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Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Jurisdictional Boundaries
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Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Jurisdictional Boundaries

Author

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  • Perroni, C.
  • Scharf, K.A.

Abstract

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting. We show that in this setting interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdictions even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Perroni, C. & Scharf, K.A., 1997. "Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Jurisdictional Boundaries," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 498, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:498
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1995-1998/twerp498.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Conley, John P. & Konishi, Hideo, 2002. "Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: existence and asymptotic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 243-262, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TAXATION ; COMPETITION;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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