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Household Taxation, Income Splitting and Labor Supply Incentives – A Microsimulation Study for Germany
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Household Taxation, Income Splitting and Labor Supply Incentives – A Microsimulation Study for Germany

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  • Viktor Steiner
  • Katharina Wrohlich

Abstract

We analyze potential labor supply effects of a shift from the current German system of joint taxation of married couples to a system of limited real income splitting on the basis of an econometric household labor supply model embedded in a tax benefit model. Our simulation results show relatively small labor supply effects of a shift from the current system to one of limited real income splitting system. In the benchmark scenario of a shift to separate taxation labor supply of wives would increase substantially in west Germany, while a significant number of husbands would drop out of the labor force. (JEL H31, H24, J22)

Suggested Citation

  • Viktor Steiner & Katharina Wrohlich, 2004. "Household Taxation, Income Splitting and Labor Supply Incentives – A Microsimulation Study for Germany," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 50(3), pages 541-568.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:50:y:2004:i:3:p:541-568.
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    1. Gustafsson, Siv, 1992. "Separate Taxation and Married Women's Labor Supply: A Comparison of West Germany and Sweden," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 61-85, February.
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    3. Peter Haan, 2004. "Discrete Choice Labor Supply: Conditional Logit vs. Random Coefficient Models," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 394, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Dickert-Conlin, Stacy & Houser, Scott, 1998. "Taxes and Transfers: A New Look at the Marriage Penalty," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 175-217, June.
    5. Dickert-Conlin, Stacy & Houser, Scott, 1998. "Taxes and Transfers: A New Look at the Marriage Penalty," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 175-217, June.
    6. Paul Bernd Spahn & Helmut Kaiser & Thomas Kassella, 1992. "The tax dilemma of married women in Germany," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 22-47, May.
    7. Homburg, Stefan, 2000. "Das einkommensteuerliche Ehegattensplitting," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 261-268.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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