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Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation
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Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation

Author

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  • Beyer, Mila
  • Czarnitzki, Dirk
  • Kraft, Kornelius

Abstract

Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no company shares under-invest into R&D compared to owners giving rise to the risk argument. Second, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of managerial ownership and R&D. Thus, managers become entrenched, i.e. powerful enough to pursue their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Beyer, Mila & Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2011. "Managerial ownership, entrenchment and innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-026, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hou, Fei & Tang, Wenjie & Wang, Huabing & Xiong, Hao, 2021. "Economic policy uncertainty, marketization level and firm-level inefficient investment: Evidence from Chinese listed firms in energy and power industries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    2. Khalil Jebran & Shihua Chen & Wanying Cai, 2022. "Excess of everything is bad: CEO greed and corporate policies," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1577-1607, November.
    3. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Ma, Hui, 2016. "Pay for accounting performance and R&D investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 142-153.
    4. Xincheng Wang & Ye Hou & Wan Cheng & Jingzhou Guo, 2023. "How do competitors and partners shape corporate R&D investments," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 1106-1125, June.
    5. Xin Liu, 2023. "Fear to lose? An analysis of CEO successors’ decision-making regarding R&D intensity based on behavioral agency theory," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(1), pages 403-430, February.
    6. Ciaran Driver & Maria João Coelho Guedes, 2017. "R&D and CEO departure date: do financial incentives make CEOs more opportunistic?," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 26(5), pages 801-820.
    7. Yuan George Shan & Indrit Troshani & Jimin Wang & Lu Zhang, 2023. "Managerial ownership and financial distress: evidence from the Chinese stock market," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(1), pages 192-221, May.
    8. Ahmed Hassanein & Jamal Ali Al-Khasawneh & Hany Elzahar, 2022. "R&D expenditure and managerial ownership: evidence from firms of high-vs-low R&D intensity," Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 21(3), pages 654-672, January.
    9. Wouter Broekaert & Petra Andries & Koenraad Debackere, 2016. "Innovation processes in family firms: the relevance of organizational flexibility," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 771-785, October.
    10. Marianna Succurro & Giuseppina Damiana Costanzo, 2019. "Ownership structure and firm patenting activity in Italy," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 9(2), pages 239-266, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; managerial ownership; entrenchment; innovation; R&D investments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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