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Pluralistic ignorance: Difference between revisions - Wikipedia

Pluralistic ignorance: Difference between revisions

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In [[social psychology]], '''pluralistic ignorance''' (also known as a collective illusion)<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bicchieri |first1=Cristina |last2=Fukui |first2=Yoshitaka |title=The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3857639 |journal=Business Ethics Quarterly |pages=127–155 |doi=10.2307/3857639 |date=1999|volume=9 |issue=1 |jstor=3857639 }}</ref> is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly believe that others predominantly hold an opinion different from their own.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Nickerson |first1=Charlotte |title=Pluralistic Ignorance: Definition & Examples |url=https://www.simplypsychology.org/pluralistic-ignorance.html |work=www.simplypsychology.org |date=May 11, 2022}}</ref> In this phenomenon, most people in a group may go along with a view they do not hold because they think, incorrectly, that most other people in the group hold it. Pluralistic ignorance encompasses situations in which a minority position on a given topic is wrongly perceived to be the majority position, or the majority position is wrongly perceived to be a minority position.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Miller|first1=Dale T.|last2=McFarland|first2=Cathy|date=1987|title=Pluralistic ignorance: When similarity is interpreted as dissimilarity.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.2.298|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=53|issue=2|pages=298–305|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.53.2.298|issn=0022-3514}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Katz |first1=Daniel |first2=Floyd Henry |last2=Allport |first3=Margaret Babcock |last3=Jenness |title=Students' attitudes; a report of the Syracuse University reaction study |year=1931 |location=Syracuse, N.Y. |publisher=Craftsman Press}}</ref>
 
Pluralistic ignorance can arise in different ways. An individual may misjudge overall perceptions of a topic due to fear, embarrassment, social desirability, or social inhibition, any of which can lead the individual to incorrectly perceive the proportion of a group that shares beliefs similar to one's own. However, pluralistic ignorance describes the coincidence of a belief with inaccurate perceptions, but not the process by which those inaccurate perceptions are arrived at. Individuals may develop collective illusions when they feel they will receive backlash when they think their belief differs from society's belief.<ref name="Anne">{{cite news |last1=Schwenkenbecher |first1=Anne |title=How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHHWF.pdf |date=16 February 2021}}</ref> However, pluralistic ignorance describes the coincidence of a belief with inaccurate perceptions, but not the process by which those inaccurate perceptions are arrived at.
 
A common example of pluralistic ignorance is the [[bystander effect]],<ref name="kitts2003"/> where individual onlookers may believe others are considering taking action, and may therefore themselves refrain from acting. This results in all the individual onlookers believing that the majority of onlookers are taking action, when in reality few or none of the onlookers take action.<ref name="Anne"/>