(Translated by https://www.hiragana.jp/)
Unilateral Measures and Emissions Mitigation
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cge/wacage/09.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Unilateral Measures and Emissions Mitigation

Author

Listed:
  • Chatterji, Shurojit

    (University of Warwick)

  • Ghosal, Sayantan

    (University of Warwick)

  • Walsh, Sean

    (University of Warwick)

  • Whalley, John

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Do unilateral measures to cut emissions provide an adequate foundation for global climate change negotiations from a post-Copenhagen perspective? We document the extent and variety for unilateral measures. In a formal model, we examine the conditions under which global learning, by building on the positive spillovers generated by unilateral measures, delivers cumulative emissions reduction over time. Using our results, we analyze the key features of a global policy regime builds on unilateral measures to accelerate convergence to a low carbon world.

Suggested Citation

  • Chatterji, Shurojit & Ghosal, Sayantan & Walsh, Sean & Whalley, John, 2010. "Unilateral Measures and Emissions Mitigation," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 09, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/09.2010_ghosal.unilateral.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-684, Part I Se.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521700801 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Shurojit Chatterji & Sayantan Ghosal, 2009. "Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(2), pages 286-305, June.
    6. Arrow Kenneth J, 2007. "Global Climate Change: A Challenge to Policy," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 4(3), pages 1-5, June.
    7. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    8. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shurojit Chatterji & Sayantan Ghosal & Sean Walsh & John Whalley, 2014. "Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, And Global Learning," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 1-16.
    2. Partha Sen, 2016. "Unilateral Emission Cuts and Carbon Leakages in a Dynamic North–South Trade Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(1), pages 131-152, May.
    3. Fleisher, Belton M. & McGuire, William H. & Smith, Adam Nicholas & Zhou, Mi, 2013. "Intangible Knowledge Capital and Innovation in China," IZA Discussion Papers 7798, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Partha Sen, 2013. "Unilateral Emission Cuts And Carbon Leakages In A North-South Trade Model," Working papers 232, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Ghosal, Sayantan & Walsh, Sean & Whalley, John, 2009. "Unilateral measures and global emissions mitigation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 915, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Shurojit Chatterji & Sayantan Ghosal & Sean Walsh & John Whalley, 2014. "Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, And Global Learning," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 1-16.
    3. Boyd, John III & Conley, John P., 1997. "Fundamental Nonconvexities in Arrovian Markets and a Coasian Solution to the Problem of Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 388-407, February.
    4. Keita Honjo, 2015. "Cooperative Emissions Trading Game: International Permit Market Dominated by Buyers," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-20, August.
    5. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    6. Richard Tol, 2011. "Regulating knowledge monopolies: the case of the IPCC," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 827-839, October.
    7. Élodie Bertrand, 2006. "La thèse d'efficience du « théorème de Coase ». Quelle critique de la microéconomie ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 983-1007.
    8. Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.
    9. Gilles, Robert P. & Pesce, Marialaura & Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 2020. "The provision of collective goods through a social division of labour," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 287-312.
    10. Zili Yang, 2016. "Mitigation Cost And Climate Damage Versus Incentive Shifts Of Climate Coalition," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 1-24, November.
    11. Stéphane Gonzalez & Alain Marciano, 2017. "De nouveaux éclairages sur le théorème de Coase et la vacuité du cœur," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 579-600.
    12. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    13. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    14. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    15. Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005. "Networks and farsighted stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February.
    16. Okada, Akira, 2023. "A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 657-669.
    17. Techer, Kevin, 2021. "Stable agreements through liability rules: A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 77-88.
    18. Roger Fouquet, 2012. "Economics of Energy and Climate Change: Origins, Developments and Growth," Working Papers 2012-08, BC3.
    19. Heyen, Daniel & Horton, Joshua & Moreno-Cruz, Juan, 2019. "Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 153-177.
    20. Jason F. Shogren, 2002. "Micromotives in Global Environmental Policy," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 47-61, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unilateral initiatives; mitigation; global learning; technology transfer;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jane Snape (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.