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My bibliography Save this paperTop Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods
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- Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 64-87.
- Lars Ehlers, 2012. "Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods," Cahiers de recherche 03-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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Citations
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- William Thomson, 2016.
"Non-bossiness,"
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- William Thomson, 2014. "Non-bossiness," RCER Working Papers 586, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney, 2022.
"Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3110-3128, November.
- Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS & Lars-Gunnar SVENSSON & Ryan TIERNEY, 2018. "Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Cahiers de recherche 08-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar & TIERNEY, Ryan, 2018. "Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses," Cahiers de recherche 2018-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Tierney, Ryan, 2018. "Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Working Papers 2018:17, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 06 Apr 2021.
- Karakaya, Mehmet & Klaus, Bettina & Schlegel, Jan Christoph, 2019.
"Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus & Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2017. "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Bettina Klaus & Jan-Christoph Schlegel & Mehmet Karakaya, 2019. "Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019.
"Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
- Balbuzanov, Ivan & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2017. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Working Paper Series rwp17-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022.
"Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching,"
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2212.07427, arXiv.org.
- Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2022. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2022028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/438, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao, 2024. "Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.
- Ahmad, Ghufran, 2021. "Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 136-162.
- Ekici, Özgün & Sethuraman, Jay, 2024. "Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022.
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- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Xinsheng Xiong & Xianjia Wang & Kun He, 2022. "A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 98-115, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Indivisible goods; top trading cycles; indifferences; fixed tie-breaking.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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