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The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength
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The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength

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  • Douglas Allen
  • Vera Lantinova

Abstract

Ancient Greece was wealthy enough to invent many of the foundations of Western Civilization. In order to accomplish this, they had to avoid the trap of dissipating wealth through continuous feuding. We contend that the ancient Olympics was one, of several, institutions that helped achieve this by acting as a signal of city-state strength. Although it could not prevent all battles, it provided information to reduce hostilities between competing cities. This hypothesis explains the rise and fall of the Olympics, and the unique and puzzling characteristics of the rules and events. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Allen & Vera Lantinova, 2013. "The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 23-44, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:14:y:2013:i:1:p:23-44
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-012-0119-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Josh Matti & Yang Zhou, 2022. "United we feel stronger? On the Olympics and political ideology," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 271-300, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ancient Greece; Olympics; Signals; Property rights; N40; N43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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