of meaning because "[t]he subject of theoretical construction can know and categorize only if the horizon of meaning is divided into a series of discrete elements" (Greimas, Fontanille [1991] 1993: xviii). Following these assumptions the construction of a discourse is possible where a subject possesses a certain narrative competence. This is presented and examined in extension by Greimas and Fontanille in their book. Greimas and Fontanille ([1991] 1993) analyzed the procedures of meaning construction which are present not only in the natural world, but more particularly in literature; however, they analyzed the processes of narration without taking into consideration whether they took place in the real world or were only fictive. It is important how the separate units representing the world are connected to form the meaning and further the discourse. Narration understood as a process is one of the important elements of the studies of French narratology, which constitutes the missing link between

the structuralist theory of Ferdinand de Saussure and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida.

5. On the relations between discourse, context and interdisciplinarity

Any examination of discourse, especially the discourse in the writings of the three researchers from the three different branches of linguistics, philosophy and sociology, must take into account that discourse is only one element of a triad, where it is intertwined with other elements, namely: context and interdisciplinarity. All these elements – discourse, context and interdisciplinarity – are tightly bound up together and influence each other. In this chapter the relations between these three elements are taken into account and their interdependency is underlined and examined as a fact that influences the main notion of discourse.

Context is one of these crucial elements which plays a special role in the formation of meaning. Generally speaking, it influences and determines discourse, but it is also perceived and assessed from the perspective of discourse, thus becoming an indistinguishable part of discourse itself. Michael Halliday ([1978] 1994: 3) in his main work *Language as Social Semiotic. The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning* states that "[t]he context plays a part in determining what we say; and what we say plays a part in determining the context." Hence, it is not only discourse that is important when it comes to the formation of individual views and the communication of individual experience. Halliday ([1978] 1994: 122) underlines the importance of both (text and context) as parts of a complete theory of meaning. Piotr Chruszczewski (2009: 1) explains that "a text is a singular realization of a particular discourse, and any text production is conditioned by its immediate nonverbal context." Similarly, Teun van Dijk cited in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* by Ruth Wodak and Michael Mayer [2009] 2014) states that "[i]t has been assumed […] that the relation between discourse and society is not direct, but needs to be *mediated* by so-called *context models*" (van Dijk 2008, 2009, cited in Wodak, Meyer ([2009] 2014: 73). Piotr Chruszczewski (2011: 215) in his book on anthropological linguistics states clearly that

> the idea of context is one of the most crucial elements in understanding both the concept of discourse itself as well as the other communicational

grammars that we have to deal with, because discourse can be under-
stood, and what follows – properly analyzed – only in the context in
which it appears."[1]

Further in the work, Chruszczewski (2011: 215) states that "contexts
are always non-verbal and they always endow texts with meaning. It is
difficult to imagine a text that could appear without any context at all."

An explanation of this view can be found in the writings of Hans-
Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004), who presents the process of communica-
tion as being always in the scope of other thinking, other discourse, or
other horizon. This leads to the situation in which it is impossible not to
have any prior-meanings; the subject is always equipped with some pre-
sumptions, forestructures or foremeanings. Hence, it is impossible not to
think before proper thinking: our foremeanings are the basis from which
our thinking and speaking comes. As subjects, we cannot find ourselves
in a situation of an absolute, linguistic void, because we always already
possess certain forestructures in our minds. Chruszczewski (2011: 215)
also supports this thesis when he writes: "[e]ven the word that is hardly
thought is always embedded in the surrounding of some other words
that come to being in a certain, determined situation and do not appear
in a complete void, because to create such a complete void is impossible."
The correct conclusion would be that these forestructures and foremean-
ings also constitute the particular context from which a subject's actual
thinking comes. In a further part of Gadamer's work ([1960] 2004) he
describes his understanding of the problem of meaning in its specificity
as coming from the contextual surrounding horizon. This approach may
help the reader understand the role of the hermeneutics in the explica-
tion of the problem of context.

As the one of three perspectives from which we perceive meaning,
context influences discourse. Teun van Dijk ([2009] 2014: 66) states
that as a "subjective mental representation" it "controls the adequate
adaptation of discourse production and comprehension to their social
environment." Context is here the medium between discourse and so-
ciety; however, to understand their interdependence, first, we have to
understand what different writers mean by discourse. A concise defini-
tion is presented by Martin Reisigi and Ruth Wodak ([2009] 2014: 89),
who consider 'discourse' "to be a cluster of context-dependent semiotic

1   All translations done by the author unless otherwise stated.

practices that are situated within specific fields of social action." Theo van Leeuwen ([2009] 2014) in the article titled "Discourse as the Re-contextualization of Social Practice: A Guide" presents useful definitions based on the writings of Foucault, which are examined in detail in the main part of the work. Van Leeuwen ([2009] 2014: 144) defines discourses as "socially constructed ways of knowing some aspect of reality" or "context-specific frameworks for making sense of things". It is particularly visible here that discourse and context overlap, but also that their interdependency necessitates some other perspective that would be helpful in distinguishing between them. Norman Fairclough ([2009] 2014: 165) introduces this perspective, writing that: "[d]iscourses which originate in some particular social field or institution […] may be recontextualized in others." Recontextualization is connected with the context in such a way that it is "[t]he process of transferring given elements to new contexts" (Reisigi, Wodak [2009] 2014: 90). It is sometimes based on the processes of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality means "that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present" (Reisigi, Wodak [2009] 2014: 90) and that "texts presuppose and even induce other texts and non-verbal behaviour" (Chruszczewski 2011: 206), and interdiscursivity "signifies that discourses are linked to each other in various ways" (Reisigi, Wodak [2009] 2014: 90). They may, for instance, be topic-related. Piotr Chruszczewski (2011: 244) also draws attention to the phenomenon of intertextuality, which he understands as the highlighting of the relations between different texts that often belong to different "borderline disciplines" (Chruszczewski 2011: 206) – which may be simply called "interdisciplinarity." Some useful definitions of interdisciplinarity are presented by Chruszczewski (2011: 244), who refers this view to the idea by Julia Kristeva that: "each text is the connection in the chain of texts, for which they are the answers, that are brought to existence by them and that transform other texts" (Kristeva 1986, cited in Fairclough, Wodak 1997: 226, cited in Chruszczewski 2011: 244), and also Halliday ([1978] 1994: 11) states that "[a]ny study of language involves some attention to other disciplines; one cannot draw a boundary round the subject and insulate it from others." What is more, interdisciplinarity may be described as a kind of methodological rule that governs the relations between discourses and contexts. Interdisciplinarity means here that – as Johannes Angermuller,

Dominique Maingueneau and Ruth Wodak (eds.) (2014: 6) indicate –
"the common ground of discourse researchers is that they understand
discourse as a complex object that can be studied from various angles."
These "various angles" may constitute different disciplines that have to
be taken into consideration when dealing with the subject of discourse.
Angermuller, Maingueneau and Wodak (eds.) (2014: 7) also state that
"[d]iscourse studies makes the case for cooperative and integrative work
going beyond individual disciplines." The three different components
of the approach to the problem of language and humanities, namely
discourse, context and interdisciplinarity, should be also taken as parts
of the broader view on communication and be included in the "coopera-
tive and integrative work" that presents their relations and in this way
is responsible for the understanding of the subject and surrounding
world. The subject's attitude and the form of his experience of this world
are dependent on the interrelations between his discourse and context,
and are scientifically described through the prism of different disciplines
according to the methodological rule of interdisciplinarity. However, in
the literature considering linguistics another division also appears. An-
germuller, Maingueneau and Wodak (eds.) (2014: 6) do not use the divi-
sion into discourse, context and interdisciplinarity, but rather "a language,
a practice and a context component." In their view "discourse emerges
from the interplay of these three components" (Angermuller *et al.* (eds.)
2014: 6) and "in order to be considered as a fully-fledged discourse ap-
proach, all three components must be acknowledged and integrated"
(Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 6–7). This classification of the compo-
nents of discourse may, however, only involve a change in the terminol-
ogy used. Not all researchers agree with this new proposition, neverthe-
less, the classification states that what is referred to as "the practice of
operating on different discourses" could be called "interdisciplinarity,"
what is called "language" could be described as "discourse," and the last
component would stay the same as "context." Thus the main idea remains
unchanged: human being's experience of the world, his or her attitudes
and ways of understanding depend strictly on the context in which he or
she lives, on the background of disciplines from which he or she assesses
these contexts, and on the practice of discourse that integrates all these
parameters. Hence, we can say that language, discourse, context and

practice all are interrelated and described from different points of view, which is further referred to as interdisciplinarity.

However, when talking about discourse theory and discourse analysis it is also worth indicating that

> [t]he fact that, today, Discourse Studies has become established as a field in its own right, in opposition to the usual disciplinary boundaries, can be explained by its preoccupation with an object that was central to the modern social sciences from the very beginning: the social production of meaning through communication and texts of all kinds. (Angermuller *et al.* (eds.) 2014: 8)

Thus, it should be underlined that the examination of discourse from different points of views, taking into account all its interdisciplinarity and its contexts ought, first of all, to bring to mind the problem of meaning: "[l]anguage is being regarded as the encoding of a 'behaviour potential' into a 'meaning potential'; that is, as a means of expressing what the human organism 'can do,' in interaction with other human organisms, by turning it into what he 'can mean'" (Halliday [1978] 1994: 21). It is always this "meaning potential that is associated with particular situation types" (Halliday [1978] 1994: 34) and "[i]n the last resort, it is impossible to draw a line between 'what he said' and 'how he said it,' since this is based on a conception of language in isolation from any context" (Halliday [1978] 1994: 34). Individual subjects cannot formulate meanings that are isolated from contexts, from their background knowledge, from the horizon of their thought; hence their discourse is always bound by contexts and the rules of interdisciplinarity. All works examined here, from the branches of linguistics to philosophy and sociology, are intended to unveil exactly these different relations in which meanings are activated. Doing this without reference to the perspectives of contexts and interdisciplinarity would be impossible. Meaning as the basic unit of these phenomena is discussed here as an introduction to semiology, then as a part of the hermeneutical project, or as an element of sociological undertaking in the form presented by Pierre Bourdieu. All these presentations are grounded in the idea that the problem of discourse is usually connected and based on the problem of meaning. This work lies within the realm that constitutes support for such a thesis.

The linguistics of Teun van Dijk

Teun van Dijk is a representative of the field of linguistics and discourse analysis. He operates within the area of linguistics delimited by Robert-Alain de Beaugrande and Wolfgang U. Dressler, and the area of discourse analysis whose foundations were laid primarily by Michel Foucault and further developed with regard to the relations of power and interaction by Pierre Bourdieu. The whole area of the development of the basic notion of discourse from the linguistics of Teun van Dijk, through philosophy by Michel Foucault to the sociology of power relations by Pierre Bourdieu will be covered in this study. First of all, I would like to present the theoretical foundations and to outline the framework within which the undertaking by van Dijk was realized.

1. A historical outline of the thought of Teun van Dijk

A historical outline of the topics dealt with by Teun van Dijk during his academic career shows that the earliest texts were concerned mostly with problems of the generative grammar of literary texts (1972a) or the foundations for typologies of texts (1972b). It is clear that he had an interest in different kinds of text grammars. In 1973 the first text totally devoted to linguistic macrostructures appeared (1973a). The same year saw the publication of the articles devoted to text grammar and text logic (1973b). In 1975 van Dijk published a text on the formal semantics of metaphorical discourse (1975a) and with this text a whole era of articles and books on the problem of discourse began to appear. Among the articles devoted to this problem are: "Action, Action Description, Narrative" (1975b), "Discourse Meaning and Memory" (1976a),

"Narrative Macrostructures" (1976b) and also many texts on pragmatics (1976c) and problems of divisions into text and context (1982) from the cognitive point of view. In the years following 1979 texts on more specific problems appear: information processing (1979), strategic discourse comprehension (1981) and different kinds of discourse analysis (1983, 1987). It is important to note that, throughout the whole history of his writing on the problem of discourse van Dijk never simplified or reduced its social dimension. Many articles (1992a, 1992b, 1994) are devoted to this social aspect of discourse, among them the problems of ideology and racism. Teun van Dijk was a professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam.

2. Theoretical background to Teun van Dijk's approach

Text linguistics is the area of study based on the primary notions of sentence, proposition, text, text production and text interpretation. Robert-Alain de Beaugrande and Wolfgang U. Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986) were the pioneers in this discipline and introduced their own, unique attitude toward it that did not conform to the traditional structuralist approach to linguistics. They rejected rules of logical and mathematical rigor, and instead introduced probabilistic models that were:

> more adequate and realistic than *deterministic* ones. Dynamic accounts of *structure-building operations* will be more productive than static descriptions of the structures themselves. We should work to discover *regularities, strategies, motivations, preferences,* and *defaults* rather than *rules* and *laws*. *Dominances* can offer more realistic classifications than can *strict categories*. *Acceptability* and *appropriateness* are more crucial standards for texts than *grammaticality* and *well-formedness*. *Human reasoning processes* are more essential to using and conveying knowledge in texts than are *logical proofs*. It is the task of science to systemize the *fuzziness* of its objects of inquiry, not to ignore it or argue it away. (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: xv)

In their approach de Beaugrande and Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986: 19) tried to make certain assumptions explicit: they underlined the relations between texts and their communicative settings, and studied "mechanisms which combine texts as single contributions into discourses as sets of mutually relevant texts." In their *Introduction to*

Texts Linguistics ([1972, 1981] 1986) they propose seven standards of textuality as the conditions for the acknowledgement of certain texts as communicative occurrences. These standards involve: the standard of cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality. The reason for the introduction of these standards was to make possible the systematic analysis of the content of texts and their influence and communicative relation with their receivers. However, the authors of the *Introduction to Text Linguistics* suppose that "a text does not make sense by itself, but rather by the interaction of text-presented knowledge with people's stored knowledge of the world" (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: 6). This assumption reminds the reader about the conditions for building an individual basis of knowledge, called "background knowledge," which was presented by Karl R. Popper in his *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* ([1963] 1999: 95, also in Grobler 2008: 73–74). Possessing "background knowledge" means that the content of information that is internalized and subjectivated by the receiver is supported by his individual stored knowledge in order to form a coherent whole that can become the basis for further analyses. Here it can also be observed that de Beaugrande and Dressler's idea of text was not based on phenomenological insight: following de Beaugrande's indications (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: 6) the reader is not supposed to look for the value of a text in the text alone. The value of a text comes from its interrelations with the context and the society within which the text is situated. Situationality is taken into consideration in the statements by Foucault ([1969] 2011: 25–26) and Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 29–35) who saw the value of a text in its interaction with its surroundings:

> The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network […] it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse. (Foucault [1969] 2011: 25–26)

A piece of discourse is hence not only an oeuvre of one author, it is shaped on the basis of the atmosphere within which it matured, within which developed the foundations of relations that were realized between

people, texts, and the rules of their assimilation. However, there is a rule that governs the appearance of a discourse and it is called by Foucault *episteme* ([1969] 2011: 211). Van Dijk (1998: 194, 211) was also aware of this idea of a certain *a priori* governing the representation of an epoch. Thus the achievements of van Dijk in text linguistics were presupposed by the assumptions by de Beaugrande (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: 6) that a theory of language should not only be based on the internal, eidetic values of texts, but, in most cases, on the utilization of language in concrete historical, social occurrences of communication. That is why de Beaugrande and Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986: 37) included in their research reflections on the problem of how language is utilized in practical communication. What is also worth mentioning here, without getting too involved in the complicated theory of textuality, is that in everyday communication, as well as in the analysis of texts, certain problems can occur, such as a block, that make further understanding of the input impossible. De Beaugrande and Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986: 37) put forward a solution to this problem: to overcome a block means to find a pathway "leading without interruption from the initial state to the goal state." This simple intuition is based on the principle of the relational character of the standards of textuality. Standards are relational because they are "concerned with how occurrences are connected to others" (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: 37). They can be connected to others

> via grammatical dependencies on the surface (cohesion); via conceptual dependencies in the textual world (coherence); via the attitudes of the participants toward the text (intentionality and acceptability); via the incorporation of the new and unexpected into the known and expected (informativity); via the setting (situationality); and via the mutual relevance of separate texts (intertextuality). (de Beaugrande, Dressler [1972, 1981] 1986: 37)

This exposition of the relations that can occur within the text or within the relation of the text toward its receiver very clearly shows how text linguistics treated the material of textuality of the text. Nevertheless, their assumptions are much more indebted to grammar and linguistic theories than to the theories of textuality worked out by the representatives of continental (French) philosophy like that of Jacques Derrida ([1967] 1997). In the text linguistics of de Beaugrande and Dressler,

the technical notions responsible for the development of their methodology are given much more importance. Van Dijk follows these assumptions and elaborates a great number of methodological notions like: structures, macrostructures, schemata, scripts, strategies, before finally turning to the analysis of the problems of ideology and racism in his later work.

3. Methodology of Teun van Dijk's approach

Teun van Dijk's methodology involves many notions elaborated previously by philosophers: he uses terms like idea, belief and proposition, and takes into account the differentiations by Gottlob Frege ([1892] 1980, 2010) or Willard van Orman Quine ([1951] 2010) with regard to the problem of meaning. It will therefore be helpful to start with an explanation of these philosophical intricacies before an examination of more sociolinguistic terms, like legitimization or persuasion, that play an important role in van Dijk's understanding of the notion of discourse.

3.1. Ideas and beliefs

During the Enlightenment the notion of idea came to be transformed from its original primarily positive connotation to a more negative one. Since that time, ideas have been considered to be the particles responsible for the formation of the ideology of certain social groups. In this sense they can be seen as building "false consciousness" (van Dijk 1998: 15). However, this is an outlook that assumes the origin of ideas in the broader framework of social views, where they are treated as the "bricks" in the wall of social theories. In the more narrow terms (but also more fundamental ones) ideas are "things of the mind" (van Dijk 1998: 15). Methodology by van Dijk (1998: 15) gives the following definition of the notion of ideas:

1. Ideas are objects or processes in/of the mind.
2. Ideas are the products of thinking or thought.
3. Ideas are part of knowledge.
4. Ideas may be personal or socially shared.
5. More specifically, ideas are new, original interesting thoughts and about important issues.

Beginning his inquiry with the notion of an idea brings van Dijk close to the area where the problem of mind appears. The cognitive sciences of which van Dijk is a representative treat mind as "a specific property of the brain-in-the-body" (1998: 17). The main activity of mind understood in this way is information processing. Van Dijk (1998: 17) however, does not allow himself to be deceived by this nomenclature. He treats the biological basis necessary for the realisation of the program of cognitive sciences with some scepticism. For him, the mind is "a product of itself." In this sense it is the result of all the processes that happen within it, but at the same time, this result also recursively determines the processes themselves. The problem of mind as a product of its working and as the main producer of the changes it undergoes is known in anthropological circles as enactionism. William Foley in his book *Anthropological Linguistics. An Introduction* defines enactionism as:

> the school of thought [which] holds that epistemology is not about how pre-given mind knows a pre-given world, but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind together on the basis of a history of actions that an embodied being takes in the world, a history o structural coupling. Knowledge is not encoded in mental categories, be they linguistic or cultural, but is embodied in the lived histories of organisms, their communicative, cultural and linguistic practices […]. (Foley [1997] 2009: 176–177)

This view assumes the notion of structural coupling that is best explained by referring to a couple dancing. This couple must continuously adapt to the new, changing environment, but the "steps" it makes are the results of its actions as well as their conditions. The steps are the result of a certain "whole" that is under constant construction. "[T]he range of behaviour available to them [the couple] is strictly constrained by the requirements on coordination" (Foley [1997] 2009: 10). The process of structural coupling is based on recurrent reciprocal action between the external elements of the environment and the appointments of the individuals that take part in this coordinated "dancing." Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch say about such living beings that they "do not operate by representation. Instead of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions […]" (Varela *et al.* 1991: 140, cited in Foley [1997] 2009: 11). The authors of this statement assume that the basis for the problems of epistemology is

no longer the classical Platonian differentiation between ideas, things-in-themselves and their representations – phenomena. Modern cognitive disciplines like connectionism and enactionism deny the necessity of using mental representations as the only possibility for the mind to understand something by representing it in the form of mental representation, as the object of representation. It is embodied action that is given preference here. This means that actions are not represented in order to become understood, they stay in close interaction with minds and the outcome that follows this interaction is in fact a change in mind. In this sense it can be repeated after van Dijk that the mind really is "a product of itself" (1998: 17). However, it is worth observing that information processing, in many of the current approaches to cognitive sciences that still base their research on the Kantian model of acquiring knowledge can also be performed where representations are still in use. Here mental representations are treated as a third way between the sensible world and the mind. What is produced in the mind as the effect of the influence of the sensible data coming from the world of experience is mental representation. Nevertheless, here the problem arises of the connection between the external sources of input and the internal ones that are placed in the mind, and amount to sending of the neuronal information within the brain. This problem is often referred to as the mind–body problem, where the body is perceived as the receiver of sensible data and the mind as their producer. The mind–body problem presented originally by Descartes is the *aporia* recursively appearing in different versions in contemporary cognitive approaches. In this sense van Dijk (1998: 17) presents the mind as "a specific property of the brain-in-the-body." The mind acts through the body, it is embodied. Representations are of secondary importance, the enactment of the mind's activity is reflected recursively in this mind. It seems as if the Cartesian controversy about the relation between mind and body has been solved. However, van Dijk does not overrate this solution. He notices (van Dijk 1998: 17) that problems whose origins stem from relations within a discourse are no less important. He tries (van Dijk 1998: 17) to avoid the reduction of all complex issues connected with discourse to the biology of human organs. He says in reaction to such charges (van Dijk 1998: 17), that it is much more convenient to work on certain problems on the level of the mind and its representations, concepts and ideas, without analysing

whether these minds exist or not. Minds are treated here both as "means of production" and as "the 'product' of mental activities like thought" (van Dijk 1998: 18), they are the result of a reduction, which is nevertheless convenient for the clear presentation of the problems of acquiring knowledge. The systematic presentation of its mechanisms may not be possible without such reductions. Van Dijk seems here (1998: 18) to evoke the attitude of Friedrich Nietzsche ([1886] 1997: ix–x, 1–14) who found the convention of language as its main advantage, not its disadvantage: though "the Reality is in constant change, in order to grasp it and to use it for practical purposes we have to catch hold of it, to fix it, to consolidate it" (Tatarkiewicz [1950] 1968: 164, trans. – P. K.-C.) in language. Reduction and convenience seem here to be the advantages of such a treatment of the problem.

In relation to problems whose origins are set within discourse, the methodological notion of belief is of importance. It can be said that van Dijk builds his theory of discourse on belief. Van Dijk emphasizes (1998: 18) that he uses the term *belief* as a technical term, hence certain commonsense uses of the term may be inadequate here. Beliefs are for him (van Dijk 1998: 19) "the building blocks of the mind," so it can be observed that he does not attach to them their common pejorative meanings as objects that are subjective and on which knowledge cannot be based. Treated not as the elements of *doxa* but rather as the fundamental objects that are produced by our minds, they constitute the system of knowledge.

Following the assumptions about the mind as the producer and the product of certain actions, beliefs must be recognized as the conditions as well as the consequences of discourse. As units of representations, they are objects that take part in the formation of our knowledge about the world – they are the basic elements in the processes of information processing that take place within memory. Van Dijk (1998: 21) writes about a certain phenomenological quality of beliefs that accounts for their being constructed as having their "objects," because belief is always about something. This means that it is necessary to assume intentionality – every belief is directed intentionally toward its object. This directedness is included in its very construction. Belief consists of intentionally approached content. The notion that is based on the relation that X is P is also known as a proposition. One definition of the term *proposition*

by Steven Pinker states ([1994] 1995: 480) that it is "a statement or assertion, consisting of a predicate and set of arguments" where predicate is "a state, event, or relationship, usually involving one or more participants (arguments)." Propositions are the forms in which beliefs can be analysed; the mind uses these forms to present states that occur in the world of experience. The advantage of using propositions to describe states or events is that they can be transformed into the forms used in natural language, so they can be used as an aid in building different discourses.

Alternatively, beliefs can be presented in networks. Network is understood here "as a collection of nodes related by paths or more specifically as graphs with edges and nodes, and so on" (van Dijk 1998: 23). Such a structuring of the relations between certain beliefs makes visible that they are usually very complex phenomena relating to other nodes, intersecting with other problems, juxtaposing other dependencies. Even if all the possible propositions were listed one after another, the complexity would not be exposed in such a clear schema as in the case of drawing a network.

The problem with beliefs is that they should not be confused with expressions that are the result of an attempt to grasp the meaning present in beliefs. Linguistic expression is very rarely able to cover the complete meaning comprised in belief. Beliefs are broader terms whose meaning cannot necessarily be exhausted in the sequences of linguistic utterances. However, it was stated at the beginning of the chapter that beliefs are units, building blocks of mind. Following this path of thinking the question of basic beliefs (van Dijk 1998: 24) can be raised and the question whether they exist may appear. Anna Wierzbicka in the book *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition. Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations* (1992) analyzes the possibility of the existence of such basic beliefs in the form of cognitive, linguistic universals. She writes (Wierzbicka 1992: 331) about "universal human concepts" – concepts that "have been lexicalised in all, or nearly all, languages." Van Dijk seems to have considered the same problem of the possibility of human knowledge being supported by some limited set of concepts (beliefs) that "do not 'summarize' more specific beliefs" (1998: 24) but rather are the basic ones that constitute more complex networks of relations. It seems that van Dijk uses the term belief in a similar way to that of Wierzbicka (1992: 331), though at the beginning of her explanation beliefs are assumed to be

broader terms than concepts. Nevertheless, van Dijk in the explication asserts that "[m]ost of our beliefs […] will be at a much higher level of conceptualization than this basic level [of human emotions and personal experiences]" (Wierzbicka 1992: 331). Here, on the contrary, beliefs appear to be more basic terms, responsible for the creation of more complex unities through the process of conceptualization. What is most important with regard to the notion of belief is that beliefs are the material necessary for further shaping through the workings of the human mind and ultimately they represent the world that the subject has access to. We can also formulate this dependence in another way: that humans have access to such a world that is reflected by their basic and complex beliefs.

3.2. Propositions

Propositions are the next element in the complicated set of notions connected with meaning and, more directly, with discourse. They take part in the formation of discourse in that discourses are built from smaller elements like sentences and clauses, which are further combined with complex propositions made up of simpler units of certain beliefs and ideas (organized in concepts). As van Dijk and Kintsch rightly observe (1983: 109) the notion of proposition is too vast to be reported on at all the levels where it is displayed. This is connected with problems of meaning, reference, and truth value, which recursively relate to the problem of ideas and beliefs.

Within the framework of compulsory knowledge on meaning are certainly the provisions by Plato on the problem of the relation between word and thing. In this respect, Plato's *Cratylus* provides remarkable insights that have spawned many contemporary solutions to this issue. Socrates in *Cratylus* states: "Things are not relative to individuals […] they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence, they are not in relation to us […] but they are independent" (Plato [427–347] [1578] 2008: 272). These lines may be seen to confirm the idea that the attachment of a word to the thing represented by it is not of an arbitrary character. However, more close examination reveals that though Socrates initially demystifies the conventionalist notion of meaning, a few lines further on he criticizes Cratylus, who is the proponent of the idea that there exist natural bonds between names and their objects; "he says that they are natural and not conventional; not a portion

of human voice which men agree to use; but that there is a truth or correctness in them" (Plato [427–347] [1578] 2008: 268). Hence, the famous dialogue is not a simple interpretation of different ideas about meaning. It represents both approaches to it: first, based on the idea of a certain universal law that governs the attachment of a name to its meaning that orders the link between things and their names, secondly, that denies "word-and-thing" unity and assumes a conventional, arbitrary relation between them. The first approach proposes an "everlasting" connection between things and words, a connection presupposed by natural rights. These rights are inherent in the essence of things; by virtue of their *eidos* things and words belong to each other. These links between things and words are not relative ones, they are not based on convention, they originate in the ontology of ideas and their semblances: phenomena. This early solution to the problem of the relation of representations to their essences is followed in the 18th century by Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1999) who explains the process of cognition as the relation between things-in-themselves and their appearances. It is not possible to know whether things-in-themselves exist. What subjects have access to is their semblances shaped in the form of knowledge about the world. The second solution to the problem of meaning questions the unity of word and thing which had previously been postulated by the sophists. In contemporary philosophy many interpretations of the Platonian analysis have appeared, one of them being the interpretation by Hans-Georg Gadamer, who in *Truth and Method* ([1960] 2004: 547) states that "the name" in times before Plato was found to be an element of its representant. The word was treated as having, for the most part, the meaning of its "name." Nevertheless, taking inspiration for finding the answers to the problem of meaning from Plato, we should be as careful with unequivocal statements as he was.

The other crucial moment in discovering the complexities connected with the problem of meaning was Gottlob Frege's differentiation ([1892] 1980, 2010) between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* – sense and reference – as it is given in the classic translation by Max Black, and into meaning and reference if Willard van Orman Quine's translation from *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* ([1951] 2010) is taken into account. This division into sense and reference was introduced with the help of the example of the morning and evening star where these names: *morning* and *evening* were

two different senses of the one and the same reference, namely: the star Venus. Venus was one and the same object of designation; however it was treated as having two distinct senses. Another example is given with a triangle, with three lines that come out of the midpoint situated on each side of the triangle. These lines intersected in the middle point inside the triangle, and the point of intersection of lines a and b, and the point of intersection of lines b and c were the same point in the middle of the triangle, hence it can be said that they had the same reference. However, they had also two different senses: one of the senses was just "the point of intersection of lines a and b" and the other sense was "the point of intersection of lines b and c." Frege's conclusion is stated as follows:

> […] think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter) besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the reference of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. In our example, accordingly, the reference of the expressions 'point of intersection of a&b and 'point of intersection of b&c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense. (Frege [1892] 1980, 2010: 2)

Frege explains that the usual scientific proceedings invite an analyst "to advance from the sense to the reference" ([1892] 1980, 2010: 4); nevertheless, he is at times satisfied with the senses of the designated object, because they may be a little different from their scientific outcome. The play on these slight differences is called poetry and while reading it a reader may feel extraordinary pleasure in finding just these little differences in the senses, without bothering about the "correct" meaning of scientific reference.

Other important notions with regard to proposition are the notions of denotation and connotation. The first one determines the designation of a certain object whereas connotation is "a set of associations that a word's use can evoke" (O'Grady *et al.* (eds.) 1997: 273). The analytic tradition also provides the notions of intension and extension to explain what meaning is. These may overlap with the notions of denotation and connotation, intension being the object that is denoted, extension of this object being its connotation. However, it is not reasonable to equate these notions with complete certainty, some authors (*e.g.* O'Grady *et al.* (eds.) 1997: 274) do not find this identification to be completely justified.

Authors of analytic provenience widely use the notion of proposition. They talk (Cruse 2004: 21), for instance, about propositional attitude or propositional content. Propositional attitude means the element of assertion in the utterance of a sentence. Propositional content means the thing that is asserted. "What is asserted is called a proposition" (Cruse 2004: 22). Propositions can have different truth values – they can be either true or false and the same proposition can have different realizations, that is they may be expressed differently. According to van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 110), some authors like Reichenbach (1947: 511, cited in van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 110) do not consider elements of language other than propositions, finding proposition to be the fundamental structures and the only ones possible for assuming truth values.

Another solution to the problem of proposition is presented by Rudolf Carnap. He warns (Carnap 1947: 26, cited in van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 110) that "a proposition is not some subjective meaning, nor a linguistic expression (a sentence), but an objective conceptual structure." This conceptual structure can further be exemplified by its instantiations: its concrete examples which are possible in the external, empirical world. Another contribution to the understanding of the terms meaning and proposition is that of Quine. *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* ([1951] 2010) marks a turning point between the former treatment of the problem of meaning and what was to follow, and created the background for analyticity, which had consequences for deciphering meaning and concept. Quine states ([1951] 2010: 2) that an analytic statement is one "that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject." He tries to reduce the problem of proposition in a visibly positivist manner when he expresses the conviction that "propositions are neither statements nor values of statements, but at most their meanings" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 111). Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983: 111) treat all these possibilities of grasping the idea of the proposition with a degree of reserve, and eventually they propose to accept it as "an abstract, theoretical construct, which is used to identify the meaning, or what is expressed by a sentence under specific contextual restrictions (speaker, time, place), and which is related to truth values." In the area of linguistics the term *proposition* was analyzed by Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor (1963, cited in van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 111) or George Lakoff and Mark Johnson ([1980] 2003), but traditionally it is regarded as "a composite unit" "analyzed in terms

of a predicate and one or more arguments" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 113) where a predicate refers to certain properties and is stated about arguments – namely: objects or persons.

The analysis of propositions is not, however, an easy task. Stating the logical dependencies and relations of various expressions has met with considerable problems. At times even atomic propositions are extremely complex on their analyzable level. One of the examples of these problems is determining the semantic roles of agents. Even an initially simple sentence made up of basic propositions presents a task that requires the building of complicated schema trees that represent all the predicated functions. It has become clear from the analysis of such examples that propositions are not simple entities and usually create complex sets of representations even when the expression is initially taken as a simple one.

3.3. Structures and strategies

The notion of proposition is necessary to allow van Dijk to progress to the broader terms of structures and strategies. Van Dijk explains (1998: 53) that when subjects experience reality they are the centers of the assimilation and processing of different data arising from this reality. In order to be able to understand these data subjects must order them into different structures. Van Dijk proposes a methodology that deals with such structures and makes them technical devices for ordering "reality" into coherent discourses. There are two main approaches adopted as far as the organization of data is concerned: the first approach is a more static one, it is called the structural approach, the second is more dynamic, and it is called the strategic approach. The structural approach deals with "objects as finished products" (van Dijk 1998: 53) and supports its analysis with rules that are responsible for the composition of these objects into larger units. "The more dynamic approach […] spells out the actual processes, moves or strategies, that is, the mental or interactional dynamics of construction" (van Dijk 1998: 53). This latter approach tends to present strategies that are undertaken to report on actions that social actors must perform to achieve their goals. Even the organization of the representations into the patterns available to carry certain meanings requires following their rules in a more dynamic way, presenting the processes of organization of these actions as ways of

constructing views and meanings. The term *strategy* is borrowed from military science "where it is used to denote the organization of military actions to reach a particular military goal" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 62). Hence, it can be concluded that the aim of the strategic analyses is to grasp the sequences of moves, which leads to the outcome in the form of knowledge of how social actors and language users make representations, how they produce utterances and how they organize their world of meanings. Subjects can take "a strategy to be a cognitive representation of some kind […] whereas a plan is a global concept of the macro-action and its final result or goal, a strategy is a global representation of the means of reaching that goal" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 65). Examples of strategies include words like: fast, optimal goal, sure, cheap. These words describe what method, kind of action or type of goal is desired for a given situation for a given social actor. If the social agent takes the strategy "fast" – it means that he is going to undertake such actions at such a speed that the intended goal of the action will be achieved quickly. The strategy "sure" provides him with a choice of those actions that provide a sure result, the strategy "cheap" means the action should be done at the lowest cost, and so on. Ultimately it can be stated that "[a] plan is macro-information that decides the possible actions contained in a global action, and a strategy is the macro-information that determines the choice at each point of the most effective or rational alternative" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 65). Strategy is not a necessary condition for performing an action; social agents usually act without a plan. However, in order to achieve a goal, a certain direction and the choice of appropriate tools may be relevant.

The next aspect of the issue of structures and strategies is connected with the kind of competence these different approaches suppose and cause. Structural approaches "tend to be more abstract and context-free, in the sense of characterizing ideal types or general patterns, and tend to ignore variations, 'deviations' and 'errors'" (van Dijk 1998: 54). Cognitive approaches, on the other hand, lead to the appearance of competence of a different kind, responsible for giving an account of a more dynamic reality of "what actors are actually thinking, saying or doing, including individual, contextual variations and 'errors'" (van Dijk 1998: 54). In this case, the realization of such strategic processes as: "actual operation, construction, reproduction, formation or change" (van Dijk 1998: 54)

can be observed. It is worth observing that usually these approaches are interchangeable and complementary. To be able to notice and report on individual changes or "deviations" in theories it is necessary to know their overall general structures and the rules governing them. Only on the basis of such a general account are individual variations observable.

Within the framework of structural or strategic approaches to the organization of knowledge, social agents can make use of more specific operational tools that help to represent beliefs, propositions and larger networks or clusters of them, known as schemata and scripts. Schemata "consist of a number of characteristic categories […] that may be combined in a specific order and hierarchy" (van Dijk 1998: 57). Van Dijk writes here (1998: 57) that if "we want to explain how people perceive objects, scenes or events, how they produce or understand sentences and stories, the knowledge they have to do is assumed to be organized in such schematic patterns." Schemata are here understood as kinds of patterns that are put in motion whenever the subject wants to analyze or order the mass of data coming from the external world. There are schemata of different objects like chair, or events, groups, social structures. Schemata-patterns order this empirical material in the form of ideas, abstractions or prototypes. The relations between these patterns are diagrammed into tree-like graphs. In order to report on all the possible dimensions of different schemata like "phonetic, phonological, lexical, syntactic, semantic, stylistic, interactional, pragmatic, contextual, etc." (van Dijk 1998: 58) it is necessary to present them simultaneously. The diagrams must represent these dimensions as "massively parallel" as all these schemata are actualized and processed in the same moment of time; hence, the resultant diagrams reveal the enormous complexity of the relations at one moment of time and also the complexity of the processing involved.

Scripts are different instruments. They are realized as attempts to render the structures of events and actions. In order to explain what they are it is convenient to imagine a subject as a customer in a shop, a participant at a birthday party or a bridegroom during a wedding ceromony. All these situations require different actions and different cognitive background to be successful in making them understandable for ourselves and for others. To successfully operate in all these actions, appropriate scripts must be launched. Subjects' reactions to given circumstances are based on their ability to access the proper script. Its realization results

in accommodation of all the dimensions of our cognitive attitude to a given situation. "The notion of script has been widely used to account for the knowledge people have about the stereotypical events of their culture" (van Dijk 1998: 58). The knowledge applicable in these situations is abstract and general, and flexible strategies are necessary to apply this knowledge to different concrete realizations.

3.4. Macrostructures

Macrostructure is a term that indicates an abstract quality that can be realized in different forms with regard to areas of grammar, cognitive processes or theories of social action. All these areas can be built with the help of numerous manifestations of the underlying macrostructures and their correlates.

In the work *Macrostructures. An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in Discourse, Interaction, and Cognition* (1980) van Dijk defines the notion of macrostructure. Van Dijk states (1980: 9) that "complex information processing at the cognitive level is accounted for in terms of macrooperations and macrostructures in conceptual representations." This means that macrostructures organize schemes that constitute the basis for experiencing in different domains of reception like vision, language, thinking, action. These forms, however, are the result of the influence of many other cognitive factors such as "knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, wishes, wants, tasks, goals, values, and norms" (van Dijk 1980: 10). Macrostructures are for van Dijk the intermediary semantic information that rules the organization of meanings of words and sentences on a local level in order to create more complex meanings on a global level. Thanks to the notion of macrostructure, language users "are able to make abstracts or summaries of discourse. Intuitively, such summaries are discourses that express the global meaning or main topics" (van Dijk 1980: 10). Thus macrostructures govern the coherence of discourse, thinking or perceiving and make the relations between semantic units explicit. The mediation of macrostructure can be used to establish a link between two disciplines dealing with their respective objects of inquiry, namely: the theory of discourse and the cognitive model of discourse processing, where the former introduces the basic notions of discourse, and the latter deals with accounts of their participation in the makings of discourse processing.

In dealing with macrostructures it is necessary to be aware that they account only for complex information processing and its cognitive objects (which may be in the form of processes as well). The difference between the operations using macrostructures and those using super-structures is here visible. The latter deals with simple objects, simple forms of cognition or perception whereas the former concerns complex processes such as building a discourse, taking turns in a conversation, performing sequences of action, complex thinking processes, *e.g.* solving tasks and problems. Van Dijk emphasizes (1980: 12) that "the meaning of one word, phrase or, clause […] and other relatively simple cognitive functions, such as object recognition, do not require macro-structural analysis." Van Dijk adds (1980: 12) that the difference between simple cognitive processes and more complex processes relates to the form of storage of cognitive material in memory: when subjects have to use long-term memory to operate on cognitive stimuli, it is usually necessary for complex information processing to be launched.

The interesting quality of macrostructure is not only that it has the organizational capacity responsible for the creation and exposition of complex relations between bits of information, but also the capacity for reduction. Macrostructure can reduce complex information consisting of many particular microelements to the major, more relevant and more general information. This quality of reducing is necessary when humans need to store and handle organized information effectively. In this sense "[m]acrostructures are, as such, representations of this reduced informa-tion" (van Dijk 1980: 14). This representational site of macrostructure also makes possible the processes of creation of new meanings, their projection into the spheres of more familiar schemata and finally their better comprehension. Retrieval of fragments of reduced information helps in the strategic composition of new, more complex meanings and makes possible the reading of the content of higher level, global mean-ings. Following these assumptions macrostructures have to be defined as certain matrices, or rules that help to define "global meaning derived from lower-level meanings" (van Dijk 1980: 15). Hence, on the one hand, it is clear that macrostructures have organizational properties, with the function of introducing coherence into discourse, action, perception or other cognitive processes. On the other hand macrostructures also have a reductive function that helps in the construction of new meanings and their projection into the area of comprehension.

Another definition of macrostructures is available in the article "Semantic Macrostructures and Knowledge Frames in Discourse Comprehension" (van Dijk 1977). In this alternative version macrostructures depend on the methodological notion of the proposition. Here macrostructures

> are assumed to be semantic structures of discourse whose meaning and reference is defined in terms of their constituents' meanings. Just as the value of a sentence is a function of its predicates, arguments, and operators, similarly the meaning of macrostructures is a function of the meaning and reference of the constituent propositions of the explicit text base and the relations between those propositions. (van Dijk 1977: 7)

As a result of the macrostructure's representation of the global level of meaning, the structure of macromeaning appears. By virtue of the relation of coherence between certain elements defined by the macrostructure, unity is introduced, which is the condition for the appearance of this macromeaning. This can be presented on the global level where macrostructure denotes their events or objects. The macromeaning of the sentence "Peter is building a house"[2] can be described in a sequence of more specific propositions stating that "Peter is buying bricks," "Peter is sawing," "Peter is mixing concrete." The content of these particular propositions can be analyzed on a lower microlevel, however, all these actions can be assigned one macrostructure of meaning on a more global level, namely that "Peter is building a house." All the above-mentioned actions constitute the macromeaning of a macrostructure of this statement. However, to obtain these macrostructures on a global level out of the microstructures some rules are necessary to govern their transformation. In other words the situation requires "mapping rules […] to transform one proposition sequence into another 'at another level' of description" (van Dijk 1977: 8). It is important to note that micromeanings that are inherently included in global macromeaning and are by these macromeanings presupposed not to need to be made explicit; however "during comprehension [of the macromeaning] they must be inferred from the explicit text base" (van Dijk 1977: 9). Hence, what is required to make the global meanings and their inherent micropropositions understandable are rules of inference for each of them from the other ones.

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2   Some of the examples come from van Dijk's works, mainly: van Dijk 1977.

These rules may produce the macrolevel from the more basic microlevels of meanings. Nevertheless, the rules must be flexible; they may be used for the construction of microlevel meanings, which in another situation may be treated as being in a superior relation to still more elementary levels of meanings. The rules must satisfy all the needs for the construction of different relationally situated meanings. What was found to be a macroproposition with regard to some lower level proposition, can be assessed as a microproposition with regard to a more global meaning. Macrorules have to fulfill relative or specific functions with regard to different levels of proposition.

The first macrorule is generalization. This macrorule states that: "Given a sequence of propositions, substitute the sequence by a proposition that is entailed by each of the propositions of the sequence" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 190). This means that if a proposition states that Adam has a dog, a parrot and a hamster these three nouns can be substituted by the simpler statement that Adam has three animals. Verbs can also be substituted by a proposition that is entailed by them, *e.g.* when it is said that Tomek is going to London by bus and Sławek is going to London by plane, the global meaning can be formulated in the sentence that they are both going to London. The form of transport becomes irrelevant here and the priority is given to the global proposition that they are going to London. Information about the kind of transport is, however, implicit in the global meaning and can be presupposed by it.

The second macrorule is deletion and it states that: "given a sequence of propositions, delete each proposition that is not an interpretation condition (e.g. a presupposition) for another proposition in the sequence" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 190). The rule of deletion works when some propositions in certain expressions are not necessary for the interpretation of another proposition within the frame of a certain discourse. Proceeding in this way deletion "deletes full proposition from a given text base" (van Dijk 1977: 11). Let us take an example of the sentences that Mary is playing with a blue ball and that she breaks a window with it. The information that "the ball is blue" is irrelevant with regard to the more important information that she breaks a window with it. Here the whole proposition is deleted from the text base of this more global discourse.

In other works by van Dijk (1980: 47) the rule of deletion is presented as a rule of selection because it selects from the level meaning

all the propositions that are not conditions for the interpretation of other propositions in a text base. Ultimately, it can be stated here that all the information that is not relevant for the construction of the coherent theme of a discourse is selected and omitted or not taken into account thanks to the rule of deletion. Van Dijk (1980: 47) also indicates different types of deletion: strong and weak ones. The former rule deletes all irrelevant detail, the latter only locally relevant detail, which means that information that conditions propositions on local level but does not condition it on a more global level is deleted.

The third macrorule is the rule of construction. However, it is worth indicating that in some articles by van Dijk (1977: 12) this rule is presented under the name of the integration rule. In works like *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension* (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983) and *Macrostructures. An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in Discourse, Interaction, and Cognition* (van Dijk 1980) van Dijk talks about the rule of construction. This rule states that: "Given a sequence of propositions, replace it by a proposition that is entailed by the joint set of propositions of the sequence" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 190). Following this definition this rule can be described as the rule for the construction of a new proposition on a global level that describes the sequence of propositions on a lower level, *e.g.* when different actions are performed at the airport like: clearing customs, checking in, boarding, a reason appears for calling them simply "taking a plane to New York" which is a proposition on a more global level with regard to this sequence.

As far as the structures of discourse are concerned the distinction made by van Dijk (1980: 107–111) between micro-, macro- and superstructures should be kept in mind. Microstructures constitute the basis for the creation of macrostructures in the way that was indicated above. Superstructures are rather structures that "go beyond the usual linguistic or grammatical organization of discourse that is […] somehow additional or grafted onto the linguistic structures" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 236). A superstructure rather has the organizational role of introducing certain conventions into the ways of "comprehension, storage, and retrieval of discourse" (van Dijk, Kintsch 1983: 236). Propositions on the local and global level are analyzed and understood thanks to the patterns of superstructures. What is also important is that superstructures should not only be presented as grammatical devices for the purpose

of the achievement of sentence building but as models for cognition. The processing of discourse in human minds is realized with the help of the conventionalized patterns of superstructures, which introduce strategic ordering and organizational categories into the stream of cognitive data. Thus, superstructure "is the schematic form that organizes the global meaning of a text" (van Dijk 1980: 108–109). It consists of different categories, such as the category of function or the category of macrofacts. In this sense narratives and different stories can also be called certain kinds of macrostructure. They have functions of "explanation, specification, comparison or contradiction" (van Dijk 1980: 107) and build the macrofacts of parables, myths or rumors.

4. Discourse in Teun van Dijk's theory

The notion of discourse is very often used in the theory presented by Teun van Dijk. However, it appears not only in the theoretical part of his work, but also constitutes the methodological background to his examinations. It is not possible to understand the theoretical applications of the notion of discourse without the basic methodological knowledge about it, hence Dijkean methodology is necessary for the understanding of his further extrapolation on the notion of discourse. His approach to discourse is multidisciplinary and is an analysis of discourse from the linguistic, cognitive, social and cultural perspectives. The linguistic and cognitive aspects of this approach have been presented in the methodological part of this study. Now I will embark on the area of social and cultural analysis.

4.1. Discourse as a communicative event

A social and cultural analysis of the notion of discourse presented in the theory of Teun van Dijk requires first an analysis of the assumptions about the character of this notion. It helps to place this notion in the broader perspective of the social sciences. The main assumption on the notion of discourse in van Dijk's theory is that the meaning of this notion amounts to a "communicative event" (van Dijk 1998: 194). A "communicative event" is an event not only of a textual character, but an event that is realized in society between social agents in the form of communication. To understand what van Dijk has in mind when talking about discourse in this sense, it is necessary to take a closer look

at the social and cultural dimensions of this notion. His definition of "communicative event" will be useful to start this analysis:

> Such a communicative event is itself rather complex, and at least involves a number of social actors, typically in speaker/writer and hearer/reader roles […] taking part in a communicative act, in a specific setting (time, place, circumstances) and based on other context features. This communicative act may be written or spoken, and, especially in spoken interaction, usually combines verbal and non-verbal dimensions (gestures, face-work, etc.). (van Dijk 1998: 194)

Van Dijk reduces here the dimensions of discourse to a short, descriptive term of talk and text. Discourse is here presented as "the accomplished or ongoing 'product' of the communicative act" (van Dijk 1998: 194) and tentatively can be treated as accounting for the written or verbal results of a communicative event. Following this way of thinking, it should also be accepted that discourse is constantly in the background of all communicative events, as the basis from which all these events arise, and the destination where all these interactions terminate. This supportive function must be understood with the assumptions of the whole creative sense it has: that this background residue is responsible for providing all the necessary presuppositions for further speech acts and their relevant thinking and meanings. Discourse for van Dijk, as the preparatory remarks envision, is not only made on the surface of the linguistic structures, but is all that is available when the subject confronts itself with the cultural and social uses of language. Discourse, in this sense, is the "product" of putting into motion all the dimensions of communicative acts, which are arranged in social surroundings. Van Dijk (1998: 194) emphasizes this social dimension of his approach, by saying that nowadays the scientific discipline known as discourse studies deals with most of the social uses of language and discourse as its consequence: "Discourse analysis focuses on the systematic account of the complex structures and strategies of text and talk as they are actually accomplished (produced, interpreted, used) in their social contexts" (van Dijk 1998: 198). Social and cultural functions are taken into account in this discipline that has developed in the humanities since mid 1960s. Initially it focused on grammar, but later pragmatic studies of discourse embraced the analysis of "(speech) acts, conversation analysis, stylistics, rhetoric, or the sociolinguistic study of discourse variation in its social context" (van Dijk 1998: 199).

Discourse in the work of van Dijk lies at the intersection of two dimensions. On the one hand its meanings, propositions and representations are personal – formed in people's minds. On the other hand "discourses are forms of social action and interaction, situated in social contexts of which the participants are not merely speakers/writers and hearers/readers, but also social actors who are members of groups and cultures" (van Dijk 1998: 6). In this sense the rules that work within discourses are socially shared. What becomes problematic is the link between processes that are realized inherently in people's minds and their public outcome in the form of different socially shared representations. The principle of the possibility of such a transformation from personal to social is cognitive in character. Van Dijk invites us to initiate the social element on the very basic level of cognition, because he finds that cognition in most cases is always already socially shared.

In some writings van Dijk (1998: 6) presents the cognitive dimension of the analysis as the one that constitutes the mediation space for relations between social and personal experiences. In others, such as "Social Cognition, Social Power and Social Discourse" (van Dijk 1988: 130), however, he places cognition, power and discourse within the area of social relations. This transposition says a lot about the supposed relations between these phenomena, they are inseparately bound together as presupposing one another. The mental, internal "facts" of thinking and perceiving cannot be analyzed in separation from social phenomena, like power or social discourse, they inherently belong to each other and the mental element indicates the social dimension in the same way as the social indicates the mental dimension. For van Dijk (1988: 130) cognition must be analyzed not as a purely mental and internal fact, but as involving social dimensions: we "simply need the theoretical construct of people's minds as an interface between the social and the personal" (van Dijk 1998: 235). In *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* van Dijk emphasizes (1998: 235) that to satisfy the needs of a complete account of the processes of discourse formation "a broader theory of (verbal or other) social interaction and social structure" is necessary and that "this social embedding of cognitive processes affects the nature of these processes as well as the contents and the structures of mental representations" (van Dijk 1988: 130). The social context in which knowledge and beliefs are acquired, where

people are treated not only as the abstract carriers of meanings but as social members, must be included in a theory on discourse formation. Following this line of thought, language is also treated as an essentially social phenomenon that constitutes a part of the theory of social cognition. Van Dijk emphasizes (1988: 134) that "[k]nowledge of the language, of physical world, of ourselves, and *a fortiori* of others and the social world, cannot in principle be purely individual, private, isolated, or solipsistic." The scope of van Dijk's analysis in many writings like: "Social Cognition, Social Power and Social Discourse" (van Dijk 1988: 135), *Elite Discourse and Racism* (van Dijk 1993: 14–16), *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (van Dijk 1998: 134) covers the cognitive, as well as the social dimensions.

What is important with regard to discourse formation is that cognitive processes such as understanding, interpretation, memorization of events take place in different parts of memory. Simple cognitive units like letters, words or propositions are organized within Short Term Memory that has limited storage capacity. Information that is gradually stored in Long Term Memory is relatively more complicated. However, further divisions are required that pertain to personal and social information processing that take place in two kinds of Long Term Memory: Episodic or Personal Memory, and Semantic or Social Memory.

Episodic Memory stores only certain kinds of information like "individual knowledge, opinions, and representations of personal experiences" (van Dijk 1993: 38). To represent this personal knowledge the cognitive system needs models, that are "unique mental representations of specific situations, events, actions and persons" (van Dijk 1993: 38). The second part of Long Term Memory, Semantic Memory stores the other kind of cognitive experiences like shared social beliefs: "social knowledge, attitudes, norms, values, and ideologies" (van Dijk 1993: 38). The way of forming individual or social beliefs may lead in both directions, at times social actors through the use of techniques like decontextualization, generalization or abstraction may derive their social representation from personal attitudes (van Dijk 1993: 39) while at other times they may derive personal elements from the social memory (van Dijk 1998: 83). Personal models that help to organize individual experiences into innumerous patterns of opinions, associations or knowledge make possible the creation of a person's own mental "biography." "Context models,

thus, represent how participants in a communicative event see, interpret and mentally represent the properties of the social situation that are now relevant for them" (van Dijk 1998: 212). Such models help to construct in people's minds the situation in which they are involved, to evaluate it and draw conclusions from it with regard to their own place within it. These models, therefore, constitute the intermediary point between what is personal and what is social. They make possible the introduction on the scene of present understanding to support the background knowledge that already constitutes their cognitive history. That is why models cannot be treated as abstractions that are arbitrarily imposed to provide the only possible way of understanding. Models are dynamic:

> [t]hey represent the ongoing interpretation of language users of the social situation. That is, context models may be partly planned, but ongoing interaction and discourse, as well as other changing aspects of the social situation, need continual updating […]. (van Dijk 1998: 213)

It is important to note that "current fragments of discourse will become part of the 'previous context' as soon as they have been accomplished" (van Dijk 1998: 213). In this sense it can be said that context models are models of experience. Different examples of the activities undertaken during everyday conduct like eating breakfast, going to the cinema, polite answers and some basic attitudes are couched in the form of models. They help in the storage of these data in memory.

Van Dijk's theory on discourse and ideology appoints a central role to the spheres of context where cognition is concerned. There is no point in saying that separate, individual worlds of cognitive ideas exist in the minds of identities. They are always already impinged on by the social dimension. This idea is known with regard to language treated not as an individual phenomenon but as an interactive result of sharing social representations. Context thus constitutes the very basis for the possibility to talk and to organize discourse. Discourse analysis must hence provide detailed and systematic study of the properties of context.

Van Dijk (1998: 211) defines context as "the structured set of all properties of a social situation that are possibly relevant for the production, structures, interpretation and functions of text and talk." Context is an immanent part of discourse and van Dijk also considers it to be the element influencing the shape of the content of discourse referred to in communicative events. What is observed on the local level of context,

i.e. in the realization of everyday situations, may be noticed also on the more global level, where ideologies are analyzed. Van Dijk writes:

> group domination, conflict and competition will be multiply exhibited in everyday practices of social actors, including their communicative practices. That is, ideologically relevant interests such as group identity, activities and goals, norms and inter-group relations of dominance and resistance, as well as social resources, are also locally exhibited and reproduced in social situations, and hence in communicative contexts. More specifically, we will find that ideologically based dominance also involves the control of context. (1998: 211)

Contexts may be analyzed by virtue of their different parameters like: the institutional domain, the type of speech event (it could be *e.g.* parliamentary debate, application letter), the intention of a given speaker, his function or purpose, the location of the situation and its circumstances. Another parameter is the social role of the agent and his membership in different parties or groups. Context constitutes the determination of structures mapped onto the situations in which participants take part. It determines the particular, concrete forms of realization of cognition that is the mediating sphere between what is created in individual minds and what is acted out in the external world. Cognition, and with it the contextual and experience models, makes what initially seems to be only an individual belief appear to have social patterns of representation included in its creation. Discourse for van Dijk appears to be created just at the point of intersection of these two domains: social and personal.

4.2. Discourse and ideology

Discourse and ideology are both terms that are very often used and assumed in discussions on the contemporary sciences. Both are also tightly interrelated and depend on each other. Van Dijk's work on discourse and ideology makes us aware that it is not possible to understand one of these terms independently of the other. That is why the extensive analysis of one of the terms must take into account the results of the analysis of the other. This dependency is sharply visible in the examinations of these notions undertaken by van Dijk. The author of *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998) performs advanced analyses of the notion of ideology. The results of this analysis not only provide a deeper insight into this notion but also highlight problems in relation to the notion of

discourse. This chapter aims to gather these results of the elaboration of the notion of discourse and present them in connection with the notion of ideology.

Defining the term ideology constitutes a difficult task; however it is impossible to organize a field of social analysis nowadays without taking into account the results of such an attempt. In the theoretical approach to linguistics proposed by Teun van Dijk all notions that are activated in order to explain problems with discourses are treated first as operational for ideologies. It can be observed in *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (van Dijk 1998) or other writings (*Elite Discourse and Racism* (van Dijk 1993), "Discourse and Manipulation" (van Dijk 2006)) how ideologies are created through using discourses in the processes of manipulation and persuasion or how they are reproduced with certain discursive manifestations. In the analysis of the notion of discourse subsidiary terms are at the disposal of the researcher. One of these subsidiary terms is the broadly elaborated notion of reproduction. Thanks to this term it is possible to understand how the legitimation of certain ideologically informed behaviours is realized. Van Dijk (1998: 262) presents the relation between ideologies and attempts by different kinds of "elites," be they professional, political, juridical, educational or other, to maintain power. First I would like to present how van Dijk understands ideology itself, because this understanding is strongly connected to the "cognitive through social" phenomena described in the previous subchapter.

To understand ideology as a system of ideas it should be borne in mind that these ideas are also social in character. They belong to the area of cognition for the same reason: cognition is treated as the mediation between the personal and social areas of thinking. Discourses are one of the possible examples of ideologically based social practices and they "certainly are the most crucial ones in the formulation of ideologies in their social reproduction" (van Dijk 1998: 6). The extensive definition of ideology states that:

> Language use, text, talk and communication (together subsumed here under the overall term of 'discourse') are needed and used by group members to learn, acquire, change, confirm, articulate, as well as to persuasively convey ideologies to other ingroup members, to inculcate them in novices, defend them against (or conceal them from) outgroup members or to propagate them among those who are (as yet) the infidels.

> In sum, if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their discursive manifestations. (van Dijk 1998: 6)

Ideology can also be presented as a more socially constructed view, as the "basis of the social representations shared by members of a group" (van Dijk 1998: 8). Ideologies organize social beliefs, they constitute the hallmarks for the creation of attitudes or evaluations, they may influence the appointment of some meaningful content as true or false and in this sense they can manipulate the relations of power within society.

Van Dijk observes (1998: 8) that "[i]deologies are self-serving and a function of the material and symbolic interests of the group." The domination of some groups may thus be supported by continuous striving to legitimate the dominating ideology. Speech acts that are performed by different language users may be informed through the relations of domination grounded in a certain ideology. Ideology is here understood as "something like a shared framework of social beliefs that organize and coordinate the social interpretations and practices" (van Dijk 1998: 8). The choice of some interpretations over others is the visible result of implementing some ideological representations. Following these assumptions, the participants and agents of ideological discourse may take control in different areas of a society. This control may be realized in spoken, everyday conversations, as well as in the textual base of a society. Media control may involve the appearance of certain contents or evaluations and the disappearance of others. Speakers that use ideology may control not only discourses but also their contexts, *e.g.* social areas where theoretical assumptions are turned into practice:

> Powerful speakers may control context structures by requiring or prohibiting the presence of specific participants, setting a time or place, allowing specific genres and not others, prescribing or proscribing the language or professional jargon spoken, by initiating or changing preferred or dispreferred topics or an agenda for a meeting, by sanctioning formal or informal lexical style, by being polite or impolite, by (requiring) the accomplishment of specific speech acts or the management of turns at speaking, or by opening or closing the interaction, among many other ways text and talk may be controlled. (van Dijk 1998: 209)

Van Dijk (1998: 184) presents many strategies for exerting ideological control. One of them is dividing the non-dominant group in such a way

that intra-group solidarity is prevented and the group cannot organize counteraction. Another form is causing division through appealing to group members as individuals. Elites also prevent access to public discourse, which marginalizes even the strong convictions of the non-dominant group. The problem is also that elite ideologies, as those most often presented in different kinds of media and popular press, have in fact no relevant alternatives; anti-racism is not so popular in the media as the racist discourse.

As different ideological representations are controlled, the problem of power appears. Vast areas of social action come under the control of one group and this leads to the problem of inequality between different social groups. This inequality assumes that different social groups are endowed with different amounts of power and social capital. What is more, this inequality in the distribution of power is connected with inequality with regard to different qualifications for undertaking the processes of legitimation of the existing social order. Eventually, the problem amounts not so much to different dispersion of capital, but much more to the different prerogatives to legitimate the possession of capital, which are sanctioned within the group and not delegated to members from outside. Hence, the privileged ones in the first sense (of possessing the capital), appear also privileged in the second sense (of the ability to legitimate this possession). Van Dijk analyzes this problem systematically under the term "the reproduction of the existing social order." In the article "Social Cognition, Social Power and Social Discourse" van Dijk (1988: 148) emphasizes this situation: "If power must be reproduced, and if social representations and their organizing ideologies sustain that reproduction, they must also themselves be reproduced." Here it can also be observed how the problem of discourse is included in the reproduction of ideologies. It is discourse in our society that:

> is the essential communicative dimension of power. Through discourse, people 'learn' how to acquire, maintain, or accept power, and even more crucially, through discourse they develop and communicate the ideologically framed social cognitions that legitimate power. (van Dijk 1988: 148)

It is discourse that makes possible the understanding of a given situation, even if this situation is procured by ideologically biased shared representations. Discourse is here the basis of the understanding of existing social arrangements, ideologies are the groups of beliefs directed only to

favor cognitive representations and practical evaluations of actions that serve some interest-driven group. This group is interested in supporting the *status quo* and that is why it produces the mechanisms of legitimation of its power and the reproduction of these structures of legitimation.

What is crucial with regard to the cognitive reproduction of ideological representations is that:

> discourse structures are produced […] cognitively, the manifestation of power in discourse is also under the control of (social) cognition. That is, power has no direct 'access' to discourse. It requires cognitive mediation, e.g. through ideology, attitudes, social knowledge, and models of social situations, respectively, as well as by the strategies that link these different representations. (van Dijk 1988: 148–149)

We have to understand that social power is also accepted on the cognitive level and thanks to the mediation of the cognitive interface. Discourse is here taken as the "expression or execution of models in episodic memory" (van Dijk 1988: 149). It is good to remember that these models regulate the interpretation of different everyday events or supply the forms of reaction to different stimuli, *i.e.* in order to know how to react in a wedding situation, the proper attitude model toward this situation must be used. Discourse is here the total outcome of the integration of the subject's old models with their new actualization, of the overall knowledge the subject has about the present situation and its past equivalents while still having in mind the difference between knowledge and ideology. Discourse can serve as the "box full of building tools" that are available for possible use to support the interests of some given social group, but, nevertheless, it need not be treated in this way, there is no necessity to treat it as somehow "condemned" to being used in this biased, interest-driven form. Discourses are here regarded as a certain possibility, a resource that provides all the material to build or support a certain view, but, nevertheless, its negative results are just as possible as positive outcomes. Discourses provide tools that can be used to build ideologies, but whether they actually appear as such does not depend on their content. Being this ground from which the dangers of ideology can arise, discourses should, at the same time, be accepted as a general source, *i.e.* the basis without which our cognition would not be possible, and which can be used in agreement with the overall will of the participants in the social order. Discourse is here understood as the possibility

to realize the actions prescribed in society, such as the possibility to be conscious participants in its communicative settings, to be the recipients of benefits it can incur on the basis of actions undertaken within it.

In analysing the problem of inequality we should remember that the effect of taking control within society can be achieved through the processes of reproduction. These processes result from the minor exertion of control in everyday speech occurrences and communicative events that further influence shared representations and bring ideologies into existence. In communication, examples of such control over the discourse accessed are: using commands instead of polite requests, or not using markers of politeness, deference or solidarity. Van Dijk adds (1988: 149–150) that "[i]n conversational interaction, speaker power may be manifested in the control over turn allocation, *e.g.* through biased self-selection as speaker, through interruptions, and more subtly in tone, pitch, fluency and the absence of hesitation markers." All these communicative behaviours serve somebody's interest. It could be the interest of man's power over woman, white person over black person, intellectual professional over physical worker. To gain control over another person speakers may control topics and topic change, may initiate a subject that serves their own interest and block the presentation of other attitudes or may simply not grant somebody the space for the expression of his ideas or points of view. A less powerful speaker's information can be suppressed, omitted, or not taken into account in further discussion. Taking control always means that the other would not have the right to use his personal freedom (to talk, to write, or to act). Van Dijk (1988: 153) writes clearly about the relation of power to discourse: "Power may also show in the control of the very access to discourse." Access to discourse has a variety of realizations. Powerful social agents may control

> the ones who engage in decisive government discussions, parliamentary debates, and board meetings, or who write (or have written) policy reports, laws, regulations, textbooks, and media messages. They are the ones who organize and control their preferential access to the media. (van Dijk 1988: 153)

It is observed here that access to discourse opens the possibility of forming ways of communicating. The form of communication decides on the range of control in different areas of society. It is also worth observing that it is access to discourse that is fought for in the struggle for control.

Discourse is implicitly assumed as a value, contrary to ideology, which is presented as the misuse of the resources of discourse. This polarization of values assumed in the writings of van Dijk on discourse and ideology should be emphasized in order not to overlook the fact that discourse is here something potentially good that can be wrongly used. This implicit characterization of the notion of discourse as the basis for the appearance of possibilities connected with communication should not be underrated.

Possessing power contributes to the reproduction of the existing social order, which is another problem dealt with by van Dijk. Reproduction of the existing order of social power is divided into two correlates: the reproduction of social practices that, within the range of social behaviour of certain groups, are repeated like daily routines, and the reproduction of these groups and other structures or institutions responsible for the production of certain behaviours. To *reproduce* for both these realizations means that somebody repeats certain behaviours or patterns of thought and as a result of this repetition they are made to continue, remain, persist. Reproduction means the repetition of certain patterns of thinking but also their production that is constantly repeated:

> [t]he active concept of 'production' is relevant here because such systems are not only being 'applied,' 'implemented' or passively 'used,' but at the same time constituted and reconstituted, as well as gradually changed, by such contextual uses by many social actors. (van Dijk 1998: 228)

The result of this socio-cognitive dimension of reproduction can be seen on the example of many types of racism. Discriminatory acts are here based on cognitive acts: first people acquire certain biased attitudes, they begin to evaluate situations according to these biased schemata, and only later do they act upon such discriminative prejudices. Discrimination on the social cognition level takes place first in everyday interaction. Individual cognitions of particular members of a group are linked to social group attitudes. This idea is stated in the sentence from the book *Elite Discourse and Racism* (van Dijk 1993: 27) where it states that "the reproduction of the system of racism presupposes the reproduction of its social cognition." It is important to note here that it is the group that has control over public discourse that can, through its misuse, contribute to the reproduction of racism or ideology.

Another distinction with regard to reproduction of ideology is that this reproduction can be realized by getting its new users to multiply certain

attitudes or patterns with some slight individual changes. Thus ideology adapts itself to changing circumstances, but its "core" meaning is saved being implicitly assumed in all its adaptations.

Ideologically biased expressions are often preserved in the form of stories about someone's experiences. New members of privileged groups learn these stories by socialization or inculcation, thus sharing them with others appears to be a complex, cooperative procedure. Many logical procedures are used to multiply biased, cognitive patterns, like generalization or inference from examples. A conclusion derived from one situation can be attributed to other people belonging to the same, discriminated group, *i.e.* as when the conclusion made on the basis of a story about a black woman who is receiving welfare benefit is attributed to all black women by calling them "welfare queens." Van Dijk (1998: 229) mentions several ways in which the social reproduction of ideology takes place, including the top–down application where general ideological beliefs are implemented in concrete practices and the bottom–up system, where ideologies are constructed on the basis of social practices and social discourses. Another method of reproduction is through the initiation of new participants and their learning core of ideological meanings, and also through acceptance or non-acceptance of some group by the privileged group. Still another way of reproduction is through extension of specific experiences to other contexts. Such social reproduction "also involves the continuity of the same structures, namely as a result of active processes, as is the case of a culture or class or, indeed, of the whole social system itself" (van Dijk 1993: 25). In this approach social members "contribute to the perpetuation of a social structure or cultural norms and values" (van Dijk 1993: 26). The system of reproduction of inequalities is perpetuated because some groups know how the system works, in this sense they are privileged twice: firstly as the beneficiaries of the system, and secondly having legitimate rights to support it. The privileged use their knowledge to make their supremacy continue through legitimation of the means for its reproduction. Acquiring prejudices may thus be seen as a way to gain the means of reproduction of your position on a social ladder.

Prejudice is described by van Dijk in his work *Prejudice in Discourse. An Analysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation* (1984). He starts his explanation of this notion by indicating that stereotypes are

created not when we "directly react to the events in the world, but rather to 'pictures in the head' we have about such events" (van Dijk 1984: 13). This explanation is supportive of the cognitive aspect of reproducing ideology that was mentioned above and clearly shows how subjective "interpretations and reconstructions of reality […] are shared by other members of the same culture" (van Dijk 1984: 13–14). The cognitive and social dimensions of the creation of certain beliefs are here exhibited. Ethnic prejudice for van Dijk is above all a specific type of attitude:

> [S]uch an attitude – writes van Dijk – will be defined in terms of an organized set of beliefs and opinions about minority groups, that is, as a 'group schema.' Such a group schema is the cognitive basis of all our information processing about members of such groups, e.g. in the perception, interpretation, or attribution of events and actions, the understanding of discourse, or our own interaction with ethnic minority members in social situations. (van Dijk 1984: 23)

Sets of beliefs that may become prejudiced, however, do not appear overnight. Our Long Term Memory stores different subjectively interpreted beliefs, which can be called cognitive, but it also stores socially shared beliefs that are made of these subjective ones. Such constructs in the form of "social representations" may become prejudiced when they come under the influence of the processes of persuasion and manipulation.

4.3. Persuasion and manipulation of discourse

Persuasion is a common behaviour accepted in social communication as a part of communicative action. However, at times it is transformed into its negative aspect called manipulation. Social behaviours are usually defined with regard to these two poles of communication. Van Dijk devoted a vast quantity of his works to analyzing the problem of distinguishing between persuasion and manipulation and to the description of their consequences for different social groups.

Persuasion is usually defined in the work of van Dijk (1998: 244) "as a process in which people change their opinions as a consequence of discourse." The influence of discourse on the change in social beliefs depends on its previous understanding – hence "persuasion presupposes comprehension" (van Dijk 1998: 244). Mental and social representations are changed when the structures of text and talk as well as the structures

of context are changed. These, however, are primarily construed as men-
tal models on the basis of the processes of the subjectivation of certain
views or their inculcation through learning. Under the influence of per-
suasion mental models of personal opinions stored in Episodic Memory,
as well as different social representations stored in semantic memory,
are changed. As a result, the content of our personal memory and social
attitudes, evaluations and norms may also be changed. Discourses may
affect beliefs in many ways: they may cause permanent change or af-
fect only temporary opinions, they may change our abstract views or
have ideological effects. It is not without importance that the means
of achieving these changes may come from observation or interaction
with members of groups presenting biased opinions and their sources
may also be the media, press or advertisements. In order to learn to
distinguish between factual beliefs (knowledge) and their ideological
representations personal knowledge is necessary: "[I]deological persua-
sion is facilitated by lacking social and political knowledge" (van Dijk
1998: 246). The cause of engagement in ideological thinking can also
be the lack of alternative choices. Hence, people who are discriminated
against through being deprived of the possibility of gaining access to
the means of education, employment or satisfying payment are far more
likely to adopt convenient ideological explanations of their situation.
Elite classes are interested in supporting ideologies for their own reasons
namely to prevent others from participating in the system that benefits
only some privileged groups. However, ideologies can spread in other
spaces of society that offer popular and simple explanation of social
problems. It is always easy to say that it is somebody else's fault. Elite
classes are also interested in supporting such a *status quo*. However, it
should be noticed that van Dijk (1998: 246) presents the contrary as-
sumption that it is elite classes that are most susceptible to the acquisition
of ideology and its later reproduction. Van Dijk writes (1998: 246) that
"the acquisition of ideologies takes place in a rich and well-developed
social and cognitive environment: people know that others may have
the same or different opinions about the world and that such opinions
may be influenced by discourse." The knowledge about the conditions
of transportation of certain ideological and discursive formations is
here the basis from which the will to dominate may arise. For van Dijk
classes that do not have the instruments of knowledge and power at their

disposal do not exemplify tendencies to dominate others. In his writings, mostly in *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998: 228–235, 243–255) and *Elite Discourse and Racism* (1993: 26) van Dijk argues that it is the group of elite classes that is mostly responsible for the reproduction of inequality or racism. In *Elite Discourse and Racism* he writes (van Dijk 1993: 26): "White group members acquire prejudices and learn to discriminate because of their knowledge of a social system of ethnic or racial inequality." However, he fails to mention that it is also in this group that the instruments for counteracting prejudices and ideologies are propagated most strongly. According to van Dijk (1998: 246), it is the possession of knowledge and the ability to make conscious evaluations on the basis of this that makes elites groups responsible for the creation of ideologies. This seems to suggest that it is only the possession of knowledge that is to blame for the acceptance of the ideological *status quo*. Van Dijk observes (1998: 246) that the possession of knowledge is necessary for the proper differentiation between facts and opinions, which should help elite classes avoid ideologies. However, the classes van Dijk equips with such an ability are paradoxically made responsible for the creation of ideology. The advantage of possessing this kind of knowledge appears to be blamed and is the reason for accusing those who possess this knowledge of bad intentions. Classes without the possibility of making use of the education system are always presented as innocent victims of ideology and domination by the elite classes.

Another form of creation, reproduction or production of certain forms of cognitive and social representations is manipulation. This problem is presented in the article: "Discourse and Manipulation" (van Dijk 2006) and shows how manipulation arises in the area of social cognition and what its effects are.

Manipulation – according to van Dijk (2006: 360) –

> not only involves power, but specifically abuse of power, that is, domination. More specifically, manipulation implies the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse: manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and against the best interests of the manipulated.

Manipulation is treated as one of the forms of persuasion, the difference between these two attitudes being that:

in persuasion the interlocutors are free to believe or act as they please, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader, whereas in manipulation recipients are typically assigned a more passive role: they are victims of manipulation. (van Dijk 2006: 361)

We can talk about victims of manipulation because they are the involuntary recipients of some information, the effect of which is that not only their actions but also their opinions and predilections are changed. This is clearly the cognitive aspect of this process. The conditions, however, that need to be satisfied for the cognitive aspect (change of mind) to be realised, are of a social character. Manipulative control is executed in certain formalized conditions, *e.g.* parents can manipulate their children from their authoritative position as parents, professors may manipulate their students because they speak in the name of their institutions, journalists can manipulate the readers of newspapers because of their institutional power. Van Dijk assumes (2006: 362) that domination, or abuse of power, necessitates the use of such social resources as the instruments of authoritative manipulation of beliefs. Access to social media, or other resources shared by participants of elite classes is the condition for the execution of power and domination, *i.e.* the manipulation of cognitive-social beliefs. Such control may recursively contribute to the power of the reigning group – hence to its reproduction. In this sense van Dijk also speaks about the illegitimation of manipulation "because it (re)produces, or may reproduce, inequality: it is in the best interests of powerful groups and speakers, and hurts the interests of less powerful groups and speakers" (van Dijk 2006: 363–364). Thus it would be manipulative if, for example, information that favours some group were withheld in order to deceive the recipient with regard to the exact content of this information. Silencing some facts and highlighting others is strongly manipulative. Information that is not manipulative and not illegitimate should be unbiased, relevant, complete and supported with arguments.

Manipulation that includes "non-verbal characteristics such as gestures, facework, text layout, pictures, sounds, music, and so on" (van Dijk 2006: 372) is discursive in character. Using discourse to manipulate beliefs according to van Dijk amounts primarily to manipulation on the basis of the context models of the recipients. In public communication behaving according to certain context models means that certain social roles are often assumed and subjects speak in the name of certain

institutions. In this regard "contextual constraints prevail […] on participants, their roles, their relations and their typical actions and cognitions (knowledge, goals)" (van Dijk 2006: 372). Van Dijk states here that such discourses appear to be "manipulative first of all in terms of their context categories, rather than in terms of their textual structures" (2006: 372). What van Dijk understands here as a discourse is not so much the textual outcome of its meanings but rather the totality of non-verbal characteristics that influence the apprehension of situations together with the verbal statements that are interwoven there. Discourse that may influence cognitive and social representations is reworked in dependency with these two dimensions: textual and contextual. Hence, some textual information need not be presented in a manipulative form, but the context of its presentation may lead to a biased reading. Examples of such manipulation can be seen in headlines in the press which assign extra weight to events that are not so important, or the reverse, diminish the weight of some events, because the information represented in this way is relevant to clients of the discourse. In sum, the general strategy of manipulating with the help of discourse amounts to exerting influence on the cognitive as well as social dimensions of its reception. Discourse manipulation may work through the authority of positions that speakers may occupy (*e.g.* "the demonstration of the presence of weapons of mass destruction" (van Dijk 2006: 376) as a way of presenting the authority of position). Discourse manipulation is as a result dependent on the power capital assumed to be possessed and represented by its holders. The amount and range of symbolic capital are also confirmed by the power of legitimation which, as "a prominent function of language use and discourse" (van Dijk 1998: 255), may be also used in ideology.

Legitimation for van Dijk is expressed in terms of legitimative discourse, "a discourse that justifies 'official' action in terms of the rights and duties, politically, socially or legally associated with that role or position" (1998: 256). Legitimation usually relates certain actions or thinking to certain, assumed norms and values and tries to impose the acceptance of certain behaviours in this way. Discourses can also be subjected to the process of legitimation or delegitimation, and those who claim to be in a position to legitimate or delegitimate a discourse are usually situated in the highest possible position on the social hierarchy ladder. This happens because it depends on discourse how our cognitive and social

beliefs are shaped, and further what our personal models of experience and socially shared representations look like. To establish hegemony over the discourse means also to change the ownership of different symbolic capital, because capital is related to the textual and contextual contents of discourses. Those who control the legitimation or delegitimation of discourses also control the spheres determined by these discourses, *e.g.* cognitive, social, political or cultural discourses: "hegemony over symbolic domain [means] namely, the control of the meanings and minds of the recipients of such discourse" (van Dijk 1998: 260). Groups that can afford to change discourse are the most privileged groups, because they can legitimate their position not only through directly imposing some views beneficial for them but in the sense that they can exert manipulation (without the consent of the subservient group) and persuasion (with conscious understanding on the part of the recipient) even with regard to everyday judgements, routine practices or basic evaluations. Thus the dominating group may impose preferred mental models of thinking, situations or behaviour. The consequence of these assumptions with regard to the direction and strength of legitimation is that discourse appears as the space whose control may contribute to the accumulation of symbolic power. It may, in fact, also lead to changes in the comprehension of the social role of social agents and result in the changes in the positions within the network of social relations. Pierre Bourdieu would argue that the legitimation or delegitimation of certain discourses by certain social groups may cause changes in the construction of the field of positions regarded as the organizing structure of society. Van Dijk assumes the possibility of such background changes without considering the consequence of undermining the whole structure of society with its dominated and dominating groups. The possibility of changing the discourse governing the order of society seems too strong for a theory that precisely and systematically analyzes complicated structures of discourse but which does not relate its terms to its underlying social realizations. Not the least important would be that the theoretical, linguistic "surface" structures in the work of van Dijk are not sufficiently grounded in their relative sociological counterparts. Van Dijk presents many examples of his overall linguistic assumptions; nevertheless, they seem to remain only on the level of "surface structure" and do not translate into the corresponding theory on the social conditions that accompany them, as is

the case of the Bourdieusian analysis presented in the following chapters. The methodology in the linguistics of van Dijk, with its numerous linguistic notions, structures and divisions presents a complex network of dependencies, but still contributes only to the linguistic elaboration and has no broader, pragmatic or ethical transpositions. In this regard, Michel Foucault's historically prior view of discourse embraces more of such dimensions.

5. Summary of the thought of Teun van Dijk

The understanding of the notion of discourse in the writings of Teun van Dijk is inseparably connected with the assumptions of his methodology and his work on ideology. In his earliest articles he starts with the explanation of the problem of text grammars and only later does he try to describe the broader issue of discourse. While explaining the theoretical background to Teun van Dijk's approach we should remember about the contribution of Robert-Alain de Beaugrande and Wolfgang U. Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986) in the form of their text linguistics. They introduced an important shift in understanding texts that amounts to a change from the text understood as the text in itself to the text that is related to its contexts. It can be also said that they reminded the reader about the interrelations between text and its social embedding. De Beaugrande and Dressler ([1972, 1981] 1986) remind the reader that texts do not mean in isolation, but they are always placed in the complicated net of relations with the social contexts or with the background knowledge of the readers.

Other implications used in van Dijk's methodology range from the works on meaning by Gottlob Frege or Anna Wierzbicka's proposition of understanding universal concepts. However, the notions of structure and strategies, or scripts and schemata are new ideas included in the Dijkean inventory. They help to explain the difficult problem of information processing and gathering experience and knowledge.

What is important with regard to the problem of discourse itself directly is its social character. Discourse for van Dijk is a communicative event. Van Dijk emphasizes the social dimension in his presentation of the notion of discourse, he states (van Dijk 1988: 134) that the individual element is always already social in character; human scripts or schemata

are shaped in agreement with social experience. Dijkean theory on ideology also appoints a central role to the spheres of context and society. This social basis constitutes the possibility of organizing discourse and van Dijk (1998: 134) reminds the reader about this when he compares discourse and ideology. The explanations of processes of manipulation and persuasion complete the presentation of the difficult problem of ideology. Van Dijk demonstrates here (1998: 134) that it is possible sometimes to manipulate somebody's cognition, but in this way we never obtain the society educated and conscious of their strengths. The knowledge on discourse can be a preliminary condition for achieving this.

The philosophy of Michel Foucault[3]

Michel Foucault can nowadays be regarded not only as a singular identity whose writings have exerted an enormous influence on many fields of humanities, and especially philosophy, but, also as a kind of institution that pushed the limits of scientific conventions to get access to areas where people counted most. Starting with internship in the Hôpital Saint-Anne where he made his first steps in gaining practical knowledge about mental illnesses, he continued his inquiry by engaging in many undertakings that put the feeling and experiencing human in the first place. He gathered around himself a group of people who, like himself, were staunch supporters of all kinds of activism and together with them, he set up many institutions and organizations designed to help people that were placed lowest on the social ladder. Such institutions as the Prison Information Group (called GIP) can be regarded as one of the most emblematic examples of his later political involvement, and in the years that followed, he was to be seen protesting, often with younger people, in the front ranks of demonstrations against different infringements of human rights.

However, it would not be irrelevant to say that Foucault, in all his undertakings, despite the whole current of thinking he made utterly conspicuous, despite the problems he brought to the surface of the enunciation, was terribly alone. The fact that he, as one of the first of the well-known intellectuals on the Parisian scene, was HIV positive, cannot be overlooked. Nor did his specific attitude to the spheres of sexuality, where such notions as the limit-experience played an important role, facilitate the situation. And in this whole situation the issues that counted

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3   Parts of the chapter on Foucault were already presented in the form of the article.

most for him were not easy topics. It required enormous courage to speak about that which was most neglected and underestimated, such as: "the reach of power and the limits of knowledge, about the origins of moral responsibility and the foundations of modern government, about the character of historical inquiry and the nature of personal identity" (Miller 1993: 13). All these problems were taking the shape and being formulated during his turbulent youth, and thanks to the people that exerted the strongest influence on him.

1. The history of the thought of Michel Foucault

One of the authors that played an enormous role in the shaping of Foucault's ideas and in helping him to find his own voice and style was undoubtedly Jean-Paul Sartre. The fact that the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre upon the young philosopher worked rather as a power to be resisted than something that the young Foucault wanted to follow is important. Sartre's main assumptions about human freedom and the total responsibility of individuals for their own deeds were completely alien to Foucault. As will be observed further, he placed other qualities and notions at the center of his own theory. However, it is important to observe the character of the intellectual climate of the epoch at the time when Foucault was starting his quest for knowledge and his "self."

The figure of Jean-Paul Sartre dominated the theoretical scene in these years. Nonetheless, it is worth observing that Sartre dominated the scene of popular philosophy, the other side of the philosophical enterprise belonged to Maurice Merleau-Ponty. When *Phénoménologie de la perception* appeared, Merleau-Ponty (1945) quickly eclipsed Sartre and this led to the election of the former to the chair of philosophy at the Collège de France.

The first novel by Sartre, entitled *Nausea*, appeared in 1938. It set out the problems that were later to be extensively elaborated in *L'être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*. The novel tries to answer ontological questions with a passion whose origin could only be of a personal character. His famous formulation that man must choose whether to live or to tell his story (Sartre [1938] 1974: 74) indicates somehow the line of thought that Foucault tried so strongly to defy; Foucault wanted to have both: life and story.

Sartre's major philosophical treatise appeared in 1943. For students preparing for the exams to the École Normale Supérieure *Being and Nothingness* was "like "a meteor" onto [their] […] desks" (Miller 1993: 40). It was impossible to overlook the irresistible power of Sartre's claim that "[m]an is condemned to be free" (Miller 1993: 43). Yet it was also this most exquisite element that was to make Foucault call the philosophy of his later adversary "terrorism" (Miller 1993: 38). *Being and Nothingness* launched a completely new way of thinking that Foucault was later so resistant to. The basic insights by Sartre are about consciousness, nothingness and anguish, bad faith, being-for-others, freedom. The narration situated the being of consciousness opposite the being of objects. Sartre, rejected classical realism where the substance is hidden under the appearances, which are all that subjects have access to. According to Sartre "a phenomenon (appearance) is relative to the consciousness to which it appears" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 131). He also understands the essence of a thing in a different way, finding it "simply the connection of appearances" and so [it] is "itself an appearance" (Sartre [1943] 1956: 12/5, cited in Gutting [2001] 2002: 131). According to Sartre, an appearance has the right to be considered "a being" in the same way as the essence has. Sartre grants the quality of being to everything that somehow presents itself to its receiver. The manifestation of the quality of being was the condition for the possession of the quality of being. Ontology for Sartre was an area of analysis of manifestation understood in such a way. However, it is worth noting that the being of phenomena that appears to us is not anyhow conditioned by our being. This is the kind of realism that Sartre proposed, namely that the being of phenomena is totally independent from our being: "the being of objects of consciousness (being-in-itself)" is totally different from the other kind of being: "the being of consciousness (being-for-itself)" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 133). Sartre's main point in his analysis of consciousness is that consciousness exhausts itself in its directedness toward an object, it does not have the positivity that would help us to talk about it as a distinct object. Consciousness diminishes itself in aiming toward an object – it is intentional in the Husserlian sense. Consciousness is also transparent – because it does not mark its existence, however, it can be conscious of itself: "to be conscious is to be self-conscious" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 135). In this one maxim Sartre is situated in total opposition to Foucault's philosophy. The assumption of

a state of constant awareness and of consciousness of the self that endures without moments of ruptures helps Sartre inaugurate a change in thinking on morality: to be moral starts to mean to be able to constantly supervise the inner self, hence the stress put on the responsibility of humans: humans are free, nothing can justify their actions, there are no excuses for human choices. Foucault's description of Sartre's philosophy as a kind of "terrorism" (Miller 1993: 38) is due to this fact; Foucault ([1975] 1991: 196, 202, 208–211) stigmatizes not only the whole tradition of introducing of a supervising power into schools, prisons, hospitals or administration (he, nevertheless presents how these institutions were established as a result of the introduction of supervising forces), but, what is more, Foucault cannot agree with the point – so strongly emphasized by Sartre – that the disciplinary, constantly constraining power should be implemented into our bodies and minds. In his writings it is rather the reverse: Foucault ([1975] 1991) tries to awaken the original strengths in us, to counteract the supervising element in us, that is called the conscience in Christian belief, but whose overwhelming power in us is designed not to free us for the true act, but to suppress our real freedom and strength. Sartre starts his ontological examinations exactly at the point that is ambivalent for Foucault, a point that cannot be treated as an obligatory one by Foucault, even if it appears later as a consequence of the brilliant analysis of consciousness. Humans' inner selves cannot be simply given to constant vigilance, even if it were to be achieved through their own power of consciousness. There are in humans selves – Foucault seems to say (Miller 1993: 109) – places that subjects are not possible to control, and their very value lies just in this quality that they cannot be controlled. It is only in moments of encountering the most traumatic limit-experiences that can disclose this, normally hidden, place in human beings.

The theme of nothingness and anguish would probably be closer to Foucault's thinking. Sartre states (Gutting [2001] 2002: 138) that the ability to form negative judgments is the very power that subjects, as humans, are equipped with. Nothingness, which is the result of the process of nihilation (the process where absence is positively perceived – as *e.g.* the absence of a friend I am waiting for in a restaurant) cannot be regarded as something on the same level as being. Nothingness is subsequent to being, it must "exist like 'a worm' in the heart of being" (Sartre

[1943] 1956: 56/56, cited in Gutting [2001] 2002: 139). Negating being-in-itself gives place to freedom, which appears when the determinism of objects and casual laws is transcended. Here it can be observed once more how the moment of responsibility in Sartre's work appears "on the scene" – it is entirely up to the human being whether he negates one possibility in order to choose another one. Nothingness that enters into a subject's being makes him retreat into one opportunity, while negating all the others. In connection with these assumptions there is another statement that Foucault strongly objected to, namely that "I cannot avoid being aware of my freedom and its ability to withdraw from what I am" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 140). For Foucault finding awareness of his acts was an everlasting quest. These moments of crossing the limits of experience were directed at grasping the meaning of acts of transgression. Hence it cannot be said, after Sartre, that awareness is something humans cannot avoid, it is rather just the opposite; subjects try to grasp the rare moments of authenticity and awareness, and it is really difficult to be conscious of them all the time. This moment, when the self through losing itself tries to find itself will be disclosed in the essays on the labyrinth which humans must enter in order to find another labyrinth inside themselves. Foucault elaborates this topic in the book on Roussel and in the essay titled "So Cruel a Knowledge."

Sartre described the human essence in terms of consciousness, but much closer for Foucault was embracing it as transcendence. This enterprise of grasping the human essence as transcendence partly originated from Martin Heidegger. Heidegger ([1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 163) found transcendence to be a "distinctively human capacity": "Being is the *transcendens* pure and simple" (Heidegger [1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 163), "'transcendence' gave to every single person the power to start over, to begin anew – to take up, reshape, and transform the world" (Miller 1993: 48) – these insights were insights continuously present in the thought of Foucault. Other remarkable intuitions were about "the being of man": "'Man', Heidegger declares, 'does not decide whether and how beings appear' […] 'man' is merely 'the shepherd of Being'" (Heidegger [1962, 1971, 1972] 1977: 210, cited in Miller 1993: 49). In *Being and Time* Heidegger takes up the problem of language which is "the house of Being" (Miller 1993: 49), an idea which is very close to Foucaultian intuitions. Other themes that coincide with Foucault's thinking and which certainly

provided an impulse for his analysis were the problem of time and death. Being-toward-death and "the falling" of Dasein are significant inventions made by Heidegger. "Being-toward-death" is the common way of escaping from it, Care is the way of veiling the truth, it is the modus of the way of being, namely: "the falling" of Dasein. To create such an indifferent attitude toward death means alienation from "its most own, the most absolute property of being" (Heidegger [1927] 1994: 357). Foucault seems to share this constant preoccupation of Heidegger with the subject of death, for the subject of death is also one that reverberates in the works by Foucault and gives it its remarkable style and profundity, very often originating from the personal experiences of Foucault with death.

In the "Letter on Humanism" ([1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 147–181) Heidegger writes about experience in a way that is very close to that described by Foucault. Heidegger ([1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 170) explains what he means, when he writes about Being-in-the-world. He does not mean "the world" as something opposed to the spiritual or to the heavenly world, but he means exactly the openness of Being: "Man is, and is man, insofar as he is the ek-sisting one. He stands out into the openness of Being. Being itself, which as the throw has projected the essence of man into 'care,' is as this openness. Thrown in such fashion, man stands 'in' the openness of Being" (Heidegger [1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 172). In another beautiful sentence Heidegger writes about the region of "between" in which "the relation of subject to object" ([1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 172) can appear. Foucault seems to be inspired by Heideggerian motives of "being-toward-death" and "falling" as the main human characteristics that have become his ontological qualities. Heidegger brings also to mind the famous quotation from Heraclitus that "A man's character is his daimon" (Heidegger [1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 174), and another one stating that "Man dwells in the nearness of god" (Heidegger [1962, 1971, 1972] 2011: 175). Both these quotations remind us about the long life quest of Foucault for his daimon, as Miller states (1993: 71), while the second quotation indicates an area that was especially important for Foucault – the region of the unthought; through encountering the limits of our experience, human beings can experience that which is usually hidden under the appearances of our conventional discourse. Miller observes (1993: 50) that it was in *The Order of Things* that Foucault "'for the first time' reveals 'the being of man in that dimension where thought addresses the unthought and articulates itself upon it.'"

As far as the Daimon is concerned, the notion is mostly elaborated by Nietzsche who inspires men to become what they are (Miller 1993: 71). The originally Greek idea of a *daimon* concerned "whatever the individual experienced as unpredictable, out of control, and not of his own doing" (Miller 1993: 70). It was close to the Nietzschean understanding of humans in whom evil is mixed with virtue. According to Miller (1993: 71), Nietzsche even states something more radical, namely, that man needs that which is bad in him, that this shapes the whole identity of the human being.

In the early 70s Foucault returned to Nietzsche's thought. He based his lectures at Collège de France on the Nietzschean analysis of knowledge, which, briefly summarized, states that knowledge is not the neutral effect of achievements in science, of the independent scientific (pure and innocent) striving to find the "objective truth." Nietzsche finds that in the process of creating the contemporary attitude to knowledge, contemporary morality and the contemporary subject was invented. In *The Genealogy of Morals* he writes that "our treasure is there, where stand the hives of our knowledge" (Nietzsche [1887] 2003: 1). Nietzsche ([1887] 2003: 3) starts his book with a question about the origins of our moral convictions, of our differentiations into good and bad. He questions the value of morality (Nietzsche [1887] 2003: 4) and such instincts as self-denial and self-sacrifice. Nietzsche ([1887] 2003: 5) saw rather a great danger for the mankind in proceeding according to these values. The appearance of modern conscience, which is "the ability to guarantee one's self with all due pride, and also at the same time to say yes to one's self" (Nietzsche [1887] 2003: 37) is a sign of the decline of man and his ethics. Nietzsche calls it not morality but the instinct for domination that satisfies itself by calling it "morality" – which grants it many prerogatives and assures man of his pretended value.

Another intellectual friend that exerted a great influence on Foucault was Jean Barraqué (1969). He was the first to develop in Foucault the drive to cross the limits, to examine the limits of experience. Their exercises were based on Nietzsche's lesson on how to instill the power of the will through daily practice and work on themselves, which sooner or later, come to be felt by the body and psyche as their torture. However, Nietzsche wrote that shaping one's own personality should be bound and patterned according to the Apollonian way of education; the personality

through exercising himself in the art of experiencing the limits of his sensitivity should achieve the visibly Apollonian character and style in which things which were previously compounded of chaos and mess became elements of harmonious order. Nietzsche wrote: "by freely applying the power of the will to sculpting and 'styling' a self, one might cast into bold relief one's 'higher necessity' and "[t]o become master of what one was," "'to compel one's chaos to become a form' is the grand ambition here" (Miller 1993: 91). Barraqué was a close companion in Foucault's quest for himself, in his "becoming what one is." James Miller writes (1993: 79–90) that their mutual influence and passion with regard to the area of "unthought," to the sphere of "unconscious" helped Foucault to gain his own style, his own literary voice. It is important that they met in the first period of Foucault's development, before he started his first work, titled *Maladie mantale et personnalité* (*Mental Illness and Personality*), published in 1954, which was informed by the writings of Binswanger and Foucault's termination in Hôpital Sainte-Anne. During these years Foucault

> supported himself at a series of odd jobs, doing research and teaching, all the while pursuing his deepening interest in the philosophy […] It was in these years that he began to study systematically […] making a habit of going each day to the Bibliotheque Nationale, mastering different theories […]. (Miller 1993: 61)

Other important influences that played a great role in the formation of Foucault's writing style and his general outlook came from Jean Hyppolite (1971), from whom Foucault adopted the conviction that the really great examination in philosophy must follow the study of history, and from Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945), who was convinced that there is nothing like Cartesian dualism in philosophy, knowledge is embodied and hence connected indissolubly with the body. From Louis Althusser (1992) Foucault took an ongoing interest in the French philosophy of science, with Georges Canguilhem (1966) and Gaston Bachelard (1961) as the main authors in this current. The last great influence that was exerted on Foucault in his early years of formation was undoubtedly the achievement of Samuel Beckett (1952) – Foucault had a chance to participate in the spectacle *Waiting for Godot* and it made a strong impression on him. Such names as Ludwig Binswanger ([1954] 1992), Jean Barraqué (1969), Maurice Blanchot (1955) should also be

mentioned. Blanchot was a great teacher for Foucault on the ability to efface himself, which was to become a very important topic for him in the later years. Georges Bataille (1945), Marquis de Sade ([1782] 1927), and Friedrich Nietzsche ([1886] 1997) inspired a whole current of suspicion in philosophy, which was to become a vivid theme in Foucault's writings.

2. Methodology of Michel Foucault's approach

Methodology in the work of Michel Foucault is not very sharply separated from the main part of his work and it is treated as an introductory part for the understanding of his theoretical terms. Some authors (O'Farrell 2005: 33) find *The Archeology of Knowledge* ([1969] 2011) to be the most important methodological work, in which Foucault presented his crucial methodological ideas and terms. However, terms with methodological connotations also appear in his later writings gathered in the volumes on ethics and aesthetics (Foucault [1994] 2000a, 2000d). Nevertheless, for the analyses on the notion of discourse undertaken in this research *The Archeology of Knowledge* ([1969] 2011) is of greatest importance. For this reason, it is desirable to start the analysis with explanations of the methodological terms included in this work.

The *Archeology of Knowledge* by Michel Foucault ([1969] 2011) can be treated as methodology which is directed at the presentation of his methodological tools. This methodology is not the kind of classical analysis which can be regarded as the discovering of history, consisting of events put in linear succession. According to Foucault, history taken traditionally is a "stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances [...] motionless bases" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 3). Such a history is an "unmoving history," synchronic view of history as a system.

The methodology that is inscribed in *The Archeology of Knowledge* marks the presence of phenomena other than those which were normally observed in the classical approach to history. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 4) talks here about "the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity." He states that the inventions made by Gaston Bachelard (1961) – an acknowledged French philosopher of science – "suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge," "they direct historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings and the never-ending tracing-back to the original

precursors" ([1969] 2011: 4). Foucault states also ([1969] 2011: 6) that "the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of limits: it is no longer one of lasting foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations […]" and he asks ([1969] 2011: 6) "[b]y what criteria is one to isolate the unities with which one is dealing?". His main concerns are about the limits and the designations of a science, an oeuvre, a theory, a concept and a text.

In *The Archeology of Knowledge* the method of posing problems is based on the questioning of documents. Archeology is for Foucault the theoretical excavation of more profound empirical facts and later the description of these empirical examinations of the documents from different epochs. The work *The Archeology of Knowledge* was written in 1969 and is the fifth most important work written by Foucault, after *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* ([1961] 1988), *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception* ([1963] 1994), *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* ([1963] 2007), and *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences* ([1966] 2002). During his years of work on these different archeologies a certain method developed: the method of archeology, which is described by Clare O'Farrell as Foucault's "approach to writing history" (O'Farrell 2005: 129). It is in outright opposition to his later developed method called genealogy that is given priority in the period when he works on sexuality, or when the lectures at Collège de France appeared. The method of genealogy, even in the derivation of the term from the Nietzschean genealogical writings (Nietzsche [1887] 2003: 5), comes from the Nietzschean idea about deriving the origin of human power from the will to power that is not yet constrained by the implementation of Christian notions like conscience, which imputes feelings of guilt or resentment based on the inversion of values. Resentment is described as emphasizing the value of pseudo-values like pity, self-denial, self-sacrifice, which amounted to, in fact, turning against the real values and Life itself as it is. The difference between Foucault's archeological and genealogical method is – as O'Farrell states (2005: 129) – "rather vague and confusing," but I will try to elucidate it in the following chapter with the systematic analysis of the works in which Foucault developed and elaborated these methods.

2.1. Discursive and non-discursive formations

The historicity of documents is one of the basic problems undertaken in Foucault's methodology. Many terms that deal with this problem appear here. Discursive and non-discursive formations are among such terms. They help to manage the difficult problem of the qualification of events or phenomena that constitute our everyday experience. Foucault tries to differentiate whether experience is of discursive or non-discursive origin. This differentiation makes possible the analysis of the content of history.

Foucault's methodological remarks concerning the approach to the history of the epoch are concurrent with implicit instructions on how to work with history. The differentiation into discursive and non-discursive phenomena helps to organize the mass of experience into an ordered whole. Foucault writes ([1969] 2011: 7) that discursive formations realize discursive practice: they do something through speaking about something. Documents, are thus carriers of discursive practice. Foucault shows ([1969] 2011: 7) how to treat documents: "the document was always treated as the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly decipherable trace." In this way a document reduces to nothing the trace of existing reality – this means that under the cover of the document nothing has been left – the trace has been erased, hence subjects have now no access to the reality and, what is more, the documents launch mechanisms that can change, falsify or manipulate that reality. It can also be asked what reality is since it is reduced. It can be doubted whether representation is connected with the reality, or whether there exist only representations which could be more coherent or even more convincing than their real objects of origin. For Foucault the language of documents is not only the surface cover added to the reality, it could be the only sign of this reality; nevertheless, there is something that stops him from such thinking. Undoubtedly it is the polemics with Jacques Derrida ([1967] 1997) concerning the sort of representation available to our senses. While reading *The Archeology of Knowledge* it could be asked what kind of existence is attributed to the reality Foucault thinks about, whether it is possible to detach the *eidos* – the true, originary reality from its semblances – *i.e.* documents. What is clear in his writings is that he tries to counterbalance Jacques Derrida's discourse ([1967] 1997) on the (lack of the) origin of things. In his works the attempt to justify the sources used in his analysis of discursive formations of many

epochs can be observed. However, it cannot be concluded that the value of Foucault's erudition lies only in the referenced documents. It is rather that Foucault sees the inner workings of all the social mechanisms introduced to facilitate the social organization. Foucault does not agree with Derrida that what subjects have access to are only textual traces; nevertheless, in texts like "Nietzsche, Freud, Marks" ([1994] 2000k: 273) he outwardly speaks about the "epidermical" structure of discourse, about the necessity of bringing the content to the surface of consciousness, which means also to the surface of the discourse. The value of discourse can be estimated on this basis, it is something responsible for bringing content to the surface of communication, of making it accessible for reading and interpreting. In this regard it can be also found that the work *The Archeology of Knowledge* is an example of a work that tries to establish the theoretical foundation for further empirical research. Foucault elaborates here extensively the backgrounds for thinking over problems of discourse as something that grounds our knowledge in its limits.

However, it should be very clearly indicated that Foucault does not only speak about discursive formations that are usually presented in language. He also describes the other kind of formations: non-discursive formations, though the former have precedence over the latter. It is important to underline the existence of non-discursive formations, because they constitute the prevailing argument in the polemics with Jacques Derrida ([1967] 2009: 36–76), where Derrida's conviction about the textualization of all kinds of practices is called "the little pedagogy" (Kruszelnicki 2008: 254, trans. – P. K.-C.). Foucault's lifelong engagement in the struggle to find himself through losing himself in limit-experiences was directed to searching through the area of the "unthought" in order to examine the places where non-discursive formations are generated. Non-discursive formations, though second in the hierarchy of importance, are not to be omitted. They and their relations with discursive dimension can provide explanation for many forms of being: practices, institutions, social and practical relations. What is important "[d]iscourse and figuration each have their own mode of being" (O'Farrell 2005: 80) each with their own non-reducible value. Gilles Deleuze in his book on Foucault ([1986] 2004: 79) also writes that Foucault "never says that the non-discursive is reducible to a statement, that it is a residue or an illusion" (trans. – P. K.-C.). (However it should be observed that in

the English translation this paragraph looks a little different. It states, that Foucault "never says whether the non-discursive can be reduced to a statement, and whether or not it is a residue or an illusion" (Deleuze [1986] 2012: 43)). Nevertheless, the following conclusion removes our hesitation on how to understand the problem: "Throughout the entire range of Foucault's work, visibilities will remain irreducible to statements and remain all the more so for developing a passion for the action of statements" (Deleuze [1986] 2012: 43). In other words, Foucault divides the area of experience into two kinds of formations: discursive, called the statement, and non-discursive, called the visibility, the latter not being reducible to the former. This means that documents cannot be treated as a kind of textual trace used instead of the reality to talk to subjects – this would be much too close to the understanding of the discourse presented by Derrida. Foucault tries to keep to the solution where two distinct areas of experience retain their own importance, however, but where "the primacy of the statement will be valuable only in this way, to the extent that it brings itself to bear on something irreducible" (Deleuze [1986] 2012: 43). Knowledge for Foucault – according to Deleuze ([1986] 2012: 44) – is the result of the connection of these two, otherwise separate moments: discursive and non-discursive. Hence, to know does not only mean to understand and to write, nor does mean merely to experience and to be engaged. To know – means both: you have to understand the source, the document, you have to report understandably on it and you have to be able to experience its results on your own example, you have to start to feel the engagement in the problem presented; you have to be able to "put on someone else's shoes," to feel and to know what others felt and knew. This is the method undertaken by Foucault in his analysis of the archives.

2.2. The total and the general history

In *The Archeology of Knowledge* Michel Foucault presents his particular attitude to history. He divides it (Foucault [1969] 2011: 11) into total history and general history. The latter does not subscribe all the events under one homogeneous rule. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 11) formulates the methodological task of the new project of general history:

> [t]he problem […] which defines the task of a general history – is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between

> these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming; what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between them […].

The Foucaultian method of treating history is to confront the linear succession of events with the "individualization of series" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 9). It can be admitted with Foucault that the situation which takes place nowadays can be described as the "displacement of the discontinuity," historical subjects can observe "its transference from the obstacle to the work itself" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 10). This transposition from the linear succession of events to the power of the discontinuous can be compared here with the power of *atopon* in Gadamerian hermeneutics, which functions as the incentive to further workings of a discourse. Donatella Di Cesare in the essay titled "Átopos. Hermeneutyka i miejsce poza rozumieniem" ("Átopos. The Hermeneutics and the Place Beyond the Understanding") (2004: 65) writes about a similar power of the un-place called *atopon* in launching a discourse, in putting it into motion: "Only the impulse can explain how the understanding is put in motion" (trans. – P. K.-C.), impulse being understood in the same way as Foucault understands rupture or discontinuity. Di Cesare also talks about rupture (2004: 65), but rather as an impulse, an impulse for the beginning of a conversation. Here a discrepancy between Foucault and hermeneutics can be observed. The former talks about a complete change in the paradigm – as was suggested by Thomas Kuhn ([1962] 2001: 101–105), while the latter describes only a different incentive to continue the discourse.

The new, general history proposed by Foucault, however, encounters many problems. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 11) admits that where documents about history are concerned one of his methodical principles concerning the evaluation of the events of history was the principle of choice. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 12) also considers that the "'conflict' or 'opposition' between structure and historical development" is a pseudoproblem. It is not that historians have to choose between history as *aletheia* – history that develops while revealing and history as synchronic structure – where it is regarded as a total and closed system.

It is in the discourse of continuity that "time is conceived in terms of totalization" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 13–14). In this sense the Foucaultian concept of discourse is a concept that is radically distinct from that recalled in anthropology and humanistics. Here another dimension

of Foucault's thought should be mentioned, namely, the dimension that focuses on subjectivity and its relations with the overwhelming discourse. In systems that are closed and treated as a separate totality the subject is in the center of the ontological field. Such a positioning of a subject can be observed in most metaphysical theories like Plato's realism ([427–347] [1578] 2008), scholastic theories, *e.g.* ontology by Thomas Aquinas ([1265–1274] 1964–1973), epistemology by Descartes ([1641, 1647] 1998) and even after the Copernican overturn when Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1999) tried to reappropriate things for the enhancing possibilities of humans, while, still leaving the human being in the center of the phenomenal world. All the phenomenological theories also left the subject "untouched" as the center of all possible concern and the master of all things, *e.g.* Scheler's phenomenology of feelings (Scheler [1923] 1980). It is only after the linguistic turn, most of all enacted by Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1994), that the position of the subject with regard to its mastering abilities was displaced. Methodology in the work of Foucault is inseparably bound up with his view on the role of the subject. He finds that "continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 13) for the specific discourse of continuities provides sovereignty of consciousness. Foucaultian discourse tries rather to decenter the human subject and to reevaluate and appreciate the margins, the borders of discourse that are undervalued in classical discourse. Topics that lie on the borders of the prevailing discourse are topics concerning areas of human activity that had been obscured as taboos, subjects neglected by proper science, areas excluded from the spheres of decent, civilized society. Foucault elevated these marginal discourses to a position available for further elaboration, to a position that made it possible to include them in the legitimate discourse. He started to talk about sexuality, about the element of evil present in all humans in a way that, paradoxically, allowed many people previously marginalized to be included within the sphere of society. That is why Luc Ferry's ([2006] 2011) doubt about whether Foucault can be regarded as the main human rights defender fails. It is precisely because of Foucault's systematic analysis of all these discursive practices that lie at the borders of the main discursive currents that caused these elements previously considered immoral, illegal, abnormal, being appreciated and included in the discourse. In many discourses (especially

classical humanistic discourses) giving primary importance and empha-
sizing the sovereignty of the subject is one of the signals that the human
being is still treated as the center of the discourse – Foucault tends to
avoid this one-sidedness, he wants to take into account the dimensions
of general history.

What is particularly vivid in *The Archeology of Knowledge* is that Fou-
cault tries to defend Otherness – both in the form of the other discourse
and in the form of the other being. Integrating events or phenomena
into one linear narrative is – according to Foucault – to be blamed for
the expropriation of the Other from the discourse. It leads to the sub-
ordination of everything Different to the area of The Same. Historical,
linear consciousness tries to subordinate everything under the sway of
The Same – it is the moment when it is not possible to save the difference
and to grant it its ontological value. Foucault tries to indicate: "every-
thing that has eluded him may be restored to him" (Foucault [1969]
2011: 13). He tries to remind the reader about the symbolic power that
is still granted to those who control history. Thus total history based on
a complete and closed system of linear accumulation is restored.

When talking about the totality of history the notion of power seems
to be very important. In *The Archeology of Knowledge* Foucault describes
([1969] 2011: 13) how those who are different are refused power. Power
is enclosed in the circle of the same people, to the circle of The Same,
not for those who "are kept at a distance by difference" (Foucault [1969]
2011: 13). In this way the maintenance of power in circles of certain
powerful people is indicative of the closed system of total history. His-
tory is reserved for the chosen ones, not for the Other. Total history and
the categories of Power belong here to the same configuration. Foucault
wants to provide a discourse that will not reject or marginalize some-
thing or somebody that is different – thus he grants special care to those
who are on the borders of the obligatory system of power. That is why
Foucault proposes a discourse of the Non-continuous, a discourse of
the margins or separate places of dispersion rather than the traditional,
linear system of development, progress, memory. In this sense Foucault
considers himself to be a Nietzscheanist. Both his premises, concern-
ing the decentered position of the subject and the genealogical schema
of knowledge are responsible for this assumption. Nietzsche ([1883]
2005: 259–268, [1889] 2007: 11–16, [1886] 1997: 3) also talked about

the decentralization of notions of humanistic disciplines traditionally made central to philosophy and history. First of all, he considered that subjects should oppose the constant striving for the ultimate foundation of knowledge. In his genealogy he "opposed the search for an original foundation that would make rationality the *telos* of mankind" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 14). Rationality based on the notion of truth only deserves mockery and irony: "To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value" (Nietzsche [1886] 1997: 3) – thus he undermined the traditional system of morality.

In his analysis of history, Foucault may at times create the impression that he suggests himself being a structuralist, especially in the fragments where he speaks about "anthropologizing Marks" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 14), where he contradicts the reactivation of the continuity of history taken as "the work of freedom," "effort of consciousness," "act of patience" which "breaks all bounds" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 14) to general history based on immobility of structures, closeness of the system and synchrony of events. Foucault, however, rejects this way of posing the problem, stating that: "if it is asserted that the question of discontinuities, systems and transformations, series and thresholds, arises in all the historical disciplines […] how could one oppose with any semblance of legitimacy 'development' and 'system,' […] 'history' and 'structure'?" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 15). Thus Foucault refuses to be qualified as a structuralist.

Foucault himself describes the methodology he abides by as exemplifying the general manner of the development of discourse – in this sense it can be observed how the construction of the methodological side of his work is also the prevailing model of the relations and structures that are present in his experimental works such as *Madness and Civilization*. That is why *The Archeology of Knowledge* is not only the methodology of his broader understanding of the subject of a discourse but it is also a preliminary introduction to his philosophy containing in its structure the ruptures, discontinuities or breaks that are already the disjoining absences making the discourse on history work. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 18) writes about the manner of his proceedings in *The Archeology of Knowledge*: "stumbling manner of this text: […] it rejects identity, it is not critical […]." As concerns the basis of his methodology, the starting point and criteria, or axioms of his approach, he notes: "I have tried to

define this blank space from which I speak, and which is slowly taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be so precarious and so unsure" (Foucault 1969] 2011: 18–19). *The Archeology of Knowledge* should be treated as an attempt at finding a place of origin for discourse.

2.3. The unities of discourse

The unities of discourse are the other methodological terms used by Foucault in his methodological treatise *The Archeology of Knowledge* ([1969] 2011). They are used to name different phenomena of discourse and thus to introduce more rigour into the difficult and obscure area of discursive experience.

Foucault ([1969] 2011: 24) describes the unities of a discourse as the notions of tradition, influence, development, evolution, and "spirit." With regard to their operational and methodological value Foucault calls these notions "ready-made syntheses" ([1969] 2011: 24). He is suspicious of many different unities that govern our thinking and he does not want to make it easy for this reason to accept them at face value, or to give them the right to organize our thoughts spontaneously. That is why Foucault starts his analysis with criticism of the general notions of discourse. His own discourse starts with an indication that he writes "in order to have no face" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 19). "Face" is something that is encountered first in contact with the Other and "face" as a figure of complete whole is here brought into doubt, is presented as a methodological problem. However, Foucault proposes something more than stating "I am neither this nor that" ([1969] 2011: 18).

The problem raised in the work by Foucault is the problem of the completeness of an oeuvre – the problem of endowing a certain group of expressions with a totality that makes them one, an inseparable whole. Foucault considers it to be rather a gratuitous pretension to understand a book as a complete whole and he asks whether it is not the case that neither a book nor the discursive unity of an oeuvre creates the complete expression of an author's views (Foucault [1969] 2011: 25). The views of an author, his oeuvre, his books are always "caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 25–26) and each presentation of the views "constructs itself only on the basis of a complex field of discourse" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 26).

This view of the dependencies between certain views and the context of their enunciation, the entanglement of a separate utterance in other significations recalls the idea of the semiotic universe proposed by Wojciech Kalaga in his *Nebulae of Discourse. Interpretation, Textuality and the Subject* (1997). However, in order to present these descriptions some designations have to be identified first, because in fact everyday formulations like "separate utterance" cannot be used – there is nothing like a "separate utterance" in a discourse. Kalaga (1997: 119) explains this by using the Heideggerian term "as-structure." He notes that: "[a]nything interpreted, as something interpreted, has the 'as'-structure as its own" (Heidegger [1927] 1962a: 192, cited in Kalaga 1997: 119–120), which means that the thing must always "be interpretable as something always already defined or fixed" (Kalaga 1997: 120). The "vicinity" of the sign is important here, that is, the network of significations within which the relations and their outcome in the form of the sign are placed. It could be stated here that the Foucaultian oeuvre, caught in a system of references is similar in its relativeness to the situation of Kalaga's sign, which must be interpreted, and what is more, gains its effective meaning, within "the framework of the semiotic universe or paradigm within which it functions or is activated as a sign" (Kalaga 1997: 119). The essential feature of a sign – for Kalaga (1997: 119) – is "its interpretability determined by the existing system of semiotic relations." This could also be a characteristic of the appearance of a certain meaningful, total, independent as-structure in the interpretable form of a Foucaultian oeuvre, a structure that, nevertheless, gains its validity on the condition of its submergence in the whole semantic field that surrounds it.

Further in the work, Foucault emphasizes the difficulty of the constitution of such an oeuvre, which – in the same way as his methodological discourse – "presupposes a number of choices that are difficult to justify" ([1969] 2011: 26). This can be understood as support for the thesis of semantic interrelations between all the emerging elements of the semantic field of a discourse. The constitution of an object of discourse, such as an oeuvre, poses the problem undertaken in Foucault's works. The objects of discourse are formed on the basis of extracting, naming and confronting different relations between different discursive unities present in a given area of knowledge. These relations may be adopted and transferred from other areas of knowledge. Foucault distinguishes

between discursive unities of which the researcher is conscious at the be-
ginning of the inquiry – they are the unities taken for granted without any
critical consideration, taken at face value. During the examination these
tentatively assumed unities are deployed in basic parts of the work and
analyzed from the angle of relations grasped among these putative unities.
After this examination it may turn out that previously adopted unities are
no longer feasible and instead new groupings of relations, new reasons for
regrouping them, new rules for their transformation have to be accepted.
Nevertheless, other elements built by virtue of the critical analysis and
conscious decision can be obtained. Foucault calls these other elements,
to differentiate them from those described above, discursive formations
and the new rules responsible for their creation: rules of formation.

Foucault states that discourses are not characterized "by privileged
objects, but by the way in which [they form] objects that are in fact
highly dispersed" ([1969] 2011: 49). It is therefore the action, the per-
formance of the formation of the objects of discourse that characterizes
the discourse. First of all, discourses and their own ways of creating
of their objects are given, and only later are the objects of discourses
created. Discourse works on the condition of the existence of a given
episteme – the set of rules for the performing and formation of an activ-
ity, *e.g.* an object of psychiatric discourse – madness – was not decisive
for the appearance of the discourse on madness, it was just the other
way round: it was the rules and contexts of the emerging discourse that
shaped the object of psychiatry. About the discourses examined in *Mad-
ness and Civilization* or *Discipline and Punish* Foucault writes: "The unity
of the discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of
the object 'madness,' or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity;
it would be the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of
objects during a given period of time" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 36). Hence
it should be borne in mind that the discourse for Foucault, whenever
its unity is postulated, is not guaranteed solely by the subject expressed
in this discourse; in fact it is just the opposite, the subject is created by
the appearance of the discourse, and the *episteme* that is the condition
for the existence of a given discourse is defined as referring to the "or-
derly 'unconscious' structures or 'epistemological field' underlying
the production of scientific knowledge in a particular time and place"
(O'Farrell 2005: 134). Different periods of time and different places

have different *episteme* that govern the development and the shaping of a certain branch of knowledge. Relations discovered in that way, relations that create part of the *episteme* are responsible for the emergence of the objects of discourse.

As a consequence of the acceptance of the notion of *episteme* a certain view of history and historicity must be given priority. In Foucault's writings, it can be observed that there is nothing like a sort of great, uninterrupted text in a given epoch. Rather disjoined individual oeuvres are discussed (Foucault [1969] 2011: 41). There is no permanence of the theme in the subsequent periods of history. What can be observed are rather "various strategic possibilities that permit the activation of incompatible themes" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 41) and "[d]iscourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 46). Discourse is here somehow a method of organizing some kind of knowledge, convictions or emotions into a coherent whole that can speak in its own name, and does not need a father or, as Derrida says about the Platonian *logos* with regard to the art of writing, "claims to do without the father" ([1972] 2010: 95). Discourse is here indeed regarded as the appliance that, containing different possible rules and axioms, can independently solve the problems appearing within it. It could also be read as the domain that alone creates its problems, perhaps on the basis of the methods that it develops to solve them. Hence, it works somehow regressively, backwards.

According to Foucault, discourses are usually analyzed in two ways: first, when the secret origin in the discourse is sought for, and secondly, when we "hear" that which has been "already-said." In the first case a discourse is found to be the constant repetition of the origin, and in the second case the "not-said" of the "already-said" is interpreted. Foucault renounces both these themes that can be expressed within the discourse – he states that they introduce once again the linear continuity of discursive unities.

When considering the notion of discourse, Foucault's starting point is to suspend the most visibly synthesizing concepts that concern and recall the discursive unities of the discourse. Though he (Foucault [1969] 2011: 14) eludes classifying himself as a structuralist or Marxist, he operates on the notions of synchronic order and systems and at times also on structural analysis. He tries to reformulate the overall

notions of a discourse (in *The Archeology of Knowledge*) on the basis
of the internal description of its historical determinations, while treat-
ing certain discourses as well as methods as objects of methodological
insight. He postulates (in *Discipline and Punish*) that the discourse will
elucidate the rules that establish it in the process of gradually revealing
itself in the progressive analysis of certain historical facts. He tries not
to treat the subject as a subject of inquiry, but rather as a node of events
approached from their exterior position. Hence, it is sometimes argued
(Dybel 2004: 200) that Foucault realizes his analysis from the point of
view of contemporary, European civilization without any understand-
ing of the relatively different historical situation of the subject placed
in another century's reality. In fact, what Foucault especially tries to do
is not to oversilence the voice of those who realize their idea of the self
on the margins of discourse and are excluded from the spheres of so-
ciety. In order to appreciate these margins it can be said that he does
just the opposite to the mentioned charges: he describes a given unity of
a discourse as if from inside and he analyzes its internal configurations
while posing questions about their continuity. It can be said here that he
"inhabits" such unities temporarily, checks their relative value and leaves
them after interrogation and description (Foucault [1969] 2011: 29).
At the beginning of the treatment of a given textual event "the material
with which one is dealing is, in its raw, neutral state, a population of
events in the space of discourse in general" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 29).
It can be observed here that the initial method for dealing with supposed
discourse is to gather, or to represent this "population of events" by
means of the method of description. Only after gathering these events,
certain unities are hermeneutically projected in advance, and only later
can they be approached from a broader perspective. Further a reorder-
ing of events according to the gradually appearing rules of the discourse
takes place. Hence, the hermeneutical method and the rule of the her-
meneutical circle can be recalled here, where Foucault states: "I shall
accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once
to interrogation" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 29). Closer inquiry continues to
disclose more elements thanks to which the view of the whole concept
gains density and clarity.

Another supporting methodological rule provided by Foucault on
the subject of the notion of discourse is that in his proposition of its

reading in *The Archeology of Knowledge* he finds that the unity of discourse is formed by the set of rules that govern the dispersion, relative dependence or juxtaposition of events recorded by pure description. It is coexistence of these phenomena organized by different set of rules that forms a discourse. The rules of this organization are derived from a thorough examination of the history of the given period of time: Foucault is famous here for his extensive research of different journals, magazines and archives that normally are hidden in the depths of libraries. It is thanks to such historical research that works like *Madness and Civilization* or *Discipline and Punish* appeared, in which profound remarks on the origin of the modern disciplinary society and the disciplinary treatment of "docile bodies" are based on the systematic, extensive reading of the contents of the archives.

Foucault's ([1969] 2011: 53) intention was to describe the relations between the objects of discourse which are on the horizontal level, and to report on the horizontal dependencies between these relations. He did not wish to present their vertical axis which means that he avoids presenting the link between the object and its foundation, its basis. In this sense Foucault cannot be accused of the mistakes of phenomenology, where the only aim was to describe the thing itself, in its originality, as it is given *originaliter*, in the phenomenological insight. Foucault states that it is desirable to "suppress the stage of 'things themselves'" ([1969] 2011: 53), but he cannot be charged here with this kind of resignation. The resignation from a phenomenological description of the vertical axis that joins the object with its foundation is not his intention. Such a description would somehow direct to the neutralization of a discourse. Foucault does not want to neutralize discourse, to deprive it of its formative power; on the contrary – according to O'Farrell (2005: 134), he appreciates its role in the creation of discursive formations, which can be helpfully understood as representing *e.g.* a certain scientific discipline. Foucault's aim is to make possible a discussion about different discursive formations, not to neutralize this possibility.

2.4. The place of the author

The role and place of the author is constantly present in Foucault's writings. Who it is that is speaking in an oeuvre is an ongoing problem for Foucault. His own problematic presence in his writings contributed to

the formulation of many statements of which the one where he tries to find himself in the empty space of discourse, is not the most misleading.

The discourse developed in the history of thought is formed in a way in which "one tries to rediscover beyond the statements themselves the intention of the speaking subject, his conscious activity, what he meant" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 30). According to Foucault, however, "we must reconstitute another discourse" ([1969] 2011: 30) on the basis of sheer description. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 30) uses formulations like: rediscovering "the silent murmuring," reestablishing "the tiny, invisible text that runs between" texts. In this way Foucault ([1969] 2011: 30) notices the allegoricity in the analysis of thought. Furthermore, asking questions like "what was being said in what was said?" ([1969] 2011: 30) he restores the old hermeneutical question of Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 269–272) who asked what is "the thing" of the conversation. In this interpretation of thought Foucault ([1969] 2011: 30) refers to the area described by Jacques Derrida ([1972] 2010: 80–89), called the discourse of logocentrism. Such a position would be the outright omission of Derrida's achievements regarding the issue of language and meaning. Understanding something as the "thing" of the conversation is still the reference rather to the Gadamerian hermeneutics than to the achievements of the "linguistic turn."

By asking about the intentions of the author, about "the subject" of the interpretation, the everlasting epistemological question is being posed once more, a question originating in Plato's writings, leading through Descartes to the Kantian confrontation of the subject and object of knowing, where language is not appreciated in the way it is appreciated by Heidegger, for there is a refusal to consider it only as a tool for expressing meaning. Derrida's analysis of the textuality of the text and the Saussurean ([1916] 1959: 65–68) division into *signifié* and *signifiant* were in this light the most radical versions of coping with this kind of problem. Foucault could not avoid his works being compared to the solutions suggested by Derrida.

Nevertheless, it is worth observing that Foucault also speaks about the intention of the author of the work. However, he speaks about it not in the way classical theories interpreted it, but in a mode initiated by Nietzsche. Paweł Pieniążek (2007–2013: 7) in his article on Foucault and Nietzsche observes that Foucault, following the reading

of Nietzsche, asks about the subject, the author of the interpretation. Pieniążek writes that:

> Foucault refers to the Nietzschean etymology of the words "good" and "bad." Asking about *Agathos* and *Deilos*, Nietzsche does not look for the final meaning of these words, it is not about to "know what goodness and evil are in themselves" but about to "know who was designated, and rather who was speaking […]. (Foucault 1973: 313, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7, trans. – P. K.-C.)

Problematizing the Nietzschean thesis: "There are no facts, only interpretations" (Nietzsche [1967] 1994, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7, trans. – P. K.-C.) Foucault in fact asks "who is speaking": "you should not interpret what is in *signifié*, but you should interpret thoroughly: you should ask who made the interpretation" (Foucault 1988: 260, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7, trans. – P. K.-C.). Pieniążek knows that Nietzsche's famous statement "do we need still to place an interpreter behind the interpretation?" (Nietzsche [1967] 1994: 202–211, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7, trans. – P. K.-C.) undermines the sense of asking about the author of the meaning – this is, after all, the origin of the whole tradition of suspicion toward the classical view on interpretation. This view states that the reader must find the subject speaking in the writing, must come to know the author's intention regarding the meaning. Nietzsche started the break with this classical notion of interpretation. Foucault was in this regard one of his disciples. Pieniążek observes (2007–2013: 7) that Nietzsche only apparently rejects this classical question about the author of the interpretation. This question, for Nietzsche, is exchanged for an equivalent question, but placed on a different level: Nietzsche asks about the subject that remains transcendental with regard to the act of the interpretation. The interpretation is here treated as a certain feeling – hence talking about its author is not unjustified (Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7). Foucault seems to agree with this conviction. However, an observation can be made that the attitude of Foucault is relevant only on the condition that the whole importance of the achievement by Nietzsche is not rejected. This achievement means that the author is apparently crossed out, but the configurations of the signs, which are still only the interpretations of other signs (and so on) create a space where their simulated author can be discerned, the author that is not conspicuously given before the reading, but who can be deduced on the basis of

the orientation in the space of interpretation. That is why, in the inter-
pretation of Foucault, Nietzsche never stopped to inquire about who was
speaking (Foucault, lack of reference, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7).
Pieniążek correctly provides us here with an explanation by Mallarmé
(lack of reference, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7) that the final answer
resulting from the proceedings of Nietzsche on the subject of interpre-
tation is that here it is the language that is speaking in the work, it is
the language that creates the space where the meaning is supplied.

Foucault represents a group of authors who find that it is important in
the reconstruction of a discourse to clear the way not for the intentions
of the author, but for the "deep structure of the language itself […] to
the epistemic "unconscious" that defines and makes possible individuals'
knowledge" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 268). The examiner must be able to
grasp the greatest amount of relations between statements, even those
not purposely formulated by the author. To analyze is to be free in the de-
scription from all interplay between relations and concepts in the text, to
give an account independent of all influencing constraints. What is also
important is that by suspending the immediacy of influence of certain
predominant unities the researcher can direct attention toward other
unities which were previously omitted. "Controlled decisions" should be
made as support to the establishment of less overwhelming discursive
unities (Foucault [1969] 2011: 32). Such a method provides the neces-
sary criticism for the creation of the elements of a more general theory of
structures. Foucault recommends here proceedings of a hermeneutical
nature: we have to make "provisional divisions as an initial approxima-
tion" when dealing with the relations of the unities ([1969] 2011: 32).
This supports the assumed hermeneutical character of the method.

In giving priority to the "deep structure of the language itself […] to
the epistemic "unconscious"" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 268) Foucault con-
stantly performs the operation of erasing the subject. The idea of decenter-
ing the role of the subject is present in Foucault's analysis in *The Archeology
of Knowledge.* It has foremost the character of a tool for the "undecentering
of the subject," for the deanthropologizing of a discourse. In *The Archeol-
ogy of Knowledge* statements alone are the tools that embrace the topic of
the discourse, not the intention of the author that makes the statements.
The statements alone choose "the subject of discourse (their own subject)
as their 'object'" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 33). Foucault is not alone among

authors who search in texts for the inherent pattern independent of the authors' purposes and the content based only on the internal configurations of relations, rules and conditions of the text. From Georges Canguilhem Foucault took the conviction that even certain underlying *episteme* concepts "derive from linguistic structures prior to the subject's experience" (Gutting [2001] 2002: 261). It is the text alone that speaks, not the author.

The issue of language that alone speaks in the text rather than the author of this text, is emphasized in moments of Foucaultian discourse where Marquis de Sade's use of language is referred to. De Sade's use of language brings us closer to the experience of the tragic consciousness of existence. It is the language that undermines the logic of "the sense and cause": "[t]he tragic consciousness is awakened on the way of the linguistic experience, when the language stops to mean anything else than itself alone" (Kruszelnicki 2008: 175, trans. – P. K.-C.). Here it can be observed how language is separated from the speaking subject and this language becomes "the tool in the hands of some other powerful force that has nothing in common with the orderly speaking in the service of representation" (Kruszelnicki 2008: 175, trans. – P. K.-C.). In this way Kruszelnicki reminds us about the function of language in Foucault's writings, which is not the classical tool for expressing meaning, but a place for the appearance of tragic consciousness.

2.5. Statement

Statement is the other methodological term used by Foucault in his work *The Archeology of Knowledge* ([1969] 2011). It is this operational term that helps to expose the elements of discourse and which thus introduces discipline and order into this area. The term *statement* is broader than the term *sentence*. A sentence must be formed according to the rule of the presence of a subject and predicate and must be grammatically correct. A statement can be made even in the form of *e.g.* a classificatory table of botanical species as in Linneus' works. As Foucault points out ([1969] 2011: 93): "a genealogical tree, an accounts book, the calculations of a trade balance are statements."

Foucault observes that "only an infinite number of sentences could equal all the elements that are explicitly formulated in this sort of statement" ([1969] 2011: 93). Statement is characterized by referring to

the "operation that has been carried out by the formula itself […] prom-
ise, order, decree, contract […]" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 93). In this
sense it can be said that the Foucaultian *statement* is somewhat similar
to the speech acts of John Searle and John Austin's, which "are the basic
or minimal units of linguistic communication" (Searle [1969] 2009: 16)
and can be analysed as locutionary acts that are equivalent to "uttering
a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference" (Austin [1962]
1975: 109) and which are identified as possessing the classical *meaning*.
But Austin ([1962] 1975: 109) and Searle ([1969] 2009: 23–25) also
analysed speech acts as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts that have
similar functions to those of Foucault statements: they inform, order,
warn, undertake or convince, persuade, deter, mislead. Statements are
for Foucault responsible for the creation of the objects of discourse, they
are the "extrinsic material on the basis of which they determine their
own object" ([1969] 2011: 95). It is up to other disciplines to define these
statements as *sentences*, "propositional forms," "speech acts." Foucault
([1969] 2011: 95) underlies here that "[t]he threshold of the statement is
the threshold of the existence of signs," which means that the existence of
statement is the satisfactory condition for claiming the existence of some
meaning. While explaining the function of statements, Foucault ([1969]
2011: 96) uses the notion of language only as a means for the building
of the statements. The language "exists only as a system for constructing
possible statements; but in another respect, it exists only as a (more or
less exhaustive) description obtained from a collection of real state-
ments" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 96). It is also important to underline that
the statement is not a structure, but a function of existence (Foucault
[1969] 2011: 97), on the basis of which one may decide whether signs
make sense.

The signs have the function of building the statement on the basis
of their relation to the real event. Their shaping may be the signpost of
their meaning – their value can be assessed on the basis of the coher-
ence of their grouping elements. The meaning of the groups of signs
(statements) can be assessed on the basis of their being a function of
the existence – their relations to the existence: "it is not in itself a unit, but
a function that cuts across a domain of structures […] and which reveals
them […] in time and space" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 98). This function
is expressed with the help of signs, but recursively the unities of the signs

can be assessed on the basis of this function. A statement "does not have the same relation with what it states as the name with what it designates or signifies" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 100) – writes Foucault, and further notes that "[a] series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something else' […] a specific relation that concerns itself […]" ([1969] 2011: 100). But this "something else" is not a relation of signifier to signified, *sentence* to its meaning, proposition to its referent. Foucault explains here that at times the same *sentence* appearing for the second time may not be the same statement. In such a situation a question arises what decides that the same sentence is read differently. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 101) proposes the answer to this question and gives us the reasons why the relation between statements and what they speak about is not of the same kind as the relation between proposition and its referent, or sentence and its meaning: "'The present king of France is bald' lacks a referent only if one supposes that the statement refers to the world of contemporary historical information" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 100). If it is referred to the content information of a work of fiction, or a novel, then it is likely to have its referent. The difference between the relations: statement and what it speaks about on the one hand, and proposition and its referent on the other, lies in the kind of relations used by them. When it is added to the conditions of the relation between their elements that this relation need not necessarily be directed to some particular domain or space, quite a different version of this relation can be created. This means that "[t]he relation of a sentence with its meaning resides within a specific, well-stabilized enunciative relation" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 102). Statements as correlates in some given world may not have an individual or particular object designated by some word in the *sentence*, but may indicate some domains in which different elements can or cannot appear. It is dependent upon the nature of this domain that the assertion can be made that "the present king of France is bald," or that he is not, or it can be simply stated that he does not exist. The kind of domain is responsible for the statement being true, false or having some other kind of valuation.

The subject of a statement is "a particular, vacant place that may be filled by different individuals" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 107), a place that can change to make it possible for the individual to be preserved or to be altered. This subject can also be described as "a dimension that

characterizes a whole formulation qua statement" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 107). This "vacant place," that gives the statement its characteristic, refers it to a given domain of events, equips it with possibilities of a positioning toward an exterior state of affairs.

The enunciative field that is inherently connected with a given *statement* gives this *statement* its character and situates it with regard to other statements. Statements function within and with the help of such enunciative fields, in which statements are immersed in a net of many kinds of relations: the field can support their meaning by proposing the presuppositions, by surrounding the statements with other contextual statements and coexisting with them in many ways. The field may contribute to the construction of a series of successions, to the distribution of functions and ideas: "Far from being the principle of individualization of groups of 'signifiers' […] the statement is that which situates these meaningful units in a space in which they breed and multiply" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 112) and further it is stated that "[f]or a sequence of linguistic elements to be regarded as a statement it must fulfill four conditions" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 112):

1. It must have a correlate in the form of a group of domains in which objects of a discourse and different relations between them may appear.

2. A statement has a subject, but does not have the same relation with this subject as conventional relations with the author of the text. Subject is a function that characterizes the statement and equips it with a particular dimension specific to one and just this one statement.

3. Statement operates on the condition of being associated with a certain domain of enunciation: "for a statement to exist: it must be related to a whole adjacent field" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 109).

4. Statement "must have a material existence," one cannot "speak of a statement if a voice had not articulated it, if a surface did not bear its signs, if it had not become embodied in a sense-perceptible element, if it had not left some trace" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 112).

Foucault ([1969] 2011: 116) also mentions the field of stabilization for a statement – this means that in different circumstances the rules of appearance, the relations between them, the potential "strength" of their

appearance are different. "The sentence 'dreams fulfill desires' […] is not the same statement in Plato and in Freud" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 116).

The author of *The Order of Things* also makes complementary remarks about the possibility for two differently formulated sentences to be the same statement: "a given piece of information may be retransmitted with other words, with a simplified syntax, or in an agreed code; if the information content and the uses to which it could be put are the same, one can say that it is the same statement in each case" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 116–117). In this sense it can be said that for Foucault's two identical sentences may be totally different statements.

Statements are rather that which characterizes the way things are said. The mode of saying things is what is interesting in the analysis of a statement: "The analysis of statements can never confine its attention to the things said […], to the 'signifying' elements that were traced or pronounced […] it is a description of things said, precisely as they were said" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 122–123). The analysis of statements "questions them as to their mode of existence, what it means to them to have come into existence, to have left traces" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 123). Analysis of statements is the analysis of the whole discursive formations in which they appear, with regard to the rule that "discourse can be defined as the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation" and that "discursive formation really is the principle of dispersion and redistribution […] of statements" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 121).

Summarizing, it can be said that discourse in *The Archeology of Knowledge* is understood as a group of statements that undergo certain principles of formation determined by it. Discourse can be taken as the one coherent system, distinguished from others, a system governed by certain discursive principles, pertaining to some objects common to all these statements and their domains. It also has certain ways of expression that are characteristic for this given system of statements. This group of statements is distinguished from other discursive formations; its elements are so strongly related to each other that they can form a group independent of the surrounding formations and at the same time they are not sufficiently deprived of the relations with the exterior groups of sentences to be completely cut off from the area exterior to this field. Foucault describes this half-dependent and half-independent formation with the words: "[t]he statement is neither visible nor hidden" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 122).

With regard to the modality of existence Foucault states ([1969] 2011: 124) that "the 'unsaid,' the 'suppressed' is not the same." He means here that it is just the way certain "information" or "enunciations" exist, not that one statement is expressed or suggested in many different ways. It is not true that we are interested in the "never changing," stable meaning given in the form of a statement. This formulation tries rather to catch different modes of giving. Foucault speaks about the following modes of giving of the statement: substitution, interference, suppression of one verbal performance by another – all these forms of enunciation take place on "the level of formulation" ([1969] 2011: 123), not on the level of meaning: "Statement is not just another unity […] it characterizes not what is given in them, but the very fact that they are given, and the way in which they are given" ([1969] 2011: 124).

While composing his own discourse Foucault looks for statements that are on the most marginal tracks of the officially prevailing discourses. He admits the importance of information even in the least exposed place: "However banal it may be, however unimportant its consequences may appear to be, however quickly it may be forgotten after its appearance […] we may suppose it to be, a statement is always an event that neither the language nor the meaning can quite exhaust" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 31). Statement is for Foucault a kind of unique fact that whenever and wherever it takes place is not unimportant. Statement is understood here as an eruption of an event in the plain structure of the discourse. It is the document, the oeuvre, the book that is created to fossilize its appearance. It is also linked to the other statements "that precede and follow it" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 31). This remark brings to mind the Hegelian idea later developed by Gadamer, of the fusion of horizons as the model of fusing and contextualizing the sentences with or by one another. That is why while examining discourse, the subject cannot stay at the level of grasping the given thought expressed by the statement – he has to catch it in its movement within the relations with other statements, he has to find the statement in that which it is actually doing, in the process of its acting, in its "existence" not in its "essence," in its "actuality" not its "potentiality," "in the exact specificity of its occurrence" (Foucaul [1969] 2011: 30). Nevertheless, the researcher is obliged to admit that Foucault conspicuously states that he should not "spread over everything a dust of facts" ([1969] 2011: 31), the working of an idea is more important in this regard.

2.6. Other methods

When the researcher wants to describe the method Foucault ([1994] 2000h: 461) uses in his works he should certainly take into account the fact that Foucault wanted to test and conscientiously analyze different anthropological universals like *e.g.* human nature, madness or sexuality. Foucault ([1994] 2000h: 461) does not reject these totalities but demands systematic skepticism toward them. As a method he takes "the study of the concrete practices by which the subject is constituted in the immanence of a domain of knowledge" (Foucault [1994] 2000h: 462). He states also that the method necessitates something more than "simple observation," in the case of a madman "one must investigate the conditions that enable people, according to the rules of true and false statements, to recognize a subject as mentally ill […]" (Foucault [1994] 2000h: 462). Such a systematic and independent analysis must be undertaken in all possible cases.

With "Nietzsche, Freud, Marks" the possibility of another method of interpretation appeared. It was the method of hermeneutics where "we, the interpreters, have begun to interpret ourselves by these techniques" (Foucault [1994] 2000k: 272). The interpretations made by Nietzsche show – as Foucault observes ([1994] 2000k: 273) – that it is really important to understand appropriately and correctly the notion of the inner depths of the human being, an examination of which is so indispensable in getting to know the subject himself. To "find himself" is hence only a game of projections where what seemed to be descending into the depths of interiority is only another formulation of the surface. This is just the way Nietzsche understands "excavating the inner depths of the self" (Foucault [1994] 2000k: 273). Not to be deluded by the deceiving concept of examining the selves it should be remembered that what seems for the subject to lie in the very depth of his interiority is only – grasped and elucidated with words – another name for the surface. What the analyst meets constantly in the analysis of his profound dimensions are only the surfaces, other moments of exteriority. The limits which he encounters in difficult experiences disappear in the depth of the unconscious. In order to make something true about the subject, to find the truth that is responsible for his true self and thus for his development and understanding, to find this truth means to be able to overcome "the last man" – as Nietzsche calls it ([1886] 1997: 77), and to become

an "Overman." The subject must "excavate" his interiority to the level of exteriority, to the level of a surface, because it is only exteriority and surface that are accessible for reading and understanding by human beings. After all, from the whole unconsciousness deeply hidden inside the subject, only these elements that can be made familiar by bringing them to the surface of interpretable "facts" are for the subject decisive and important. "Depth is now restored as an absolutely superficial secret" (Nietzsche [1886] 1997: 77) when the subject tries to project it into the area of consciousness. The constant projection of a new horizon of understanding and then – in accordance with the rule of the hermeneutical circle – approaching this new projection and verifying the facts is undoubtedly the method used by hermeneutics, where description plays the main role.

3. Discourse in Michel Foucault's theory

The notion of discourse in Foucault writings is inseparably connected with two other dimensions that are undertaken by Foucault: the dimension of the subject (identity) and the dimension of language. Both are analyzed in the earlier as well in the later works, but, they are taken into account from different methodological stances. In the case of the earlier works they are considered from the position of archeology, while in the case of the later period of writing they are taken from the point of view of a genealogist deeply engaged in the Nietzschean concept of philosophy as genealogy. The first approach to the problems of discourse and language has its origin still in the methodological undertaking of *The Archeology of Knowledge*.

3.1. On the notion of language

We can find in *The Archeology of Knowledge* many statements that deal with the abstract notion of language. Most often language is used as a tool for the expression of something else, it designates things, refers to something or signifies it. Foucault writes: "Language always seems to be inhabited by the other" ([1969] 2011: 125). Statements, however, are the modes of expression where "what is said" does not suppress the fact "that it is said" and the way in which it is said. The mode of existence of some expressions is hence more important than what they express.

The importance of a sentence is in its being a statement – where, how and when you said something is as important as what you said.

Language – for Foucault ([1969] 2011: 125) – is "hollowed by the absence." Humans are never satisfied by that which is expressed. They expect that it does not express anything only at the surface of its signifying discourse – they always look for something that is substituted for that which was intended by its expression. A sentence (or statement) at times exists in a way that makes it the bearer of the indication toward other meaningful relations – it is hollowed by its own lack of meaning and it realizes itself in the movement of indication toward other discourses. It seems that to grasp this sense of language Foucault ([1969] 2011: 125) proposes to "ignore its power to designate, to name, to show, to reveal, to be the place of meaning of truth, and, instead, turn one's attention to the moment […] that determines its unique and limited existence." This moment is determined in the space of its relations to other statements.

Language for Foucault ([1969] 2011: 125) is not the sedimentation on the solid ground of signified elements in the course of its performance but the play of uses of certain enunciation – the form of this play, the reasons why a certain statement is used in such and such a way are the concerns of the Foucaultian analysis of statements belonging to a given discourse. The play between visibility and non-visibility of that which is expressed by the statement is the condition on which a certain characteristic of statements can be supported. The "unique and limited existence" of the statement is caught in the moment of "how" it exists – in order to describe it one must take into account all its dependencies connected with the surrounding domains of other discourses, with objects that can throw a different light on the expressions solidified in a given discourse. The dependencies, as well as the ruptures, incisions, discontinuities in a discourse are responsible for the representative, manifest shape of the examined discourse.

It can be said about the discourse that is in use in Foucault's writings that its statements are strictly of the kind described by Foucault himself in *The Archeology of Knowledge*. These statements are of an enunciative character and Foucault notes ([1969] 2011: 126) that "the enunciative level […] defines the modality of its appearance." Foucault's discourse is an attempt to describe the visible in the case where there is nothing

else, having in mind that the analysis always has to be based on a limited amount of materials or documents, limited but expressible: "[w]e shall try to render visible, and analyzable, that immediate transparency that constitutes the element of their possibility" ([1969] 2011: 126). Foucault operates not on the vertical axis, directed toward the deep structure, he prefers to grasp what is possible to be grasped in the encompassing presence of the given, written data. He (Foucault [1969] 2011: 126) seems to say that what constitutes the expressible elements of the meaning is the surface of the discourse, not what is "hidden," "inexpressible" and only suggested by the empty place left by the "object" of meaning. It is not the play between the signifieds of the discourse, nor is it the play between its "solidified" signifying trace. Rather, it is *the way* it appears than *what* appears that is the characteristic mode of existence of a statement. At the same time it is shaped by the elements given in the surrounding discourses or formations and it realizes itself in the unique distinct way that it appears and works. It is this unique mode of enunciation that can be indicative of the independent, special value of the statement.

Foucault situates discourse in the space between transcendence and anthropology. Language is for him (Foucault [1969] 2011: 127) the statement and hence it possesses and realizes all the characteristics of the statement: first, it is based on a finite amount of data and is situated in the limited space between given formations, discourses; secondly, it does not satisfy itself in the indication toward something "hidden" in the "deep structure" of language, it is rather just that which is "graspable," "expressible" and lies on the surface or periphery of the discourse. "[T]he opening up of a transcendental destiny" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 126) of a human being cannot be fulfilled in the Foucaultian discourse. Foucaultian discourse is not a striving towards overcoming that which is human, including human language. In fact, it is just the opposite: the Foucaultian discourse realizes itself especially in that which is human, but, nevertheless, man must always be on the verge of that which is human, must "risk losing himself" in order to be able to find himself (Miller 1993: 144) and to understand what it means when something is really human. Foucaultian discourse also realizes itself in exceptionally human language, and not in any sacred language. Discourse is just the way sentences exist, the mode of their existence that can be obtained by humans through the never ending re-using of the set of determined statements.

What Foucault is trying to elucidate is "a possibility of description" that he used "without being aware of its constraints and resources" ([1969] 2011: 128). With modesty he admits that "rather than trying to discover what I said […], I shall try to reveal […] what made it possible to say what I did" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 128). In the construction of his analysis Foucault is not "proceeding by linear deduction, but rather by concentric circles, moving at times toward the outer and at times toward the inner [statements]" ([1969] 2011: 128). In this regard the analysis takes on the shape of a hermeneutical undertaking, where the researcher moves by virtue of the hermeneutical circle, working out projected understandings each one after the other, checking them up and projecting their new outcomes.

Discourse for Foucault ([1969] 2011: 130) is a strictly historical being; it is a part, a fragment of history, emerging from this history with its own historical rules of possibility of existence. In this sense it is not appropriate to say what it is. It should be described each time it is excerpted from history, with all its specific rules and the discontinuous modes of appearance appropriate to each formation. There is no single, general statement about what a discourse is. It is an unrepeatable formation, changing in and with time, that appears in the unique field of relations with other historical discourses: "'discursive practice' […] is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area […]" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 131). Foucault ([1969] 2011: 132) provides us with a description of how the given discursive formation influences the shape and body of statements, and *vice versa*: of how the expressing of the statements is the mapping of the dependencies of discourse. In the second part of *The Archeology of Knowledge* (in the third chapter about Statement and the Archive) ([1969] 2011: 89–148) Foucault tries to present what can be rediscovered through statements, "to what extent they can modify and redistribute the domain of the history of ideas" ([1969] 2011: 89–148). That these statements are the main building blocks of a discursive formation is beyond doubt, but they are also the outcome of the influence of the relations they undergo in this formation.

Discourse does not say everything that is accumulated in it with the help of each statement treated as the "tip of the iceberg" of meaning that brings with itself the meaning hidden beneath the level of

what is expressed. It is only the separated, distinct, surface-originating statements that must be dealt with in a discourse. Properly analyzed discourse will present the rules of the redistribution of statements within a given discourse, it will elucidate also the distribution of empty spaces in discourse, which are responsible for a given meaning of a statement; its relation to other domains of discourse, its mode of expression. Following this argument, the role of the "gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 134) in a discourse must be appreciated. There are two exemplified principles of inquiry into the structure of discourse, one by analysis of its statements, and the other by analysis of the gaps between its statements called by Foucault "a principle of division in the […] mass of discourses" and "a principle of vacuity in the field of language" ([1969] 2011: 134). These principles present in the process of Foucault's discursive formation are in opposition to the rule of discourse formation presented by Jacques Derrida ([1967] 1997: 19–20).

There are considerable differences in the understanding of the notion of language, discourse and the signifying practice in general, between the work of Foucault and Derrida are considerable. What distinguishes Foucault's theoretical insights from Derrida's is mostly that words are projected to be absent from Foucault's analysis of discourse in the same way as "things" are absent (Foucault [1969] 2011: 53). On the other hand, like Derrida ([1967] 1997: 19–20) Foucault wanted to show that "discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language" but discourse is rather taken as "a group of rules proper to discursive practice" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 54). Discourses are not groups of signs but "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 54). Discourses do "more than use these signs to designate things. It is this 'more' that renders them irreducible to the language and to the speech" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 54). This "more" is just practice, practice working in the process of the formation of their objects. Certain relations between discursive formations are in constant use, which makes them responsible for the establishment of a given discourse. The practice in using these relations leads to the movement of the discourse, it sets it in motion. It is in this movement that its rules can be grasped and analyzed.

In our considerations concerning language a closer examination of Foucault's idea that there is nothing beneath the manifest discourse

should be made: "Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 60). What Foucault notes here is that subjects move themselves only within the surfaces or the peripheries of discourses, or in the "between" between them – this empty space of the "between" is what can be organized in a discourse. Subjects move only in the exteriority of the surfaces, of the "covers," which are thus responsible for established meaning. It is these "covers" that create the meaning. "[W]e are not linking these 'exclusions' to a repression; we do not presuppose that beneath manifest statements something remains hidden and subjacent" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 135) – everything is performed in the play between the surfaces. "There is no sub-text" ([1969] 2011: 135) – Foucault comments. Statements like: "The enunciative domain is identical with its own surface" or "[e]ach statement occupies in it [in a surface – P. K.-C.] a place that belongs to it alone" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 135) are vivid manifestations of the objection to Derrida's constant struggle to support his edifice of discourse on the play between the signifier and signified. Even if Derrida ([1967] 1997: 23) tries to evade the charges of grounding the meaning in the solidity of the signified and exchanges it for the figure of a trace, even if he ([1967] 1997: 36) introduces the effacement, the disappearing of the trace at the moment of its appearance and the rule of the supplement as the rule of the expropriation of a trace in its signifying process – the difference between Derrida and Foucault is conspicuous. The incandescence of a trace proliferating its meanings has nothing in common with the reflecting of surfaces that do not produce anything additional to them, that do not hide anything different than themselves. In Foucault's writings – what is present – are surfaces that speak only as surfaces. In Derrida's writings the subject never knows whether what he encounters is the appearance of a statement or its disappearance, whether he sees a trace or "a trace of a trace," a testamentary sign of a trace as Michael Naas (2008: 4) exemplifies it. In the work of Foucault such a situation cannot occur, for the meanings of the statements can be determined by the possible place they can occupy (Foucault [1969] 2011: 129). What is responsible for the organization of a discourse is "the possible distribution of the subjective positions […], the forms of succession,

of simultaneity, of the repetition" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 129). Here it can be observed that the distributions of the positions of the statements in a discourse are, among many other factors, responsible for the identification of the meaning built by them: "The description of statement consists in discovering what special place it occupies, what ramifications of the system of formations make it possible to map its localization" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 135). Foucault writes also about the "isolation" ([1969] 2011: 135) of a statement which is possible when the statement is placed in the scission between the places of already existing statements. The *atopon*, the rupture, the discontinuity can be treated as a motor for the appearance of statements. It is very important for Foucault, though not for Derrida ([1967] 1997: 158), that there really are "empty" places between the events in the discourse. For Derrida a discourse is continuous stream or net, and "there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida [1967] 1997: 158) as the famous formulation by Derrida announces. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 232) appreciates both situations: places that are full of meaning, are filled with sentences, and also the places that stay empty, being very usually the sources of borderline experiences.

Foucault ([1969] 2011: 134) introduces something called "the law of rarity," which means that there is no possibility of saying everything. It is not possible to express everything that seems to be hiding in the domain of the "unexpressed." It is a privilege to be expressed, a privilege also in the sense that during its expression, that which is expressed appears. It did not have an existence before it was expressed. Here the most important value of the discourse is embraced: the value of language as an expression. Foucault often reminds us about this value, the value of the preservation of being by virtue of writing: to write means not to die, to be saved in writing. "To write as not to die" writes Foucault in his famous essay ([1994] 2000i: 89). However the "law of rarity" determines that what the subject encounters in the history of discourses, in the history of ideas are only small "islands" of meaning with regard to the spaces of emptiness within the discourse. Discontinuity is here the main principle of the appearance of discursive formations. Foucault formulates this in talking about "the incomplete, fragmented form of the enunciative field, the fact that few things, in all, can be said" ([1969] 2011: 134). The subject is not submerged in the infinite, linear continuity of discourse, of statements. The subject only at times encounters an expression that brings

new being into linguistic circulation and existence. Discourse for Foucault ([1969] 2011: 135) encompasses things "that are transmitted and preserved, that have value […]." Discourse makes these things visible, because they are surrounded and submerged in the background it creates, they are brought to existence in the form of discursive formations. In this sense the foundational character of a discourse cannot be refuted.

3.2. On the notion of interpretation

The notion of interpretation is the everlasting question that has its origin in ancient times in the work of Plato ([427–347] [1578] 2008) and Aristotle ([384–322] 1831–1870) and is also efficiently analyzed in modern times, be it in the works by Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004) or Paul Ricoeur ([1990] 2003). Nor is the problem unfamiliar to Michel Foucault, who, after all, undertakes his analyses in the period after the linguistic turn.

The author of *Madness and Civilization* brings under scrutiny the notion of interpretation as it is one of the few entities that had considerable influence on the understanding of problems connected with language, and the understanding of the phenomenon of language as the existential after the linguistic turn. "To interpret – writes Foucault ([1969] 2011: 135) – is a way of reacting to enunciative poverty, and to compensate for it by a multiplication of meaning." Following this line of argumentation, it can be stated that the dissemination and multiplication of meanings in Derrida is only one of the forms of interpretation. It would situate Derrida dangerously close to the common view of interpretation by hermeneutics (*e.g.* in the option presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 269–272), where as the ancient tradition indicates it is possible to grasp the "thing of the conversation" and this opens up the possibility of meeting, on the level of conversation, a certain kind of "communion"). For Foucault meanings do not proliferate infinitely as is the case for Derrida ([1967] 1997: 157). Nor do the surface expressions of the "deep structure" of a sentence in an interpretation change continuously as in the situation created by Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 269–272). In the writings of Foucault it is necessary to "weigh the 'value' of statements" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 136) by examining the place of their occurrence, their status, their working potential. In the work of Foucault ([1969] 2011: 138) discourse is given first, with all its crossing and inter-relation, and only later

can the position of its author be presumed, and only on the condition of knowing the author's position suggested by the discourse. Thus the kind of subjectivity that is given to the subject can be supposed. In order to find and to determine a given discourse one has to describe the relations of exteriority in a given field of enunciation. The researcher does not need to look for the foundations, the origin of the problem, but he needs to choose a certain field of articulation of some discursive formation in the history, and describe the surface relations and dependencies between the objects of this enunciation. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 141) calls this program of research a "positivist" approach and describes himself also as a positivist. He does not struggle with a given discourse to come to grips with its hidden meaning, to extract its only true, never-changing nucleus of meaning. What he does (Foucault [1969] 2011: 145–146) is to report that which is at a close distance, at hand, and which it is possible to observe and notate. At the level of the discourse's exteriority, which is according to Foucault ([1969] 2011: 145–146) the only possible level of communication of ideas and representations, he reports on different kinds of manifestations of discourse. Foucault ([1969] 2011: 147) also talks about the threshold of existence of the content of the Archive. This threshold "is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can no longer say" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 147). This is definitely a different view of our relation to tradition than that represented by Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 299–306) or Derrida ([1967] 1997: 81–93). In the case of Gadamer, the subject is submerged in tradition and cannot gain distance to it. Knowledge about tradition can be achieved by fusing our horizons with the horizon of the future and horizons of the other subjects or fields not known to us. The fusion of horizons provides us with a continuous history, without thresholds or ruptures. In the case of Derrida ([1967] 1997: 144–164), tradition is identified with the constant proliferation of meaning. Hence a conclusion can be ventured that the notion of tradition is also connected with continuity for Derrida, but of a different kind. Ruptures, discontinuities, if they are given any importance, are only the incentive for further dissemination. For Foucault ([1969] 2011: 147) the Archive is not discontinuous but it is formed in a shape of isolated "islands" of meanings, appearing in the background of the empty spaces of that which has not yet been expressed. The Archive "emerges in fragments, regions, and levels" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 147). To speak what

is outside language one has to be able to go outside of it, outside of that which is expressible, to stand near by it and to observe it from a distance. This approach to language is impossible in hermeneutics, where its rational, logocentric explications, sketching the homogenous area of understanding, accessible to everyone and to nobody, exclude all that is dark, profound and certainly not simple in human life. And yet it is this that makes this life, this man something exceptional, something that transgresses the limits, that makes it the principle of transgression itself.

3.3. On the problem of fiction and representation

A problem that appears together with the issues of language and interpretation is undoubtedly the problem of fiction and representation. Fiction, for Foucault ([1969] 2011: 148) can be treated as the space of the birth of subjectivity and the subject. The neutral space from which contemporary literature speaks is the space of fiction. The utterance characteristic of this enunciation is no longer the classical "I think" but the modern self-reflective "I speak." "I speak" is different from "I think" in this regard, in that the latter posits a clear "I," who is the effect of the stated activity. The formulation "I speak" does not determine the one, certain subject of the speech. The basis for "I speak" is the open space of dispersion, displacement, shift – it is the "ergon" without "parergon" because of the breaking, of the emancipative power of fiction it creates. "I speak" – as Foucault indicates ([1969] 2011: 148) – has a kind of self-referencing relation just like the famous paradox of the liar that starts from the words: "I lie, I speak." Foucault writes: "If the only site for language is indeed the solitary sovereignty of "I speak," then in principle nothing can limit it […]" ([1969] 2011: 148). If the Cartesian separated subject is assumed, supporting its entanglement in a discourse becomes impossible. If subject is such a strongly delimited identity, separated from its background, from its contexts, it becomes the rule for dispersion and destruction. That is why the subject that is proposed by Foucault is not the subject exemplified in the writings by Descartes, but the subject submerged in discourse that is its outside. However, it should be noticed that Foucault finds discourse as something separate from life: "Discourse is not life" ([1969] 2011: 232). He notes that discourse is "a complex, differentiated practice, governed by analyzable rules and transformations" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 232). People at times perceive discourse

as something open to interpretation, as something that is continuously developing and in this way they are completely in opposition to the view of discourse as a definite and determined system of rules and their modes of transformation. Nevertheless, Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 148) writes that contemporary literary discourse is not so much an interiorization but "it is far more a question of a passage to the 'outside.'"

Literature is important in this inquiry because it is part of the prevailing discourse, the part that is responsible for its shape created from its inside. In modern times literature does not want to manifest itself, it rather tries to distance itself from itself, to create a position of distance: "the 'subject' of literature [...] is less language in its positivity than a void that language takes as its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of 'I speak'" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 149). Language is "speech about speech" that "leads us [...] to the outside in which the speaking subject disappears" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 149). In another formulation Foucault states that the "naked experience of language" poses a danger "for the self-evidence of 'I think'" ([1994] 2000n: 149). According to Foucault, this is the reason why western philosophy has for so long rejected an analysis of language. Here appears the result in the form of decentering of the subject. Foucault wants to speak about "a language from which the subject is excluded" ([1994] 2000n: 149) in the same way as – according to Charles Hardwick (1977: 80–81, cited in Kalaga 1997: 47) – Charles S. Peirce wanted to talk about language which is not actualized by the subject's use. Kalaga states (1997: 47) that Peirce tries to define the notion of the Thirdness in his conception of the sign and he wants to describe it in the form of language itself without recourse to the person who transforms the influence of the Object (Secondness) and hence who receives the effect of this transformation – the Interpretant (Thirdness). Peirce wanted to explain and present the process of the production of meaning without pertaining to its actualization within the spheres of the subject (Kalaga 1997: 47). He stated: "my insertion 'upon the person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood" (Hardwick 1977: 80–81, cited in Kalaga 1997: 47). Peirce is experiencing the same event as Foucault when he asks about the possibility of achieving access to language in a situation of complete expropriation from the being of the subject: "the being of language only appears for itself with the dis-appearance of the subject" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 149). The question

arises how it is possible to report on language, to grasp its inherent elements, when they are what they are on the condition of independence from human interference.

Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 150) believes that the moment, when thought is born and articulated, appears to be placed in the exteriority with regard to a discourse, it can be said that it is born in the space of the exteriority of a discourse. There is no interiority of speech; thinking happens in the sphere of exteriority. Thought, which appears at the borders of a discourse that is born out of this exteriority, is the expression of the outside. Foucault calls it "the thought of the outside" ([1994] 2000n: 150). For Kalaga quoting Peirce (Peirce 1931–1958: 8.191, cited in Kalaga 1997: 145) the situation is quite different. Here thinking takes place only in the area of signs, there is apparently no cognition apart from the area of signification: "Every thought, or cognitive representation, is of the nature of a sign. 'Representation' and 'sign' are synonymous" (Peirce 1931–1958: 8.191, cited in Kalaga 1997: 145). Here, if the subject wants to think, he cannot flee into the area of unthinking, the area free of signs. It is quite the contrary: if the subject wants to acquire "a real proper name," he has to exercise himself in depersonalization, he has to open himself to "the multiplicities that traverse" him, to the "intensities that flow" through him (Miller 1993: 195). Signs can also make a sphere that is the source of such multiplicities, such intensities. What is important is to open yourself to the experience, not to stay in the closure, in the confinement of fear.

Language for Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 152) is set "outside" of itself and in this position it gains distance toward itself. The question arises whether this does not contradict what Peirce said, that cognition is possible only on the condition of articulation (in signs) (Peirce 1931–1958: 8.191, cited in Kalaga 1997: 145). Foucault posits here another problem: not that of stabilizing meaning but of putting it in motion, in other words, making it "think." For him (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 152) thinking necessitates the void, the distance between signs, in which the fragile formation of "I speak" may appear and be manifested. Discourse becomes in the moment of speaking, it is not pregiven. The whole world of meanings and the impression of being sunk in the lavishness of discourse appears the moment the subject expresses his "I speak." The impression of being overwhelmed by the exuberance of meanings, the impression of grasping

the point of understanding in the game of signification is the result of "I speak." "The discourse about which I speak does not preexist the nakedness articulated the moment I say, 'I speak'; it disappears the instant I fall silent" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 148), "The sovereignty of 'I speak' can only reside in the absence of any other language" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 148).

Discourse for Foucault is something that has no center in something that it talks about. Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 153) proposes to find as discourse and to call "a discourse" something that is directed toward itself as if toward its outside. The thought originating in a discourse possesses itself only as something alienated from itself: "a discourse that constitutes its own space as the outside toward which, and outside of which, it speaks" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153). Discourse born of this self-directedness assumed as gaining distance to itself, as separating the object of this auto-reflection from its subject appears as one "with no conclusion and no image, with no truth and no theater, with no proof, no mask, no affirmation, free of any center, unfettered to any native soil […]" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153). Such discourse does not amount to the formulation, discovering and description of the "thing of the conversation." Its sole object is constituted through self-reference, which in effect brings into being its naked power of constituting. The metaphorical picture of such a productive power is "the mirror" – but not a mirror taken as the frame in which resembled things are included – but mirror as the symbol of doubling, of the power of constituting, the power of creation by directing its productive resources to some part of the reality grasped. It is not the reality that is being emphasized, but the power of discourse which brings into being that which is inside as if it were outside. Mirror is a discourse that creates by the sole power it possesses, by directing it to itself as to its outside – thus it creates the thought of the outside, moving on the verge of its discursive possibilities.

A discourse does not have the shape of the initial statement, the statement of the absolute beginning that names something that has not yet come to the surface of a language. This discourse is rather the always already started repetition of the murmur that surrounds the systematic field of discourse. The words of this discourse "welcome the outside it addresses" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153). "[…] [T]his discourse as a speech that is always outside what it says […]" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153) and

that advances toward that which "has never received language" ([1994] 2000n: 154) – Foucault assumes here two spaces, one which is given in the language, and the second that is given outside of it, that is given in language's "unthinkable," "unspeakable."

3.4. Discourse in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*

The work that directly followed *The Archeology of Knowledge* was *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* Here the idea of the presented discourse is different from the idea of discourse revealed in *The Archeology of Knowledge*. Here, I would like to look more closely at the notion of discourse from this perspective.

In the work *Discipline and Punish* Foucault ([1975] 1991: 54–59) analyzes the appearance of the different discourses of penal justice. He starts with the presentation of public torture, and gives reasons for such severe punishments. He explains the connections between punishment and the whole sphere of the system of production, because the legal assessment of labor power was one of the reasons for this form of punishment in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Another, according to Foucault ([1975] 1991: 54), reason for this contempt for the body was the general attitude to death. Death in these times was much closer and more familiar than today; epidemics, high child mortality, massacres – all these things meant that people had to tame death.

Foucault ([1975] 1991: 48) writes about different discipline discourses. He indicates the intrinsic connections between the kind of punishment and the power that was instituted through this punishment. The power of the sovereign was restored and reconstituted thanks to certain kinds of ritualized punishment and their ceremonial executions. Foucault ([1975] 1991: 48–50) holds the view that behind a certain discourse of discipline stands another discourse connected with the body and its labor power. The former is a consequence of sustaining the latter. Discourse here is viewed not only as a set of theoretical rules, but also as influencing people's behaviour. The discourse about punishment in the 16th century and the power represented during tortures were intermingled.

In the second half of the 18th century the discourse of punishment changed its form. Previously, writes Foucault ([1975] 1991: 82–85), the policy toward illegalities performed by different classes, especially the less privileged classes was looser. The lowest classes, which were

officially deprived of privileges, were gratified with some tolerance with regard to many rules or ordinances. People were in the habit of not obeying certain edicts or rules, "different social strata had its margins of tolerated illegality: the non-application of the rule, the non-observance of the innumerable edicts or ordinances were a condition of the political and economic functioning of the society" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 82). Foucault observes ([1975] 1991: 82) that in the second part of the 18th century this policy begins to change. This was connected with such factors as growing wealth, demographic growth and economic development. However, it was not "a new sensibility" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 82) that appeared in these times, but rather a different approach to punishing. The change was mostly caused by a change in the situation of the bourgeoisie, which had been freed from feudal burdens and therefore started to treat their possessions as their own. Finding themselves in the situation of owners, they treated some workers' failure to pay or abandonment of old obligations as theft: "all the tolerated 'rights' that the peasantry had acquired or preserved […] were now rejected by the new owners who regarded them quite simply as theft […]" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 85). The legal discourse started to change: the illegality of property (*i.e.* the margins of tolerance toward the non-observance of some rules) was accessible to lower classes, the illegality of rights was the dominium of the bourgeoisie, who used their power to disobey the regulations of its own laws. This redistribution of illegalities was characteristic of the discourse of this time, and resulted in a change in discipline. Foucault ([1975] 1991: 85) demonstrates how this change occurred. The way Foucault treats the developing and changing discourses of discipline and punishment can shed some little light on how he understood the general notion of discourse.

In the 18th century some elements of the modern discourse in discipline and punishment began to appear in legal practice. One of these elements was the rule of "perfect certainty," which states that everyone should have access to the laws so the laws should be published. In other words the idea of written legislation appeared. This moment was bound up with the appearance of a surveillance power that performed its legal operations hand in hand with the system of justice. Police and justice become two complementary elements of the same process. The appearance of the police is not related to an attempt to make punishment more

severe, but rather to make it unavoidable. Society must be convinced that no monarch can attenuate or pardon any crime, therefore to convince society about the unavoidability of punishment there must be a link "between the offence and a penalty" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 96). For this reason the traditional methods of excessive punishment were abolished. These methods had set spectacular punishments but there had been no consistency in the treatment of criminals. There were no univocal rules, common to everybody, and even those which were present were not obeyed consistently. As a result the law was implemented haphazardly and unsystematically. Now, the law on property crimes had to deploy one codified "social pact" which was known to all and the same for all.

Another modern element that appeared in these times was the rule of "common truth." This was strictly connected with the previously mentioned rules. There was a common law for all, but a malefactor could only be found guilty on condition of first being proved guilty. The proof had to be publicly presented with regard to general criteria of verification known to all. "The need for a complete demonstration of the truth" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 97) appears parallel to the need for the formulation of accusations in conformity with the rules of common sense and reason. In these times empirical research becomes a method of investigation understandable for all interested in the issue. In this case also "the power relation that underlies the exercise of punishment begins to be duplicated by an object relation in which are caught up not only the crime […] but also the criminal as an individual to be known according to specific criteria" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 101–102). A change in tactics in the method of exercising power over the suspects appears. The accent is put much more clearly on the inquiry concerning the motives of the criminal. Individualization of the law with regard to the specific case can be observed, in which each suspect is treated separately, and a psychological approach is launched where it is important whether the crime was performed in cold blood and with wicked intention or due to affects, whether the criminal was from a higher or lower class and whether in his past he had had access to education. However, Foucault ([1975] 1991: 99) notes that this individualization of the law was coexistent with the opposite tendency of unification and codification of the law.

At the end of 18th century the emphasis was placed on discipline.

> The disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out the individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture. (Foucault [1975] 1991: 148)

Discipline created certain orders in which certain rules had to be obeyed, certain spaces that inhibited dangerous movements and encouraged more complacent behaviour. Discipline was directed at the body that was supervised, hierarchized, rewarded and punished. The exercise of the body and its habits was the method of implementing expected behaviours. Pupils in school are thus ranked (spaced) according to their behaviour, accomplishments, performances, abilities, status. Workers in a factory are distributed over the available space in such a way as to eliminate uncontrolled disappearance or unnecessary circulation. Registers appear that are designed to establish presences and absences, useful communications, supervision of conduct. A similar situation can be seen in hospitals, where "discipline organizes an analytical space" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 143). Foucault observes ([1975] 1991: 143) that in the creation of the discipline particular to each segment of social cooperation or administration of the space different arrangements of many areas take place, *e.g.* the arrangements of economic supervision are prior to and result in techniques of medical observation. The policy of coercions "that act upon the body" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 138) is designed to shape the kind of "political anatomy" or "mechanics of power" that is directed at the creation of "docile bodies." These bodies are made obedient and useful in the creation of the system of power. It was the 18th century that there appeared for the first time the formulation of the tables, in which factors that operate in many segments of society (economy, medicine, education, punishment) were ordered and spaced. Drawing tables was the task set not only for the administrative authorities but mostly for science; observing and regulating the circulation of goods and money would serve as the principle of the accumulation of wealth (an attempt which was clear in Smith's theory of wealth). The attempt to construct general tables for different branches of science is described in a detailed way in *The Order of Things,* where Foucault ([1966] 2002) analyzes step by step the development of different *episteme* in different ages. "The table" is

the principal form for organizing knowledge in the 18th century. Close relationships can be observed between the general schemata of the table implemented in the sciences and its use in the administration of power that is described in *Discipline and Punish.*

In the following epochs the process of documentation became increasingly visible and desirable. This was bound up with a new element of the disciplining power, now identifiable as the power to normalize and standardize. Individuals were set standardized norms and were constantly examined to ascertain whether they adhered to them. The execution of power was no longer directed only from without, from the external position of the judge and the judicial power. The exercise of power was implemented into the inside of society: every individual was supervised and underwent standardization according to new codes in schools, hospitals, the army and factories. Time and space were strictly rationed, the body was exercised according to internalized norms, the writing apparatus recorded every progress and set the individual within a network of hierarchies and ranks according to the individual's abilities, progress, worth. This was a symptom of the change in the shape of the penality: it ceased to be exercised from the outside, taking the form of "perpetual penality" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 183) that constantly "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 183). Comparison placed each individual in a line between good and evil, and even the smallest indulgence on the part of the pupil was recorded and calculated and the "micro-economy of a perpetual penality" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 181) situated him according to his acts on the hierarchical ladder, as the "rank in itself serves as a reward or punishment" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 181). Exerting power in this way led to the internalization of the norms that served the techniques for differentiation, and at the same time they were the principle of the objectification of the individual – he was trapped in a web of interdependencies and relations that, taken as a kind of positioning him, were regarded as a reward or punishment. Power relations were in such a way internalized and affected the individual from within.

Following the development of many different organizations of disciplinary and punitive power, Foucault presents configurations of power operating in many different spheres of societies at different historical moments. Foucault shows how the exercise of power changes its form,

how it shifts from external positions with regard to the convicted to more internalized systems, where the individual exerts the disciplining power toward him and by him, because previously internalized norms, ambitions, privileges, abilities influence his behaviour together with his convictions about conscience gratification or simply satisfaction from his own moral progress and achievements. Whenever the convicted undergoes deliberately planned treatment, whenever he is not allowed access to some goods or rewards, he feels punished, he finds himself inadequate with respect to the given norms he has internalized. In this sense the power to punish, the power of the punishment is mixed with his knowledge and sense of guilt. Discourse in this account embraces not only the theoretical assumptions of a certain area of knowledge, but also the practical consequences, which are especially clear on the example of the empirical and theoretical research in *Discipline and Punish.* Foucault ([1975] 1991: 18) tries to show that the power discourse shapes not only the particular mechanisms working in the social life, but it also influences the assumptions on which it is based. It may be said that power relations themselves change under the impact of a change in the realizations of their assumptions. The changing discourse produces changing social circumstances and a change in the functioning of certain social mechanisms and institutions, at times bringing to life totally new inventions. But there is also a very visible change in the discourse managing these institutions under the influence of the results of their working: a changed quality of social life. Thanks to the analysis made by Foucault, it can also be assumed that whenever a discourse is problematized, an element of power appears to be inherently present. The task of the analysis is to find the deployment structures of these moments of power. Knowledge about discourse can help in ordering and naming the powers that take part in the organization of certain domains of knowledge. Acquiring knowledge about discourse as a form of connection between theory, practice and power relations produces the background for more specific examinations. Knowledge about the notion of discourse helps to gradually reveal the network of dependencies in the structural or hermeneutical disclosing. At times Foucault ([1969] 2011) proposes analytical treatment, like the analysis of the notion of discourse in *The Archeology of Knowledge* that provides the background for the specific examinations of *Discipline and Punish.*

James Miller (1993: 210) in his book *The Passion of Michel Foucault* states that the real prison Foucault describes in his book titled *Discipline and Punish* is not the institution of prison that was introduced around 1840. *Discipline and Punish* is about "the 'prison' within – the kind patrolled by conscience and built out of aptitudes and inclinations" (Miller 1993: 211). It is "an allegory" about "the soul, effect and instrument of political anatomy; the soul, prison of the body" (Foucault [1975] 1977: 30–34, cited in Miller 1993: 211). *Discipline and Punish* is a historical study on different forms of disciplining the body, and methods of punishment that range from the harm done to the flesh in torture to the numbing regime in modern prisons or psychiatric hospitals. However, in analysing the idea of the power that was implemented throughout history as a form of punishing and managing the lives of madmen and criminals, Foucault aimed to grasp the truth that is hidden under the cover of many historical documents reporting on the kind of tortures, administration, institutions, forms of isolation or confinement. The problem of finding the truth on a certain subject manifests itself as the broader problem of distinguishing how categories of truth and falsehood changed and were gradually brought to the surface of discourse. As Miller writes (1993: 211): "the distinctions and categories essential to 'knowing' as such […] were themselves transient and changing products of transient and changing institutions and practices."

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault does not follow the path that most contemporary scientists would follow by thinking that the change from torture to prison marked an improvement in the form of punishment. Foucault has doubts and talks about the hidden costs of a "penal style" that would avoid visible coercion and act instead "in depth" by seeking to transform "the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations" (Miller 1993: 212). This change appears more dangerous for the being of man that previous harm done to the body.

3.5. Discourse in later writings

In an examination of how the notion of discourse is understood in Foucault's later writings the essay titled "Language to Infinity" may be useful. The opening lines surprise us with a metaphor about discourse as something that "has the power to arrest the flight of an arrow in a recess of time, in the space proper to it" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89).

"[T]he flight of an arrow" is here the expression of an action, a move-ment, a movement toward its end, its purpose, its death. Discourse can "arrest" this movement, can close it "in the space proper to it" – to freeze it in a space, to enclose it in the frame of a picture. To capture the passage of time, the transgression, the transit, transformation in space, in some kind of a form is the task of a discourse. Time settled, time sedimented, the passing grasped in a form that does not pass. Time is here visualized. Discourse is seen as the visualization of the passing of something that is only to be experienced and to pass.

Discourse is a place originating from the atopic place, from the mo-ment "between" the rational discourses, from the moment of a-topos, being outside of each place. Foucault calls it the void that is opened at the time of experiencing by the approach of death. It is the foreshad-owing of death that opens up the sphere from which a discourse can originate: "approach of death […] hollows out in the present and in existence the void toward which and from which we speak" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89). To find this place is to find the way to one's own identity, however "[n]obody can build you the bridge over which you must cross the river of life, nobody but you alone" (Nietzsche [1874] 1990: 165, cited in Miller 1993: 70) and "[t]here are countless paths and bridges and demigods that would like to carry you across the river, but only at the price of your self; you would pledge your self, and lose it. In this world there is one unique path which no one but you may walk. Where does it lead? Do not ask; take it" (Miller 1993: 70) – this is the way Foucault expresses the idea of losing oneself and winning one's self at the same time. To find somebody's own path to one's identity is to wrestle with death that opens its space in us. At times, in these moments, when its advance is particularly strong, the solution is to speak against death.

To speak against death – this is the language that in the forestructure of fiction, somehow in advance, produces something that has still not yet been appointed as the complete form of a subject's identity. How is it that the subject, against death that imminently awaits in the future, can still speak as if from the center that governs all his powers to dissolve? How is it that after the announcement of the death of God, the death of the sub-ject, and the death of the author, that all are synonyms of the complete dissolution of the powers able to save the wholeness called "man," how is it that after all these events, there is still the possibility to speak from

the depths of subject's identity? Foucault writes ([1994] 2000i: 89–90) that "[a]gainst this speech which announces his death [...] Ulysses must sing the song of his identity."

At the beginning of the text titled "Language to Infinity" Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 89) describes the hypothetical (yet literary) situation of Ulysses, who after returning back home from his long journey hears a very old song about his own history. This strikes him as if he were "listening to his own death: he covers his face and cries" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90). Here an identity is presented that has to be created in the process of singing, in the process of communication. Foucault seems here to write about the origins of subject's power to consolidate something that in the 19th century was just described as a *subject*. The song of creation could be understood here as the kind of protolanguage that still has yet to come and support the human struggle to save their identity.

According to Foucault's assumptions based on the criticism of humanism (which attitude is called at times antihumanism), the unity of a subject is only the function of the totalizing, centering powers of rational thinking that from the times of Plato tended to the unification of the dispersed and differentiated wielding powers in society and human beings, under the guise of dialectics that unified contradictions, that was able to create out of oppositions, the one, coherent, dialectically upheld, view of reality, a reality that in fact consisted of fragments, figures that were alien to it, particularities and accidental events, that could in no way be united in one system that annihilated the oppositions.

Foucault assumes ([1994] 2000i: 89–91) that discourse is a song of human identity against the imminence of death. Discourse is the form in which human identity can express itself and recursively build itself through this expression, because it is not that discourse only expresses subject's identity, rather the other way round: it is the discourse that calls subject's identity into being. Hence, it can be repeated after Jean-Francois Lyotard ([1979] 1986: 39) that it is the power of the subject's little narration about itself that consolidates the self; moreover, this narration is the origin of the subject's conviction that he possesses himself, that there exists an outright center of his consolidating powers that governs his thinking and controls his finiteness. Discourse as a kind of story, fiction, narration, is the instrument for the creation of subjects' selves – it keeps them together, it helps not to dissipate the self into the fragments

governed rather by the Derridian *Differance* than by the Deleuzian *The Same* (Deleuze [1968] 2010: 22–27). Discourse, according to Foucault's "Language to Infinity," is the principle of the existence and development of the subject. In this sense, the statement can be ventured that achieving and building discourse is equivalent to acquiring the kind of proto-language that is indispensable for the preservation of the self, of the identity. "Boundless misfortune […] marks the point where language begins; but the limit of death opens before language, or rather within language, an infinite space" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90). Foucault seems to say that subject's "song of identity" should start from this "infinite space," from this moment of *atopia*, the "place" that is between discourses, but, nevertheless, helps discourse to appear. This "infinite space" is the resourcefulness of language itself.

Undoubtedly, death is "the most own of our possibilities" – as Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 357, trans. – P. K.-C.) formulated it, and in agreement with this, Foucault states that "before the imminence of death, language rushes forth" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90). However, it also happens here that the power of language, of discourse is stronger than the power of human understandings. After all, it may be as Mallarmé says: it is language alone that is speaking. The consolidating powers of language that inform the shape of human identity are overwhelming and embrace the whole incompleteness and accidentallity of a human's fragments in a coherent and stable form. Thus the subject's finiteness and incompleteness is objectified by the virtue of the fundamentality of language. Pieniążek (2007–2013: 7) adds here remarks about this fundamentality: it can be said so about language, about words, because they suggest certain interpretation, because they are overwhelming, because there is nothing behind these interpretations. Interpretation is here infinite, because it is totally unfinished and never-ending – it is not possible to refer to the basis, to the historical origin of some of it: "There are no facts – only interpretations" – as Nietzsche has said ([1967] 1994, cited in Pieniążek 2007–2013: 7, trans. – P. K.-C.). Discourse helps in the constant creation of the identity to be performed only on this condition of the "being-unfinished" quality of the interpretation: "Headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it encounters something like a mirror" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90). Death as the "ultimate possibility" (Kalaga 1997: 32), is the final condition for the whole process of

the construction of the discourse about yourself. Discourse for Foucault is not only the governing of the area of power and knowledge, concerning some historical period, especially when the analysis of social inventions like prisons, hospitals, schools or churches is undertaken. Discourse is also the totality directed to governing the appearance of the self, its constant striving to preserve it against death. Language can be seen here as a tool for bringing out the identity, the never-ending resourcefulness of its performance and creation.

However, discourse is something other than language. It is the coherent whole that contains all the rules required for its progression, all the mechanisms that are put into practice to fulfill its theoretical obligations. Discourse is everything that is produced by the subject to guarantee his character, to retain his form. "Perhaps there exists in speech an essential affinity between death, endless striving, and the self-representation of language" – comments Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 90). A few lines further he writes an answer: "From the day that men began to speak toward death and against it, in order to grasp and imprison it, something was born […]" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 91). Foucault's thesis is that it was an identity that was born out of implementing the discourse into the instability and flux of everyday experience.

The language that is used in a discourse works as if it was based on the rule of resembling itself infinitely in the *mirror*. This is very well shown on the example of Sade's works, where language encounters its own impossibility, its own impotence. The explanation presents the language that reveals its "absolute power" and in this movement it creates terror, "but this is the moment in which language inevitably becomes impotent, when its breath is cut short, when it should still itself without even saying that it stops speaking. Language must push back to infinity this limit it bears with itself, which indicates, at once, its kingdom and its limit" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 98). The language of terror is the infinity of excess, but it is also the moment when it stops talking, when it finds itself mute, expressionless. It stops itself on the border of the possibility of its infinite multiplication, it finds in itself a dearth, a lack, a void, which all are built on the virtue of the rule of a mirror, while the effect of the mirrored resemblance of its shapes consists of repetitions and so on. It is the void, the absence, because everything that is reflected is also only a reflection. Language that is an infinite repetition like the sign of life is also absence,

a void constituted only by the movements of repetitions – there is noth-
ing behind this structure, the subject always touches only the surface.
Excess and lack are the limits of language – it can be asked whether these
limits indicate the influence of death. It is – writes Foucault ([1994]
2000i: 99) that this "actual infinity of illusion […] forms […] the thick-
ness of a work – the absence in the interior from which the work para-
doxically erects itself." If the result of an appearance of a new discourse
is the appearance of its new subject – like the appearance of a madman
is the result of the appearance of a discourse on madness – how is it
that such a discourse appears? Thus the reason for its appearance be-
comes problematic. Even the most advanced of the works of Foucault
on discourse and methodology, *The Archeology of Knowledge* does not
give an outright answer to a question formulated in this way. As a conse-
quence of the reading of the essay "Language to Infinity" the conclusion
appears that the origin of the appearance of a certain discourse is the mo-
ment when language encounters its limits, when it finds it impossible
to talk about the problem further. Then, a whole series of new stories
appears, new explanations arise, language loses its power to describe, to
analyze the already existing problem, it finds itself impotent with regard
to the given subject, hence it creates new areas of inquiry, erects "ma-
chines" or institutions charged with managing the new areas of inquiry
for the new answers. Foucault notes here that in this way language pushes
its limits back to infinity ([1994] 2000i: 98) and the result is that the se-
ries of new stories, new problems posed in a different way – new myths
appear to obscure these limits of language. The area of social interactions
and institutions arises because language cannot manage the problem on
the level of its analytical tools alone. It cannot provide explanations by
virtue of analysis only, it then starts to create new myths: pictures that
are still further from rather than nearer to the solution to the previously
identified problem. Language builds new stories, new symbols of its im-
potence: "Language must push back to infinity this limit […] Thus, in
each novel, an exponential series of endless episodes; and then, beyond
this, an endless series of novels" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 98). Foucault
tries to exemplify the infiniteness of the struggle to solve the problem,
a struggle that manifests itself each time it undertakes a new attempt
to solve the task. It manifests itself through the continuous creation of
a new myth, a new structure that is only the embellishment of an empty

struggle. Myths are continuously created as the outcome of the activity of the force that is convinced about its possibility of finding a solution. The appearance of new stories, instead of old explanations, is the moment for the appearance of a new discourse. Language pushed to its limits, language that cannot find the means for the exposition of its reasons, its uses, its proceedings resorts to the creation of a new riddle. Society then answers by supplying all the necessary methods and instruments to cover the necessities of a new theory: a madman appears as the subject possible for satisfying the needs of a theory about madness.

Of course, Foucault observes ([1994] 2000i: 99) that everything has been said in the "library of the Babel," but, nevertheless, "standing above all these words is the rigorous and sovereign language that recovers them, tells their story, and is actually responsible for their birth". Discourse is such a story: born on the ruins of all possible explanations, regained and recovered in a new form that involves the limits of language in a given subject. Discourse for Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 100) is characterized hence by the one indispensable feature: it is deployed against death, it increases the distance between itself and death, by constantly proliferating its figures. The language about which Foucault writes and which is a component of a discourse, its proliferation being the condition for the appearance of the discourse, "postpones death indefinitely by ceaselessly opening a space where it is always the analogue of itself" ([1994] 2000i: 100). Three such conditions should be remembered which make language's progress and passage a constant simulacrum with its own rules of proliferation: a death, a mirror and a double. Discourse appears when these rules are obeyed and in this way the void opens, giving birth to it.

3.6. Discourse in "The Thought of the Outside"

The later writings of Michel Foucault are a rich source of information on discourse. Although they do not possess the quality of the methodological definitions from *The Archeology of Knowledge*, the insights they propose may help in the overall understanding of the Foucaultian term of discourse. The essay "The Thought of the Outside" is an exemplary text from this later period of Foucault's work. The thought of the outside – as Foucault called it ([1994] 2000n: 147) – became a challenge for many authors, who tried to reconcile their own assumptions with Foucault's achievements in this regard.

Discourse is the main topic in the Foucaultian essay titled "The Thought of the Outside." It is understood here not as a complementary event to the phenomena called Being and Speech, but it has to be found in the quest for the "Thought of the Outside." Discourse is established here as a thought that was able to free itself from dependency on the subject. Discourse – notes Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 150) – has always been polluted with the narrations that tried to find the interiority of the self reflected in the relations with the outside. Foucault in the essay on the "Thought of the Outside" tries to turn our attention to another phenomenon that has been becoming more and more visible in the 20th century. This is the phenomenon of the pure Outside that can be grasped even in the elements that are most interiorized and always presented from the perspective of finding the stable self. Foucault's attempt is to introduce the thought of the outside into the inside of the self and to allow it to disintegrate the self from within. What is achieved here is a subject not centered on itself, but whose direction is inverted. Now, it is the dissipating, independent power of language that speaks through the subject. The subject becomes here the medium of language, an instrument not only of an expression of its consolidating powers, nor an expression of the univocality of its message, but an instrument of the expression of the working powers of language. Hence, it can be said that the linguistic turn appears for the second time, now in its climax: it is not only that language ceases to be the instrument of the expression of human desires, it even stops being the existential that determines the ontological quality of human beings. Now the implications of the intrusion of language are much stronger: now it is the subject that is the instrument for the expression of the everlasting powers of language, the subject as the only medium through which something much stronger is manifested, the Discourse that organizes itself through the subject, thanks to which the subject can grasp itself but only as a form of deficiency, a lack infinitely repeating the great figures of language, language whose power of infinity uses subjects as mirrors, as the resource of repetition, as the principle of the double.

Discourse is hence for Foucault the space where the subject can finally discover itself, but this subject finds itself there infinitely strengthened through repetition, doubled and mirrored – thanks to the possibilities of our condition of finity, which reduces, doubles, resembles, produces only

new explications of the old myths. In the discourse the subject is also speaking itself into the outside, in the direction of the outside. Hence, according to the previous essay "Language to Infinity," it can grasp itself in the activity of prolonging distance to and indirectly deferring death. Discourse for Foucault does not only supply theories for sustaining the prevailing discourse of society, but also provides a tool for sustaining human beings, even if the power of the Outside that talks through subjects is at times incomprehensible and the language the subject produces as its outcome is not enough for infinity to be grasped. Human Language thus remains mute, astonished and terrorized – as the works by Marquis de Sade ([1782] 1927), Antonin Artaud ([1938] 1958), Friedrich Hölderlin (1913–1923, 1943) and Friedrich Nietzsche ([1883] 2005) show. They are the best examples of the power of language which is limited and determined, yet where its limits are also the best signs of its infinity, of its potential. In this sense discourse is not only a theoretical device, but the method of sustaining our beings in their progression toward death. It is an individual story, which Foucault claimed throughout his whole life, an individual explanation of his existence. It is the support, the background for the ability to perform everyday activities. Discourse – as it appears on the pages of *Essential Works* ([1994] 2000a, 2000d) – is the source of every individual's opening, responsible for the quality of participation in everyday life. All subjects are Daseins, beings thrown into the world – this situation needs support, and Foucault presents the rules of its working in the essays on language. The creation of individual discourse is such a support in the struggle to exist as an identity.

The main thesis concerning the discourse derived from the essay the "Thought of the Outside" is that discourse should not be reduced to the dimension of interiority. The dimension of the Outside is something opposed to the dimension of interiority, on which a great deal of the western tradition of philosophy is based. To manage to find appropriate language freed of commitments toward consciousness the subject has to enter the "void" that is created by self-reflecting, by finding its limits, by language – the void that is extensively examined in the essay "Language to Infinity." In the essay "The Thought of the Outside" discourse is based on two elements: reflexive patience "always directed outside itself" and a fiction that "undoes its forms" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153). It is discourse "with no conclusions and no image, with no

truth and no theater, with no proof, no mask, no affirmation, free of any center, unfettered to any soil; a discourse that constitutes its own space as the outside toward which, and outside of which, it speaks" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 153). Foucault writes ([1994] 2000n: 154) that when "discourse ceases to follow the slope of self-interiorizing thought" it then "returns thought to the outside" and only then it "becomes a meticulous narration of experiences, encounters, and improbable signs." In this way a picture of a discourse is achieved that concerns what happens between conscious reflection, between linguistically fixed events. Here discourse is about the un-space, a-topos, something that lies "between." It sustains "a discourse on the nondiscourse of all languages; the fiction of the invisible space in which it appears" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 154). Discourse concerns the moments where everything begins – it is the newness, the opening, based on forgetting rather than reflection, hence it cannot also be a positivity, a presence, it is rather the "beyond" of the presence, its "between."

After reading the chapter "The companion" in "The Thought of the Outside" the reader may be convinced against the conception of a discourse as something that helps to build an identity of a person. Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 163) underlines the importance of the seducing voice of the sirens, the voice of the attraction that appears in the interiority and which thus expropriates it from itself from within.

The voice of attraction is the calling of the voice of the Other, of the Outside hidden inside humans' interiority. This outside that inserts itself into humans' selves

> empties the place into which interiority customarily retreats and deprives it of the possibility of retreat: a form arises – less than a form, a kind of stubborn, amorphous anonymity – that divests it of its unmediated right to say I, and pits against its discourse a speech that is indissociably echo and denial. (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 163)

Hence, the discourse of identity, of self must from this moment take into account the power of attraction that is exerted upon it and opens inside it the space into which the outside with all its elements enters. From this moment the absence inside the subject has to be accepted, the absence which will never allow him to stay quiet and safe. The power of expropriation of the subjects' selves from their being is the element by virtue of which their ability to form discourse arises. It is just this

seducing voice of the Outside that opens the space in humans, not fa-
miliar enough to reconcile with it, where the conflicting discourses
are in a constant state of fight. This is the origin of the power that sup-
ports human's everyday conduct. Discourse as something alienating and
disquieting appears as the rule of progress.

3.7. Desert, labyrinth and the crossing of the limits

Foucault's writings are rich not only in methodological notions like
discursive formations or discursive practices. His later writings, which
include the essays from aesthetics and ethics, are rich with terms that
are appropriate to the different purpose expressed in these writings.
It is no longer the formulation of a definition of a discourse, but rather
an attempt to express the difficult, human struggle with death that very
often transforms itself into a desire to write. The metaphors of desert,
labyrinth and crossing of the limits are the primary examples of how to
cope with the problems of finding answers to the most urgent questions
of human identity.

Discourse in the later writings is at times understood as the "desert,"
an empty place within human beings from which "a language without
an assignable subject" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 163) can appear. Discourse
understood as coming from the "desert" is conflicted with a discourse
whose origin is the speaking subject in this being. The first discourse
comes from the dark, unexplored place, the second one is strictly of
a discursive character. This first, conflicted discourse in subjects is not
another "speaking subject." It is the power of a language at its limits, it
is "the impossibility" that should be crossed over and an un-place in
which language disappears. This "companion," as Foucault notes ([1994]
2000n: 165), "has no name," is faceless, but is constantly reappearing in
the form of questioning, it is "the discourse manifesting the impossibility
of responding". To lose oneself in order to find oneself is hence to find
oneself constantly questioned without ever the possibility of receiving
an answer and to find oneself related toward the voice of attraction which
can never be satisfied either. The only advantage of this being related to
this power is that the conflicted self must constantly build a discourse,
must "speak so as not to die" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89). The discourse
is the condition and the result of the Outside entering the interior of
an identity. However, it should be remembered – admonishes Foucault

([1994] 2000n: 166) – that the experience of the outside is not directed at the regaining of an identity. It is rather indirectly directed at the production of discourse – it is language that gains, and language that speaks: "any subject it may have is no more than a grammatical fold" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 166). Language as the stream of speaking laid bare and "the visible effacement of the one who speaks" (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 166). Discourse – it can be concluded in consequence – should have to share these qualities, and after all, it is discourse that counts for Foucault. A given identity seems to be a place where the lines of different influences and micro-discourses intersect and intertwine, the place of a manifestation of language, of discourse that dominates in a given period of time.

Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 166) at times writes contradictory statements, *e.g.* when he states that: "we are quite far from the experience through which some are wont to lose themselves in order to find themselves," because in other places he presents the conviction that the subject can find itself through losing itself first (Miller 1993: 144). However this second utterance should be read through the lens of the Nietzschean philosophy, where the interiority that is to be won is not the classical interiority deeply hidden in humans. The interiority by Nietzsche ([1881] 1911: 230, cited in Foucault [1994] 2000k: 273) is something that is rather exterior than interior, it is a fold of an exteriority, a surface of words that project the subject's very being. Hence an important role in understanding and finding identity plays the thought of the outside that was, according to Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 150), first exposed in the writings by Marquis de Sade. Before this exposition the place where human beings tried to organize themselves in the interiority of a thought was discourse (Foucault [1994] 2000n: 150). According to Foucault ([1994] 2000n: 150), it was de Sade who discovered the thought of the outside, without the subject, without the interiority. He does not look for the discourse that would be a justification of an identity. If he is looking for something then it is the quest for a discourse that is self-justifying speech of the language alone. It is a language that expresses itself alone, that is not in the service of an identity. Here Foucault is of the same opinion as de Sade, in opposition to the view that discourse is something necessary for the creation of our identity.

However, the answer to at times equivocal expressions about the task of finding oneself or, just the opposite, of forgetting about oneself, could

be – as Miller proposes (1993: 147) – the Foucaultian figure: the labyrinth. The labyrinth – is "a structure in which to hide, a line of defense" but also "a space of daimonic revelation, a place where a person might come to 'think differently,' it facilitated, as a literary device, self-effacement and self-expression simultaneously" (Miller 1993: 147). It is very important that the labyrinth exemplifies two forces not only present in all humans, but seemingly present in Foucault's writing his quest for truth and in his approach to discourse against death. To conceal and to reveal oneself at the same time, in the same figure of the labyrinth is probably the element of the game directed against the power of death, and – which means the same – the source of the infinity of language inside human beings, the source of the thought of the Outside that from subject rushes toward the outside in the form of a discourse.

Another important notion for understanding Foucault's thought is *fiction*. Foucault imports fiction into a discourse otherwise based on solid, documented, referenced facts. It is the kind of element of transcendence that is put in motion in his scientific research. He explains it by saying that "the possibility exists for fiction to work within truth, for a fictive discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 'fabricates' something that does not yet exists, that is, 'fictions' it" (Miller 1993: 211). This passage from Foucault's work indicates the way Foucault treated the notion of discourse. In his view scientific, classical ways of approach are fused with assumptions with regard to discourse that result from his specific approach in other areas of his inquiry. It can be noticed that his position with regard to discourse is informed by his convictions concerning the power of the nondiscursive area of human experience, concerning the importance of the area of "the unthought" and the limit-experiences that release and open in a human being the spheres otherwise trained by institutions, conventions and rules that have left human beings docile and numb, as the automaton designed only to fulfill these prescriptions. The philosophy of Foucault underlines the moment of freedom in humans, but not freedom taken in the Sartrean sense as a kind of terror inflicted on them. This is a freedom that is connected with the moment of transcendence included in the Nietzschean philosophy of Overman. Foucault, impressed by the writings of Nietzsche, believed in moments in human life that could awaken humans and surprise them by their own possibilities.

It was the result of going beyond the moral divisions into good and evil that were described in Nietzsche's writings ([1886] 1997: 1–17). Foucault's political activities in the 70s, especially when he started to lead the Prison Information Group also resulted from this view and converged with his presumptions on the importance of pursuit in life, of description and qualification, of moments that make it possible to go beyond the dualistic distinctions in ethical philosophy. His famous depreciation of the notion of humanism originated precisely from these presumptions: that it is not enough and not as easy to divide humans into two categories: good and bad, and to condemn those who are on one side, and to praise those who are on the other. In the words of his close friend Maurice Blanchot, he asserts that there is really a short distance from pain, hatred and aggression to love, pleasure and joy. The elements of pleasure and pain, love and hatred are very closely related and intermingled. It is rather that no pure love and no pure hatred exist independent of themselves, but that the first does not exist without the other. In fact, the existence of the second is the condition for the first. This is the reason why distinctions like "good" and "bad" rather destroy our ability to judge reality according to its complex and subtle qualities – all that results from them is that the subject finds itself impotent to qualify properly, it becomes lazy, numbed by the simplicity of the distinction and as a result, it gives priority to reduction over justice. That is why Foucault (1977: 223, 227, 233, cited in Miller 1993: 200) after Nietzsche speaks about the necessity of going beyond the reductive "ideology of good and evil." Foucault frequently explains (1977: 221, cited in Miller 1993: 199) that the crux of the problem for the ethical position was humanism: "Humanism is everything in Western Civilization that restricts the desire for power." This sentence should be explained with the help of Nietzsche's theory of the Overman.

Krzysztof Michalski rightly observes what Nietzsche's often misunderstood passages about Overman really mean. In *Płomień wieczności* ("The Flame of Eternity") he (Michalski 2007: 235) writes about the moment of fusion of joy and pain. These moments of "mixed sweetness and bitterness":

> give to human beings a happiness not known to him up till now, not the happiness of undisturbed peace toward which the last man is directed, but the happiness which is not the result of the fulfillment of dreams or expectations, won games, satisfied desires, it is the happiness

that has its origin in the fact that the life I live is not only mine that it is also something more, that it shines with something that is not only human. (Michalski 2007: 235, trans. – P. K.-C.)

Here it can be conspicuously observed how the moment of transcendence becomes – through Nietzsche – the moment of Foucault's philosophy. Human life cannot be judged according to simple categories of good and evil because it is not only these categories that qualify it. Human life is much more complicated and complex, and it is always something more than only "human." This is the very meaning of this "over" in the notion of the "Overman." Human life is a quest for something sacred, not in the sense of religion, but in the sense that it transcends all limits. The Overman in Nietzsche's writings is the man that comes after the last man, who is the symbol of defeat. The Overman – is "the interior tension in human life, the tension between that which exists, and that which is dark, unknown, strange, new: that which transcends life. The life that defeats itself, the life that blows itself from inside" (Michalski 2007: 234, trans. – P. K.-C.). "Every moment of life […] joins indissolubly the bitterness with the sweetness" – writes Nietzsche ([1873] 1962, cited in Michalski 2007: 235, trans. – P. K.-C.).

The Freedom that can be observed in the writings of Foucault is not the Sartrean freedom but that of Nietzsche. A freedom that is the moment of the over-coming of the Overman: "The constant strive of going beyond what is given, of going toward the unknown […] creates also the distance to what exists, it gives freedom from all situations" (Michalski 2007: 234–235, trans. – P. K.-C.). It produces bitterness in the aftermath of leaving, what was until the present moment mine, but at the same time it produces "the joy of liberation, the sweetness of freedom" (Michalski 2007: 235, trans. – P. K.-C.). This is the freedom Foucault talks about, the moment of transcendence that is included in the limit-experience. Also the moment of writing, the moment of fiction in the work does not follow the rational path: "The work wells up from the unthought and the unthinkable" (Miller 1993: 162). Foucault himself writes about this moment of the unthinkable, of this still unknown area of experience that is the very source of his discourse. His thoughts on the "blank space" from which he tries to speak have already been mentioned, a "blank space" that is "slowly taking shape in a discourse" which is still "so precarious and so unsure" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 18–19). Hence, the discourse is

something that interweaves two elements: the rational, methodological, documented thread of the factographical truth, and the other moment that develops from the dark, unknown area in the human being, the only area that is responsible for the tragic truth about the human beings, the truth that originates in that which transcends humanity and that encounters death and limit. This second source of discourse gives it the real universal value, not amounting to something good or bad but rather to the continuous struggle to make oneself free to become what one really is, to cross one's limitations. It becomes apparent in this moment of his philosophy that Foucault wants to offer people the possibility of being what they want to be and at the same time seeing in this desire the belief in human value – that they are not going to be worse than they are but just the contrary, that they will be concerned with achieving their own value. However, this last conclusion may be a little deceptive extrapolation, because Foucault talks about becoming what you really are, but he never talks about progress. Hence, by saying that people will become "better" it should be understood that they will realize their real value, their "potential" and that they acquire the ability to illuminate "a shadowy domain that deprives us of our continuities […] dissipates the temporal identity […] dissolving consciousness" (Miller 1993: 160). Thus Miller highlights the problem of dissolution of identity that is present in Foucault's analysis.

All these moments present in Foucault's philosophy have an impact on his idea of discourse. A "true discourse" should connect the fictive and scientific elements (Miller 1993: 211) and only in this way can it pay attention to both, equally important human spheres: the rational and the irrational, the one that helps human being in functioning in a society and history, the other reminding him of his higher obligations toward himself and others as an ideality that transcends all limits.

4. Summary of the thought of Michel Foucault

The knowledge on discourse presented in the later writings of Foucault is different in character from supported by his more methodological writings. However, both these sources enlarge the amount of knowledge on discourse considerably. It is worth summing up all of these insights and examinations in one conclusive chapter on Foucault.

The summary must include the information about discourse presented in two main essays: "Language to Infinity" and "The Thought of the Outside." In the essay "Language to Infinity" language is presented as something mirroring itself, as something that opens "the space in which writing could flow and establish itself" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90). One of the most "decisive ontological event[s] of language" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 90) is that it constructs a special space, "a virtual space where speech discovers the endless resourcefulness of its own image and where it can represent itself as already existing behind itself" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 91). This space can be called the space for the development of an identity. Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 91) writes here about the space representing something that grows out of it and about this event that is in and through that space represented, which exists "behind" it and is formed out of it. The space created out of the strivings against the imminence of death.

In the essay "The Thought of the Outside" Foucault seems to take quite a different position, a position which contradicts the tendencies to interiorization, attempts of the self in the dimensions of interiority, where the self is seen as the form of the center, as the stable idea on which all other enterprises are based. The essay titled "Language to Infinity" seems to support such an idea. The essay "The Thought of the Outside," on the other hand, tries to reveal the other dimension of thinking, nevertheless, this "other" thinking also has its own subject, that is its discourse: in the form of the thought of the Outside.

Taking into account the notion of discourse, it should be remembered that both these texts by Foucault present two distinct perceptions on the topic of discourse: the first perception is of a discourse designed by an identity to support its powers, to contradict the powers of death, the second perception is of a discourse that is created through an identity to support it but with the help of some greater powers – the powers of language itself. In the first case, the discourse is a meticulously, conscientiously designed narration through which the idea of a total self is established and elaborated. In the second case an identity is the total sum of the interference of the more powerful element, the device of language. It is the result of linguistic operations that are performed on the sole condition of its own rules. It is the language that talks through an identity as a driving force for the building of a story.

The key element that appears in Foucault's later writings is the *mirror*. A *mirror* plays an important role also in the essay "Different Spaces." It is viewed here as the source of certain heterotopias. According to Foucault ([1994] 2000g: 179), it can be understood also as the source of heterotopia called identity. A mirror is seen here as a kind of lens that enables subjects to be perceived as concrete beings identical with themselves; an identity that is created thanks to "that gaze which settles on me": "[f]rom that gaze which settles on me […] I come back to myself and I begin once more to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself in the glass" (Foucault [1994] 2000g: 179). These words are crucial with regard to the problem of identity: looking at itself reflected in the mirror creates a situation in which it becomes possible to identify itself, *i.e.* to re-construct itself thanks to the space of reflected visibility. A mirror – that could also be understood as the symbol of the power of self-revealing concealed in the performance of language – such a mirror, such a language "gives me my own visibility that enables me to look at myself there where I am absent" (Foucault [1994] 2000g: 179). I am absent in the context of death, not only my future, imminent death, but also in the situation of the death of God, of the death of man, of the death of author, and in the context of the "death" of the other universal values. I am absent also in my progression toward death, in the sense of my own "dying" as the place of my "disappearance," of my progressing absence. In this situation "writing so as not to die" and "speaking so as not to die" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89) and in this way building one's own discourse supporting the reality of who I am in the situation of the absence of many previously helpful realities is undoubtedly the only solution to save and to develop one's own identity.

In another essay titled "So Cruel a Knowledge" Foucault also writes about the figure of a mirror. The subject of a discourse is also the creation of an identity thanks to the gaze finding its way into the mirror: "In looking, the one does not know that, at bottom, he is seeing himself; the other, not knowing he is being looked at, is vaguely aware of being seen" ([1994] 2000m: 61). Thus the observed gains consciousness by seeing himself in the mirror – himself not knowing of his being observed. His identity being grasped and established in his true reflected self, not concealed by the conscious presentation – it is rather that not the presentation of his body is grasped but the self-presentation of a language

that speaks through him is evoked; the more it is re-presented, the more the language speaks unconsciously. The mirror is the frame, the *parergon* that encloses the impersonal, overwhelming power of language expressed through the gazing eye – reconstituting the scene of the vision, the range of elements enclosed in one view. Mirror is the symbol of the unifying powers of a gaze, the perception enclosed, captured in a frame, giving completeness to the fragmented reality of the human subject. What is mirrored is already a complete whole, an identity, with certain, readable, identifiable borders, encapsulated within limits – totalized, united whole: an identity. However, since the gaze in a mirror is multiplied, it refers to the infinity of the reflection.

The idea of a mirror serves in Foucault writings as a metaphor to designate the unifying powers that are in the possession of the self. It is one more example of the idea that Foucault, in many of his writings, examines the subject: how it is constituted, how it is objectified, what the process of its creation is. The coming back to the totalizing idea of a subject is especially vivid in his later works: his short essays and the writings on the sexuality of the subject. There, the idea of the identity as the center of many activated powers, is necessary.

To understand Foucault's idea of discourse it may be useful to explain how he treats the margins of an accepted discourse. This problem appears in his polemics with Jacques Derrida concerning the Cartesian treatment of the problem of madness. Derrida's arguments are presented in the essay "Cogito and the History of Madness" ([1967] 2009: 36–76). Foucault responds to Derrida's arguments in the essay "My Body, This Paper, This Fire" ([1994] 2000j). Derrida's charges amount to stating that Foucault did not understand the argumentation of Descartes ([1641, 1647] 1998: 18), who states that only the intellectual powers of the human mind, the reasoning, can create the foundations of human knowledge. Sensory data cannot be the basis for this knowledge because they can deceive. The foundations of knowledge must be of intellectual, not of sensory origin; this is expressed in Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am" (Descartes [1641, 1647] 1998: 18). Hence, the real problem that is put forward here is what kind of experience can constitute the foundations of human knowledge. The situation of a madman is exemplary here. Descartes ([1641, 1647] 1998: 62) presents a madman as a person who is deceived by the demon with regard to sensory data. This results in a view

that our knowledge must be based only on the intellectual abilities of our mind. Derrida ([1967] 2009: 36–76) charges Foucault with not understanding Descartes' argumentation stating that "the example of madness is not […] indicative of the fragility of the sensory idea" (Foucault [1994] 2000j: 393). For Descartes, it is sleep and dream that are indicative of the fragility of the sensory idea and it is dreaming that elucidates that sensory data cannot be the source of certainty of knowledge. Derrida argues ([1967] 2009: 61–63) that Descartes does not find the source of the weakness of the argument about the sensory origin of knowledge in the situation of a madman. The existence of madness is not an argument for the weakness of this theory. There is another sphere of "experience" that really proves such an impossibility. It is the presence of sleep and dream. Hence, the existence of madness is not a satisfying argument in abolishing the theory about the sensory origins of knowledge. Descartes sees clearly a more convincing argument that comes from a much closer area of life; it is sleep and dream that could support his theory. This is also the argument Derrida puts forward. He notes (Derrida [1967] 2009: 62) that "[i]t is in the case of sleep, and not in that of extravagance, that the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes suspect, is stripped of 'objective value.'" The other quotation states: "[T]he sleeper, or the dreamer, is madder than the madman" (Derrida [1967] 2009: 61). Here, it can be observed that it is not the existence of madness, but the existence of sleep and dream that provides support for his theory about the grounding of human knowledge only on intellectual presuppositions. Sensory data, thanks to the example of dream and sleep, are disqualified. Foucault ([1994] 2000j: 395) is conscious of the stakes in this debate. That is why he tries to endorse the possibility of the existence of something that is not included in the dominating discourse. He asks: "Could there be anything anterior or exterior to philosophical discourse? Can this condition reside in an exclusion, a refusal, a risk avoided, and, why not, a fear?" (Foucault [1994] 2000j: 395). Foucault sees the possibility of locating the origins of philosophical discourse in spheres alien to it, in areas that lie outside the scientific discourse like exclusion, refusal, risk and fear. Foucault ([1994] 2000j: 395) sees here clearly the possibility of the existence of quite different areas, areas situated beyond the dominating discourse. They can be called the discourses of the margins; however, what is problematic is whether they can be

called discourses at all. Derrida cannot agree that the origins of discourse can be different from those lying within a dominating discourse. Derrida ([1967] 1997: 158) strongly opposes this solution. In his writing every sign is included in the prevailing discourse, "there is nothing outside of the text" – he writes (Derrida [1967] 1997: 158). Foucault's idea of a discourse is presented from a different point of view. Here, a discourse is not something that is total, it does not encompass a whole life, it is rather made or developed from the different spheres of life that have their own dimensions, means of expression, rules of extinguishing or amplifying. Foucault tries to propose the possibility of a discourse originating from different grounds than the scientific, philosophical discourse. It could be said that he tries to show that it could originate from an anti-discourse, which is exemplified by the figure of the madman. Foucault endorses that the case of madness proves the impossibility of grounding knowledge only on intellectual presuppositions. Origins of knowledge other that the rational also exist.

That Foucault looks for support for the identity and subject is also demonstrated on the example of the essay "My Body, This Paper, This Fire," where he (Foucault [1994] 2000j: 407) tests the foundations on which the subject is grounded by presenting the process of doubting and where by distinguishing different ways of doubting, he introduces a more fundamental doubt; the doubt concerning the subject as based on the only possible solid basis: rationality. Foucault asks ([1994] 2000j: 407): "If I am to resolve myself to doubt everything thoroughly, must I first disqualify myself as rational? If I want to maintain my qualification as rational, must I give up carrying up this doubt." The whole analysis of the possibility of totally doubting the system of one's own actuality is the indicator that Foucault does not ignore the position of inquiring into what an identity is. I find that the whole essay "My Body, This Paper, This Fire" is an example of such an analysis. The charges that Foucault makes against Derrida state that Derrida "is the most decisive modern representative" of "the reduction of discursive practices to textual traces" (Foucault [1994] 2000j: 416). His texts presented in the work *Of Grammatology* provide support for this thesis.

That Foucault was looking for the determining the shapes of the subject throughout his life is also shown in the text written almost entirely by Foucault about his own philosophy, a text that was an entry for

the *Dictionnaire des philosophes* (Foucault [1994] 2000h: 459). Foucault writes here about his ongoing struggles to define the subject:

> The problem is to determine what the subject must be, to what condition he is subject, what status he must have, what position he must occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become a legitimate subject of this or that type of knowledge [*connaisance*]. In short, it is a matter of determining its mode of 'subjectivation […].' ([1994] 2000h: 459)

A little further on the same essay Foucault also writes about the moment of "objectivation," which is "a question of determining under what conditions something can become an object for a possible knowledge […] how it may have been problematized as an object to be known" ([1994] 2000h: 460). Both these moments are part of the process of determining the discourses that can be said about certain things in a certain domain of knowledge. Hence the question of the subject, of its possibilities of becoming a subject for himself and what appeared only then possible – to become the object of knowledge, are crucial for the determination of the role and understanding that Foucault had for the problem of discourse.

The notion of discourse is hence, for Foucault ([1994] 2000h: 461) inseparably connected with the problem of a subject. The modes of subjectivation and objectivation of the subject are important elements for his understanding of a discourse. The problem lies in an area dedicated to the history of thought, which was the area of inquiry for Foucault. Foucault states ([1994] 2000h: 460) that what is important in defining a certain discourse that prevails in a given period of history are veridictions that verify the conditions under which a certain discourse is valid (is true or false). Veridictions deal with given domains of things. Here it is visible how Foucault's abstract, methodological considerations about the *episteme* that are the pattern for the performance of a knowledge in a given time and which contain the leading theory and rules appropriate for it, are connected with his precise, systematic and conscientious analysis of discursive formations like practices in the area of psychiatry, clinical medicine, penality, education system, army. Foucault (in *Madness and Civilization*, *The Birth of a Clinic*) examines the possibilities and conditions of existence of these formations and the quality of the discourse he endorses in these empirical studies is the outcome of these analytical procedures. Hence it can be said, that for him, the notion of a discourse is grounded in the study of the subject that undergoes

changes in the process of changing the given discourses. A subject that is the result and the cause of a discourse is also the function whose elucidation helps to understand the notion of discourse as it was held by Foucault. Procedures that are instilled to observe a subject, to analyze it, to interpret it, to recognize it "as a domain of possible knowledge" (Foucault [1994] 2000h: 461) are the elements of the content of the discourse on the understanding of the subject. These methods of its understanding create the patterns that are further the characteristics of the prevailing discourse. Discourse embraces methods of generating the patterns for the subject's own understanding, for its main ways of seeing its domains of pleasures, desires, labor, commitments. The discourse prevailing in a certain period of time is responsible for the creation of patterns of understanding itself by a subject, of its perception of many areas that influence and shape the totality called subjectivity or identity. Foucault tries to analyze these patterns of self-perception and the impact of a discourse upon these patterns. Foucault "also tried to analyze the formation of the subject as he may appear on the other side of a normative division, becoming an object of knowledge – as a madman, a patient, or a delinquent" ([1994] 2000h: 461). It must be taken into account that for Foucault, these patterns, visible in the creation by the subject of a whole area of its subjectivity are mostly delimited and indicated in the situation of limit-experiences, on the borders of common social life, in the area of exteriority with regard to the main currents of human performance. Foucault ([1994] 2000e: 69–89) seemed to be convinced that the domain of limit-experiences, the domain where the subject enters into contact with events exterior to the prevailing discourse, the domain of the outside is the place where the moments indicating the way the individual perceives itself are most evident. He searched for such moments where the ways the individual perceives itself disclose most the kind of pattern that governs his human conduct. This pattern is one of the moments of the discourse that is undertaken by a certain subject in a certain period of time. Hence, if someone wants to rediscover what a discourse is for Foucault, he must certainly take into account the Foucaultian analysis of the subject. And to analyze the subject is to examine all the practices "understood as a way of acting and thinking at once, that provide the intelligibility key for the correlative constitution of the subject and the object" (Foucault [1994] 2000h: 463). Understanding of this "correlative

constitution of the subject and the object" is the condition for achieving a discourse appropriate to a given subject, that governs the whole area of social organizations in different periods of time. The notion of discourse in Foucault is always the outcome of such an analysis.

The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu

The third presentation of the notion of discourse is based on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu. His approach is considerably different from the theories of Teun van Dijk and Michel Foucault on account of the fact that it contains sociological input and even his theoretical formulations are very often based on strictly empirical case studies. This is also the reason why the theoretical part of his work is thought mostly to be the methodological preliminary for the empirical research. However, this thesis is projected to enlighten just these theoretical insights that can help in understanding the notion of discourse assumed (very often *implicite*) in Bourdieu's works.

Many scientists and researchers who have tried to provide an outline of Pierre Bourdieu's work have admitted that "[t]he rich complexity of Bourdieu's conceptual world resists easy summary" (Swartz 1997: 4). Some thinkers (Swartz 1997: 3) find that the work of Bourdieu resembles or results from its background which "reflects the particular organization of intellectual discourse that characterized France in the 1950s and 60s." Not least are his commitments to the theories and ideas represented by Michel Foucault. Other analysts (Brubaker 1993: 217, cited in Swartz 1997: 5) argue that Bourdieu's work "is particularly ill-suited to a conceptualist, theoretical logocentric reading, one that treats it as the bearer of a set of logically interconnected propositions formed in terms of precise, unambiguous concepts." Their description presents Bourdieu particularly as a scientist whose assumptions owe much to the antilogocentrism of Jacques Derrida. Antilogocentrism does not have a clear, precise, conceptual definition of the notion of discourse. The discourses present in this approach are set in practice; hence, the researcher's *post-factum*

attempts to grasp the rules that govern them are seen as doomed to fail-
ure: as if trying to grasp something that was previously in very systematic
language projected as something-not-able-to-be-grasped, as something
whose non-logocentric existence was based on its own effacement.
Hence, the descriptions of the concepts by Bourdieu are rather "heuristic
devices for communicating a general approach to the study of the social
world" (Swartz 1997: 5). In this sense it is desirable to understand and to
know the philosophy of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida in order to
grasp the character of the approach by Bourdieu. Swartz adds here that
Bourdieu's work "can be read as an ongoing polemic against positivism,
empiricism, structuralism, existentialism, phenomenology, economism,
Marxism, methodological individualism, and grand theory" (1997: 5).
Bourdieu is not a theorist, he presents an object-dependent, empirical
approach, with theory being only a pivot he uses for introducing the no-
tion of habitus, which helps to solve the problem of sources of action
(namely: mechanism/finalism *aporia*).

1. The history of the thought of Pierre Bourdieu

The history of the thought by Pierre Bourdieu was visibly shaped and
influenced by the writings of Michel Foucault. Bourdieu's theory of so-
cial distinctions and different kinds of capital owes much to the prolific
Foucaultian idea of power/knowledge. In order to see Bourdieu as an in-
dependent writer and his thought as an autonomous achievement it is
worth, first, indicating the differences between his theory and Foucault's
in the field of the notion of power.

1.1. Comparison with the theory of Michel Foucault

Although Bourdieu's theory of social distinctions originates in Foucault's
idea of power relations, it contradicts his assumptions about two kinds
of power: one kind of power relation as "strategic games between liber-
ties" or "strategic relations of power" and the other as relations, or "states
of domination" (Foucault [1994] 2000c: 299). The first kind of power
relation is found to be less repressive. It is rather productive of social
hierarchies, and constitutes what can be called strategic relations within
society. The second kind involves relations of domination: in this catego-
ry can be found the real relations of repression and violence. Bourdieu

does not differentiate between stronger or milder power relations. For him, every action is power-laden, a struggle for "social distinction" (Swartz 1997: 6), and all cultural artefacts such as symbols and practices are an embodiment of power relations. Swartz writes (1997: 6) that here "all cultural symbols and practices, from artistic tastes, style in dress, and eating habits to religion, science and philosophy – even language itself – embody interests and function to enhance social distinctions." Bourdieu takes from Foucault the idea that power is overwhelming and that in the social world there is no place for actions not burdened with the power relation function. It can be said that even the least exposed action can be described in terms of power and carries the mark of power. In the social world, whether it deals with the style of dressing or the position on the political hierarchy, all such distinctions are constitutive of the position within a social field and at times the milder ones are even more crucial. For Bourdieu "[t]he struggle for social distinction […] [is] a fundamental dimension of all social life" (Swartz 1997: 6) and like Foucault it "is not a separate domain of study but stands at the heart of all social life" (Swartz 1997: 6). However, the struggle for distinction must be supported and is usually introduced through the exercise of power and "the successful exercise of power requires legitimation" (Swartz 1997: 6). For Bourdieu legitimation is understood as a discourse. Hence, our first, tentatively postulated, introductory definition of a discourse in the work of Bourdieu is that it is a basis for a practical outcome in the form of the social practice of the relations of power. This kind of discourse plays a supportive role in the legitimation of social distinctions and hierarchies. Hence, the statement can be ventured that it produces the legitimation of certain practices in the same way as when knowledge produces the legitimation for the usurpation of power.

1.2. The introductory hypothesis on the notion of discourse

The notion of discourse as proposed by Bourdieu operates in and can be deduced from his assumptions made in many different fields of analysis. It results from the areas of inquiry that his individual research contributed to, such as the theory of symbolic interests, the theory of capital, the theory of symbolic violence and symbolic capital, or the theory of habitus. He discerns the problems of language and discourse in culture, which is treated as the source of matrices for the reproduction of

the existing social power relations. These matrices are engendered or reactivated through the realization of habitus, which is the rule of their reinforcement. Within the area of research, problems of the relationship between individual reasons for acting and their social, external determination arise. The first option assumes conscious intentions of the social actor and the second focuses on the influences of the external factors to which behaviour is only an indirect response.

Discourse for Bourdieu is an important notion because in his attempts to create a new approach to sociological inquiry, so-called socioanalysis, he wants to guarantee a space for reflection, for critical metaanalysis. Bourdieu would like to see sociology as a branch of science that directs the needle of criticism first of all toward itself. "A systematic and rigorous self-critical practice of social science" (Swartz 1997: 11) is his aim. Hence, discourse, or rather undertaking a meta-discourse on the possibility of scientific analysis of power relations is for Bourdieu the basic and necessary moment of science itself. There is also a very important conclusion on the subject of the notion of discourse in Bourdieu's theories and writings: that he treats it as a sometimes invisible and unappreciated, but necessary, element of a complete sociological theory. Bourdieu considers that the structure of the social order can be changed by public and accessible presentation of certain discourses (alternative discourses) on the sources of social inequality, *e.g.* on the obscured and unconscious, lying behind the real sources, namely interests in certain forms of exercising power. A thesis can be ventured that for Bourdieu it is discourse that has the real power to change the structure of social arrangements. This change can be realised in the form of resistance which Bourdieu openly encourages. He admits that he cannot find any other, higher obligation and destination for the social sciences than that of having the possibility to change social arrangements and the effects of the, usually unacknowledged, hidden interests. Bourdieu writes (1990: 15, cited in Swartz 1997: 12) that "the critical examination of the relations between the researcher and the object of research [is] […] 'the most significant product of [his] […] whole undertaking.'" Of course, "the critical examination of the relations" is not enough, it has to be described, named and ordered, it has to take the form of a discourse, and what is more, this discourse has to be revealed and presented to achieve the corrective power to change the original misrecognition of

the participants of the social order. It is only by revealing and exposing this interpretation of the actual social relations, called discourse, that the whole theory by Bourdieu can possess its postulated revolutionary value. According to Swartz (1997: 12), Bourdieu directs his criticism against "the self-image and self-esteem of the intelligentsia as carriers of universal cultural values freed from economic and political determinants." Discourse is treated here as the instrument whose presentation helps in making conscious what previously was unconscious and in this way it becomes the only means to transform the existing social stratification and unequal power relations. In this situation discourse can be re-used in a political manner, in so-called political intervention, which brings to mind terms like knowledge-power used by Foucault. However, for Foucault power is dispersed, unlike in the case of Bourdieu, where it is concretely situated.

1.3. On the formation of the thought of Pierre Bourdieu

The origins of the thought by Bourdieu come from the French philosophical tradition and owe much to the philosophical and political climate of the 50s and 60s. Bourdieu was a graduate of the most renowned French university, École Normale Supérieure. Among his classmates was Jacques Derrida, and a few years earlier Michel Foucault had defended his agrégation (in 1951). Bourdieu, like Derrida and Foucault, gradually revealed his controversial attitude toward the institution of Academy. The criticism toward privileged, higher classes of intelligentsia will accompany his approach throughout his whole career and will result in many works devoted to the problem of preferential treatment and discrimination. Although the philosophical influences in Bourdieu's thought were visible, he preferred the objectivist and empirical position of Lévi-Strauss ([1958] 1968) to the theoretical stance presented by Jean-Paul Sartre ([1943] 1956). Among the scientists whose influences carried the most weight in his early formation was also Gaston Bachelard (1961) with his scientific attitude within the field of epistemological reflexion. Another important persona for Bourdieu was Émile Durkheim (1966), who was the representative of Classical Sociological Theory together with Karl Marx (Marx, Engels 1978) and Max Weber (1978). These three representatives of Classical Sociological Theory were very important in shaping Bourdieusian thought. Durkheim's theory is important for

Bourdieu for its conviction concerning "the social at the very heart of the most subjective experience" (Swartz 1997: 46). Following Marks, Bourdieu finds that: "the cultural practices function to legitimate and perpetuate class inequality" (Swartz 1997: 39) and – according to Marxism in the form presented by Louis Althusser – that in the final instance it is always economical factors that determine human consciousness. Culture, ideology and religion also play an important role here, but it is economy that is determinative. According to Swartz (1997: 39), "Bourdieu is a materialist in the sense that he roots human consciousness in practical social life." Bourdieu's thought was therefore also influenced by Weber's strongest claim that "the most elementary forms of behaviour motivated by religious or magical factors are oriented to this world" (Weber 1978: 399, cited in Swartz 1997: 41) rather than to the "other" one that appears after our death. Thanks to Weber's theory Bourdieu became aware of the economic or political interests that usually lie behind the "religion interest." He finds (Swartz 1997: 41) that it is the demand for power that motivates and administers religious belief and practices. Similarly, the production of these beliefs is only the surface layer of the more mundane striving for domination in society. On the basis of these insights Bourdieu extrapolates that "all practices are fundamentally interested whether directed toward material or symbolic items" (Swartz 1997: 42). Their usual motivation is simply that of gaining profit. In this sense it can be said that people act in a way that can provide for them the maximum amount of cultural or economic capital. These statements consist of elements taken from his theory on symbolic power that is largely inspired by Weber. The logic of self-interest undergirds all activities humans undertake. The accompanying element of the logic of self-interest is the misrecognition that falsifies the true sources of motivation. People deny that the real motivation standing behind striving for "higher goods" is usually economic or political interest. In the final solution it is money or power that launch the striving for beauty, knowledge or good. Misrecognition is, however, a positive condition which enables activities to gain in symbolic power, hence for their legitimation: "Status culture is a sort of veneer that legitimates class interest" (Swartz 1997: 45). Bourdieu's conviction about linking the prestige of certain lifestyle patterns to their material sources was influenced by the concept of social class and status group developed by Weber.

Developing these assumptions led Bourdieu to many advanced projects of analysis of French social behaviours, lifestyles patterns, "schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action" (Swartz 1997: 47). Bourdieu described and critically analyzed the French educational system of *grandes écoles* (in books: with Jean-Claude Passeron *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (1977), and with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Passeron *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries* (1991)). His examination are, however, not theoretical divagations but are arranged on the basis of classical field work, though using theoretical and methodological tools, like the notion of habitus and the notion of field. His data-gathering method was developed during his field work in Algeria, where he made his first steps in field work and was educated as an empirical researcher rather than a theorist. His first book as the result of these endeavours was published in 1958. Another famous case study is *Outline of a Theory of Practice* ([1972] 2012) where he develops a theory on the symbolic distinctions in a society on the basis of the spatial organization of the house of the Kabylian society, their matrimonial strategies, sense of honour or functions of kinship relations.

1.4. Theoretical assumptions

The first, major theoretical assumption of Bourdieu's theory results from the problems connected with the subjective/objective dichotomy. Bourdieu, according to Swartz (1997: 54), brings out into the open the most famous dichotomies; he poses existentialism against structuralism, phenomenology to theoreticism, idealism to Marxism, ideas to matter. These oppositions provide the background to his idea on the relation of common, everyday knowledge to scientific knowledge. Bourdieu finds that to start thinking scientifically it is necessary to break with everyday opinions and interpretations. The reason for this assumption is that any single social actor bases his personal organization of knowledge on the positions he takes within society, because he always carries with him the baggage of his personal attitude, which, in turn, depends on his social background and social conditions. He extrapolates from the divisions and structures that are present in the society that he is a participant to his convictions about the real stratification of knowledge. To gain independent, unbiased perception, he must first reach the position of an independent observer, because "agents classify and construct their

understanding of the social world from particular positions in a hierarchically structured social space" (Swartz 1997: 57). Hence, it can be said after Bourdieu and Hahn (1970: 14, cited in Swartz 1997: 55) that "[t]he variations of the subjective/ objective dualism […] stem from broader underlying social divisions among classes and status groups in the social order." Social structures that are determinative of a part of the outlook or opinions of the social agent must be problematized on the level of social science, and their impact must be neutralized through notification and exposition. The scientist must report on these influences and take them into account when trying to formulate a scientific picture of the situation. Bourdieu proposes here peer confirmation and validation of the proposals (Swartz 1997: 55).

Objective knowledge also has its limitations, Bourdieu finds that: "practices are constitutive of structures as well as determined by them" (Swartz 1997: 58). Practices are the origin of the shape of the objective structures according to which they are later recursively analyzed. The objective scientist must be conscious of this dependence. Performing against the rules of objectivism and theoreticism also has the disadvantage that it projects "the formal properties of theory onto the informal world of everyday practices" (Swartz 1997: 59) – so the influence takes on a different direction and can terminate in the form of theoretical extrapolation. It is also a form of symbolic violence because it imposes a form of interpretation derived from ready-made theories and interpretations that can be based on the reductionist assumption that all behaviours have already been catalogued and classified. The imposition of certain interpretations because of possessing the power to impose them is also not a solution. What Bourdieu proposes is to raise one's self above the partial distinctions and the views contaminated with the influences present in all social involvement through scientific cooperation and control of each others' results. Science is an undertaking that makes this enterprise possible.

Another of the important notions in Bourdieu's methodology is the notion of relation. He contrasts it to the substantialist view which reifies properties attached to persons and considers these persons through the lens of these properties. In such a way these persons gain the values based on the properties mentioned and are understood as substances: are substantialized, turned into substances whose value derives from the value of the given property. Bourdieu does not see properties

like occupation, age, sex as distinct from persons but proposes to analyze their relationships to individuals. Proceeding in this way he calls forth relational thinking that is based on the assumptions of the Saussurean contrastive linguistics. Ferdinand de Saussure saw the value of signs in linguistics as the result of their relationships within the system of relations. Structuralism is the invention that "locates meanings of signs not in themselves but in their contrastive relations" (Swartz 1997: 61). "In science – note Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant (1992: 97, cited in Swartz 1997: 62) – the real is the relational." Thus different relations create a system of relations on the basis of which the values of different variables are assessed. Analysis by virtue of this method transcends the limitations of the usual, common thinking and becomes the scientific enterprise. The classical method of analysis based on the assumption of the existence of binary oppositions is also important for Bourdieu. He (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012) analyzes fields of cultural production that are based on binary oppositions and all their relative positions toward each other within a system. The relations of the elements within this system are what decides about their meaning. However, Bourdieu gives priority to certain kinds of relations. He prefers "competitive rather than cooperative, unconscious rather than conscious, and hierarchical rather than egalitarian" (Swartz 1997: 63). In this way "Bourdieu's relational method intersects with core assumptions that he makes about the fundamental character of social life" (Swartz 1997: 63). It should also be observed that he considers that the substantialist view based on the phenomenological category of the Thing-in-itself and essences can be a source of discrimination, because it presents individual differences as "intrinsic properties" (Swartz 1997: 63). In the theory proposed instead, where the value of things, of persons is based on the relations of these things, these persons to their surroundings, such negative results never appear.

1.5. Symbolic power

The understanding of the meaning of symbolic power in the work of Bourdieu is conditioned by the understanding of his theoretical assumptions and other notions, such as cultural capital, symbolic violence or the notion of habitus. The meaning of symbolic power rests on the presumption that an action performed by social agents, whether it is physical, mental or emotional, is always directed by certain interests.

Action is always interested – notes Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 178), regardless of whether these are economical, indirect interests or "higher," symbolic interests. Action is directed to enlarge the amount of symbolic or economic capital; however, action is "patterned and interest-oriented at a tacit, prereflective level of awareness that occurs through time" (Swartz 1997: 67). This is the reasoning that often appears as the argument for accusations of complete economic determinism raised against Bourdieu, who is presented as one who totally disregards all "higher goods" and well grounded forms of human culture. His well known critical posture toward the self-image of highbrow culture is also mentioned by such authors as David Gartman (1991) or Axel Honneth (1986). Nevertheless, it is true that Bourdieu sees economic interest as the most elementary and fundamental interest, and that all actions understood through the lens of his theory are reduced to some interest, whether conscious or unconscious. Bourdieu – according to Swartz (1997: 68) – "rejects any ahistorical, universal view of human nature," that would deal with universal laws of morality inscribed in our universally similar minds. Instead, he accepts the position of the materiality of human interest, depending on its social, historical environment and differs within all the sociological levels of engagement in social action, the materiality which depends on the transformations of this interest into the governing rules of behaviour. In this respect Bourdieu's attitude resembles that of Friedrich Nietzsche ([1886] 1997: 77–83), who rejected the universal value of "humanity" and indicated that

> man is not only this or that; it is not an animal rationale or a creature able to laugh; it is not simply some creature who, like the lawn, can be trimmed, watered or corrected. Man – beyond all that, is the constant striving to overcome himself, it is always an open question, a question without end and without the boundaries. (Michalski 2007: 229, trans. – P. K.-C.)

The same rejection is present in the Foucaultian attitude toward humanism and his conviction that "man is an invention of recent date" and that the arrangements that brought him into existence can also make him disappear "like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault [1966] 2002: 422). These words by Foucault are only a way of emphasizing the conviction that it is the context of certain theories, the juxtaposition of exclusions of some terms from the area of discourse

on man and the appearance of other notions that made possible the appearance of the notion of person and human condition. All these elements had to be brought into existence to make possible the appearance of the notion of man. The humanistic approach is relatively recent and there is no guarantee of everlasting, universal human values; it is rather the opposite: a very specific, particular, historical situation had to take place to make possible this conviction about the existence of universal, human values. Hence, it can be concluded, that the conditions of the appearance of certain elements of knowledge about humans are rather of Bourdieusian materialist origin than universal, naturalistic ones.

The conviction that the human being and his actions are placed within a historical horizon is not a new one. Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004) underlined the historical character of the human being and postulated that it is not possible to understand him beyond this horizon. Moreover, this horizon and its historicity are constitutive of the human character, of the human being in its uniqueness. Nor does Gadamer apportion truth to the conviction about the universality of human nature. He "refuses to countenance any particular disposition or support any philosophy that is based on rigid aprioris" (Sikka 2008: 239). Human nature is not given *a priori*. It should be underlined that in contrast to Derrida and Foucault, Gadamer bases his assumption on the belief that subjects move generally in the space of freedom and "[n]either natural necessities nor causal compulsions determine our thinking and our intending" (Gadamer 1981: 51, cited in Sikka 2008: 239).

In understanding the materiality of interest for all actions it should be taken into account that Bourdieu thinks about interest in the broader dimension of his notion of embodied dispositions: "Interested action is not a means-end mode of organizing action. Rather, interest is 'practical' and 'dispositional' and does not have the goal orientation commonly associated with a utilitarian framework" (Swartz 1997: 71), "interest is a historical arbitrary, a historical construction that can be known only through historical analysis, *ex post*" (Wacquant 1989: 41–42, cited in Swartz 1997: 71). In this sense interest for Bourdieu operates like the notion of historical *a priori*, or *episteme* for Foucault. It can be deduced only from analysis *ex post* and there is no possibility of predicting it. Foucault admits that it is not possible to know in advance how *episteme* is created and when it appears: "The *episteme* appears and

disappears abruptly for reasons Foucault is not able to explain, much to the indignation of his critics" (O'Farrell 2005: 63). Bourdieu explains his position of emphasizing the interest-oriented character of all actions by saying that he provides sufficient reason for the solution of the problem. He (Bourdieu 1980: 18–19, cited in Swartz 1997: 72) calls it the principle of sufficient reason and describes it as an element of the scientific procedure. He uses the economic term *interest* instead of the broader explanation that all human actions have their goal, have some motivation or rationality. Nevertheless Bourdieu avoids these terms in order not to participate in the discourse of intellectuals and Academia: "In relegating culture to superstructure, Bourdieu contends, Marxists leave the door open to idealistic (*i.e.*, disinterested) interpretations of culture" (Swartz 1997: 72). Thus he stands up against the ideology of the intelligentsia saying that at times they undertake actions selfishly, he exposes their "interest in disinterestedness" (Swartz 1997: 73). He finds that this kind of interest is veiled interest of an economic nature. It works on the same rules and presupposes the same counting of costs and benefits.

1.6. Cultural capital

In explaining the notion of cultural capital that is crucial for Bourdieu, it is important that this notion is more informative when concrete types of cultural institutions, *e.g.* types of school successes are analyzed. Bourdieu and Wacquant note (1992: 160, cited in Swartz 1997: 75–76) that "cultural capital inherited from the family milieu" is a better explanation of school success than explaining it with notions of talents or individual predispositions. However, the author of *Language and Symbolic Power* does not seem to notice that the factors that come from the exterior situation are not the only reasons for individual achievement. Individual work and predispositions can also play an important role. Bourdieu himself is an exemplary case: coming from a lower middle class family did not help him in terms of upward social mobility but he achieved extraordinary academic success. According to Swartz (1997: 76), in answer to these charges Bourdieu states that "investment of inherited cultural capital" can significantly extend the chances of achieving school success. The author of *Outline of a Theory of Practice* observes also that we are the witnesses of a "historical trend of cultural capital becoming more and more the new basis of social stratification" (Bourdieu, Boltanski 1977: 33, cited

in Swartz 1997: 77). The power of different kinds of capital is clearly seen in the works of Bourdieu, where he distinguishes many forms of gathering the capital, including "economic, cultural, social […] but also family, religious, political, moral and state capital" (Swartz 1997: 79). On this point Wacquant observes (1993: 19–44, cited in Swartz 1997: 79) that power for Bourdieu is "more concentrated in particular institutional settings" than is observed in the work of Foucault. This observation seems, however, not to take into account the potential of power included in the notion of habitus.

1.7. Symbolic violence

Symbolic violence is another Bourdieusian methodological term that has made a career in the academic world. It is strictly connected with other terms dealing with the problem of social cooperation and communication. Symbolic here means that violence does not always need to be physical to do harm. Symbolic violence is violence that paradoxically exerts the greatest impact on the lives of societies. It can change the character of lives and the possibilities resulting from them. This kind of violence, though the most rarely perceived, is the most dangerous form of violence for different social groups precisely because of its invisibility.

Bourdieu claims (1989: 555, 1990: 122–134, cited in Swartz 1997: 82) that: "the principal mode of domination has shifted from overt coercion and the threat of physical violence to forms of symbolic manipulation." Foucault's influence is here clear. In one of his major works *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* ([1975] 1991) Foucault presents a shift from the physical, haphazard mutilation of the accidental offender in order to support the power of the sovereign to the interiorized form of oppression when children at school or prisoners are subjected to rules that incite their will to cooperation and discipline. The power of external punishment is transformed into the intrinsic, individual rule of behaviour. Manipulation ceases to be overt and starts to be internalized and hence invisible and more dangerous. Symbolic manipulation for Bourdieu seems to be the last step in this line of the process of sophistication of the mechanisms of coercion. Nevertheless this does not mean it is the most civilised form of violence. Symbolic systems are also systems of domination.

As it is presented, the structure of the symbolic system is based on the Saussurean linguistics that operates on the system of exclusion and inclusion according to the rules of binary oppositions. All symbolic systems are based on this logic, the logic of difference. Divisions into rare and common, good and bad, high and low, inside and outside are those that were extensively elaborated in the Derridian criticism of logocentrism ([1967] 1997), in which he undermined the logocentric view of reality derived from the Platonic primary division into things-in-themselves (eidos, essences) and their phenomena (appearances). The artificial division into the object and subject of inquiry that resulted from this vision seemed improper to a whole generation of French intellectuals, including Foucault and Derrida. Bourdieu's objectivist approach informed by the epistemology of Bachelard returns to the criticised notion of *logos* and logocentric oppositions. However, in terms of method it is strongly opposed to phenomenology, which was organized around the notions of essence, *eidos*. Bourdieu writes:

> All agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perpetual schemes, which receive the beginnings of objectification in the pairs of antagonistic adjectives commonly used to classify and qualify persons or objects in the most varied areas of practice. (1984: 468, cited in Swartz 1997: 84)

However, "the ultimate source of all paired oppositions" (Swartz 1997: 85) is the paired opposition: dominant/dominated. All actions can be reduced to a network of social power relations. According to Bourdieu, "structuralist logic of contrastive relations applies not only to symbolic systems, such as language (à la Saussure), myth (à la Lévi-Strauss) or discourse (à la Foucault) but 'also to the social relations of which these symbolic systems are a more or less transformed expression'" (Bourdieu 1983: 314, cited in Swartz 1997: 86). In this sense it is structuralism that organizes Bourdieu's approach.

1.8. On the notion of habitus

Habitus is the central notion in Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power. In *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (1977, cited in Swartz 1997: 97) Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron describe habitus as the "product of structures, producer of practices, and reproducer of

structures." The notion of habitus is based on an action understood as a strategy, but strategy not in the sense of conscious, rational calculation but rather a tendency to act, a disposition that is not conscious and that usually includes moments of uncertainty and ambiguity. This means that strategy is always employed in time and space; the moment of tempo, of rhythm is included in the notion of structure. Bourdieu states ([1972] 2012: 9) that the time in which a practice is performed is not the same time as that involved in scientific undertakings. The understanding of what it means to be a practical strategist is preliminary to the understanding what habitus is. According to Bourdieu's definition, habitus is:

> the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation. ([1972] 2012: 78)

"The 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating its objective structures in the habitus: '[…] in each of us, in varying proportions, there is part of yesterday's man […]'" (Durkheim 1938: 16, cited in Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 78–79). The second definition states that habitus is:

> a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems. (Bourdieu 1971: 83, cited in Swartz 1997: 100)

Habitus has strongly practical connotations, it is "practical rather than discursive, prereflective rather than conscious, embodied […] durable though adaptive, reproductive though generative and inventive, and the product of particular social conditions though transposable to others" (Swartz 1997: 101). The concept of habitus was presented as problematic on the grounds of the polemics in social sciences concerning the importance of the individual and social dimensions of discourse. Disputes were launched with regard to the problem of the scale of structures that take part in building habitus. The point was whether the microstructures that shape the phenomenon of individual identity

are more crucial for the creation of different social bodies than the macrostructures that are external to an individual and in which social agents participate. Bourdieu tried to solve this problem through indicating that these two extremes are only two dimensions of what is called social action. In this sense the interiority of an individual is in the same way social as macro, external, social structures.

What is worth observing while explaining the notion of habitus is that Bourdieu admitted (on the basis of his early reading of Panofsky's work on scholasticism (1951)) the necessity of developing different habituses for performing different occupations. Habitus was meant as the "habit-forming force" that demands certain actions in order to become a professional in some discipline. It is possible to shape certain manners of thought or cognitive capacities. Swartz claims (1997: 102) that where habitus is concerned "schools systems [are seen] as the institutionalized context where the intellectual habitus of a culture develops." This analysis of the academic current is included in Bourdieu's broader criticism of French intellectuals' attitudes to their work (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 29–73). In his understanding of habitus, Bourdieu adopts a similar position to that of Noam Chomsky (1965) on the power of "generative grammar" to produce infinite number of grammatically correct sentences. Bourdieu's habitus is seen as the disposition to generate "the infinity of possible practices" (Swartz 1997: 102). However, it is not a universal capacity but it resolves from the capital that has been previously accumulated. It is a structure that structures future actions, but also a structure that is constantly structured through newly absorbed cultural information: "Habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized. As a result, internalized dispositions of broad parameters and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a particular group in a stratified social world develop through socialization" (Swartz 1997: 103). There is something hermeneutical in origin in the notion of habitus, which is recognizable when Bourdieu explains the categories of structuring structure and structured structure. He writes that habitus works as a "system of circular relations that unite structures and practices; objective structures tend to produce structured subjective dispositions that produce structured actions which, in turn, tend to reproduce objective structure" (Bourdieu, Passeron 1977: 203, cited in Swartz 1997: 103). This reminds us of the origins of such thought

as the rule of the hermeneutical circle whose final conclusions were brought to the surface of discourse by Hans-Georg Gadamer. The author of *Truth and Method* tries to exemplify the notion of the hermeneutical circle by saying that:

> [w]ho wants to understand the text, has always to make a projection. He projects in advance the sense of the totality of meaning only when he notices the outline of the first sense that appeared in this text. This sense appears only because the reader reads the text with certain expectations for the determined sense. (Gadamer 1993: 229, trans. – P. K.-C.)

To comment on this similarity it can be said that structured expectation influences the sense that appears in the text, and the other way round: the senses that have been previously accumulated and internalized into the body of knowledge have informative power over our expectations. It can even be asked whether what Gadamer says about it in his fragments on the structured and structuring expectations is not something similar to Bourdieu's habitus. Expectation can so far be described as a kind of inclination toward a certain sense, as something that delimits what can appear in agreement with certain rules. Inclination, predisposition, tendency, propensity are words used to describe this "directiveness" of habitus.

The difference between the notion of the hermeneutical circle by Gadamer and the notion of habitus by Bourdieu lies in this, that Bourdieu speaks about habitus rather in the context of pragmatics, he writes about "the internalization or 'incorporation' of the fundamental social conditions of existence into dispositions" (Bourdieu 1990: 54, cited in Swartz 1997: 104). However, the rule of incorporation of the material of data that further creates the matrix responsible for the shape and range of the absorption of these data is the same in both cases: in the Heideggerian-Gadamerian rule of the hermeneutical circle and in the Bourdieusian rule of habitus. In this sense habitus can be viewed as the "necessity internalized and converted into a disposition" (Bourdieu 1984: 170, cited in Swartz 1997: 105). Here it can be concluded that the kind of discourse one takes part in when providing an explanation of one's conduct is also the result of these unconscious choices that are made on the basis of the practical evaluation of possibilities available to a given person. Individual discourse that determines the views about the world that are later socialized and that recursively influence this

discourse is indirectly informed by its structured power. This discourse is the product of the clash between an identity and society, or rather it is the result of social, two-dimensional (at one end of the scale – the micro structures of identity, at the other end – the macro structures of society) theoretical and practical events. This conclusion can be extrapolated and it can be said that the notion of discourse for Bourdieu is inherently connected to the sphere of practice where structures of identity and individual choices are created. Discourse is something always connected with practice. It is an extension of this sphere, where the same rules, like those that are used for the creation of habitus, operate. It is worth noticing, how the operational rule for the habitus for Bourdieu is similar to the rule of the creation of *Die Auslegung* for Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960] 2004: 268–278) and Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1994: 30, 202–218, 458–476). Their working procedures are the same. The notion of discourse for Bourdieu is the result of the same rule that works as a rule of interpretation for Gadamer. What is achieved is the primary existential notion of habitus in the analysis of the Self. The pragmatic aspect of this operating only shifts the realisation of the discourse more in the direction of the social enterprise than in the domain of the self. However, this social enterprise can also be realised in dialogic forms, in conversation, as is the case in the philosophy of Gadamer.

2. Methodology of Pierre Bourdieu's approach

Methodology in the work of Pierre Bourdieu is rich in theoretical operational terms like field, field positions, homology, habitus or different kind of capital. All these terms are, however, also efficient in describing empirical cases of field work, and that is why they apply also, in consequence, to his theoretical explanations. One of the most often used methodological terms coined by Bourdieu is the term of *field*.

2.1. On the notion of field

The notion of *field* is central for Bourdieu's conception of understanding and habitus. This operational concept is used for determining the place where the organization of knowledge within the habitus takes place. Bourdieu defines it as:

> a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.). (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 97, cited in Swartz 1997: 117)

Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012) problematizes many different fields. He writes *e.g.* about "the intellectual field," "the literary field," "the philosophical field" ([1968–1987] 2012: 108–110), "the field of consumption" ([1968–1987] 2012: 95–96), "the field of instances of reproduction and consecration" ([1968–1987] 2012: 120–125), "the field of the dominant class" ([1968–1987] 2012: 93–94). It is fields that are responsible for the creation of the habitus of the social class of intellectuals. Field indicates the area where scientists or intellectuals compete for their respective symbolic or economic capital. Field analysis may deal with social-class lifestyles (Bourdieu 1984), educational institutions, religion, literature or others.

Field is the construct which, through exposing the relations of power between objects or positions that are placed within it, highlights the conflictual character of social life. Bourdieu suspends notions like group or populations because he finds that field is especially appropriate to indicate the relational character of the elements within it: "to think in terms of field is to think relational" (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 96, cited in Swartz 1997: 119). Thus Bourdieu's fields are "fields of struggle" (Swartz 1997: 117) where the arrangement of power is captured. "Fields are sites of resistance" (Swartz 1997: 121) and it is at this point that Bourdieu's theory differs visibly from the theory of Foucault, who presents the relations of power not in a form that would provide the theoretical incitement to resistance. Foucault talks about domination ([1994] 2000c: 299), Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 41–44, 164–169) tries to emphasize the moment of struggle that is inherent in the concept of field. It is in this sense that charges are raised by Jacques Derrida against Foucault. In the article "Cogito and the History of Madness" ([1967] 2009) Derrida argues that Foucault must tacitly accept the hierarchy and hence the abuse of power in society because of his inadequate

understanding of the problem of madness. By opening up this problem in the 1970s, Foucault and Derrida created a sphere for debate where problems of relations of power in society could be revealed. In tense debates Derrida charged Foucault with inconsistency in his treatment of the problem of madness. Tina Sikka (2008: 230) in her article titled "Pragmatics, Poststructuralism, and Hermeneutics: An Examination of Discursive-Consensus Formation and Its Ethical Implications" writes that Derrida "accuses Foucault of valorizing and excluding madness and that Foucault, in doing so, actually re-invokes the hierarchy that he is supposedly overturning." Derrida ([1967] 2009: 36–76) accuses Foucault that he, in his attempts to reach real madness in its essence through undermining modern attempts to exclude it or to bring it to the margins of society was in fact establishing margins where madness eventually could reign. Derrida ([1967] 2009: 36–76) tries to argue that despite Foucault's striving, madness is not excluded at all, that Foucault in his struggle to get close to it and make it speak about the most controversial human behaviour and understanding, in fact obscures it and reaffirms madness' exclusion. Sikka claims (2008: 231) that Derrida distances himself from this position. Similarly Kruszelnicki (2008: 258) is of the opinion that Derrida in his confrontation with Foucault tries to present the impossibility of expressing the essence of madness without referring first to the only possible language of *logos* and of rationality. The only possible language to speak about madness would be the language of *logos*. However, Foucault understands madness as the "absence of work" ([1994] 1999: 244, trans. – P. K.-C.) and "to write about madness in the language of madness […] would mean to write and to speak in an incomprehensible manner" (Kruszelnicki 2008: 258, trans. – P. K.-C.). This would also mean leaving madness beyond the borders of society – so to marginalize it. Hence Derrida's accusation of Foucault is that he tacitly re-invokes a hierarchy in society. What Bourdieu (1987: 7–10, cited in Swartz 1997: 10) tries to embrace in his work is to express the problematic hierarchies of power in order to make people aware of them and finally to be able to overthrow them. The explication of the problem is the condition for changing these relations. Bourdieu notices that to make something conscious is to submit it to the "gazing eye." In the debate with Derrida Foucault did not seem to be able to find a solution to the problem of changing the relations of power in the way

Bourdieu did. The problem of Foucault's presentation of madness in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* ([1961] 1988) is that even the exposition of this issue to conscious reflection does not lead to a solution because Foucault's proposition of solving the problem of madness is to stop exposing it ("the absence of work") and to write about it in a manner which is incomprehensible, in a way that cannot be grasped by conscious reflection. Such an exposition of the problem (which is in fact an anti-exposition) cannot be operational in making somebody aware of the problem, for the incomprehensible, "insane" language of this exposition would rather obscure the subject than explain or reveal it. Foucault's solution cannot be found as an incitement to abolishing discriminative power relations. Instead, it would be more likely to initiate these relations through introducing the marginalizing anti-language of insanity in which nobody can communicate. "Absence of work" is Foucault's concise definition of madness; however, it does not provide a solution to its marginalizing powers. Madness expressed incomprehensibly could multiply discrimination rather than abolishing it. However, it has to be admitted that Foucault is constantly aware of the situation that the subject is a prisoner in the implicit systems that discipline him (works as *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* ([1961] 1988) or *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* ([1975] 1991) provide evidence of this understanding) and what he tries to do is to grasp "the system of limits and exclusion which we practice without realising it" (Foucault 1971: 73, cited in O'Farrell 2005: 69), to envision the conditions of possibility of certain knowledge and the constraints of power. Nevertheless, his reflection on the problem of madness does not result in a solution to the problems of abusive discriminative power. It is Bourdieu that tries consciously to overcome the problems connected with the attempt to undermine the present relations of power. According to Swartz (1997: 10), "[b]y exposing those underlying interests that bind individuals and groups into unequal power relations, sociology becomes an instrument of struggle capable of offering a measure of freedom from the constraints of domination." Bourdieu in his works, *e.g. The Field of Cultural Production* ([1968–1987] 2012) presents how these constraints of domination come into being, he reveals the procedures with which the relations of power are constituted. However, to provide exemplars of using the methodological notion of

the field in practice, some crucial information on this operational tool must be added.

Fields for Bourdieu according to Swartz (1997: 121) are the structures within which the processes of the multiplying of the present power relations are supported: "[f]ields capture struggle within the logic of reproduction." The limits between different fields are themselves problematic and are found to be the object of struggle. The legitimation of the importance and limits of certain fields is what is to be accomplished in this struggle, hence many institutions or organizations of power try to establish such boundaries and their legitimation. Being able to establish the boundaries of a subject's area of power and, what follows, being able to confirm the power to legitimate results in the possession of a certain symbolic or economic power, which means being included on the site of dominating rather than dominated agents. However, fields are only the tools to make visible the processes that are played out within them and the positions that can be assumed by certain "players." It is convenient to sketch all the possible movements within the indicated arenas of struggle.

Fields have structural properties. One of their structural properties is position. Certain positions appear and change within fields. Positions can assume a dominant or a subordinated value. Positions can also be equipped with capital of different kinds, economic, symbolic, labour, intellectual or other. The capital is distributed unequally, which produces relations of subordination or dominance. The system of agents in the field is not only their juxtaposition as in a picture: "[T]he constituting agents or system of agents may be described as so many forces which, by their existence, opposition or combination, determine its specific structure at a given moment in time" (Bourdieu 1971: 161, cited in Swartz 1997: 123). In understanding the workings of the relations and positions within the field, the notion of structural relationality is useful, a notion taken from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959: 114), where he wrote about language that it "is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others." Bourdieu's concept of field represents similar qualities, with comparisons of the position and power of a given agent being it the condition of its field value. These values are further read as the representations of the power relations of certain classes or groups.

Three different types of relations to be observed within fields are crucial: the conservative function, the function of succession and that representing the subversive mode of existence.

> Conservation strategies tend to be pursued by those who hold dominant positions and enjoy seniority in the field. Strategies of succession are attempts to gain access to dominant positions in a field […] [S]trategies of subversion are pursued by those who expect to gain little from the dominant groups. (Swartz 1997: 125)

The last of the presented strategies usually presupposes a rupture with the dominant group in the field. What is also important with regard to the notion of field is that certain kinds of fields and their relative function impose forms of struggles appropriate to their organization. Following this assumption, finding oneself in the area of the dominant group makes one somehow responsive to the commitments represented by this kind of field, and one's proceedings within this field accommodate to the rules that are demanded in this field. Thus – writes Swartz (1997: 125) commenting on the requirements of the field – "entry into professional fields limits struggle to the forms and terms of what is considered legitimate professional procedure." To understand this explication it should be born in mind that "the principle of position-takings lies in the structure and functioning of the field of positions" (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 35). The methodology of the possible undertakings is hence strictly delimited. It is the field that imposes the procedures of reinstating or conserving certain behaviours. Bourdieu also argues ([1968–1987] 2012: 34) that the researcher cannot speak about the production of discourses in the area of the given fields as about something independent of these fields. If something occurs within a certain field, it will certainly have the qualities imposed by this field. Conscious reflection is a possibility for avoiding field violence; nevertheless our internal, habitual abilities are formed in agreement with the overall structures and functions of the field. Bourdieu also overturns here the common convictions about the origin and production of literary material or material coming from other areas of cultural production. He writes: "we escape from the correlative dilemma of the charismatic image of artistic activity as pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist" (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 34). What he proposes is that, when the subject is in a position to qualify the value of a certain oeuvre, the activities of

all the pertinent agents are taken into account: "people who conceive the idea of the work […], people who execute it […], people who provide the necessary equipment and material […], and people who make up the audience for the work" (Becker 1976: 703–704, cited in Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 35). The value of an oeuvre is not an independent *a priori* value, independent of the fields of production, but the result of the collaboration of all mentioned social agents, the result of its position within the field of relations.

2.2. Homology

In order to be able to operate with the notion of the field, the terms homology and conflict are necessary. Both have a methodological character and they help in the understanding of the Bourdieusian theory of social practice. Homology helps to describe the behaviour of members of different social groups and relates this behaviour to their different positions in the field. Conflict is the rule that governs these different behaviours.

In Bourdieu's methodology the term homology is understood as "a resemblance within a difference" (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 105–106, cited in Swartz 1997: 129) and takes place in the area of field. Homologies can be structural or functional and express similarities between the different spaces of cultural production. Following these assumptions it can be said there is homology between the Parisian theatre scene and the dominant classes that attend the spectacles: "the social characteristics of the audiences of the different Paris theatres […] [are] perfectly congruent [with the] characteristics of the authors performed […], the works, and the theatrical businesses themselves" (Bourdieu 1984: 175–176, cited in Swartz 1997: 130). Homology works in such a way that certain resemblances in the behaviour of given social groups or classes can be detected and reported, *e.g.* consumers in subordinate positions within the field choose products that are produced by the subordinate categories of producers. This happens without any conscious attempt to adjust products to the needs of the consumer. This unconscious adjustment is just what Bourdieu calls a homology: "a symbolic isomorphism parallels the structural isomorphism among fields, and […] the cardinal semantic oppositions, such as high/low, light/heavy, and refined/crude, in cultural fields function to reinforce analogous social distinctions" (Swartz 1997: 131). To call somebody's style refined or crude is to place

him within the homologous field of higher/lower position with respectively more/less symbolic capital: refinement assumes that somebody possesses more symbolic power and what follows is to describe him as belonging to the homologous class of refined people. People that are refined in the arena of field are placed in the dominant position. To possess refined style is to be a refined person, and refinement is the position within the field of symbolic capital homologous with the position of a dominating class. Swartz observes here (1997: 132) that "[s]truggles in cultural fields produce cultural distinctions that are simultaneously social distinctions." They create shifts and changes in the positions within the relations of power. Changes in the relations of power cause changes in the homologous fields and the possessions of different kinds of capital. What is interesting is that the change of homology first incites change in the positions of cultural capital, only later does this change transform the orders of social classes through the homological influence on their ideological narrations. Nevertheless, homology is usually an instrument of reinforcement and the reproduction of patterns of conflict.

2.3. Conflict

The methodological tools of field, field positions, different capitals, homology and habitus gain in meaning when the notion of *conflict* is introduced as the main dynamic in the working of the reproductive mechanism. Fighting for power within the respective area of fields is what reinstates the existing social arrangements through the winning of legitimation for domination of social classes. Certain groups are interested in supporting the existing social order, others that derive their powers from subordinate positions in the field, are condemned to use solutions to the problem that come from these subordinate regions. Hence, fighting only reactivates existing positions, strengthens the strong ones and weakens the weak ones: "the greater the difference in asset structure of these two types of capital, the more likely it is that individuals and groups will be opposed in their power struggle for domination" (Swartz 1997: 137). The most decisive in the distribution of different capitals are two basic capitals: economic and cultural. The unequal distribution of these is responsible for the inequalities in the amount of other possessed capitals like: administrative, university, artistic, scientific, intellectual, religious or others.

3. Discourse in Pierre Bourdieu's theory

The shape of Bourdieu's methodology and his methodological tools like habitus, field or conflict are important with regard to the notion of discourse that is assumed by Bourdieu. That a certain determined notion of discourse is assumed by him is beyond dispute; however, he does not present anything that could be called a definition of this term. Yet a certain notion of discourse provides a constant background for Bourdieu's theoretical, methodological and practical investigation. The basis for its elaboration is certainly the primary notion of habitus.

3.1. The habitual dimension of discourse

Together with the practical presence and strength of the powers of habitus in the practical and theoretical life of an individual, discourse is the background that was not appointed as something evident in human life. In fact, for Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 78) its constant support is treated only as the basic structure on which other elements that make communication possible are distributed. Discourse in the case where Bourdieu examines it, is a kind of stable scene of storage of possible meanings that is prior to all conscious, deliberate, mental or physical activity. The discourse that is assumed here is connected with the "generative principle of regulated improvisations" that "produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 78). This principle (habitus) is a guarantee of the existence of a certain objectivity according to which all potential actions are organized. This objectivity not only has the character of an abstract rule organizing the activity; it is also present in the improvised behaviour and assumed to be independent of all overall and general patterns. The individual being undertakes his actions and thinking, believing that they are totally independent of the connections with the background influences, assuming that these actions and thinking will be completely personal; that they will be his own actions. However, it is easy to observe that even in very differentiated conditions of certain historical periods, some styles of living and thinking dominate over others that are less visible. This domination of certain styles of living and thinking of different people in a given period of time is the result of the working of an objective

intention in their attitudes. The word "intention" suggests that it is not an abstract quality: it is present in human thinking as a certain inclination toward some solutions; nevertheless, it is also objective in the sense that most people in this given time represent such an attitude. The problem is to what extent historical consciousness and historical context is present in Bourdieu's thinking on habitus. It seems as if the strength of the arguments such as "fusion of horizons" and of the "conversation with tradition" about which Gadamer speaks in *Truth and Method* ([1960] 2004: 349–382) is not taken into account. For Bourdieu, it is habitus that takes over the function of harmonizing personal, independent styles into one approach to reality which dominates in a certain epoch. In this sense it can be said that a certain habitus is responsible for the character of the meanings that appear within the spheres indicated and delimited by independent individuals. Each agent – notes Bourdieu – is

> a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a *modus operandi* of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an "objective intention" […] which always outruns his conscious intentions. The schemes of thought and expression he has acquired are the basis for the *intentionless intention* of regulated improvisation: endlessly overtaken by his own words, […] the virtuoso finds in the *opus operatum* new triggers and new supports for the *modus operandi* from which they arise. ([1972] 2012: 79)

Discourse is here understood as the background from which the agent constantly feeds his ideology of action, but it is also something that is the indispensable result of his practical undertakings. Besides conscious reflection that is carried out, discourse appears as a consequence of achieving the objectivity of certain individuals' intentions thanks to which they are similar to the independently improvised intentions of other people. Discourse appears in the moment of production of this objectivity that comes into being through the tuning in of different, individual intentions. Thus discourse is something that supports and is the result of the actions of the individual being, but is also the kind of interactive rule that governs the appearance of partial individual discourses. It can be said that in the overall discourse of the epoch, the individual discourses are harmonized and from this they achieve their dominant quality in style. The quality of these partial discourses is

rooted in the respective quality of the overall discourse, and this overall discourse's quality is derived from the qualities of the dominating habitus, but on a different methodological level. Discourse for Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 79) is certainly based on the character of the notion of habitus. Meanings and understandings that are created are submitted and are the result of the embodiment of the qualities of the dominant style in thinking, which can be elaborated in institutions whose rules of working are also rooted in this certain style of reasoning. This style is delimited by the regulated and regulative practice of habitus. Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 79) often writes about the establishment of a discourse of a certain epoch and about the separate, particular discourses that belong to it as something that is not totally conscious. This establishment does not originate from conscious reflection on discourse's conditions of possibility or its constraints or limits. Nor does it originate from its subjects, or their input into the tradition of thought: "subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing, what they do has more meaning than they know" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 79). Nevertheless, this unconscious intention – which seems to be a paradoxical formulation but in the case of Bourdieu it is not – produces effects that are reasonable and sensible. This is because habitus is the prior effect of the unconscious interiorization and internalization of the knowledge and rules working in a certain time and space. All that is the result of the working of habitus – here also the prevailing system of discourse – is what has been previously introduced in it. Habitus works like a "black box" that transforms all the mechanisms and all the material of data that were introduced into it, according to schemes that were also shaped on the basis of the workings of this "black box." What is released from this box works recursively and forms the working rules of the box. Additionally, a more abstract level of interpretation also exists: the interactive level, where all the boxes are tuned in "to play the same symphony." Habitus, being the rule of this tuning in, produces the mechanisms that work interactively and pertain to all possible discourses built with the help of these reinstated principles. This homogeneity of habitus causes continuous reinforcement of the individual, separate habituses, and it is also the reason for "practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 80). Bourdieu writes ([1972] 2012: 80) that "one of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is

the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world." This conclusion supports our thesis for the general character of discourse present in the investigation by Bourdieu. Discourse is here the result of the objectifying, homogenizing powers of habitus to create a coherent narration, orchestrated in one tonality, on the meaning with which action is thus inaugurated. In this way also the overall communication between the participants of discourse is made possible and invited with the common, stable meanings as the points of orientation in discourse being the conditions for understanding. Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 80) seems here to agree with Ludwig Wittgenstein's ([1953] 2009: 243–315) conviction that there is no possibility of the existence of a private language. Habitus is the guarantee that all the elements in discourse will be harmonized and identified as belonging to one matrix of language and hence understandable. The acceptance of this assumption of a common code facilitates communication. Habitus makes people speak the same language, they move within the same discourse of possible references. Discourse is here the result of the achieved objectivity, of the working of the all-embracing powers of habitus, which works on the local level of individual styles and on the global level of historical *a priori*. It is the effect of the working of the internal powers coming from the individual habituses, the interior mechanisms structuring human activity, rather than from the exterior interactions within historical contexts. Nevertheless, the social element in the creation of a discourse cannot be underrated. Habitus is, after all, also the product of what was introduced into it from the outside environment: the social as well as historical element. It is here, in the sociology of Bourdieu, that the false dilemma regarding the origins of our knowledge about the world is overcome. This is the dilemma between mechanism and finalism.

3.2. Mechanism/finalism dilemma

In Bourdieu's sociology two kinds of powers meet: power that reigns in the interiority of the self and exterior power that rules the organization of society. When the exterior power of society and historical contexts meet with the power of the interiority of the self conflict arises. These two powers: exterior and interior meet, however, for Bourdieu, in one, coherently joining notion of habitus. They meet without causing a split

or a break in other areas of discourse. Habitus is responsible for the fact that each agent "following only [his] own laws" "nonetheless agrees with the other" (Leibniz [1696] 1866: 548, cited in Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 81). Thus a discourse that is resistant to the dangers of falling into the trap of extremes of mechanism or finalism is achieved.

The theoretical assumptions of mechanism say that our actions are determined by exterior conditions and how the individual being behaves is only a mechanistic reaction to a pregiven situation. Action is then presented as "moments in a sequence of programmed actions produced by a mechanical apparatus" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 73). The opposite of this approach to the origins of human behaviour is finalism, which assumes that our orientation in the world is directed teleologically by purpose on the condition of possessing free will and wilful power ready for arousing action. This would mean the reduction of "the objective intentions […] to the conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 73). In comparison with the Bourdieusian proposition, both solutions are partial and naive. What he presents is a way of overcoming the limitations of both these programmes through the introduction of the notion of habitus that

> is precisely this imminent law, *lex insita*, laid down in each agent by his earliest upbringing, which is the precondition not only for the co-ordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination, since the corrections and adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose their mastery of a common code. (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 81)

This "common code" is a discourse that is the pre-conscious background for and at the same time, the result of conscious activity. Discourse seems to be the assumed rule for the coordination of the practices of the habitus. Dispositions that appear in the aftermath of the working of habitus, were seemingly orchestrated exactly on the conditions of acquaintance with the "common code." Dispositions reveal themselves in the area of the projected discourse, discourse in the space that opens for the possible habitual orchestration of inclinations, dispositions, intentions. Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 81) writes here very clearly about the "language of interaction." This language is something that presupposes a space of discourse; interaction appears on condition of possessing a common language, which is the result and, at the same time, has an impact on the appearing discourse. Here it can be observed that

discourse for Bourdieu is understood on the basis of this hermeneutical dependence: that the problem of the fundamental beginning, the absolute origin, where issues of language, discourse and human interaction are concerned, cannot be dissolved. The controversy of mechanism versus finalism is visibly overcome when Bourdieu says ([1972] 2012: 72) that discourse based on habitus appears as the "dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of interiority." By virtue of overcoming this problem of the precedence of the origins of knowledge, it is possible to talk about "transcending subjective intentions" into the realm of objective ones that are nevertheless intentions but tuned in with other ones. This interactive coordination produces the precondition for the existence of a certain discourse: the system of linguistic and cultural competence responsible for effective communication and understanding. Thus it can be repeated after Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 80) that "'communication of consciousness' presupposes community of 'unconsciousness.'" The habitus is hence the unconscious condition for the existence of conscious, objectified discourses dependent on the position within the field.

3.3. On the notion of language

Language in the work of Bourdieu is treated in a similar way to the neo-Kantian theories that establish the creative power relation between words and outside reality. "Symbolic efficacy in the construction of reality is perfectly justified" – writes Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 105). In another sentence he states that language helps to organize the world's impressions in patterns that are governed by certain rules: "the act of naming helps to establish the structure of this world, and does so all the more significantly the more widely it is recognized, *i.e.* authorized" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 105). Here the main difference is visible between the Bourdieusian understanding of what a language is and what a discourse is. Language appears as the structuring according to certain rules of the impressions flowing from the experiencing of the world. Discourse is seen as the background toward which this language reaches in order to legitimate its acts, to authorize them. Discourse is here the source of legitimation and authorization for the sentences of language. This is very clearly seen in the usage of different discourses by different social groups, *e.g.* in the case of scientific discourse where the consensus between members of

this given group is the source of the existence of a discourse of science. To be granted the possibility to speak in the name of the group of people called scientists the social actor must receive acceptance of his utterances and understandings, some kind of "imprimatur." The language he uses is arbitrary and optional, but his discourse must be in agreement with the discourse of the group he aspires to, and in whose name he tries to speak.

The problem of discourse is inherently connected with the issue of language, and language can be understood in two ways, from two distinct points of view: one description will embrace it as a completely interior phenomenon projected by the individual, though with the consciousness of the exterior elements take part in the creation of a certain outlook. The second description would have language as the determinative power of the exteriority. In the first case, free will is one of the elements that is assumed when talking about this approach to language. Individual experiences, reflection, engagement and consciousness are here dominating moments that influence the thinking and shaping of the identity. When we talk about Gadamerian categories like *Bildung* ([1960] 2004: 8–17), fusion of horizons ([1960] 2004: 305), Heideggerian Care ([1927] 1994: 444–452) and Throwing into the World ([1927] 1994: 248–255) (or progressing toward death), Foucault's *epimeleia heautou* – Taking Care of the Self ([1994] 2000b: 255) – all these moments take place in the horizon of this first understanding of the notion of language, where interiority has greater weight than the exteriority of the surrounding where the subjects live. We are reminded here also about Saussurean language that is also purely "'internal,' in the sense that [it] […] focus[es] exclusively on the internal constitution of a text or corpus of texts, and hence ignore[s] the social-historical conditions" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 4). However, there is also this second site, the site directed toward the outside of our experience, toward its exteriority. Here language is understood differently, not as the instrument of salvation from the constraints that come from subjects, but the other way round, as the mechanism of coercion. Language here does not free subjects from their determinations, it locks them in the world of its only possible range of vocabulary, terminology shaped by virtue of enslaving but necessary reductions, and the notions that rather deceive humans with regard to the truth of life and their own condition instead of making them aware of reality. However, this

language is the only one that accepts its origin as coming from the interrelations and communication between people, so as being formed in the melting pot of social interaction through the certain "dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 72). This language is conscious of its limitations, it is not destined to release its hidden powers to name what was until then unnamed and thus to make humans conscious of their determinations. This language – and the language proposed by Bourdieu belongs here – as the product of human interaction is designed precisely to depict the mechanisms and dangers that appear in this interaction. This language constitutes the field where the positions of agents, the changes in the net of relations of power and accumulations of different kinds of capitals can be mapped out. These elements can be projected into the sphere of language only on the condition that they are the products of the powers of language. Language is not automatically the solution of these problems, but it reveals them, it is the plan of their exposition, thanks to its elementary limitations. Language for Bourdieu is rather the arena of conflict and the exposition of "intimidation and abuse, […] politeness, condescension and contempt" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 1). This language is hence the origin of legitimation of certain powers and can be also, on the same principle, the instrument of reinforcement of the existing social order. However, by remaining on the site of exteriority and deriving the rules of its working from the same exterior arrangements of society makes it a tool that can recover and name mechanisms responsible for the situations that appear in the society. Disadvantage is thus turned into language's advantage, and there is no instrument better to detect and identify all society's problems than the language that was created in the struggle concerning this very society. After all, language for Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 4) is the effect of the insertion of the exterior, social element into the interiority of individual discourses, it is "the interplay between linguistic practices and concrete forms of social life" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 2), linguistic practices being the objective *a priori* moment employed in the realization of individual forms of social life.

For Bourdieu, the group that achieves the dominant position by operating the "right" language also dominates in the other areas of culture and society. Language for Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 5) is the ticket to the position of domination within different areas of society. It helps

to achieve the symbolic power and – what follows – different kinds of capitals: intellectual, economic, cultural. Language can also endow certain groups with the authority to state something legitimately on some topic. This restores power to the groups that rule in the area of different cultural or linguistic competences. Thus "linguistic exchanges – are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers or their respective groups are actualized" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 37). Learning competences within the area of language is hence the gate through which certain groups can enter into the space of power to legitimate their way of thinking and their activities.

Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 44–45) indicates important moments that take place in the creation of the legitimate language, which usually is the unconscious support for the existing social order with all its inequalities and abuses. It would be impossible to notice the stratifying functions of language without taking into account the theory of language introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure ([1916] 1959). Language is here presented as an independent entity that works solely by virtue of its inherent rules and it is the relational power of language that imposes the understanding of its meanings. It has nothing to do with social or historical influences, it is the inner workings of language that appoint the value to its meanings that are further used by participants in communication. Language provides meanings and users employ them in interaction. Bourdieu finds that:

> [t]his philosophy of history which makes the internal dynamics of a language the sole principle of the limits of its diffusion, conceals the properly political process of unification whereby a determinate set of 'speaking subjects' is led in practice to accept the official language. ([1977] 2010: 44)

Bourdieu observes here that the reason why de Saussure spoke about language, clear of any alien elements, that develops independently of any influences from the outside is that he did not take into account the primary processes of legitimation that legitimated this language as the official one. The realization of these processes of legitimation made possible the existence of such an independent language. Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 44) calls this independent language (*langage*) that is given in advance (*discours*) and is analyzed by de Saussure ([1916] 1959: 9) as *langue* – the official language (*langage*), independent of any social

usage influences (*parole*). This official language, however, should not be analyzed as the first, *a priori* given, language, independent of any social influences. It can be taken for granted that it is the most elementary level of analysis of language because this language is found to be already legitimated. It is forgotten that the processes of legitimation had to be realized at least on the same basic level or earlier to produce the language taken by subject as "a self-contained whole and a principle of classification" (de Saussure [1916] 1959: 9). That is, the assumed French discourse system here is that *parole* (speaking) is contextualized by *discours* (speech) as a personal narrative or *story* (*l'histoire*) as connotation, whereas *langue* (dialect) is contextualized by *langage* (grammatical language) as a public narrative or history (also *l'histoire*) as denotation. Thus for Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 87), Discourse becomes an unconscious habit (*habitus*) that takes on the power of a social norm (*hexis*). Hence, de Saussure was deceived by the unjustified assumption about the priority of the official language. It is due to its social use that this official language comes into existence. Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 45) exposes this misunderstanding and indicates how concentrating on the official language recursively reinforces the powers that stand behind its introduction. That is why to speak about *the* language is not the solution of the problem but only a hypothesis that needs to be supported with arguments. Nevertheless, the arguments are on Bourdieu's side, when he states ([1977] 2010: 45) that "[p]roduced by authors who have the authority to write […] the language is a code […] in the sense of a system of norms regulating linguistic practices." Other languages may be excluded from the area of legitimation, hence they may not possess the quality of an argument in the space of a discourse. This also means that certain groups may be deprived of language, which means that they cannot defend their cultural and social rights – they become mute. It can be seen here how Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 45) exposes a crucial difficulty with language: where there is no language, no discourse equipped with certain norms, rules, and values can appear. Following the Saussurean presuppositions that there is only one language and one discourse responsible for its legitimation, we have to admit that people who are the users of different languages cannot take part in the organization of the official discourse and cannot assume the privileged positions of power that are through it engendered. As a result, they are excluded not only from discourse, they are also excluded

from the possibility of winning concrete profits. The understanding of language in the way proposed by de Saussure ([1916] 1959) prevents us from understanding the mechanisms of power and excludes certain groups from participation in the processes of reinforcement of the existing order that excludes them from the system of rewards and benefit. Forgetting about the social origins of language and about its creation through the constant use by their real users makes possible a discourse on society that serves the interests of only those who possess the power to legitimate their position.

3.4. Discourse of belief

The struggle for linguistic authority is the precondition and the rule for taking part in the monopoly of legitimate discourse. The stake is high, because discourse in the understanding by Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 35) is not only the regulated space for the appearance of coherent expression about certain subject within its respective culture, but it is the condition for the production of values within a given field. The value of a work of art is constituted through the creation of a certain belief, and it is this belief that forms the basis for a discourse. Later, when appointed specialists invest their symbolic capital (their prestige) in the reinforcement of the position of the artist, the subject starts to understand the value of the work of other people who took part in the creation of this belief: "The production of discourse (critical, historical, etc.) about a work of art is one of the conditions of production of the work" (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 35). It can be observed here how a certain ideology within the artistic field appears. It is connected with the cooperation of many agents to "consecrate" the space of discussion, which is further the source of legitimation of the presentation of the work of art. "The work of art is an object which exists as such only by virtue of the (collective) belief which knows and acknowledges it as a work of art" (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 35). Even critics who seem to be the only group independently evaluating the worth of the object of art are not excluded from this rule. They "declare not only their judgement of the work but also their claim to the right to talk about it and judge it. In short, they take part in a struggle for the monopoly of legitimate discourse about the work of art, and consequently in the production of the value of the work of art" (Bourdieu [1968–1987] 2012: 36). Following this line

of argumentation it can be asked after Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 76): who creates the creator? Discourse plays an important role in setting up the boundaries of space within which anything worth the artistic gaze can appear. This discourse can be perceived as the homogenous space that governs the appearance of the work of art. All the instruments that later help the work of art to be discovered and granted the value are brought into existence by the rules indicated by this space of discourse. Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 39) writes even more strongly that "[w]hat circulates on the linguistic market is not 'language' as such, but rather discourses that are stylistically marked both in their production […] and in their reception […]." To build the value of certain objects, and to gain profits from participation in appointing some expressions, legitimate or not legitimate, is first to build a discourse that would secure all the position-takings within the field of power. Discourse provides language that consecrates certain undertakings and is reciprocally reinforced through allocating prestige and power to it because of the legitimation that produces profits. However, Bourdieu observes ([1977] 2010: 58) that to make the process of legitimation permanent, continuous creation is necessary for only such creation can ensure the imposition of the dominant mode of expression. It has to be remembered that creators are not phantoms, they really create objects; the procedure is more complicated. The self-perpetuating mechanisms produce not only works of art which are highly valued on the market, but they also produce artists who really excel in their craft. Discourse is self-perpetuating because it produces not only objects to which the label of the great value is attached but it also produces the masters in their profession. The real social inequality stems from the unequal possibilities of taking part in such a discourse that transforms your moderate abilities into the level of artistic geniuses. Discourse for Bourdieu is the space of competence by entering into which the subject is provided with possibilities that other social enterprises would not offer.

4. Summary of the thought of Pierre Bourdieu

The notion of discourse in Bourdieu's writings is inseparably connected with his methodology, *i.e.* his notion of the field and position-taking within this field. The quality of discourse is determined by the particularity

of the position occupied by discourse's actors in a field of competition. Language that belongs to discourse is organized by the rules that are obligatory within discourse. It is authorized by persons granted authority thanks to the possession of different kinds of capital: economic, symbolic, intellectual or others. Discourses and within them authorized languages are treated as the fields that guarantee certain kind of authority for their users. They work in such a way that their work is distributed and performed within the frames that constitute the space consisting of different elements, their properties, positions, different processes and relations. The processes are realized with regard to assumed positions and they result in changing the positions within the field of discourse. These changes, or simply, their positions are experienced as the values and qualities granted to persons and their language that are organized within the field. Discourse is here treated as the space for these undertakings. The participation in that space results in certain qualities being attributed to certain persons, which situates them on the ladder of social hierarchy or within its structures. "[T]he substance of […] discourse […] is no more than a testimony […] of the guarantee of delegation" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 107). People that participate in a discourse are delegated by it to certain fields of action, are granted values and become the value of a given variable. "[T]he substance of discourse, depends on the social position of the speaker, which governs the access he can have to the language of the institution, that is, to the official, orthodox and legitimate speech" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 109). Discourse is the space of an organization of certain variables and their participation in a system organized by them. Everybody has to participate in it, one way or another; there are no selves that are not also actors in this game of discourses, which equip individuals with certain predispositions to invest their strengths in the appropriate area of the struggle. Different kinds of competences are indicated and determined through taking over a certain position, *e.g.* through becoming a certain variable within the field of discourse. Thus becoming a certain variable determines access to different possibilities placed within the social discourse: "[i]t is the access to the legitimate instruments of expression, and therefore the participation in the authority of the institution, which makes *all* the difference […]" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 109). Bourdieu writes ([1977] 2010: 107–111) that discourse is the basis responsible for making both kinds of enunciation: communicative ones

and performatives. Here the differentiation between different kinds of utterances made by John L. Austin has to be brought to mind. He (Austin [1962] 1975: 109) divided speaking acts into locutionary acts that have conventional sense and reference, illocutionary acts such as informing, warning, *etc.*, and perlocutionary acts with which it is possible to *i.e.* convince, persuade or mislead.

Bourdieu underlines that when he speaks about discourse he has in mind not only the communicative uses of language but also the performative uses where subject can do something with words. Bourdieu notes ([1977] 2010: 111) that speech that is undertaken is always directed from certain, valuable spheres of discourse. It gains the value of being representative of all the elements that are contained within this discourse. Hence, concrete speech is laden with all the characteristics of a given discourse launched by uttering one of its elements: "[…] speech concentrates within it the accumulated symbolic capital of the group which has delegated him [a given discourse user] and of which he is the *authorized representative*" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 111). Discourse is here seen as a place in which different kinds of capital are accumulated and transformed by virtue of the rules of the working of this discourse, rules that are also constituted through the interplay of these capitals. Discourse is a source of competences in which participation grants individuals certain positions within the social field. It can also be treated as the matrix of relations realized in a social reality, resembling the order of these relations in social life. Bourdieu also states ([1977] 2010: 111) that the value of the performative act is gained through the establishment of the relationship "between the properties of discourses, the properties of the person who pronounces them and the properties of the institution which authorizes him to pronounce them." Only the summing of all these elements grants a certain performative act its value, otherwise it would not reach its point (*e.g.* proclaiming the name of the ship by an inappropriate person would not be considered as naming it properly). Summarizing, it should not be considered that some expressions possess value in themselves alone, as if they were their own essential source of power, because it is rather that their power "in reality resides in the institutional conditions of their production and reception" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 111) which can further be derived from the qualities of discourses within which they are inscribed.

Bourdieu indicates ([1977] 2010: 113) that it is not that discourse has to be understood and recognized in order to make its conditions and values true. It is enough that it is unconsciously related to, that it grants certain utterances that derive their origins from its certain values. The discourse of authority is such a discourse. People do not think important to express the recognition of the certain discourse; they take it for granted and use it as a legitimation of their speech or action. Discourses of authority also usually have to be referred to or launched through the usage of their expressions by persons who belong to these discourses. Bourdieu calls this authority to use certain discourses and certain languages a *skeptron* which is the licence to be "known and recognized as being able and enabled to produce this particular class of discourse: a priest, a teacher, a poet […]" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 113). To possess a certain skeptron means to be authorized by the appropriate group as the executor of their power to legitimate.

Bourdieu also explains the insufficiency of Austin's elaboration of the problems with language. He notes that the language of authority is only:

> the limiting case of the legitimate language, whose authority does not reside […] in the intrinsic properties of discourse itself, but rather in the social conditions of production and reproduction of the distribution between the classes of the knowledge and recognition of the legitimate language. (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 113)

However, on the basis of the Bourdieusian assumptions presented above, it can be stated that the power to produce and reproduce the structures of distribution of knowledge comes from certain positions of the agent within the field of discourse. It is discourse that grants power to those who participate in it and the participation in this discourse is what legitimates the actions undertaken. To be part of an institution or to work by virtue of it means that the subject has to possess language (competence) to work out his actions within society. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that for Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 113) it is the social conditions that decide on the reproduction of recognition of legitimate discourse – in the final analysis it is the economy that decides about the superstructure of culture and its legitimation. These presumptions originate directly from Marxism and Weber's influences present in Bourdieu's theory.

The last, conclusive idea in Bourdieu's theory is the idea of symbolic power; certain classes or privileged groups possess it, which makes them more powerful to authorize their proceedings. Though Bourdieu's idea of language derives much from the neo-Kantian idea of its creative power with regard to reality, his theory of symbolic power is more committed to structuralist assumptions on the problem of knowledge. However above all, it is desirable to follow Durkheim to see how Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 164) tries to avoid the distinction between apriorism and empiricism and proposes a theory based on symbolic forms that "cease to be universal (transcendental) forms and become […] social forms, that is, forms that are arbitrary (relative to a particular group) and socially determined" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 164). Structuralist assumptions, nevertheless, operate on forms that are treated as structured structures which "can exercise a structuring power only because they themselves are structured" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 166). This is remarkable change in the understanding of the problem of the origin of knowledge: inquiry and knowing something are based on forms that are taken from the range of possible forms accessible in the society, or in other words, that are created within different discourses that are obligatory for their participants. Symbolic power perceived as "a power of constructing reality" (Bourdieu [1977] 2010: 166) is here one of the main constituents of the field of discourse – it is as much created within the frames of discourse as it creates this discourse reflexively. Discourse is seen here as embracing different symbolic forms, which are the instruments of social integration. In this sense it dictates the forms that are available for use in the communication of different meanings as well as dictating the standard and the style of the communication. What is worth indicating is that Bourdieu ([1977] 2010: 166) finds that proper discourse is also a condition for proper morality, where the language it proposes provides the logic of communication and this "'[l]ogical' integration is the precondition of 'moral' integration." Proper discourse is here the entrance to the sphere of ethics. Expressions that are made available for use within a discourse by this discourse's quality have here not only ontological, but also ethical commitments.

A comparison of the three discourse paradigms

At the beginning of this inquiry I presented my aim to analyze the notion of discourse comprised in the writings of Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. However it was not claimed that the possession of complete knowledge on the thought and works of each of the above-mentioned scientists is possible: it would be impossible to know all the intricacies resulting from their works. Even extensively elaborated biographies about one of the chosen authors often cannot exhaust the topic, let alone a dissertation that aims to provide an outline on only one aspect of their works, namely: discourse. It therefore seemed reasonable, taking into account the scope of the subject, to weave the thread of argumentation through this broad area focusing mainly on the subject of discourse. I provide only the necessary information on the history of thought, methodology or other basic notions to support the understanding of the relations in which the notion of discourse is entangled and without which a proper understanding of its workings would be impossible.

However, after conducting all the analyses and presenting each of the writers' characteristic approaches, their assumptions on the notion of discourse and their elaborations on the subject, I am in a position to describe the interrelations between these writers' works and thoughts and to focus mainly on the comparison of their research.

The arguments that are taken into account in the analysis of the notion of discourse come from the theories presented by the chosen writers, each examined separately. In order to uphold or oppose these arguments, it would be useful to have some other perspective from which it would be possible to examine the topic of discourse, in other words, the vision

of discourse that reaches beyond what has been said on the topic in the above pages. This different vision could serve as something against which to measure the authors' approaches. Such a view of discourse can be found in the book on *Jacques Derrida i doświadczenie. Rekontekstualizacja* ("Jacques Derrida and Experience. Recontextualization") written by Xymena Synak-Pskit (2010). The author (Synak-Pskit 2010: 118) defines a discourse here not so much as the linguistic result of operations on meanings but rather as the "event" of discourse. Discourse appears here as the event of sense, and writing is seen as the figure of experience that opens this possibility of sense. The event of discourse in the work of Synak-Pskit (2010: 116), understood as the "*a priori* synthesis," seems at first sight to be a reduced version of the discourse understood broadly as consisting of social cognitions and social relations as is held by van Dijk. However, even if Synak-Pskit's proposition seems to remain only on the level of the semantic analysis of language and the constitution of sense, it must be noticed that it is not the author's goal to place discourse once again in the area of language itself. Discourse for Synak-Pskit (2010: 116) is an event in the sense that it overcomes the limitation of van Dijk's linguistic treatment of it. For Synak-Pskit (2010: 116) discourse is a field for the appearance of moments of the presence of sense, of the moments when sense is created. Discourse is here based on these points when sense exists, moments that are bound by language but do not exist only in language. They are described as "transcendental *signifié*," where transcendence is understood as crossing over the border, which can be taken here as crossing over the border of language itself. This transcendence means that sense, in agreement with the principle of contrast with its surroundings, can enter into the sphere of *being present*. Here the immanence of the field can be added, where this quality of the sense's *being present* may be realized. The field of positions and relations between these positions presented in the approach to discourse by Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012, [1972] 2012) may conveniently depict what this sphere of immanence could look like. Discourse, in consequence of being supported on these assumptions, would be the result of realized syntheses making present given senses in the field of relations and their positions provided by background knowledge. This background knowledge understood as the resource and tool kit of possible social cognitions makes these sense syntheses possible and at the same time locates them in a historically

and socially given field. Discourse as the outcome of semantic synthesis of *a priori* meanings realized in the possible, indicated by relations and background knowledge fields of interaction best described by Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012, [1972] 2012) would be the hallmark of the form of the proper understanding of discourse. Discourse understood as the result of the creation of sense that is thrown into the background of the social environment, which is also its condition.

Equipped with the methodological notions of field positions presented by Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 29–74, 161–175) the subject is provided with the possibility of understanding a notion of discourse exterior to the examples described in this dissertation. Before the final comparison and summary, it is worth bearing in mind other resolutions, like that of Xymena Synak-Pskit (2010: 116), with regard to the notion of discourse.

One of the major problems undertaken by van Dijk in his works is the problem of ideology. Van Dijk (1998: 5) situates it within the conceptual triangle of cognition, society and discourse. Ideology is the problem that incorporates these dimensions: it can be treated as an autonomous system of ideas or as a strictly social phenomenon. Among social institutions, there are some that are of an inherently discursive character: the prime functions of ideology are usually connected with the discursive dimension. Van Dijk (1998: 5) mentions here functions like: concealment, legitimation, manipulation or persuasion presented here in the part concerning his linguistics. In his writings he tends to treat the notion of discourse from the view point of ideology rather than the other way round.

At the beginning of his work *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* van Dijk (1998: 6) attaches the term discourse to problems of "language use, text, talk and communication." He also needs "discursive manifestations" to reveal certain ideologies before our eyes. Discourses are for him "not the only ideologically based social practices, they certainly are the most crucial ones in the formulation of ideologies" (van Dijk 1998: 6). Van Dijk (1998: 6) presents discourses as "forms of social action and interaction, situated in social contexts of which the participants are not merely speakers/writers and hearers/readers, but also social actors who are members of groups and cultures." This means that van Dijk introduces into the problem of discourse social elements that were also

of crucial importance for Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu ([1972] 2012: 72) tried to connect the internal, individual element and the social, external ones in the creation of individual knowledge with the help of the notion of habitus. Van Dijk (1998: 6) sees three moments that are important for the appearance of ideology: cognition, society and discourse, where cognition and society correspond to the internal and external elements in the creation of the Bourdieusian habitus. For Bourdieu discourse was the incentive element, assumed, but never brought to the surface of conscious linguistic analysis about it: in *e.g. Outline of a Theory of Practice* ([1972] 2012) discourse is hidden behind linguistic structures treating about social behaviours. Van Dijk (1998: 6) problematizes discourse as one of three basic moments responsible for the creation of a sphere where the problems of knowledge are worked out. He underlines the importance of social elements in the creation of discourse and though "[d]iscourse rules and norms are socially shared" (van Dijk 1998: 6) it is brought into existence by the achievements of individual practice that can adopt different kind of competence. For Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 226) competence is created in the processes inaugurated by habitus. It is achieved in the training of everyday routine experience and by the introduction of legitimation based on consensus of social groups. This competence in the works of Bourdieu as well as in the writings by van Dijk (1998: 54–55, 246) was found to be a stage on the way to the acquisition of qualifications possible to legitimate certain actions. In van Dijk's research (1998) it can be observed how the notion of discourse gains the quality of the phenomenon responsible for the creation of certain views.

Van Dijk finds (1998: 193) that his concept of discourse is fuzzy in the way language, communication or society are fuzzy. This concept lies at the intersection of linguistic, cognitive, social or cultural analysis and is the result of the examination of text and context undertaken from a "critical, socio-political perspective" (van Dijk 1998: 193). To differentiate between discourse and ideology for van Dijk it is necessary first to differentiate between ideology and usual, cognitive representations used in everyday communication. Ideology is never presented here simply as a system of beliefs, though it may be treated as a kind of introductory and general description. Treating ideology as a system of beliefs would not differentiate between beliefs that are ideological in character and

other cognitive representations that may not be ideological. To function
in a society the subject usually uses socially shared cognitive representa-
tions. However, what makes a system of beliefs ideologically biased is
the fundamentality of these beliefs that reaches to the very interests
and goals of a group. Ideologies in van Dijk's theoretical framework are
"merely the most fundamental social representations shared by a group,
namely, those representations that embody its overall interests and goals"
(1993: 41). The relation of ideology to discourse is such that ideology, as
well as other social conditions that are less fundamental in character,
may be used in the process of the creation of discourse, but discourse
may not always be based on ideology.

Discourse for van Dijk (1993: 41) is something more general than
ideology. Ideology reaches deeply into the very goals, interests and
fundamental predilections of social agents. It is rather their deep social,
cognitive and political orientation, beliefs that express their inner inclina-
tions with regard to their basic theoretical convictions and attachments.
Discourse operates within the less deep area of general and relatively
abstract social representations. These can be useful when social partic-
ipants try to come to know their general statements on the background
of statements of other members of a group: "only through discourse can
people come to know directly what the general opinions are of other
group members" and "discourse is the most effective way to both acquire
and share general attitudes" (van Dijk 1993: 41). Hence, the main differ-
ence between ideology and discourse for van Dijk appears to pertain to
another differentiation, namely that between ideology and knowledge.
In the comparison of discourse and ideology it is discourse that is shifted
much more in the direction of knowledge. Ideological beliefs represent
rather the particular dimension of individual interests, goals and predi-
lections: the individual theoretical inclinations of a given social agent.
In other words, discourse is the dimension where social communication
is made possible. It is not so much appointed to or focused on the individ-
ual sphere of social cognition. Discourse operates on a broadly available,
general, abstract level of statements that help to situate each social actor
in the field of socially possible positions. Discourse, like knowledge, is
not relative in character. It situates the social agent in the objective field
of positions and thus makes interaction possible. Ideology for van Dijk
has little in common with knowledge. It can be treated as the external

effect of the implementation of Bourdieusian habitus, being concerned mainly with individual predispositions that are further transposed into their social embeddings. These individual predispositions are embodied in the form of individual interests and goals and are later represented in socially shared attitudes and evaluations. That is why ideologies divide instead of connecting. They cannot be regarded as a sufficient background basis from which objectively valid, universal valuations can emerge. From the background of ideology valuations emerge that are relative to the particular social group or individual. Having ideology as a basis can practically guarantee that the valuations that will emerge from this group's convictions will serve the interests of only this one, particular group without taking into account the interests of other social members. Having ideology at a basis, the social agent thus attempts to legitimize different inequalities and this means that instituting ideology as the basis of any social enterprise is a sufficient condition for giving rise to injustice. In this sense van Dijk states that: "ideologies feature the fundamental social principles and building blocks, such as norms and values, underlying the structures and formation of attitudes. That is, they represent the mental embodiment of the fundamental social, economic, and/or cultural goals and interests of a group" (1993: 40). It can be noticed here that reaching deeply into the sphere of individual predilection (of each agent) means that the sphere of objectivity that makes communication and social interaction possible is evaded. Ideology is partial and the partiality of the deep, inward, individual is contrasted here with the universal and objective, simply expressed at the level of the socially available means of discourse. Discourse, hence, appears as the area for the possibility of achieving communication, whereas ideology, reaching more deeply into the grounds of the individual being makes it impossible to find a common language for the expression of the experiences of all members of society, serving rather only certain, privileged groups. Discourse for van Dijk (1993: 41) is hence much closer to knowledge in being more general, more abstract, more objective and available for inter-group communication. It makes the working of society possible, hence it stands not only for the semantic structures of sense, but also for socially shared representations of a general and objective character.

However, while comparing van Dijk's ideology to the external effect of the implementation of habitus the reader should bear in mind

the importance of the notion of habitus and give justice to it. Habitus is after all about the social accommodation to the cultural surroundings, but it can equally be viewed as the effect of these social situations: it is the "product of structures, producer of practices, and reproducer of structures" (Bourdieu, Passeron 1977, cited in Swartz 1997: 97). Stating that ideology is the external effect of the implementation of habitus means that the result of the working of habitus is the production of abilities that are of an individual character. This makes possible their appropriation to the external world. Habitus is, of course, an outcome of the workings of these external conditions. Nevertheless, its primary effect is the integration of the workings of these conditions into the very individual abilities in the form of certain dispositions toward some solutions. Ideology by van Dijk can be characterized in the same way: it is directed externally toward other social groups but it is the product of the working of evaluations originating internally, of interests and goals worked out internally. The internal dimension that is produced and optimized by habitus is directed outside and is grasped and formed in the system of socially shared representations. It would be astounding if representations produced in such a way were not biased, not relative and not directed to the achievement of benefits for only a certain group of social agents. After all, individuals differ, hence it is not possible to satisfy the specific interests of everyone. Interests must be brought to a more universal, objective and hence also less differentiated level for it to be possible for everyone to be satisfied: not being green haired, having long legs, short hands and reading comics for everyone, but rather a certain freedom of choice for everyone. The first example may be ideologically based on the view that *e.g.* if our grandpa was green haired and he was a good man then green haired people would be better people, that is why everybody should be green haired. The second example grants everybody the possibility to choose whether they want to be good and green haired or rather good with her usual hair colour.

Another similarity between the theories on discourse of van Dijk and Bourdieu is that van Dijk (1993: 47) operates on the Bourdieusian notion of symbolic capital. His theory makes use of this notion when he speaks about the reproduction of the existing social order of inequality by elites. Following his line of argumentation it can be observed how symbolic capital understood strictly in Bourdieusian terms creates a power base

that is responsible for the support of the existing order. Symbolic capital for van Dijk (1993: 47) creates a situation in which the possession of the power of legitimation of some states is automatically legitimated. Bourdieu also writes about the legitimation of a certain power to legitimate some states in a similar way. In *The Field of Cultural Production* ([1968–1987] 2012: 36) he writes about the situation of professional critics of art who "declare not only their judgement of the work but also their claim to the right to talk about it and judge it." Thus, according to Bourdieu ([1968–1987] 2012: 36), a certain discourse on a work of art is also initiated or supported, because "corps of professionals [make themselves] appointed to conserve the work of art." Finding themselves to be the only legitimate ones to speak about art because they possess a certain trained competence in speaking about it, they delimit the sphere where discourse on art can appear, they inaugurate and consecrate this discourse because they produce its main moment: they produce the value of the work of art based on the belief they have aroused in it. They make others believe in the value of a piece of art based on certain, produced conjointly, discourse.

Ideologies may decide about who is to keep and who is to be refused the possession of certain types of capital, especially symbolic capital. In this sense van Dijk's theory is certainly related to that of Bourdieu. *Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach* (1998) presents the view that the amount of possessed symbolic capital may be dependent on the ideologically shaped social representations of the group. These social representations may have an evaluative function which means that the application of certain ideologically biased beliefs may result in the support or destruction of somebody's capital. Ideology in the work of van Dijk appears to be a very strong instrument in the hands of social agents responsible for the constant undermining or supporting of the convictions and actions of others. It should be remembered that ideology for van Dijk is not only the theoretical outcome of certain semantic assumptions, it is inherently connected with the other valid and crucial part of cognition – its social dimension. Ideologies in this sense are instruments involving concrete actions in the social communicative area. Van Dijk presents many social examples of abuse of power and seems to suggest that it is ideology, through its mechanisms of influencing different discourses, that is responsible for this social abuse of power.

Thanks to the repetition of arguments concerning the production of artistic discourse it is simpler to understand the notion of discourse in general. The question of the distinction between discourse and ideology or knowledge must now be reviewed in the work of Bourdieu.

First of all, discourse in the work of Bourdieu must be analyzed from the point of view of habitus which is the main driving force in its creation. It is, on the one hand, the space for storing facts originating from knowledge, on the other hand, the principle governing the production of new knowledge, assimilation and "regulated improvisation." It is in this "regulation" – improvisation is always already regulated – that the working of habitus is visible. Regulation takes place on the basis of inherited internal rules that are ultimately determined by the social surrounding within which social agents grow up. In the paragraphs above concerning the comparison of van Dijk's ideology to the external effects of habitus, its social, interactive dimension is mentioned. Here, it must be repeated with regard to the notion of discourse that the "generative principle of regulated improvisations" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 78) that governs the creation of discourse is the guarantee of the objectivity of created views. Hence, on the one hand, ideology is juxtaposed with habitus because of its employment of the internal powers that are at their roots individual and not repetitive in character, but on the other hand it is discourse that must be juxtaposed with habitus – because as Bourdieu states, habitus is the guarantee of objectivity. Habitus appears here to possess the astounding quality that joins two powers: that directed from inward externally and the other one that introduces what is external into the very core of our internal character. In this regard Bourdieusian habitus resembles the relation of social to cognitive in van Dijk's theory. In this case it can also be observed how the external element takes part in the creation of the internal one and also the other way round. Interiority, created in such a way, determines how the exteriority will be perceived. I think that the rules working in the theory of enactionism also describe this problem very well: Foley openly states ([1997] 2009: 12–13) that the basic insight that stands behind Bourdieu's idea of habitus is precisely this notion of embodied practice where "brains use processes that change themselves," where "we cannot separate such processes from the products they produce" (Minsky 1986: 288, cited in Foley [1997] 2009: 9). The idea of Bourdieusian habitus realizes this kind of thinking

that "the results of [nervous system] internal processes are more of its own internal processes" (Foley [1997] 2009: 9). In this sense the "range of possible subsequent states" (Foley [1997] 2009: 10) that habitus may procure is determined by the states in which it can take part, which is recursively determined by the state habitus is actually in. This idea of embodied actions is common to both, van Dijk's idea of social cognition and Bourdieu's idea of habitus. Discourse is the result of processes understood in this way.

Discourse for Bourdieu is determined by the possibilities provided by habitus: the regulated and regulative practice of habitus determines the shape of discourse which also consists of meanings that are the result of conscious production by an agent, or of meanings that are the result of the influence of conditions working in historical time which are absorbed into the body of knowledge unconsciously. Discourse in the work of Bourdieu consists of these two dimensions, similar to the "regulated and regulative" dimension of habitus. Bourdieu while talking about this second dimension of discourse, based on assimilated, but unconscious meanings, uses the words "intentionless intention" and notes that the actions and works of the social agent contain "'objective intention' […] which always outruns his conscious intentions" ([1972] 2012: 79). Discourse is hence both: the sphere that is consciously produced on the basis of a certain background, and of the sphere where objectively universal meanings accumulated throughout the centuries are conveyed. It is also the outcome of the working of these two spheres on each other, whose best representation and governing principle will be the notion of habitus. A good conclusion on the relations between van Dijk's and Bourdieu's notions of discourse, ideology and knowledge would be that in the latter's presentation discourse is the "dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of interiority" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 72), whereas in the presentation of the former, ideology is the result of the tendency of habitus to externalize interiority, while discourse is found to be rather the objectivation, generalization and universalization of this internal sphere in humans. Both, internalization of externality and externalization of interiority are characteristics of the broader problem of the integration of socially shared representations into the body of cognition, representations that do not always need to be ideologically biased and may take part in the formation of discourse.

Van Dijk (1998: 233) writes rather from the point of view of ideology and its reproduction. He uses the notion of discourse as a prop in understanding what ideology and racism are. Van Dijk states explicitly that "ideologies cannot be reduced to discourse" (1998: 317), but "discourse has a special function in the expression, implementation and especially the reproduction of ideologies" (1998: 316) and it is "only through language use, discourse or communication […] that [ideologies] can be explicitly formulated" (1998: 317). Hence, it can be observed that discourse, though the equivalent of the dimension of human experience less deeply rooted in the individual than is the case with ideology is a much more basic term. This discourse can be applied not only to the formulation of ideology, but it operates on a much more universal and socially available level. It can also be used for the construction of the scientific view, *i.e.* can be used for the formulation of assumptions concerning objective knowledge.

We should also make some final remarks with regard to the notions of discourse, ideology and knowledge in the work of Foucault. My aim is to compare these notions with those presented by Bourdieu and van Dijk and formulate conclusions.

In his work *The Order of Things* Foucault ([1966] 2002: 261) talks about ideology *a propos* his description of the conditions of the coexistence of ideology and critical philosophy in 18th century. Foucault notes there ([1966] 2002: 261) that ideology in these times was based on the domain of representations, however, but it "does not question the foundation, the limits, or the root of representation." Bringing to mind the definition of ideology as it appeared in the 18th century is important because it situated all knowledge "in the space of representations" (Foucault [1966] 2002: 261). Knowledge was made to provide the rules for the organization of representations, hence, it was reduced to the position of supplying the methodological tools, laws of composition and decomposition, links of connection, for ideology. Ideology "tried to resume in the form of representation precisely what was being formed and re-formed outside representation" (Foucault [1966] 2002: 263). Only when Kant started critically questioning representations with regard to their foundations, origins and limits, did he cause "the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation" (Foucault [1966] 2002: 263). This situation can be compared with charges posited

by van Dijk against ideology. In his writings ideology is also presented as reaching toward the depths of human predispositions and bringing to the light of the day, to the surface of discourse inner interests and goals, without asking about their origins. Van Dijk's ideology posits the values of somebody's inner convictions or drives as universally valid and un-questionable. It is only the critical power of knowledge that can examine the foundations, origins and limits of such posited contents of individual minds. The value of knowledge in both outcomes: by Foucault and by van Dijk lies in this possibility assumed by them of critically questioning contents that are initially assumed to be universally valid without analyz-ing whether this is really the case.

Foucault ([1969] 2011: 203–205) also compares knowledge (*savoir*) with ideology in the work *The Archeology of Knowledge*. First, he notes (Foucault [1969] 2011: 203) that when ideology is critically overcome by asking questions with regard to its foundations, science appears in the field previously occupied by ideology – in the field of knowledge. It is science that is responsible for the organization of discursive formations or discursive unities and practices. However, the relations of discourse, science, knowledge and ideology are more complicated, because ide-ology always permeates the boundaries of what is scientific. Foucault states ([1969] 2011: 204) that ideology takes hold of scientific discourse at the moment when knowledge is transformed into science. Ideology may hold sway at the moment when science is trying to work out its forms, to establish its scientific laws and rules. This is the moment when science is in a state of developing its structures, its discursive regularities, when it is trying to work out the competence of a certain discourse. Then ideology may appear as one of the possible results of this transformation, as one of the possible discursive practices. Foucault proposes a different solution here with regard to ideology than that proposed by van Dijk. Foucault states that to

> tackle the ideological functioning of a science [...] is not to uncover the philosophical presuppositions that may lie within it; nor is it to re-turn to the foundations that made it possible, and that legitimated it: it is to question it as a discursive formation [...] It is to treat it as one practice among others. ([1969] 2011: 205)

We see here that to uncover the workings of ideology in our life it is not enough to make its hidden foundations and origins conscious.

Ideology must be treated, paradoxically, without prejudice as a common example of many forms of discursive formations, it must be treated systematically like these other forms of discourse. In this sense Foucault considers ideology not as something contrary to science, to knowledge, but something that lies within their borders ("Ideology is not exclusive of scientificity" ([1969] 2011: 205)). It can be supposed here that this treatment of ideology makes it also one of the elements responsible for what the whole of discourse looks like within a particular historical narration. Hence ideology, just like the science and knowledge of a particular epoch, is part of the discourse of this epoch, whether it is accepted or not. It is responsible for the shape of some of its discursive formations and it influences others. The barrier for ideology to become science or knowledge may be called by Foucault ([1969] 2011: 206) thresholds of formalization or thresholds of positivity. However, this transition to formalization is also realized within the sphere of all discursive formations. Ideology, as one of the possible discursive formations may have an impact on the shape of the *episteme* of a given epoch. This is because episteme "is not a form of knowledge (*connaissance*) or type of rationality […] [but] the totality of relations that can be discovered" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 211). Ideology as one of possible discursive formations can influence or change the dependencies between these relations.

Discourse for Foucault is not only connected with issues of science and ideology. Its knowledge and sense creation value can also be grasped in writings on the problem of the constitution of the Self. Though Subject for Foucault must first be erased in order to be regained its totalizing and centring function cannot be overrated. It is Subject that undertakes the task of writing, and Foucault states that Subjects "write so as not to die." Writing here has the value of preservation, of saving being in words. Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 89) in his writings on aesthetics tries to establish a space from which the subject could erect its identity. It is the "approach of death […] [that] hollows out in the present and in existence the void toward which and from which we speak" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89). This "void" is understood as the space and origin from which "Ulysses must sing his song of identity" (Foucault [1994] 2000i: 89–90). Discourse is here understood as the place of creation of individual narration about the Self, as the form of Self-creation. Van Dijk (1975b: 286) also speaks about this power of discourse: the power to create the Self. Van Dijk (1975b: 286)

presents this power in the form of narration. Discourse has here the narrative functions that work as models of experience. These narratives are deployed just to sing the song of our identity and present ourselves in everyday life, in conversations "in which we tell each other our personal experiences" (van Dijk 1975b: 285). Narratives provide the possibility to reinstate the chaos of our lives into the space of meaning, to transform it into coherent wholes of a discursive character. For Foucault ([1994] 2000i: 100) the creative power of discourse, of the song of identity is contrasted with the expropriating powers of death: the distance toward death is increased by continuously proliferating meanings, which thus "postpones death indefinitely" ([1994] 2000i: 100). However, it can be clearly stated that Foucault also speaks about narration, about discourse whose power is to save identity, to "arrest the flight of an arrow" ([1994] 2000i: 89) – to freeze passing time in the form of a story.

However, to "sing the song of identity" for Foucault does not have an independent quality, because it serves the higher reason of emancipating the multiplying powers of language. For Foucault it is language that matters and eventually "headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it encounters something like a mirror" ([1994] 2000i: 90). Language finally sees itself in the mirror, it reflects itself alone, not Subject, the Subject is only an accidental side-effect of the powers of language. On the other hand van Dijk and Bourdieu always seem to have before their eyes the social basis from which everyday conversation and ultimately self-creating narration can arise. Nevertheless, discourse in the outcome presented by Foucault reaches more deeply, where the creation of humans' lives appears to be not only the surface layer of its hidden grounds, but the only existence that is accessible; the aesthetics of existence appears to be the only ontology of our being. Foucaultian discourse reaches also into the inner space of our conflict with death. Death as the ultimate possibility that makes possible every narration, that makes possible the temporary synthesis of meaning and sense is absent in the writings by van Dijk and Bourdieu. Discourse understood from this elementary, existential perspective, like at Foucault, would occupy a position at the basis of all its other possible realizations, whether in connection with science, knowledge or ideology. However, in the years following Foucault's inquiry, linguistics and sociology thanks to van Dijk and Bourdieu have gone different ways – ways where reflection on

the social dimension prevails. It would be reasonable to leave Foucault's analyses where they also situate themselves alone – at the indispensable basis of all further examination with regard to the social area, at the "heart" and the centre of considerations about discourse. Discourse analysis would not have succeeded in achieving its goals without presupposing its basic moments disclosed in Foucault's writings. Certainly, its practical incentive, which also influenced Bourdieu so much, comes from the inspiration of Foucault. The linguistic elaboration of the intricacies of discourse by van Dijk do not appear to have the depth of the Foucaultian analysis. Hence, Foucaultian achievements have to be granted the central position of grounding the linguistically elaborated presumptions. Foucault additionally presents the figure of death and its influence on the self-creating identity. Van Dijk deals with linguistic elaboration of the intricacies of the surface structure of discourse. Bourdieu transposes these assumptions into the practical field of positions. It should be noted that the relations between the theories, juxtapositions of arguments, influences of some parts on the others make it clear that the more careful the reading of the works of the subject writers, the greater the possibility of different interpretations.

The decision to undertake this work was dictated by the sole belief in the power of the written material to be analyzed and by the need to attempt to provide answers to the questions posed. Let the reader decide whether this has been achieved. What is certain also for the author is the conviction that the philosophical basis of our times and, as a result, its everyday language representations, are in fact formulated under the very influence of the work of the three writers. Our contemporary perspective on perception and thinking has been shaped and continues to be shaped by the work of Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The notion of discourse that prevails today seems to possess the qualities indicated by them. It is therefore difficult to present a hierarchy of importance of their works. As a result, it must be admitted that the legitimation of the divagations on the problem of the notion of discourse amounts not so much to positioning of the above-mentioned authors' works, but rather to the presentation of their assumptions. Hence, let the fascinating topic of discourse be the best justification for the attempted task. The works of Teun van Dijk, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are at the foreground of our contemporary thinking,

and therefore it is to these works that we must constantly return to find answers to the complicated problematic of the paradigm concept that thematizes human communication: Discourse is an event that influences the process of the creation of an individual interpretation and self-understanding.

Streszczenie

Celem niniejszej pracy jest zbadanie pojęcia dyskursu, jakie występuje w naukach humanistycznych XX wieku. Pojęcie to jest przedstawione w kontekście prac Teuna van Dijka, Michela Foucaulta i Pierre'a Bourdieu. W każdym z wymienionych przypadków pojęcie dyskursu występuje w innej formie i pojawia się na tle innej dziedziny wiedzy: w przypadku Teuna van Dijka jest to lingwistyka, w przypadku Michela Foucaulta – filozofia, a w przypadku Pierre'a Bourdieu – socjologia. W związku z tym, że teoretyczną podstawą rozumienia pojęcia dyskursu są różne dziedziny wiedzy, w niniejszej pracy jest ono prezentowane jako umieszczone w sieci relacji i zależności wynikających ze specyfiki tych dyscyplin naukowych. W każdym przypadku brana jest pod uwagę historia myśli danego badacza, jej założenia teoretyczne oraz metodologia badawcza. Dopiero po wstępnej analizie pojęcia dyskursu w relacji do innych naukowych pojęć danej teorii i jej metodologii badaniu zostaje poddane tytułowe pojęcie dyskursu.

W pracy zaprezentowane są relacje pojęcia dyskursu z podstawowymi terminami filozoficznymi, takimi jak: język, interpretacja, fikcja, reprezentacja, a także ze ścisłymi terminami – zarówno filozoficznymi, jak i językoznawczymi, jak: sens, znaczenie czy nastawienie sądzeniowe. Przedstawione i opisane zostają również terminy funkcjonujące w socjologii, mianowicie: pojęcie habitusu, kapitał kulturowy, władza symboliczna czy przemoc symboliczna. We wstępie pracy przedstawiane i analizowane są pojęcia nauk humanistycznych przydatne w dalszej szczegółowej analizie pojęcia dyskursu. Pod uwagę wzięte są prace Hansa Georga-Gadamera ([1960] 2004) dotyczące hermeneutyki i hermeneutycznego sposobu interpretacji tekstów, prace Martina Heideggera ([1927] 1994),

które dotyczą konstytucji podmiotu i przenoszą obiekt badań z dziedziny epistemologii w dziedzinę ontologii i analityki egzystencji, widoczne są również odniesienia do najnowszych badań Humberta Maturany i Francisca Vareli (1987), dotyczące sposobu pracy umysłu oraz uczenia się i poznawania. Autorka przywołuje też francuską językoznawczą teorię dyskursu i jej przedstawiciela Dominique'a Maingueneau ([2003] 2014), odwołuje się do pracy Ervinga Goffmana ([1974] 1986) z nurtu interakcjonizmu, relacjonuje badania Michaela A. K. Hallidaya ([1975] 2014) w obszarze funkcjonalizmu, etnometodologię Harolda Garfinkela ([1972] 1986), etnografię komunikacji Johna J. Gumperza i Della Hymesa ([1972] 1986). Dla rozwoju pojęcia dyskursu istotne są także poglądy badaczy, którzy wraz z Teunem van Dijkiem (1998) współtworzyli i współtworzą tradycję Krytycznej Analizy Dyskursu, mianowicie Normana Fairclough ([1995] 2010) i Ruth Wodak ([2007] 2014). Interesujące w związku z podjętym tematem okazują się również badania Algirdasa J. Greimasa (Greimas, Fontanille [1991] 1993), które wraz z pismami Rolanda Barthes'a ([1953, 1972] 2009), można usytuować w dziedzinie francuskiej narratologii.

Szeroka perspektywa badawcza pozwala spojrzeć na problem dyskursu z różnych punktów widzenia i uchwycić jego wielorakie zależności. Ostatni rozdział pracy jest analizą porównawczą, która w sposób systematyczny bada podobieństwa i różnice pojęcia dyskursu w wymienionych trzech dziedzinach nauki. Celem pracy nie jest opowiedzenie się po stronie któregoś z prezentowanych rozwiązań, a raczej szczegółowe, systematyczne przebadanie zależności, w jakich pojęcie dyskursu znajduje się we współczesnej nauce. Wydobycie na powierzchnię dyskursu jego licznych uwikłań, w sensie metodologicznym, epistemologicznym czy estetyczno-etycznym, jest nadrzędnym celem pracy, natomiast ustalenie definicji tego pojęcia jedynie pretekstem do szczegółowej jego analizy. Zamiarem autorki jest swoista rekontekstualizacja pojęcia dyskursu, zaprezentowanie go z różnych perspektyw, które współcześnie stanowią nieodłączną składową dyskursu naukowego. Teuna van Dijka problem ideologii czy manipulacji, Foucaultiańskie problemy archeologii czy genealogii wiedzy, wreszcie Pierre'a Bourdieu kapitał kulturowy i przemoc symboliczna stanowią nieodłączny element współczesnej panoramy badawczej, choć każda z tych teorii sugeruje i zakłada różne pojęcia dyskursu. Celem niniejszej pracy jest wyeksplikowanie relacji łączących

dyskurs z elementami wymienionych trzech teorii oraz usytuowanie pojęcia dyskursu w nowym kontekście, będącym wynikiem ich wpływu.

Pierwszy rozdział dysertacji dotyczy pojęcia dyskursu w pracach Teuna van Dijka. Badacz ten zajmuje się szerokim spektrum zagadnień, począwszy od szczegółowych rozpraw na temat gramatyki i logiki tekstowej, po filozoficzno-społeczne zagadnienia perswazji czy manipulacji informacją w społeczeństwie. Jednym z głównych poruszanych przez niego problemów jest ideologia. W połączeniu z tym zagadnieniem pojawiają się również kwestie wiedzy i dyskursu.

Dyskurs dla van Dijka jest przede wszystkim wydarzeniem komunikacji, dlatego po zapoznaniu się z jego tekstami nie można dłużej słusznie obstawać przy tekstowym charakterze dyskursu. Van Dijk stwierdza wyraźnie, że dyskurs to nie tylko tekst, ale również, a nawet przede wszystkim, kontekst. Dyskurs jest nie tylko wydarzeniem wiedzy, ale również wydarzeniem społecznym. Van Dijk pisze wyraźnie, że „[d]yskursy są formami społecznego działania i społecznej interakcji, są usytuowane w kontekście społecznym, którego uczestnicy są nie tylko mówcami/pisarzami i słuchaczami/czytelnikami, ale także aktorami społecznymi będącymi jednocześnie członkami grup i kultur" (1998: 6, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Społeczny element jest wyraźnie widoczny u van Dijka już na poziomie kognitywnym. Van Dijk dostrzega element społeczny na poziomie pracy umysłu i wykształcania się podstawowych, indywidualnych przekonań. Utrzymuje on (van Dijk 1988: 130), że nie jest tak, iż najpierw mamy osobiste, indywidualne przekonania, które następnie aplikujemy w sytuacjach społecznych. Przeciwnie, twierdzi on, że to element społeczny, społeczna komunikacja i interakcja są narzędziami tworzenia najbardziej podstawowych, indywidualnych przekonań. Pomocne okazuje się tu Dijkowskie rozumienie „kognitywnego przez społeczne." Autor „Ideologii. Podejścia multidyscyplinarnego" (*Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach*) tłumaczy to, mówiąc, że: „społeczne uwarunkowanie procesów kognitywnych wpływa na naturę tych procesów jak również na treść oraz struktury przedstawień umysłowych" (van Dijk 1988: 130, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Można więc powiedzieć, że teksty van Dijka sugerują, że najpierw jesteśmy członkami wspólnoty, że najpierw jesteśmy w społeczeństwie, a dopiero na drugim miejscu jesteśmy jednostkami, indywidualnościami. Takie rozumienie człowieka ma wpływ na ujęcie pojęcia dyskursu. Jest ono przede wszystkim wynikiem

działania kontekstu społecznego, a dopiero w drugiej kolejności jest uważane za wydarzenie również tekstowe.

Rozumienie pojęcia dyskursu od strony jego społecznego uwikłania powoduje, że w miejscu dyskursu otwiera się pole do tworzenia się ideologii. Van Dijk widzi duże zagrożenie w tym, że dyskurs może przekształcić się w ideologię. Ma to miejsce wtedy, gdy podstawy formułowania sądów stają się zbyt indywidualne zamiast pozostać na poziomie uniwersalnych wytycznych. Przykładem może być sądzenie, że wszyscy powinni mieć zielone włosy, przy założeniu, że komuś dobrze się wiedzie, ponieważ ma zielone włosy. Tego typu uogólnienie poglądów może być według van Dijka (1993: 40) źródłem powstania ideologii. Van Dijk uważa natomiast, że dobrze jest, gdy osobiste przekonania budowane pod wpływem uczestnictwa w społeczeństwie, czyli odpowiednio zuniwersalizowane, stają się przekonaniami dzielonymi przez różne grupy społeczne. W ten sposób mogą się wytworzyć różne dyskursy, np. dyskurs naukowy. Ideologie według van Dijka (1988: 262) są przekonaniami wypływającymi z indywidualnych interesów jednostek, niewystarczająco uniwersalnych, ponieważ nakierowanych na utrzymanie władzy w danej sferze przez wspomniane jednostki. Dyskurs ma więc na celu porozumienie, komunikację – jest, jak to było określone na wstępie, zdarzeniem komunikacji, natomiast ideologia ma na celu zachowanie władzy, czyli dominację.

Aby dopełnić wizję dyskursu u van Dijka, należałoby uwzględnić jeszcze prezentowaną przez niego relację tego pojęcia do pojęcia wiedzy. Podsumowujące porównania trzech pojęć: dyskursu, ideologii i wiedzy są zawarte w ostatniej części pracy. Analizy pojęcia dyskursu są również uzupełnione o wyjaśnienia na temat perswazji, manipulacji oraz reprodukcji i legitymizacji ideologii.

Wyjaśnienie pojęcia dyskursu u Michela Foucaulta ma charakter filozoficzny, jednakże korzystają z niego specjaliści z różnych dziedzin. Sam Foucault badał dyskursy naukowe oraz paranaukowe różnych epok historycznych, od historii naturalnej, poprzez gramatykę ogólną czy historię bogactw, do dyskursów dyscyplinarnych, penitencjarnych czy medycznych. Główną pracą metodologiczną przygotowującą grunt pod szczegółowe analizy historyczne była *Archeologia wiedzy*. Dyskurs jest w niej analizowany jako formacja, która działa na zasadzie reguł specyficznych dla danego pola dyskursywnego. Każda praktyka dyskursywna zajmuje się pewnym wydzielonym polem obiektów. Rodzaj reguł

dostępnych danej formacji przesądza o tym, jakie wypowiedzi w ramach tej formacji mogą być utworzone.

W późniejszych pracach (począwszy od 1971 roku) Foucault ([1994] 2000a) analizuje dyskurs w relacji do formacji niedyskursywnych i mimo że dyskurs jest uznany za ważną formę doświadczenia, Foucault stara się nie stawiać go na pierwszym miejscu przed doświadczeniem niedyskursywnym. Foucault uważa je bowiem za równoprawne z formacjami dyskursywnymi: „[k]ażde z nich, dyskurs i figuracja ma swoją własną formę bycia" (O'Farrell 2005: 80, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Również Gilles Deleuze stwierdza, że nie jest u Foucaulta tak, iż „niedyskursywne jest redukowalne do wypowiedzi, że jest jej pozostałością czy też iluzją" (Deleuze [1986] 2004: 79). Takie podejście Foucaulta do doświadczeń i wypowiedzi niedyskursywnych było spowodowane jego stałym zainteresowaniem obszarami w człowieku, które nie są łatwo eksplikowalne. Istnienie takich obszarów jak cierpienie, śmierć czy pasja powoduje, że należy uznać, iż nie wszystkie dziedziny doświadczenia człowieka są jasne i proste. W związku z tym, że w człowieku istnieje obszar „śmierci", obszar ciemny i nienazwany, nie można wszystkiego sprowadzać do dyskursu, nie wszystko daje się w ten sposób zredukować. Takie pojmowanie natury człowieka (choć Foucault nie używa uniwersalistycznych, obciążonych tradycją humanistyczną terminów jak „natura") ma wyraźny wpływ na to, jak autor *Archeologii wiedzy* rozumie pojęcie dyskursu. Nie jest to u niego termin, który obejmuje sobą całość doświadczenia człowieka i pozwala je całe wypowiedzieć. Oprócz dyskursu istnieją bowiem doświadczenia, których dyskurs nie jest w stanie objąć. To w tych niedyskursywnych rejonach Foucault szukał tego, co najdobitniej świadczy o człowieku i jego istocie. Dyskurs jawi się więc jako pole niekompletne, wymagające uzupełnienia. Okazuje się również sferą powierzchniową, jego elementami składowymi są natomiast liczne zerwania i nieciągłości. Dyskurs nie stanowi tu jednej, linearnej formy.

Na tle takiego rozumienia dyskursu pojawiają się liczne problemy, z którymi Foucault próbuje się mierzyć. Jednym z nich jest kwestia dzieła. Początkowo dzieło wydaje się czymś zamkniętym i kompletnym, pewną totalnością samą w sobie. Foucault natomiast kwestionuje totalność i samowystarczalność dzieła, twierdzi, że poglądy autora czy też jego dzieło są „uwikłane w system odniesień do innych książek, innych tekstów, innych wypowiedzi: dzieło to węzeł w pewnej sieci

relacji" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 25–26, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Nie jest więc tak, że dzieło tworzy dyskurs, jest raczej odwrotnie, to dyskurs tworzy dzieło: „tworzy się ono tylko na podstawie złożonego pola dyskursu" (Foucault [1969] 2011: 26, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Przedstawiona analiza problemu dzieła jest ściśle związana z pojęciem dyskursu. Dzieło to nie samoistny twór, a wynik pracy w pewnym polu dyskursu, które jest polem relacji wypowiedzi. Dzieło to wykorzystanie tych relacji do stworzenia nowej jakości: pewnej jedności dyskursywnej, pewnej oddzielnej wypowiedzi, zbudowanej jednakże w polu istniejącego dyskursu.

Dyskurs w ujęciu Foucaulta jest analizowany z wielu różnych punktów widzenia. *Archeologia wiedzy* jest tylko jednym z możliwych ujęć. Oprócz archeologii w dziełach Foucaulta obecne jest również podejście genealogiczne, wzorowane na pracach Fryderyka Nietzschego. Wpływ Nietzschego i jego genealogii widać w późnych pracach Foucaulta, które również są analizowane w niniejszej pracy. „Język bez końca", „Myśl zewnętrzna" czy „Nietzsche, genealogia, historia" prezentują zestaw figur będących w relacji do pojęcia dyskursu; są to figury labiryntu, pustyni czy też przekraczania granic.

Trzecim obszarem, na którym pojawia się pojęcie dyskursu, jest socjologia Pierre'a Bourdieu. Podobnie jak Foucault, był on uczniem francuskiej École Normale de Supérieure i należał do czołówki badaczy francuskiej nauki. Jednakże – będąc członkiem Akademii – nie cofnął się przed przeprowadzeniem krytyki tej części społeczeństwa francuskiego. Dostrzegł takie zjawiska jak gromadzenie kapitału kulturowego, władzy symbolicznej czy przemoc symboliczną wywieraną przez członków elity naukowej i artystycznej. Jego badania tych zjawisk objęły nie tylko społeczeństwo francuskie. Bourdieu prowadził liczne empiryczne badania terenowe, najsłynniejsze są te prowadzone w Algierii. Efekty jego pracy nie są teoretyczne w takim stopniu, jaki prezentują prace van Dijka czy Foucaulta, są to empiryczne *case studies* badające różne obszary społecznej działalności społeczeństw pierwotnych. Rozpatrywane z tego punktu widzenia dzieło Bourdieu nie ujawnia na pierwszy rzut oka treści dotyczących pojęcia dyskursu. Bourdieu nie podaje jego definicji, czy też nie formułuje problemu *explicite*. Można natomiast wywnioskować kształt zakładanego przez niego pojęcia dyskursu, analizując jego prace na temat habitusu czy władzy symbolicznej. Habitualny wymiar dyskursu jest tu wyraźnie widoczny. Jest on oparty w tym sensie na

dialektyce „internalizacji zewnętrzności i uzewnętrznienia wewnętrzności" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 72, tłum. – P. K.-C.), czyli na regule widocznej w działaniu habitusu. Sam habitus u Bourdieu to „generatywna zasada regulowanych improwizacji, produkująca działania, które zmierzają do reprodukowania regularności charakterystycznych dla warunków zewnętrznych produkcji tej generatywnej reguły" (Bourdieu [1972] 2012: 78, tłum. – P. K.-C.). Inna definicja podaje, że habitus „to system trwałych, przekształcalnych dyspozycji, które integrując przeszłe doświadczenia, funkcjonują w każdej chwili jako matryca postrzegania, akceptacji i działania oraz umożliwiają realizację różnorodnych zadań" (Bourdieu 1971: 83, cyt. za: Swartz 1997: 100, tłum. – P. K.-C.)

Dla zrozumienia pojęcia dyskursu Bourdieu ważne jest, by dostrzec obecne w nim dwa elementy – element otoczenia zewnętrznego, który staje się warunkiem kształtowania się dyspozycji wewnętrznych podmiotu, oraz te dyspozycje, które wpływają na postrzeganie zewnętrzności. Oba elementy nieprzerwanie kształtują relacje podmiotu z otoczeniem. W tym sensie możemy powiedzieć, że – podobnie jak u van Dijka, a nawet w jeszcze większym stopniu – to, co społeczne, uczestniczy w tworzeniu tego, co indywidualne. Bourdieu regułę tego obustronnego wpływu nazwał właśnie habitusem, a dyskurs zakładany przez taką teorię jest dyskursem opartym na tej regule. Możemy tu też zaznaczyć, że dyskurs u Bourdieu jest nie tylko zespoleniem tekstu i kontekstu, jak to było u van Dijka. Można tu odwołać się do wyraźniejszego przykładu, mianowicie enakcjonizmu Humberta Maturany i Francisca Vareli oraz ich reguły zwanej *structural coupling*, która jest odwzorowaniem działania habitusu. Jej działanie można wytłumaczyć na przykładzie tańczącej pary, której kolejne kroki są determinowane przez pozycję, jaką para przyjmuje, pozycja ta jest z kolei wynikiem wyboru pewnych kroków tańca. Również habitus jest regułą, według której świat zewnętrzny wpływa na kształtowanie się pewnych predyspozycji, natomiast same te predyspozycje determinują postrzeganie świata. Dyskurs u Bourdieu jest więc nie tylko sumą tekstu i kontekstu, ale wynikiem wpływu jednego na drugi, czego efekt determinuje z kolei to, czym jest dla jednostki każde z nich. W przypadku enakcjonizmu prezentowanego przez Maturanę i Varelę obiektem wpływającym na zmianę samego siebie jest umysł („umysły używają procesów, które zmieniają same siebie", Minsky 1986: 288, cyt. za: Foley [1997] 2009, tłum. – P. K.-C.),

jednakże podobieństwa z pojęciem habitusu są uderzające. Dyskurs u Bourdieu podlega regułom wyznaczanym przez habitus: rozumienie indywidualne wpływa na postrzeganie świata zewnętrznego, natomiast świat zewnętrzny kształtuje osobiste predyspozycje do jego rozumienia.

Podsumowaniem prezentowanej pracy, w której zawarte są powyższe konotacje, jest rozdział czwarty. W części tej autorka prezentuje wnioski płynące z całości pracy i zestawia je w ogólniejszej perspektywie. Podjęta jest tu także próba ujednoznacznienia definicji pojęcia dyskursu, jednakże nie przesądza się o tym, że taka jednoznaczność jest wymagana. Autorka ma świadomość, że zbadanie pojęcia dyskursu, nawet jeśli zostało ono zawężone do prac trzech wymienionych badaczy, jest przedsięwzięciem trudnym. Jeżeli jednak udało się choć w przybliżony sposób przedstawić charakter i trajektorię rozwoju tego pojęcia, cel pracy można uznać za osiągnięty.

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# Subject index

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The book constitutes an original contribution to the cultural history of contemporary Europe. The fundamental problematic driving current research in the human sciences is the concept of Discourse. The analysis provides an indispensable introduction to the three key intellectuals whose work defines the contemporary scene: Van Dijk, Foucault, and Bourdieu. The book provides a very readable account of the issues surrounding communication, linguistics, philosophy, and semiotics that intersect to define the human condition. It is a "must read" for any scholar working on the conceptual and social application of discourse analysis and communicology.

An excellent review of Van Dijk's work, clear and concise.

The chapter [on Foucault] is extremely good, both in theory explication and analysis.

Paulina Kłos-Czerwińska's book is a unique creation and scholarly contribution which has my highest recommendation for publication. [...] The book represents the finest type of academic scholarship, yet is written with a very clear and concise narrative. The book will appeal to general reader and expert alike. [...] It will be a welcome addition to any library.

Excerpts from the publication review
by prof. Richard L. Lanigan