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In [[social psychology]], '''pluralistic ignorance''' (also known as a collective illusion)<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bicchieri |first1=Cristina |last2=Fukui |first2=Yoshitaka |title=The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3857639 |journal=Business Ethics Quarterly |pages=127–155 |doi=10.2307/3857639 |date=1999|volume=9 |issue=1 |jstor=3857639 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly believe that others predominantly hold an opinion different from their own.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Nickerson |first1=Charlotte |title=Pluralistic Ignorance: Definition & Examples |url=https://www.simplypsychology.org/pluralistic-ignorance.html |work=www.simplypsychology.org |date=May 11, 2022}}</ref> In this phenomenon, most people in a group may go along with a view they do not hold because they think, incorrectly, that most other people in the group hold it. Pluralistic ignorance encompasses situations in which a minority position on a given topic is wrongly perceived to be the majority position, or the majority position is wrongly perceived to be a minority position.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Miller|first1=Dale T.|last2=McFarland|first2=Cathy|date=1987|title=Pluralistic ignorance: When similarity is interpreted as dissimilarity.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.2.298|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology|volume=53|issue=2|pages=298–305|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.53.2.298|issn=0022-3514}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Katz |first1=Daniel |first2=Floyd Henry |last2=Allport |first3=Margaret Babcock |last3=Jenness |title=Students' attitudes; a report of the Syracuse University reaction study |year=1931 |location=Syracuse, N.Y. |publisher=Craftsman Press}}</ref>
Pluralistic ignorance can arise in different ways. An individual may misjudge overall perceptions of a topic due to fear, embarrassment, social desirability, or social inhibition. Individuals may develop collective illusions when they feel they will receive backlash when they think their belief differs from society's belief.<ref name="Anne">{{cite news |last1=Schwenkenbecher |first1=Anne |title=How We Fail to Know: Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHHWF.pdf |date=16 February 2021}}</ref> From a group-level perspective, and arguably the most accurate way of analyzing pluralistic ignorance, causes of divergence between public behaviors and private opinions are caused by conservative lags (change in attitude without a change in behavior), liberal leaps (change in behavior without a change in attitude), and social identities (conforming to societal expectations of how one should behave based on the traditional ideals of the group).<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |
However, pluralistic ignorance describes the coincidence of a belief with inaccurate perceptions, but not the process by which those inaccurate perceptions are arrived at. Related phenomena, such as the [[spiral of silence]] and [[false consensus effect]], demonstrate that pluralistic ignorance is not unique in its inaccurate assumption of others' opinions and how these misconceptions can lead to negative consequences like [[groupthink]] and the [[bystander effect]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Miller |first=Dale T. |date=2023 |title=A century of pluralistic ignorance: what we have learned about its origins, forms, and consequences |journal=Frontiers in Social Psychology |volume=1 |doi=10.3389/frsps.2023.1260896 |issn=2813-7876 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book |
== History ==
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Although social psychologists, such as Allport and Katz, initiated the development of pluralistic ignorance, work pertaining to this phenomenon has since been heavily conducted by sociologists and public opinion researchers.<ref name=":2" /> This shift, in part, can be attributed to laboratory experiments, the primary research method of social psychology, proving insufficient in studying the inconsistencies between attitudes and norms.<ref name=":2" />
As Allport was the first person to bring awareness to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, it is important to point out that his analysis of this phenomenon was strictly at the individual level.<ref name=":0" /> He strongly disagreed with expanding the discussion to the larger group and involving the concept of shared cognition, "the collective cognitive activity from individual group members where the collective activity has an impact on the overall group goals and activities."<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Citation |
This is not a unanimous stance for all those who have studied pluralistic ignorance. Sargent and Newman acknowledge that the individual aspects of pluralistic ignorance are important to discuss, but are lacking in providing a full picture of all the moving parts at play in the study of pluralistic ignorance.<ref name=":0" /> In their perspective, pluralistic ignorance is defined as “a group-level phenomenon, wherein individuals belonging to a group mistakenly believe that others’ cognitions (attitudes, beliefs, feelings) and/or behaviors differ systematically from their own, regardless of how the misperception arises”.<ref name=":0" />
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Perhaps the most researched consequence of pluralistic ignorance from an individualistic perspective is the [[bystander effect]]. In its most rudimentary form, the bystander effect describes a situation in which “bystanders” may be experiencing an event that makes them feel a strong set of emotions, yet they assume the other bystanders, that are also not acting, do not feel the same way about what they are witnessing.<ref name=":2" /> This ultimately can result in a lack of action across the board when action may be the appropriate choice given the situation.<ref name=":2" />
Maintaining the perspective of the individual, pluralistic ignorance can also cause people to feel alienated from a specific group.<ref>{{Citation |title=Beyond One's Self |date=2012-10-12 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203337998-12 |work=Self-Insight |pages=151–172 |access-date=2023-12-14 |publisher=Psychology Press|doi=10.4324/9780203337998-12 |isbn=9780203337998 }}</ref> When one’s personal attitude is seemingly in contrast to the majority, if not all, of those in the group, it can cause the individual to become “embittered” and “suspicious of those around them”.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |last=Blackford |first=Russell |title=The tyranny of opinion: conformity and the future of liberalism |date=2019 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-350-05600-8 |series=Think now series |location=London New York}}</ref> It may even motivate the individual to speak out against what is the perceived majority view or go completely silent.<ref name=":4" />The most probable result is the conformity of the individual in the way they speak and behave, possibly to the point of changing their personal convictions, in what might be the inaccurately perceived majority opinion.<ref name=":4" />
==Related Phenomena==
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