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The Impact of the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks on Their Business Model
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The Impact of the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks on Their Business Model

Author

Listed:
  • Aurélien Violon

    (Banque de France - ACPR and Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)

  • Dominique Durant

    (Banque de France)

  • Oana Toader

    (Banque de France - ACPR)

Abstract

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to provide empirical evidence on how the recent international regulation designed for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) drove changes in these institutions' activity. Our econometric approach quantifies the impact of the designation of G-SIBs on their activity, controlling for both structural differences and industry trends. We find that G-SIBs have reduced the expansion of their balance sheet, which further improved their leverage ratio. A downward pressure is noticed on their return on equity, but no adverse consequences are observed on lending. We find no effect on G-SIBs' funding cost advantage, which suggests that "too-big-to-fail" distortions still persist.

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélien Violon & Dominique Durant & Oana Toader, 2020. "The Impact of the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks on Their Business Model," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(5), pages 95-142, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2020:q:4:a:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Moenninghoff, Sebastian C. & Ongena, Steven & Wieandt, Axel, 2015. "The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-to-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 221-236.
    5. Robert Hills & Dennis Reinhardt & Rhiannon Sowerbutts & Tomasz Wieladek, 2017. "International Banking and Cross-Border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from the United Kingdom," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(2), pages 404-433, March.
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    8. Brandao-Marques, Luis & Correa, Ricardo & Sapriza, Horacio, 2020. "Government support, regulation, and risk taking in the banking sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    9. Sebastian Schich & Oana Toader, 2017. "To Be or Not to Be a G-SIB: Does It Matter?," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 169-192.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tirupam Goel & Ulf Lewrick & Aakriti Mathur, 2021. "Does regulation only bite the less profitable? Evidence from the too-big-to-fail reforms," BIS Working Papers 922, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Luis Garcia & Ulf Lewrick & Taja Sečnik, 2023. "Window Dressing and the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 231-264, October.
    3. Homma, Yasutake & Suzuki, Katsushi, 2023. "TLAC bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Saibal Ghosh, 2023. "Stability versus soundness: what matters for women central bank governors?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 2315-2338, August.
    5. Marwan Alzoubi & Ayman Abdalmajeed Alsmadi & Hamad kasasbeh, 2022. "Systemically Important Bank: A Bibliometric Analysis for the Period of 2002 to 2022," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, December.
    6. He, Dongwei & Wu, Yifan & Wang, Yifan & Xing, Xueyan, 2023. "Prudential regulation and bank performance: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    7. Luis Garcia & Ulf Lewrick & Taja Sečnik, 2021. "Is window dressing by banks systemically important?," BIS Working Papers 960, Bank for International Settlements.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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