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My bibliography Save this articleEffects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China
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DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12402
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- Dionne, Georges & Liu, Ying, 2017. "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Working Papers 17-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, revised 15 Oct 2019.
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- Dionne, Georges & Fenou, Akouété & Mnasri, Mohamed, 2023. "Consolidation of the US property and casualty insurance industry: Is climate risk a causal factor for mergers and acquisitions?," Working Papers 23-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Dionne, Georges & Desjardins, Denise & Angers, Jean-François, 2021. "Road safety for fleets of vehicles," Working Papers 21-3, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
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