Washington, April 24, 1954.

SUBJECT
Position Paper on PBSUCCESS

I. Appreciation of the Situation

The following estimate of the situation in Guatemala and adjoining countries is taken from a special estimate prepared during the past week by the Board of National Estimates. General Bull headed the Special Panel and the views of State (OIR) and the service intelligence agencies were solicited in the preparation of the estimate. The terms of reference of the estimating panel included the following questions:

What is the present strength of the Communists in Guatemala?

What are the current strengths and attitudes of Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador and what are the effects upon them of a continued march of Communism in Guatemala?

On whose side is time?

The conclusions of the Board of National Estimates as of 22 April 1954, are as follows:

[Omitted here are the Conclusions from Document 132.]

a. General

Before listing specific assets, the population of Guatemala should be mentioned as a strong, potential asset. Predominantly anti-Communist the people, once aroused from their normal political inertia, could play a powerful role against the Arbenz regime. Increasing government repression and Communist brutality are having their effect evidenced in numerous instances of popular unrest throughout the country. A few typical examples taken at random are the signature of an anti-Communist petition by 50 people in Communist Escuintla; a new vigorously anti-Communist newspaper in Chiquimula; large pockets of averred anti-Communists at numerous points in the Mazatenango area; public meetings attended by several hundred people at Puerto Barrios; and the denial to the Communists of the local labor organization at Quezaltenango.

Though only tied together informally at present, considerable focus has been given to the large Catholic group by the extremely effective pastoral letter of April 4 issued by the Archbishop of Guatemala urging all Catholics to combat Communism. This letter, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], can, and it is believed will, have continuing effect if its message is continuously replayed.

Additional unity of purpose is provided by the psychological assets available in Guatemala as well as the encouragement generated by the vague but growing recognition that "something is in the air"--a well-backed movement is around the corner. Calligeris' announced leadership and well-received political manifesto of late February have contributed to this. It has also been a consequence of the paramilitary program, not presently military and formidable, but psychologically persuasive. A consciousness of the stick behind the carrot is considered a prerequisite to creating any effective opposition in Guatemala, Communist-dominated as it is today.

b. Psychological

Psychological assets include many newspapers and radio stations, not controlled or influenced by CIA, which are still independent. "El Espectador", for example, is strongly anti-Communist. So is Clemente Marroquin Rojas, the most influential journalist in Guatemala City. Admittedly these independents must move with caution and their days of independence may well be numbered but for the moment they survive.

A controlled group in Guatemala City publishes a weekly, "El Rebelde", directs poster and leaflet teams, a telephone provocation team, "goon" squads and runs intermittent radio broadcasts. It also operates a political organization consisting of a coalition of numerous political groups known as the National Anti-Communist Front (FAN), which provides coverage of the entire country. This is supplemented by a special group, "Inspectors", who periodically travel throughout the country contacting numerous agents.

Several other small anti-Communist publications in various parts of Guatemala receive financial aid and guidance.

c. Military and Paramilitary

As stated above the Board of National Estimates concludes that a revolutionary potential exists in the Guatemalan Army. Specific data may be adduced to confirm this estimate.

Disaffection and dissatisfaction are evident throughout all echelons. The high command is particularly vulnerable to defection and in some instances defection in place is practically assured. The Minister of National Defense, Jose Angel Sanchez, is opposed to Communist control over Arbenz and is considered inclined towards supporting any well-organized opposition movement. The Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, is probably discredited and considered no longer loyal to Arbenz. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Parinello de Leon, has repeatedly indicated his desire to see the end of the Communist-controlled regime. The Chief of the Air Force, Colonel Luis A. Giron, is believed disaffected. The Minister without Portfolio, Colonel Elfego Monzon, is actively, covertly organizing within the Army for a coup [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Plans are under way to incorporate his assets with those of the Junta and a meeting is being planned to effect this union. Thus, within the high command a definite capability exists to defect in place sufficient numbers of influential military leaders to ensure control over the Armed Forces before any overt action is undertaken.

In furtherance of the objective to defect the Army, two distinct operations are in progress; the Junta, through its military contacts and an independent effort by CIA targeted at key personnel. The Junta leadership, being primarily composed of Guatemalan Army officers in exile, has achieved certain success to date. The leaders of this organizational effort have been examined by polygraph and cleared as to the validity of their statements. The independent effort is now being carried out by a case officer in the field following 60 days of intensive study of the most promising targets of importance.

In addition, a military organization of younger officers positively pledged to Calligeris is in existence. They have been organized and contacted by Calligeris' military representative in Guatemala. The Calligeris organization presently has four trusted military leaders in the four sectors of Guatemala City and a leader in each of the nine target garrisons. These leaders estimate that, on D-Day, they can capture from within all the garrisons except Quiche, Mazatenango and San Jose, where added efforts to prepare capitulation are in progress.

At best, the apparently "safe" garrisons will be taken without firing a shot. Where this does not work, correct disposition of friendly elements plus the denial of weapons and ammunition to enemy forces should quell opposition. If necessary, civilian paramilitary units will step in to provide overwhelming force.

As regards this civilian paramilitary organization, substantial numbers of men in each of the nine garrison areas in Guatemala are already pledged. The number of men available in each garrison area are listed below. Three columns are given to show the various estimates, ranging from the most conservative to the optimistic. Column I figures cannot, of course, be guaranteed but are the result of checking Calligeris' figures with individual leaders who have been exfiltrated from Guatemala. These figures have been sufficiently confirmed by questioning, where possible, that it is the belief of the Lincoln staff that they are accurate. Moreover, in no instance has questioning shown initial estimates to be seriously erroneous.

	I	II	III
	Total Positive Pledges	Total Which There is Reason to Believe Exist in Area & Are Anti-Govt to Point of Taking Action	Calligeris Claimed Support. Presently Unconfirmed but not Disproved
Guatemala City	1725	4225	9125
Coban	920	1750	4850
Quezaltenango	415	1915	8490
Mazatenango	195	2095	4000
Quiche	187	1887	4000
Puerto Barrios	471	671	1485
Jutiapa	660	2060	6000
Zacapa	565	1175	1200
San Jose	4	150	150
Total target, garrison vicinity	5142	15,928	39,300

In addition to the above civilians available in the garrison areas, four other civilian organizations in important tactical areas, ringing Guatemala City, are envisaged. Strength figures in these areas computed in the same manner as above are as follows:

	I	II	III
Area I	70	70	70
Area II	350	1300	3520
Area III
Area IV	150	1350	9420
Total Tactical outer org.	570	2720	13,010

The entire complex of friendly military and paramilitary assets will be firmly organized, finally trained and led on D-Day, by the paramilitary assets developed and existing outside Guatemala. These assets are discussed under 2c below.

d. Intelligence

Intelligence from within Guatemala is provided mainly by the Junta Intelligence Service located in Honduras and discussed in the next section below. In addition the Guatemala City Station is providing good intelligence on political and psychological subjects as well as from sources on the Government, Army and Communist Party. In addition intelligence is provided by the propaganda organizations mentioned above as well as by the State Department and the service attachés.

a. General

One of the major assets of the Group outside of Guatemala is the backing provided by other countries./2/

[5 paragraphs (31 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. Psychological

In addition to independent media, the following controlled external PW assets are available:

Publications and Radio

Boletin del Ceuage	5000 copies (3000 smuggled into Guatemala)	Published weekly in Honduras by controlled anti-Communist group of Guatemalan exiles.
Radio Programs	Honduras	Same group.
Leaflets and Bulletins	Honduras (smuggled into Guatemala)	Same group.
El Combate	5000 copies (3000 smuggled into Guatemala)	Published weekly in Salvador by anti-Communist front group (FAGE).
Radio Broadcasts(Cristal YSY)	Reaches about 50 miles beyond Guatemalan border	Same group.
Pronto	Newspaper, just begun.	Published in Mexico by
	Distribution in Guatemala	anti-Communist Guate-
	being developed, if possible	malan group (FEGAM).
Bulletin for the Liberation of Guatemala	Newspaper, anti-Junta but also anti-Communist	Published in Mexico (a few reach Guatemala) by Comm. for the Liberation of Guatemala (LIONIZER).

A principal, if not the principal, psychological asset is a clandestine radio [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which is expected to go on the air April 26. Broadcasting tapes are and will be prepared at Lincoln. This station will be beamed at Guatemala from where it will be purportedly broadcasting. Programs are planned for the next thirty to forty days and two weeks of tapes are now ready for use. This radio will also provide the radio support needed immediately prior to the uprising unless it is inoperative or its use is undesirable in which case a contingency station fully under our control will be used. Preparations for this installation are substantially completed.

A writing staff of Guatemalans has been installed in safe houses near Lincoln to provide the support needed for the above assets as well as preparing additional propaganda material for field distribution. A reporting system has been devised for psychological purposes which is providing substantial raw material for the writers. This is supplemented by hourly FBIS service and the receipt within 18 hours of publication of daily newspapers from Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Mexico, Salvador and Honduras.

To buttress the effects of the Caracas anti-Communist resolution two conferences in Mexico City have been arranged. The first scheduled for May 1 will be sponsored by the "Latin American Laborers in Exile" largely under the auspices of ORIT. Though not directly targeted at Guatemala, it is anticipated that considerable propaganda against the target will be generated. The second to be convened 27-30 May will be called the "Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America". It will be attended by many prominent anti-Communists from every country in Latin America and will have as its main object the focusing of the attention of Latin Americans on the Communist situation in Guatemala thereby constituting a call for all anti-Communists to aid in the struggle.

c. Paramilitary

In the paramilitary field Calligeris is, of course, the leader and has with him an Executive, a senior Colonel, plus four ex-officer personnel as a staff. In addition there are 67 trainee graduates of one of our schools; 9 radio operators and crypto clerks in training plus 5 more on the way, who are already experienced. Recently about 40 more men arrived from Guatemala as sub-unit leaders or special task personnel while some 212 men with varying degrees of experience and different capabilities are available on a stand-by basis and will provide the nucleus for various shock forces. Adequate provision has been made for logistical support.

d. Intelligence

The primary intelligence assets are those initially provided by the Junta (Headquarters in Honduras) but now sufficiently reformed, compartmented and polygraphed to be legitimately considered the equivalent of a direct PBSUCCESS asset. This separate but controlled service has penetrations in the major Guatemalan Government departments, all military garrisons, the Communist Party (PGT), [1 line of source text not declassified]. A CE Section has been developed giving exclusive attention to Communist penetrations of the Junta, conducting investigations and developing safeguards. Moreover, radio operators will soon be deployed within Guatemalan target areas to provide W/T communications for intelligence and EEI's.

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

C. Security

Ever since the work was first started on the preparation of a plan for PBSUCCESS it has been fully recognized that the U.S. would be accused of being the main sponsor of most if not all activities directed against the Arbenz regime. Written statements to this effect were included in the report on Stage One written in December 1953;/3/ in a paper written in March 1954 and presented to the Secretary of State,/4/ and, in addition, there have been numerous oral reports to the same effect. Moreover it has been consistently assumed that in an operation of this scope some evidence supporting the accusations would unavoidably be available to unfriendly powers or individuals. Nevertheless it was concluded that there was sufficient likelihood that no irrefutable evidence of a legal nature would be discovered to justify the undertaking particularly when the risks were weighed against the importance of the project.

A careful review of all known factors bearing on security now in existence including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the U.S. Embassies in Guatemala and Honduras indicates that so far the estimates have been accurate and that security has been as well maintained in this project as could reasonably be expected. Consequently it is fair to assume that no irrefutable evidence tying the project to the U.S. Government is in the hands of the enemy. It would of course be as impossible in this case as in all others to guarantee this last statement but it can be asserted that the risks of U.S. involvement today are not such as to warrant, in our opinion, a termination or modification of the project on security grounds, if it is otherwise desirable.

Added support in cloaking the U.S. hand exists in the number of other countries which both have good reasons for wanting to see the replacement of the Arbenz Government and have the means for backing a coup of the size planned. The following facts are known to many:

[4 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

The known hostility of the above countries to Arbenz was useful in cloaking the U.S. hand at the time of the January 1954 White Paper./5/ This paper directly accused Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, as well as private U.S. interests, of attempting to intervene in Guatemalan affairs with the acquiescence of "the government of the North". Much of the "evidence" appended to the White Paper was quickly established as spurious and the Guatemalan Government itself hedged on whether "the government of the North" was intended to mean Mexico or the United States. Consequently nothing in the White Paper established official U.S. involvement. Continued study of the after effects of the White Paper indicates that it somewhat reinforced suspicions among all those previously inclined to suspect the U.S. but was roundly disbelieved by the majority of anti-Communists in Central America.

In conclusion the following observations on the question of U.S. involvement seem appropriate:

a. Although a number of individuals in both the Nicaraguan and Honduran Governments are personally convinced that the U.S. is favorably disposed toward this operation and although the Guatemalan regime may and probably does have indications to this effect, plausible denial by the U.S. in response to any charges could still be sustained. This would be especially true if the Guatemalan regime had been effectively overthrown and its leaders scattered.

b. There is not the slightest doubt that if the operation is carried through many Latin Americans will see in it the hand of the U.S. But it is equally true that they would see the hand of the U.S. in any uprising whether or not sponsored by the U.S., particularly since the U.S. has made it clear in many overt ways that it heartily disapproves of the Arbenz regime. In short it might be said that the only way to forestall such a belief is for the U.S. to make sure that there is no revolution, which we are in no position to do since there is good reason to believe that some one of the other potential sponsors will in all probability press for the revolution which under such circumstances (a) would in all likelihood abort and (b) would be laid at our door anyhow.

c. Assuming that in this instance a decision is taken to terminate or substantially to modify the present project for security reasons or at least on the grounds that the hand of the U.S. is too clearly shown, a serious question is raised as to whether any operation of this kind can appropriately be included as one of the U.S. cold war weapons, no matter how great the provocation or how favorable the auspices, as far as the entire area of Latin America is concerned.

II. Possible Courses of Action

A. Continue the plan in substantially its present form, bending every effort toward the earliest feasible conclusion. Some adjustment of the present target date would probably be necessary in view of the delays thus far encountered in the timetable of scheduled accomplishments and developments. There would, of course, be an understanding that the final phase would not be authorized unless and until the Director had satisfied himself that conditions were favorable for the success of the operation.

B. Adopt a substantially modified form of the plan, accentuating the intelligence, propaganda, political action, and defection aspects thereof, and postponing paramilitary action until October or later. This would have to assume that there could be a vigorous and coordinated program of official and overt action and covert operations.

C. Abandon the present plan and rely upon overt diplomatic action and relatively minor political and psychological warfare activities to overthrow the present regime. What is specifically proposed is to begin with a strong official statement of the United States position toward the present regime in Guatemala, followed by an attempt to secure the support of the Caracas majority at an OAS meeting in September for the application against Guatemala of the sanctions envisaged in the Rio Pact. Essentially this would involve an economic and communications blockade of Guatemala by OAS members or at least by those members willing to support and join in the action.

III. Conclusions

A. The best chance of removing the Arbenz regime is to proceed as energetically as possible along the lines of the present plan. There is evidence of political and psychological unrest within Guatemala and of growing hostility to the regime. A revolutionary potential exists in the Army. Continued application of planned and integrated pressures should force progressively greater unrest and defection while removal of such pressures will greatly strengthen the opposition and discourage or disaffect allies and potential allies.

B. It is fair to assume that no irrefutable evidence tying the project to the U.S. Government is in the hands of the enemy. The security of the project is as good as can be expected and fully in keeping with the estimates made and reported on numerous occasions starting with the beginning of the project. Any action against the Arbenz regime will be charged against the United States whether or not it has any responsibility for it.

C. Alternative IIB which would substantially postpone the target date offers few advantages but has numerous disadvantages, among them: possible loss of assets through disaffection or insecurity (time and exposure being in direct ratio); loss of support from other nations, almost surely Honduras which would hesitate to support near its elections, even assuming it still has a stable and friendly government; and Nicaraguan support would diminish if it could be counted on at all; disruption of the present defection program, both military and civilian, which is geared to early action; loss of intelligence as a result of the effect of further evidence of inability to act on the part of Calligeris; similar reduction in the effectiveness of propaganda; danger of an early, abortive coup by impatient elements; and strengthening of the Arbenz team since time is on its side particularly if pressures are relaxed.

D. Alternative IIC is outside the jurisdiction of CIA but presents difficult questions requiring answers not presently available. Some of these are:

1. Will evidence of Communist domination in Guatemala be available in such convincing form as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for a Latin American politician, not wishing to recognize the fact, to avoid doing so?

2. How many of the countries that voted for the Caracas resolution would vote in the same fashion, if such vote involved taking action against Guatemala?

3. Assuming an embargo is voted, when will it be possible and will it be effective in denying (a) access to Guatemala of non-Western Hemisphere shipping adequate for its trade, (b) access to imports of Mexican petroleum, (c) access to imports of Argentinean grain and (d) access to European sources of supply for industrial goods? Would such an embargo close European, Asiatic and Soviet bloc markets for Guatemalan coffee?

4. Assuming failure before the OAS, will it be possible to undertake any action along the lines presently contemplated or will our hands be tied?

5. Is it contemplated that our NATO allies would be asked to recognize that the Guatemalan regime presents a serious military threat and therefore to join in the imposition of economic sanctions?

Frank G. Wisner

[place not declassified], April 28, 1954, 0150Z.

2179. Re: HGGA 936./2/

1. Increasing Catholic activities in WSBURNT, noted in ref, make supporting action by Catholic Church dignitaries, lay groups, publications elsewhere in SGRANGER highly desirable for effect in WSBURNT and internationally.

2. Suggest that [2 codewords not declassified] committee in [place not declassified] and contacts in [3 places not declassified] and anywhere else in SGRANGER might be contacted through stations concerned on via PBPRIME Catholic channels.

3. Action might be tied to pastoral letter already publicized and could aim at:

A. Warning against spread atheistic communism

B. Prayer, assistance for endangered faithful in WSBURNT, defense of their Catholic schools, youth activities, other church assets

C. Faithful to avoid spiritual contamination from Commie-controlled WSBURNT government agencies, fronts, propaganda media.

4. LINC answering ref by dispatch.

5. Advise.

Washington, April 28, 1954, 10 a.m.

PLACE: War Room

PERSONS PRESENT: Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, [9 names not declassified]

Mr. Wisner spoke first, saying that "we have the full green light and the go ahead." This was in regard to policy and he indicated that he was not addressing himself to operational considerations. With regard to flights, approach, etc.--it is all in the affirmative. He mentioned there may be operational consideration requiring that the program be shifted forward from the present date or other changes and the staff should bear in mind constantly the importance of maintaining a sufficient degree of flexibility in their approach to this thing so that the program can be adjusted to fit the need.

It was strongly recommended that none of this relieved us of the responsibility we owe to our government and ourselves to so conduct this operation that there will be a minimum possible chance of it being pinned on the U.S. officially and conclusively and so as to maximize the possibility that when the blame gets around to being placed, such confusion will exist as to who did it that it can't be sorted out.

Mr. Wisner did not think false trails had been sufficiently developed.

Mr. Barnes stated that he considered himself here largely in the capacity of a Headquarters representative. He brings some of the Headquarters thinking here and will take back there from time to time the thinking here. He stated that [name not declassified] had been chief of operations and will continue to be but that he, Barnes, will help in any way that he can.

[name not declassified] then started a very general briefing covering most of the aspects of PBSUCCESS in general, reserving for various individuals directly concerned the more specific aspects of KUHOOK, KUFIRE and KUGOWN situation.

Mr. Wisner stated that the Director is always going to reserve the final judgment as to when to pull the last switch. He has to be satisfied that we have sufficient elements of strength and status of readiness. He is interested only in the success of the operation. He is not interested policy-wise. There is no operation regarded as being so important as this one and no operation on which the reputation of the Agency is more at stake.

The boss has to be satisfied that we have what it takes. Mr. Wisner stated that he did not anticipate lengthy delays but there might be operational considerations which LINCOLN would know more about than Washington which would temporarily alter plans. He suggested that when LINCOLN has something really good, Headquarters should be told about it, slug it for the boss' attention.

Mr. Wisner requested documents which are available at LINCOLN showing the internal strength and what the opposition is. He stated that Headquarters had never received a clear and concise statement of what the plans are with respect to what takes place on D-day. He had thought that Headquarters had this but apparently if they do no one can find it. He asked for about 2 pages on this subject.

[name not declassified] said that no detailed tactical plan had been contemplated till it was known what we had. Now we were concerned with the development of assets. [name not declassified] then proceeded with the general briefing, touching briefly on Regional Command, LINCOLN set-up, etc. and stated the fact that Security is here being used operationally.

Mr. Wisner asked for information about SCRANTON-SHERWOOD. The question of being sure about communications between [name not declassified], the Calligeris' Command Post and station was raised and discussed at length. Statement was made that two lines of communications will be available--through the CP (indigenous) and through the station.

PT/16 discussion was reserved for afternoon discussion.

Intelligence breakdown of RUFUS net was discussed. Development chart was displayed (and explanations given re progress marked on same).

Mr. Wisner questioned what should be told the Chargé in Guatemala about reporting on SHERWOOD when it goes on the air.

It is felt that we have the capability of reaching operational readiness during the month of June. Lots of factors have bearing on that and certain operations may not develop as planned but we are aware of that. Though we have a plan laid out, we know there can be changes and are prepared to be flexible.

[name not declassified] asked that the KUHOOK briefing be left till last in order that it could be properly seen in focus.

[name not declassified] was asked to explain the PP operations. He stated that their main asset is SHERWOOD and that 6 days programs are already taped.

Issue was raised about possibility of substituting tapes in order to provide current coverage of any developments of interest. Mr. [name not declassified] mentioned that RUFUS had a man with a good radio voice whom they proposed to bring up and train and then send back for use in just such instances. [name not declassified] disapproved this plan because it is planned that no indigenous personnel from the Calligeris group will be used at the site. Mr. Wisner felt that the use of the radio was a very important point and its effectiveness and impact is proportionate to the speed with which it acts. He cited as an example Radio Free Europe. A discussion on this subject between Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes and [name not declassified] followed.

Mr. Wisner was informed by [name not declassified] of the possibility of using Marine Air Force for special flights to Panama. Mr. Wisner said he would go to work on this when he and Mr. Bissell returned to Headquarters, and that he would not need a follow-up cable on this.

SHERWOOD is to be on the air two hours a day as of 1 May and this will be lengthened to 4 hours a day. There is a possibility of plugging this station's program in on a government-sponsored program eventually.

[name not declassified] discussed the military paper now being published. The articles in this are being prepared by army officers on RUFUS' staff. Mr. Leddy (ODACID) was concerned with the possibility that, if the tone of this paper were not sufficiently modulated and if the paper should be believed by the people to be published by an underground group within the existing Guatemalan army, it might cause an early purge of the Guatemalan army.

[name not declassified] said that this could not happen because the army paper started in the exiles' paper and the articles are signed by the true names of the people writing them. Texts have so far been restricted. Tempo has been gauged to the time and now articles are moderate.

Cruz Wer was brought up and the program against him, with its results, was discussed.

El Rebelde is being published again. The "32" program is in action. Mr. Wisner suggested that Headquarters should propagandize the "32" campaign and Arbenz' reaction to it and tell what the "32" means. This should be circulated. "Arbenz is arresting patriots who are in favor of keeping out foreign intervention."

[name not declassified] stated that currently rumors are being circulated. Presently there is a rumor in the rural areas that government leaders have prepared for flight abroad. On the other side, there is a rumor that Castillo Armas is on the way.

Mr. [name not declassified] stated that RUFUS is encouraged now. Our reasons for delays have been kept from him. The political plan "Cruz y Quetzal" was reviewed with RUFUS during [name not declassified] visit with him. They (RUFUS) favor it but feel it is a bit flowery. They feel that the idea of "Cruz y Quetzal" should be retained but want to include the Plan of Tegucigalpa and the joint result would be "Cruz y Quetzal". They played down the Indian thing and also read out the part about the U.S. having a commercial influence there.

RUFUS had three questions troubling him: 1. What would be the Group's attitude if a group of anti-Arbenz and anti-Communist officers grab the ball and prematurely take over the government? What would the Group's attitude be in such an event? (Mr. Wisner said we will stay on his side. "He is our hero.") 2. RUFUS is worried about the approaching elections in Honduras since Galvez' position weakens daily. (Mr. Wisner said that SKILLET had briefed them on this and he is worried about the local situation.) 3. RUFUS is worried about his 80-100 trained men now in Tegucigalpa over whom he virtually has no control until he gives the battle cry. The town is full of Guatemalan agents. He is worried about getting them out of Tegucigalpa. (Mr. Wisner agreed that he had a problem there.)

Mr. Wisner suggested to Mr. Bissell that with help from Mr. Barnes a paper be prepared to show Holland which points out to him the things done and being done which are exclusive of the PM aspect. He (Mr. Holland) has been told about certain things. The paper we have talks about assets and he wants to talk about action. The manner of building up the stories on the police chief is colorful--this shows results.

Mr. Wisner said we have to make this thing stick. ODACID admits they are at fault in not having a program for making this thing sure and making it stick once we have done it. Mr. Wisner spoke of economic assistance, being prepared to recognize the new government, making statements about it once it has been accomplished. We should get credit for what we are doing. Mr. Wisner stated he was not sure ODACID would be kept up-to-date at all; but they needed to be given something to tide this over. It is a privilege for ODACID to be kept informed, not a right.

It was suggested that the Pastoral Letter be included in the paper for ODACID.

[name not declassified] was asked to give 5 minutes information on EEIs gathered.

Mr. [name not declassified] was asked to give a short briefing on [name not declassified] mission. He stated we gather intelligence from SEMANTIC and SECANT who are now back in Guatemala.

Mr. Wisner questioned if we were getting anything from the military missions in the target country. If we wait till the last minute to ask that they be withdrawn, they won't do it. He requested that LINCOLN advise what was desired to do about the mission. Is it desirable that steps be taken now to prepare for its withdrawal? (about 15 May). The withdrawal should be so designed that it can be played up for propaganda purposes. Mr. Peurifoy said that the Air Mission has not been doing what was requested of it.

[name not declassified] stated that we are over 18 days behind on black flights. We feel that we should have an extra aircraft added in order to make up this deficit. AMD, last week, assured him they were able to provide this aircraft within a maximum of 7-8 days. This would be plane and crew. Crew would have to use the same cover story as the others have. Mr. Wisner was concerned with the security angle with regard to extra crew rather than the plane. He said he would take this matter up on his return to Headquarters. He would favor an extra plane rather than the crew. It was requested that at least the plane be procured since we are pressing luck in using only 2 aircraft.

There followed a general discussion of the labor situation. The Labor Board wants to know everything. There is friction between the unions. This would be a cold approach to the head of the Steel Workers Union. [name not declassified] brought up the fact that we have spotted and cleared an Aprista down there. He will work operationally through [name not declassified]. The man who was chosen was chosen because he knows the field and has the necessary qualifications. Originally this approach was to be most informal--not to be a firm proposition.

Mr. Wisner requested information on the deception program with the New Orleans angle. [name not declassified] had prepared a follow-up on this and would brief him after lunch.

Mr. Wisner said he thought everyone would agree that it was very important for [name not declassified] to have the talk with [name not declassified], find out what is motivating him (is he abandoning the ship or is it that he feels he has done all that he can usefully do?). [name not declassified] was requested to assess his reasons. Find out what it is that has caused him to take this move. If he is getting out because he has lost confidence, find out why. If his answer is negative, don't accept it as a final answer; keep the issue open. Tell [name not declassified] that you ([name not declassified]) will have to come back and talk to the Group. He has had his feelings hurt. [name not declassified] was instructed not to let [name not declassified] break the conversation finally. Mr. Bissell suggested that [name not declassified] attempt to get [name not declassified] to postpone the date he had given for severance. [name not declassified] said [name not declassified] had put on paper several incidents which happened after his trip to Mexico--but chiefly the fact of his poor health prompted this move.

Meeting adjourned at 1230, with Mr. Robertson scheduled to give a briefing at 1400.

[place not declassified], April 28, 1954.

SUBJECT
General--KUGOWN
Specific--Catholic Church Activities

1. We are very pleased with your report in ref., since we, too, consider it highly important to mobilize anti-communist activities of the Catholic Church dignitaries and of Catholic lay organizations and indications on a continuous and rapidly increasing scale.

2. We suggest that ESSENCE (or any other contacts which you might be able to utilize for this purpose) may make use of some or all of the following arguments when dealing with either Church dignitaries and leaders of Catholic lay groups or publications:

a. Express gratitude for the pastoral letter, stress both its domestic and its international effect and emphasize the urgent need for more such active, spiritual guidance in the face of the growing communist threat.

b. Underscore fear that commies will interfere with religious instruction in schools, with Catholic youth activities and other aspects of church life, as they did wherever their power increased.

c. Suggest that the Church might warn the faithful against inevitable spiritual contamination through the commie-led fronts (which should be listed by name, indicating each group's affiliation with international communist organizations, such as WFDF, WIDF, FUS, IFC, etc.)

d. Lay organizations and publications might warn the people that Guatemala will isolate itself from all Latin America (politically, economically and spiritually) if it continues to be springboard for the international communist conspiracy.

3. In your dealings with Catholic publications and radio programs, you might--in addition to the above general arguments--suggest that it might not be sufficient merely to tell what the communists did to the Church and to people in general in far-away countries such as Russia (for whose fate the average Guatemalan may not care) in order to awaken popular revulsion against communism, it appears necessary to tie these experiences in other countries closely to the personal lives and interests of your local audience. This could be done, for instance, by describing graphically how the local church would be turned into a meeting hall for the "Fighting Godless", how the reader's children would have to spend their time with the "Red Pioneers", how the pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Malenkov would replace the pictures of the Saints in every home, and the like.

4. We are suggesting to HQs to initiate parallel action in other Latin American countries.

5. Please keep us informed about the progress of your activities along the above lines and send us copies of all materials which might result from these activities.

Jerome C. Dunbar/2/

Washington, April 28, 1954.

SUBJECT
Meeting of 28 April 1954

PRESENT
Ambassador Peurifoy, Ambassador Willauer, Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. [name not declassified]

1. Ambassador Peurifoy recommended that both he and Ambassador Willauer be advised as to D-Day and that they be sounded out approximately 10 days before. Mr. [name not declassified] noted the difficulty of such change of views by cable and suggested that it might be more effective to accomplish the Ambassador's objectives by sending down at that time an individual [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to consult directly with the Ambassadors. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested that Mr. Leddy was best suited for such a task.

2. With regard to the problem of sabotaging Honduranian aircraft, Ambassador Willauer proposed [name not declassified] as a person qualified and experienced for the assignment. He suggested that [name not declassified] availability could be ascertained through [name not declassified]. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested that it was unfortunate that Col. Acosta himself was unable to do anything to stop the sabotage especially since he had a suspect in view and that this gave little basis for hoping that a lone American could do better. Mr. [name not declassified] raised the question as to whether RUFUS could not supply an individual. Ambassador Willauer observed that RUFUS is in direct contact with Acosta through Flores.

3. Both Ambassadors were questioned re view of emergency communication links available to them in their respective countries.

4. Ambassador Peurifoy proposed again leaflet drops and sabotage prior to D-Day. The necessity was pointed out that of decided security in such actions would be premature and precipitate an opportunity for our readiness to exploit it. Mr. [name not declassified] advised Ambassador Peurifoy that railroad and Polwel targets had been pin-pointed by Lincoln following the Ambassador's recommendation of last week.

5. Ambassador Willauer asked what are the alternates to [place not declassified].

6. Ambassador Peurifoy was briefed on the oral report received with regard to the reported entry by unknown persons of a letter addressed to him. He was advised that this oral report was not conducive and that the written report would be passed to him in due course. Mr. [name not declassified] proposed that we be permitted to consider for recommendation to Ambassador Peurifoy the use of this channel for deception purposes which would have as their primary objective the disinvolvement of the embassy from revolutions rumored to be afoot.

7. Ambassador Willauer proposed that gasoline tank trucks [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could transport the arms to their points of disbursement. Messrs. Roosevelt and [name not declassified] raised a number of practical and security barriers to such a program.

8. With regard to PBSUCCESS in his area, Ambassador Willauer made the following observations:

a. That RUFUS' safehouse is across the street from the Ambassador's first secretary's residence. He asked whether RUFUS' location could be changed.

b. Operating difficulties in Tegucigalpa are most severe because of the size of the town and the small number of visiting Americans. Tourists' cover is not adequate for our people; in any case that cover has been used up by them and moreover they are not behaving as tourists.

c. Mr. [name not declassified] is too young and inexperienced and while doing a fine job considering his capabilities, another senior individual should serve as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and contact to Willauer.

d. Ontrich while active and imaginative is not appropriate by age or background to deal with the president. The president had raised to Willauer some objection to dealing with Ontrich whom he described as a "boy."

e. The need for the plane which he had proposed to the agency several months ago still exists. In addition to the craft he can supply a CAT pilot and crew chief. We could supply the co-pilot and radio operator through his gaining excellent cover and an opportunity to have frequent contact with him.

f. He requested arms for 20 persons including his four marines, and $5,000 for emergency use in connection with the safety of U.S. official persons.

9. With regard to the operation in his area, Ambassador Peurifoy requested the following:

a. A check on the status of the 3 additional people proposed for his embassy.

b. Heavy and light weapons for his staff in addition to the 30 revolvers already dispatched.

c. $10,000 into his hands for use in connection with protection of American lives.

d. Ambassador Willauer noted that Eric W. Watts, the Director of Jardine Mathisson and Company and Manager of their Japanese office will visit him beginning mid-May. Ambassador Willauer said this could probably not be put off. A May trip is requested.

10. With regard to the possibility that [name not declassified] may sever diplomatic relations over the Duarte affair, it was Ambassador Peurifoy's view that it could not be undesirable at this time, although he had some months ago recommended against such a sever of relations. Mr. [name not declassified] pointed out that such an action by [name not declassified] would increase our own security because subsequent disturbances would probably in many people's minds be credited to him.

Mr. [name not declassified] raised again with Ambassador Peurifoy the delicate and complex problems involved in the post operational period, and repeated Mr. Wisner's statements to the effect that department advice and assistance is needed. The Ambassador stated he would have recommendations forwarded to us. He noted that the main problem had to do with the difficulty security wise of making an assessment of RUFUS' acceptability and viability in the area.

E. The above notes do not pretend to cover the entire discussion, the nature of which was not conducive to usual reporting.

[name not declassified]

Washington, April 30, 1954, 2211Z.

48833. (From Whiting). Re: LINC 2261./2/

1. While we appreciate there may be need for proposed leaflet drops and recognize validity your supporting arguments, any use our own aircraft for this purpose presents both policy and practical difficulties. It would be direct involvement ODYOKE assets and in event of mishap would be most spectacular and conclusive proof implication. Moreover we have no available planes suitable for purpose since C-47 or other slow-flying aircraft would be too vulnerable.

2. Believe possibility use either [name not declassified] or Identity A owned and crewed aircraft safer and better for many reasons if it possible arrange this. Would consider it desirable have Calligeris explore this possibility with Identity A as part his proposed discussion and request for assistance. If Identity A amenable then details might be worked out between [name not declassified] and Identity A providing for staging or basing of one or two Identity A aircraft on [name not declassified] field.

3. As a general commentary upon this or any other proposed use of aircraft, request that you consider the impression which will be created by and the conclusions which will be drawn from, the obviously integrated use of aircraft in conjunction with D-day operations. It seems to HQs that the addition of this mechanistic refinement coming on top of the use of radio and other intricate features of the plan will almost inevitably set upon this operation the seal of a non-Latin product. This is entirely apart from the strict question of security, the point being that even if we were able to do this without security leaks and without any mishap, the conclusion would nevertheless be drawn by our friends and foes alike in the United Nations, etc. that this could not be anything other than what it in fact is, and certainly could not be an indigenous uprising.

Washington, May 1, 1954, 1947Z.

48937. 1. After intensive study HQs re withdrawal military mission WSBURNT tentative decision reached in consultation JMBLUG that on balance preferable mission remain because:

A. Withdrawal would convince army hopelessness receiving help from mission and might discourage those who opposed to govt.

B. Presence of mission serves as channel for pressing idea that arms not now available because of nature of govt.

C. As situation deteriorates some army officers may turn to mission with info or for advice. Doubt they would feel close enough to approach non military Embassy people.

2. JMBLUG will advise his appreciation of situation on return and make final recommendation. Consider mission can be more effective para 1B than in past.

3. Request your comment prior proposed meeting with appropriate military authority early next week.

Washington, May 1, 1954, 1948Z.

48933. Ref: A. LINC 230,/2/ B. LINC 2294./3/

1. In discussion ODACID tentative thinking pending meeting following ODACID's review of LCPANGS situation with Ambassador is:

A. No approach whatever should be made Somoza either by Magoffin or local ODACID chief as outlined ref A paras 3 and 4. ODACID reaffirms ruling against such representations on matters related to PBSUCCESS by its representatives to any foreign government.

B. ODACID concurs re in ref B action which might interpreted to be for info intell purposes only.

C. FYI: ODACID plans instruct local chiefs KMFLUSH and LCPANGS to renew efforts pacific settlement present tension in line with ODACID parallel action in OAS but such efforts will in no way be related to PBSUCCESS nor will any reference be made to revelations described in ref B.

2. Complexities of LCPANGS situation and best course to follow in observing PBSUCCESS needs will be discussed Tuesday. Request at that time LINC appreciation of possibility [name not declassified] may be using PBSUCCESS also as cloak for move against LCPANGS. If we conclude that such possibility exists we shall have to decide what position to take vis-a-vis [name not declassified].

[place not declassified], undated.

1. During the next few weeks, beginning not later than the second week of May, we ought to aim with increasing intensity and urgency at provoking first distrust and finally, open disaffection against the pres-ent regime among the armed forces of the Target Country. We ought to use all available outlets for this purpose, in particular (a) Radio, (b) La Voz, (c) rumors which ought to be initiated through radio and press, but also passed on by direct word of mouth. We suggest that you tell this plan, as explained in more detail below, to Manuel in installment form--that is, tell him every week only what you expect him to do in the following week or so. This would be not only good security, but it would also make it easier for us (and for you) to change details in the later phases of the plan, if the need for such changes should arise. However, we leave it to you to decide how much you may tell Manuel at any given time and to elaborate on our ideas as you will find suitable.

2. As a first step, the general themes of propaganda against the Arbenz regime should be sharply focused upon the military audience (details to be worked out with the advice of Manuel and of the military men writing for La Voz, etc.), based on the fundamental argument that the honor and the personal as well as the professional future of a soldier or officer depends upon the deeds (and misdeeds) of the regime under which he serves. Such general themes will include, for instance:

Guatemala is being turned into the beachhead of international communism in the Western Hemisphere (Radio Moscow applauds every speech by Toriello, every step taken by Arbenz);

Taxpayers funds are being spent for communist propaganda (see press items on propaganda exhibit about Caracas conference in Guatemala City) and for extensive travels of communist leaders to Moscow and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain, while the government is less and less able to pay even its own employees, let alone to fulfill its other obligations;

Freedom is being suppressed, censorship tightened, independent newspapers and radio stations terrorized;

And so forth.

3. As a next step, members of the armed forces ought to be made increasingly aware that they are about to be misused for aggressive communist purposes. One way of starting this might be to assert that Arbenz and Diaz have consented to have the Caribbean Legion supplemented not only by arms and equipment from the regular Guatemalan Army but by regular army personnel as well. One of Manuel's sources inside the army (or inside some suitable government office) may have come across evidence--a secret document, or the record of conversation between Arbenz and a likely communist leader, presumably Fortuny. According to that document (it might also be presented as an interview), Moscow is very dissatisfied with the failure of the attempt against Somoza, feels that the Caribbean Legion will never fulfill its purpose unless it is bolstered by regular, trained military personnel and demands therefore that selected groups of officers and EM of the regular Army be assigned to Legion "commando"-type enterprises, naturally not openly, but under appropriate cover. (This theme lends itself primarily to dissemination by rumors.)

4. The next step might be a direct, formal warning to all military personnel against penetration of the Army by the Communist Party and against political snooping by these cells. Based on the fact that all Communist Parties anywhere, since the very foundation of the Communist International, have been under the strictest orders to penetrate the armed forces of their respective countries, it is only natural that the Guatemalan CP follows the same pattern. You might mention in this connection that Communist Parties have been known to use the charms of the female members of their youth groups to make contacts with military personnel (if you and Manuel assume that such a charge against the AJDG will be believed, you might put this very specifically, quoting actual incidents). He might also broadcast or print an interview with a CP defector who discloses party activities in forming cells inside the armed forces.

5. This campaign should reach its climax around 1 June with the disclosure that Arbenz has concluded a secret pact with the CP (perhaps directly with an emissary from Moscow or at least in his presence) about the bolshevization of the armed forces, providing for the appointment of political commissars in all units and for the arrival of a Red Army (possibly: Czechoslovak Army) training and the indoctrination mission--perhaps to be disguised as a trade or "cultural exchange" mission, but conceivably also quite openly. This development would correspond to the changes which the armed forces underwent in all countries in which the communists have seized power. You might add that the pact also provides for an extension of military conscription and that those conscripts for whom there will be no arms immediately available (especially since the Caribbean Legion and other aggressive, revolutionary enterprises will have priority--see para 3 above) will be organized into labor battalions for the construction of military airfields, border fortifications and other work resulting from a communist foreign policy for Guatemala. This announcement should be made in a spectacular manner, based on either an intercepted official document, the letter of a high CP official or the statement of a defector from either the CP, the armed forces High Command or from Arbenz' own office (whatever your local experts may consider more effective and more likely to be believed). It should be publicized in a special broadcast, interrupting all regular programs and to be repeated several times, as well as in a special edition of La Voz--possibly with an additional number of reprints of that special item, provided distribution inside the armed forces can be assured.

6. You are aware that this is a highly sensitive proposition: its black character must under no circumstances become known beyond Manuel and, if technically unavoidable, one or two of his closest and most trustworthy associates. All other personnel involved in producing and distributing the items required for the campaign outlined above must be made to believe in the general character of these disclosures, in order to avoid any possible leaks or "backfiring".

7. Please advise us soonest what you think about the chances of implementing the above program, how Manuel reacts to it and keep us currently informed about the progress made along these lines. If you feel it essential, call on us for any additional background information (experience with communist impact upon the armed forces in other countries, etc.) which we might be able to give you within the limited time left--but we are not sure whether many details of that sort will be really needed.

Washington, May 5, 1954, 2003Z.

49462. 1. Background: During past month Guat Govt overtly and covertly eliminated all vestige free radio. Radio Voz de la Capital ceased broadcasting after personnel attacked by masked persons. 5 April, Oscar Conde, opposition radio commentator, was arrested on return from Caracas. April reports from inside Guat indicated all anti-Commie programs were clandestinely jammed by Guat police. Roberto Vizcaino, owner of Radio Continental, which also broadcast anti-Commie news, was forced out of Guat and station turned over to Commies for use. (Disposition to "Tribuna Popular" Commies rumored.) On 21 April, Radio Internacional was invaded by five masked, armed men and all staff was tied, one brutally beaten and all equipment destroyed. Station had been broadcasting "anti-Commie hour" sponsored by "student anti-Commie assn." Last week, Radio Telefunken canceled news program on grounds program contained "political thoughts". On 1 May, Guat Govt openly informed all Guat stations that Article 37 of Congressional Decree 372 requires all privately owned radio stations to record and submit all broadcasts re national or international politics to Guat Min of Communications within 24 hours prior to broadcast. Recordings be reviewed by Guat Minister Charnaud MacDonald and be returned in "due course".

2. Brief of May 5 special to New York Times by Paul Kennedy follows:

Guat Government has officially acknowledged existence clandestine radio station broadcasting anti Communist material. Matter was brought to attention of government by Commie controlled Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala which claimed it had learned station located in San Marcos Department of Guatemala near Mexican border. Police, however, subsequently stated belief it behind Honduran border, according government statement station called "voice of liberation". This given in context of reference to many Guat Govt acts suppressing freedom of speech, e.g., actions censoring and suppressing radios and newspapers.

3. Request implement and sustain above story. Emphasize station came up soon after repression free speech by government and speculate it may be manned by Guat radio personnel who joined forces opposing government when they received advance warning of government repression.

4. Play following variations. Original information re location station within Guat altered by police for following reasons. (1) They cannot stand admit strength of opposition within country. (2) Government desires mount provocation against Honduras to cloak possible overt acts against Honduras.

5. Suggest LINC require regular reports from PBSUCCESS stations in order enable WH stations sustain story. Since story will probably be self generating to some extent, WH stations authorized interpret along lines: (1) Station within Guat. (2) Represents first indication strength of groups opposing Communist controlled government. (3) Government reported planning confiscate private radio receivers; people buying up spare receivers to have one in hiding.

6. Request weekly cable summaries info LINC describing coverage, interpretations, and local reactions.

On May 6, 1954, President Somoza called a press conference to announce that a large arms cache had been discovered on Nicaragua's Pacific Coast after an unidentified submarine had been seen. According to Piero Gleijeses in Shattered Hope:

"For anyone who couldn't divine the source of the weapons and the nationality of the submarine, a clue was obligingly provided: the arms Ôwere stamped with a hammer and sickle.' The weapons had, in fact, been planted by the CIA, with Somoza's enthusiastic complicity. The ploy, however, was too crude to have much value as propaganda and received only limited attention at the time." (page 294)

[place not declassified], May 7, 1954, 0228Z.

984. 1. WASHTUB at this moment appears to be complete success. [name not declassified] called press conference of entire press and diplomatic corps. All were completely sold including PBPRIME Ambassador, First Secretary and military attaché. Latter identified country of origin of weapons, as he has spent some time in Far East. French Minister who has served in Greece pointed out how cache completely fits pattern used in Greece, explaining that men for whom arms intended could arrive at cache either by land or sea and if apprehended have no arms, but once fully loaded weapons are dug up, men are ready to go into action immediately. British Ambassador [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] read markings on rifles and dates of manufacture; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] he is sending cable to his govt advising of gravity of situation. WSHOOFS Ambassador wanted to telephoto markings to PBPRIME for destroyer and search planes to locate submarine. New reports of sub sightings coming in from coastal residents who believe their own stories.

2. [name not declassified] again asked Magoffin for negative requested in [telegram indicator not declassified] 950./2/ Believe it absolutely imperative he be furnished this. He can stall for a period of time by saying he has turned it over to PBPRIME for amplification in hope of identifying sub, but sooner or later may have to produce it if credibility of story to be maintained.

[place not declassified], May 11, 1954, 1052Z.

991. 1. WASHTUB on breaking was accepted completely by press, public, and diplomatic corps. However at present time approximately 70 per cent of public with whom discovery discussed discounting story and believe [name not declassified] made plant himself to gain sympathy of PBPRIME and expedite implementation of Mutual Assistance pact. Believe discovery of new cache in another country followed by second discovery in KMFLUSH would be of greatest value in consolidating credibility of WASHTUB.

2. Jules Dubois of Chicago Tribune cabled [name not declassified] requesting negative of submarine photo. [name not declassified] stalled by advising he has turned negative over to ODACID for study. Am briefing ODACID chief so he will not deny. Urgent that developed negative 620 size be furnished soonest.

[place not declassified], May 11, 1954.

2622. Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 991./2/ WASHTUB.

1. LINC has made every effort to produce foolproof negative. It is LINC's opinion however that no negative made here at this stage would survive careful scrutiny of trained investigator. No one can prove print not actually made with camera LINC provided but very easy disprove negative due to individual camera characteristics. Believe further that if such negative given newsman whole story might blow up with serious results. Following is suggested: As [name not declassified] has informed newsmen negative now in ODACID hands for study lay on private transmission by Ambassador of negative to Washington where negative will become classified and no longer available. [name not declassified] should indicate willingness to have experts in ODACID investigate it further, and release it to them permanently.

2. Although we concur in some need for other confirmation of WASHTUB we do not believe same story should be repeated even different country. However for your info only LINC as sequel to WASHTUB plans soon to expose cache similar arms in WSBURNT city then publicize to effect arms were identical to those found by [name not declassified] and belonged to BGGYPSIES. Meanwhile hope [name not declassified] will stand firm as above.

[place not declassified], May 14, 1954, 0913Z.

997. Re: LINC 2622./2/ [name not declassified] advised Dubois that negative turned over to ODACID. ODACID chief confirmed to Dubois that negative has been forwarded to PBPRIME. Dubois satisfied and asked no further questions. To offset considerable opinion that there was no submarine and story was a plant by [name not declassified] Magoffin leaking to known gossips fact that he has seen negative and that it appears to be genuine. Whispering campaign underway only 3 days but having moderate success.

Washington, May 14, 1954.

SUBJECT
Calligeris

1. The following comments and opinions regarding Calligeris are being submitted for the record to assist in any possible future evaluation of his personality. The basis for these remarks is the following: a ten day personal association in January 1954, a six day personal association in April 1954, a review of Subject's correspondence with [name not declassified] during the period January-May 1954, and a résumé of [name not declassified]'s remarks during the above noted period.

2. Calligeris, initially an unknown, undistinguished Lt. Col. in the Guatemalan army, became involved in the Junta when [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the military leader of the anti-communist Guatemalan forces in exile.

3. Prior to this time Calligeris' most overt act against the regime had been an abortive revolutionary movement which was triggered by the assassination of Col. Arana, a close friend of Calligeris. Calligeris' coup against the government became known before any action could be taken and resulted in his imprisonment. His subsequent "heroic" escape from prison was arranged entirely [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Safehouse personnel have testified that outside forces even knew the exact hour when Calligeris would be sprung and were waiting for him in a car outside of the prison area.

4. It was not long after this that [name not declassified], in search of an army leader who was willing to join an anti-government movement, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Calligeris as the battle leader of the anti-communist forces with headquarters in Honduras. That this group, with Calligeris as its military leader, left much to be desired, is clearly evidenced by three separate, costly abortive attempts by the Calligeris forces to succeed in a coup against the Guatemalan Government: all of these attempts failed at the 11th hour because the promised military elements inside the country did not fulfill their reported promises to support Calligeris.

5. [2 lines of source text not declassified] determined to assure all possible controls and support be given to Calligeris since he was no longer certain that Calligeris possessed sufficient background to command such a technical, military-political operation. For these reasons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Calligeris follow the orders of the Group's advisers, whether they be military, intelligence, or propaganda.

a. This brings to light a Calligeris personality trait which is now clearly recognizable. He is a firmly stubborn man who in the face of indisputable evidence is prone to maintain his own point of view. The manner in which he defends his own decisions is interesting. Personal experience has shown that Calligeris will yield readily on general points and appear to be most willing to conciliate, promising that changes as suggested will be carried out. However, his execution of the details of any agreement will be as he sees fit. This completely modifies his original agreement with general plans. His geographical position plus the lack of a group contact with him who can effectively assure his completion of activities, has given him reason to believe that he can modify to suit his own desires any orders or instructions from [name not declassified] or the Group. It should be pointed out that Calligeris has not developed this line of thinking with an altogether malicious intent. Delays, lack of decisions, reversal of decisions by the Group have tended to increase his necessity to take the initiative when he, from his Honduran outpost, saw the necessity for some course of action.

b. The undersigned now realizes that Calligeris, when shorn of intelligence and propaganda responsibilities in January 1954,/2/ keenly resented this decision to which he agreed without any undue enthusiasm. His subsequent actions soon abrogated the agreement in such a direct manner that his excuses of a lack of adequate communication [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] only made the case more obvious. In the end the Group yielded to Calligeris' wishes, thus giving him a clear idea that if he persisted his ideas would be accepted.

c. This same trait of stubbornness has carried over into his defense of his subordinates: in many cases he has selected well [1 line of source text not declassified] but in other outstanding cases his closest advisers have proved to be outright traitors or at best dubious recipients of the high confidence he has placed in them. In the two known cases of Delgado and Secaira, Calligeris--under the increasing pressure of the Group or subordinates in his group to examine more closely their loyalty--has become proportionately more loyal in defending the suspects, or at least he was in no way willing to sever his connections with them. An explanation for this perverse loyalty is the fact that both men in the past made many open and also fervent pledges of loyalty to Calligeris. These demonstrations apparently have a great deal of influence with Calligeris and have clouded his logic. The important lesson to be gained from these examples by the Group is that if in the future Calligeris is elevated to high responsibilities, selfish and cunning men will soon grasp this key of obtaining and maintaining favor with Calligeris. By their constant demonstration of loyalty, they can maintain positions with little or no real talent. It will behoove the Group to aid in every manner in order to see that Calligeris is surrounded by sincere men.

6. The undersigned believes that Calligeris has the mentality and sufficient personal ambition to aspire to the job of being the new Guatemalan strong man. He has previously insisted that the temporary government last two years, preferring the three years period. Steps to simmer down such desires should be initiated at once. He should be confronted as soon as possible, with the outline of the temporary government which will indicate his limited authority. [name not declassified] is in the process of preparing this. [name not declassified] is fully aware that strong personalities will be needed to surround Calligeris and simultaneously [name not declassified] is in the midst of recruiting capable individuals. The Group should maintain at Calligeris' Headquarters a Senior Representative who in effect would be the "stern" man who is primarily concerned with the political and diplomatic activities of the Calligeris Headquarters./3/ Remembering that Calligeris operates on the principle of extending where there is no barrier, the submission of the temporary government organization, with solid backing from Group to support such a government and nothing else, should be hammered home by a capable representative of the Group who would be stationed at his Headquarters. This action constitutes one effective step which can be taken now, before D-Day. Also, the immediate inclusion of other Guatemalan military men of stature as may result from the K-Program in the Junta Headquarters will tend to reduce Calligeris' stature.

a. The above suggestions are no guarantee that Calligeris will remain bounded by any agreement reached before D-Day but it will considerably increase the moral force which can be brought to bear upon him after he is installed.

7. Calligeris, in the undersigned's opinion, could not last too long in the rough and tumble of Guatemalan politics without the support of the men [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. From the visible support which he has received to date, he counts on not too many military men. He could expect no support from the elements of the present regime. Any alienation of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would estrange him immediately with individuals more conservative than the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Calligeris would therefore be dependent on a very small base of people who have resided with him in exile. It is not logical that such a small element of people, few of whom have had political experience, could long survive the ordeal of righting the "mess" made by the communists. A representative from Group, properly installed, could easily in the course of a few weeks, make the above points painfully clear to Calligeris.

[name not declassified]

Washington, May 14, 1954.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 80, Folder 5. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

Guatemala City, May 16, 1954, 0925Z.

567. 1. [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified], obtained following info from one [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] employee and confidant: ship named Alfhem not listed in Lloyds Registry and flag and port of origin unknown, arrived Puerto Barrios 1500 hours 15 May. Was met by Minister Defense Sanchez who managed get ship docked and unloaded by 18 hours./2/ Shipment consigned to WSBURNT government and allegedly is 2,000 tons armament types unknown.

2. Investigation continues. Shall advise./3/ Possibility provocative effort.

3. Request priority any information you may have.

4. Alerting Semantic but doubt we or he could do anything even if armament shipment.

5. If arms, could [place not declassified] send sab team in time?/4/ Shall try delay through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] shipment to capital if story proves true.

6. Evaluated F-3.

Washington, May 16, 1954.

SUBJECT
Acts of Force Before D-Day

1. In view of repeated observations by Guatemalans to the effect that the anti-Communist forces must prove their strength by deeds as well as words, as well as the need for accelerating the psychological pressure on Guatemalans, certain limited, specific acts of violence prior to D-Day are hereby proposed.

2. The acts are as follows:

a. D-12. Raid on Arbenz' Finca, "El Cajon." This raid should be a combination of arson and demolitions work, but should not attack personnel. It should be conducted in the absence of Arbenz from the finca. The purpose of this raid would be to focus public attention on the fact that Arbenz is the enemy of the anti-Communists and that more dire things are in store for him later.

b. D-10. Disposal of [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This would be the first anti-personnel action. Its purpose, beyond that of helping to paralyze [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], is to show the public that the anti-Communists resent the Soviet-style [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] system and consider [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a prime symbol of oppression.

c. D-8. Disposal of [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified], for the same reasons as the disposal of [name not declassified]. The disposal of [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] would make the anti-Communist protest against the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] character of the Arbenz regime perfectly clear.

d. D-6. Disposal of [name and 1 line of source text not declassified]. This action documents the anti-Communist character of the revolution and leaves [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] leaderless.

e. D-4. Disposal of [name not declassified]. With this, opposition to both the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] character and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] regime will have been effectively displayed.

f. D-1 or D-Day before H-hour. Disposal of [name not declassified]. It is apparent, from Page's debriefing of [name not declassified]/2/ and many other indications, that the fate of [name not declassified] may well be the key to the entire D-Day situation. With [name not declassified] still on the scene, he would undoubtedly be able to command certain support which would render the task of friendly forces more difficult. If the issue were in doubt, his personal ability and prestige could tip the scales unfavorably. An attempt should therefore be made to have victory grow out of the disposal of [name not declassified], rather than reckoning with [name not declassified] after victory. This action must be carried out as close to D-Day as possible; otherwise members [less that 1 line of source text not declassified] or non PBSUCCESS forces might fill the vacuum before Calligeris could./3/

3. In any program of this sort, the possibilities of reprisals and their damaging effect on the D-Day objective must be considered. The above actions would undoubtedly invite some reprisals and lead to an attempt on the part of the government to tighten security. However, such government actions in the period D-14 to D-Day must be expected anyway. On the other hand, successful accomplishment of the above actions should cause panic among the government sympathizers and possibly negate their increased vigilance. At the same time, friendly forces should be greatly heartened and mobilized. The program as described above would give enough time for both enemy disintegration and friendly mobilization prior to D-Day. On balance, it is believed that these shows of friendly strength and these efforts to "soften up" the enemy would be beneficial and would decrease the risk of putting all PBSUCCESS eggs in the D-Day basket. It may also be that the government reaction to one or the other proposed acts of violence would provide significant guidance to existing friendly D-Day plans.

4. It should be emphasized that the success of only one or two of the proposed actions would be insufficient and would give a "flash-in-the-pan" impression to the public. Execution of the whole program, with proper KUGOWN exploitation, would be not only physically impressive but psychologically most explicit and significant.

5. If the foregoing program is approved, C/FI should be immediately requested to obtain, under the direction of C/PM, the requisite information relative to the personal habits, movements, etc., of the target personalities and appropriate data on Arbenz's finca. Chief of Station, Guatemala, has indicated his ability to procure such information on short notice. The first three proposed actions have been suggested by him, either orally or by dispatch./4/

Washington, May 16, 1954, 2135Z.

839. Pass to SKILLET from ODACID and Whiting.

1. We have received report from JMBLUG to following effect. [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified], was told by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that ship Alfhem arrived Puerto Barrios 1500 hours 15 May carrying shipment consigned Guatemalan Government and allegedly consisting of 2000 tons armament, types unknown. Further reported that vessel met by Sanchez, Minister of Defense, and unloaded by 1800 hours.

2. Information available here indicates Alfhem is Swedish flag vessel of 4850 gross tons owned by Angbats A.B. Bohrslavska Kusten. Lloyds loading list of 11 May gives last sighting off Brest, France, reportedly enroute from Stettin, Poland, to Dakar.

3. You requested to do following: utilizing the services of the naval attaché, KUBARK personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Embassy personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and your own best judgment, get for us the fullest evidence regarding this shipment which if necessary can be used to prove Guatemalan efforts to import clandestinely arms from behind Iron Curtain. Such evidence would include the originals or photostats of the ship's documents showing origin of shipment, consignor, consignee, description, tonnage, also photographs of ship plus recognizable pictures its captain and crew. Also aerial and ground photos of unloading operation and of the units of cargo. Make every effort to obtain specimens of the cargo by purchase, theft, loss overboard and subsequent clandestine recovery.

4. Exercise your resourceful judgment as to any additional item of evidence obtainable. Report urgently your plans and steps taken to accomplish them. First item of info required is positive identification and location of vessel which should be possible by aerial recce and preferably photos.

5. This action given SKILLET because he believed have more facilities and greater freedom of action than JMBLUG, who also being requested provide such info as he can obtain through his own resources. You are authorized coordinate your actions with JMBLUG to extent you deem desirable.

6. Note for Princep: this is top priority matter and you requested provide fullest support to SKILLET.

Guatemala City, May 18, 1954, 0159Z.

574. Ref: GUAT 573./2/

1. Seamen aboard Alfhem told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Puerto Barrios that another ship due here within two days and a third due as soon as the second ship leaves. Names date these ships not known.

2. High ranking military officers including Min Def Sanchez, Alfonso Martinez, Colonel Barzanallana, were in Puerto Barrios awaiting arrival ship and still there. Sanchez others at Hotel del Norte, Puerto Barrios accompanied by aides and at least five body guards.

3. Crates unloaded/3/ on seven flat cars and now enroute capital have following shape and size; 9 feet high, base 3 feet by 3 feet, top round with diameter approximately 18 inches, one side crate perpendicular and other side sloping like pyramid. Weight 785 lbs each. Triangular marking on side of crates. Could be mortars.

4. Three box cars unknown contents also enroute capital. Should arrive around mid-night. Due abundance empties Puerto Barrios impossible deny military their use. Apparently military intends forward to capital as unloaded which direct from ship to train cars.

5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Puerto Barrios estimates that government will need minimum seven days to unload ship at present speed although Minister Sanchez trying hurry.

6. No signs ammo unloaded as yet but probable such aboard although crew members did not take any precautions usually associated with ammo shipments. TRCA officials will attempt prevent ammo shipments coming capital attached to regular trains. Have promised advise upon learning about ammo.

7. Due congestion port as result strike New York, trains leaving every three or four hours. To these trains government apparently intends hitch cars containing Alfhem material. Impossible obtain ETD since trains departing as loaded. Impossible obtain that material be forwarded in one train. Under normal conditions Alfhem cargo would take minimum of five double header trains and government has made no request for such.

8. Meanwhile public kept away from pier and no visitors allowed aboard.

9. Since relatively small amount total cargo unloaded strongly suggest action taken soonest against ship. Request attention be given other ships mentioned para 1, which evaluated F-3, rest 2.

[place not declassified], May 18, 1954, 0102Z.

2798. Re: A. Dir 00858; B. Linc 2766; C. Linc 2767; D. Linc 2774./2/

1. Proceeding as indicated in previous msgs this subject. Simple rail cuts not contemplated but as stated blowing tracks while train passing at bridges previously selected for later targets. Also second charge before bridge with third charge further back to completely block and or destroy train. Same method will be employed by second team further up track in event first should fail.

2. Map will show all relevant sab targets selected in areas where highways either do not exist or are extremely poor.

3. Can assure you that will make use of all KUHOOK experience available in Lincoln and field.

4. Appreciate HQs actions re delaying tactics and keeping LINC well informed.

HUL-A-827

[place not declassified], May 19, 1954.

SUBJECT
General--KUGOWN/WASHTUB
Specific--Publicity in Guatemalan Press

1. We understand that the story of the unidentified submarine which landed in Nicaragua, caching arms of Communist origin at the shore, did not receive much, if any, publicity in the Guatemalan press. This story however should not only interest Guatemalan newspapers because it concerns a rather ominous event in a neighboring country, but most specifically since certain communications implicate Guatemala directly. The most specific of these clues were the cigarettes of Guatemalan origin found together with the weapons: this has received ample publicity in Nicaragua as shown by the attached masthead of Novedades, Managua, 7 May, which carries a headline referring to those cigarettes, even above the masthead, across the entire page.

2. We suggest therefore that you make a cautious effort to obtain added publicity for this story in the Guatemalan press and public opinion. We would consider it particularly apt if you could induce one of the oppositional members of the Guatemalan congress to address a letter to the President, expressing concern about these clues, pointing at Guatemalan complicity in this arms smuggling affair and demanding a full, public investigation. He might add (if you consider that feasible) that he is greatly concerned by the fact that the Guatemalan Army has been receiving recently its arms and equipment in more or less clandestine and illegal ways which are unworthy of the honor and proud traditions of the Army. He might demand that the President make a full report to congress on this matter, especially since a peaceful foreign policy of the country makes it obviously easy to speak frankly about the very modest state of national armament.

3. If you should find it impossible to utilize a member of congress for the above purpose, we suggest that you try using any of your available press contacts. It might perhaps be possible to arrange for an interview of any suitable traveler who happened to have been in Managua on the day of President's Somoza's press conference on the subject and to tie the questions relative to the Guatemalan cigarettes to that interview. Or, if any of the newspapers with whom you are in contact, has a correspondent in Managua, they might ask him (preferably by telephone) to send a special report on the finding of those cigarettes and any other clues which might point, directly or indirectly, to Guatemala.

4. Please advise as soon as you have been able to take actions along either of the above lines.

Jerome C. Dunbar/2/

Guatemala City, May 20, 1954, 1309Z.

605. Re: DIR 01050./2/

1. Available sources tending indicate many WSBURNT army officers, though as soldiers glad receive arms, have grave misgivings about recent shipment. Among reasons for misgivings are:

A. Has dramatically demonstrated closeness of govt to Soviet.

B. Fear that present mission will be replaced by hordes of Soviet or satellite instructors who might do anything including displacing even the WSBURNT officers.

C. That shipment is shocking evidence that Soviet and Commies intend completely take over WSBURNT.

D. That ODYOKE cannot tolerate situation and will be forced take drastic action with terrible consequences to WSBURNT.

2. We will try exploit uneasiness by rumor, black propaganda, etc.

3. Indications are many officers would turn against govt if strong dramatic anti govt action starts.

4. [name not declassified] told ESQUIRE night 18 May that SMILAX now approachable. B-2. Sources para 1 and 3 ESPERANCE, ESPERANCE-1, ESPERANCE-3. Eval: B-3.

[place not declassified], May 20, 1954.

2890. Ref: GUAT 602./2/

1. Inadvisable disclose our relationship with ESQUIRE to Calligeris, especially in view [name not declassified]-Calligeris hostility. Basic compartmentation between Calligeris and K-Program must be kept.

2. Assure ESQUIRE we will keep him out of Calligeris black book at proper time.

3. LINC not contacting Calligeris on this matter. Will inform you if Calligeris volunteers anything.

4. ESQUIRE not to disclose any operational details to [name not declassified].

5. Keep ESQUIRE in WSBURNT as long as operationally necessary and feasible.

Guatemala City, May 21, 1954, 1003Z.

621. Following for Whiting from JMBLUG:

1. Am sure you aware of type of equipment landed in WSBURNT. We also have reports at least 1 more ship with ammo is approaching these shores. It seems to me that time has come for drastic action. The psychological situation is such here that it hard put into words. Everyone is expecting something to be done. At same time everyone believes, whether rightly or wrongly, that OAS will not be our solution. I have no objection to this step which might be taken simultaneously but I should like to renew with all the power I have the suggestion and the urgent plea that sabotage teams be immediately dispatched with orders to create hell.

2. Should this ammo ship arrive and its cargo be dispatched nothing short of direct military intervention will succeed.

3. I want you to know above is written not in panic but with cool deadly determination that freedom shall not perish in this country.

Washington, May 21, 1954, 2128Z.

01705. SGUAT (for JMBLUG from Whiting).

Please read following message to ODUNIT senior member of Mil/Mis in WSBURNT:

"This is to emphasize and reaffirm the verbal instruction given to you personally that it is in the national interest to furnish the Ambassador with whatever information you may have or can procure, which reveals the attitude of the military toward to regime.

During your normal and personal contacts with members of the WSBURNT armed forces it is desired that you stimulate conversation toward obtaining an expression of attitude without engaging in clandestine or other irregular contacts or practices.

This message has the concurrence of ODACID, ODEARL (ODUNIT) and KUBARK. ODIBEX transmitting substance direct to their member."/2/

Washington, May 21, 1954, 1708Z.

01610. Re: LINC 2949./2/

1. Whereas HQs agrees need for evidence active opposition we are unable approve use this plane from this base with this crew for this purpose.

2. The impact of leaflets does not appear to warrant the serious risks and possibilities of total ODYOKE compromise. If leaflets are the answer and we regard them as of marginal value under present circumstances why not let the Calligeris controlled internal propaganda organizations distribute or disburse them. A much more solid showing of internal resistance would be some success sabotage effort which we trust you are souping up.

3. Use of Calligeris internal propaganda organization this purpose at this time would provide useful test strength and capability that organization.

4. Possibly [name not declassified] or Calligeris other friend further south would be willing send over a plane at night for purpose of leaflet drop./3/ Why not try this.

[place not declassified], May 21, 1954, 2128Z.

2957. 1. To show friendly strength, LINC considering action on idens./2/

2. Advise if you consider hitting these targets currently feasible, psychologically beneficial. Effect should not be so great as to touch off full revolt. Request your list of alternate or added pre-D-day targets, with eye to KUGOWN rather than KUHOOK utility.

3. Submit operational data and suggestions you and LINC targets, i.e., locations, vulnerabilities, routes of movement, guards, etc.

Guatemala City, May 22, 1954, 5 p.m.

759. Up to this morning, 69 carloads of material unloaded from Alfhem had arrived in Guatemala City and unloading and shipments were continuing regularly. Ship may finish unloading Monday.

Charnaud MacDonald, Minister of Interior, revealed last night that attempt to blow up train morning of May 19 had cost lives of one Guatemalan soldier and one saboteur. Three other soldiers were wounded in battle described as lasting half hour between soldiers armed with rifles and saboteurs armed with submachine guns. Latter then retired toward Honduras frontier and escaped.

Press this morning carried photographs nitroglycerine cartridges which failed to explode and were used to connect charge with detonator. Minister reportedly emphasized this type explosives not used by any branch of Guatemalan Government and "possibly not in any Central American country".

Peurifoy

Washington, May 24, 1954.

SUBJECT
Consolidation of New Guatemalan Regime

1. The task of consolidating the new Guatemalan regime falls into two parts:

a. Duties devolving on the Guatemalans. This is currently being discussed with [name not declassified] and will be covered in a later memorandum.

b. Duties devolving upon ODYOKE. These form the subject of the present memorandum.

2. The duties devolving upon ODYOKE are:

a. Diplomatic recognition of the new government. ODACID must clearly take the lead in recognizing the new government, not only because other Hemisphere nations expect it, but also because such early recognition will capitalize most effectively on the overt moves that ODYOKE has made against the Guatemalan Communists. Early recognition by ODACID could do much to re-affirm ODYOKE leadership in the Hemisphere. (The cover and deception requirements of covert action should be satisfied by other means and should not be allowed to hamper early overt recognition.) Action: ODACID.

b. Economic and technical assistance. There should not be extension of American economic aid and technical assistance to Guatemala alone; this could be interpreted by other Central American and Hemisphere countries as "rewarding" a recently Communist and aggressive nation, without corresponding help to nations that never were Communist. There should be an overall economic aid and technical assistance program for all Central America, as recommended in LINC 2885./2/ Action: ODACID and FOA.

c. Coordination of UFCO Action. Immediate conversations should be initiated with the UFCO, with a view toward coordinating ODACID and UFCO action in the consolidation period. Specifically, UFCO should be advised that ODACID will not support UFCO requests with diplomatic notes during the early months of the new government; while it was necessary and proper for ODACID to support UFCO against a Communist government, it will be improper for ODACID to make the same demands of an anti-Communist government. Likewise, UFCO should be asked not to mortgage the political viability of the new regime by pressing its claims too soon. Rather, as JMBLUG has recommended, UFCO should await the call of the new government to a joint parley in view of the influence that pro-UFCO elements and individuals will have in the new government ([name not declassified], SUPERIOR, etc.) the UFCO should be able to await and join in such a parley with equanimity. It may be advisable for the parley to agree to turn over the Guatemalan-UFCO dispute to an impartial commission, chosen by the parties to the dispute. It may also be advisable for the new government to levy promptly the increased taxes that the UFCO has declared itself willing to pay; then the issue of compensation for expropriated land can be masked by the tax "victory" of the new government; compensation might actually be made in the form of taxes lower than they would be otherwise. Action: ODACID.

d. Labor leadership. The AFL, either acting through the ORIT or independently, should be urged to send immediately a highly qualified team of labor instructors to assist anti-Communist Guatemalan labor leaders in the purging and re-organization of both urban and rural unions. These instructors should be men willing and able to cooperate with the Catholic Church in Guatemala. Action: ODACID-KUBARK.

e. Special Security Commission. A special team of qualified personnel should be dispatched to Guatemala, on request from the new government, to assist the new government in the detection and elimination of all Communists and pro-Communists from positions of influence in Guatemala. This mission should have its costs shared between the two governments. Action: ODACID to secure the request from the new Guatemalan government, KUBARK to prepare and dispatch the team.

[name not declassified]