The Existence PrincipleWhen we ask whether something exists, we expect a yes or no answer, not a further query about what kind of existence, how much of it, whether we mean existence for you or existence for me, or whether we are asking about some property which it might have. In this book, this simple requirement is defended and pursued into its various and sometimes surprising implications. In the course of this pursuit, such questions arise as `Do appearances exist?' `Do unknowable things exist?' `Do past and future exist?' `Does God necessarily exist?' This novel and non-technical approach to important philosophical questions will be of interest to senior students of philosophy and, indeed, to all general readers with philosophical interests. |
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Contents
Time and Existence | 113 |
Universals and Properties | 133 |
Necessary and Possible Existence | 157 |
Perfection and Existence | 175 |
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Common terms and phrases
abandon accept actual admit adopt affairs allow alternative appearances applies argument assumed avoid basic becomes beliefs causal challenge Chapter claim clear concept of existence concerned connection consider consists course deny dependence determinate different kinds discussed distinction distinguished doubt effect elementary entities envisage example excluded middle existence principle fact false follows further future give given idea incompatible independent indeterminacy intentional involved ISBN issue kinds of existence knowledge law of excluded limits logical look matter meaning mentioned merely metaphor metaphysical mind move nature necessary necessary existence necessity non-existent noted objects once particular past perspective Philosophy position possible present problem properties question reality reason reference regarded rejection relation remains sense simply space speak statements suggests supposed taken talk temporal tense theory things third thought treated trouble true truth truth-value universals whole
Popular passages
Page 59 - As I was going up the stair I met a man who wasn't there. He wasn't there again to-day. I wish, I wish he'd stay away.
Page 53 - What is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick's being straight but looking bent sometimes ? Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then it jolly well has to look straight at all times and in all circumstances? Obviously no one seriously supposes this.
Page 12 - Man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.
Page 57 - But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
Page 60 - Phenomenology are accounts, among other things, of the various ways in which we distinguish, within our experience, between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, between, for example, forces and the perceptible manifestations of these forces (PG pp.
Page 182 - God necessarily exists" means that it follows necessarily from something that God exists contingently. The a priori proposition "God necessarily exists" entails the proposition "God exists," if and only if the latter also is understood as an a priori proposition: in which case the two propositions are equivalent. In this sense Anselm's proof is a proof of God's existence.
Page 56 - We make a strong distinction between the World As It Is and the World As It Should Be. This stuff that we have to do is in the World As It Is, not in the World As It Should Be.
Page 122 - It will be the case that' ('P' and 'F') are of the same category as negation. The following are well-formed expressions of tense logic: PA . It was the case that A . TR/I.
Page 152 - Hume, it may be recalled, divided relations into two classes — into 'such as depend entirely on the ideas', and 'such as may be changed without any change in the ideas'.28 If we read 'states of affairs' for 'ideas', the cases I have mentioned are those that belong to the first of these classes.
Page 13 - But prima facie there is no warrant for the assumption, still less for the dogma that, because all experience implies a mind, that which is experienced owes its being and its qualities to mind. Minds are but the most gifted members known to us in a democracy of things. In respect of being or reality all existences are on an equal footing.