Sudan’s Ongoing Civil War, With Michelle Gavin

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is Sudan's ongoing civil war.

With me to discuss the conflict in Sudan, that has killed as many as 150,000 people and may kill many more, is Michelle Gavin. Michelle is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She was the U.S. ambassador to Botswana from 2011 to 2014, where she served concurrently as the U.S. representative to the Southern African Development Community. She was also a special assistant to President Barack Obama and the senior director for Africa at the National Security Council. Michelle is the author of the "World's Shameful Neglect of Sudan," which you can find on CFR.org. Michelle, thank you for coming back on The President's Inbox.

GAVIN:
Thank you for inviting me.

LINDSAY:
We spoke last summer, Michelle, about the origins of Sudan's civil war, which started in April of 2023. Anyone who wants a deep dive into the power struggle that precipitated that conflict should listen to that episode, but I was hoping perhaps you could start with you giving us, in essence, the CliffsNotes version of how the war started.

GAVIN:
Well, when a popular uprising made Sudan essentially ungovernable in 2019, the military seized control and ousted President Bashir and his regime, and that military came to a transitional arrangement with civilians that was intended to steer the country toward democratic elections. Eventually it became clear the military was not willing to share power. There was a coup. And then what you had was a government that was not a mix of military and civilians, but it was a mix of armed actors. You had the Sudanese Armed Forces, the formal military structure, and you had the Rapid Support Forces, essentially a government created militia force. This is the force that was primarily responsible for the genocide in Darfur about twenty years ago.

LINDSAY:
Darfur is in the western part of Sudan. It's a region.

GAVIN:
That's right. Darfur is a region in Western Sudan. And so the SAF, Sudanese Armed Forces, and the RSF, we struggling for power, and eventually that struggle became an armed one, which has now led to this conflagration that's decimating the country of Sudan.

LINDSAY:
So fill us in on where the fighting stands right now. Where does the SAF control? Where does RSF control? Where are they contesting their control?

GAVIN:
Well, roughly, one can think of it as the SAF being dominant in the east. They've essentially moved their headquarters to Port Sudan. And then most of Darfur-

LINDSAY:
Which is on the Red Sea, correct?

GAVIN:
That's correct. And most of Darfur, almost all of Darfur, is under the control of the RSF. Right now, a city in Darfur where many people had sought sanctuary over the course of the fighting, that had managed to avoid conflict for some time, is now in danger of falling as the RSF has surrounded this city and active conflict is ongoing right now.

LINDSAY:
My understanding is that the RSF controls Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, which sits at the confluence of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, but that the SAF have taken control of some of the suburbs of Khartoum, particularly Omdurman.

GAVIN:
This is the latest news, yes, and it's possible that this could go back and forth for some time. What's I think important to note about that is the level of destruction that's already occurred in Khartoum and Omdurman. Vast swathes of these cities have been leveled. It is almost unquantifiable the losses both to people, to history. If the fighting were to stop tomorrow, the rebuilding will take generations.

LINDSAY:
Do we have a sense at this point, Michelle, as to what the death toll has been? I have seen numbers in the press, but they seem to be all over the map, as low as fifteen thousand, as high as one hundred fifty thousand. Now, I realize part of that may owe to the question of direct combat deaths versus deaths that are result of the destruction of society, loss of food system, malnutrition, disease and the rest. But do we have a picture of the severity of the death toll?

GAVIN:
Unfortunately, no, we don't. You're quite right. There are guesses that are all over the map. But here's what we do know. We know that over ten million Sudanese are displaced. If you add in those who've actually fled the country and are refugees, more than a quarter of the country has been forced to flee their homes.

LINDSAY:
Yeah. Sudan has an estimated population of forty-eight million.

GAVIN:
Close to, yes, yes. And so these death toll figures in the ten thousands, one can surmise these are probably not terribly accurate. But it's very, very difficult get clear information because there's very little access to Sudan. There's very little humanitarian access as well as media access. So it's tremendously difficult to know how many people have been killed but that lack of access is going to lead to an even higher death toll. And you've got qualified, experienced, humanitarian experts who believe that as many as 2.5 million people could be killed, starved to death, in famine, by September.

LINDSAY:
So help me understand that, Michelle. What accounts for the lack of humanitarian and media access? Because there are conflicts around the world and journalists go to them. Humanitarian groups are very active. They put their lives at risk to do so. What accounts for the situation in Sudan currently where we see such a small footprint by both groups?

GAVIN:
The old Sudanese government under President Bashir had a very long and costly history of squeezing humanitarian access as part of its tactics of maintaining control. So you saw this during the civil war that preceded the succession of South Sudan. You definitely saw it over the course of the conflict in Darfur about twenty years ago. There is a long history of denying access, using endless sort of bureaucratic hurdles to make it difficult for humanitarians to operate. On the part of the RSF, this is a force that appears to operate with no norms whatsoever. The most recent reports of RSF storming, a hospital, opening fire, looting the medical equipment, that's just a taste, just a flavor, of what kind of force that is. So it's very difficult to come to any kind of agreement with that kind of entity that enables humanitarian access. It's going to take some non-traditional approaches to be able to get the kind of cash and food into Sudan to prevent a massive loss of life due to famine.

LINDSAY:
On the point of the RSF's conduct of the war, and its many atrocities, I should also note there have been ample accusations and a lot of supporting evidence that the RSF has been engaged in sexual violence using rape as a weapon of war and that gender-based violence has characterized a number of their assaults. Is that a fair assessment, Michelle?

GAVIN:
That is absolutely fair, absolutely accurate, and completely in keeping with the history of this force, which used similar tactics in the 2003, 2004, 2005 conflict in Darfur.

LINDSAY:
Now help me place Sudan sort of in a geopolitical or strategic context. Obviously, Sudan is the third-largest country in Africa. By area it's the eighth most populous country in Africa. It has a five-hundred mile border on the Red Sea, which is one of the main arteries of international commerce. And I was surprised to learn that Sudan actually is one of Africa's largest miners and exporters of gold. Help me understand sort of the significance of Sudan as a country in the region.

GAVIN:
Sudan plays an interesting bridging role between North Africa and the rest of the continent. It has currency in both of those worlds, in the Islamic world, but also Africa. It's interesting, for example, to note that Sudan has been essentially expelled by the African Union because of the unconstitutional seizure of power on the part of the military. So while the SAF, this rump force that controls less than half the state, continues to speak for the country at the United Nations, at the AUえーゆー the Sudanese seat is empty.

Because of its access to the Red Sea it's of strategic importance geopolitically. And of course you'll have seen the reports of Russia trying to make a deal for access to the Red Sea for the possibility of a naval station on the Red Sea for its forces with the SAF. There are always been a number of international suitors eager to have influence in Sudan because of this important geography, this ability to operate in multiple worlds, this access to the sea in one of the world's most kind of commercially important areas. And it's also a very tough neighborhood. So I think it's just important to quickly note the fragility of Sudan's neighbors.

LINDSAY:
And it has a lot of neighbors.

GAVIN:
It has many, many neighbors, and many of them are highly unstable. Certainly Libya. There has been a border conflict with Ethiopia quite recently. You've got Chad, where there are ethnic ties to groups in Darfur, and of course Chad has been allowing transit of arms into Darfur for the RSF. It's clear that some of these arms are coming from the United Arab Emirates. But it's a delicate political balancing act for the Chadian government there. The region is essentially awash in arms and actors, both state and non-state, who are playing a role and could be drawn even further into this conflict.

LINDSAY:
Let's talk a little bit about those outside actors, Michelle, and the role they're playing and who they're siding with. You mentioned Russia's recent efforts to build bridges to the SAF to obtain naval bases on the Red Sea. But at the beginning of the conflict, the Wagner Group had ties to the RSF and supported them. We have Egypt, which is always interested in what happens in its southern neighbor, if only because the Nile originates at least partly in Sudan and so what happens to the south matters to the Egyptians. You mentioned the UAE, which I should note denies publicly playing any role in providing weapons to anyone in Sudan. But who else is being involved in the war in Sudan?

GAVIN:
The Saudis have also played a role. Jeddah has been the site of numerous failed attempts to get to a cease-fire. By and large, it appears that the Saudis are backing the SAF. A number of Gulf rivalries, like that between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are essentially being exported to Sudan and are helping to continue to fuel this conflict.

LINDSAY:
And do we know why the UAE would line up on the side of the RSF?

GAVIN:
It is puzzling. Certainly at this point, the SAF, comprised both of former Sudanese military and intelligence services and some of the most senior figures from the Bashir era, these are Islamist hardliners. And so part of what seems to be driving the Emirati support for the RSF is a desire to ensure that Islamists do not have control over critical sea lanes. But what's also really important, I think in the context of this point to note, is that neither the RSF nor the SAF have any actual legitimacy, have any actual claim to be any kind of legitimate authority in Sudan. Not legally, not constitutionally, not popularly. And it's a source of constant frustration among Sudanese people as they struggle to survive that the rest of the world seems to believe that Sudan's future should belong to one or the other of these actors. Neither of these actors is popular to any extent on the ground.

LINDSAY:
But they are the actors that have power, at least in parts of Sudan. And hence-

GAVIN:
They're the actors who have guns.

LINDSAY:
Fair enough. They're the actors who have guns. Well, that takes us to the question of trying to negotiate a peace, or short of a full-fledged peace, a cease-fire. Help me understand what has been done on that front. You've made references to holding meetings in Jeddah. Should note the Jeddah, it's on the Red Sea, so it's essentially across the Red Sea from Sudan. Help me understand what progress is being made, or not being made and why, on the peace front?

GAVIN:
Well, there have been multiple rounds of talks. There's been the Jeddah process. There have been talks in Nairobi, there have been talks in Addis. IGAD, the sub-regional organization for this part of Africa, has not played any kind of constructive role in driving toward peace. But many of Sudan's neighbors, very alarmed at the prospect of a failed state in their midst, have tried to bring these actors together. But consistently, these talks have failed and the talks have failed because we have not had a moment where both sides have concluded that they cannot achieve complete military victory. So as long as they continue to have external support to drive their war effort, at this point, both sides seem to be willing to utterly destroy what's left of the country in pursuit of defeating the other.

LINDSAY:
One of the things I've heard on that point, Michelle, is that the SAF has been able to rebound recently because Iran has been providing them with drones that the SAF has been able to use very effectively against the RSF. What is your reading of the relationship between Tehran and the SAF?

GAVIN:
Well, it's an interesting set of bedfellows. I think to some degree speaks to the desperation of the SAF to find essentially any partner that can help them sustain themselves in the face of the RSF's military advances. From a U.S. policy point of view, when you look at the Russian element, the Iranians, and the SAF is kind of increasingly aligning itself with actors antithetical to our interests, but the RSF is not any kind of alternative. This is a group of people responsible for horrific atrocities. And also, and I think this is important, I don't believe in any way capable of ever governing Sudan. It's not a disciplined force. It's wildly unpopular. This has always puzzled me about the Emirati support because at the end of the day, I just don't think it's a realistic scenario that you've got Hemedti at the head of some kind of RSF-dominated government that can maintain any kind of order in Sudan.

LINDSAY:
So Michelle, I'd like to talk a bit more about what the United States is doing in terms of the civil war in Sudan. I guess one question is this macro issue of what U.S. interests are at stake, but also I'd like to know to what extent the United States has been able to or has sought to build coalitions to try to bring the fighting to an end.

GAVIN:
Great question. So I would start just by stepping back a little and to note that for decades, U.S. policy had quite explicitly sought a change in government in Sudan because the Bashir regime had harbored international terrorists, committed international crimes, destabilized neighbors. It was a problem for U.S. policy. And there was a very comprehensive suite of sanctions that the U.S. had been enforcing trying to essentially pressure that government and hoping to elicit some change. So it's extra painful, I think, from a U.S. perspective to note that the Sudanese people rose up and did the work that our policy couldn't accomplish and yet now we find ourselves in this catastrophic situation.

For the U.S. our concerns are complex. There's a desire not to go back to a Sudan that harbors actors threatening to the U.S., that seeks to weaken and destabilize neighbors. There were concerns in the past about the Iran connection and the U.S. desire to see the Iranian government isolated is part of the U.S. calculus here. But I think also more broadly, if you look at the consequences that followed from the state collapse in Libya, and imagine that scaled up to some degree, it's difficult to imagine that Sudan's crisis stays in Sudan's borders. And so you're talking about the potential destabilization of the Horn. You're talking about the potential for that increasingly Russia-dominated Sahelian Belt to have this other very strong element to it. So from a security geopolitical point of view, it's quite important not to let the worst case scenario unfold.

And so what has the U.S. been doing? Well, we do now have a special envoy for Sudan, which was not the case for several years. Tom Perriello is working energetically to try to encourage the belligerents to come to a cease-fire, to try to prod the humanitarian community to find new ways of getting assistance to the people most in need, to try and call attention to this crisis, to get the world to reckon with the fact that it's very difficult to imagine this ending without some kind of intervention, be that a peacekeeping force, which is not popular these days on the continent or at the UN, but we have a limited set of tools at our disposal and a increasingly dire problem.

So he is engaged in these diplomatic efforts and sort of exhortations. The U.S. has also applied some targeted sanctions to actors on both sides of this conflict. And it is important to note, while we've talked about RSF atrocities, it is also clear that the SAF has not been prioritizing civilian protection: in fact has bombed markets, schools, is in no way making the protection of the Sudanese people it's priority. So the sanctions have I think, limited effect. I think very few of these actors have assets in the U.S. It's painfully apparent that for all of the criticism that's come from Capitol Hill and elsewhere of a sort of half-hearted U.S. effort, the U.S. has done more than most. And everything from responding to humanitarian appeals, to trying to wrestle with these external actors who are fueling the conflict, there hasn't been a lot of multilateral solidarity on the importance of stopping this crisis.

LINDSAY:
Well, and as you pointed out, Michelle, structurally this does not look to be a crisis that is ripe for resolution because the two warring factions both believe they have a chance to be the ultimate victor, which makes them not inclined to go along with any negotiations. So Special Envoy Perriello, I think has his work cut out for him just given the nature of where the players are.

But that leads me to the bigger question of whether someone who is a special envoy, even if chosen by the president, will have the kind of clout you need to move negotiations along when they exist? I take your point there's been criticism on Capitol Hill of the administration and people who want to see the U.S. do more on Sudan would say things like, "Why isn't Secretary Anthony Blinken making this a priority?" I don't mean there's a criticism of the secretary, I'll note he has a lot of other things on his plate and again, in all administrations you have to prioritize. But you've been there. You've worked in the White House on the staff of the National Security Council. You've also been on the ground. How do you think about those issues?

GAVIN:
Well, they are difficult and special envoys can be very effective or they can be a part of a policy response that involves heated discussions in Washington and not much else. There are always turf battles, concerns about reporting lines, who's really in charge of what. And it takes everybody rowing in the same direction and comfortable with the kind of structural approach to have any chance of success. But I do think it would've been entirely untenable not to have a special envoy. You do need someone working this issue every day. And as you rightly point out, the secretary of State has a very, very busy calendar.

But for a special envoy to be effective, they need to be able to get that support from the secretary, from the president if need be, to push the process along and be able to kind of bring in the heavyweights when necessary. And that is difficult. And I think it's extra difficult in a situation like Sudan where it's not just African capitals we need to be speaking with here, right? As we discussed, the conflict is being fueled by a range of external actors, not all of them in Africa. And so then you get to some of the kind bureaucratic seams in our own foreign policymaking, the different equities of different regional bureaus, and all of these are kind of drags on any envoy's efforts to drive some kind of resolution.

LINDSAY:
As you look at the situation in the Sudan today, Michelle, and against the backdrop of having recently been in Africa, thank you for coming on despite the jet lag, what do you see the broader lessons here for the continent? Is this an event that you think is likely to metastasize? And I will point out there's been a lot of talk about rejection of democracy, coups in West Africa, in the Sahel. We have issues of Islamic extremist violence across the Sahel. Do you see a way out of this? Choices that need to be made? What is your overall assessment?

GAVIN:
I think that we are on the precipice of such a horrifying humanitarian disaster in Sudan that it should be focusing policy minds. What's horrifying about that is the loss of life but it's also important to recognize just how angry people are on the ground about the neglect, the lack of high level attention, the sense that other crises in the world merit near constant media coverage, attention at the highest levels from our government, and that all of our rhetoric about wanting to be a partner, about backing the forces of democracy, all of that comes into question when people watch this kind of destruction and devastation and it's not met with a response that is anywhere close to adequate to save lives.

It is really hard to overstate the seriousness of the food security crisis right now. There are already people dying of starvation and the numbers that experts are coming up with are really orders of magnitude worse than what we've seen for a very, very long time. And we've been seeing a number of humanitarian crises in this Sahel and in the Horn. This is something much worse. And it's unfolding right now. There is really no time to waste.

LINDSAY:
On that sobering note, I'll close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Michelle Gavin, the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations. Michelle, thanks as always for joining me.

GAVIN:
Thank you so much for having me.

LINDSAY:
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Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.