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Sanzioni antitrust e vaglio giurisdizionale: uno sguardo alla tecnica di quantificazione
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Sanzioni antitrust e vaglio giurisdizionale: uno sguardo alla tecnica di quantificazione

Author

Listed:
  • Angelo Castaldo

    (Università Sapienza di Roma - Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici, Filosofici ed Economici)

  • Marco Grantaliano
  • Nicola Faraone

Abstract

Da una disamina ad ampio spettro della casistica antitrust italiana in tema di intese e abuso di posizione dominante è emersa un’elevata propensione del giudice amministrativo nazionale a rideterminare (nel 52% dei casi) l’importo delle sanzioni pecuniarie comminate dall’Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM). Tale considerazione sembra confermata, in ottica comparativa, dal basso tasso di ricorsi accolti (10%) presso la Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea in tema di contenzioso antitrust. Da tale evidenza emergono alcuni quesiti. Il Giudice, quando esercita il suo sindacato di merito, si attiene alla stessa metodologia su cui si basa l’Autorità ? Modificando la sanzione, incide sulla funzione deterrente della stessa. Quindi: emerge un rischio di inficiare la capacità deterrente della sanzione? Su tale sfondo, il presente lavoro indaga le modalità con cui il giudice amministrativo italiano motiva e lega, nel dispositivo, l’accolto con l’effettiva rideterminazione eseguita. L’analisi sui casi parte da un dataset composto da n. 524 sanzioni AGCM comminate per abuso di posizione dominante e intese nel periodo 2000-2015. Per analizzare l’approccio implementato dal giudice amministrativo si sono vagliati tutti i casi (n. 119) di procedimenti con sanzioni rideterminate a seguito di ricorso giurisdizionale. Le risultanze dell’analisi condotta portano a ritenere fondato il timore che l’opera del Giudice possa occasionalmente, tramite l’attività di ridetermina, incidere sull’efficienza ed efficacia complessiva dell’apparato sanzionatorio antitrust. Tale rischio, andatosi attenuando nel tempo, può derivare da una incertezza metodologica alla base del calcolo della sanzione. Incertezza che si ritiene tanto più ampia quanto maggiore è il distacco logico dalla tecnica tracciata nelle guidelines.

Suggested Citation

  • Angelo Castaldo & Marco Grantaliano & Nicola Faraone, 2018. "Sanzioni antitrust e vaglio giurisdizionale: uno sguardo alla tecnica di quantificazione," Public Finance Research Papers 33, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome.
    • Handle: RePEc:gfe:pfrp00:00033
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sanzioni antitrus; Vaglio giurisdizionale; Linee guida Antitrust.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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