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China, Brunei: ties that
bind By Prashanth Parameswaran
When Chinese President Hu Jintao met
Brunei's Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah on the sidelines
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting this September in Russia, both leaders
said they were pleased with the development of
bilateral ties in recent years.
Though
relations between Beijing and Bandar Seri Begawan
have strengthened considerably over the past few
years, the future could pose challenges that both
sides will have to navigate in order to preserve
these close ties.
Sino-Brunei relations
are deeply rooted in history and date back over
2,000 years. The two sides traded as early as
China's Western Han Dynasty, and some accounts
suggest Chinese
settlers from Fujian
province arrived in Borneo and settled in the area
now called Brunei in the 13th and 14th centuries.
Brunei's Sultan Abdul Majid Hassan, who
died during his travels in China in the early 15th
century despite the Chinese emperor's best efforts
to help treat his illness, was buried with royal
tribute in Nanjing and continues to serve as a
symbol of the relationship today.
In more
recent times, however, relations were somewhat
distant as Brunei was a British protectorate for
most of the last century until it gained
independence in 1983. Even then, due to various
concerns including communism and sensitivities
related to its ethnic Chinese population, Brunei
on September 30, 1991, was then the last member of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
to establish official ties with Beijing.
Since then, China increasingly has seen
Brunei as a useful source of oil and gas to fuel
its economic growth and a voice for better ties
between it and ASEAN. Meanwhile, Brunei, an
Islamic sultanate with a population of 400,000 and
the fifth-richest country in the world per capita,
has considered Beijing to be a crucial partner to
engage to both diversify and strengthen its
fossil-fuel-based economy and preserve peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
While relations between the two countries
have tightened over the last decade or so, the
last year has seen a particular increase in the
momentum of the relationship ahead of Brunei's
chairmanship of ASEAN in 2013.
Last
November, Wen Jiabao became the first Chinese
premier to visit Brunei in the history of the
bilateral relationship, and both sides celebrated
the 20th anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic relations with great fanfare. Wen's
visit began what the Brunei Times called "a whole
new chapter" in Sino-Brunei relations.
This year, the chairman of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Jia Qinglin paid the first visit of its kind to
Brunei in April, and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi also visited in August. Top officials also
have met on the sidelines of key meetings, as
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Brunei's Sultan
Hassanal Bolkiah most recently did at APEC.
Commercial relations have strengthened
considerably, as well. Trade in 2011 soared to
US$1.3 billion, nearly four times what it was in
2008 and surpassing the $1 billion target
previously set by the two countries. The bulk of
that is in energy, which is not surprising since
Beijing needs to fuel its rapid growth while
Brunei is Southeast Asia's third-largest oil
exporter and the world's fourth-largest natural
gas exporter.
Soon after Wen's visit to
Brunei in 2011, for example, Brunei agreed to
increase oil exports to China from 13,000 barrels
per day to 16,000 barrels per day. Meanwhile,
China's National Offshore Oil Corp has inked a
deal with Petroleum Brunei for oil and gas
commercial exploration, while Zhejiang Henyi Group
and Sinopec Engineering Inc are working to help
develop an oil refinery and aromatic cracker plant
in Brunei to boost the energy sector in the
largest ever foreign direct investment in the
country.
Both sides increasingly have
tried to broaden the reach of their cooperation
beyond energy. Within the economic realm, the two
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) to boost cooperation in agriculture in
April. Apart from increased trade, the MoU also
included more joint efforts in human resource
development and providing training for government
officials and professional technical personnel.
Both sides have tried to encourage greater
investment and private sector interaction. Beijing
has signaled that it would like small and
medium-sized enterprises from Brunei to invest in
"lesser developed" parts of China, while Bandar
Seri Begawan has tried to get Beijing to broaden
its range of investments in the country through a
range of trade fairs, expositions and symposiums.
A recent National Chamber of Commerce and
Industry meeting in Brunei, for instance, saw a
Chinese delegation comprising government
representatives from various industries including
real estate, construction, medicine, and gem and
jade. Cooperation also has been recently extended
to the city level, with Nanjing and Bandar Seri
Begawan becoming sister cities last year - an
arrangement that is expected to boost tourism and
cultural activities.
China and Brunei also
continue to place a great emphasis on
people-to-people ties, which CPPCC chairman Jia
Qinglin singled out as one of the four ways to
enhance bilateral cooperation during his visit
earlier this year. For Brunei, the main focus is
on tourism because aside from its ASEAN neighbors,
China brings the most tourists into Brunei.
Beijing and Bandar Seri Begawan have also
both been paying increasing attention to the role
of youth in bilateral ties. Chinese youth groups
have paid visits to Brunei, and the Universiti
Brunei Darussalam and Zhejiang University forged
an official partnership in July this year,
initiatives that not only cement
inter-generational ties between the two nations,
but also potentially could provide Brunei with
young investors or graduates interested in working
or doing business there.
The ceremonial
dimension of people-to-people ties also should not
be overlooked. China continues to invest a great
deal in emphasizing the rich history of the
relationship, promoting the China-Brunei
Friendship Hall completed in 2006 and the Brunei
Heritage Garden unveiled in 2008 - both of which
are located in Nanjing where the former Brunei
sultan is buried. For Brunei's part, the
Brunei-China Friendship Association founded in
2006 continues to promote ties through events
including cultural exchanges and exhibits.
Yet, despite the great strides in
Sino-Brunei relations over the past few years, the
relationship still has its limits, which could
pose challenges for both sides in the coming
years. First and most obviously, China is only one
of Brunei's key partners, and the sultanate has
boosted its relationships with a wide variety of
actors over the past few years ranging from the
United States and the European Union to the its
ASEAN neighbors and Russia in order to diversify
its options.
While this is natural, it is
a tricky balancing act to maintain, particularly
for a very small country that is trying to manage
ties with much larger powers and is acutely
sensitive to fears of entrapment or abandonment.
What would happen if, for instance,
tensions between Washington and Beijing should
increase in the Asia-Pacific in the future? Bandar
Seri Begawan would find itself in the middle of a
great power rivalry and potentially have to choose
sides, which could pose challenges for its
diversification strategy. Neither the United
States nor China would like being spurned, and
Beijing in particular has demonstrated its
tendency to use economic coercion in certain
circumstances to make its displeasure known. [1]
Second, Brunei's preferred low-key
approach to dealing with contentious issues may be
challenged as it assumes a very public role as
ASEAN chair in 2013, at a crucial time for the
organization. The country has a long tradition of
avoiding confrontation and trying to resolve
differences peacefully with mutual respect and
consensus as embodied in the approach of its
foreign minister, Prince Mohamed Bolkiah. [2]
For instance, despite having a sovereignty
claim over the Louisa Reef, a small atoll in the
South China Sea that overlaps with Chinese (and
Malaysian) claims, the sultanate has not occupied
any of the territory and tends to downplay the
issue with Beijing by focusing on multilateral
mechanisms for dispute resolution and joint
development.
Similarly, at the ASEAN
deliberations in July this year that were hosted
by Cambodia and infamously produced no joint
communique because of differences over the South
China Sea, Brunei simply said it would be "guided
by" the decision of the ASEAN chair. This
contrasts with the other Southeast Asian
compatriots and South China Sea claimants that
insisted on a reference to the dispute. [3]
As the ASEAN chair next year, Brunei will
not have the luxury of simply deferring to other
countries or remaining neutral on what to do about
the South China Sea question. While it may be
tempted to once again downplay or sidestep the
issue to avoid angering Beijing, doing so may risk
undermining ASEAN unity as Vietnam, the
Philippines and other members may want a tougher
line.
Third, fundamental domestic
challenges also exist for both sides further down
the road that could affect ties. For Brunei, it
needs to make a difficult transition away from its
deep reliance on fossil fuels, which now account
for more than 60% of the economy and 95% of export
revenues, that are expected to run out in the next
two to three decades.
While the government
realizes this transition needs to occur and has
had its fair share of successes - like in
alternative energy sources - the shift required is
a dramatic one. This shift entails not only a
realignment of economic incentives and priorities
but also possibly changing the very relationship
between state and society.
The path is not
without its risks for Sino-Brunei relations as
Chinese interest in the sultanate may ebb as its
oil and gas reserves decline or Brunei may itself
face domestic hiccups down the road that constrain
its ability to act effectively in the
international arena. China also faces its own
transition and will need to both reorient its
economy and renegotiate its social contract
domestically while taking on greater
responsibilities internationally in line with its
growing power.
With the growing breadth
and depth of relationships and roles that Beijing
will have in the coming years, there is the
possibility that tiny Brunei increasingly may be
out of China's radar, particularly if the
sultanate's economic and geopolitical significance
also declines.
When Premier Wen delivered
a speech at Universiti Brunei Darussalam during
his visit there last November, he praised
Sino-Brunei relations as developing smoothly based
on mutual respect and equal treatment, and added
that he was "fully confident of the future
development of bilateral ties".
While the
significant progress the relationship has made
over the past few years is cause for optimism, the
potential challenges of today and the decades
ahead may certainly put that prediction to the
test.
Notes 1. For
specific examples and a broader discussion of
this, see, Bonnie Glaser "China's Coercive
Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend,"
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
August 6, 2012. 2. Carlyle A Thayer, "Background
Briefing: Brunei: National Security Outlook,"
Thayer Consultancy, August 22, 2011. 3. Carlyle A
Thayer. "ASEAN's Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?"
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 34, No.
4, August 20, 2012.
Prashanth
Parameswaran is a PhD candidate at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University and a freelance journalist. He has
written widely about international affairs in the
Asia-Pacific and blogs about the region at The
Asianist [www.asianist.wordpress.com].
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