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Learning from a Piece of Pie
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Learning from a Piece of Pie

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  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Olivier Donni
  • Ivana Komunjer

Abstract

We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargaining environment is described by a set of variables that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e. whether an agreement is reached, and if so the individual shares) and the environment (including the size of the pie) are known, but neither are the agents' utilities nor their threat points. We consider both a deterministic version of the model in which the econometrician observes the shares as deterministic functions of the variables under consideration and a stochastic one in which because of latent disturbances only the joint distribution of incomes and outcomes is recorded. We show that in the most general framework any outcome can be rationalized as a Nash solution. However, even mild exclusion restrictions generate strong implications that can be used to test the Nash bargaining assumption. Stronger conditions further allow to recover the underlying structure of the bargaining, and in particular, the cardinal representation of individual preferences in the absence of uncertainty. An implication of this finding is that empirical works entailing Nash bargaining could (and should) use much more general and robust versions than they usually do. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni & Ivana Komunjer, 2012. "Learning from a Piece of Pie," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 162-195.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:1:p:162-195
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdr020
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    Cited by:

    1. Bo Honoré & Áureo de Paula, 2011. "Interdependent Durations in Joint Retirement," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2011-5, Center for Retirement Research, revised Feb 2011.
    2. Nishimura, Hiroki, 2021. "Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    3. , P. & ,, 2014. "On the consistency of data with bargaining theories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    4. Cherchye, Laurens & Demuynck, Thomas & De Rock, Bram, 2013. "The empirical content of Cournot competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1552-1581.
    5. Hubner, Stefan, 2016. "Topics in nonparametric identification and estimation," Other publications TiSEM 08fce56b-3193-46e0-871b-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Bo E. Honoré & Áureo de Paula, 2016. "A new model for interdependent durations with an application to joint retirement," CeMMAP working papers CWP07/16, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    8. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van der Straeten, 2013. "Alliances électorales entre deux tours de scrutin. Le point de vue de la théorie des jeux coopératifs et une application aux élections régionales de mars 2010," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(2), pages 173-240.
    9. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2013. "Nash‐Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 195-235, March.
    10. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2022. "(In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family," Working Papers 2, SITES.
    11. Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2012. "The Sharing Rule: Where Is It?," Working Papers 16/2012, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    12. Hubner, Stefan, 2023. "Identification of unobserved distribution factors and preferences in the collective household model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 234(1), pages 301-326.
    13. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2021. "Bargaining in the Family," CHILD Working Papers Series 88 JEL Classification: D1, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    14. Oliveira, Fernando S., 2023. "The emergence of social inequality: A Co-Evolutionary analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 192-206.

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