(Translated by https://www.hiragana.jp/)
L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique.. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/ecoldc/ecop_175_0051.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique.. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux

Author

Listed:
  • Antoinette Baujard

Abstract

Publicdecision-makers seek tomaximize social welfare, hencetosatisfythepopulation'sindividualpreferences. Howdo the systems for gathering information on agents' preferences affect the quality and the interpretation of public decision-making? The paper applies a decision-making model to the allocation of a subsidy for public or private transportation. Individual preferences are revealed, at the aggregate level, by individual behaviors in different choice contexts. Using Saari's techniques of probability calculus for voting paradoxes, the loss of information due to these particular conditions of data collection is assessed and analyzed in detail. The author draws conclusions in three areas: information reliability and decision quality; model formulation; and the implementation of welfarism.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoinette Baujard, 2006. "L'estimation des préférences individuelles en vue de la décision publique.. Problèmes, paradoxes, enjeux," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 51-63.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_175_0051
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=ECOP_175_0051
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-1-2006-4-page-51.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Baujard, 2006. "From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism : A step back to Bentham’s felicific calculus of its members," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200606, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    2. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 1999. "Measuring Preferences by Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(4), pages 755-778, December.
    3. Wulf Gaertner & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "On the structure of choice under different external references," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(3), pages 609-620.
    4. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163, September.
    5. Kapteyn, A.J., 1994. "The measurement of household cost functions : Revealed preference versus subjective measures," Other publications TiSEM 8471daaa-5d7d-4026-a7c1-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Kapteyn, Arie, 1994. "The Measurement of Household Cost Functions: Revealed Preference versus Subjective Measures," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 7(4), pages 333-350, November.
    7. Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996. "Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 239-249, August.
    8. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-558, September.
    9. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    10. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    11. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046, September.
    12. G.A. Cohen, 1990. "Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1990035, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Haslett, D. W., 1990. "What is Utility?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 65-94, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antoinette Baujard, 2006. "Une critique opérationnelle du welfarisme dans la prise de décision publique," Post-Print halshs-00155130, HAL.
    2. Antoinette Baujard, 2016. "Utilitarianism and anti-utilitarianism," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 40, pages 576-588, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6.
    4. John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 145-164, April.
    5. Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2022. "The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen’s paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 427-447, October.
    6. Perote-Pena, Juan & Piggins, Ashley, 2005. "Pareto efficiency with spatial rights," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 265-283, April.
    7. Herrade Igersheim, 2006. "Libéralisme de la liberté versus libéralisme du bonheur. Le cas du paradoxe libéral-parétien," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 389-398.
    8. Maurice Salles, 2006. "La théorie du choix social : de l'importance des mathématiques," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 200617, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    9. Piggins, Ashley & Salerno, Gillian, 2016. "Sen cycles and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 25-27.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:13:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Herrade Igersheim, 2013. "Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 463-477, April.
    12. Lingfang (Ivy) Li & Donald Saari, 2008. "Sen’s theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 393-413, October.
    13. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Arrow’s decisive coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 463-505, March.
    14. John A. Weymark, 2017. "Conundrums for nonconsequentialists," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 269-294, February.
    15. Frey Bruno S. & Stutzer Alois, 2000. "Maximizing Happiness?," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 145-167, May.
    16. John A Weymark, 2012. "Social Welfare Functions," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers vuecon-sub-13-00018, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    17. Kuklys, W. & Robeyns, I., 2004. "Sen’s Capability Approach to Welfare Economics," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0415, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Antoinette Baujard, 2007. "Commensurable freedoms in the capability approach," Post-Print halshs-00294563, HAL.
    19. repec:hal:journl:dumas-00906152 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Steven Pressman & Gale Summerfield, 2000. "The Economic Contributions of Amartya Sen," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 89-113.
    21. Klasen, Stephan & Villalobos, Carlos, 2020. "Diverging identification of the poor: A non-random process. Chile 1992–2017," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    22. Itai Sher, 2020. "How perspective-based aggregation undermines the Pareto principle," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 19(2), pages 182-205, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_175_0051. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.