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Imperfect Competition and Congestion in a City with asymmetric subcenters
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Imperfect Competition and Congestion in a City with asymmetric subcenters

Author

Listed:
  • André de Palma
  • Fay Dunkerley
  • Stef Proost

Abstract

This paper develops a model for the monopolistic competition of subcenters for the shoppers and workers of a central city. The model is an extension of the de Palma & Proost (2004) model that is limited to the symmetric case. Inhabitants of a CBD can choose one of the subcenters to buy a differentiated product and choose one of the subcenters to supply differentiated labour. The subcenters compete in prices and wages and the access to the subcenters can be congested. The short term and free entry equilibria are studied. As general properties are rare in the non-symmetrical monopolistic competition case, this paper draws more on numerical examples than on hard theorems. Starting from a symmetric base case, the paper explores the effects on welfare and number of subcenters of introducing diversity in the distances to the subcenter, quality of the subcenters, congestion and attractiveness of the subcenter as workplace. The paper shows cases where asymmetry can increase welfare and where the order in which firms enter the market matters for the equilibrium outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • André de Palma & Fay Dunkerley & Stef Proost, 2004. "Imperfect Competition and Congestion in a City with asymmetric subcenters," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 544091, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:544091
    Note: paper number ETE WP 2004-11
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    File URL: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/392563
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:2:p:113-35 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Simon P. Anderson & André de Palma, 2001. "Product Diversity in Asymmetric Oligopoly: Is the Quality of Consumer Goods too Low?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 113-135, June.
    3. Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-179, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Andre De Palma & Fay Dunkerley & Stef Proost, 2010. "Trip Chaining: Who Wins Who Loses?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 223-258, March.
    2. Fay Dunkerley & Andre De Palma & Stef Proost, 2009. "Spatial Asymmetric Duopoly With An Application To Brussels' Airports," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 529-553, August.
    3. Sun, Weizeng & Guo, Dongmei & Li, Qiang & Fang, Haidong, 2021. "School runs and urban traffic congestion: Evidence from China," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    4. Vandyck, Toon & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2018. "Regional labor markets, commuting, and the economic impact of road pricing," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 217-236.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies

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