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Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion
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Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion

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Abstract

This paper uses the rules of engineering as a rhetorical device to discuss why the international financial architecture needs a structured mechanism for dealing with sovereign insolvency. The paper suggests that the most important problem with the statusquo relates to delayed defaults and sketches a proposal aimed at mitigating this problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugo Panizza, 2013. "Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion," IHEID Working Papers 03-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp03-2013
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    1. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    2. Kathrin Berensmann & Angélique Herzberg, 2009. "Sovereign Insolvency Procedures – A Comparative Look At Selected Proposals," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 856-881, December.
    3. Yeyati, Eduardo Levy & Panizza, Ugo, 2011. "The elusive costs of sovereign defaults," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 95-105, January.
    4. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    5. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2014. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, April.
    6. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-8.
    7. Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 85-90, May.
    8. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 2000. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt46p4z4c4, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    9. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2007. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 901-924, December.
    10. Dooley, Michael P., 2000. "International financial architecture and strategic default: can financial crises be less painful?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 361-377, December.
    11. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Raffer, Kunibert, 1990. "Applying chapter 9 insolvency to international debts: An economically efficient solution with a human face," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-311, February.
    13. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
    14. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    15. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
    16. Péter Banczúr & Cosmin Ilut, 2006. "Determinants of Spreads on Sovereign Bank Loans: The Role of Credit History," MNB Working Papers 2006/1, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
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    Cited by:

    1. Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2015. "What to do after the clean slate? Post-relief public debt sustainability and management," BeFinD Working Papers 0103, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    2. A. Fatas & Mr. Atish R. Ghosh & Ugo Panizza & Mr. Andrea F Presbitero, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," IMF Working Papers 2019/101, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Ugo PANIZZA, 2015. "Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries - The Grants versus Loans Debate in a World without Crystal Balls," Working Papers P120, FERDI.
    4. Jochen Andritzky & Désirée I. Christofzik & Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, 2019. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 20-34, May.
    5. Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2018. "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Quo Vadis?," Africagrowth Agenda, Africagrowth Institute, vol. 15(3), pages 4-8.
    6. repec:nam:befdwp:3 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Consiglio Andrea & Zenios Stavros A., 2018. "Contingent Convertible Bonds for Sovereign Debt Risk Management," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, June.
    8. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2019. "Introduction to the special issue on sovereign debt restructuring," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 309-319.
    9. Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2015. "Capital Markets and Sovereign Defaults: A Historical Perspective," Working Papers unige:73325, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    10. Trebesch, Christoph, 2015. "Kurzgutachten zu Staatsschuldenkrisen," Working Papers 06/2015, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    11. Altamura, Carlo Edoardo & Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2016. "On the Origins of Moral Hazard: Politics, International Finance and the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982," Working Papers unige:82509, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    12. Busch, Berthold & Matthes, Jürgen, 2015. "Ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren für den Euroraum," IW policy papers 23/2015, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; Sovereign default;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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