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Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?
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Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?

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  • John Whalley

Abstract

This paper emphasizes the range of factors which enter country calculations to seek regional trading arrangements. These include conventional access benefits, but extend to safe haven concerns, the use of trade arrangements to underpin security arrangements, and tactical interplay between multilateral and regional trade negotiating positions. In a final section, results from an earlier modelling effort by Perroni and Whalley are used to emphasize that non- traditional objectives may be quantitatively more important than traditionally analyzed objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • John Whalley, 1996. "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?," NBER Working Papers 5552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5552
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    1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1997. "Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 91-123, February.
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    12. Paul Krugman, 1989. "Is Bilateralism Bad?," NBER Working Papers 2972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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