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Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk
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Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk

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  • Broer, Tobias

Abstract

An additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets. When risk-neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities, structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists’ demand on risky tranches. With disagreement about default correlation, low-correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless. High-correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good. Risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass-through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching.

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  • Broer, Tobias, 2018. "Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 505-518.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:3:p:505-518
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.12.001
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    7. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2024. "Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 325, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Structured finance; CDO; RMBS; Disagreement; Default correlation; Credit risk; Great recession; Housing bubble;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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