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- M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, April.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2001. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," CSEF Working Papers 75, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jan 2004.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Corporate control; Private benefits; Takeovers; Esops; Employment protection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2003-03-14 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-LAW-2003-03-14 (Law and Economics)
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