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Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology
Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics
Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe explores the history of gunpowder in Europe from the thirteenth century, when it was first imported from China, to the sixteenth century, as firearms became central to the conduct of war. Bridging the fields of military history and the history of technology -- and challenging past assumptions about Europe's "gunpowder revolution" -- Hall discovers a complex and fascinating story. Military inventors faced a host of challenges, he finds, from Europe's lack of naturally occurring saltpeter -- one of gunpowder's major components -- to the limitations of smooth-bore firearms. Manufacturing cheap, reliable gunpowder proved a difficult feat, as did making firearms that had reasonably predictable performance characteristics. Hall details the efforts of armorers across Europe as they experimented with a variety of gunpowder recipes and gunsmithing techniques, and he examines the integration of new weapons into the existing structure of European warfare.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published May 12, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 11, 2013
One day I asked my friend "if longbows could fire faster and further than Napoleonic muskets, and armour had largely gone out of by that time, why didn't they come back into use?"
His reasonable answer was that you could train a large army to use muskets in a very short period of time, unlike the lifetime of practice for a longbow.
The question stuck with me though, and the more I learned about early firearms, the fewer good points they seemed to have. How did guns come to supplant bows? What role did they really have in the end of the era of the knight?
I thought I'd have a look for a history of firearms that would answer this question. It's an important topic, which I'd have thought could easily get a wide readership. Yet when I looked I found very little.
That's how I came upon this book; a little more academic than my usual history reading, but seemingly the best option. I wasn't disappointed by it.
The author places firearms firmly in the general context of warfare in Renaissance Europe. While firearms are always on his mind, their importance isn't magnified by looking at them in isolation.
Roughly speaking, Hall's key points are:
Gunpowder weapons have to be seen in the context of existing missile weapons.
Cannon had clear advantages over older siege weapons, particularly once cast bronze cannon and cheaper, properly grained gunpowder became common. In a few campaigns they overwhelmed defensive strategies based on fixed fortifications. However this period did not last long before fortifications responded. The first example was Henry V's 1415 campaign in France, and by the 1530s siege durations were back to what they had been in the middle ages.
Handheld firearms did not have the same obvious advantages. In many ways they were very similar to crossbows - both could penetrate armour at short range, and both very very vulnerable while they reloaded. For a long time the two weapons were used alongside one another, and it took centuries for the arquebus to supplant the crossbow. Both weapons were most effective defending walls; in the field they were vulnerable to cavalry.
Combined-arms tactics required heavy infantry to stop the shock charge of heavy cavalry or the advance of enemy infantry, then hold them in place while short-ranged enfilade fire from missile weapons on the flanks wore them down. English tactics developed in the 14th century were not dissimilar to pike & shot tactics of the 16th. Firearms gave some advantages in terms of penetration and stopping power, but this was not a revolutionary change.
In fact, the pike was more important than the arquebus. The pike was a very old technology, but one that required different attitudes and training to those of the mediaeval soldier, and new ways of organising armies. Pike units required discipline and cohesion. As long as they maintained formation, pike units could resist the shock of a heavy cavalry charge. Maintaining formation usually meant not moving too far or too fast.
These facts dictated defensive tactics. There is a clear line from the English tactics of the 14th & 15th century and the pike & shot tactics of the 16th century. The stakes used at agincourt were an early version of the field fortifications later built to protect arquebusiers.
Small arms technology changed little from the introduction of corned gunpowder in the late 15th century to the spread of the bayonet in the late 17th century. Changes in warfare in this period were more a result of the fall and rise of fortifications, the establishment of tactics and finally in the expansion of armies due defensive strategies and the strength of the state.
Through most of this period, the role of heavy cavalry - "knights in armour" - declined but was still important. Heavy cavalry could still defeat light cavalry and could still devastate unprotected missile troops and disorganised pikemen. The end of the knight only came with the development of the wheel-lock pistol. Reiter, carrying two or more pistols, were just as mobile as lances, and could defeat them in combat.
Without knowing enough to properly critique Hall's arguments, I just have a few criticisms of the way the book is written. It ends rather abruptly, without a clear summing up. Like one of the other reviewers, I would have liked more pictures or diagrams - for example, how a lock mechanism works. My biggest problem with the book is the lack of a clear comparison of crossbows and arquebuses. The latter seem to slowly supplant the former, without Hall making explicit why. I assume because they were more powerful, but that is an assumption; Hall reports ballistic tests on firearms but no comparative data for crossbows.
Those few issues aside, the book covered exactly what I was hoping for, and left me interested in finding out more about the role and development of firearms in other regions and eras.
His reasonable answer was that you could train a large army to use muskets in a very short period of time, unlike the lifetime of practice for a longbow.
The question stuck with me though, and the more I learned about early firearms, the fewer good points they seemed to have. How did guns come to supplant bows? What role did they really have in the end of the era of the knight?
I thought I'd have a look for a history of firearms that would answer this question. It's an important topic, which I'd have thought could easily get a wide readership. Yet when I looked I found very little.
That's how I came upon this book; a little more academic than my usual history reading, but seemingly the best option. I wasn't disappointed by it.
The author places firearms firmly in the general context of warfare in Renaissance Europe. While firearms are always on his mind, their importance isn't magnified by looking at them in isolation.
Roughly speaking, Hall's key points are:
Gunpowder weapons have to be seen in the context of existing missile weapons.
Cannon had clear advantages over older siege weapons, particularly once cast bronze cannon and cheaper, properly grained gunpowder became common. In a few campaigns they overwhelmed defensive strategies based on fixed fortifications. However this period did not last long before fortifications responded. The first example was Henry V's 1415 campaign in France, and by the 1530s siege durations were back to what they had been in the middle ages.
Handheld firearms did not have the same obvious advantages. In many ways they were very similar to crossbows - both could penetrate armour at short range, and both very very vulnerable while they reloaded. For a long time the two weapons were used alongside one another, and it took centuries for the arquebus to supplant the crossbow. Both weapons were most effective defending walls; in the field they were vulnerable to cavalry.
Combined-arms tactics required heavy infantry to stop the shock charge of heavy cavalry or the advance of enemy infantry, then hold them in place while short-ranged enfilade fire from missile weapons on the flanks wore them down. English tactics developed in the 14th century were not dissimilar to pike & shot tactics of the 16th. Firearms gave some advantages in terms of penetration and stopping power, but this was not a revolutionary change.
In fact, the pike was more important than the arquebus. The pike was a very old technology, but one that required different attitudes and training to those of the mediaeval soldier, and new ways of organising armies. Pike units required discipline and cohesion. As long as they maintained formation, pike units could resist the shock of a heavy cavalry charge. Maintaining formation usually meant not moving too far or too fast.
These facts dictated defensive tactics. There is a clear line from the English tactics of the 14th & 15th century and the pike & shot tactics of the 16th century. The stakes used at agincourt were an early version of the field fortifications later built to protect arquebusiers.
Small arms technology changed little from the introduction of corned gunpowder in the late 15th century to the spread of the bayonet in the late 17th century. Changes in warfare in this period were more a result of the fall and rise of fortifications, the establishment of tactics and finally in the expansion of armies due defensive strategies and the strength of the state.
Through most of this period, the role of heavy cavalry - "knights in armour" - declined but was still important. Heavy cavalry could still defeat light cavalry and could still devastate unprotected missile troops and disorganised pikemen. The end of the knight only came with the development of the wheel-lock pistol. Reiter, carrying two or more pistols, were just as mobile as lances, and could defeat them in combat.
Without knowing enough to properly critique Hall's arguments, I just have a few criticisms of the way the book is written. It ends rather abruptly, without a clear summing up. Like one of the other reviewers, I would have liked more pictures or diagrams - for example, how a lock mechanism works. My biggest problem with the book is the lack of a clear comparison of crossbows and arquebuses. The latter seem to slowly supplant the former, without Hall making explicit why. I assume because they were more powerful, but that is an assumption; Hall reports ballistic tests on firearms but no comparative data for crossbows.
Those few issues aside, the book covered exactly what I was hoping for, and left me interested in finding out more about the role and development of firearms in other regions and eras.
December 25, 2023
Beste gs boek
December 19, 2008
If your are intersted in the muzzle velocity of muskets v. arquebuses or how the corning of gunpowder changed warfare, this is your book. If you are not into historical metallurgy or the production of saltpeter then maybe you should stay away, but if your are this book is a fascinating look into the development of early firearms. Worth reading for true nerds.
May 21, 2023
This is a scholarly book on what is commonly called the Gunpowder Revolution in Europe, 1400-1600. The emphasis is on continuity rather than on sudden radical change, on the slow stop-start nature of the change, driven by experience, improvisation, and experiment. There is a good deal of information on technical details like the internal ballistics of arquebuses and methods of corning black powder. It seems that arquebus balls had little advantage over crossbow bolts except at very close range, since their poor aerodynamics causes them to lose velocity quickly. The book provides many such insights into the nuances of military development during this period, which saw the slow development of coordinated use of heavy cavalry, masses of pikemen, arquebusiers, and field artillery.
Wheellock pistols first appeared in 1505 (but were outlawed some places because they were too easy to conceal, compared to matchlocks). They were much easier for horsemen to handle, and their wide deployment in the late 16th century led to the eclipse of heavily armored lance-wielding men-at-arms.
The absence of heavy cavalry in turn allowed infantry formations to morph from squares to the lines typical of the early modern period. A revolution in infantry formations had already occurred just before the advent gunpowder: large bodies of trained and disciplined troops, either archers or pikemen, turned out to be just about invincible, at least in defense. Matchlock arquebuses were first used mainly to defend castle walls, then gradually came into use to defend field defenses like ditches, wagon lagers, and palisades. The combination of pike and arquebus became very powerful in defense in the field and very difficult to attack successfully without very high casualties later in the 16th century. This led to a tendency to avoid pitched battles in favor of maneuvers and sieges. Also, the desire to seek a battlefield advantage, combined with the growing organizational ability of states, led to much larger and more professional armies.
And if you're going to have sieges, you will want to have cannon. The French developed an efficient train of siege artillery to win the Hundred Years' War, and their expedition to Italy with it in 1494 tipped the balance against forts for a while. This led to a lot of open battles. However, teh balance was restored within 30 years by the perfection and wide adoption of the trace italienne (whose development however went back to 1450). Field artillery also gradually improved, and its deadliness hastened the change from square to line formations.
Wheellock pistols first appeared in 1505 (but were outlawed some places because they were too easy to conceal, compared to matchlocks). They were much easier for horsemen to handle, and their wide deployment in the late 16th century led to the eclipse of heavily armored lance-wielding men-at-arms.
The absence of heavy cavalry in turn allowed infantry formations to morph from squares to the lines typical of the early modern period. A revolution in infantry formations had already occurred just before the advent gunpowder: large bodies of trained and disciplined troops, either archers or pikemen, turned out to be just about invincible, at least in defense. Matchlock arquebuses were first used mainly to defend castle walls, then gradually came into use to defend field defenses like ditches, wagon lagers, and palisades. The combination of pike and arquebus became very powerful in defense in the field and very difficult to attack successfully without very high casualties later in the 16th century. This led to a tendency to avoid pitched battles in favor of maneuvers and sieges. Also, the desire to seek a battlefield advantage, combined with the growing organizational ability of states, led to much larger and more professional armies.
And if you're going to have sieges, you will want to have cannon. The French developed an efficient train of siege artillery to win the Hundred Years' War, and their expedition to Italy with it in 1494 tipped the balance against forts for a while. This led to a lot of open battles. However, teh balance was restored within 30 years by the perfection and wide adoption of the trace italienne (whose development however went back to 1450). Field artillery also gradually improved, and its deadliness hastened the change from square to line formations.
April 7, 2020
Book contains both good review of previous influential writings (debate on 'military revolution' of Roberts, Parker and others) as well as author's own reasonable view on the matter. Author's understanding of relations between developments of tactics/strategy and technology are especially interesting. Also I found quite reasonable argument that it were strategic considerations that caused increase of army size and not increased circumference of fortifications (as Parker suggested).
At the beginning I was slightly disappointed about author tendency to describe late medieval warfare from rather English (or British) perspective but on the way to 16th century he applies more and more of continental evidence for warfare developments.
I am quite convinced with the logic that author uses to explain the process of disappearance of knighthood (men-at-arms, heavy lance cavalry of medieval type) from battlefields due to increasing importance of particular developments in firearms along with pikemen infantry.
Point about the difference between medieval and early modern armies in the way they acquire skilled people is of especial importance across the book.
Last chapter is rather cursory but still provides extremely interesting insight into socio-economical context of soldiering in 16th century for an individual.
At the beginning I was slightly disappointed about author tendency to describe late medieval warfare from rather English (or British) perspective but on the way to 16th century he applies more and more of continental evidence for warfare developments.
I am quite convinced with the logic that author uses to explain the process of disappearance of knighthood (men-at-arms, heavy lance cavalry of medieval type) from battlefields due to increasing importance of particular developments in firearms along with pikemen infantry.
Point about the difference between medieval and early modern armies in the way they acquire skilled people is of especial importance across the book.
Last chapter is rather cursory but still provides extremely interesting insight into socio-economical context of soldiering in 16th century for an individual.
April 20, 2024
This's a history of European warfare in the early days of guns.
What stood out the most to me is how different guns and gunpowder were then, and how little we still know about the effects of different physical and chemical changes - because, of course, most research has been done with modern guns and powder. Hall tries to piece together an understanding from contemporary texts and the few modern experiments, with interesting results - and, he shows, a good explanation of the strategies and tactics used by contemporaries.
What stood out the most to me is how different guns and gunpowder were then, and how little we still know about the effects of different physical and chemical changes - because, of course, most research has been done with modern guns and powder. Hall tries to piece together an understanding from contemporary texts and the few modern experiments, with interesting results - and, he shows, a good explanation of the strategies and tactics used by contemporaries.
December 19, 2009
This is probably going to sound lame, but I wanted more pictures. I think a history book is a bit dead feeling without a lot of pictures of the artifacts of the time. But the writing might be excellent though, I didn't give it a chance.
December 18, 2009
"The Patterns of War Through the Eighteenth Century" wünscht rückblickend es wäre dieses Buch geworden.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews