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Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provision de bienes publicos un analisis formal
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Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provision de bienes publicos un analisis formal

Author

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  • Leonardo Adalberto Gatica Arreola

    (Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico)

Abstract

Objetivo Avanzar en una explicacion teorica sobre el efecto que tiene el sistema de partidos sobre el uso eficiente de los recursos publicos, particularmente sobre el uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental. Metodologia Se desarrolla un modelo formal para abordar el problema antes descrito. Resultados Se presenta un modelo formal que logra capturar como el incremento del numero de partidos politicos que compiten en una economia incentiva un mayor uso clientelar del empleo gubernamental. Limitaciones Si bien este trabajo busca explicar los resultados de otros analisis empiricos y avanzar en terminos teoricos, unicamente presenta un modelo formal sin aportar evidencia empirica. Originalidad A saber del autor, hasta la fecha no hay en la literatura un modelo teorico que, enfocado en el uso del empleo gubernamental, explique los efectos que el sistema de partidos puede tener en el empleo clientelar de los recursos publicos. Conclusiones El modelo explica como la presencia de un mayor numero de partidos genera nuevos grupos de votantes politicamente rentables, que pueden ser capturados por el partido en el gobierno mediante el ofrecimiento de empleo burocratico.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Adalberto Gatica Arreola, 2020. "Sistema de partidos y eficiencia en la provision de bienes publicos un analisis formal," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 17(2), pages 33-56, Julio-Dic.
    • Handle: RePEc:qua:journl:v:17:y:2020:i:2:p:33-56
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sistema de partidos; eficiencia gubernamental; clientelismo; provision de bienes publicos.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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