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Reprinted from the *American Jewish Year Book 2017*

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The American Jewish Year Book 2017
The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities

This Report derives from Chapter 7 of the *American Jewish Year Book, 2017*.

The *American Jewish Year Book* is "The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities." This volume is a very important and prestigious annual publication because it has acted as a major resource for academic researchers, researchers at Jewish institutions and organizations, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media, both Jewish and secular, educated leaders and lay persons, and libraries, particularly University and Jewish libraries, for up-to-date information about the American and Canadian Jewish communities. For decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has been the premiere place for leading academics to publish long review chapters on topics of interest to the American Jewish community.

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World Jewish Population, 2017

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World Jewish Population, 2017

At the beginning of 2017, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 14,511,100—an increase of 103,500 (0.72%) over the 2016 revised estimate of 14,407,600—slightly lower than the 14,410,700 original estimate (DellaPergola 2017a). The world's total population increased by 1.12% in 2016 (Population Research Bureau 2017). The rate of increase of World Jewry hence was two thirds that of the total population.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world (the *Diaspora*)—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2016. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* Jewish population concept addresses a human collective that is mutually exclusive with respect to other subpopulations, while acknowledging that the number of persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities are increasing in contemporary societies (Josselson and Harway 2012) (see Section 1 below). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews from 11 million to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah (Holocaust) (DellaPergola et al. 2000), 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12 million to 13 million. While starting in the 1970s, world Jewry stagnated at *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years, some demographic recovery occurred since 2000, mostly reflecting an increase in Israel. It took about 14 years to add another million from 13 million to 14 million. In historical perspective and based on the same definitions, world Jewish population has not recovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it will take decades more to do so, if ever.



Fig. 1 World total population and core Jewish population, 1945-2017

World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 to about 6.5 million in 2017. The Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing to about 8.1 million in 2017. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.418 billion in 2017. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.96 per 1,000 currently—or one per every 510 inhabitants in the world.

Two countries, Israel and the US, account for 83.7% of the 2017 total, another 17 countries, each with 18,000 Jews or more, account for another 14.8%, and another 79 countries, each with Jewish populations below 18,000, account for the remaining 1.5%. **Figure 2** shows the largest *core* Jewish populations in 2017.



Fig. 2 Largest core Jewish populations, 2017

Israel's Jewish population (*not* including 384,500 persons not recorded as Jews in the Population Register but belonging to families initially admitted within the framework of the *Law of Return*) reached 6,451,000 in 2017 (44.5% of world Jewry). This represented a population increase of 116,500 (1.84%) in 2016. In the same year, the total Jewish population of the Diaspora was estimated to have decreased by 13,000 from 8,073,100 to 8,060,100 (-

0.16%). Following the 2013 Pew Research Center study of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), the US *core* Jewish population was assessed at 5,700,000 and was estimated not to have changed, constituting 39.3% of world Jewry in 2017. Jews in the US were estimated to have slightly increased since the year 2000, following several years of moderate decline after probably reaching a peak around 1980 (DellaPergola 2013a). Jews in the rest of the world were assessed at 2,360,100 in 2017 (16.2% of world Jewry). Since all of the decline of 13,000 among Diaspora Jews occurred in countries other than the US, that amounted to a loss of -0.56% in the aggregate for those countries.

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel hosts the largest Jewish community worldwide, although there are some dissenting opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). Over the past decades demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births and deaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish collective identification, not subordinated nor on par with other explicit religious or ethnic identifications. At the same time, Israel's growing Jewish population faces a significant demographic challenge with its gradually diminishing majority status vis-á-vis the Palestinian Arab population who live within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a relatively young age composition. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, the US and Germany), and possibly some growth due to local natural increase (as possibly true in Mexico and the UK) the number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates.

The defining principle of demography is that a population size at a given time reflects an uninterrupted chain of events that change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date. Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths) where low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly population generate higher death rates; and (b) the balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). The third determinant consists of identification changes or *passages* (accessions and secessions)—in this case to and from Judaism—and applies only to subpopulations defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group.

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess

another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. (See further discussion in Section 1.) The detailed mechanisms and supporting evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of the *American Jewish Year Book* and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a).

Section 1: Assessing Jewish Population

Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola et al. 2005; DellaPergola 2017a).

The 2017 Jewish population data were updated from 2016 and previous years in accordance with known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. In the updating procedure, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target. Otherwise, previous estimates were adjusted based upon newer, better evidence.

The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2017 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bi-local residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage, but analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

Definitions

Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population is addressed at all. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would not be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail across countries.

In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility of undertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use of quantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems:

1) *Defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
2) *Identifying* the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population—primarily by systematic canvassing of populations and personally ascertaining personal identifications. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
3) *Covering* the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational*, not *prescriptive*, definitional criteria. Its conceptual aspects, far from pure theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least, available budgets. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. While response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be much better than general surveys, the quality of the data is certainly being impacted.

But no method exists to counter these decreases in response rates and cooperation rates. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover, namely the degree of

indifference to or involvement with feeling Jewish. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated through various imperfect indirect techniques. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, and corporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction work such as this.

Keeping this in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (Figure 3): (a) the **core Jewish population (CJP)**—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive identification framework, subdivided among those who do see or do not see religion as a major avenue for identification (Jewish only, religion: Circle 1 in Figure 3; Jewish only, no religion: Circle 2 in the Figure); (b) the **population with Jewish parent(s) (JPP)**—subdivided among those who say they are partly Jewish because their identity is split between two or more different and relevant identification frameworks (Circle 3), and those who say they are not Jewish but have Jewish background in the form of at least one Jewish parent (Circle 4). Taken together Circles 3 and 4 are also referred to as the "Jewish Connected" population; (c) the **enlarged Jewish population (EJP)**—subdivided between others who say they have Jewish background but not a Jewish parent (Circle 5), and all non-Jewish household members who live in households with Jews (Circle 6); and (d) the **Law of Return population (LRP)** (Circle 7).

This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition approaches but it also delineates different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective catchment constituencies. More detail on these definitions is presented in the Appendix. It is important to realize that the categories in Figure 3 are not static but continuous passages occur across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole configuration outside, and vice-versa. Further definitional extensions (not shown in **Figure 3**) may address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of **affinity with Judaism**, sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal cultural or social connections with Jews. Moreover, some studies may have reached people whose **ancestors *ever* were Jewish** regardless of the respondents' present identification. Several socio-demographic surveys indeed ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some population surveys, however, *do* ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt 2002). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010; Tian et al. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.



Fig. 3 Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2017
1-2 = Core Jewish population (CJP)
1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (JPP)
1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)
1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP)
Areas represented are not proportional to actual populations

The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core* definition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities, but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here. The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, and major metropolitan area, are consistently anchored to the concept of *core* Jewish population. The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the population with Jewish parents, the *enlarged* definition, or the *Law of Return* definition (see the **Appendix table**).

Data Sources

The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c and 2014d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population censuses, public and private sponsored surveys, population registers, and records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions. Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Jewish population projections undertaken by the author, in light of the latest data, also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data. A full list of the types and quality of documentation upon which Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the **Appendix** below.

Section 2: World Jewish Population Size and Distribution

World Jewry at the beginning of 2017 was assessed at 14,511,100 and constituted 1.96 per 1000 of the world's total population of 7.418 billion by mid-year 2016 (Population Reference Bureau 2017) (**Table 1**). Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographical distribution (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014) provide findings quite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As Jews are usually an extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by large sampling errors.

Table 1 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2016 and 2017[a]

Region	2016 Revised[b]		2017		Percentage change 2016-2017	Jews per 1000 total population 2017
	Estimate	Percent[c]	Estimate	Percent[c]		
World total	**14,407,600**	**100.0**	**14,511,100**	**100.0**	**0.72**	**1.96**
Diaspora	8,073,100	56.0	8,060,100	55.5	-0.16	1.09
Israel[d]	6,334,500	44.0	6,451,000	44.5	1.84	747.34
America, total	**6,469,500**	**44.9**	**6,470,600**	**44.6**	**0.02**	**6.49**
North[e]	6,088,100	42.3	6,090,100	42.0	0.03	16.91
Central, Caribbean	57,000	0.4	57,000	0.4	0.00	0.26
South	324,400	2.3	323,500	2.2	-0.28	0.77
Europe, total	**1,372,400**	**9.5**	**1,359,100**	**9.4**	**-0.97**	**1.66**
European Union[f]	1,084,700	7.5	1,078,700	7.4	-0.55	2.13
FSU[g]	249,400	1.7	242,400	1.7	-2.81	1.21
Other West	20,700	0.1	20,600	0.1	-0.48	1.46
Balkans[h]	17,600	0.1	17,400	0.1	-1.14	0.18
Asia, total	**6,370,800**	**44.2**	**6,486,600**	**44.7**	**1.82**	**1.49**
Israel[d]	6,334,500	44.0	6,451,000	44.5	1.84	747.34
FSU	17,300	0.1	16,700	0.1	-3.47	0.19
Other	19,000	0.1	18,900	0.1	-0.53	0.00
Africa, total	**74,300**	**0.5**	**74,000**	**0.5**	**-0.40**	**0.06**
Northern[i]	3,600	0.0	3,500	0.0	-2.78	0.01
Sub-Saharan[j]	70,700	0.5	70,500	0.5	-0.28	0.08
Oceania[k]	**120,600**	**0.8**	**120,800**	**0.8**	**0.17**	**3.02**

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2016. Source: Population Reference Bureau (2017)
b Corrections reflect newly available data for Israel (-1,900), Georgia (-800), Armenia (+100), Iran (-300), Zimbabwe (-200). For the original estimates see DellaPergola (2017a)
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding
d Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
e US and Canada
f Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)
g Asian regions of Russian Federation included in Europe. Excluding the Baltic countries
h Including European and Asian regions of Turkey
i Including Ethiopia
j Including South Africa and Zimbabwe
k Including Australia and New Zealand

According to our revised estimates, between January 1, 2016 and January 1, 2017, the Jewish population increased by an estimated 103,500 persons, or 0.72%, versus 96,000 and 0.67% the previous year. This compares with a total world population growth rate of 1.12%, versus 1.38% the previous year. World Jewry continued to increase exclusively due to the population increase in Israel (1.84%) overcoming actual decrease in the Diaspora (-0.16%). Among total population, growth was 1.5% in less developed countries, and nearly nil in more developed countries. **Table 1** offers an overall picture of the Jewish population at the beginning of 2017 as compared to 2016 by major geographical regions. The originally published estimates from the 2016 *American Jewish Year* Book were slightly revised reflecting retroactive corrections due to improved information. These corrections resulted in a net decline of 3,100 persons in the 2016 world Jewry estimate, comprising a subtraction of 1,900 from the previous estimate for Israel, and a net deduction of 1,200 in the Jewish Diaspora total.

The number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 6,334,500 in 2016 to 6,451,000 at the beginning of 2017, an increase of 116,500, or 1.84%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from the revised 8,073,100 to 8,060,100—a decrease of 13,000, or -0.16%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), from France, from the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem countries, and from other countries, and the internal decrease typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In 2016, of a total increase of 116,500 core Jews in Israel, 100,000 reflected the balance of births and deaths, and 16,500 reflected the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration) and to a minor extent net conversions to Judaism (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2017; Fisher 2015). Israel's net migration balance includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change produced 86% of the total Jewish population growth in Israel. According to our estimates, most of the Diaspora's estimated decrease reflected emigration. This quite certainly underestimates the actually negative vital balance in most countries, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Adjustments could be needed in the future.

Recently, however, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs in the Diaspora as well. The addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel (DellaPergola 2017c).

Reflecting these global trends, 83.7% of world Jews currently live in two countries, Israel and the US, and 96.2% are concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. In 2017, the G8 countries—the world's eight leading economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, and US)—constituted about 89% of the total Diaspora Jewish population. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends.

About 45% of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with 42% in North America (**Table 1**). Another about 45% live in Asia, overwhelmingly in Israel. Asia includes here the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asian parts of the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounts for over 9% of the total. Little more than 1% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania. Among the major geographical regions shown in **Table 1**, the number of Jews increased between 2016 and 2017 in Israel (and, consequently, in Asia as a whole), and minimally in Oceania and in North America thanks to continuing immigration to Australia and Canada. Jewish population size decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe, the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.

As noted, in our present study we corrected previously published Jewish population estimates in light of new information. The last upward correction in

the US following the 2013 Pew study generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series of data for the US, total Diaspora, and World Jewry since 2000. **Table 2** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2017, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and as now retroactively corrected, also adjusting all revisions that had been suggested in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981, by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* in the past based on the information that was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

Table 2 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2017

	World Jewish Population			World Population		Jews per 1000 total population
Year	Original estimate[a]	Revised estimate[b]	Annual% change[c]	Total (millions)[d]	Annual% change	
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.57	2,526	1.76	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.82	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.01	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.81	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,150,000	0.22	6,127	1.42	2.15
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,460,000	0.47	6,514	1.23	2.07
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	13,854,000	0.58	6,916	1.20	2.00
2015, Jan. 1	14,310,500	14,311,600	0.64	7,236	0.91	1.98
2016, Jan. 1	14,410,700	14,407,600	0.67	7,336	1.38	1.96
2017, Jan. 1	14,511,100		0.72	7,418	1.12	1.96

a As published in the *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originally published as of Dec. 31 of the previous year
b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
c Based on revised estimates, except latest year
d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations (2015), Population Reference Bureau (2017)

The time series in **Table 2** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 282,000 in the 1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2017, world Jewry increased by 657,000, but Israel's Jewish population increased by 747,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 90,000. **Table 2** also demonstrates the slower Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population. In 2017, the share of Jews among the world population (1.96 per 1,000) was 41.2% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Alternative definition frameworks

In **Table 3** we evaluate the Jewish population's regional distribution according to several alternative definitions, as outlined in **Figure 3**. Updated and revised *core* Jewish population estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who *have Jewish parents* regardless of their current identity (JPP); the *enlarged Jewish population* inclusive of non-Jewish household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the *Law of Return* (LRP). Detailed country estimates are reported in the **Appendix Table**. The main purpose of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparability across countries. In light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from the criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in the present study and in the US and Canada reports in this series (Sheskin and Dashefsky; Shahar). In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in another country. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on a minimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing population trends in their countries.

Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,511,100 (CJP) in 2017, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a broader global aggregate population estimate of 17,645,650 (JPP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, an *enlarged* estimate obtains of 20,499,200 (EJP). Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel's *Law of Return*, the total Jewish and non-Jewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 23,311,000 (LRP). The US holds a significantly larger *enlarged* (EJP) population living in households with Jews or other persons with Jewish background than Israel—roughly 10 million compared to 6,835,500, respectively.

The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of persons who have a Jewish parent (JPP), regardless of their own identification, stands 3,134,550 higher than the 14,511,100 core Jewish population. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) is estimated at an additional increment of 2,853,550. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return (LRP) is roughly estimated at 23,311,000, an additional increment of 2,811,800. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return potential aggregate (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is 8,799,900. Of these roughly estimated 8.8 million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewish-connected, or otherwise included non-Jews, 75.1% live in North America, 8.7% in the EU, 6.5% in the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 4.4% in Israel, 3.7% in Latin America, and 1.6% in other countries.

Table 3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2017

Region	Core Jewish population[a] CJP	Population with Jewish parents[b] JPP	Enlarged Jewish population EJP[c]	Law of Return population[d] LRP	Difference LRP – CJP		Percent increase LRP over CJP
					Number	Percent distribution	
World total	**14,511,100**	**17,645,650**	**20,499,200**	**23,311,000**	**8,799,900**	**100.0**	**61**
North America	6,090,100	8,450,200	10,550,300	12,700,400	6,610,300	75.1	109
Latin America	380,500	514,900	627,500	706,100	325,600	3.7	86
European Union[e]	1,078,700	1,313,600	1,576,200	1,848,600	769,900	8.7	71
FSU in Europe[e]	242,400	410,700	552,500	814,000	571,600	6.5	236
Rest of Europe	38,000	46,800	53,200	59,900	21,900	0.2	58
Israel[f]	6,451,000	6,643,250	6,835,500	6,835,500	384,500	4.4	6
FSU in Asia	16,700	27,000	38,200	52,800	36,100	0.4	216
Rest of Asia	18,900	23,600	27,100	30,400	11,500	0.1	61
Africa	74,000	81,900	88,900	96,900	22,900	0.3	31
Oceania	120,800	133,700	149,800	166,400	45,600	0.5	38

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity
b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent
c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)
d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification
e The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Union
f Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the Core Jewish population and the Law of Return population is quite different in the three main geographical divisions considered (**Figure 4**). Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel than elsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births in Israel from these households. In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of population aggregates around the Jewish core. One finally notes that with the emigration—mainly to Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does not necessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Indeed their propensity to change country of residence may be lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or less submerged component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with the passing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, and more of those non-Jews directly related pass too because of the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose their linkage to the core collective.

Greater detail is provided in **Figure 5** on the respective weight of the different population components within the broader Law of Return population in each of the 18 largest Jewish populations worldwide. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a larger share relative to the Law of Return definition include South Africa, Australia and the UK, France and Belgium, Mexico and Chile. Countries where the core constitutes the lowest share of

the Law of Return definition include Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Germany, and the US.



Fig. 4 Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 2017



Fig. 5 Eighteen largest Core, Jewish Parentage, Extended, and Law of Return Jewish populations, percentage distributions, 2017

Section: 3 Major Regions and Countries

The Jewish population in the **Americas**, estimated at 6,470,600 in 2017, is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (390,000, 6%), South America (323,500, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,000, 1%) (**Table 1** and **Appendix table**). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in Central and South America, with the exceptions of Panama and Mexico, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). In the community of Miami alone, the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In neighboring Broward County, the same measure increased from 5,300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016 (Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2016, the total number of immigrants from Latin America to Israel approached 25,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons who are highly educated and highly involved in Jewish life (Bokser Liwerant et al. 2015). However, outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to express their Jewish identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries. Persons with such backgrounds are also emigrating to Israel (Torres 2017).

The Jewish population in **Europe**, estimated at 1,359,100 in 2017, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 28 countries prior to the secession vote of the UK in June 2016, had an estimated total of 1,078,700 Jews in 2017 (79.4% of the continent's total). The momentous political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the structure of Jewish communities in Europe. Some revitalization of Jewish community life in the western countries occurred through immigration from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession and rising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et al. 2013; European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013). Total emigration from the EU to Israel reached 8,406 in 2015 and diminished to 5,570 in 2016. In spite of the ongoing unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013). The EU's growing format symbolized an important historical landmark, now put under new scrutiny after the 2016 Brexit. Disagreement about the possible inclusion of Turkey, with its large Muslim population and its mostly Middle Eastern location, reflect the unsolved

dilemma in the definition of Europe's own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. The former Soviet republics in Europe comprised 242,400 Jews (17.8% of the continental total). The FSU is the area where in absolute numbers Jewish population has diminished the most during the past 25 years (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 14,687 in 2015 and 14,471 in 2016. Our 2017 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics was 268,500, of whom 251,800 are in Europe (including the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 16,700 are in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly twice as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, 2015). A similar number of further eligible persons would probably lead to a *Law of Return* population approaching 900,000 for the whole of the FSU. All other European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including Turkey, combined comprised 38,000 Jews (2.8% of the European total).

The Jewish presence in **Asia** is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for more than 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia account each for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, the fast economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and especially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The numbers are still small but growing.

The Jewish population in **Africa** is mostly concentrated in South Africa (about 94% of the continental total). Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in **Oceania** where Australia accounts for 94% of the total.

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation accompanied by an increasing concentration in a few countries, 98.9% of world Jewry in 2017 lived in the largest 22 Jewish communities, each evaluated at 15,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 21 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 70.7% in the US (**Table 4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-á-vis* the Jewish presence.

Table 4 Countries with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2017

Rank	Country	Core Jewish population	% of total Jewish Population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative%	%	Cumulative%
1	Israel[a]	6,451,000	44.5	44.5	b	b
2	United States	5,700,000	39.3	83.7	70.7	70.7
3	France	456,000	3.1	86.9	5.7	76.4
4	Canada	390,000	2.7	89.6	4.8	81.2
5	United Kingdom	289,500	2.0	91.6	3.6	84.8
6	Argentina	180,500	1.2	92.8	2.2	87.0
7	Russia	176,000	1.2	94.0	2.2	89.2
8	Germany	116,500	0.8	94.8	1.4	90.7
9	Australia	113,200	0.8	95.6	1.4	92.1
10	Brazil	93,800	0.6	96.2	1.2	93.2
11	South Africa	69,300	0.5	96.7	0.9	94.1
12	Ukraine	53,000	0.4	97.1	0.7	94.8
13	Hungary	47,500	0.3	97.4	0.6	95.3
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.7	0.5	95.8
15	Netherlands	29,800	0.2	97.9	0.4	96.2
16	Belgium	29,300	0.2	98.1	0.4	96.6
17	Italy	27,300	0.2	98.3	0.3	96.9
18	Switzerland	18,700	0.1	98.4	0.2	97.2
19	Chile	18,300	0.1	98.5	0.2	97.4
20	Uruguay	16,900	0.1	98.7	0.2	97.6
21	Turkey	15,300	0.1	98.8	0.2	97.8
22	Sweden	15,000	0.1	98.9	0.2	98.0

a Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
b Not applicable

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be directly related to the country's level of development (**Table 5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2017, the share of Jews out of the total population was 747.3 per 1000 in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). Israel's population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such, attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, Jews represented 17.6 per 1000 of total population; Jews comprised 3.7 per 1000 total population on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.9 per 1000 on average in the other 13 countries with 15,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority (82%) of world population.

To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 5** reports the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2016). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's level of education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not

necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The latest available HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2015. Of the 22 countries listed, six are included among the top ten HDIs among 188 countries ranked (Australia, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, US, and Canada). Another five countries are ranked 11th to 25th (Sweden, UK, Israel, France, and Belgium), five more are between 26th and 50th (Italy, Chile, Hungary, Argentina, and Russia), five are between 51st and 100th (Uruguay, Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, and Ukraine), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (119th), pointing to lesser development in the host society. One should stress that Jewish communities may display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of their respective countries, but nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting together to 95.6% of world Jewry, live in countries whose HDI ranks among the top 50.

Table 5 Largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2017

Rank	Country	Core Jewish population	Total population	Jews per 1000 total population	HDI rank[a] 2015
1	Israel[b]	6,451,000	8,631,900	747.3	19
2	United States	5,700,000	323,900,000	17.6	10
3	France	456,000	64,640,000	7.1	21
4	Canada	390,000	36,200,000	10.8	10
5	United Kingdom	289,500	65,800,000	4.4	16
6	Argentina	180,500	43,600,000	4.1	45
7	Russia	176,000	144,300,000	1.2	49
8	Germany	116,500	82,600,000	1.4	4
9	Australia	113,200	24,100,000	4.7	2
	Total Ranks 3-9	1,721,700	461,240,000	3.7	21.0[c]
10	Brazil	93,800	206,100,000	0.5	79
11	South Africa	69,300	55,700,000	1.2	119
12	Ukraine	53,000	42,700,000	1.2	84
13	Hungary	47,500	9,800,000	4.8	43
14	Mexico	40,000	128,600,000	0.3	77
15	Netherlands	29,800	17,000,000	1.8	7
16	Belgium	29,300	11,300,000	2.6	22
17	Italy	27,300	60,600,000	0.5	26
18	Switzerland	18,700	8,400,000	2.2	2
19	Chile	18,300	18,200,000	1.0	38
20	Uruguay	16,900	3,500,000	4.8	54
21	Turkey	15,300	79,500,000	0.2	71
22	Sweden	15,000	9,900,000	1.5	14
	Total Ranks 10-22	474,200	540,200,000	0.9	48.9[c]
	Rest of the world	164,200	6,080,829,100	0.0	±100[c]

a *HDI* The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (measured as US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme (2016)

b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights**.** Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and non-Jewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank

c Average HDI rank for group of countries

Major Cities

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to live in major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews have manifested unique propensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with their socioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city, definitions varying by country. It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case of a recent Jewish population study of the service area of UJA/Federation of New York (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012), we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 that were included in the Jewish population count because they were neither born Jewish nor had converted to Judaism. We therefore did not consider them part of the core Jewish population. This correction affected our estimate for the New York CSA. On similar grounds, we introduced a correction in the Jewish population estimate for the San Francisco Bay CSA (Phillips 2005). Note that elsewhere in this volume, Sheskin and Dashefsky did not use these corrections as they rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish federations.

The unequivocal fact of an overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2017 more than half (53.9%) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2016; Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York, Jerusalem, Los Angeles, and Haifa (**Table 6**). Over two-thirds (68%) of world Jewry lived in the five previously mentioned largest areas plus the following six: South Florida, San Francisco/San Jose, Washington/Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago. Paris' position reflects Jewish emigration from France. In 2017, the 17 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population, each with 100,000 Jews or more, encompassed 76% of all Jews worldwide.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and approaching 3.5 million Jews by the *core* definition, largely exceeded that in the New York CSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.16 million Jews. Of the 17 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, nine were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living, with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespread transnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of core Jewish among total population (90%), followed at distance by Jerusalem (71%), Haifa (67.1%), and Beersheba (58.4%). In the diaspora,

the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan areas was in New York (9.5%), followed by South Florida (8.0%), San Francisco/San Jose (4.3%), and Philadelphia (4.3%).

Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. Especially in the US the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in **Table 6**. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or vice versa, and some may even commute weekly (Pupko 2013).

Table 6 Metropolitan areas (CSAs) with core Jewish populations above 100,000, 1/1/2017

Rank	Metropolitan area[a]	Country	Core Jewish population	% Jews out of total population	% of world Jewish population	
					%	Cumulative%
1	Tel Aviv[b]	Israel	3,468,500	90.0	23.9	23.9
2	New York CSA[c]	US	2,158,000	9.5	14.9	38.8
3	Jerusalem[d]	Israel	890,600	71.0	6.1	44.9
4	Los Angeles CSA[e]	US	686,000	3.7	4.7	49.6
5	Haifa[f]	Israel	617,800	67.1	4.3	53.9
6	South Florida CSA[g]	US	479,500	7.6	3.3	57.2
7	San Francisco/S.Jose CSA[h]	US	336,000	4.3	2.3	59.5
8	Washington/Baltimore CSA[i]	US	334,000	3.5	2.3	61.8
9	Philadelphia CSA[j]	US	309,000	4.3	2.1	63.9
10	Boston CSA[k]	US	298,000	3.4	2.1	66.0
11	Chicago CSA[l]	US	295,000	3.0	2.0	68.0
12	Paris[m]	France	277,000	2.3	1.9	69.9
13	Beersheba[n]	Israel	218,500	58.4	1.5	71.4
14	London[o]	UK	195,000	1.0	1.3	72.8
15	Toronto[p]	Canada	189,000	3.1	1.3	74.1
16	Buenos Aires[q]	Argentina	159,000	1.2	1.1	75.2
17	Atlanta CSA	US	121,000	1.9	0.8	76.0

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. For definitions of Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) in the US see: United States Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (2013). A table of the population of the top 20 CSAs can be found in Chapter 5 of this volume. Some of the US estimates may include non-core Jews

b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, and Ashdod Subdistrict. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000

c Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 100,000 individuals pertaining to the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Cohen et al. (2012). This is the New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA Combined Statistical Area, including much of southeastern NY, western CT, and northern NJ. Principal cities: New York, NY; White Plains, NY; Newark, NJ; Edison, NJ; Union, NJ; Wayne, NJ; and New Brunswick, NJ

d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of Judea and Samaria District. The Jerusalem metropolitan area was redefined in 2014, bringing to a diminished population estimate.

e Includes Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana area, Riverside-San Bernardino and Ventura County areas

f Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District. The geographic extent of the Haifa metropolitan area was considerably reduced in 2014, leading to a diminished population estimate

g Includes Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Okeechobee, and Indian River Counties. Not including 57,100 part-year residents

h Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 40,000 individuals who we see as part of the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Phillips (2005).

Includes the San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward area, Napa, San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma
i Includes the District of Columbia, northern Virginia, Montgomery County, Prince George's County, and the Baltimore-Towson area
j Includes Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington area (PA-NJ-DE-MD) and much of southern NJ,
k Includes Boston-Cambridge-Newton, Bristol, southern New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
l Includes Chicago-Joliet-Naperville area (IL-IN-WI)
m Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
n Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District. The Beersheba metropolitan area was considerably reduced in 2014, leading to a diminished population estimate
o Greater London and contiguous postcode areas
p Census Metropolitan Area
q Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A.

Section 4: International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants as such by single country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2013; Eurostat 2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS (formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) (HIAS 2013) in the US or the Zentralwohlfhartsstelle in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the former Soviet Union (FSU) opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated total 1.7 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2015 including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years of 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002-2004 and increased again to 71% in 2010-2012. The decrease for the US as a destination for FSU migrants since the onset of the 21st century is noticeable, as is the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany over the past ten years. These significant increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities, and real or expected disruptions in the societal environment affecting Jewish life. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic options in the main countries of destination.

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and 2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a net migration balance to Israel, decreases the Diaspora Jewish population and increases Israel's Jewish population. **Table 7**

shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2015 and 2016. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition.

Table 7 New immigrants to Israel[a], by last country of residence, 2015-2016

Country	2015	2016	Country	2015	2016	Country	2015	2016
GRAND TOTAL[b]	**27,850**	**25,010**	Greece	24	18	Tadjikistan	5	0
			Hungary	81	79	Turkmenistan	11	20
America - Total[b]	**3,948**	**4,098**	Ireland	7	17	Uzbekistan	234	196
North America	**2,789**	**2,814**	Italy	353	159	**Other Asia**	**120**	**146**
Canada	338	280	Luxembourg	2	0	Cambodia	0	1
United States	2,451	2,534	Netherlands	55	61	China	11	7
Central America	**149**	**144**	Poland	21	14	Hong Kong	4	5
Costa Rica	13	12	Portugal	7	10	India	47	52
Cuba	41	11	Romania	21	13	Indonesia	2	0
Dominican Rep.	0	1	Slovakia	4	2	Iran	35	33
El Salvador	1	3	Spain	87	72	Nepal	2	0
Guatemala	3	6	Sweden	33	22	Pakistan	2	0
Honduras	1	14	United Kingdom	623	598	Philippines	1	0
Martinique	8	0	**FSU in Europe**	**14,043**	**13,604**	Qatar	1	0
Mexico	71	82	Belarus	318	632	Singapore	4	7
Panama	10	15	Estonia	2	9	South Korea	4	5
Puerto Rico	1	0	Latvia	49	46	Syria	0	1
South America	**1,010**	**1,140**	Lithuania	13	31	Thailand	4	6
Argentina	262	248	Moldova	177	187	Vietnam	0	1
Bolivia	3	2	Russian Fed.	6,589	6,946	Yemen	3	28
Brazil	404	569	Ukraine	6,879	5,737	**Africa - Total[b]**	**394**	**409**
Chile	53	54	FSU unspecified	16	16	**Northern Africa**	**202**	**191**
Colombia	97	82	**Other West Eur.**	**96**	**115**	Algeria	0	1
Ecuador	11	15	Andorra	2	2	Eritrea	3	0
Paraguay	1	1	Gibraltar	8	1	Ethiopia	91	106
Peru	30	43	Liechtenstein	1	0	Kenya	0	2
Uruguay	65	56	Monaco	5	3	Libya	1	0
Venezuela	84	70	Norway	5	3	Morocco	95	68
Europe - Total[b]	**22,645**	**19,526**	Switzerland	75	106	Tunisia	12	14
European Union[c]	**8,406**	**5,570**	**Balkans**	**100**	**237**	**Sub-Sahara Afr.**	**192**	**218**
Austria	45	40	Macedonia	3	0	Ghana	1	0
Belgium	242	168	Serbia	7	4	Mauritius	1	4
Bulgaria	13	11	Turkey	90	233	Namibia	1	0
Croatia	4	0	**Asia - Total[b]**	**744**	**867**	Nigeria	0	1
Cyprus	9	6	**FSU in Asia**	**624**	**721**	South Africa	189	213
Czech Republic	18	7	Armenia	19	29	**Oceania - Total**	**112**	**109**
Denmark	9	8	Azerbaijan	105	115	Australia	103	101
Finland	7	1	Georgia	117	172	New Caledonia	1	0
France	6,627	4,147	Kazakhstan	117	152	Polynesia	0	1
Germany	114	117	Kyrgyzstan	16	37	New Zealand	8	7

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizens
b Including country unknown
c Not including the Baltic countries
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data

In 2016, Jewish international migration somewhat diminished versus the previous year. In recent years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the decreasing Jewish population in the main areas of Jewish emigration. Overall, a clearly negative relationship prevails between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. At the same time, perceptions and experiences of mounting antisemitism in some countries, particularly in France, have stimulated Jewish emigration. In the foreseeable future a continuation of moderate levels of migration can be expected, provided that current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions are not seriously disrupted across the global system, especially in Europe. From this point of view, the 2016 vote by the British to secede from the European Union might carry significant consequences in the longer term.

In 2016, 25,010 new immigrants arrived in Israel, compared to 27,850 in 2015 (a 10% decrease), 24,066 in 2014, 16,882 in 2013, 16,557 in 2012, 16,892 in 2011, 16,633 in 2010, 14,567 in 2009, and 13,699 in 2008. Plausibly, similar migration changes occurred toward some other countries as well, although Israeli immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families. Russia was the main country of origin (6,946 immigrants in 2016 vs. 6,589 in 2015), followed by Ukraine (5,737 vs. 6,879), France (4,147 vs. 6,627), and the US (2,534 vs. 2,451). Increases occurred from Belarus (632 vs. 318), Brazil (569 vs. 404), South Africa (213 vs. 189), Moldova (187 vs. 177), while declines were recorded from the UK (598 vs. 623), Canada (280 vs. 338), Argentina (248 vs. 262), Belgium (168 vs. 242), and Italy (159 vs. 353). In 2016, immigrants to Israel increased from North and South America, Europe other than the EU and the FSU, Asia, and Africa, namely from Ethiopia (106 vs. 91), while it diminished from the EU, the FSU European republics, Central America, and Oceania. To these figures, one should add several thousand immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration.

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes upon some employment opportunities—is today probably the main single source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016). The level of emigration from Israel is overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings illustrate the primacy of socioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about immigrant admissions. The effects of ideological and security- and fear-related factors are weaker determinants of the volume and timing of Israeli immigration and emigration. It cannot be disputed, however, that the preference for Israel as a country of destination over competing countries is significantly affected by Jewish norms and values.

Section 5: Jewish Population in Major Countries

We turn to a concise review of the information available and the criteria followed in updating the figures for the 22 largest Jewish populations worldwide. The countries are listed in decreasing order of magnitude of the respective Jewish communities.

Israel

Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Israel is the country with the largest core Jewish population in the world. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of growth—1.84% in 2016. With an average of 3.13 children currently born per Jewish woman, as of 2015, and a relatively young age composition (27.1% under age 15 and only 12.9% age 65 and over as of 2015), Israel's Jewish population is nearly the only one displaying above-replacement fertility and a balanced age composition. A moderately positive international migration balance helps to keep Israel's Jewish population increasing.

Information on religion is mandatory in official population data regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and in the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority). Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, entering the country including immigrants, exiting the country including emigrants, and conversions). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the concept of religion actually is a combination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (*Halakhah*). At the beginning of 2017, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,451,000, as against a revised total of 6,334,500 in 2016. A minor downward adjustment of -1,900 compared to last year's estimate reflects late entries of demographic events, including late registration of conversions and other revisions of personal status. The revised core population combined with a revised figure of 384,500 "Others"—non-Jewish members of households who immigrated under the Law of Return or were born in Israel—formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,835,500 in 2017, of which these "Others" constituted 5.6% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who are not recognized as Jewish have one Jewish parent. The Jewish parent population of Israel is thus estimated at 6,643,250.

For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2016, 134,100 Jewish births—the highest ever in Israel's history—and 37,066 Jewish deaths—not the highest ever—produced a net natural increase of 100,034 Jews—again the highest ever. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate increased slightly to 3.13 children per woman, higher than in any other developed country and twice or more the current average of *Jewish* children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes called the *effective Jewish fertility rate*). This reflected not only the large family size of the more religious Jewish population component, but also significantly a diffused desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile

(DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d, 2015b).

At the time of this writing, the final data on the components of population growth for 2016 were not yet released. In 2015, 24,100 Jewish new immigrants and immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time) arrived in Israel. The net balance of these minus the balance of Israelis leaving the country and Israelis returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad was 19,100. Therefore, an estimated 5,000 Jews joined the number of those who permanently or in the long term reside abroad. Looking at the broader picture, including non-Jews, there were 34,800 new immigrants and immigrant citizens. The net migration balance was 33,100; therefore the missing number was only 700, indicating that among Arabs who constitute the vast majority of non-Jews the propensity to emigrate was lower than among Jews. These data about Israel's international migration balance point to a steady if moderate level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to quite low levels of emigration. Estimates of total emigration from Israel, including Jews and non-Jews, have ranged historically from less than 5,000 to 15,000 annually. In 2016, the total number of new immigrants diminished slightly to 25,010 from 27,850 the previous year. The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants. In 2014, the net balance of conversions to and from Judaism was 2,500. Overall, between 1999 and 2014, nearly 83,200 persons were converted to Judaism by Rabbinical Conversion Courts, some of whom were not permanent Israeli residents (Fisher 2013 and 2015; Waxman 2013).

Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority, **Table 8** reports numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households *and* Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, and foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *enlarged* definition) in each division is also shown. At the beginning of 2017, of the 6,451,000 *core* Jews, 5,821,000 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 215,200 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 21,500 on the Golan Heights; and 393,300 lived in the West Bank. *Core* Jews represented 74.7% of Israel's total *legal* population of 8,631,900, including 1,796,400 Arabs and others, but excluding 233,800 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Statistical Monthly). The latter group comprised 84,500 legal foreign workers, 15,700 undocumented foreign workers, 78,500 tourists whose visas had expired, 14,800 refuge seekers, and 40,300 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration Authority 2016). Israel's *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,835,500 represented 79.2% of the State's total legal population. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, comprised 20.8% of the total legal population. As shown in **Table 8**, the *enlarged* Jewish population represented 78.7% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers and refugees), 40.2% in East Jerusalem, 47.7% in the Golan Heights, and 13.8% of the West Bank's total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.

Table 8 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2017[a]

Area	Core Jewish population	Others	Core Jewish and others[b]	Arab population and others	Foreign workers, undocum., refugees[c]	Total	Percent of Jews and others[d]
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Grand total	**6,451,000**	**384,500**	**6,835,500**	**6,088,200**	**233,800**	**13,157,500**	**52.0**
State of Israel[e]	***6,451,000***	***384,500***	***6,835,500***	***1,796,400***	***233,800***	***8,865,700***	***77.1***
Thereof:							
Pre-1967 borders	5,821,000	366,400	6,187,400	1,439,100	233,800	**7,860,300**	**78.7**
East Jerusalem[f]	215,200	8,100	223,300	332,000	-	**555,300**	**40.2**
Golan Heights	21,500	1,600	23,100	25,300	-	**48,400**	**47.7**
West Bank	393,300	8,400	401,700	[g]	-	**401,700**	**13.8**[h]
Palestinian Territory				***4,291,800***		***4,291,800***	-
West Bank	[i]	[i]	[i]	2,502,700	-	**2,502,700**	**[13.8]**[h]
Gaza	0	0	0	1,789,100	-	**1,789,100**	**0.0**

a Rounded figures
b Enlarged Jewish population
c All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel Population and Migration Authority (2016)
d Column 3 divided by column 6
e As defined by Israel's legal system
f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies (2017)
g Included under Palestinian Territory
h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction
i Included under State of Israel
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; and author's estimates

Regarding the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG), in November 2007 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated 3,767,000 persons in WBG, including 225,000 in East Jerusalem—clearly an undercount because of the PCBS's limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, 2009b). The new Census total, not unexpectedly, was more than 300,000 lower than the PCBS's own pre-census estimate for the same year. Our own independent assessment for the end of 2007, after subtracting East Jerusalem (already included in the Israeli total), accounting for a negative net migration balance of Palestinians, and some further corrections, was about 3,500,000. By our estimates, between a previous census in 1997 (PCBS 1998) and 2007 the yearly average population increase among Palestinians in WBG (not including East Jerusalem) was 2.91%. This exactly matched the 2.91% yearly growth rate for Arabs in Israel over the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). In subsequent years, the growth rate of Israel's total Arab population slowly declined to 2.20% in 2016, as against 1.84% for the Jewish population with immigration and 1.58% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in WBG was probably decreasing as well, among other things because of some net emigration. According to Israel's IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2016), the balance between recorded births and deaths of Palestinians in the West Bank resulted in a growth rate of 2.57%. But because of net emigration we assume here a rate of growth of 2.20%, similar to that of Muslims in Israel whose demographic characteristics are quite similar to those in the Palestinian Territory. Probably

both fertility and mortality are somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. Our adjusted population estimates for WGB at the beginning of 2017 is 4,291,800, of whom 2,502,700 live in the West Bank and 1,789,100 in Gaza. These figures are lower than some other independent evaluations. The IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria estimates the number of registered Palestinians in the West Bank at 2,919,350 at the beginning of 2016 (as noted, most likely an overestimate once considering emigration). The PCBS estimates for mid-2016 were 2,935,368 for the West Bank (of which 426,533 live in the Jerusalem Governorate) and 1,881,982 for Gaza. A total of 4,816,503 thus obtains for WBG (PCBS 2016). The UN estimated the WBG total population at 4,668,000, including over 300,000 in the city of Jerusalem (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2015). The Population Reference Bureau (2015) estimate was not far off: 4.5 million excluding Jerusalem. Our own estimate for WBG without Jerusalem, as noted, is 4,291,800. The difference versus PCBS reflects their initial Census overestimate inclusive of persons, students and others, who actually resided abroad for more than one year, and their assumed growth rates that ignore the reductive impact of emigration. Other much lower estimates of WBG population (e.g. Zimmerman et al. 2005a and 2005b; Feitelson 2013) rather than ascertained demographic criteria reflect a political stance and should be dismissed (see also Miller 2015).

The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 332,000 at the beginning of 2017, and constituted 37% of Jerusalem's total population of 882,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Choshen et al. 2010, 2012; Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015; Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2016; DellaPergola 2008b). By summing the 1,796,400 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,291,800 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,088,200 Arabs obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus a total enlarged Jewish population of 6,835,500.

Table 9 reports the percentage of Jews, according to the *core* and *enlarged* definitions, out of the total population of the combined territory of Israel and Palestine. The existence and size of a Jewish population majority is conditional upon the definition of who is a Jew and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect on population composition of gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of a total population which declines according to the diminishing territorial and population configurations considered.

A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 13,157,500, including foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the beginning of 2017. The c*ore* Jewish population of 6,451,000 represented 49.0% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rigorous rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but actually does not exist

any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2011a; Soffer and Bistrow 2004; Soffer 2015). If the 384,500 non-Jewish members of Jewish households are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,835,500 represented 52.0% of the total population living legally or illegally in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a tiny majority. If we subtract from the grand total, the 233,800 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations rise to, respectively, 49.9% and 52.9% of the total population resident in Israel and the Palestinian Territory estimated at 12,923,700 in 2017. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the total percentages of Jews rise to 57.9% core and 61.4% enlarged; after subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the percentages become, 58.1% and 61.5%, respectively; they become 75.0% and 79.4%, respectively, if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank; and rise to 78.0% and 82.6% if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem.

Table 9 Percent of core and enlarged Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2017

	Percentage of Jews[a] by definition	
Area	**Core**	**Enlarged**
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	**49.0**	**52.0**
Minus foreign workers and refugees	49.9	52.9
Minus Gaza	57.9	61.4
Minus Golan Heights	58.1	61.5
Minus West Bank	75.0	79.4
Minus East Jerusalem	78.0	82.6

a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs and others of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly
Source: Table 8

The United States

In the **US**, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must rely on alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein 1981, 1989, 1992; Sheskin 2015a). To assess the current number of Jews in the US one should consider three issues. (1) The first issue is the need to rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded in *demographic concepts and research techniques* (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail, see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2012, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d, and 2014e). (2) The second issue is the definitional predicament already discussed above. To perform comparisons over time constant *definition* assumptions are needed. Given ongoing acculturation and assimilation trends in America, but also new meanings attributed to Jewish identity or the rediscovery of submerged identities from the past, group definitions today often may not be the same as past ones. (3) the third issue is the broader *narratives* within which one seeks to place the findings and their interpretations (Kaufman 2014). Intriguingly, whereas in the

past the logical sequence moved from the data (by a given definition) to their interpretation, and to an emerging narrative, today the sequence often seems to be reversed: from a chosen narrative, to interpreting the trends, to reading data that are being redefined according to the preferred narrative. Indeed, competing narratives and non-comparable empirical and definitional approaches stand behind diverging US Jewish population estimates, with a high-low gap of nearly two million individuals. Opposite interpretations circulate of current and expected trends: rapid growth, stability, or slow decline. These entail very different implications at the cognitive level and for Jewish community service planning (DellaPergola 2011a). Previous to and following the 2013 Pew survey of Jewish Americans, intense debate in the social scientific community is matched by a lively media discussion (Heilman 2005, 2013; Pew Research Center 2013; *The Jewish Daily Forward* 2014).

The quest for US Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies (DellaPergola 2013a). The **first** is to bridge across numerous different Jewish population estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births and deaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such as accessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. In the US, several major sources of data allow for a detailed reconstruction of nationwide Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. The **second** strategy, pursued since the beginnings of Jewish population studies in the US in the early 1940s (Robison 1943), is to construct the national total from a compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). The **third** more recent strategy is to construct a national total through a meta-analysis of the available pool of national surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each of which include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Of the three alternatives, only the first was designed to determine nationwide Jewish population estimates. The second and third methodologies were not but they provide valuable grounds for comparative analytic work and in-depth multivariate analysis.

The initial requirement in any serious attempt to monitor Jewish population size over time is a reliable baseline figure. The total US Jewish population was realistically assessed at 4.4 million in 1945 (Rosenwaike 1980), an improvement over pre-existing estimates that relied on the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et al. 2002). Several national surveys of Jewish population were undertaken between 1957 and 2001. These various data sets fit well one with another when performing forward-backward Jewish population projections as well as checking with available data on international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions (DellaPergola 2005). The 5,013,000 Jews found in the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969) quite accurately predicted the 5,420,000 Jews found by the 1971 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 1971) (Massarik 1974; for a somewhat higher estimate see Lazerwitz 1978). NJPS 1971 in turn did predict the 5,515,000 found by NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991). If there had been an NJPS 1980, it would probably have shown a Jewish population peak of around 5.6-5.7 million, reflecting continuing Jewish population growth due to a first echo effect of the relatively large baby-boom cohorts. But the Jewish population was aging through the combined effect of postponed marriage, low

fertility, more frequent intermarriage, and the non-attribution of Jewish identification to a large majority of the children of intermarriages. The unavoidable consequence for Jewish population was a stoppage of growth and incipient decline. Both NJPS 1971 and NJPS 1990 (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983, 1988) predicted some Jewish population reduction after 1990, indeed found by two nearly simultaneous and competing studies in 2001. Both NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001) assessed American Jewry at 5.2-5.3 million (see also Perlmann 2007). Other Jewish population projections suggested somewhat higher scenarios, but likewise pointed to eventual decline after temporary growth (DellaPergola et al. 1999, 2000).

NJPS 2000-01 yielded an initial estimate of 5,200,000 after imputation of persons in homes for the elderly, prisons, military bases, and other institutional settings (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). Further cohort analysis and projections unveiled under-coverage of over 250,000 individuals born between 1950 and 1970 (Saxe et al. 2006a, 2007; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). Evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accessions, and secessions provided revised estimates of 5,367,000 for 2000-01, and 5,425,000 for 2013—not including the institutionalized (DellaPergola 2013a). A rounded core Jewish population estimate could thus be placed at 5.6-5.7 million in 2013, very close to the estimate suggested by a 2007 Pew survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). Whether such significant under-coverage of the Jewish adult generation born during the baby boom years reflected insufficient efforts or skills during the NJPS fieldwork or the elusive nature of those adults' own Jewish identification cannot be easily determined. Either explanation is reasonable.

The 2013 Pew "A Portrait of Jewish Americans" (Pew Research Center 2013) found that *Jewish religion* (Jews by religion or JBRs) without other religious identities applied to 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a total of 5.1 million Americans. Another 600,000 persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported *no religion and Jewish* (Jews, no religion or JNRs) without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million mutually exclusive Jewish population. These 5.7 million—an increase of 300,000 over 1971—correspond with a *core* Jewish population concept which relied on self-assessment (enhanced by some outside decisions by analysts) and mutual exclusiveness between religious or ethno-religious populations. Another million—600,000 adults and 400,000 children—reported *no religion and partly Jewish*, thus reaching a total of 6.7 million designated in the Pew report as *the net Jewish population* estimate. A further 2.4 million non-Jewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a *Jewish background*. Of these about one-third had at least one Jewish parent, expanding to a total JPP of about 8 million, and about two-thirds did not have a Jewish parent, further expanding to 10.6 million. An additional 1.2 million non-Jewish adults reported some *Jewish affinity*, raising the figure to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group.

As against this quite solid body of evidence stemming from the first research strategy outlined above, higher alternative results are provided by the other two strategies. Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky estimate the US Jewish population at over 6.8 million (see the US Jewish population report). This would be an increase of 600,000

over a 1971 estimate obtained with the same method. While local Jewish community studies still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves recognize (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010, 2017; Sheskin 2008, 2009). One should acknowledge the many and diverse databases, the lack of synchronization in time, and the very uneven quality of the various sources, including sometimes embarrassing skill gaps across different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations may risk cumulating significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groeneman and Smith 2009).

The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set of general social surveys is an innovative and ambitious project in the social scientific study of American Jews (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, 2009b). The Jewish population estimate suggested by SSRI for 2016 was 7.2 million. This figure implies that American Jewry increased by 1.7 million or over 30% since 1990, as against 12% for the US total white non-Hispanic population (US Census Bureau 2014). The same project found that at least 70,000 Jewish babies are born annually, and that the vast majority of US Jews do not adhere to any of the known Jewish religious denominations (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These facts are plausible only if one shifts from a *core* concept of individually-identified Jews to an *enlarged* concept of the total population with Jewish background. Important caveats include: (a) the fact that Jews are over-represented in general sample surveys because of their higher socioeconomic status and their scarce presence among people difficult to cover like the homeless or those without a functioning telephone; (b) using data for a sample of US adults to represent estimates for total Jews and ignoring the lower percentage of children among Jews; (c) projecting percentages of Jews among total population, hence population size from percentage of Jewish households, ignoring multi-religious household composition and thus factoring non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; or (d) using data on Jews by religion to estimate Jews without religion.

The 2013 Pew study confirmed some leading demographic patterns among US Jews, namely postponed marriage, non-marriage, and small family size (Barack Fishman and Cohen 2017; Hartman 2017). Rising frequencies of intermarriage were assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts based on an extended Jewish population definition. Identification with Judaism among children of intermarriages, though on the increase (Sasson et al. 2017), continued to fall below the 50% of all such children and younger adults which would help maintain demographic stability (Rebhun 1999; Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky with Heller 2008; Phillips 2013). The percentage of non-Jewish children raised by Jewish couples was 7% (probably from previous marriages), versus 67% among intermarried couples. The current aging composition of US Jewry and other evidence about age-specific birth and death rates probably generates about 5,000 fewer Jewish births (by the *core* definition) annually than the estimated number of Jewish deaths. The Jewish death rate is unknown in the field of Jewish demographic research and it would be reasonable to try to assess it. Jewish immigration to the US has

nearly stopped from the FSU but continues from other countries in Western Europe, Latin America, Israel, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle East and South Africa. Accounting for unrecorded migration to the US, an annual net migration into the US of 5,000 Jews (or slightly more) can be estimated. In other words, net immigration balances the losses due to the excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births (stressing the *core* definition). Shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society are comparatively more frequent than in other countries. Different surveys found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose ground, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the "religiously undefined" (none and not reported) tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin et al. 2001; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Smith 2009; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008; Pew Research Center 2015). American Jewry neither gains nor loses large numbers due to conversions from and to other religions. However, by the Pew, the total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions.

This said, the true predicament of American Jewish demography concerns population definitions. The new *partly Jewish, no-religion* category introduced by Pew 2013, in addition to persons who define themselves as *Jews of no religion* calls for special attention. In the recent past, the broad label of *Just Jewish* might have accommodated both. The new label may indicate a stronger relevance of the non-Jewish identification component along with a weakening of the Jewish one. Based on several comparable measures, the *partly Jewish no-religion* individuals look more similar to *non-Jews with Jewish background* than to the JNRs (DellaPergola 2015a). The partly Jewish with no religion are mainly the children of intermarriages and do maintain some attachment to Judaism and other Jews, though much less than others who formally declare not to be Jewish but may have maintained significant links with their families of origin. The partly Jewish stand quite completely outside the organized Jewish community and demonstrate extremely low interest for the leading modes of Jewish identification in America.

Relying on the 2013 Pew survey, following these observations, and on the assumption that Jewish identity is mutually exclusive versus other competing religious and ethnic identities, our core Jewish population estimate remains stable at 5,700,000 for 2017—the world's second largest. Broader definitional criteria naturally generate higher estimates. Including the partly Jewish and the pertinent portion of non-Jews with declared Jewish background, about eight million Americans have at least one Jewish parent. The *enlarged* total population in Jewish households approaches ten million. The *Law of Return* population probably approaches twelve million. By each of these expanded criteria, the number of persons included is significantly larger than in Israel.

France

France contains the largest Jewish community in Europe. A 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen with Ifergan 2003). Several follow-ups (Cohen 2005, 2007, 2013b) indicated a decreasing Jewish population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and

other countries. A new survey (Ifop 2015) addressed an enlarged definition of the Jewish population in France but did not provide much conclusive information about the size of the Jewish community. Instead, it offered important insights about their past and prospective migration. In retrospect, 39% reported they had relatives living in Israel vs. 31% who had relatives in another country (US, Canada, and UK in particular). This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 65% to Israel compared to 35% to other countries. Regarding possible future migration, 13% reported they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it, the corresponding percentages for migrating to other countries are 13% and 33%, respectively. In reality, migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, increased to 2,903 in 2013, 6,545 in 2014, to a historical peak of 6,627 in 2015, and to a lower 4,417 in 2016. The total for 2001-2016 was 42,774. Jewish emigration was directed as well toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of anti-Semitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. A previous survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence in five years found that 33% expected to be living in France, 26% in Israel, 14% in another country, and 27% were uncertain (Cohen 2013a). Assuming Israel attracted two-thirds of the total who departed France, about 60,000 Jews and family members have emigrated from France since 2001. Presumably, some of these may have returned to France in the meantime, thus reducing the impact of net migration. Currently more than half of the total Jewish population live in the Greater Paris metropolitan region (Cohen with Ifergan 2003; Ifop 2015). Jews of Sephardi ancestry, mostly first, second, or third generation immigrants from North Africa, clearly predominate numerically over those of Ashkenazi origin who, until World War II, constituted the main component of the Jewish population. Considering these trends, our 2017 estimate for French Jewry decreased to 456,000—the third largest Jewish population in the world. The corresponding enlarged Jewish population is 600,000.

Canada

In **Canada,** the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS) (previously known as a population census) allows for comparisons with numerous previous Censuses (Statistics Canada 2003a, 2003b; Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014; Shahar 2015, 2016). Data on Jewish ethnicity, released every five years (in years ending with the digit 1 or 6), can be compared with data on religion released every ten years (in years ending with the digit 1). Data on religion and ancestry are collected through open-ended questions (where “Jewish” may be one of the examples given as a possible response to the ethnicity question), with examples and instructions provided. Both types of information help to estimate Canada’s *core* Jewish population. Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Consequently, people can report to be ethnically Jewish only, or Jewish and of another ethnic origin, being the descendants of intermarriages. Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are *not* included in

the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion who declare a Jewish ethnicity (single or part of a multiple choice) are included in the *core*. The Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA defined this as the *Jewish Standard Definition* (Torczyner et al. 1993; Shahar 2004). The newly suggested *Revised Jewish Standard Definition* also accounts for: a) persons with no religious affiliation, but who are Israeli by ethnicity; b) persons with no religious affiliation, but with knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a "non-official" language; c) persons with no religious affiliation but who were born in Israel; and d) persons with no religious affiliation who lived in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014; Shahar 2014, 2015, 2016). This definition provided an estimate of 391,665 in 2011. The latter figure is not strictly comparable with the concept of *core* Jewish population as it includes the fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom may not readily identify as Jewish if asked, possibly preferring *partly Jewish*, or the alternative ethnic origin, by which they would not be included in the *core* Jewish population. As argued above, some of these would better be included among the *enlarged* Jewish population.

In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion. The Jewish population was greatly concentrated in the major urban areas: about half lived in Toronto, another fourth lived in Montreal, and the total of the five main urban areas (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Ottawa) accounted for 87% (Weinfeld et al. 2012). The national total by religion remained nearly unchanged compared to 2001, when it reached 329,995. Previously there had been a significant increase from 296,425 in 1981 and 318,070 in 1991. Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. An initial estimate of 293,175 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 349,000 in 2001, 315,000 in 2006, and 309,650 in 2011—a decrease of 1.7% in five years and 16.3% in twenty years. In other words, the ethnic mode of Jewish identification was stronger than the religious mode until 2001, but has since lost traction among Canadian Jewry. By combining religion and ethnicity, the core Jewish population was evaluated at 312,060 in 1981, 356,315 in 1991, 370,520 in 2001, and 380,000 in 2011. Compared to the core figure, religion tended to lose some ground, constituting 95% of the broader concept in 1981 and 86% in 2011. The main Jewish population growth therefore involved the total of persons with a Jewish religion, but another ethnicity, and persons with a Jewish ethnicity, but no religion.

More striking changes affected the distribution of Canadians and of the Jews among them between single and multiple ethnicities. Among Canada's total population in 2011, 58% of the total population provided a single ethnicity answer and 42% reported multiple ethnicities. Of the 19 million who provided a single ethnicity, 5.8 million (31%) declared themselves Canadian, and 4.7 million (34%) of the 13.8 million who provided a multiple response did so. All in all, 10.6 million of a total population of 32.9 million reported a Canadian ethnicity—which in other epochs was thought to be a nonexistent construct. The growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). Most likely, the rapid growth of *Canadian* as a primary or additional ethnic category affects identification

perceptions among Jews. In 1981, 90% of total ethnic Jews declared a single ethnicity, but this share decreased to 66% in 1991, 53% in 2001, 43% in 2006, and 37% in 2011. The proportion of Jews (63%) with a multiple ethnicity is today much higher than among the total population (42%). The sharp decrease from 1991 to 2011 in Jewish ethnic identification can be explained by an increase in intermarriage which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews. There are significant gender differences in this respect: the likelihood of a child of intermarriage being raised Jewish is four times higher if the mother is Jewish than if the father is Jewish (Goldman 2009).

Between 2001 and 2011, 21,445 Jews by religion immigrated into Canada, mostly from the FSU, and were reported in Canada in the 2011 NHS. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This reflects some emigration, a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and passages of Jews from self-definition by religion to self-definition with no religion. Emigration from Canada is moderate, with 338 persons migrating to Israel in 2015 and 280 in 2016, plus an unknown—possibly greater— number moving to the US and other countries. Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition because of aging, we estimate the Jewish population at 390,000 in 2017—the world's fourth largest Jewish community. Taking into account all ethnic Jews who profess a non-Jewish religion, and/or multiple ethnicities, and all other non-Jewish household members, an *enlarged* Jewish population of 550,000 would probably obtain, along with a *Law of Return* population possibly as high as 700,000.

United Kingdom

In the **United Kingdom**, the 2011 Census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 269,282 in 2011 (+1%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002 and 2012; United Kingdom National Records of Scotland NRS 2011; Graham, 2013a; Graham and Caputo 2015). The 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century (Kosmin and Waterman 2002) and was generally believed to have somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry. In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas, especially after it was realized that government investment considers population figures (Graham and Vulkan 2012). In 2001, about 15% of the UK total population reported no religion and another 8% did not answer the question, for a total of 23% (Graham, et al. 2007; Graham and Waterman 2005; Voas 2007; Graham and Waterman 2007). In 2011, the total rose from 23% to 32% (25% and 7% respectively). In view of the organized Jewish community's efforts to encourage participation in the Census, Jewish population estimates probably were not affected by the increase in *no religion* to the same extent as for the total population. The evidence is also that the many persons who did not report a religious affiliation, as well as many others reporting weird labels like

"Jedi Knight," "Wicca," or "Heavy metal" did not live in residential areas associated with a strong Jewish presence.

Detailed tabulations obtained by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (IJPR) and the Board of Deputies of British Jews from the Office for National Statistics from the 2001 Census allowed for an in-depth socio-demographic profile of British Jewry, along with better evaluation of the quality of Jewish population estimates (Graham et al. 2007 and 2012; Boyd and Staetsky 2013). Jews were dispersed over the whole national territory, including all counties but one—the Isles of Scilly. The presence of Jews in areas lacking Jewish infrastructure suggested a lower degree of affiliation with the organized community than previously assumed. A significant correlation was found between the known local presence of very Orthodox Jews in a ward, and non-response to the religion question. On the other hand, post-Census surveys of Jews in London and Leeds did not reveal high percentages declaring they had not answered "Jewish" to the question on religion (Miller et al. 1996; Graham and Vulkan 2007). There were significant geographical shifts among UK Jews between 2001 and 2011. The most significant relative increase occurred in the North East, including the Gateshead Yeshiva. Increases also occurred in the North West (Manchester) and East Midlands (Nottingham) areas. On the other hand, significant losses occurred in the Yorkshire and Humber (Leeds) and West Midlands (Birmingham) areas, as well as throughout the South East (Surrey), the South West (Bournemouth), Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. In London, the main portion of the metropolitan area was quite stable (148,602 in 2011 versus 149,789 in 2001) with an increase of over 3,000 in Inner London, partly compensating for a decrease of 5,000 in Outer London, while the areas just beyond London's northwestern suburbs (Hertfordshire) continued to expand steadily. As noted, some of these changes may have reflected the higher propensity of Haredi Jews to participate in the 2011 than in the 2001 Census.

British Jewry is aging, but as noted above, the higher participation of Haredi Jews in the Census is reflected in a somewhat younger age composition, with an absolute increase of 3% in the percentage under age 15 and a 1% decrease in the percentage age 65 and over. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005). Comparing the uncorrected Census returns for the 0-9 age group and the recorded number of Jewish births over the past ten years preceding the Census, the discrepancy was only 2.5%. This confirms some undercount, but not on a scale that would significantly impact Jewish population Census estimates. The same vital statistics indicated a continuing excess of Jewish burials over Jewish births until 2004, but since 2005 the trends apparently reversed. However, the decrease to fewer than 3,000 Jewish deaths in recent years seems to indicate a significantly reduced Jewish community, or a significant under-reporting of Jewish burials, or both.

Synagogue membership in the UK decreased, by 17.8% between 1990 and 2000, and by 4.5% (about 1% annually) between 2001 and 2005 (Hart and Kafka 2006; Graham and Vulkan 2010; Vulkan and Graham 2008). The most recent evidence is that this trend has continued (Casale Mashiah and Boyd 2017). In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households across the UK held

synagogue membership, against 82,963 in 2010, 83,567 in 2005, 87,519 in 2001, and 92,653 in 1995. While the total number of Jewish households declined from 147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016, the number of synagogues actually increased from a low of 328 in 1983 to 454 in 2016. The denominational balance significantly shifted. Between 2010 and 2016, membership of the Central Orthodox declined by 7.5%, Reform declined by 4.1%, Liberal by 9.5%, and Sephardi by 21.4%; Masorti synagogue membership grew by 15.5%, and the Strictly Orthodox by 18.4%. Jewish education was growing, confirming the surge in the Jewish birth rate (Staetsky and Boyd 2016) but intermarriage was on the rise, too, though at moderate levels compared with most other European and Western countries: from 11% in 1965-69 to 26% in 2010-13 (Graham 2016).

Updating UK Jewish population estimates must account for the polarization outlined by these data between a growing highly Orthodox sector, and an aging and declining mainstream, amidst continuing emigration, with a total of 7,825 going to Israel between 2001 and 2016. Allowing also for some immigration, namely from France, we estimated the UK's total Jewish population quite stable at 289,500 in 2017—the fifth largest Jewish community in the world. Linked to this core, we may assume an enlarged Jewish population of 370,000 in the UK.

Argentina

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—following the bankruptcy of the country's Central Bank, dire economic conditions, and special incentives offered by Israel. In 2003, the Argentinean economic situation eased somewhat and Israel restricted its incentives for immigrants, resulting in much lower levels of migration. About 1,500 persons left Argentina for Israel in 2003, decreasing steadily to 271 in 2014, 262 in 2015, and 248 in 2016 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Based on the experience of previous years, approximately 20% of these migrants probably were non-Jewish household members. Partial evidence from different sources indicated that less than half of total Jewish emigration from Argentina went to Israel, with most others going to South Florida where the Greater Miami Jewish Federation ran a program to assist Argentinian Jews. By 2014, 4,400 persons lived in Jewish households in Miami in which at least one adult was Argentinian (Sheskin 2015b).

A 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005) found an enlarged Jewish population of 244,000. Of these, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered themselves as totally or partly Jewish—consistent with our own previous estimate of 165,000. This estimate for the major urban concentration provided support to our national *core* estimates also inclusive of provincial communities. The 244,000 figure was a good estimate of the AMBA *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) as part of the over 300,000 who were

identified as in some way of Jewish origin or attached to a person of Jewish origin. Another survey, limited to the City of Buenos Aires, suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005). A recent report on intermarriage (Erdei 2014) stresses the increasingly open boundaries between religious communities and the negotiation of a Jewish identity in the context of growing interreligious couples. While 46% agree/strongly agree that the partner be Jewish, 41% disagree/strongly disagree.

The current situation implies an annual loss of about 300-500 persons through a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths and emigration. Argentina's Jewish population was assessed at 180,500 in 2017—the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

Russia

In the **Russian Federation**, Jewish population continued its downward course in the context of a country whose general population had been diminishing for years and only recently has started to slowly recover (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994 Russian Federation Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). After the compulsory item on ethnicity *(natsyonalnost)* on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people who likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (Tolts 2011). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions of Jews in the Russian Federation in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted data for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging and a negative balance of births and deaths. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered through emigration or vital events.

Jewish population size was more stable in Russia than in other FSU republics. This partly reflected Jewish migration among the various republics as well as lower emigration from Moscow and other important urban areas in the Russian Federation (Tolts 2003). In recent years, some Israelis, mostly former immigrants, have also migrated to the FSU (Cohen 2009; Tolts 2009). The number of births to couples with two Jewish parents decreased from 1,562 in 1988 to 169 in 2000. Births to couples with at least one Jewish parent were estimated at 5,858 in 1988 and 1,057 in 2000. Recorded Jewish deaths were 13,826 in 1988 and 8,218 in 2000. The negative balance of vital events was -7,978 in 1988 and -7,161 in 2000 (Tolts 2009). The striking imbalance of Jewish births and deaths, and continuing emigration (6,589 in 2015, and 6,946 in 2016 to Israel, including non-Jewish household members) implies an extremely elderly age composition and continuing population decrease. In 2002, 4.9% of Jews in Russia were under age 15 versus 36.6% age 65 and over, with a median age of 57.5 (Tolts 2015). We evaluated Russia's Jewish population at 176,000 in 2017—the world's seventh largest Jewish community after losing one position to Argentina.

Germany

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration mainly from the FSU brought to the country over 200,000 Jewish and non-Jewish household members between 1989 and 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. This major immigration stream eventually diminished to a few hundred annually after the German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a struggling welfare system, limited Jewish immigration from the FSU. On January 1, 2005, the previous special quota immigration law (*Kontingentsflüchtlingsgesetz*) was replaced by new, more restrictive, rules (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), and Jews lost their privileged quota status. The new law elevated integration into German society and good economic prospects above other considerations and required Jews (and others) aspiring to immigrate to Germany to first prove that a community would accept them as members. Prior knowledge of the German language was required. Potential Jewish immigrants now also had to prove that they would not be dependent on welfare and were willing to enter the German labor market (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz et al. 2002; Erlanger 2006). In 2016, only 359 new immigrants from the FSU were added to Jewish community membership (Zentralwohlfhartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2016). The latter figure compared with a peak of 8,929 in 1999. Between 2002 and 2004, the *enlarged* total of Jewish and non-Jewish household members who migrated to Germany from the FSU was larger than the number of FSU migrants to Israel, but Israel regained primacy as of 2005. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the beginning of 2007, diminished gradually to 100,437 in 2015, 99,695 in 2016, and 98,594 in 2017. Of the current total, only 5,000-6,000 were part of the original community of 28,081 members in 1990. The remainder was mostly recent immigrants and their children.

Most of the past growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany) which increased from 29,957 in 1989 to 99,558 in 2007, but decreased by 7.5% to 92,122 in 2016. In the Länders of the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) (East Germany), the number of Jews was assessed at 1,100 in 1989, increased to 8,236 in 2007, and decreased by 8.1% to 7,573 in 2016. Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area became dominant in Jewish population distribution. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. The community-registered Jewish population in Berlin, despite wide reports of a huge increase, diminished from 10,009 at the beginning of 2007 to 9,865 in 2016, and 9,735 in 2017. There is, though, some evidence that Jews who are registered elsewhere might in reality be now living in Berlin (Glöckner 2013). At the end of 2014, the number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 3,991 (plus 2,774 with dual citizenship) versus 3,065 in 2011 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012 and 2015; Rebhun et al. 2016). No more than a few hundred more were

registered in the surrounding Brandenburg State. This does not account for Israelis and others who may have acquired German citizenship. Between 2000 and 2010, 25,012 applications for German citizenship were submitted to the German consular offices in Israel (Harpaz 2013).

German Jews are very aged. In 2016, 265 Jewish births and 1,498 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of 1,233 Jews. German Jewry surely enjoys new opportunities for religious, social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps, Jasper, and Vogt 1999). While 418 Jews joined a German Jewish community in 2015, 567 Jews withdrew membership. Another 409 immigrated from countries other than the FSU republics, versus 187 who emigrated out of Germany (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2016). According to Israeli sources, 114 persons arrived from Germany in 2015 and 117 in 2016. All in all, because of these and other population movements, the total organized Jewish community inclusive of orthodox and liberal congregations diminished by 1,101 persons in 2016. This is not surprising in view of the extremely average age composition with 4.8% under age 12 and 28.4% age 70 and over. Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and the choice by some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate, we assessed Germany's *core* Jewish population at 116,500 in 2017—the world's eighth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population, inclusive of the non-Jewish relatives of immigrants, is closer to 225,000.

Australia

Australia's 2011 Census reported a Jewish population of 97,336, compared to 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Foreign-born Jews increased by about 5,000 between 2006 and 2011, implying a yearly growth of about 1,000, of whom about 300 were Israel-born (Graham 2014a). In view of the general non-response to the question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a ten year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2014a). The Jewish population is highly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2011 together comprised 85% of the total.

Intermarriage in Australia is less frequent than in most other Western large and medium-size communities, but it is on the rise and affecting the Jewish birth rate. In 2011, 14.4% of all Jews had a non-Jewish partner, which would rise to 23.1% if partners without religion are added. Among Jews in *de facto* partnerships, only 39.6% had a Jewish partner. Over the period 2001-2011, mixed partnerships increased at twice the rate of Jewish partnerships. The percentage Jewish among all youngest children present in households varied by religion of parents: 98% if both were Jewish and 34% if only one was Jewish. Of the latter: 83% if the mother was Jewish and the father had no religion; 48% if the mother was Jewish and the father non-Jewish; 22% if the father was Jewish and the mother had no religion; and 14% if the father was Jewish and the mother non-Jewish (Graham 2014a).

The 2016 Census quite surprisingly recorded 91,022 Jews, a decline of 6.5% versus 2011. The explanation is easily found in changes introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the Census form. The option “No religion” was moved from the bottom to the top in the list of printed options. The result was a dramatic increase by 45.5% in the number reporting no religion. Several other religions lost respondents: Anglicans 15.7%, Eastern Orthodox 10.7%, Catholics, 2.7%, and Other Christians 4.7%. Judaism did not appear as a printed option in the questionnaire but only as a write-in option, which manifestly is a determinant of undercounting. Accounting for such factors as continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, moderate but rising intermarriage rates, but also the community’s rather old age composition (Eckstein 2009; Markus et al. 2009; Markus et al. 2011; Forrest and Sheskin 2014), we estimated the *core* Jewish population to have grown by 200 in 2016 to 113,200 in 2017—the world’s ninth largest.

Brazil

In **Brazil**, the second largest Central and South American Jewish community, the 2010 Census provided new data on Jews (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE 2010). The reported national total was 107,329, of whom 105,432 lived in urban localities and 1,987 in rural localities. The census classified Brazil's population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white, 10,429 brown, 1,690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in the Southeast, 12,963 in the South, 4,266 in the Northeast, 2,367 in the North, and 1,394 in the Central West. These data need to be critically evaluated against the evidence of previous censuses that supplied somewhat erratic evidence (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica 1991, 2000; Decol 2009).

The Jewish population in São Paolo decreased from 41,308 in 1980 to 37,500 in 2000 (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estatistica IBGE 2000; Decol 1999, 2009), which certainly was an undercount. The 2010 census found 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. While an upward adjustment is reasonable, a 36% increase is not. There also was a 2.5% increase in Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a decrease of -8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern and Southern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What cannot be attributed to demography and likely reflects new emerging identifications or misclassifications is a decennial increase of over 8,000 people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These growing numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also in São Paulo, point to inclusion as Jews in the Census population of many thousands of persons who in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah's Witnesses, besides possible cases of *Converso* Jewish ancestry. The same applies when evaluating the background of the about 13,000 non-whites recorded in the census, beyond the known existence of small well-established communities of descendants of Jewish immigrants who have long integrated within the local non-Jewish population.

Census data were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the Jewish Federation of São Paulo that found 47,286 Jews

(Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002) and an assumption that about one-half of Brazil's Jews live in that city. A new survey of the community of São Paulo (Milkewitz et al. 2014) unveiled an aging Jewish population, with 53% concentrated in five main neighborhoods, a high rate of attendance (96% ever and 63% currently) in Jewish community centers, a 17% intermarriage rate (20% among persons age 30 to 39), and widespread support (70%) for the concept that intermarriage prevents the development of a Jewish home. Allowing for moderate but growing emigration (3,974 to Israel between 2001-2016, including 404 in 2015 and 569 in 2016), our assessment of Brazil's core Jewish population stands at 93,800 in 2017—the world's tenth largest Jewish community. Brazil's *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households), was assessed at 132,191 in 1980, 117,296 in 1991, 119,430 in 2000 (Decol 2009), and 150,000 in 2017.

South Africa

According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population of South Africa was 61,675, out of a total of 75,555 including nonwhites. Factoring in an evaluation of the national white non-response rate (14%) and additional factors led to a revised estimate of 72,000 (Saks 2003). Allowing for a certain proportion of actual Jews among the self-reported Jews among South Africa's nonwhites (11,979 blacks, 1,287 coloreds, and 615 Indians, most of whom practice other religions), we assessed the total Jewish population at 75,000 in 2001. After the major wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transferal of power from the apartheid to a democratic government, South African Jewry has been relatively stable, though slowly diminishing (Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006). Due to continuing moderate emigration to Israel (402 in 2015-2016) and other countries, we estimated South Africa's Jewish population at 69,300 in 2017—the world's eleventh largest Jewish community.

Ukraine

In **Ukraine,** the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews. Reflecting the dramatic pace of emigration since 1989, the 2001 Census fully confirmed our previous assessment of ongoing demographic trends and 100,000 estimate for January 1, 2002, vs. 487,300 Jews counted in the January 1989 Census (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). A new Census was planned in 2010, but was postponed. The instability, deep internal cleavage, and civil war in Ukraine that reached its peak in 2014-2015 call for a more detailed inspection of Jewish geographical distribution and for an assessment of the ethno-political environment in which Ukrainian Jews live. Over 80% of Ukrainian Jews in 2001 were Russian speakers. Looking at changes from 1989-2001, the Jewish population diminished more sharply in the Western regions where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians were similar. The northwestern regions where Jewish and total population decline was highest were also those most

affected by the 1986 nuclear plant disaster at Chernobyl. Large quantities of radioactivity were released and continued to produce seriously damaging health effects in subsequent years, prompting emigration. The share in Western (and pro-Western) regions out of Ukraine's total Jewish population diminished from 10.0% in 1989 to 6.6% in 2001. This indicates an overwhelming concentration of Ukraine's Jews in regions with a predominantly Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment where the current war is being fought, with all the obvious negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5,816 Jews in Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia and where in 2014 a special census found 3,374 Jews (Rosstat 2014). Adding continuing emigration (6,879 in 2015 and 5,737 in 2016), we assess the 2017 *core* Jewish population at 53,000—the world's twelfth largest Jewish community.

Other Central and South American Countries

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161, plus another new category of 8,315 *Neo Israelitas* (New Jews), for a grand total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica 2002). Projecting the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0-4, the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. At face value, this would indicate an increase of more than 10,000 (+21%) over ten years if only counting Jews, and nearly 18,500 (+38%) if also including New Jews. Such increase would be only 485 (+2.6%) in the Federal District, 5,728 (+40.7%) in the State of Mexico, and 10,518 (+82.2%) in Mexico's other states. These census findings are most intriguing and remind us of highly erratic returns in past Mexican Censuses. An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) indeed unveiled a significant presence, among those defined as Jews, of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and reportedly shoeless (*descalzos*). The further inclusion of a category of *Neo Israelitas* in 2010 leaves open the question of the attribution to Judaism of a population possibly comprising followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as descendants of *Conversos*.

A 2000 Jewish population survey provided a national estimate of 39,870 Jews, of whom 37,350 lived in Mexico City (Comité Central Israelita de México 2000), confirming the results of a previous survey carried out in 1991 (DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Another survey in 2006 confirmed the previous results (Comité Central Israelita de México 2006). A further survey in 2015 (Comunidad Judía de México 2015) on a national sample of 504 households suggest a national total of 44,512 of which 40,952 in the Federal Capital and its suburbs. Judging by the household size reported one tends to think that these figures relate to the enlarged Jewish population even though the amount of intermarriage is low in Mexico, around 9% in 2015. There is

evidence that the small provincial communities outside the Capital's metropolitan area are declining. Jews of Middle Eastern ancestry are now largely predominant (61%) over Jews of Ashkenazi origins. At a time when migration, if anything, is slightly reducing Jewish population size (Bokser Liwerant 2013), Mexican Jewry still displays relatively high birth rates, infrequent intermarriage, and a relatively young age profile. Allowing for some emigration to the US and Israel (1,185 moved to Israel between 2001 and 2016, of whom 153 moved in 2015-2016) and some new immigrants, our 2017 Jewish population estimate was kept at 40,000—the world's fourteenth largest Jewish community.

Chile holds the fourth largest Jewish community in Central and South America. This relatively stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,300 in 2017—the world's nineteenth largest—on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995). Between 2001 and 2016, 932 migrated to Israel, of whom 107 migrated in 2015-2016.

Uruguay has experienced continuing emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006; Shorer Kaplan 2016). Between 2001 and 2016, 2,058 migrated to Israel, of whom 121 in 2015-2016. The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was assessed at 16,900 in 2017—the world's twentieth largest Jewish community.

Other European Union Countries

In **Hungary**, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population has been diminishing for several years. A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger *enlarged* Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). The report reconstructed Jewish population changes between the end of World War II and 1995 (based on Stark 1995), but the latter study significantly underestimated emigration from Hungary to countries other than Israel, as well as to Israel outside the major migration periods. Demographic extrapolations based on the ascertained number of post-Holocaust *core* Jewish survivors (Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002), the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU survey on perceptions of antisemitism (Kovács 2013a), and estimates of births, deaths, and emigrants to Israel and other countries since 1945, closely match our assessment. In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only 10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion, compared to. 13,000 in 2001, clearly an underestimate but indicative of a trend. In 2015-2016, 160 persons migrated to Israel. Our *core* estimate for 2017 was 47,500 Jews, the world's thirteenth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population in Hungary is assessed at about 100,000.

In the **Netherlands**, a 1999 survey estimated a Halakhic Jewish population of 30,072, of whom perhaps as many as one-third were immigrants from Israel, and an *enlarged* Jewish population of 43,305 (van Solinge and de Vries 2001; Kooyman and Almagor 1996). A new survey in 2009 confirmed high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly, and an increase in the number of Israelis (van Solinge and van Praag 2010; Tanenbaum and Kooyman 2014). Out of an *enlarged* Jewish population of 52,000, 25% had a

Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. In 2015-2016, 116 people migrated to Israel, less than from other European countries with Jewish communities of similar size. Accounting for aging and assuming incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our Jewish population estimate is 29,800 for 2017, the fifteenth largest Jewish community in the world.

In **Belgium**, quite stable numbers long reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries. However, 410 Jews migrated to Israel in 2015-2016, reflecting growing concerns about Islamization, terrorism, and antisemitism. Jewish population estimates often mentioned for Belgium are quite obsolete and unsubstantiated in comparison with most other EU countries, but the order of magnitude reported here is supported by indirect evidence such as the number of votes collected by Jewish candidates in the 2003 legislative elections (Cohn 2003) and the FRA survey on perceptions of antisemitism (Ben Rafael 2013). The Jewish population was estimated at 29,300 in 2017, the world's sixteenth largest Jewish community.

In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 25,143 in 2001, 24,462 in 2009, and 23,901 in 2014 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010; Lattes 2005, Campelli 2016). A new survey unveiled the evolving patterns of Jewish identification and community participation (Campelli 2013). Our 2017 estimate of 27,300—the world's seventeenth largest Jewish community—allows for 3-4,000 non-members and considers migration to Israel of 512 in 2015-2016.

In **Sweden**, the Jewish population is estimated at 15,000 in 2017—the world's twenty-second largest Jewish community, based on a local survey and on a total estimate of the affiliated community of about 5,600. About 90% of the affiliated live in Stockholm (Dencik 2003, 2013). Only 55 migrated to Israel in 2015-2016.

Other European Countries

In **Switzerland**, in light of new Census data, the estimate was updated to 18,700 in 2017 (Statistik Schweiz 2005, 2012)—the world's eighteenth largest Jewish community. In 2015-2016, 181 migrants went to Israel.

In **Turkey**, most of the Jews live in Istanbul's European neighborhoods and this is why Turkey is here included in Europe while in international statistics it is included in Asia. A 2002 survey in Istanbul suggested widespread aging in a community that has experienced continuing emigration (323 went to Israel in 2015-2016). In Istanbul, 10% of the Jewish population was under age 15, compared to 18% age 65 and over (Filiba 2003; Tuval 2004). More recent evidence points to a steady decrease of the Jewish population (Kubovich 2016). The 2017 estimate was 15,300 Jews—the world's twenty-first largest Jewish community

Section 6: Dispersion and Concentration

In 2016, 98 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 10**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, three had 50,000 to 99,999, five had 25,000 to 49,999, eight had 10,000 to 24,999, nine had 5,000 to 9,999, 25 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 39 had less than 1,000. The 73 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for 1% of world Jewry.

In only four Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (20.0 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), the US (17.6), Canada (10.8), and France (7.1). The case of Israel is very different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 74.7% of the total legal population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.2% of the total population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing.

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Eleven more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Belarus, and Panama. Five countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.

Table 10 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion (per 1,000 total population), 1/1/2017

Number of core Jews in country	Jews per 1000 total population					
	Total	Less than 1.0	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-19.9	20.0+
Number of countries						
Total	98	69	24	1	3	1
100-999	39	35	3	-	1	-
1,000-4,999	25	24	1	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	9	5	4	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	8	2	6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	5	2	3	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	3	1	2	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	5	1	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total[a]	14,511,100	288,500	1,224,300	456,000	6,090,600	6,451,000
100-999	10,400	8,700	1,100	-	600	-
1,000-4,999	55,200	53,200	2,000	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	66,100	38,400	27,700	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	116,000	27,100	88,900	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	173,900	67,300	106,600	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	216,100	93,800	122,300	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,721,700	-	875,700	456,000	390,000	-
1,000,000 or more	12,151,000	-	-	-	5,700,000	6,451,000
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)						
Total[a]	100.0	2.0	8.4	3.1	42.0	44.5
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.4	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.5	0.3	0.2	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.8	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.2	0.5	0.7	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	1.5	0.6	0.8	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	11.9	-	6.0	3.1	2.7	-
1,000,000 or more	83.7	-	-	-	39.3	44.5

a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

Section 7: Outlook

Jewish population trends constitute a sensitive indicator of broader political, socioeconomic, and cultural trends globally, regionally and in individual countries. The use of Jewish demographic data for a wide range of analytic and planning purposes is possible, therefore, only after acknowledging the global nature of causal mechanisms and the significant dependency of Jewish upon general social and demographic trends. Current data should be read in historical and comparative context, so as to detect the major underlying drivers of Jewish population change within the broader context of world society.

Accurate population data, as far as they can be estimated, should constitute a necessary tool in the planning of Jewish community life. Beyond the many and arguable problems related to the fluid and shifting boundaries of Jewish identification and to Jewish population definitions, and beyond the imperfect availability and accuracy of data, it is important to recognize that powerful and consistent trends constantly shape and reshape the

demographic profile of world Jewry. The recent momentum of Jewish population change in the US and in most other countries—at best tending to zero growth if the *core* definition is consistently adopted—contrasts with that of Israel—characterized by the continuation of very significant natural increase, strengthened by a minor net influx of new immigrants and a trickle of conversions to Judaism. While the transition of Israel to the status of largest Jewish population in the world is grounded on solid empirical foundations, the US constitutes a very large and stable Jewish population—culturally and socioeconomically powerful, creative, and influential in Jewish life. The US also constitutes a primary site of new modes of personal identification attachment—whether exclusively Jewish or shared and combined with alternative identifications; whether through direct genealogical linkage or by voluntary association with others who are Jewish. Some of these options may be shared or may be rejected by Jews in other countries. These growingly indirect and increasingly individualistic definition and identification patterns operate along, and to some extent compete with, the more conservative and mutually exclusive Jewish family and identification patterns that continue to prevail in Israel. The only possible option in a global assessment of Jewish population trends is that common and somewhat more restrictive definition criteria are adopted as a core concept in all countries worldwide.

Both the American and the Israeli models of Jewish identification, of self-assessment, of Jewish institutional projection and influence, hence of Jewish population dynamics and structure, generate widespread echoes across all other Jewish communities worldwide. Powerful mutual influences, collaborative initiatives, and sometimes tensions do exist between the two major communities. The aggregate demographic weight of other Jewish communities globally—aside from their continuing cultural relevance and historical memory—is gradually decreasing. The Jewish world has become demographically more bi-polar but also tends to become more eclectic and transnational reflecting pervasive trends in contemporary world society. In a global society where the old, plain Jewish/non-Jewish dichotomy loses significance and empirical grounding (DellaPergola 2014e), the challenge of determining the size and distribution of Jewish population becomes more complex with passing time. In order to overcome this challenge, observers should pay due attention to the quality of empirical work without losing grip on the underlying meaning of Jewish identity.

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American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the renewed *American Jewish Year Book.* World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 and as of January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not issued. The interested reader may consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a).

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Appendix

Definitions

In most Diaspora countries, the ***core Jewish population*** (***CJP***—a concept initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does not necessarily coincide, with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in

the *core* Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The 2013 Pew Research Center survey of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), by introducing the previously not empirically tested concept of *partly Jewish,* helped clarify the demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the *partly Jewish* as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers would suggest that the *partly Jewish* stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of *Non-Jews with Jewish background*, or *Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity*. Recent research experience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between different *core* and *non-core* statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and vice versa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is not necessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.

Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of ***total population with at least one Jewish parent*** (***JPP***) includes the core Jewish population plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013).

The ***enlarged Jewish population*** (***EJP***—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) further expands by including the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent; and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as *partly Jewish* or as *PJBs* who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of *multiple ethnicities,* naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition. For

both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households.

The ***Law of Return population*** ***(LRP)*** reflects Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law itself does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the *Law of Return*. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to *all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren,* as well as to *their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses*. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so-called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions than to the *core* definition.

Presentation and Quality of Data

Jewish population estimates in this report refer to January 1, 2017. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence some margin of inaccuracy. For example, a wealth of data about Israel's population becomes available annually when the *American Jewish Year Book* is already in print. Some of Israel's data here are the product of estimates based on the most recent trends, but may need adjustment when the actual data are released. Indeed, where appropriate, we revise our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2016 totals for

major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2017 estimates. Corrections of the 2017 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident core Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the Appendix an estimate of 1) mid-year 2016 total (including both Jews and non-Jews) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2017); 2) the estimated January 1, 2017 core Jewish population (CJP); 3) the number of Jews per 1000 total population; and 4) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last three columns provide rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (JPP), the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP), and the Law of Return population (LRP). These figures were derived from available information and assessments on the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, and the data should be taken as indicative only.

Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or “snowbird” issue in estimating the US Jewish population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.)

Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. In the **Appendix table** the main types of sources are indicated as follows:

(C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts and over counts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated.

(P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep a permanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of individual demographic events.

(S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public organization.

(J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization.

(E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization.

Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the Appendix table, as follows:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period.
(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period.
(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.
(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which a country's base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2017 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al. 2000b; and author's current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2017 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

Appendix Table. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2017

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b] CJP	Jews per 1000 total popula-tion	Source			Population with Jewish parent[e] JPP	Enlarged Jewish population[f] EJP	Law of Return population[g] LRP
				Type[c]	Accuracy rating[d]				
World	**7,414,801,000**	**14,511,100**	**1.96**				**17,645,650**	**20,499,200**	**23,311,000**
America total	**997,031,000**	**6,470,600**	**6.49**				**8,965,100**	**11,177,800**	**13,406,500**
Bermuda	65,000	100	1.54	C	B 2016		200	300	400
Canada	36,200,000	390,000	10.77	C	B 2011		450,000	550,000	700,000
United States	323,900,000	5,700,000	17.60	S	B 2013		8,000,000	10,000,000	12,000,000
Total North America[h]	**360,231,000**	**6,090,100**	**16.91**				**8,450,200**	**10,550,300**	**12,700,400**
Bahamas	400,000	300	0.75	E	D 1995		500	700	800
Costa Rica	4,900,000	2,500	0.51	J	C 1993		2,800	3,100	3,400
Cuba	11,200,000	500	0.04	S	C 2013		1,000	1,500	2,000
Dominican Republic	10,600,000	100	0.01	E	D 2000		200	300	400
El Salvador	6,400,000	100	0.02	E	C 1993		200	300	400
Guatemala	16,600,000	900	0.05	S	B 1999		1,200	1,500	1,800
Jamaica	2,700,000	200	0.07	J	C 2010		300	400	500
Mexico	128,600,000	40,000	0.31	C,S	B 2010		45,000	50,000	65,000
Netherlands Antilles	365,000	300	0.82	C	C 2016		500	700	800
Panama	4,000,000	10,000	2.50	S	C 2012		11,000	12,000	13,000
Puerto Rico	3,400,000	1,500	0.44	J	C 2000		2,000	2,500	3,000
Virgin Islands	110,000	400	3.64	E	D 2016		600	700	800
Other	28,725,000	200	0.01		D 2016		300	500	700
Total Central America, Caribbean	**218,000,000**	**57,000**	**0.26**				**65,600**	**74,200**	**92,600**
Argentina	43,600,000	180,500	4.14	S	B 2003		270,000	330,000	350,000
Bolivia	11,000,000	500	0.05	J	C 1999		700	900	1,000
Brazil	206,100,000	93,800	0.46	C	B 2010		120,000	150,000	180,000
Chile	18,200,000	18,300	1.01	C	B 2002		21,000	26,000	30,000
Colombia	48,800,000	2,200	0.05	S	C 2010		2,800	3,200	3,600
Ecuador	16,500,000	600	0.04	J	B 2011		800	1,000	1,200
Paraguay	7,000,000	1,000	0.14	C	B 2002		1,300	1,600	1,900
Peru	31,500,000	1,900	0.06	S	C 1993		2,300	3,000	3,500
Suriname	500,000	200	0.40	J	D 2000		400	600	800
Uruguay	3,500,000	16,900	4.83	S	B 2013		20,000	25,000	27,500
Venezuela	31,000,000	7,600	0.25	S	C 2012		10,000	12,000	14,000
Total South America[h]	**418,800,000**	**323,500**	**0.77**				**449,300**	**553,300**	**613,500**
Europe total	**818,470,000**	**1,359,100**	**1.66**				**1,771,100**	**2,181,900**	**2,722,500**
Austria	8,800,000	9,000	1.02	C,J	B 2011		14,000	17,000	20,000
Belgium	11,300,000	29,300	2.59	J	C 2002		35,000	40,000	45,000
Bulgaria	7,100,000	2,000	0.28	C,J	C 2011		4,000	6,000	7,500
Croatia	4,200,000	1,700	0.40	C,J	C 2001		2,400	3,000	3,500
Cyprus	1,200,000	100	0.08	E	D 2012		200	300	400
Czech Republic	10,600,000	3,900	0.37	C,J	C 2011		5,000	6,500	8,000
Denmark	5,700,000	6,400	1.12	S	C 2001		7,500	8,500	9,500
Estonia	1,300,000	2,000	1.54	C,P	B 2016		2,600	3,400	4,500
Finland	5,500,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010		1,600	1,900	2,200
France[i]	64,640,000	456,000	7.05	S	B 2012		530,000	600,000	700,000
Germany	82,600,000	116,500	1.41	J	B 2016		150,000	225,000	275,000
Greece	10,800,000	4,200	0.39	J	B 2000		5,500	6,000	7,000
Hungary	9,800,000	47,500	4.85	C	C 2011		75,000	100,000	130,000

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b] CJP	Jews per 1000 total popula-tion	Source			Population with Jewish parent[e] JPP	Enlarged Jewish population[f] EJP	Law of Return population[g] LRP
				Type[c]	Accuracy rating[d]				
Ireland	4,700,000	1,600	0.34	C	B 2011		2,000	2,400	2,800
Italy	60,600,000	27,300	0.45	S,J	B 2015		34,000	41,000	48,000
Latvia	2,000,000	4,800	2.40	C,P	B 2016		8,000	12,000	16,000
Lithuania	2,900,000	2,600	0.90	C,P	B 2011		4,700	6,500	10,000
Luxembourg	600,000	600	1.00	J	B 2000		800	1,000	1,200
Malta	400,000	100	0.25	E	D 2012		200	300	400
Netherlands	17,000,000	29,800	1.75	S	B 2009		43,000	52,000	60,000
Poland	38,400,000	3,200	0.08	C,J	C 2002		5,000	7,500	10,000
Portugal	10,300,000	600	0.06	C	C 2001		800	1,000	1,200
Romania	19,800,000	9,200	0.46	C,J	B 2002		13,500	17,000	20,000
Slovakia	5,400,000	2,600	0.48	C	C 2011		3,600	4,600	6,000
Slovenia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 2003		200	300	400
Spain	43,300,000	11,800	0.27	J	D 2007		15,000	18,000	20,000
Sweden	9,900,000	15,000	1.52	S	C 2007		20,000	25,000	30,000
United Kingdom[j]	65,800,000	289,500	4.40	C,S	B 2011		330,000	370,000	410,000
Total European Union 28	**506,740,000**	**1,078,700**	**2.13**				**1,313,600**	**1,576,200**	**1,848,600**
Belarus	9,500,000	10,000	1.05	C	B 2009		18,000	25,000	33,000
Moldova	3,600,000	3,400	0.94	C	C 2004		5,700	7,500	11,000
Russia[k]	144,300,000	176,000	1.22	C	C 2010		290,000	380,000	570,000
Ukraine	42,700,000	53,000	1.24	C	C 2001		97,000	140,000	200,000
Total FSU Republics	**200,100,000**	**242,400**	**1.21**				**410,700**	**552,500**	**814,000**
[Total FSU in Europe][l]	**206,300,000**	**251,800**	**1.22**				**426,000**	**574,400**	**844,500**
Gibraltar	30,000	600	20.00	C	B 2001		700	800	900
Norway	5,200,000	1,300	0.25	P	B 2010		1,500	2,000	2,500
Switzerland	8,400,000	18,700	2.23	C	B 2012		22,000	25,000	28,000
Total other West Europe[h]	**14,130,000**	**20,600**	**1.46**				**24,200**	**27,800**	**31,400**
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,500,000	500	0.14	C	C 2001		800	1,000	1,200
Macedonia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C	C 1996		200	300	400
Serbia	7,100,000	1,400	0.20	C	C 2001		2,100	2,800	3,500
Turkey[k]	79,500,000	15,300	0.19	S,J	B 2016		19,300	21,000	23,000
Other	5,300,000	100	0.02		D 2016		200	300	400
Total Balkans	**97,500,000**	**17,400**	**0.18**				**22,600**	**25,400**	**28,500**
Asia total	**4,356,300,000**	**6,486,600**	**1.49**				**6,693,850**	**6,900,800**	**6,918,700**
Israel[m]	8,230,200	6,057,700	736.03	C,P	A 2017		6,245,750	6,433,800	6,433,800
West Bank[n]	2,904,400	393,300	135.42	C,P	A 2017		397,500	401,700	401,700
Gaza[n]	1,789,100	0	0.00	C,P	A 2017		0	0	0
Total Israel and Palestine[o]	**12,923,700**	**6,451,000**	**499.16**				**6,643,250**	**6,835,500**	**6,835,500**
[Total State of Israel][p]	**8,631,900**	**6,451,000**	**747.34**			X	**6,643,250**	**6,835,500**	**6,835,500**
Armenia	3,000,000	100	0.03	C	B 2011	X	200	300	400
Azerbaijan	9,800,000	8,100	0.83	C	B 2009		10,500	16,000	22,000
Georgia	4,000,000	1,700	0.43	C	B 2014	X	4,500	6,000	8,700
Kazakhstan	17,800,000	2,800	0.16	C	B 2009		4,800	6,500	9,600
Kyrgyzstan	6,100,000	400	0.07	C	B 2009		700	1,000	1,500
Turkmenistan	5,400,000	200	0.04	C	B 2010		300	400	600
Uzbekistan	31,900,000	3,400	0.11	C	B 2010		6,000	8,000	10,000
Total former USSR in Asia[h]	**86,600,000**	**16,700**	**0.19**				**27,000**	**38,200**	**52,800**
China[q]	1,386,100,000	2,700	0.00	E	D 2015		2,900	3,300	3,500
India	1,328,900,000	5,000	0.00	C	C 2011		6,000	7,000	8,000

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b] CJP	Jews per 1000 total popula-tion	Source			Population with Jewish parent[e] JPP	Enlarged Jewish population[f] EJP	Law of Return population[g] LRP
				Type[c]	Accuracy rating[d]				
Indonesia	259,400,000	100	0.00	E	D 2016		200	300	400
Iran	79,500,000	8,500	0.11	C	B 2012	X	11,000	12,000	13,000
Japan	125,300,000	1,000	0.01	E	D 2015		1,200	1,400	1,600
Philippines	102,600,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400
Singapore	5,600,000	900	0.16	J	C 2015		1,000	1,200	1,400
South Korea	50,800,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400
Syria[r]	17,200,000	100	0.01	E	D 2015		200	300	400
Taiwan	23,500,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400
Thailand	65,300,000	200	0.00	E	D 2015		300	400	500
Other	812,576,300	100	0.00		D 2016		200	300	400
Total other Asia	**4,256,776,300**	**18,900**	**0.00**				**23,600**	**27,100**	**30,400**
Africa total	**1,203,000,000**	**74,000**	**0.06**				**81,900**	**88,900**	**96,900**
Egypt	93,500,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400
Ethiopia	101,700,000	100	0.00	S	C 2015		500	1,000	2,500
Morocco	34,700,000	2,200	0.06	J	C 2015		2,500	2,700	2,900
Tunisia	11,300,000	1,100	0.10	J	C 2015		1,200	1,300	1,400
Total Northern Africa[h]	**331,000,000**	**3,500**	**0.01**				**4,400**	**5,300**	**7,200**
Botswana	2,200,000	100	0.05	E	C 1993		200	300	400
Congo D.R.	79,800,000	100	0.00	E	C 1993		200	300	400
Kenya	45,400,000	300	0.01	J	C 1990		500	700	900
Madagascar	23,700,000	100	0.00	J	D 2016		200	300	400
Namibia	2,500,000	100	0.04	C	C 1993		200	300	400
Nigeria	186,500,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400
South Africa	55,700,000	69,300	1.24	C,S	B 2011		75,000	80,000	85,000
Zimbabwe	16,000,000	200	0.01	C	B 2001	X	600	800	1,000
Other	460,200,000	200	0.00		D 2016		400	600	800
Total Sub-Saharan Africa[s]	**872,000,000**	**70,500**	**0.08**				**77,500**	**83,600**	**89,700**
Oceania total	**40,000,000**	**120,800**	**3.02**				**133,700**	**149,800**	**166,400**
Australia	24,100,000	113,200	4.70	C	B 2016		125,000	140,000	155,000
New Zealand	4,700,000	7,500	1.60	C	B 2006		8,500	9,500	11,000
Other	11,200,000	100	0.01		D 2016		200	300	400

a Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2017), mid-year 2016 estimates
b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity
c (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register. (E) Estimate.
d (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A, B, and C, the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2016 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information
e Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent
f Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)

g Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification
h Including countries and territories not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of those countries combined
i Including Monaco
j Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
k Including Asian regions
l Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU
m Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bank
n Author's revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2017: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,448,800; Gaza: 1,750,600; Total: 4,199,400. The West Bank also includes 377,200 Jews and 8,300 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total of 385,500 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 2,834,300 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents
o Not including foreign workers and refugees
p Israel's total permanent (de jure) population as defined by Israel's legal system, not including foreign workers and refugees
q Including Hong Kong and Macao
r Jewish population includes Lebanon
s Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa

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