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Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods
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Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods

Author

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  • Douglas Gale
  • Robert W. Rosenthal

Abstract

We explore a dynamic, competitive model for experience goods and study an equilibrium for it in which firms plan initially to produce high quality at low price, then high quality at high price, then low quality at high price. Each consumer is aware that all firms eventually intend to run down their reputations at customers' expense, yet he rationally chooses to wait for direct evidence that the firm to which he is attached has already entered into the exploitative phase.
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Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods," Papers 0035, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0035
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    Cited by:

    1. K. Chau & S. Wong & C. Yiu, 2007. "Housing Quality in the Forward Contracts Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 313-325, April.
    2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    3. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, "undated". ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    4. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Manolis Galenianos & Alessandro Gavazza, 2017. "A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 858-896, March.
    6. Arthur Campbell & C. Matthew Leister & Yves Zenou, 2020. "Word‐of‐mouth communication and search," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 676-712, September.
    7. González, María P. & Scartascini, Carlos, 2023. "Increasing the Use of Telemedicine: A Field Experiment," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12850, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Manolis Galenianos & Alessandro Gavazza, 2014. "A Quantitative Analysis of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 53, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    9. J. Miguel Villas‐Boas, 2006. "Dynamic Competition with Experience Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 37-66, March.
    10. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    11. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    12. Hortacsu, Ali, 2005. "Trust and Reputation on eBay: Micro and Macro Perspectives," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vj7d50q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    13. Rutherford, William & McGimpsey, William & Narayan, Prakash, 2013. "Evaluation of New Zealand’s regulatory framework to support the reputation of horticultural commodity exports," 2013 Conference, August 28-30, 2013, Christchurch, New Zealand 187038, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    14. Steven Tadelis, 1999. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
    15. Simon Board & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2022. "A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 44-80, May.
    16. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2000. "Competing with Experience Goods," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0771, Econometric Society.
    17. Tara Mitchell, 2016. "Quality Observability and the Structure of Agricultural Supply Chains," Trinity Economics Papers tep1316, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    18. Mitchell, Tara, 2022. "Paying for Unobservable Quality: Moral Hazard and the Challenges of Maintaining Quality along the Supply Chain," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 47(2), May.
    19. Panzar John C & Savage Ian, 2011. "Does a Minimum Quality Standard Always Reduce the Price of High Quality Products?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-32, June.
    20. Christian Matt & Thomas Hess, 2016. "Product fit uncertainty and its effects on vendor choice: an experimental study," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 26(1), pages 83-93, February.
    21. Bing Jing, 2011. "Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 451-473, June.
    22. Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 53-74, February.

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