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{{Short description|Chinese government online influence operation}} |
{{Short description|Chinese government online influence operation}} |
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'''Spamouflage''', '''Dragonbridge''', '''Spamouflage Dragon''', or '''Storm 1376''' is an online [[propaganda]] and [[disinformation]] operation that uses a network of social media accounts to make posts in favor of the [[Chinese government]] and harasses dissidents and journalists overseas.<ref name="CNN2023">{{cite news |last1=O'Sullivan |first1=Donie |last2=Devine |first2=Curt |last3=Gordon |first3=Allison |date=13 November 2023 |title=China is using the world's largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/china-online-disinformation-invs/index.html |access-date=6 May 2024 |work=[[CNN]] |archive-date=14 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231114005321/https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/china-online-disinformation-invs/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Beginning in the early 2020s, Spamouflage accounts also began making posts about American and Taiwanese politics.<ref name="Gilbert2024">{{cite magazine |last1=Gilbert |first1=David |date=April 29, 2024 |title=Why China Is So Bad at Disinformation |url=https://www.wired.com/story/china-bad-at-disinformation/ |access-date=9 May 2024 |magazine=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]] |publisher= |archive-date=9 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509210920/https://www.wired.com/story/china-bad-at-disinformation/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Milmo |first=Dan |date=2024-04-05 |title=China will use AI to disrupt elections in the US, South Korea and India, Microsoft warns |url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/05/china-using-ai-disrupt-elections |access-date=2024-04-07 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |
'''Spamouflage''', '''Dragonbridge''', '''Spamouflage Dragon''', or '''Storm 1376''' is an online [[propaganda]] and [[disinformation]] operation that uses a network of social media accounts to make posts in favor of the [[Chinese government]] and harasses dissidents and journalists overseas.<ref name="CNN2023">{{cite news |last1=O'Sullivan |first1=Donie |last2=Devine |first2=Curt |last3=Gordon |first3=Allison |date=13 November 2023 |title=China is using the world's largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/china-online-disinformation-invs/index.html |access-date=6 May 2024 |work=[[CNN]] |archive-date=14 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231114005321/https://www.cnn.com/2023/11/13/us/china-online-disinformation-invs/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Beginning in the early 2020s, Spamouflage accounts also began making posts about American and Taiwanese politics.<ref name="Gilbert2024">{{cite magazine |last1=Gilbert |first1=David |date=April 29, 2024 |title=Why China Is So Bad at Disinformation |url=https://www.wired.com/story/china-bad-at-disinformation/ |access-date=9 May 2024 |magazine=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]] |publisher= |archive-date=9 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240509210920/https://www.wired.com/story/china-bad-at-disinformation/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Milmo |first=Dan |date=2024-04-05 |title=China will use AI to disrupt elections in the US, South Korea and India, Microsoft warns |url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/05/china-using-ai-disrupt-elections |access-date=2024-04-07 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> It is widely believed that the Chinese government is behind the network.<ref name="CNN2023"/><ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last1=Hsu |first1=Tiffany |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=1 April 2024 |title=China's Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/business/media/china-online-disinformation-us-election.html |access-date=1 April 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]] |quote=The accounts sometimes amplified or repeated content from the Chinese influence campaign Spamouflage, which was first identified in 2019 and linked to an arm of the Ministry of Public Security. |archive-date=3 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240403091121/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/business/media/china-online-disinformation-us-election.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Yang2024"/><ref name=":0" /> The campaign has largely failed to receive views from real users,<ref name="Gilbert2024"/> although the evolution of its tactics has allowed some Spamouflage accounts to see some success in receiving organic engagement.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|2}}<ref name="Yang2024"/> |
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== History == |
== History == |
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In September 2019, research firm [[Graphika]] published a report identifying a network of spam accounts across different social media platforms making posts supporting the Chinese government and attacking its critics, naming the network "Spamouflage Dragon" due to its tactic of mixing in non-political [[Spamming|spam]] content as camouflage.<ref name="Graphika2019">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage.pdf |title=Cross-Platform Spam Network Targeted Hong Kong Protests |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Eib |first2=C. Shawn |date=September 2019 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Tamora |first3=L. |access-date=2024-05-06 |archive-date=2024- |
In September 2019, research firm [[Graphika]] published a report identifying a network of spam accounts across different social media platforms making posts supporting the Chinese government and attacking its critics, naming the network "Spamouflage Dragon" due to its tactic of mixing in non-political [[Spamming|spam]] content as camouflage.<ref name="Graphika2019">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage.pdf |title=Cross-Platform Spam Network Targeted Hong Kong Protests |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Eib |first2=C. Shawn |date=September 2019 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Tamora |first3=L. |access-date=2024-05-06 |archive-date=2024-05-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240511182006/https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|2}} The network initially targeted exiled businessman [[Guo Wengui]] in 2018 and gradually also added criticisms of the [[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests]].<ref name="Graphika2019"/>{{rp|22}} The spam network's content did not receive much genuine engagement or views from real users, and the report concluded at the time that the low quality of the operation suggests that "it was not a state-backed operation".<ref name="Graphika2019"/>{{rp|22}} |
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In early 2020, after becoming mostly dormant for a period of time following takedowns by social media platforms that occurred as a result of the 2019 Graphika report,<ref name="Graphika2020">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/Graphika_Report_Spamouflage_Returns.pdf |title=Return of the (Spamouflage) Dragon: Pro-Chinese Spam Network Tries Again |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Eib |first2=C. Shawn |date=April 2020 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Camille |first3=François |last4=Léa |first4=Ronzaud |access-date=2024-05-09 |archive-date=2024- |
In early 2020, after becoming mostly dormant for a period of time following takedowns by social media platforms that occurred as a result of the 2019 Graphika report,<ref name="Graphika2020">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/Graphika_Report_Spamouflage_Returns.pdf |title=Return of the (Spamouflage) Dragon: Pro-Chinese Spam Network Tries Again |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Eib |first2=C. Shawn |date=April 2020 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Camille |first3=François |last4=Léa |first4=Ronzaud |access-date=2024-05-09 |archive-date=2024-05-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240511182012/https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/Graphika_Report_Spamouflage_Returns.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|5}} the Spamouflage network reemerged with a focus on praising the [[Chinese government response to COVID-19]] in addition to posting about its previous topics of interest.<ref name="Graphika2020"/>{{rp|2}} |
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In February 2021, a Graphika report indicated that some accounts in the Spamouflage network had begun to see some success in receiving views from real users.<ref name="Graphika2021">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf |title=Spamouflage Breakout: Chinese Spam Network Finally Starts to Gain Some Traction |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Hubert |first2=Ira |date=February 2021 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Yang |first3=Cheng |access-date=2024-05-09 |archive-date=2021-03-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305022803/https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|3}} Instead of solely using disposable spam accounts, Spamouflage began using accounts with a veneer of plausibility, developing fictional personas and co-opting the identities of stolen accounts.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|45}} Spamouflage posts began to be amplified through retweets by Chinese government officials, including [[Zhao Lijian]] and then-ambassador to [[Venezuela]] Li Baorong.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|13, 56}} Its posts closely followed Chinese government messaging and had a new focus on aggressively criticizing the [[United States]] and both of its major political parties.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|4-5}} |
In February 2021, a Graphika report indicated that some accounts in the Spamouflage network had begun to see some success in receiving views from real users.<ref name="Graphika2021">{{Cite report |url=https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf |title=Spamouflage Breakout: Chinese Spam Network Finally Starts to Gain Some Traction |last1=Nimmo |first1=Ben |last2=Hubert |first2=Ira |date=February 2021 |publisher=[[Graphika]] |last3=Yang |first3=Cheng |access-date=2024-05-09 |archive-date=2021-03-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305022803/https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_report_spamouflage_breakout.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|3}} Instead of solely using disposable spam accounts, Spamouflage began using accounts with a veneer of plausibility, developing fictional personas and co-opting the identities of stolen accounts.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|45}} Spamouflage posts began to be amplified through retweets by Chinese government officials, including [[Zhao Lijian]] and then-ambassador to [[Venezuela]] Li Baorong.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|13, 56}} Its posts closely followed Chinese government messaging and had a new focus on aggressively criticizing the [[United States]] and both of its major political parties.<ref name="Graphika2021"/>{{rp|4-5}} |
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=== Interference in Canadian politics === |
=== Interference in Canadian politics === |
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{{ |
{{Main|Chinese government interference in Canada}} |
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In 2023, fabricated videos in which Chinese dissident Liu Xin is depicted via [[deepfake]] to be making baseless allegations of legal and ethical violations by [[Justin Trudeau]], [[Pierre Poilievre]] and other Canadian politicians were posted by Spamouflage accounts. [[Global Affairs Canada]] and Liu both believe that the videos may have sought to discredit Liu and hurt Canadian politicians' perception of him.<ref name="Shen2024">{{cite news |last1=Shen |first1=Nono |title=China critic says he's the target of deepfake 'spamouflage' attack by Beijing |url=https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/china-critic-says-he-s-the-target-of-deepfake-spamouflage-attack-by-beijing-1.6625954 |access-date=11 May 2024 |work=[[CTV News]] |agency=The Canadian Press |date=1 November 2023 |archive-date=9 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231109225440/https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/china-critic-says-he-s-the-target-of-deepfake-spamouflage-attack-by-beijing-1.6625954 |url-status=live }}</ref> |
In 2023, fabricated videos in which Chinese dissident Liu Xin is depicted via [[deepfake]] to be making baseless allegations of legal and ethical violations by [[Justin Trudeau]], [[Pierre Poilievre]] and other Canadian politicians were posted by Spamouflage accounts. [[Global Affairs Canada]] and Liu both believe that the videos may have sought to discredit Liu and hurt Canadian politicians' perception of him.<ref name="Shen2024">{{cite news |last1=Shen |first1=Nono |title=China critic says he's the target of deepfake 'spamouflage' attack by Beijing |url=https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/china-critic-says-he-s-the-target-of-deepfake-spamouflage-attack-by-beijing-1.6625954 |access-date=11 May 2024 |work=[[CTV News]] |agency=The Canadian Press |date=1 November 2023 |archive-date=9 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231109225440/https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/china-critic-says-he-s-the-target-of-deepfake-spamouflage-attack-by-beijing-1.6625954 |url-status=live }}</ref> |
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{{reflist}} |
{{reflist}} |
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{{Disinformation}} |
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{{Authority control}} |
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[[Category:Ministry of Public Security (China)]] |
[[Category:Ministry of Public Security (China)]] |
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[[Category:Chinese foreign electoral intervention]] |
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[[Category:Chinese information operations and information warfare]] |
[[Category:Chinese information operations and information warfare]] |
Revision as of 20:03, 11 May 2024
Spamouflage, Dragonbridge, Spamouflage Dragon, or Storm 1376 is an online propaganda and disinformation operation that uses a network of social media accounts to make posts in favor of the Chinese government and harasses dissidents and journalists overseas.[1] Beginning in the early 2020s, Spamouflage accounts also began making posts about American and Taiwanese politics.[2][3] It is widely believed that the Chinese government is behind the network.[1][4][5][3] The campaign has largely failed to receive views from real users,[2] although the evolution of its tactics has allowed some Spamouflage accounts to see some success in receiving organic engagement.[6]: 2 [5]
History
In September 2019, research firm Graphika published a report identifying a network of spam accounts across different social media platforms making posts supporting the Chinese government and attacking its critics, naming the network "Spamouflage Dragon" due to its tactic of mixing in non-political spam content as camouflage.[7]: 2 The network initially targeted exiled businessman Guo Wengui in 2018 and gradually also added criticisms of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests.[7]: 22 The spam network's content did not receive much genuine engagement or views from real users, and the report concluded at the time that the low quality of the operation suggests that "it was not a state-backed operation".[7]: 22
In early 2020, after becoming mostly dormant for a period of time following takedowns by social media platforms that occurred as a result of the 2019 Graphika report,[8]: 5 the Spamouflage network reemerged with a focus on praising the Chinese government response to COVID-19 in addition to posting about its previous topics of interest.[8]: 2
In February 2021, a Graphika report indicated that some accounts in the Spamouflage network had begun to see some success in receiving views from real users.[6]: 3 Instead of solely using disposable spam accounts, Spamouflage began using accounts with a veneer of plausibility, developing fictional personas and co-opting the identities of stolen accounts.[6]: 45 Spamouflage posts began to be amplified through retweets by Chinese government officials, including Zhao Lijian and then-ambassador to Venezuela Li Baorong.[6]: 13, 56 Its posts closely followed Chinese government messaging and had a new focus on aggressively criticizing the United States and both of its major political parties.[6]: 4–5
In October 2022, Google's Mandiant reported that Spamouflage, which it calls Dragonbridge, was spreading propaganda and disinformation targeting the 2022 United States midterm elections. One video discouraged Americans from voting and cast doubt on the American political system.[9]
In April 2023, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment against 34 officers of China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) accused of running a disinformation campaign targeting US-based Chinese dissidents. Meta Platforms and private researchers cited by CNN believe that they are linked to Spamouflage, although the DOJ did not explicitly refer to Spamouflage by name.[1][4]
In April 2024, Institute for Strategic Dialogue researchers stated that some Spamouflage accounts had begun making posts about American politics under false American personas, a strategy that was previously used by Russian disinformation campaigns.[5] Under this new strategy, Spamouflage accounts pretending to be supporters of Donald Trump received engagement from real users, with one post being retweeted by conspiracy theorist Alex Jones.[5] The researchers indicated that they did not find Spamouflage accounts pretending to be Joe Biden supporters, although the existence of such accounts could not be ruled out.[5]
Activities
Criticism of Guo Wengui
Criticizing exiled businessman Guo Wengui, who has become a prominent critic of the Chinese government, was the initial focus of the Spamouflage network, and Guo has continued to be one of the targets of the network.[10]: 15 The prolonged propaganda campaign featured numerous political cartoons attacking Guo and associates such as Li-Meng Yan and Steve Bannon in multiple languages.[11]: 1
Harassment and transnational repression
A June 2022 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) found that several journalists, mostly women of Chinese descent working for overseas media outlets, were subjected to a harassment campaign carried out using Spamouflage accounts in what the ASPI called an instance of "digital transnational repression".[12]
Interference in American politics
Prior to the 2020 United States presidential election, Spamouflage accounts made posts criticizing Donald Trump in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, actions he took against China, and the George Floyd protests. Although the network made a large volume of videos, they were of poor quality and received few authentic views. Many of the videos had broken English, and the intended audience of the videos was unclear.[13]
In 2021, a Graphika report noted that Spamouflage, which previously focused on criticizing Trump and then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, began criticizing Biden after the new president was inaugurated. The report concluded that the focus of the network was to spread the narrative of "China's rise and America's fall" rather than partisan election interference.[6]: 4–5
Before the 2022 United States midterm elections, the Spamouflage network made posts casting doubts on the American political system, pointing to examples of political division and violence as evidence of the United States's decline.[14] Videos they posted portrayed American elections and the American government as being ineffective in improving Americans' lives.[9]
Russian invasion of Ukraine
In the lead-up to the 2024 United States presidential election, Spamouflage accounts began making posts about divisive American political issues. Accounts pretending to be American Donald Trump supporters spread false conspiracy theories about Joe Biden and amplified Russian disinformation about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In contrast to previous Spamouflage campaigns, these accounts received engagement from real American users.[5]
Interference in Canadian politics
In 2023, fabricated videos in which Chinese dissident Liu Xin is depicted via deepfake to be making baseless allegations of legal and ethical violations by Justin Trudeau, Pierre Poilievre and other Canadian politicians were posted by Spamouflage accounts. Global Affairs Canada and Liu both believe that the videos may have sought to discredit Liu and hurt Canadian politicians' perception of him.[15]
Attempted mobilization of real-world protests
COVID-19
According to Mandiant, in April 2021, Spamouflage accounts called for protests in New York City against Li-Meng Yan, Guo Wengui and Steve Bannon for spreading "rumors" about COVID-19 and publicized an address purportedly belonging to Guo. Although Spamouflage accounts claimed, sometimes using manipulated images, that the protests were successful, there is no evidence that protesters were successfully mobilized.[16]
Rare earth mines
A 2022 Mandiant report indicated that Spamouflage accounts had called for protests against proposed rare earth mines in the United States and Canada. The minerals are of strategic importance in electronics manufacturing, and the United States had started trying to increase domestic production in order to counter China's control over the field.[17]
Effectiveness
Low quality and limited authentic engagement
The network has largely been ineffective at getting views and engagement from real users.[2] One reason identified for the failure of the propaganda campaign, in contrast to more successful campaigns by Russia and other state actors, is its operators' lack of familiarity with the global information environment owing to the closed-off nature of the Chinese internet.[2] While some new technical tools adopted by Spamouflage operators, such as generative artificial intelligence, may increase the operation's efficiency, they will not necessarily make the operation more effective.[2]
An August 2020 Graphika report noted the poor quality of Spamouflage content. Videos that Graphika discovered contained "clumsy" text-to-speech voiceovers, grammatically incorrect English, and poorly-translated Chinese idiomatic expressions like "cast a chestnut in the fire will burn themselves with fire".[18]: 19
Successes
Spamouflage has been able to disrupt discussions on controversial subjects by taking up space in search results with spam posts.[11]: 14–15 Additionally, new tactics attempted by the network, such as a small cluster of Twitter accounts pretending to be American supporters of Donald Trump that were reported on in 2024, have allowed it to receive some real engagement.[5]
Attribution
The network has been attributed to the Chinese government by Twitter and Meta.[1][12] Global Affairs Canada has also linked the campaign to the Chinese government.[19] Sources have linked Spamouflage to the Chinese Ministry of Public Security's "912 Special Project Working Group", which was the subject of a 2023 indictment by the American Department of Justice.[2]
An August 2023 threat report released by Meta notes that the timing of the network's activities match up with office hours in China, and that the network displays coordinated activity across multiple platforms.[1] Institute for Strategic Dialogue researcher Elise Thomas notes that the operation's lack of innovation despite prolonged ineffectiveness is characteristic of a government campaign.[2]
Initial reports of Spamouflage's activities did not always attribute the campaign to the Chinese government. Graphika researcher Ben Nimmo speculated in 2019 that amateurs or a private firm was behind the campaign.[20] In 2020, Graphika stated that it was unable to determine the relationship between Spamouflage and the Chinese government.[13]
In a response to CNN, Chinese government spokesperson Liu Pengyu denied China's involvement in Spamouflage.[1]
See also
References
- ^ a b c d e f O'Sullivan, Donie; Devine, Curt; Gordon, Allison (13 November 2023). "China is using the world's largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds". CNN. Archived from the original on 14 November 2023. Retrieved 6 May 2024.
- ^ a b c d e f g Gilbert, David (April 29, 2024). "Why China Is So Bad at Disinformation". Wired. Archived from the original on 9 May 2024. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ a b Milmo, Dan (2024-04-05). "China will use AI to disrupt elections in the US, South Korea and India, Microsoft warns". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2024-04-07.
- ^ a b Hsu, Tiffany; Myers, Steven Lee (1 April 2024). "China's Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 3 April 2024. Retrieved 1 April 2024.
The accounts sometimes amplified or repeated content from the Chinese influence campaign Spamouflage, which was first identified in 2019 and linked to an arm of the Ministry of Public Security.
- ^ a b c d e f g Yang, Lin (8 April 2024). "Chinese nationalist trolls pretend to be Trump supporters ahead of US elections". Voice of America. Archived from the original on 9 May 2024. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ a b c d e f Nimmo, Ben; Hubert, Ira; Yang, Cheng (February 2021). Spamouflage Breakout: Chinese Spam Network Finally Starts to Gain Some Traction (PDF) (Report). Graphika. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-03-05. Retrieved 2024-05-09.
- ^ a b c Nimmo, Ben; Eib, C. Shawn; Tamora, L. (September 2019). Cross-Platform Spam Network Targeted Hong Kong Protests (PDF) (Report). Graphika. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-06.
- ^ a b Nimmo, Ben; Eib, C. Shawn; Camille, François; Léa, Ronzaud (April 2020). Return of the (Spamouflage) Dragon: Pro-Chinese Spam Network Tries Again (PDF) (Report). Graphika. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-09.
- ^ a b Mandiant Intelligence (26 October 2022). "Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Leverages New TTPs to Aggressively Target U.S. Interests, Including Midterm Elections". Archived from the original on 9 May 2024. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ Warren, Patrick; Linvill, Darren; Fecher, Leland; Warren, Jayson; Sheffield, Steven (2023). The 5-year Spam: Tracking a Persistent Chinese Influence Operation (Report). Clemson University. Archived from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-09.
- ^ a b Fecher, Leland; Reich, Tyler; Taylor, Jack; Warren, Patrick (2022-01-01). Oh, the Places You'll Guo! The Tactics and Impact of a Chinese Multilingual Narrative Flooding Campaign through Political Cartoons (Report). Clemson University. Archived from the original on 2024-05-11. Retrieved 2024-05-09.
- ^ a b Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (3 June 2022). "China-linked Twitter harassment targets female Asian journalists outside China". Axios. Archived from the original on 21 November 2023. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ a b Timberg, Craig; Harris, Shane (12 August 2020). "Chinese network of fake accounts targets Trump with English-language videos". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 8 November 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Sganga, Nicole (26 October 2022). "China-linked influence campaign targeting U.S. midterms, security firm says". CBS News. Archived from the original on 7 November 2022. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Shen, Nono (1 November 2023). "China critic says he's the target of deepfake 'spamouflage' attack by Beijing". CTV News. The Canadian Press. Archived from the original on 9 November 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Serabian, Ryan; Foster, Lee (7 September 2021). "Pro-PRC Influence Campaign Expands to Dozens of Social Media Platforms, Websites, and Forums in at Least Seven Languages, Attempted to Physically Mobilize Protesters in the U.S." Mandiant. Archived from the original on 18 April 2024. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Murphy, Margi (28 June 2022). "Pro-China Agents Posed as Activists to Protest US, Canada Mines". BNN Bloomberg. Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 17 August 2022. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Nimmo, Ben; François, Camille; Eib, C. Shawn; Ronzaud, Léa (12 August 2020). Spamouflage Goes to America (PDF) (Report). Graphika. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 December 2021. Retrieved 11 May 2024.
- ^ Tunney, Catherine (23 October 2023). "China linked to propaganda campaign targeting Trudeau, Poilievre, says Global Affairs". CBC News. Archived from the original on 9 May 2024. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ Uchill, Joe (25 September 2019). "Bumbling social media scheme hit Hong Kong protestors". Axios. Archived from the original on 5 December 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2024.