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Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda
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Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda

In: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption

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  • Odd-Helge Fjeldstad

Abstract

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research.

Suggested Citation

  • Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 2006. "Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3740_17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chand, Sheetal K. & Moene, Karl O., 1999. "Controlling Fiscal Corruption," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1129-1140, July.
    2. Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
    3. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Torsvik, Gaute & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004. "How middle-men can undermine anti-corruption reforms," Working Papers in Economics 12/04, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    4. Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
    5. Espen Villanger & Anette Walstad Enes, 2004. "The role of participation and empowerment in income and poverty dynamics in Indonesia 1993-2000," CMI Working Papers WP 2004: 13, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    6. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad & Florida Henjewele & Geoffrey Mwambe & Erasto Ngalewa & Knut Nygaard, 2004. "Local government finances and financial management in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers WP 2004: 7, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    7. Arne Wiig, 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility in the Angolan Oil Industry," CMI Working Papers WP 2005: 8, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    8. Joel Slemrod, 2002. "Trust in Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 9187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Tungodden, Bertil, 2003. "Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 1459-1467, August.
    10. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    11. Bernard Gauthier & Ritva Reinikka, 2006. "Shifting Tax Burdens through Exemptions and Evasion: an Empirical Investigation of Uganda," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 15(3), pages 373-398, September.
    12. Astri Suhrke & Espen Villanger & Susan L. Woodward, 2005. "Economic Aid to Post-conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler," CMI Working Papers WP 2005:4, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    2. Leonardo Romeo & Paul Smoke, 2014. "The Political Economy of Local Infrastructure Planning," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1417, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    3. Andrews, Matt & Bategeka, Lawrence, 2013. "Overcoming the Limits of Institutional Reform in Uganda," WIDER Working Paper Series 111, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Tina Søreide, 2006. "Is it wrong to rank? A critical assessment of corruption indices," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 1, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    5. Richard M. Bird, 2008. "The BBLR Approach to tax Reform in Emerging Countries," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0804, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Kent Eaton & Kai Kaiser & Paul J. Smoke, 2011. "The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms : Implications for Aid Effectiveness," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2336.
    7. Matt Andrews & Lawrence Bategeka, 2013. "Overcoming the Limits of Institutional Reform in Uganda," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2013-111, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Seim, Line Tndel & Sreide, Tina, 2009. "Bureaucratic complexity and impacts of corruption in utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 176-184, June.
    9. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad & Ivar Kolstad & Knut Nygaard, 2006. "Bribes, taxes and regulations: Business constraints for micro enterprises in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 2, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    10. Mohamed, Hazik, 2018. "Macro and Micro-level Indicators of Maqāṣid al- Sharī‘ah in Socio-Economic Development Policy and its Governing Framework," Islamic Economic Studies, The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), vol. 25, pages 19-44.
    11. Espen Villanger, 2006. "Is bonded labor voluntary? A framework against forced work," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 7, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    12. Gedion Onyango, 2021. "Whistleblower protection in developing countries: a review of challenges and prospects," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(12), pages 1-30, December.
    13. Matt Andrews, 2018. "Overcoming the limits of institutional reform in Uganda," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(S1), pages 159-182, March.
    14. Margaret Levi & Audrey Sacks, 2009. "Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(4), pages 311-333, December.
    15. Tahseen Ajaz & Eatzaz Ahmad, 2010. "The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 405-417.
    16. Pamela Jagger & Gerald Shively, 2015. "Taxes and Bribes in Uganda," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 66-79, January.
    17. Edgar Kiser & Audrey Sacks, 2011. "African Patrimonialism in Historical Perspective," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 636(1), pages 129-149, July.
    18. Matt Andrews & Lawrence Bategeka, 2013. "Overcoming the limits of institutional reform in Uganda," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-027-13, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    19. Matt Andrews & Lawrence Bategeka, 2013. "Overcoming the Limits of Institutional Reform in Uganda," CID Working Papers 269, Center for International Development at Harvard University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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