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Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments
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Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments

Author

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  • Arthur Dolgopolov

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Daniel Houser

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Cesar Martinelli

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Thomas Stratmann

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

Abstract

We study theoretically and experimentally assignment markets, i.e. two-sided markets where indivisible heterogeneous items with unit demand and unit supply are traded for money, as exemplified by housing markets. We define an associated strategic market game, and show that every Nash equilibrium outcome of this game is a competitive equilibrium allocation with respect to an economy consisting exclusively of the goods that were traded. That is, inefficiency may arise from miscoordination because some goods are not traded. Experimental results show players behaving close to Nash equilibrium predictions for auction-like market designs and close to generalized bargaining for the market design that incorporates decentralized communication. Communication improves efficiency, but introduces with some probability outcomes inconsistent with Nash equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Dolgopolov & Daniel Houser & Cesar Martinelli & Thomas Stratmann, 2019. "Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 1075, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1075
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