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International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries
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International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries

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  • Hsiao‐Chi Chen
  • Yunshyong Chow
  • Shi‐Miin Liu

Abstract

Under an often employed imitation mechanism, we investigate whether n countries with different emission abatement benefits and costs can achieve an international environmental agreement. When the abatement efficiencies, ancillary benefits of abatement, and/or the numbers of countries are large, an international environmental agreement with full participation is the unique long‐run equilibrium. For the remaining situations, either no agreement is the unique equilibrium or both equilibria above can emerge with positive probability. These results hold whatever the function forms of countries' abatement costs are, whether the transboundary pollution of emissions is considered, and whether the mutation rates depend on abatement costs and time.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao‐Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Shi‐Miin Liu, 2022. "International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 285-309, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:3:p:285-309
    DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12296
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    1. Hsiao‐Chi Chen & Shi‐Miin Liu, 2023. "International environmental agreements under different evolutionary imitation mechanisms," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(2), pages 248-289, June.

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