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Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt
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Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt

In: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II

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  • Catarina Marvão
  • Giancarlo Spagnolo

Abstract

Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or cancel the sanctions for the first firm(s) that self-report being part of a cartel and have become the main enforcement instrument used by competition authorities around the world in their fight against cartels. Such policies have been shown to be a powerful tool in inducing firms to self-report or cooperate with a cartel investigation in exchange for a reduction in sanctions. Since they reduce sanctions for successful leniency applicants, these programs may also be abused to generate many successful convictions for the competition authority at the expense of reduced cartel deterrence and social welfare. Hence, it is vital for competition authorities and society to understand how leniency programs affect firms’ incentives, in order to optimize their design and administration. A rich theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature has developed in the last two decades to meet the challenge. In this chapter, we review some of the key studies that have been undertaken to date, with emphasis on more recent contributions and without claiming to be exhaustive (we apologize in advance to the authors of papers we could not discuss), highlighting and comparing the main results, and setting out their limitations. We conclude with a general assessment and an agenda for future research on this topic at the core of competition policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:17978_4
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    Cited by:

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    2. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. Forsbacka, Tove & Le Coq, Chloé & Marvão, Catarina, 2023. "Cartel birth and death dynamics: Empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    4. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020. "Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    5. Ruben Korsten & Andrew Samuel, 2023. "Cartel formation and detection: the role of information costs and disclosure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 117-153, August.
    6. Tanja Artiga González & Markus Schmid & David Yermack, 2019. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4813-4840, October.
    7. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2020. "Combining cartel penalties and private damage actions: The impact on cartel prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Spiegel, Yossi, 2017. "Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-037, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter Ormosi & Zherou Majied, 2019. "Public and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-06v3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Hans W. Friederiszick, & Linda Gratz, & Michael Rauber,, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    11. Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023. "Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 111-122, September.
    12. Mariuzzo, Franco & Ormosi, Peter L & Majied, Zherou, 2020. "Fines and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    13. Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz & Michael Rauber, 2019. "The impact of EU cartel policy reforms on the timing of settlements in private follow-on damages disputes: An empirical assessment of cases from 2001 to 2015," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-19-03_R1, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 25 Jun 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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