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Economic Performance and Electoral Volatility: Testing the Economic Voting Hypothesis on Indian States, 1957–2013
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Economic Performance and Electoral Volatility: Testing the Economic Voting Hypothesis on Indian States, 1957–2013

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Abstract

The electoral consequences of variations in economic growth on vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of fourteen Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: first changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and the state average of volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results suggest that both volatilities are reduced by higher income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be somewhat more sensitive to growth rates. Examination of the periodicity of income growth’s impact finds that the growth rate in the final year of governance has a stronger effect on volatility than does the average income growth rate arising over the entire election cycle. We also find that vote switching responds more to negative rather than positive growth changes and, by decomposing volatility, find that growth changes affect internal vote shifting more than between established parties and new comers. More generally the responsiveness of volatility to set of economic and political characteristics of the state suggests that theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding electoral outcomes and hence the process of development

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  • Bharatee Bhusana Dash & J. Stephen Ferris, 2018. "Economic Performance and Electoral Volatility: Testing the Economic Voting Hypothesis on Indian States, 1957–2013," Carleton Economic Papers 18-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:18-07
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Stephen Ferris & Marcel-Christian Voia, 2019. "Elections, Economic Outcomes and Policy in Canada: 1870 - 2015," Carleton Economic Papers 19-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    2. Stephen J. Ferris & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2020. "What aggregate data can tell us about voter turnout in Canada; did changes in the distribution of income matter?," Carleton Economic Papers 20-18, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    3. J. Stephen Ferris & Bharatee Bhusana Dash & Marcel-Cristian Voia, 2021. "Does Income Inequality enter into an Aggregate Model of Voter Turnout? Evidence from Canada and Indian States," Carleton Economic Papers 21-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vote volatility; Economic voting; Indian States; Political business cycle; growth asymmetries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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