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My bibliography Save this paperDebt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: Did the BRRD improve market discipline?
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DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3263375
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Citations
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- Vittoria Cerasi & Stefano Montoli, 2020. "Bank resolution and multinational banks," Working Papers 447, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2020.
- Ulf Lewrick & José María Serena Garralda & Grant Turner, 2019. "Believing in bail-in? Market discipline and the pricing of bail-in bonds," BIS Working Papers 831, Bank for International Settlements.
- Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2022.
"Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
- Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2021. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," IWH Discussion Papers 4/2021, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander & Ozanne, Alessio, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Fiordelisi, Franco & Scardozzi, Giulia, 2022. "Bank funding strategy after the bail-in announcement," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
- Tânia Costa & Júlio Lobão & Luís Pacheco, 2023. "Reassessing bank monitoring models: an empirical analysis of the value of market signals in the period 2008–2020," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(2), pages 206-227, June.
- Vittoria Cerasi & Paola Galfrascoli, 2021. "Bail-in and Bank Funding Costs," Working Papers 472, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2021.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2018-10-22 (Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2018-10-22 (European Economics)
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