Hoping to tamp down a swirl of speculation over its role in the bailout of American International Group, Goldman Sachs reiterated Friday that its direct losses would have been minimal if the vast insurance conglomerate had failed.
Goldman also described how, as early as July 2007, it began to have “collateral disputes” with A.I.G., as the two firms disagreed on the value of the mortgage-backed securities that were the basis of multibillion-dollar contracts between them.
David Viniar, Goldman’s financial officer, walked reporters through a thicket of numbers in a conference call Friday, which Goldman held to “clarify certain misperceptions” about its positions with A.I.G.
While he acknowledged that its relationship with A.I.G. raised a “complex set of issues,” Mr. Viniar was adamant that, because of the collateral it held and hedging trades with third parties, Goldman would not have taken a direct hit if A.I.G. had been allowed to collapse.
Since September, the government has set aside more than $180 billion to support American International Group, according to a report from the Government Accountability Office.
A significant part of those funds has flowed through A.I.G. to various trading counterparties, many of them major financial institutions, which A.I.G. at first refused to identify.
Under intense pressure from lawmakers, A.I.G. recently released a list of counterparties, and Goldman was among the largest. For some, this raised questions about the government’s motivations for not letting the insurance company go into bankruptcy protection.
Henry Paulson, the Treasury secretary at the time of the initial A.I.G. bailout, had previously been Goldman’s chief executive.
All along, Goldman has said that its exposure to A.I.G.’s troubles was “immaterial,” because of outside hedges that would have protected it.
On Friday’s conference call, Mr. Viniar described how Goldman entered into a large number of trading positions with A.I.G. in 2006 — a time when, he said, A.I.G. had a high credit rating and “appeared to be a sophisticated trading counterparty.”
But in 2007, Goldman began to mark down the the value of the super-senior collateralized debt obligations that were underlying the credit default swap agreements with A.I.G. He said Goldman and A.I.G. could not agree on how much additional collateral A.I.G. had to supply to reflect the risk.
During the negotiations, A.I.G. asked Goldman to accept less than full value for some of the contracts, but Goldman refused, Mr. Viniar said.
By the time of the A.I.G. bailout in mid-September, he said that Goldman held $7.5 billion in collateral from A.I.G., and had hedged the remaining $2.5 billion of its $10 billion net exposure using credit default swaps with other parties. (Goldman’s overall position with A.I.G., or the “notional” value of the contracts, was about $20 billion, he said.)
After the rescue, Goldman received an additional $2.6 billion in collateral from A.I.G.
In mid-November, Goldman also sold $5.6 billion in securities related to the swaps at par — or full value — to a government-backed vehicle that was created to help unwind A.I.G.’s ill-fated trades.
Asked why Goldman accepted full value for the securities, which were valued on the open market at far less, Mr. Viniar said his firm had entered into a commercial contract with A.I.G. and was “not in a position to take a loss.”
Accepting a loss it wasn’t required to take would have gone against Goldman’s duty to its shareholders — and, Mr. Viniar added, to taxpayers.
“Frankly,” he said, “we also had taxpayer money at Goldman Sachs.” That was a reference to Goldman’s participation in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, in which the government bought preferred shares in many large banks.
Mr. Viniar said he didn’t know how large a role that Goldman’s collateral calls had in A.I.G.’s near-collapse, but he rejected the suggestion that his firm might feel guilty about its demands.
“All we did is call for the collateral that was due to us under the contracts,” he said. “So I don’t think there’s any guilt whatsoever.”
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