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Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions
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Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

Author

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  • Catenaro, Marco
  • Vidal, Jean-Pierre

Abstract

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary. JEL Classification: E61, H87

Suggested Citation

  • Catenaro, Marco & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2003. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Working Paper Series 259, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2003259
    Note: 76996
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp259.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2014. "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 263-278.
    2. Jun‐ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamura & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2016. "Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(4), pages 1599-1630, November.
    3. Ascari, Guido & Rankin, Neil, 2007. "Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 708-723, December.
    4. Wolfgang Eggert & Jun-Ichi Itaya, 2014. "Tax Rate Harmonization, Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 796-823, October.
    5. Jun-ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamura & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2010. "Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 3240, CESifo.
    6. Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2014. "Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 461, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Wenming Wang & Keisuke Kawachi & Hikaru Ogawa, 2014. "Fiscal Transfer in a Repeated-Interaction Model of Tax Competition," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(4), pages 556-566, December.
    8. Sonja Brangewitz & Sarah Brockhoff, 2012. "Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition," Working Papers CIE 48, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    9. repec:hok:dpaper:259 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jun-ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamura & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2011. "On the Sustainability of Partial Tax Harmonization among Asymmetric Countries," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-540, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    11. repec:hok:dpaper:286 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Folgt die Steuerpolitik in der EU der Logik des Steuerwettbewerbs," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 256/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    13. Patrice Pieretti & Skerdilajda Zanaj & Benteng Zou, 2012. "On the long run economic performance of small economies," DEM Discussion Paper Series 12-14, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    14. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2018. "Self-enforcing capital tax coordination," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 915-940, September.
    15. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2013. "The Dynamics of the Location of Firms – A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition," DEM Discussion Paper Series 13-15, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    16. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2008. "Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2403-2411, December.
    17. Han, Yutao & Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Asymmetric competition among nation states: A differential game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 71-79.
    18. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2014. "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 263-278.
    19. Krishanu Karmakar & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Fiscal Competition versus Fiscal Harmonization: A Review of the Arguments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1431, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    20. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Fiscal Issues; Policy Co-ordination;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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