

Why Analytic Feminism?

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My questions in this chapter include both why there is such a thing as “analytic feminism” and whether there should be something that we designate in this way. Although it might seem strange to raise the latter question in a book that exhibits wonderful analytic feminist work, I think it’s important to continue to address the underlying issues. The first section of the chapter focuses on reasons why philosophers do analytic feminism and some of the permutations among them. Next I weigh reasons for and against labeling forms of feminist philosophy by method to help decide whether on balance it’s a good idea to categorize feminist philosophies in this way. Finally I discuss briefly two feminist topics whose development has benefited by crossing methodological divides and make a suggestion for the future of feminist philosophy.

1 Why do philosophers do analytic feminism?

The short answer is that some philosophers with feminist values and politics have been educated in the literature and methods of analytic philosophy and want to use analytic tools in their theoretical feminist work. This was true not only of some early feminist philosophers in the 1970s, it continues to be true today. A few preliminary remarks will help us explore a longer answer to the question. First, let’s agree that, for all its divergent strands, there still is a tradition called analytic philosophy that is minimally characterizable not as a doctrine or a specific method, but by (a) the figures who are considered canonical such as Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and their mainstream descendants; (b) the desire for clarity and precision in the use of central concepts of the Enlightenment tradition—truth, objectivity, moral agency, and so on;

(c) the view of itself in contrast with other philosophical traditions—in different eras, for example, with absolute idealism, phenomenology, or poststructuralism.¹ This is very rough and intentionally leaves the borders loose. Analytic feminists, as feminists, critique the figures, concepts, and styles of various forms of analytic philosophy all the while owing a debt to it and using it in their work.

How feminist philosophers came to claim the label “analytic feminist” is explained by Ann Cudd and Kathryn Norlock as they recount the history of the Society for Analytical Feminism in Chapter 3 of this book.² My quick take is this: it was important to the early analytic feminists to claim both feminism and analytic philosophy. They wanted to say publicly that analytic philosophy is not irredeemably sexist and androcentric, but can be useful for doing serious feminist work, in short, that analytic feminist philosophy is *feminist*; it was also important to show, especially to nonfeminist philosophers, that analytic feminist philosophy is *philosophy*. Additionally, analytic feminists wanted to have enough programs to discuss their work and venues for publication, and to encourage different kinds of philosophical feminists to cite and engage with each other’s work, regardless of the extent to which they disagree over substance or methods.³

Feminists who use the label “analytic” all see themselves to varying degrees as coming out of strands of an analytic tradition and frame their projects and questions to some extent in its terms. Nevertheless the notion of *variation* is important—and runs along several axes: (a) about the degree of open-mindedness and enthusiasm with which they use the analytic tradition; (b) about the kinds of analytic philosophy most amenable to feminist use; and (c) about the kinds of feminist projects most amenable to analytic philosophy.

1.1 Degrees of open-mindedness and enthusiasm

The range of philosophers who identify as analytic feminists runs from the few who barely read nonanalytic philosophy because they find it inferior all the way to those who seem to be analogous to “cultural Catholics,” that is, those who think in analytic terms because their early philosophical training and inclination (in whatever order they occurred) just happened to be analytic. It’s where we came from, how we were raised philosophically; I consider myself in the latter category; I would include Naomi Scheman’s “analytic semi-manque” as a boundary-dwelling species of a minimal cultural Catholic. Scheman’s own analogy is not the cultural Catholic, but being a New Yorker 1993: 245–49). Regardless of where analytic feminists fall on this spectrum, we critique the philosophers/questions/

methods/concepts that we see as misogynist, androcentric, or even mildly sexist; we reframe and reconstruct philosophy in ways that attempt to avoid all the facets of philosophy we critique, using a gendered lens to do so (though at its best, it’s a lens inflected by many other axes of oppression and privilege). We are feminists after all.

Even setting aside the first type of person who finds nonanalytic philosophy inferior, there is still an enormous variety of types and levels of commitment to analytic philosophy among analytic feminists. For example, Carol Hay, during opening remarks at the 2016 Society for Analytical Feminism (SAF) Conference, said, “To me, analytic feminism is a way of doing feminist philosophy that is responsive to the analytical canon in a particular way: we’re critical (often very critical) of this canon, but we also take ourselves to be responsible to, and for, it” (Hay 2016). In contrast with Hay’s view, my own previous characterization commits analytic feminists only to a more instrumentalist view with no responsibility for and to the canon:

Analytic feminists are philosophers who believe that both philosophy and feminism are well served by using some of the concepts, theories and methods of analytic philosophy modified by feminist values and insights. . . . [A]nalytic feminists share something that we might call a *core desire* rather than a core doctrine, namely, the desire to retain enough of the central normative concepts of the modern European tradition to support the kind of normativity required by both feminist politics and philosophy. This “core desire” finds its expression, for example, in the ways analytic feminists use some of what we might call the “core concepts” that Cudd mentions (1996): truth, logical consistency, objectivity, rationality and justice. (Garry 2014, emphasis in original)

Before leaving this topic, two last points bear mentioning. First, not all feminists trained in analytic philosophy take up the label “analytic feminist”; they do not actively reject it, but simply do not use it. In the United States, for example, many early feminist philosophers such as Marilyn Frye, Alison Jaggar, Claudia Card, not to mention all the early feminist philosophers of science, were educated in analytic graduate programs. Second, not even the most enthusiastic analytic feminists bother claiming the label in contexts outside professional philosophy. When we teach feminist classes to students in a wide range of majors, speak on public issues, or interact with colleagues in women’s, gender, and sexuality studies, it’s sufficient to be identified as a feminist philosopher (though the need to explain one’s analytic background might well arise if asked a question about (Jenkins or Irigaray)).

1.2 Kinds of analytic philosophy most amenable to feminist use

When twentieth-century academic feminist philosophy began in the 1970s, we worried more about our specific critiques than about which traditional philosophers we appealed to. Given the explicit and implicit misogyny and androcentrism in philosophy, feminists were pleased to find support in anyone in any philosophical tradition, for example, in works of (or at least passages in) Plato, Mill, Marx, or Merleau-Ponty. However, as feminist philosophers grew in number as well as in the sophistication and complexity of our thought, some trends became apparent. Different kinds of philosophy were better for different feminist projects. Recall that by the 1970s naturalized epistemology (at least in a narrow Quinean form) already existed, Wittgenstein's popularity was still high, John Rawls had great influence in moral and political philosophy, and classic logical positivism was already losing influence in many areas of philosophy. In continental philosophy, critical theory, phenomenology, and postmodernism competed for attention. Many methods were there for early feminist picking. We tended to pick the ones we knew best—and among those, ones that seemed most fruitful for our particular projects.

Most analytic feminists leaned toward philosophy that can have a “natural” or “social” component because of the need to allow “space” for gender to enter the conversation. One cannot really pursue completely abstract, “ideal” epistemology or ethics if gendered experiences or empirical social differences need to be considered in our thinking. Figures come in and out of favor depending on the topic or field: for example, Quine has been long relevant to feminist empiricist philosophers of science (e.g., Nelson 1990); and in recent decades J. L. Austin's work on performatives has been taken up by analytic feminist philosophers of language working on topics such as hate speech and pornography (e.g., Langton 2009; Maitra and McGowan's collection 2012; Milkola's collection 2017) as well as nonanalytic philosophers such as Judith Butler (1997).

1.3 The types of feminist projects most amenable to analytic methods

As we consider this topic we need to recognize differences among generations of feminist philosophers. In the 1970s feminist philosophers could rarely look to academic philosophy for feminist inspiration (or “political consciousness”). It went the other way: we brought our political consciousness from our life experiences and then used philosophy—where possible—to help make sense of

the confusion and contradictions. As we quickly realized, however, philosophy was part of the problem as well as of potential help in thinking things through. So we needed to be careful in our use of philosophical tools—heeding the warning of Audre Lorde that “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house” (Lorde 1984: 112).

As the body of feminist philosophy, including analytic feminism, has increased in size and complexity over the decades, we are now in a better situation (although we'd best still remember Lorde's warning). Today we have a range of feminist readings and assessments of traditional philosophers at our disposal; we also have several iterations of discussions of key concepts in most fields of philosophy (objectivity, rationality, autonomy, care/justice, power, etc.). Thus, because the projects of later feminist philosophers have more analytic feminist work to build upon, we are able to undertake a wider range of projects using analytic methods. The same is true, of course, of other feminist philosophical methods. Even political inspiration can now be found in academic (feminist and other socially engaged) philosophy.

Having set the context in this way, let's look at some examples of core feminist philosophical projects that have been most amenable to analytic methods. The most obvious and most enduring are analyses or clarifications of concepts—oppression, equality, rape, sexual harassment, gender, woman/man—all need spelling out and analyzing (e.g., Superson 1993; Cudd 2006; Diaz-Leon 2016). Whether we're inclined to look for necessary and sufficient conditions or family resemblances to illuminate concepts that help us make sense of our experience, we have sets of tools to use. Let us think that feminists analyze only existing, everyday concepts, Sally Haslanger proposes that we think in terms of “ameliorative” projects, that is, proposing analyses of concepts that we *should be using*, taking into account the purposes and goals we have (2012, see especially Chapter 13). In this way we illuminate the point(s) of using a concept in particular intellectual and political work.

A second obvious kind of project is to find what is useful within an analytic philosopher's work for feminist purposes, remembering all the while to criticize the less useful (or worse) features. For example, in a 1993 essay that has become a feminist classic, Louise Antony appealed to Quine's work. Antony notes that feminists offer critiques of traditional notions of objectivity (as impartiality and neutrality) at the same time they assume some notion of them as they criticize androcentric, sexist assumptions, that is, “male bias.” She appeals to Quine's naturalized epistemology to alleviate this “bias paradox” by using it to look at

empirical situations to see which “biases” in fact lead toward truth or away from it (1993/2002).

(One can readily see what feminists find useful in analytic philosophers’ work in Sharyn Clough’s 2003 anthology that pairs six essays of traditional analytic philosophers with essays of feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science whom they influenced.⁴ There is also an abundance of feminist work influenced by Wittgenstein (e.g., Scheman 1993; Heyes 2000, 2003; O’Connor 2002, 2011; Thuesen 2004; Garry 2012).

(Of course, one’s general training in clearheaded analysis can be useful to any topic. There is barely an area of philosophy that feminists haven’t touched in the last four decades. The chapters in this book are a testament to some of this range. Nevertheless, clearheaded analysis is not unique to analytic feminists, but should be exhibited by anyone trained to think well and carefully.)

2 Should there be analytic feminism: Is it a good idea to categorize or divide feminist philosophers by philosophical method?

We have always had a diversity of views among feminist philosophers—with the attendant desire to sort them out, make sense of our differences, and see whether views might fit together or continue to clash. Although I confess never to have been enamored of any of the sets of distinctions, they grew from the perfectly understandable urge to sort or categorize in order to make sense of the assumptions that feminist theorists were making and the resulting disagreements among us.

The two best-known earlier sets of distinctions were drawn by Alison Jaggar (1983) and Sandra Harding (1986). Jaggar initially distinguished among liberal, Marxist, socialist, and radical feminist theories (later feminist categories added, either by Jaggar or others, were multicultural, lesbian separatist, psychoanalytic, etc.). Of course, the feminist versions undermined the paternal discourses in many ways, but were still beholden to them for many of their basic assumptions and ways in which the issues were framed. For example, the conception of an autonomous agent was central to the liberal tradition; feminists used it and also greatly expanded and modified it in their discussions of relational autonomy. In spite of the fact that some of their paternal founders, for example, Marx, encompassed metaphysics and epistemology in their work, Jaggar’s categories

were most useful (and at home) in social and political philosophy. It’s important to note that critiques came quickly from women of color who believed that their viewpoints were obscured by these categories (Sandoval 1991, 2000).

Harding used the feminist categories empiricist, standpoint theorist, and postmodernist, although she always maintained that they were unstable categories and that each undermined its paternal discourse (1986). These worked much better for epistemology and philosophy of science than for other fields, though the latter two categories are used in ethics and social/political philosophy as well.

Neither of these two sets of categories lines up neatly and cleanly with different philosophical methods such as analytic, pragmatist, phenomenological, hermeneutical, poststructuralist, not to mention new materialist, decolonial, Daoist, or Confucian. This mismatch of categories led people to make mistakes such as improper generalization. For example, although it might not be wrong to assume that poststructuralists would tend to hold postmodern theories of justice, and that liberalism might have its roots in the “abstract individualism” with which many analytic philosophers feel comfortable, nothing implies that all and only analytic feminists are liberal feminists, or that all and only socialist feminists are standpoint theorists.

In addition to the desire to avoid confusion and to block improper generalizations and inferences, the politics of feminist philosophy mentioned in the first section led to the founding of the Society for Analytical Feminism (SAF) in 1991. Today one might think, OK, I understand the reasons for the methodological labels two or three decades ago, but haven’t those problems been solved? Today feminist philosophers speak to each other and cite each other’s work. Different methods are respected within feminist philosophy. Do we still need to label by method?

In what follows I try to look fairly at the strongest reasons for and against maintaining the label “analytic feminism.” Nevertheless, I want to alert readers that my own position is one of caution: I think it best that feminists use methodological distinctions very sparingly, that is, only when they are needed to avoid confusion or are otherwise extremely helpful. Even if we are trained in only one contemporary tradition and continue to work mostly within it, there is usually no need to use methodological labels. Their overuse encourages both political and philosophical behavior that is undesirable.

Because many of the feminist facets of the issue cannot be easily separated from broader concerns about the value of categorizing by philosophical

methods, let's start with the wider contemporary philosophical context. My examples are drawn from analytic philosophy in North America simply because I know this context best. It's no news that in much of the academic world, philosophy included, specialization has become more and more narrow. Although I'm certainly not arguing against research specializations in Kant, Quine, Husserl, Beauvoir, or Foucault, I oppose making methodological narrowness a virtue. When we focus heavily on contemporary methodological labels it encourages people to be "virtuously narrow," at least among those using the dominant (analytic) philosophical method.

Narrowness and overuse of methodological labels starts when we are young philosophers and can easily lead us on a downward trajectory. Many philosophers, myself included, have not been educated in more than one twentieth-century philosophical method, that is, not in "pluralist" programs. We start at a disadvantage with respect to appreciating or even understanding other traditions and the ways work in them might interact with our own. I consider this a limitation, not a virtue. Of course, there are limitations of time, energy, personal interests, or even differences in our "writing" that help dictate how we frame philosophical issues or how broadly we read. Despite these very real limitations, we can be more or less narrow minded, judgmental, or open to learning from others with different training.

Once a philosopher becomes "virtuously narrow" it is quite easy to go from simply not reading widely or conversing with those in other traditions to the next step—believing that those works or those colleagues are not worth thinking about, and not at all relevant to what we do as philosophers. This philosopher feels entitled to ignore other traditions. A Rawlsian analytic political philosopher might feel entitled not to read Habermas, not to mention Adorno. A poststructuralist philosopher of language might feel entitled not to read analytic work. This limits our thinking as philosophers—admittedly at the same time it allows us to progress in a narrower area. We would probably be better philosophers if we were open to new figures and different approaches.

Make no mistake about it: the "virtuously narrow" traditional philosopher also feels entitled to ignore feminist philosophy as well as other liberatory philosophical work, whether on race, disabilities, class, or queer/trans issues. At worst, this philosopher finds socially engaged and liberatory work simply "not philosophy." This path needs to be discouraged.

We philosophers are more likely to have our fundamental assumptions questioned if we talk to philosophers who don't share our methods (or, for that

matter, our values). One hopes that this makes us less likely to be complacent about our "progress" or to overestimate the merit of our work. Of course, there is clearly a place for a range of approaches here. Sometimes we just want "to get on with it" by talking with others who do share our assumptions and can carry the conversation forward without much ado. Realistically, given that journals and book publishers tend to specialize by method, this sometimes makes sense. By now the reader might think I'm crazily unrealistic in thinking that avoiding the use of labels will make us less "virtuously narrow" so that we really do read and think about a broader range of philosophy. I realize that philosophers are unlikely to give up labels any time soon, if ever, but it's important to think about the broader philosophical context when we think about the problems with feminist divisions by method. In addition, it's important to see the pitfalls of being "virtuously narrow"—whether in traditional or feminist philosophy.

2.1 Reasons for feminist philosophers to use methodological labels

Many of the reasons a feminist philosopher uses a methodological label echo reasons that philosophers in general want to use labels: she gives herself a more manageable body of literature with which to engage; the audience is more likely to understand a feminist philosopher's views properly if we understand her mainstream tradition; it's easier to know what to take for granted, who she's read, what her moves mean, and so forth (this works best, of course, when the reader is versed in or at least acquainted with the author's tradition).

Other reasons are more specific to feminists or other socially engaged philosophers. I'll mention four here. First, to avoid rancor: although feminists share many values and goals, for example, to end the oppression of women, increase freedom for all women, respect women's dignity, and so forth, we disagree on many things, including philosophical assumptions and methods. Methodological labels can make it easier to sort and understand our differences and similarities, one hopes, without rancor.

Second, to facilitate the goals of some feminist philosophers, it is particularly helpful to label by method. For example, if a feminist's goal is to *integrate* feminist philosophy into traditional philosophy, it is more likely to be successful within the current methodological divisions, regardless of whether one likes them. Anita Superson offers suggestions to facilitate the goal of integration, for example, that it's important for feminist articles to be accepted in "top-flight"

journals (2011). Many of these journals in North America explicitly accept only analytic philosophy.

Third, even if one does not care explicitly about *integrating* feminist philosophy into traditional philosophy, methodological labels can make it easier for feminist philosophers to converse with and build bridges between themselves and the traditional philosophers whose work is relevant to theirs. One might think, "Why must we make it easier for them?" Although I can appreciate this sentiment, one answer is that it could lead to more widespread use of feminist work in nonfeminist philosophers' own teaching and research. And, although it's debatable whether philosophy today has wide cultural influence, if one believes that it does or hopes that it could (at least through our teaching), then it's good to make it easy for potential allies to use feminist work.

Finally, a point about the politics of philosophical power was once suggested to me by a German analytic feminist: if analytic philosophers are dominant in a country, there's no point in analytic feminists' not using the dominant label to promote their own views. The German feminist believed that there'd be no value to her claiming the label "analytic" in central Europe; instead she worried that it would compound her marginalized status.

This led me to reflect on one way that North America differs from Europe: it's not just analytic feminists who adopt labels here. Although continentally-inclined feminists did not form a separate organization as early as analytic feminists did, the Society for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) has long had an active group of feminists, and in 2007 continental feminists formed the organization PHILOSOPHIA, holding conferences and in 2011 inaugurating a journal by that name. Throughout this time pragmatist feminists have also created special issues of journals and anthologies (Seigfried 1993; Hamington and Bardwell-Jones 2012) as well as books calling attention to their pragmatist character (Seigfried 1996; Sullivan 2001).

2.2 Reasons for feminist philosophers not to use methodological labels

Although the reasons below are all political in a broad sense, the first three are at the same time theoretical/scholarly.

First, because contemporary academic feminist philosophy began only in the 1970s it's important to appreciate our "young" age and continuing need for a

broad base of resources within (as well as outside of) philosophy. Given this need, there are reasons why we should not want to narrow ourselves by method.

- a. We can't yet be positive about what is and isn't relevant, useful, or promising.
- b. Feminist philosophy is, broadly speaking, naturalized, socialized philosophy. It is not about generic "man," nor is it very abstract philosophy without interplay with the everyday world. So some parts of traditional philosophies (e.g., the god's-eye view, work that centers male experience as if it were universal, etc.) will not be as relevant to us as other feminist approaches—regardless of their methodological label—within philosophy or, for that matter, outside of it.
- c. Feminists have a special obligation to scrutinize the scholarly methods and concepts we use. Cross-method communication makes this easier.

As noted above, every feminist philosopher has to find a way to make her own peace with Lorde's point about the master's tools not dismantling the master's house (1984). My own strategy is to point out that it is not the master's house, that it was an "illegal taking." The house/houses are the property of everyone. However, a person can't be adequately vigilant alone about her tools and assumptions. To sustain our vigilance we need others with liberatory agendas to help us critique our tools and assumptions in fundamental ways. I mean to include help not only from feminists using other methods, but also from critical race theorists, queer and trans theorists, disabilities theorists, and a wide array of intersectional and decolonial theorists.

Second, there is a cluster of overtly political points that argue against the use of methodological labels. The first two, offered by Marilyn Frye, are relevant specifically to analytic feminism. By identifying ourselves as analytic feminists we might mean to contrast ourselves as "sensible," "rational" feminists rather than "extreme" feminist philosophers such as Mary Daly.⁵ We gain credibility, for example, by blaming Mary Daly's forced retirement in the late 1990s on her "extremism," in much the way people blame rape victims, so that it's easier to think it won't happen to us (Frye 2001: 86–87).

Frye also believes that calling ourselves analytic feminists might encourage others to subsume feminism under a patrilineal identity rather than to prioritize our being feminists. She notes ironically how much "better placed in history" one seems when seen "in that august Oxbridge lineage [of Austin

and Wittgenstein, rather] than in a lineage featuring dozens of mimeographed feminist pamphlets authored by collectives . . . Kate Millett, Mary Daly, Andrea Dworkin . . . [feminist philosophers such as] Claudia Card, Naomi Scheman, Maria Lugones, Sarah Hoagland, and troubadours like Alix Dobkin and Willie Tyson" (2001: 86–87).

Finally, a broader political point: solidarity is important. Regardless of method, feminist philosophers want women to be treated better in philosophy and to have feminist philosophy respected *as philosophy*. Although there has been some progress on both fronts, we are still swimming upstream. We need solidarity among the still small number of feminist philosophers. I realize that solidarity doesn't require agreement on all things, but continued emphasis on differences of method does not promote solidarity.

Let's draw this section to a close by returning to feminist philosophers' concerns in 1991 when SAF was founded. We have made great progress at least along the following lines: analytic feminists no longer worry that their work isn't seen as feminist by other feminist philosophers; feminist philosophers with different methodological orientations respect each other in spite of our labels, even if we don't cite across methodological divisions as often as we might; we have also created multiple organizations that do not "compete" in a negative sense.

On the last point: in their chapter in this book, Cudd and Norlock note that some of those surveyed in the founding of SAF had initial worries about competition and potential divisiveness among organizations for feminist philosophers, specifically between SAF and the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP)—an organization that in principle has no specific method in its feminist focus. This has turned out not to be a problem: complementary organizations focused by subject fields as well as by method have flourished in the intervening years. Just looking at North America, in addition to SWIP, SAF, and PHILOSOPHIA, we have Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST), Feminist Epistemology, Methodology, Metaphysics and Science Studies (FEMMASS), the Society for the Study of Women Philosophers (SSWP, a historically oriented group), the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers, and the Roundtable on Latina Feminism. In fairness, while there's not "competition," there is some ongoing concern about organizations being "exclusionary" by method (e.g., some people don't submit their papers to SAF or PHILOSOPHIA because of a worry that it's not "analytic enough" or "continental enough"—or don't even attend for fear of feeling out of place).

However, the fact that we have successfully moved beyond most of our initial worries does not answer the question whether feminist philosophers should use methodological labels. Nor, candidly, do the reasons that I've given here for or against doing so. Although I personally give more weight to the reasons against methodological labeling, I know full well that other feminists will weigh the reasons differently. I hope that someone who likes to call herself an analytic feminist would do so sparingly, keeping in mind that labels can serve to exclude people and points of view. I would prefer to take the open-minded attitude expressed by Cudd in the passage below from a symposium, "Feminism as Meeting Place":

Although I was trained in graduate school by and mentored in my early career by philosophers firmly wedded to the analytic tradition, and jealous of any proposals by continentalists, since beginning to work on philosophical feminism I have begun to recognize the contributions that other traditions can make to my work. I thank feminists of all traditions for this continuing lesson in philosophy and community. (Cudd 2003: 132)

3 Recent examples of cross-methodological work and suggestions for the future

Let's close by looking briefly at two examples of cross-methodological feminist work—one that moved slowly across methods and another that flourished quickly. The first example is feminist standpoint theory, a topic whose development could have moved more quickly without methodological divisions. The fact that standpoint theory originally developed from a Marxist tradition and was so labeled very early on led many analytic epistemologists and philosophers of science to either reject it, not see its relevance, or not take it seriously for a long time (it's also fair to say that some of the early versions had more difficulties than later ones). In the twenty-first century a number of analytic philosophers who would categorize themselves as "feminist empiricists" have come to appreciate the important insights of standpoint theory and find convergence among some of their views (see Chapter 11 in the Epistemology section of this book). Kristen Intemann summarizes the situation in her abstract of "Twenty-five Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?":

[Feminists] have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists

have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.” (Intemann 2010: 778)

As the passage from Intemann indicates, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science from different philosophical traditions came to recognize that a better position—one that is able to meet objections earlier “competing” positions could not—comes from combining the strongest features of each. My point is that labeling ourselves by method likely delayed this fruitful recognition.

In contrast with standpoint theory’s slower development across divisions of method, interest in epistemologies of ignorance and epistemic injustice grew rapidly from feminists and critical race philosophers across the board. They quickly recognized the value of analyzing unjust, oppressive knowledge practices that are both widespread and deeply ingrained. Within a decade Charles Mills’s *The Racial Contract* (1997) and later essays (Mills 2007), Miranda Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice* (2007), a special issue of *Hypatia* on *Feminist Epistemologies of Ignorance* (Tuana and Sullivan 2006), and a collection *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance* (Sullivan and Tuana 2007) all appeared and set off a further explosion of diverse work.⁶ Although both Mills and Fricker can be identified as analytic, the authors in the two volumes on epistemologies of ignorance are more diverse in their methods: pragmatist, analytic, various continental strains, and, at least as important, authors drawing from sources whose work, due to racism, isn’t always seen as “philosophy.” These authors did not dwell on labels, but simply attended to the issues. Differences in philosophical methods seem to be transcended by the urgent need to make progress on epistemic injustice and ignorance, for example, the ways in which white ignorance is constructed and maintained; the ways that the word (“testimony”) of marginalized people is devalued, smothered, and not even acknowledged; the injustice of not having concepts that enable marginalized people to speak about salient experiences; to name just a few.

Although continuing work on epistemic injustice—more so than epistemic ignorance or epistemic oppression and resistance—might run a risk of being framed in a narrowly analytic manner, I believe the group of issues encompassed by “epistemic injustice and ignorance” will flourish as topics not tied to one methodological tradition. Although space limitations prevent my going into detail about the diversity of individual authors,⁷ let me note some recent and forthcoming collections and special issues exhibiting a broad array of authors. *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice* alone compiles thirty-seven new essays on the topic written from across the methodological spectrum (Kidd et al. 2017). The issues are also being widely applied around the globe; for example, *Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women’s and Gender Studies* has a special issue *Epistemic Injustice in Practice* (2016) with applied essays in many fields and on many continents. An especially promising development is a special issue of *Feminist Philosophical Quarterly* in 2018 focusing on the connections between epistemic injustice and recognition theory that developed in continental contexts from the work of Beauvoir and Fanon (the call for papers appeared in Spring 2017).⁸ It seems that the amount and diversity of recent discussion on these topics is surpassed only by work on the concept of intersectionality and its applications. To my mind, work on intersectionality as well as on epistemic ignorance and injustice exhibit flourishing interaction among many kinds of feminists and critical race theorists.

Discussions of epistemologies of ignorance and epistemic injustice illustrate the way I would like to see feminist philosophy develop.⁹ Although I framed this chapter to address the terms and time period in which the question whether to devise a label “analytic feminism” arose, it’s important to note that the context was white, Western/Northern (call it Eurocentric) feminist philosophy. Although within that context there’s been much good work coming from both analytic and continental traditions as well as from others, we need to get beyond (way beyond!) “analytic” and “continental.”

The vision and parameters of feminist philosophy need to change, specifically, to decenter white and Eurocentric work in favor of more inclusive feminist practice. It is in this way that our politics and our theoretical work will be enriched. There are feminists all over the world using transnational and decolonial approaches as well as Western women of color doing work in all traditions, much of it intersectional. White feminists need to read, listen much more carefully to, and interact with women of all ethnicities and cultures. Similar things can be said for straight and cis feminists with respect to queer

and trans people, and for other more/less powerful interpersonal interactions. It's only with these kinds of interactions that feminist philosophy will cease making many women's lives and perspectives invisible. Centering the lives and perspectives of non-Western and non-white women and feminists in our thinking will result in shifting the priorities of feminist philosophy. We don't yet know what impact new priorities will have on feminist philosophical methods. However, whatever the impact is, priorities need to shift, both for the sake of justice and of truth.

Notes

- 1 This characterization of analytic philosophy comes primarily from Garry (2014). Let me note more generally that some other ideas in the chapter draw on Garry (1995) and (2014).
- 2 Cudd and Norlock distinguish "analytic" from the broader sweep of "analytical"; I do not make this distinction.
- 3 Some of the women who deserve credit for encouraging respectful disagreement among feminist philosophers during a crucial period are Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt. Their edited collection, *A Mind of One's Own* (1993/2002), encompassed divergent feminist positions in central philosophical fields, especially on the role of gender in epistemology and on interpreting canonical figures as useful for feminism. Naomi Scheman (1993) and Antony (1995) also had a candid debate about psychological individualism and feminism. In addition, a number of feminists participated in roundtables/symposia on "Doing Philosophy as a Feminist" and "Intra-Feminist Critique and the Rules of Engagement" at meetings of the American Philosophical Association over the years (some are published in *The APA Newsletter on Feminism in Philosophy* (1991, 1993, 2001)).
- 4 Among those included are Lynn Hankinson Nelson with W. V. O. Quine, Sharyn Clough with Donald Davidson, Edrie Sobstyl with Wilfred Sellars, and Heather Douglas with Carl Hempel (Clough 2003).
- 5 Mary Daly refused to teach men in upper-division feminist courses at Boston College (though she said she would work with them independently).
- 6 I should avoid the impression that this work had no antecedents: Marilyn Frye (1983) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990) deserve credit for raising issues of epistemic injustice and oppression even earlier.
- 7 As examples of recent work, see Kristie Dotson (2011, 2012), José Medina (2013), and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. (2012, 2014). Some of this work is best characterized as on epistemic oppression and resistance.

- 8 See the Call for Papers for more detail about potential connections and issues http://inlib.uwo.ca/fpq/call_for_papers.pdf. Note that the editors of the special issue—Paul Giladi, Nicola McMillan, and Alison Stone—conceive of current work on epistemic injustice as a development in "Anglo-American feminist epistemology." This is a wonderful example of differing perceptions: the editors rightly note that work on epistemic injustice lacks a connection with continental work on recognition; I focus on the existence of some nonanalytic feminists and critical race theorists writing on the topics and think that this makes the work broader than analytic—in spite of the way the issues are sometimes framed. What is marvelous is that the editors' perception leads to their editing this special issue that makes explicit cross-method connections!
- 9 Of course, I could have taken as examples other new work that crosses the boundaries of Western philosophical methods in fruitful (and intersectional as well as interdisciplinary) ways, for example, philosophy of disabilities and philosophy that attends to queer and trans issues. These areas are also characterized by a sense of urgency about the daily lives their work addresses.

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