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My bibliography Save this paperDynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall
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- Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2024. "Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
- Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2022. "Dynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1399, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2024.
"Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
- Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2021. "Dynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall," QAPEC Discussion Papers 12, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre.
- Lockwood, Ben & Le, Minh & Rockey, James, 2022. "Dynamic Electoral Competition with Voter Loss-Aversion and Imperfect Recall," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1399, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
electoral competition ; repeated elections ; loss-aversion ; imperfect recall ; advantage;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2022-04-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2022-04-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2022-04-04 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2022-04-04 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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