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Environmental Protection, Consumer Awareness, Product Characteristics, and Market Power
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Environmental Protection, Consumer Awareness, Product Characteristics, and Market Power

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel Boyer
  • Philippe Mahenc
  • Michel Moreaux

Abstract

We investigate the behavior of a polluting monopolist whose production causes a global damage affecting consumers and non-consumers alike while consumption causes a specific damage affecting consumers only. The monopolist anticipates strategically how her decisions on product variant, price and pollution affect the purchasing decisions in a Hotelling market. We compare a standard unregulated monopolist and a monopolist subject to environmental regulation. We show that both monopolists choose the same product variant, that the regulated monopolist pollutes less, produces as much or more, and charges a higher price than the unregulated one. Hence, environmental regulation always lead to an increase in price but never to a reduction in production. Nous étudions le comportement d'un monopole dont la production cause un dommage global de pollution pour les consommateurs et les non-consommateurs de son produit et un dommage spécifique additionnel pour les consommateurs. Le monopole anticipe de manière stratégique l'impact des caractéristiques et du prix du produit et celui du niveau de pollution sur les décisions d'achat des consommateurs. Nous comparons le monopole standard non réglementé et le monopole sujet à une réglementation environnementale. Nous montrons que les deux monopoles choisissent la même variété de produit, que le monopole réglementé pollue moins, produit autant sinon plus, et demande un prix plus élevé que le monopole non-réglementé. Ainsi, la réglementation environnementale dans ce contexte entraîne toujours une hausse de prix mais ne mène jamais à une baisse de production.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 2007. "Environmental Protection, Consumer Awareness, Product Characteristics, and Market Power," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-05, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2007s-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Brécard, Dorothée, 2014. "Consumer confusion over the profusion of eco-labels: Lessons from a double differentiation model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 64-84.
    2. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO.
    3. Dorothée Brécard, 2017. "Consumer misperception of eco-labels, green market structure and welfare," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 340-364, June.
    4. Burani, Nadia & Mantovani, Andrea, 2020. "Non-linear pricing and conscious consumption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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    Keywords

    environmental protection; consumer awareness; product characteristics; market power; protection environnementale; consommateurs verts; caractéristiques des produits; pouvoir de marché;
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