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Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs
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Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs

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  • Brenner, Thomas
  • Witt, Ulrich

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  • Brenner, Thomas & Witt, Ulrich, 2003. "Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 429-448, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:50:y:2003:i:4:p:429-448
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    2. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-1393, November.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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    6. Richard J. Herrnstein & Drazen Prelec, 1991. "Melioration: A Theory of Distributed Choice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 137-156, Summer.
    7. Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep, 1998. "Learning by experience and learning by imitating successful others," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 559-575, March.
    8. George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, 1992. "Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 573-597.
    9. Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean, 1991. "Cooperation in the long-run," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 145-156, February.
    10. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    11. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    12. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
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    14. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
    15. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
    16. Gerald Silverberg & Luc Soete (ed.), 1994. "The Economics Of Growth And Technical Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 408.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Zschache, 2017. "The Explanation of Social Conventions by Melioration Learning," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(3), pages 1-1.
    2. Huang, Weihong, 2010. "On the complexity of strategy-switching dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 445-460, September.
    3. Joseph M. Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, 2019. "Asymptotic Value in Frequency-Dependent Games with Separable Payoffs: A Differential Approach," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 295-313, June.
    4. Joseph Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, 2016. "Asymptotic value in frequency-dependent games: A differential approach," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16076, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. DUDLEY, Leonard & WITT, Ulrich, 2003. "Yesterday’s Games: Contingency Learning and the Growth of Public Spending, 1890-1938," Cahiers de recherche 2003-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    6. R. Joosten, 2005. "A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-06, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    7. Leonard Dudley, 2010. "General Purpose Technologies and the Industrial Revolution," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2010-11, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    8. Reinoud Joosten, 2007. "Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2007-02, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.

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