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Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis
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Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis

Author

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  • Patrice Bougette
  • Stéphane Turolla

Abstract

This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’ characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinanting factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2006. "Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis," Working Papers 06-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:06-08
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    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2006-08.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2013. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 596-619, November.
    2. Peter L. Ormosi, 2009. "Determinants of the success of remedy offers: Evidence from European Community mergers," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2009-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2008-28, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Peter Ormosi, 2010. "The determinants of merger litigation strategies: An empirical analysis of EC mergers," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Anastasiya Redkina, 2014. "Using Remedies In Russian Merger Control," HSE Working papers WP BRP 62/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Julie Bower & Howard Cox, 2013. "Merger regulation, firms, and the co-evolutionary process: An empirical study of internationalisation in the UK alcoholic beverages industry 1985-2005," Working Papers 48, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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