Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

CFR experts discussed developments in the Middle East and the implications of the death of the leader of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar. LABOTT: Thanks very much. And thank you to all of you for joining today for the CFR media briefing. I feel like just a few weeks ago we were here talking about the—in advance of the October 7 one year anniversary, and there were so many developments to talk about. And now we have so many more. So and we have another really stellar panel to join us today. I’m going to have, you know, a conversation with the panelists for about a half hour. Then we’re going to open it up to questions from the audience. We particularly welcome members of—questions from members of the media. And just a reminder that this is on the record.   So let me introduce the panel right now.  Steven A. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies here at CFR, and also the author of a new book, which is excellent, if I could give a little plug for you, Steven.  COOK: Thank you.   LABOTT: The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. Hot off the presses.  Bruce Hoffman, the Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  And back in business here at CFR is Ed Husain, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.   So let’s just jump right into it. Bruce, you know, we’ve said before, you know, Israel was trying to change the status quo here with not just the killing of Sinwar but, you know, with this—with this whole post-October 7th military campaign in Gaza. You know, there’s a lot of questions about now whether Israel would be seeking a truce with the killing of Sinwar’s death, but you say that’s not the right question. How does this change Israel’s strategy for a complete military victory over Hamas, if that’s even possible? And what might a post-Hamas Gaza look like? Does Hamas keep fighting under new leadership? Does this prolong the war? Set the scene for us where we’re going right now.  HOFFMAN: Right. Well, there’s been a lot of talk about ceasefires or truces, but ceasefires are generally entered into in warfare when there’s some sort of a stalemate and truces arise when both sides are exhausted. I mean, what’s clear is that in the past month the center of gravity in this war has shifted, whether it’s decisively or not, but it seems more decisively than ever in Israel’s favor.   A lot of the arguments that the Biden administration made about fears of expanding the war to the southern Gaza, the efforts to blunt an IDF offensive into Rafah, you know, were ignored for the reason that, exactly as you described, Elise, Israel—which I’m not sure was understood in Washington—that Israel was looking for a new status quo, not a return to the status quo ante, that would have given rise to, in the future, the sixth Gaza war. I mean, don’t forget, for the past decade and a half there’s been five wars fought between Israel and Hamas. So I think in this stage, and judging from what Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategy has been, it’s to prevent that sixth war and to change the security dynamic.  This is an evanescent opportunity perhaps to do so. It is true that leadership decapitation in the past has not been a magic solution that has ended a terrorist campaign. But let’s face it, this is a very different terrorist campaign. It’s one—a counterterrorist campaign, I should say. Sorry. It’s one that has accounted, tragically, for so much civilian death, suffering, deprivation, certainly. But it’s also at least halved, if not more than halved, Hamas’ fighting capability.   The fact that Sinwar was killed above ground and not in the tunnels means that the IDF’s strategy of at least paring back that huge universe of tunnels has succeeded. By taking out the tunnels, the IDF is also systematically dismantling Hamas’ military capabilities, to make good on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s pledge that Hamas will never be able to stage another October 7 attack. And let’s roll this back. A year ago when Sinwar, Haniyeh, and others were promising, you know, waves of future Al-Aqsa Floods.   So for me, it’s, you know, does Israel now accept the calls for a ceasefire, when it has a very rare opportunity to defeat Hamas? Which is different from destroying it. As a political movement and an ideological, it will never be completely eliminated. But to defeat it and to ensure that it cannot, for the foreseeable future—I mean, everything in the Middle East is evanescent—for the foreseeable future pose a threat to Israel?  LABOTT: Well, I want to talk about, you know, kind of Israel’s strategy in a minute. But, Bruce, just quickly, and then I want to go to Ed on this, you know, given the importance of Sinwar in both the military and political capacities, you know, how challenging is it for Hamas to replace him? And does the organization kind of continue to remain unified under new leadership to continue the struggle?  HOFFMAN: Well, even if they do replace him—and his brother Mohammed is one of the leading contenders—given Israel’s success, and obviously the success has come from human intelligence as well as sophisticated technical technological means, I mean, how long—what’s his longevity like? It doesn’t—his actuarial table doesn’t look very good, compared to the other leaders of Hamas. And let me just add—finish on one point, so we can move on. You know, it’s often said there’s not a military solution to terrorism. That’s not true. There’s very rarely a military solution. That is entirely accurate. But if you were willing to kill tens of thousands of civilians, as Israel has been willing to, if you’re willing to decapitate almost the entirety of a terrorist organization, you could pretty much destroy it.   And there is precedence for that. In 2008, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces—completely oblivious to international outcries over humanitarian concerns over at least the 40,000 Tamils civilians that were believed to be killed—destroyed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam and killed its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, and the entire leadership. And that was a similarly international and entrenched terrorist group that has not arisen. I don’t foresee exactly the same scenario in Israel and Palestine or in Gaza, but Israel now is faced with this choice whether to push on with what Netanyahu, I’m sure, will see as an historic opportunity to deal a crushing blow to—or, at least to hope to deal a crushing blow to a terrorist group, or does he stop? From my perspective, I don’t see why he would stop. But I guess we’ll see about that.   LABOTT: OK, Ed, let’s pick up on that—on the kind of future of Hamas. Could someone like—you know, we talk about the brother. Could someone like Khaled Mashal steer Hamas away from the Iranian axis towards a more diplomatically inclined future? There’s been some talk about that. Or with Hamas, you know, kind of potentially weakened in Gaza, is there, like, a rebranding of Islamist movements in the—in the Palestinian territories as kind of new leadership emerges? Could the group splinter into more radical factions or even kind of inspire similar movements around the region?  HUSAIN: Thank you, Elise, for you—for your question. And thank you, everyone, for joining us this morning.  In the last two hours, Khalil al-Hayya has made a broadcast from Gaza for about six minutes, which has been repeatedly played on Al Jazeera out of Qatar, to explain Hamas’ next move. So we’ve already seen Hamas move toward someone inside Gaza as the voice, as the leader, as the spokesperson, rather than someone such as Khaled Meshal out of Doha in Qatar. Khaled Meshal may be respected in Iran and may be respected in Qatar, but he doesn’t enjoy popular command inside Gaza. And the Israelis want to be able to deal with someone inside Gaza, as will Israel, America, and our Arab allies on the day after the war.  It's worth bearing in mind that while we in the West want to put a lot of pressure on Israel to come to some kind of truce or ceasefire, Khalil al-Hayya this morning went out of his way—because, you know, it’s Friday prayers in the Middle East, millions are out praying; and it will be Shabbat, as most of our participants know, later today and over tomorrow. So his message is the following, that Hamas will not end the war. Hamas wants to see all Israeli soldiers withdraw from Gaza. Hamas will not release the hostages. And Hamas, as per its usual talking points, wants to have Jerusalem as its capital in a future Palestinian state.  Now, we may say, well, those are just talking points and we can ignore them. I’d caution against that kind of ignoring because the Western or the American insensitivity towards this had led to October 7. We don’t take them seriously when they say that they want to kill more Jewish people, they want to kill more Israelis, and they want to kill Arabs and Muslims who get in the way. So Hamas is very, very direct in what it wants. So I would—I would encourage us to think about how do we place even more pressure on Hamas and its paymaster, Iran, rather than a country—i.e., Israel in this case—facing an existential threat. And it’s not longer just me saying this anymore; we’ve had Hamas, after a whole year of being attacked, still wanting to continue. And we saw them lobbing rockets as late as October 7 of this year, never mind last year.  A couple of other points, if I may, Elise, before, you know, my friend and colleague Steven shares his latest thoughts.  The Hamas leadership now, trained under Yahya Sinwar, knows how much treasure, blood, and diplomatic capital Israel will put towards releasing the hostages. And we must not forget Yahya Sinwar was a product of this kind of exchange back in 2011 in order to get the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit released. I think Israel—  LABOTT: Right.  HUSAIN: So just over a thousand Palestinian terrorists, among whom Yahya Sinwar was the most senior. So they’ve seen how much Israel is prepared to sacrifice, so their demand, Khalil al-Hayya this morning said to release all Hamas or Palestinian prisoners. So that’s part of—part of what they want. And I think it’s important that we in Washington, D.C. also push back against Hamas demands.  Just two points and I’ll finish.  On October 7 of last year, Israel had very little respect in the eyes of its Arab allies and Arab enemies, because how could an advanced nation in the heart of the Middle East be forced to lose so much dignity, over 1,200 lives, terrorists killing, you know, 1,200 Israelis; but more to the point, taking so many hostages while Israel was asleep at the wheel. How was that possible that they could just come over on paragliders and tractors? So Israel had to over the last year reestablish its deterrence and its credibility in the eyes of its Arab allies, and now it's done that. To be able to go and eliminate a Hamas leader in the presidential compound in Iran was, I think, a hugely impressive move. The walkie talkie attacks, the pager attacks, and now removing Yahya Sinwar, that has allowed Israel to reestablish its credibility in the eyes of its Arab Muslim allies and enemies.  But remains is this—and this is my last point—is that all of this has been possible because of Iranian political-military cover for Hamas and Hezbollah and others to operate. And it would be a mistake, I think both on Israel’s part and our part in Washington, D.C., and broader Western alliance of Israel, is to hold Israel back at this stage. Israel has no option other than to secure its existence by eliminating threats from inside Iran. What those threats look like I don’t know, but I am confident that the Israeli prime minister will not hold back from attacking Iranian assets that pose a threat to Israel in the next fifteen, twenty, thirty years.  LABOTT: OK.  Steven, let’s pick up on that. You know, I think you are, along with Ed and Bruce, in agreement that Israel is not going to negotiate any form of a deal. Is the goal now complete eradication of Hamas influence in Gaza, though? And with this focus on military pressure, you know, how does Sinwar’s death impact the hostages? Could this—I would assume—certainly diminish their willingness to release hostages in favor of retaliatory actions, maybe, unfortunately, killing the remaining ones that are alive?  COOK: Yeah. Thanks, Elise. It’s a—it’s a pleasure to be with you all this morning.  And I’m glad you asked the question about the Israeli strategy here and the destruction of Hamas, and it provides me an opportunity to pick up on something both Bruce and Ed said, which is that in Washington we spend a lot of time interpreting what leaders say rather than taking at face value what they said. And I would say that from October 7 through today, Israeli leaders have been fairly consistent in what their goals have been, and we’ve sort of tried to complexify those things by saying this isn’t possible and so on, and the Biden administration trying to steer them in other directions, and they mean other things. And it’s the same thing with Hamas, that we are complexifying what—people are being absolutely upfront in what their intentions and their goals are.  Hamas’ intention by launching Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was the liberation of all of Palestine, and it was a step in that. And they achieved a number of goals.  The Israelis, on October 8, said we are going to change the rules of the game. We are not going to live like this any longer, and we will destroy Hamas as a threat to Israel.  And that’s why I’m in full agreement particularly with Bruce here about the fact that the Israelis aren’t going to stop. Their goal has been the destruction of Hamas. As Bruce pointed out, it’s not impossible to destroy a terrorist organization. Whether they can do it remains still an open question.  There’s also Israeli politics. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s right wing is—has complained—even though they’re part of the government, has complained over this year that the government wasn’t doing enough to actually defeat Hamas. And now, after killing Sinwar, they certainly will press Netanyahu to resist whatever pressure he gets from Washington to seek a truce or a ceasefire, to press the advantage, and to continue the fight. And as Ed pointed out, Khalil al-Hayya has said we welcome the continuation of the fight.  I think here’s the—here’s the problem that the Israelis are going to confront, is that an essentially leaderless Hamas—we have no idea who’s going to be the next leader of Hamas. It could be Khalil al-Hayya. It could be Sinwar’s brother. It could be Khaled Meshal. Who knows whether any of them have the political support internally in the organization in the same way that Sinwar did to actually lead Hamas from within Gaza or from without. It’s that the Israelis are going to confront an essentially leaderless organization and atomized cadres of Hamas fighters. That will—  LABOTT: Let me just—let me just pick up on that—on that point. Does another group—like, does PIJ or, you know, other groups gain more influence? Could we see the rise of new groups with similar ideologies now that Hamas is, like, you know, leaderless?  COOK: I defer to Bruce on the question of, you know, the viability of PIJ or some other groups emerging. All I’m saying is, is that the Israelis will continue to have to be in the Gaza Strip continuing to fight atomized cadres of Hamas fighters.  Their overall goal—once again, listening exactly to what they say—Ron Dermer said last December Israel’s goal is overall security control over Gaza. We need to be there because we hadn’t been there, at the time, in seventeen years. So the Israelis are going to stay. And there will be a continuing fight. The Israelis clearly have achieved part of their goal, which is rendering Hamas unable, at least in the short and medium term, to undertake another Al-Aqsa Flood-like operation. And they’re determined to make sure that that never happens again. So the outcome is maybe some sea change in Hamas, maybe some new group, maybe some—but more likely, we’re going to see a continuation of what we’ve seen so far, because the fight is still within the Israelis. And at least rhetorically, at the moment, Hamas isn’t giving it up.  LABOTT: OK, hold on for one second because I want to talk about the wider strategy. But, Bruce, what do you think of this idea of the future of Palestinian resistance? Would Hamas lose its grip on Gaza? Would other groups, such as Islamic Jihad, gain more influence? Could we see, you know, a kind of struggle there, particularly in Gaza but in the wider Palestinian territories, of groups seeking influence and kind of favor with Iran?  HOFFMAN: Well, none of them are Hamas. None of them had the financial power, had the political throw weight, or had the fighters they could mobilize. So Palestine Islamic Jihad isn’t the only faction there. And that, of course, is one of the enormously complicating factors for the hostages, is Hamas was not holding all of them. Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine is active there. Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine General Command. These are dinosaurs from the Cold War that have reemerged and saw opportunity when the fence was breached to sort of elbow themselves, in a very minor fashion, onto the limelight.   But I think this goes to the heart of what October 7 was about and how it impacted Israel. And it’s—there’s a parallel to 9/11—or, September 11, 2001. Prior to then, terrorism was seen as a tactical threat, as something that tragically killed people but did not have strategic or even existential implications. We woke up to the fact that—on September 11, that terrorists, at least have an intentionality of exerting some existential—you know, dealing a knockout blow to their enemies, if it was all within their realm. And as we saw in the United States, counterterrorism crossed the realm from being a tactical concern to being a strategic one. I would argue that’s the same thing that’s happened in in Israel.   So for their point of view, having to deal with the myriad of smaller, less capable, less well organized—and mostly apolitical. That was one of Hamas’ strengths, is that it was a political organization, also a social welfare organization. None of the other resistance—quote/unquote, “resistance factions” on the ground in Gaza have anything like those capabilities. So from Israel’s perspective, dealing with atomized terrorist groups, well, that was the way counterterrorism has been for, you know, forty or fifty years in Israel. Hamas was the one who emerged to pull everyone together and succeed on October 7.   Given that that capability has now been—at least indefinitely, or at least for the foreseeable future—taken away from Hamas, and therefore from the, quote/unquote, “resistance,” the resistance groups or terrorist groups in Gaza, that’s not an undesirable income—outcome, rather—from the Israeli point of view. And let’s be clear. And I think Steven can perhaps amplify this, because he was most recently in Israel. But, you know, polling has regularly shown two-thirds of Israelis—at least two-thirds—do not favor right now, a two-thirds solution. That’s somewhere in the vicinity of three-quarters of Israelis believe that a Palestinian state would create more terrorism, not less.   So how do we get to peace now, from the Israeli perspective? It’s ensuring, just as Ed, I think, very accurately described, that Israel’s deterrence capability is reestablished. That reassures the Israeli public. And that the security of Gaza is reassured—is assured to the Israeli public. And that is what from—I think, from the Netanyahu government’s perspective—will move us closer to peace, and another reason, I think, why they will be reluctant to stop right now.  LABOTT: Right. Steven, I want to pick up on what you were talking about, about the internal Israeli political dynamic. You know, obviously Netanyahu has gained support, whether it’s between killing Haniyah, killing Sinwar, all these, you know, attacks against Hezbollah and everybody. There are reports of divisions within the Israeli political and military leadership over, you know, how to handle the war as it relates to the kind of wider should now they go into Lebanon. But those kind of divisions seem to maybe be, you know, thinning as Israel is gaining more success and, as Ed said, more deterrence. How do you think these internal dynamics will shape this strategy going forward? And with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s involvement, does now attention turn more to a wider regional war involving Hezbollah and potentially Iran?  COOK: Four years later, I’m still muting myself. I think the tensions between the government and the IDF have diminished significantly. You know, we’re a long way from the days in which the IDF High Command was demanding a plan for Gaza—a political plan for the Gaza Strip, and Benny Gantz, who was part of the war cabinet, was giving Netanyahu deadlines to produce one, as was the minister of defense. Part of this has to do with the successes. The Israelis, though, have, essentially since mid-September when I was there, described their operations as turning the page on the Gaza Strip and focusing their attention on Lebanon—a conflict for which they had been—unlike in Gaza, a conflict in Lebanon is something that they had been preparing for, for the better part of the last twenty years.   So we’ll have to see how Lebanon unfolds and what’s next in Gaza. It’s clear that the IDF does not want to have a full-blown Israeli occupation of Gaza where they are protecting Israeli settlements. But they are fully prepared to remain on the Netzarim Corridor, this east-west axis that divides the Gaza strip into north and south sectors, perfectly prepared to stay on the Philadelphi Corridor, right up on the border with Egypt. The question is, and now here we’re getting into Israeli politics, is what Netanyahu’s partners on the right might think about the disposition of Gaza. And one can easily imagine, although while it seems easy to imagine this I don’t think this has really registered with the Biden administration.   One can easily imagine Israeli settlers dropping a double wide in the middle of what was an Israeli settlement in Gaza, and daring the idea of not to defend it. I mean, that’s the way settlements, in some cases, have been—have been established. So there may yet be friction between the political echelon and the security services over what to do with the Gaza Strip. But, by and large, until the killing of Sinwar, the focus had been over the last month on Lebanon. There was increased Israeli operations in Jabalia. There was all this talk of whether the Israeli government was implementing what’s called the General’s Plan, which is to lay siege of this area and to clear it out of civilians, and those who did not leave would be targets.  I think, you know, again, the killing of Sinwar has somewhat changed the—at least the conversation. But the Israelis will continue to press their advantage. And that’s in line with both what Netanyahu’s partners on the right want, and by and large the Israeli public wants. Because they are fully in agreement about changing the rules of the game since October 7. The problem is of course, what about the hostages? And that’s where the fight has been to prioritize victory, however defined, or returning the hostages? And but it really hasn’t been a fight about changing the rules of the game. I think everybody in Israel agrees. No two-state solution, no revitalized Palestinian Authority, and changing the way in which Israel establishes security for itself in both the south and the north.  LABOTT: Yeah. Ed, pick up on that, because, you know, Steven, you know, while talking about Israeli political dynamic, there’s also the kind of wider regional dynamic that you wrote a very interesting piece in Newsweek about. You know, talk about—we have this widespread destruction in Gaza, but we also have the Israelis now kind of establishing more deterrence. You have more success. You know, how does the region—is responding to all this? And how do you think they’re going to respond in the wake of Sinwar’s death? Does this shift regional opinion against Israel either way? Is there opening for Israel in its—you know, how does this affect the regional power dynamic with countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE balancing, you know, relations with Israel—and Jordan and, obviously, countries with significant Palestinian populations?  HUSAIN: Yeah. I think part of the answer is in your question, Elise. In the—in the kind of countries you just delineated in your list, I would just add Egypt, and I’ll explain in a moment why.  LABOTT: Yeah, of course. Sorry.  HUSAIN: And Steven is absolutely right that there is widespread disillusion in Israel across the right and the left on the viability of a two-state solution. And the pursuit of that dream, at least in the mindset of most Israelis, is exactly that; it’s a dream. It doesn’t look anywhere near being a reality in the next electoral cycle or beyond.  But at the same time, the Israelis yearn for, crave for more Abraham Accords-style agreements. And I think that’s where the cognitive dissonance lies right across Israel, because yes to more peace, yes to more recognition, yes more abilities for the Israeli population writ large to travel to Dubai, to travel to Abu Dhabi—I mean, it’s interesting that American aircraft are not flying into Israel, but from Dubai we have the Emirates and Etihad and others flying in. And Israelis and visitors to Israel are flying from—  LABOTT: Yeah. There is a kosher hotel in every—in every city in the UAE.  HUSAIN: Well, exactly. Exactly. And there’s a—you know, a minyan now available in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi. And there’s—I mean, there’s a lot going on in the Arabian Gulf.  LABOTT: Did you say a minyan?  HUSAIN: Yeah. I mean, for Friday night shul gatherings, Saturday morning prayers.  LABOTT: I didn’t know that.  HUSAIN: Yeah. I mean, in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi in ample numbers.  Now, that’s where Saudi Arabia wants to get to, and that’s where Israel wants to help Saudi Arabia. And I think to be more blunt, that’s where the current U.S. administration wants Saudi Arabia to get to, some kind of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel backed by an American security guarantee to Saudi Arabia. But over the last eight, nine months, it’s been difficult to discern what the Saudi message is exactly.  I know this is on the record and perhaps I shouldn’t be saying this, but I will regardless.  LABOTT: Say it.  HUSAIN: Yeah, I will, because for the interests of regional peace I think it’s worth taking a hit on this. You know, Crown Prince Prime Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman has in private said on more than three occasions to people who have been in the room that he’s not given in a huge way to what happens in Gaza or in the West Bank. He wants an American security guarantee that allows for Israeli-Saudi normalization. But at the same time, the Saudi Foreign Ministry has been toeing a different line, which is there must be some kind of Palestinian state. And I think they’re not as irreconcilable as they appear. I mean, some kind of Palestinian state, political horizon next ten years, could be in line with—I mean, Steven mentioned Ron Dermer, the minister for strategic affairs inside Israel, has basically been the brains trust on all of this. I mean, his three Ds, I think, give us great hope: demilitarize Gaza, deradicalize Gaza, and then work towards developing Gaza into something that’s much more akin to a peaceful ally. And I think if that’s the direction of travel, there may still be business to be done between the Saudis and the Israelis as per the Abaham Accords, as per the model set out by the United Arab Emirates. But so much of that depends as to what happens in this town here, in Washington, D.C., on November 5 and beyond.  LABOTT: Yeah.  OK, we’re going to go for about two more minutes and then we’re going to open it up to questions.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Let’s keep it short so we can get as many questions in as we can. We particularly welcome questions from media for this media briefing. And a reminder: This is on the record.  Bruce, what about the long-term security of Gaza? Once, you know, the war in Gaza ends, you know—what Ed was saying—how can the international community ensure that there’s not a rise of Hamas or a similar militant group? What security measures, regional and international, could be implemented to prevent another iteration of the conflict?  HOFFMAN: That’s, I think, the most worrisome and unknown dimension of what’s going on today. And there’s a—there’s a profound sense of déjà vu in the sense that—at least that I know it—I don’t see a phase-four plan that Israel has. You know, phase one of warfare is intelligence and reconnaissance. Phase two is combat operations. Phase three is occupation and stabilization. And phase four is moving on, is really assuring a lasting peace. I mean, we’re still clueless about that. And that, I think, is absolutely vital. That has been a criticism by the administration of Israel’s counterterrorism strategy, is that, much like the U.S. experience over the past twenty years, it was great on kinetics and on the use of force but less good in envisioning a lasting, stable, and secure environment. And that’s going to be absolutely critical.  But we don’t know. I think Ed has shed some light on that, the interests of—especially of Gulf countries and of Saudi Arabia of coming in and helping and assisting. Once there’s a plan and once there’s—  LABOTT: Well, making it the new Dubai, right?  HOFFMAN: Well, this has always been the dream about Gaza. And having been there several times—(laughs)—it does have that potential. But there’s a—there was always a long way to go. And with 70 percent of the inhabitable structures there destroyed, there’s an even longer distance to go now. But that, of course, is the imperative, and that hasn’t been—  LABOTT: Well, I’m just going to point out that I spoke to an Arab diplomat—I won’t even, like, offend them by, like—or, I won’t even—one of the countries in the Gulf said, well, now that the Israelis kind of, you know, destroyed everything, it’s going to be easier to build it all up.  HOFFMAN: Once the threat—I mean, the key is eliminating the threat of terrorism. I’m talking about sporadic terrorism, the more tactical variant that has existed, which I think we’re almost there. But there has to be a plan to prevent, let’s say, the alphabet soup of terrorist groups that are still active in Gaza and the remnant of Hamas from engaging in this prolonged guerilla war or prolonged insurgency that would threaten to undermine any progress, whether it’s progress in security or progress in economic development.  And of course, look, the enemy of terrorists—the biggest enemies are always moderates, and always those who seek peace and stability. So there will be an incentive for resistance to whatever phase-four plan is eventually agreed upon and adopted, and that’s why it’s so critical to secure—that’s why the Israeli government will see as so critical to secure Gaza right now.  HUSAIN: But, Elise, if I may?  LABOTT: Yes.  HUSAIN: There’s another dichotomy, just exactly as Bruce highlights, is that there is an attitude in multiple Gulf Arab capitals that you break it, you own it. So Israel has responsibility for what happens in Gaza.  But at the same time, Gulf Arab capitals, especially both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, have said that they are willing to be involved in some kind of development of Gaza, but that should not entail their own humiliation. In other words, they won’t be putting boots on the ground when Israel has counterterrorism capabilities—  LABOTT: Of course. Right.  HUSAIN: —that humiliates them. But they’ve all asked for some kind of U.S. onshore or offshore leadership.  COOK: This is—  HUSAIN: So, so much of this—Steven, go ahead. I don’t want to—  COOK: I’m sorry, Ed. I didn’t mean to interrupt.  LABOTT: Yeah. Go ahead, Steven.  COOK: But just to—not to belabor the point, but this is why these ideas of, you know, deradicalization, development, and whatever are—  HUSAIN: Demilitarization.  COOK: —are dreamlike, like the two-state solution. It is certainly the case everybody is interested in this, but no one is willing to go first. I’ve heard Saudis speak eloquently about a time-limited process towards the development of a state, and that if there’s a plan that they’ll come in. But they’re never willing to talk about what it is that they’re actually willing to do.  In addition, in a lot of these discussions—particularly the ones that come from the Israelis about, you know, what’s going to happen with Gaza—it is something that the Israelis dream up in their own offices and believe that this is an easily implementable plan when the Palestinians are also interested in justice, in statehood, and redressing grievances, especially after so many Palestinians have been—have been killed in this conflict. So the, you know, Gaza as Dubai being—is something that, you know, everybody—you know, people talk about at these moments of crisis, but we are—not just for the kind of practical reasons that Bruce pointed out that we’re so far away from them, but because we’re not actually addressing—it doesn’t actually address some of the critical issues that confront the Palestinian population—  LABOTT: Right. I want to get to that.  COOK: —and their desires, and their needs, or a map for self-determination.  LABOTT: And I want to get to that, and then I’d like Ed to weigh in too. So how—is it possible for the PA at this point to take a larger role in a post-Hamas Gaza, particularly with Hamas leadership kind of decimated? And what would need to happen for the PA to be a viable governing entity and for—in order for Israel to support it? And if that—is that even possible?  COOK: To be a viable governing entity, it would have to not be the PA. And for it to not be the PA, the Israelis wouldn’t support it, right?  Let’s go back to the dawn of the PA, where Yitzhak Rabin was very, very honest. He said they won’t have a supreme court. They’ll essentially be the contractor to the IDF in terms of security—which has undermined, along with massive corruption, the PA’s popularity and legitimacy among its own people.  Now, there are some polls—and how you poll in Gaza during wartime is questionable—but there are some polls that would suggest that Gazans would prefer the Palestinian Authority to Hamas. That’s not too far a leap to understand why. But nevertheless, the PA remains unacceptable to Israel even in its current form given the fact that the Israelis believe—and they’re not entirely wrong—that the PA has been leading in an effort to delegitimize Israel in the international community, has been a leading voice in trying to undermine the Jewish connection to the land. I mean, the PA is gathering diplomatic momentum to throw the Israelis out of the U.N. General Assembly in much the same way that apartheid South Africa was thrown out of the General Assembly in 1974. So, again, going back to what Bruce and I were discussing before and Ed knows well, two-thirds of Israelis are opposed to a revitalized Palestinian Authority administering the Gaza Strip for all of those reasons.  LABOTT: Ed, what do you think? Talk about the future of the PA.  And then we’re going to open it up. I think we have a question online.  What does the future of the Palestinian kind of governance look like in Gaza?  HUSAIN: The PA’s greatest enemy is not Israel; the PA’s greatest enemy is Hamas. The PA absolutely loathes the presence of Islamist organizations. And, yes, Elise, the factions within it, you know; Mahmoud Abbas’ son leading one faction, Hussein al-Sheikh leading another faction. But I think the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates put it best when he recently said that the PA is operating as Ali Baba and the forty thieves, you know? And it’s uncharacteristic of a—of a senior Arab diplomat to put it in those terms, but that was what was leaked out of a meeting that he had with other GCC leaders.  But I just want to say a couple of other things if I may, Elise, very quickly, and then we can open up. It’s to say that for Gaza to become Dubai, it needs its own Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid or Sheikh Zayed, and we haven’t seen that kind of humble, wealth-distributing—  LABOTT: That’s a good point.  HUSAIN: —kind, compassionate leadership. We just haven’t.  My old boss Tony Blair used to say that politics is part performance, part philosophy, and part delivery. On the part of the Palestinian leadership, we haven’t seen part delivery or a clear part philosophy; we’ve just seen performance, rocking up in Arab capitals and performing, from Yasser Arafat until now. So unless there’s—unless there are those significant changes in leadership—philosophy, performance, and delivery—we won’t see a Dubai in Gaza emerge without the—without the emergence of a Mohammed bin Rashid type figure and an entrepreneurial population that isn’t full of hatred and its own identity isn’t anti-Jewish; isn’t all about destroying Israel, but about building itself. And I think those are the bigger philosophical shifts that need to take place inside Gaza.  And the last point I wanted to make is this. And I think it’s really important for us to appreciate where Gaza is on the map and the significance of Egypt—you know, a hundred, a hundred and ten million people next door—while we’ve had, you know, entirely positive, by and large, comments in the—in the public discourse out of the Gulf Arab countries, we’ve had the total opposite out of Egypt. So just yesterday, the greatest religious figures inside Egypt—Ahmed Al-Tayeb at Al-Azhar—has been applauding the so-called martyrdom operations and the resistance culture. And I think we should be seriously concerned when you have leadership of a hundred and ten million people across the border from Gaza applauding the resistance, applauding a martyrdom culture, applauding suicide bombings, applauding jihad, and applauding the elimination of the state of Israel, and what that means for Israeli concerns about their own security and, therefore, Hamas feeling, and PIJ and other organizations, that they actually have support across the border, A, with Egypt, and then further along with Iran and elsewhere. So I just don’t think—I think we should be really worried about the direction of travel in the Middle East.  LABOTT: OK.  I think we have a question online. Please identify yourself and your affiliation.  OPERATOR: We’ll take our first question from Chase Winter.  Q: Thanks for doing this again.  I guess this question is for Steven, but can you kind of look at the U.S. kind of position here? You know, officials were saying, you know, they want to seize this opportunity for a ceasefire hostage deal, which, you know, has kind of been off the table anyways for the last several weeks. But it would seem that we’re kind of facing the same constraints as before, if not even more, right, given, you know, the ballistic missile attack from Iran, expanding—the war expanding in Lebanon, as well as, you know, just the uncertainties that you’ve talked about around Hamas. Can you kind of give me your viewpoint on, you know, is this sort of a perfunctory diplomatic effort just because you kind of have to try, but still going to have to face the same obstacles? I mean, what are you kind of seeing there?  COOK: Well, look, you know, when talking about the U.S.-Israel relationship over the course of this last year, people tend to kind of get a brain cramp about it. There is a difference between the two governments. The Biden administration wants deals. They want a ceasefire deal. They want a deal in Lebanon. They want, you know, some sort of deal with the Israelis about how to go after Iran. And the Israelis look at this in an entirely different way. They want to change the rules of the game. And the deals that the Biden administration has on offer are not changing the rules of the game. And there’s the rub. And that’s the source of friction and tension. I’m not suggesting that the Israelis are right here, but that’s the difference between the two governments that’s a real problem.  There was—had the Israelis not killed Yahya Sinwar, we’d likely be talking about the Blinken-Austin letter. And I think that that is a perfect example of the—where the two governments differ on these things. The Israelis want to win, and the United States wants a deal to reset the situation somewhere close to the status quo. So it’s not—we don’t really need to get too complex about it. There’s just two different views about what the end is of this conflict, and what it looks like.   LABOTT: OK, we have another question.   HOFFMAN: Can I just jump in for a second, Elise?  LABOTT: Yes, please, Bruce. Please.  HOFFMAN: I mean, just to add something to what Steven said, at the risk of stating the obvious. Nothing’s happening in the next three weeks.  COOK: (Laughs.)  HOFFMAN: I mean, with the election coming, there’s nothing—there’s nothing happening.  COOK: For three months.  HOFFMAN: Yeah. Well—  LABOTT: Well, if something happened—we’re going to get—I want to get to, you know, Hezbollah and Iran. But is something happening in the next three weeks—i.e., maybe an attack on Iran?   COOK: Well, no, I think—Bruce, you speak for yourself. I’m sorry.   HOFFMAN: No. Go on, Steven.   COOK: No, I was just going to say, nothing—this is an opportune time for both Israelis and their opponents to engage in whatever they’re going to do, because you have a lame duck president.  HOFFMAN: Right.  LABOTT: Bruce.  HOFFMAN: But also—I mean, look, the U.S. has been successful in restraining Israel in its—whatever its retaliatory plans for Iran were. That’s why the THAAD missiles and a hundred U.S. personnel are there. That was the quid pro quo for Israel going in a different direction, from not hitting Iran’s nuclear facilities, or not attacking Kharg Island or energy. So, I mean, Israel feels, all right, we’ve already—we’ve made that concession to the U.S. I think that’s probably the limits of Netanyahu patience.  LABOTT: OK. Let’s go to our next question.   OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Lyric Hughes Hale.  Q: Yes. Hi.  If we could go down one level further, we’ve been talking about U.S.-Israel relations. But what about within the Biden administration itself? Even if it’s a lame duck administration, within the State Department, Defense Department, are there two points of view about what should be done? Is there just—are we really acting in unanimity? When you say “the United States,” who is “the United States”? And also, what about this—the support—the broad-based support for an attack against Iran? That is something—Elise, I agree with you. That is my question. That is the question, in my view. Thank you.  LABOTT: Ed, you want to take a stab, and then maybe Steven will weigh in?  HUSAIN: No, I defer to Bruce, because Bruce delineated both the likelihood or otherwise on the Iran front. So Bruce should take that. But also, Bruce has got deep relations inside the defense establishment—(laughs)—so I think Bruce can speak to—  LABOTT: OK, Bruce, why don’t you start? And then we’ll go around.   HOFFMAN: Well, there’s the lame duck factor, but I’ll go out on a limb and say I don’t think the Biden administration right now has a lot of credibility with Israel because, of course, the Biden administration for months has been trying to negotiate some ceasefire with Hezbollah. That went absolutely nowhere. Has been trying to negotiate with Hamas. Admittedly there have been roadblocks from Netanyahu and his government, but also even more formidable ones from Sinwar. But the point being is that repeatedly the Biden administration told Israel not to go to south Gaza, not even to touch Rafah. And of course, the vice president was explicit. She said she had looked at the map and Israel shouldn’t go in.   Well, Sinwar wouldn’t be dead. Hamas wouldn’t be as weakened as it is if Israel had listened to U.S. advice. So that’s why I think right now they’ve taken the advice on Iran, because that’s even a bigger strategic issue with lots of regional implications. I’m not sure they’re going to listen to the U.S. They feel a lot of what the administration is saying is driven by the presidential election, about priorities, and about one state in particular that, whatever polls you read, says is absolutely critical for the pathway in the electoral college. So in that sense, nothing will happen. But also, I think Israel isn’t going to listen to the Biden administration that much right now.   And then finally, I think Israel has responded that in terms of what it’s going to do with Iran. I mean, the THAAD missiles and a hundred U.S. military personnel. That is enormously significant. Now, it does give the U.S. some leverage, but at the same time that was to restrain Israel from going, perhaps, to the extremes that more extreme members of Netanyahu’s government, and also people outside of government, wanted to pursue.   LABOTT: So, Steve, the feeling is if Harris wins, she’s obviously not going to want an attack on Iran. And if Trump wins, he probably won’t be that upset. So does Israel take this opportunity in the next three weeks? What happens?   COOK: Well, let me just—and let me apologize. When I’m—when I’m done answering these questions, I do have to run. Let me just underline something that Bruce said. The Israelis are no longer taking the advice of the United States, particularly when it comes to Gaza, across the board. And there’s a sense that—when I was in Israel, that everybody—that the United States has just been wrong on a variety of things. And that the United—that Israel need to stop taking advice from people who couldn’t get it done in, you know, Afghanistan and other places. That may be unfair, but that was their perspective on things.   And they point to—exactly to Rafah. And they point to the pressure that was applied on them after the World Central Kitchen accident that paused their operations for three weeks. And they argue that the conflict would have been over sooner, or they would have been gone from this place sooner, had it not been for this kind of unnecessary pressure from the Biden administration. Again, it may be unfair criticism, but there is—that is a view within Israel, and it is, I think, one that is more widely held than we might suspect. It goes beyond Prime Minister Netanyahu.  In terms of whether the Israelis are going to take the opportunity in the next three weeks or three months to hit Iran, I think it’s not—I think it’s obvious that they will. I’m not entirely sure that I agree with your characterization of the two candidates, Elise. Certainly, you know, the Democratic foreign policy community, the Democratic Party foreign policy community, has, you know, sought a better relationship with the—with the Iranians, through the JCPOA and other—and other agreements. And certainly President Trump, when he was in office, you know, his rhetoric was certainly bellicose when it came to—when it came to the Iranians. But at critical moments when he would been justified in hitting the Iranians and hitting the Iranians hard, he never did.   I’m thinking particularly of the summer of 2019 when the Iranians were taking oil tankers in the Gulf, mining the Gulf. They shot down an American surveillance drone operating in international airspace. And then the summer culminated in an attack on Saudi oil facilities. All of those things were things that could have led to, under the Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine, a robust American response. And the president said, they didn’t attack us. So I’m not quite convinced that President Trump would be so happy with an American—with an Israeli response that risked dragging the United States into a conflict.   To Lyric’s specific question of who’s in charge, is there a—there are differing views. But, of course, on Israel policy, the person in charge has been the president of the United States. There’s been too much—we understand too much about discussions within the administration, about people wanting to do things either slightly differently or more differently, and the president has been consistent in what he has—in controlling this policy.  I have to run. My apologies.   LABOTT: OK, bye. OK, bye.  COOK: Thank you very much. See you all. Thank you, Ed, and Bruce.  LABOTT: Thanks, Steven. Thanks so much for joining us. We’re just going to have one or two more questions. We have a question online, and then we’re going to wrap up. But first, before we take that last question, I’d like to ask the panelists about, you know, this kind of idea of a wider war, particularly with Hezbollah. Ed, you know, where do you see this going? With Hamas leadership being decimated, is this now—do we turn towards Hezbollah and Israel, you know, gets into a wider war with Hezbollah? Do they focus on Iran? What do you think happens now?  HUSAIN: If you’re sat in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv you have a real problem of almost 130,000 Israelis who are not at home in the northern part of Israel. It’s just inconceivable that any country in the world would let that happen, that you would move in excess of 100,000 of your population because they could be under rocket fire and other forms of attack from Hezbollah. So it’s just impossible for Israel to turn a blind eye to the threat that Hezbollah poses, one. Two, Hezbollah is much more heavily infiltrated by Israeli assets than we had previously understood. And therefore, it’s in a position of strength. Three, in Lebanon next door Hezbollah also has a significant opposition to it from Christians and Sunni Muslims. Four, what we have with Hezbollah is a regional isolation of it. So the Saudis and others are opposed to Hezbollah’s Shia pro-Iranian doctrine.   All of those factors are in Israel’s favor to further weaken not just—not just Hezbollah’s ability to threaten Israel, but also Hezbollah’s ability to rule over Lebanon. And I think it’s a much bigger aim. And it’s a much stronger attempt to weaken Hezbollah so it’s no longer in control of Lebanon that poses a threat to Israel in the next decade and beyond. I think we have to just understand that Bibi Netanyahu thinks in terms of 100-200,000-year cycles. And his father was, you know, a historian, wrote encyclopedias. And whenever you sit with Bibi, he recalls these big historical moments. And he, in his head, sees the protection of Israel, and, by extension the Jewish people, his primary focus in life now.  Yes, I understand the historical—the cynicism that, ah, yes, he’s also trying to avoid prison and corruption. But that doesn’t take away from his angst to secure Israel’s future from threats. And those threats include Hezbollah and Lebanon. So to that end, I think, yes, the attacks on Hezbollah will increase. And therefore, the control center of Hezbollah is in Tehran. So you can’t attack Hezbollah without expecting an Iranian response. So the risk there is very much alive and strong.  LABOTT: Right. Now—OK, Bruce, and then we’re going to take the last question. With Sinwar gone, does Iran kind of increase its support for Hezbollah and groups across the region, the Houthis, to compensate? You know, what happens there? And how does Hezbollah respond right now? And just kind of weave in Iran’s strategy into that.  HOFFMAN: Well, Hezbollah, and I would argue too, the Iranian security establishment has been knocked off balance. And, you know, Iran’s capabilities are very severely limited. I mean, as we can see, that they’re—you know, the card that—the cards that they had to play were the two missile attacks on Israel. And both of them were—nugatory may be a complimentary term in terms of their actual effects. I have to say too that President Trump’s decision four years ago to kill Qasem Soleimani, who was the preeminent leader of the IRGC, is looking pretty good in hindsight because that really did deprive Iran of its strategic center of gravity in orchestrating all of its proxies in the region.   So Israel—Hezbollah is an entirely different kettle of fish than Hamas. It’s much more formidable. It’s much better organized. It’s much more integrated into Lebanese society, which also means there’s also tremendous resentment of Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not going to be defeated or eliminated, but I think Israel’s goal there is to pare back Hezbollah’s capabilities so that the threat from Hezbollah is reduced for at least the indefinite future. And I think Iran is very limited in what they can do to defend its proxy, otherwise we would have seen more intervention over the past few weeks.   LABOTT: OK. We have time for one more quick question. If you could, you know, ask your question quickly. And I’m going to ask one of the panelists to answer it quickly, because we are at time.   OPERATOR: We’ll take our last question from Hussein Ibish.  LABOTT: Hi, Hussein.  Q: Thank you. Hi. Thank you very much.   I mean, I’ve been kind of suffering through this conversation because I think it’s sort of unrealistic in framing Israel’s quest for security in purely military terms. You know, what’s missing is the extremism of this Israeli government, which is, you know, really determined to annex the West Bank. They’re pretty open about it. The coalition agreement speaks of Jewish sovereignty and all of Eretz Yisrael—not Medinat Yisrael, but Eretz Yisrael. And the insecurity that Israel faces is inherent in its rule over many millions of disenfranchised people who have neither a state of their own nor any participation in state that rules them, which is Israel. And from this situation inevitably comes, you know, sort of extremist responses like October 7. It’s not only predictable. It was inevitable.  LABOTT: Yeah. Hussein, thank you for introducing that point. It’s very important.   Ed.  HUSAIN: I, with all respect, have to disagree with the premise of the question, because it overlooks cause and effect. If, both in Gaza and the West Bank, there was a willingness to recognize the right of Israel to exist without the increase in suicide bombings, without rockets flying, and we wouldn’t have had the need either for the wall or for, you know, Sharon’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and then what happened consequently, in other words Hamas winning. So, yes, I agree that extreme reactions can be produced by occupation, but we have to ask ourselves why is there an occupation to start with? And on that front, there is a lot to do with the fact that, by and large—and I’m sorry to say this, and I don’t want to say but it’s the truth—that we collectively haven’t had the conversation in recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state in the heart of the Middle East.  Once that’s secure on both sides—in Gaza and West Bank—I don’t think you’ll have an Israel that wants to go out there and occupy and hold land. It’s only there because it sees a genuine security threat. And I think the Israelis say this often. If the PA or the Palestinians do more in combating extremism and terrorism, Israelis do less. If the Palestinians don’t do anything, i.e., the Palestinian leadership, it forces the Israelis to do more. So fix that equation, I think, and you will see Israeli withdrawal, because the Israelis, I don’t think, want to be an occupying force. But you keep threatening their right to exist, and you teach in your schools that the Jews are pigs and monkeys and have no right to be in the Middle East, I mean—and then you produce suicide bombers, and then you produce the PA and Mahmoud Abbas that questions the Holocaust. I mean, so if we can get into the extremism issue, but we have to accept this cause and this effect.  LABOTT: OK. Thanks, Ed. Look, we’re over time. We have to run. I want to thank all of our panelists. Steve Cook, Bruce Hoffman, Ed Husain. Check out CFR.org for more information on these developments. And just want to thank CFR and everybody for attending.  (END) 

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program are collaborating to convene an expert discussion to examine the future of the Middle East. As part of a series of virtual events convened by CFR and Brookings in the lead-up to Election Day, the conversation will examine the escalating conflicts in the Middle East and the policy options and priorities for an incoming U.S. administration in the region.  The series is a part of Election 2024, a CFR initiative focused on exploring the United States’ role in the world, how international affairs issues affect voters, and the foreign policy issues at stake in November, and Election ’24: Issues at Stake, a Brookings initiative aimed to bring public attention to consequential policy issues confronting voters and policymakers in the run up to the 2024 election. Both projects are made possible in part by grants from Carnegie Corporation of New York.

CFR experts discuss developments in the Middle East a year after the October 7 attacks in Israel. LABOTT: Thank you very much. And thank you to everyone for joining this media briefing. I’m Elise Labott. I am the Edward R. Murrow press fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m pretty new. You can see by my empty bookshelf, as Elliott reminded me. But looking forward to working with you all this year. And so glad to be with this panel today to discuss the developing situation in the Middle East, but also just kind of, as we approach the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, look at how we got here and where we’re headed.   There’s a lot to unpack, and I couldn’t think of a better panel to be discussing this today. I’m going to get—talk with the panel for about a half hour, and then we’ll get to your questions. Let me introduce the panel. You have their bios there, but I’ll just introduce everybody.  Elliott Abrams is the senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations. His new book, If You Will It: Rebuilding Jewish Peoplehood for the 21st Century.  We will be having Steven Cook, the Enri Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies joining us momentarily. His new book, The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East, is out right now.  Farah Pandith is an adjunct senior fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  And Ray Takeyh is the Hasib Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies.  So, as you can see, I mean, there’s just a wealth of knowledge and insights here to discuss what’s going on.  Now, we were going to, you know, talk about how we got here, October 7, and the evolution of the situation in the Middle East. But clearly the developments over the last two weeks have really, I think, taken a lot of people by surprise. We knew that, you know, there could be an escalation, but I don’t think anybody really foresaw what would be happening. You know, after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and several other Hezbollah leaders, Iran fired at least 200 ballistic missiles at Israel last night, marking a real sharp escalation in this simmering conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, but also Israel and Iran. Here we have Steven. Thank you so much, Steven, for joining us. We’re just going to dive in.  Elliott, let’s start by talking about how, you know, these miracle workers in Israel over the last two weeks that killed all these Hezbollah leaders failed so badly with what—in a way that they weren’t able to go after Hamas and prevent the October 7 attacks.  ABRAMS: Thanks, Elise. The IDF, for one thing, has been preparing for at least a decade for war in the north. They’ve been preparing to go after Hezbollah. I think still remarkable the degree to which they permeated Hezbollah and knew where everyone was. But they’ve been mapping and charting exactly where, you know, arms depots are, where small bases are, where tunnels are, in a way that they were clearly not doing for Gaza. They were preparing for Lebanon. That’s one huge difference. The other, though, is hostages. I mean, if you—if you think of what the Lebanon conflict right now would be like, what the IDF would be doing, if there were a couple of hundred Israeli hostages held by Hezbollah, it would be a very, very different thing. So I think those are two of the main differences.   The other, of course, is the—I guess a third, what’s the role of Iran? And while it’s true that Iran has more and more over the last couple of decades been financing Hamas, been helping arm Hamas, the relationship is not the kind that Hezbollah has always had. Hezbollah is a creature of Iran. Hezbollah is Shia. Hezbollah is, or was—(laughs)—Iran’s deterrent against a direct Israeli attack on the nuclear program. Personal relations between Nasrallah and Khamenei were a quite personal, and close, and direct. So it’s a—it is a very different story than the story of Hamas and Gaza.   I’d add one more thing. There was a perfect storm on last October 7. That is, in a sense, everything that could possibly have failed in the Israeli system did fail. You know, who was on duty and who was not on duty? Who was in the office, who was not in the office? What happened to communications? I mean, everything failed. They will do need a commission of national inquiry to go over this, but it was a kind of perfect storm.  LABOTT: Steve, you want to pick up on that? I mean, we were here. I was saying before you came on that we were here to talk about the kind of evolution of the situation in the Middle East since October 7. But I think, you know, events clearly have overtaken us over the last two weeks. And we find ourselves kind of—you know, not a lot of—you know, there was a strike in the last twenty-four hours in Gaza. But now we’re kind of looking at a whole new dynamic in the region. Set the—you know, set the scene for us a little bit.   COOK: Thanks, Elise. And my apologies for calling in late. It’s been a—it’s been a busy morning already for me. Look, I think—you know, I was in Israel two weeks ago. And essentially the message that I was getting was that major military operations in Gaza are winding down. Hamas has been broken as a fighting force. There are Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip, but Israel is going to retain a presence there. And, very much unlike the last eighteen years, is going to continue terrorist—anti-terrorist operations throughout the Gaza Strip for as long as is necessary.   And this often makes the discussion—it seems that it has made the discussion about a ceasefire superfluous. Of course, there is this urgent issue of hostages, but the Israel Defense Forces and security establishment writ large are essentially turning the page and looking towards the north. And their view is that, you know, to not undertake operations against Hezbollah is to essentially surrender part of Israeli sovereignty to Hezbollah and Iran. And that’s why they have done the things that they’ve done over the course of the last two and a half weeks, and seem intent on continuing to do it.   Now, what does that mean kind of regionally? Does that mean that there’s going to be a regional war that, you know, people have been—have been talking about? I think a lot of this depends on, first, how the Israelis respond to the ballistic missile attack from yesterday. My assumption is—and I think it’s a pretty good one—is that the Israelis are going to go up the escalation ladder in order to try to reestablish their deterrence and strike some fear into the—into the hearts of the Iranians, which would forestall a regional conflict.   But also keep in mind that, as the Israelis have done significant damage to Hezbollah and are now poised to engage in direct confrontation with the Iranians, they have support. They have support from regional partners. That may not be out front, but it’s hard for me to believe that the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Bahrainis, and others don’t believe that a region without Hezbollah, without Hamas—or, a much diminished Hamas, a much diminished Hezbollah—is a better region.  So they have—they have that support. The United States has—it seems to me that the Israelis have, one, stopped listening to the advice of the Biden administration, though continued—  LABOTT: You think?  COOK: But continued robust coordination with CENTCOM, which is to their great advantage. And so they feel like, you know, the Biden administration, from Rafah to Iran, have been interested in striking deals, rather than Israel really reestablishing its sovereignty and its security. That’s the Israeli perspective here, whereas the White House has broader concerns about a regional conflict. I think that those concerns are real, but the idea that, you know, this would be an all-out war with the Saudis, Emiratis, you know, it seems to me that that’s an unlikely—an unlikely outcome here.   So the Israelis are determined to press their advantage. As I said, they’re not listening to the administration on this. And it will be a function of how the Israelis respond and how the Iranians perceive that response that will tell us much about what’s to come in the coming months. But this is not something that is going to end. Hezbollah is not over, even if the Israeli estimate that it has taken out 50 percent of its ordnance. That leaves, what, 75,000 missiles, rockets, and drones, plus tens of thousands of fighters. And, of course, the Iranians have a very significant ballistic missile force as well. So this is something that we’re going to be with for some time.  LABOTT: Right. Far from over. OK, Ray, a lot going on. Let’s talk—we’ll talk about where Iran’s headed and, you know, what you think its strategic calculation is now. But talk about what the last couple of weeks have done to Iran. Has it hurt their stature among their proxies? Has it—you know, this was the crown jewel in their kind of axis of resistance, so to speak. Talk about, you know, where Iran is right now, not only a year after October 7, but particularly in these last two weeks. You kind of saw that, you know, they’re vowing revenge, but you’ve seen a rather muted, you know, if you call 300, you know, missiles muted. But, you know, you would expect Iran to—one might expect Iran to retaliate immediately, very harshly. Are they playing the long game? Set the scene for us in terms of Iran’s calculations now.  TAKEYH: Well, Hezbollah, as I think Elliott mentioned and Steven mentioned, it was the crown jewel of the axis of resistance. It was actually coordinating between various proxies. And Nasrallah himself had very close relationship with the Iranian hierarchy. He had—he was in the 1990s Hezbollah’s representative to Iran. He lived in Tehran. He was trained in the theological centers. He actually spoke Persian. So there was a close connection between the leadership and Nasrallah as well. So the kind of decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership was bound to elicit some kind of a response, because there are a couple of audiences that the Iranian regime is playing toward—in front of.  Number one, attempting to establish some sort of a line of deterrence with Israelis, because this comes at the top of the August targeted killing of the Hamas leader in inauguration ceremony in Iran. Second, they had to reassure their proxies in some way that they’re not entirely on their own. That actually, the relationship between proxies and patron can be a complicated one, especially when the sacrifices are usually one side. And finally, there’s a domestic audience that people aren’t really focusing attention to. This is a regime that governs by fear and enforces its authority by frightening its population. And being embarrassed and emasculated internationally would compromise its domestic standing as well, in terms of controlling its population, potentially.   So all these things had to be part of a calculation in terms of eliciting some kind of a reaction. The Iranian attack last night, yesterday, that was a very serious attack. It was 181 ballistic missiles, the most sophisticated variety of missiles that Iran has in its arsenal. It was designed to do significant damage. And its failure, of course, again, the Israelis have to make a decision whether they judge the operation by its intent or its logistical failure. At this point, we’re in a situation—we’re in a potential escalatory dynamic where if you can look at it from the perspective of the two adversaries, it’s sort of in their mutual interest to escalate.   The Israelis need to establish their line of deterrence. They’re well within their right to respond aggressively toward what the Iranians did. It seems to be the Islamic Republic’s thesis that whenever it doesn’t like something that is happening in the region, it has a right to throw 180 ballistic missiles over Israel. That’s unacceptable from Israeli position—any Israeli government, or any other government. And I think the Iranians feel in their interest, given all the competing audiences they have, to continue the ladder of escalation.  There is one sort of an off ramp that the Iranian regime always offers itself, namely lying. Abbas Araghchi is on airwaves in Iran saying that 90 percent of our missiles hit their target. (Laughter.) If their target is earth and dirt, he’s not entirely wrong. So the mendacity that the Islamist leadership is so expert at could actually come in handy, to use the Biden administration term, for de-escalation. So, but we’re in a—to add cliches upon cliches—uncharted waters. (Laughter.)  LABOTT: Well, I want to—I want to just pick up on that before we go to Farah. So you said, you know, obviously the missiles failed. And they did on April 13.   TAKEYH: Correct.  LABOTT: So was this kind of a show of force that they—you know, when we saw what happened on April 13, it was almost a Kabuki dance, because the Iron Dome took all those missiles down. Did they kind of know that that was going to happen again, but they—you know, yes, it was, in theory, designed for a lot of damage. But, you know, it’s a pretty good bet that between the United States, Israel, and their Arab—and that coalition, they were going to be able to take them down. So were they really intending to, you know, do damage and escalate this? Or were they determined to, you know, show some force but not escalate at the same time?   TAKEYH: Well, in my opinion—just my opinion—this recent attack was designed to do significant damage. Because if you look at the rhetoric of the—of the regime prior to the attack, it wasn’t a rhetoric that we’re going to escalate and damage Israel. It was essentially, Hezbollah has to be rebuilt. Hezbollah still exists. Hezbollah’s still strong. It was essentially toward re-strengthening Hezbollah, as opposed to revenging Israel. That was the rhetoric that was coming out of the country. So obviously decision making in private was different than the messaging that they were doing in public.   Second of all, honestly, I don’t think any government, including the Iranian government, will like its vaunted defense force to be so radically emasculated. The Iranian regime has spent billions of dollars on its missiles. It has refused to compromise this missile trajectory and ordinances in any negotiations. So I don’t think they actually said, well, here’s what we’re going to do. We’re going to have a barrage of missile that fails. It will emasculate our military. It’ll make us look silly. But I think it’ll be a good PR move.   I don’t think what happened last night was a good PR move. I don’t think what happened in April was a PR—was a good PR move. It reflects the fact that the Islamic Republic’s first line of defense, which was significant projectiles, second line of defense, Hezbollah’s significant missile force, is no longer as much of a deterrent or a powerful force as they once thought. And these two episodes have crystallized that deficiency, to the detriment of the regime, I think.  LABOTT: All right, well, we’ll get back to that because I think there’s some more to unpack about that.   Farah, let’s talk about, you know, first, the impact of October 7, and then how that’s compared to the last two weeks in terms of extremism in the region. I mean, if the October 7 attacks might have fueled extremism, does the kind of success of, and Nasrallah’s assassination diminish it? What impact might these events have on the recruitment and radicalization efforts of other extremists? And do you foresee a shift in how they approach everything in the wake of these setbacks?   ABRAMS: You’re muted.  PANDITH: That’s not good. I said that was a really important question, and I wanted to thank you for it. Two of you talked about jewels, maybe even three of you have talked about jewels. So let me tell you what al-Qaida said about October 7. Al-Qaida said that it was the jewel of attacks in Islamic history in modern times. So we are—we are looking at the last year of an effort by groups that use Islam for their nefarious ends, whether it is ISIS, whether it is al-Qaida, whether it is Shabaab, to, as you just said, radicalize and recruit. And the way in their—the way they’re doing it is it’s carpe diem. They are seizing the day. This is the moment that they can use online and offline tactics to be able to build the ideological dimensions that are not just for today, but for the longer term.   So we’ve been talking about tactics, about what Iran is doing, and what Israel may do. And that’s vitally important. But I take a longer view here because we all know, in the last two decades of dealing with the aftermath of 9/11, that you can’t kill an ideology. And what has happened, as we as we look at the trajectory of events that have happened since the brutal and horrific attacks of October 7, is that each one of these groups have utilized the ecosystem for their—for their purposes. So whether you’re Shabaab and you’re using a pro-Palestinian and, you know, anti-colonial framework to sort of, you know, cozy up to those who are looking at this event in one way, or you’re al-Qaida using it to support Hamas but also saying go after Israel, go after the United States, or whether you’re ISIS, that hasn’t, in fact, congratulated Hamas for the attack, but has used the moment to be able to say, it’s the—it’s the West, stupid. Go after Americans. Go after Jews. Go after Israel.  So from the terrorism ecosystem, and Avril Haines said, this is a once a generation—a one-time generational event. And as we look at the global impact, it’s not just what’s happening in the region. It’s what’s happening across the world that have looked at this event and have been catalyzed to think a particular way. And that’s the danger here. It isn’t just that how do we contain these groups? It’s what’s the ripple effect that it’s going to have on generations of young people around the world who are watching this in real time? And that emotional trauma is one component, but also the components around how they feel about what they’ve seen on their smartphones, what they believe, how they’ve been duped with the myths and disinformation online.   Seventy percent of Generation Z gets their news from social media. They aren’t reading—you know, they aren’t watching CFR panels. They’re not—this is—they’re going to TikTok. They’re going to Instagram. They’re learning about things from the perspective of actual individuals that have an opinion about something. And I’m not trying to make light of what is an unbelievably serious moment, but you can see that if you’re—if the people who are delivering news to you are not factual, or if foreign influencers are going online and manipulating facts and changing videos and making you believe that there weren’t hostages, or making you believe that there wasn’t sexual exploitation, and you grow up believing that none of that really happened, what does that mean for the threat environment longer term for countries like the United States, or Israel, or anybody in the region, but in fact the larger ecosystem of terrorism?   So when you’re asking these important questions about sort of what’s happening around us, I look at it from that perspective. And I look at it—and I’ll be quiet in a minute, but there’s one piece that is terrifying to me. And that is this. When 9/11 happened, we were looking through the lens of a group called al-Qaida. And we were going deep on who al-Qaida was, what they believed, and what are the narratives we could use to stop that ideological pull. In 2024, we now see a cross-pollination of ideological forces. So it is not just a Shabaab, or an ISIS, or an al-Qaida. It’s also the neo-Nazi groups that are finding common cause with groups that are not ideological aligned on other things, but they all converge on one important thing. Which is, they hate Jews.   And which is why, as we look at the rise of antisemitism in our country and in Europe, and you see the anti-Jewish, anti-Israel momentum that has been built over the last year. And I hope that you will follow up and talk about this. But there are societal implications for what’s happening in the Middle East that are right here, right down the street.   LABOTT: I just want to have a quick follow, because—and I’m glad you brought up the youth, because that’s something—and how they get their information on foreign affairs. That’s something we’re going to be looking at at the Council over the next few—over the next year. So everybody stay tuned for that.   But, Farah, you made an interesting point about antisemitism and, you know, these groups. And I found what’s interesting is that you saw a lot of anti-Israeli sentiment and, in fact, antisemitism with what’s going on in Gaza. I mean, over the last couple of weeks it’s almost kind of dissipated. And I feel like it’s hard to, you know, maybe people that have had opposition to Israel—you know, on one hand, it’s been, you know, the innocent killing of innocent Arabs and Palestinians. It’s almost a different narrative that’s hard to square with what’s going on in in Lebanon. And what do you think that is? Do you think it’s because there’s not a clear antisemitic narrative that people can use? Or why do we see this different narrative?  PANDITH: So I’m not sure I agree with you, because I think that maybe headlines are saying that but what we know statistically on the ground is that the rise of antisemitism hasn’t gone away. You’re seeing—and anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, everything is all mushed together.  LABOTT: Right. It’s been conflated, but I feel—and I want Elliott to weigh in—in the last—I don’t know, in the last couple of weeks, we’ve seen less of that as the attention from Gaza to Lebanon, I think, has changed a little bit.   PANDITH: Well, I want to say one other thing, though, Elise, on sort of the way people are perceiving information. I clearly know, and you know too, the horrors of what happens when you don’t believe real things, the disinformation, misinformation component. So what they believe that they are seeing is important for us to keep our finger on. The kinds of hate that comes out of that, whether it’s antisemitism or anti-Israel hate, or, in fact, anti-Muslim hate that’s also a byproduct of this—of the of this last year as well. There is an important component here in terms of how we understand not things in a flash, in a moment, but over the longer term. And that’s what I’m trying to get at here, that the kind of hate is—it’s naturally progressing. Even if you may see a spike up or down, there has been a consistent movement of anti-Jewish, anti-Israel sentiment, and, in fact, anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment as well.   LABOTT: Got it. Got it. Elliott, talk about the U.S. here. We know the U.S. has kind of been cautious supporting Israel, but warning against escalation. Talk about that key challenge in terms of in balancing military support for Israel while trying to avoid this wider conflict, because, you know, they’re advising Israel to, you know, take the win and avoiding escalation. Does this—what does this do to Israel’s calculations? And does it—does it help? Or does it just—Israel seems to be ignoring it anyway, so.  ABRAMS: Before I get to that, I do want to follow up on what you and Farah were just saying, because I think—I do think, Elise, you’re right in saying that it’s been remarkable that the demonstrations, the anti-Israel demonstrations, for example, on campus, seem to be diminishing now when Israel’s victorious in the last few weeks. And I think—and it gives me no pleasure to say this—but I think many of these crowds were energized by the idea of seeing Jews killed, humiliated, raped, murdered, tortured. They liked it. And it gave them new energy. And now the Jews seem to be—all of a sudden, they’re victorious. Now those crowds quiet down and stay home. It’s pretty disgusting.   On the role of the United States, I think you rightly characterize the Biden administration. Of course, there is a problem, which is we are in an interregnum. Normally it would last from election day to January 20, but it started months early when the president decided not to run for reelection. So the Israelis, I would say, from that point of view, dealing with a lame duck president, are a little bit less likely to take his advice.   Secondly, they thought he gave them bad advice in April, the take the win. And they’ve reached the conclusion—and this is not just Netanyahu—I think it’s—I think it’s Israel—that this is bad advice. That they’re in an existential conflict, and they need to show victory. They need to hit back. They believed, as they characterized it, you know, they were fighting this ring of fire, that Iran was surrounding them with its proxies. And people were writing things, like, what’s the future of the Jewish state? It’s going to be strangled by Iran and the ring of fire.   And now they’ve seen their way clear to break it. First, Hamas. Now, the crown jewel, as we’ve said. Now, the strongest proxy seems to have been, I was going to say decimated—even more than—more than decimated. So they’ve seen their way clear now. And they’re striking the Houthis, again, part of the ring of fire. And now the Iranians have responded by attacking Israel directly. And in a certain sense, opening the option to Israel of a direct attack on Iran. And, you know, Jake Sullivan said yesterday that we know the Israel—I’m not quoting—but we know the Israelis are going to respond in a strong way, and basically approved it, in principle.   Now there will be, or certainly are, discussions about what does that mean. But I think the Israelis now as a country have seen a way out of the terrible events of October 7 to reassert their independence and reassert themselves as a dominant—a dominant power in the region. One of several. And put—in a certain sense, put October 7 behind them. They can’t, because of the hostages. But from a military point of view, from a defense point of view, they can. And they’re going to.  LABOTT: Steve, pick up on that. Like, what is the regional kind of perception route? Obviously, no one’s, you know, crying any tears for—Steven. I’m sorry, I keep calling you Steve and I know that I should be calling you Steven.   COOK: It’s OK.  LABOTT: But we’ve been friends for twenty years, so. But, you know, nobody’s shedding any tears for Nasrallah. Nobody’s shedding any tears for Hamas or Hezbollah. You know, a few months ago there was more talk from the region about a ceasefire, bloodshed, we need to stop the killing. And now with this kind of last two weeks, with a little bit of the success of the Israelis in terms of going after Hezbollah, is the dynamic changing a little bit? And now, you know, kind of the Gulf Arabs, you know, it’s kind of you want to be with a winner because the Israelis are saying, hey, we’re killers. And do you want to be with us against your enemy Iran?   COOK: Well, before I get into the regional response, let me just underline something that Elliott said. Is that, you know, my experience in talking to Israelis a number of weeks ago was that they did not think the United States was providing them good advice at all. And that, you know, whether it was Rafah or, you know, the pause after the World Central Kitchen accident, those kinds of things were things that delayed what they considered, you know, Israeli victory. And that now I think we see clearly in Lebanon that the United States’ advice on this is—has not been taken.  Now, maybe the advice of other partners is being taken in Lebanon. I think that, as I said before and as you just intimated, no one in the Gulf is shedding a tear for Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah, Yahya Sinwar, or Ismail Haniyeh, or any of the leadership of Hamas. Although there is, and there continues to be—particularly among populations—particularly among governments that have really extended themselves, though in partnership with Israel, to do what they can to provide humanitarian relief. There’s an extensive Jordanian field hospital, an extensive Jordanian humanitarian pipeline into the Gaza Strip. The Emiratis have a field hospital there and are in discussions to establish the second one. So it’s not as if people have, you know, turned their back on what’s happened and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza—in the Gaza Strip.   It’s just that now the Israelis themselves are turning the page. And there is—doesn’t seem to be a real, urgent need for a ceasefire that nobody really wanted anyway. Really, the United States was the one that needed and wanted it. And then, of course, the families of the—of the hostages. And, of course, Palestinians caught in the crossfire. But—(laughs)—where those decisions were being made, the conflict was not necessarily ripe for resolution or diplomacy, in terms of a ceasefire. Clearly Yahya Sinwar has made—does not want a ceasefire. And Netanyahu’s partners on the right have clearly wanted him to prioritize victory over the return of hostages.   Now, when it comes more broadly to the Gulf response to Hezbollah and Iran, there is—I’m not necessarily sure there’s, you know, a sign up with us, but this is a kind of manifestation of the strategic consensus that has developed in the region over the course of the last decade, particularly as the discussions in Washington about withdrawing from the region, pivoting to Asia, things like the JCPOA, President Trump’s non-response to Iranian provocations in the summer of 2019—all of these countries have come together to believe that they may be on their own to confront the exercise of Iranian power, including those of its of its proxies.  A senior Saudis said to me: We think Iran is a paper tiger with iron claws. And that’s driving this consensus. And the fact that the Israelis are going about doing things to defang the paper tiger of its iron claws—is that a mixed metaphor? I don’t know. But whatever—you know what I mean. It’s something that I think that they can be supportive of, certainly more supportive of the Israeli military operations than the Gaza Strip that has hurt so—and killed so many people. Even if you dispute those numbers, they’re still quite large. But, you know, when the Israelis, you know, undertook a daylight raid on the port of Hodeidah in July, the response from the Gulf was: Finally someone is doing something about this. We’ve been waiting too long for the United States to do it. So kudos to the Israelis for doing it.  LABOTT: So, Ray, how does Iran perceive that? Given the weakening of Hezbollah, you know, the weakening of Hamas, which is lesser to some extent, this kind of new narrative of, you know, Iran on the back foot, and how does this—does this reignite cross—so we see now, like—you know, Lebanon, you know, fractioning into more of a civil war, and Iran taking a back step? I saw Zarif the other day say some—Javad Zarif, the foreign minister say, well, maybe Hezbollah makes its own decisions now. And kind of, like, taking—I don’t know if they were taking a little step back. That’s something that might hurt the hardliners. Talk a little bit about Iran’s kind of strategic goals now. What does this do to its nuclear ambitions? Does it—you know, is this—does this make that more urgent? And how—what does this mean in terms of diplomacy? Is there an opportunity for diplomacy with Iran, if it’s in a little bit of a kind of, you know, shell shock right now?  TAKEYH: I suspect the first order would be the long-term strategy of rebuilding those proxies, particularly Hezbollah, in terms of trying to refurbish their missile arsenal, replenish their coffers, essentially reconstitution of Hezbollah in some way. And that would be a long-term project. How it’s going to be achieved, logistically and all that, of course, remains to be seen. But that’s a long-term attempt to, once again, rehabilitate what Steven called the iron claw. There are other proxies militias in Iraq that are still intact. And in some way, they are more important to Iran’s security, because Iraq was always more important to its immediate security.   But the overall strategy of relying on axis of resistance in order to encircle your enemies with the rings of fire and compel concessions out of them, that only works if the targeted country exercises self-restraint, as the United States did in Iraq, as we had done before. It doesn’t really work when there’s a determination to respond and decapitate the proxy in question. So that was always the case. The Iranians had hoped by actuating the axis of resistance the international community and the United States would impose an armistice on Israel. And the international community and United States did try to impose an armistice on Israel. (Laughs.) It was not—it was not a wrong calculation. Except the Israelis did not want to stop, and Sinwar didn’t want to stop, most immediately. I suspect if he was more forthcoming, you might have had a ceasefire of some sort. I don’t know.  The nuclear issue is interesting here, because the logical outcome of this is that the nuclear deterrence becomes more significant and more important. But that argument is rested on a certain assumption. And that assumption is that there’s an inverse proportion between the axis of resistance and the nuclear issue. The better the axis of resistance does, the less important the nuclear issue becomes. If you look at the way that Iran has expanded its nuclear infrastructure, when axis of resistance was doing well the nuclear infrastructure expanded. When it’s not doing well, it’s expanded.   Now the critical decision that the regime has to make at some point, and some point soon, is whether to detonate. That’s really where we are. And a lot of factors will go into that. And what is happening in the region will certainly inform that, the level of Iran’s penetration by outside intelligence services will certainly go into that. And all these factors have to kind of figure out where and how, if to cross the nuclear threshold. That is a big question out there.  In terms of diplomacy, President Pezeshkian had tried to essentially have a diplomatic opening. Now there are certain explanations for that. Number one, he wants a diplomatic opening because he believes sanctions relief can only come through nuclear negotiations. Number two is, a diplomatic process is necessary to shield the nuclear program at the time where you’re about to detonate or move forward. It’s very difficult for anybody to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities when there’s active diplomacy taking place between United States and Iran. And that’s true about—certainly about the United States. It’s certainly true about Israel.   There’s two things that are very difficult for the United States to do.   LABOTT: Would they be open to that?   TAKEYH: Well, I think there is an attempt to resume nuclear negotiation. That offer has been made. And I suspect that they’re waiting for the next president to take that offer up. And I suspect the next administration will take that offer up. So some of—the purpose of that diplomatic opening, to me, is more cynical. I don’t know if they’re looking for an agreement, but it is a very effective way of shielding your program from a potential retribution at the time when that program is surging forward. But, you know, that’s just my opinion.  LABOTT: OK. We’re going to open it up to questions in one minute. I just want to grab one more question from Farah. But we particularly welcome questions now from members of the media for the CFR media briefing. Remember, this is on the record. If you raise your hand, they’ll get you in the queue. And while we get some questions going, Farah, what happens now in the region? Do you expect a cooling effect on extremist groups, given the last couple of weeks? Or do you expect further radicalization, especially with groups like the Houthis and Shia militias stepping up their rhetoric and action?   PANDITH: I think what we can expect is an escalation of the threat environment the way we’ve watched it progress over the last almost twelve months. And I think the consequences of the emotional impact on people around the world is going to play out. I mean, you’re seeing—you’re seeing weird things happen. So, for example, in the Netherlands, Dutch police, it’s been reported that they are changing their rotations to protect synagogues and houses of worship because—or anything—any Jewish organizations, because they are morally objecting to doing that. You’re seeing societal changes in our country and in other countries around the world, the us versus them. It’s been heightened. The societal fabric is tearing. You’re seeing—you know, we all watched what was happening in the U.K. with the riots that were taking place over there.   These are not planned things that we could have expected to have happen. But the follow-on effect to the—to the changes that have happened in the Middle East, the escalation of events, can present itself in a lot of ways that we haven’t planned for yet. So I mean, you heard the other day the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, say he really thought that what had just happened in the last couple of days was really going to have and play out in in in the U.K. in a very dramatic way. You are seeing changes in even the United States, in the way people talk about each other and about what is important. So you’re talking about—you’re talking about an unknown, Elise, honestly. But it is important that we keep our eye on the ball in terms of the lessons that we’ve learned from this kind of event when it happened on 9/11, which is expect the unexpected and be prepared for the societal impact in ways that we would not have predicted.  LABOTT: And, clearly, we saw that after October 7. OK, we’re going to open it up to questions now. As a reminder to ask a question, please click the raise-hand icon on your Zoom window. When you’re called upon, please accept the unmute now prompt, then proceed with your name, affiliation, followed by a question. We’re going to have a lot of questions. Please keep your questions short. Let’s get as many questions in. No long statements or proclamations. Let’s just keep the questions going, and allow this stellar panel to answer them for you. We particularly are welcoming questions from members of the media. This is a CFR media briefing. So I’m going to hand it over to Monica and Anya, who will go for the questions.   OPERATOR: We’ll take the first question from Chase Winter. Q: (Off mic)—doing this. I’ll try to keep this quick.  Can you—can you discuss a little bit more sort of U.S. policy and the evolution of it? Maybe how you see it going forward? Because we’ve—you know, the—it appears Israel is kind of—really climbing up that escalatory ladder. And I’m kind of wondering at what point, you know, do we fall off of it or, you know, it leads to conflict. Because, as you kind of alluded to, Sullivan yesterday, you know, appeared to be on board for sort of a fairly robust Israeli response, anything against, you know, the nuclear program. You know, you have Naftali Bennett yesterday calling for strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, and the like. So, kind of, how are you sort of viewing this situation playing out a little bit? And how—  LABOTT: Elliott, you want to go to that?   ABRAMS: Well, I think part of the problem, again is the interregnum. That is, what are we talking about? Who’s president? We’re in the last months of the Biden presidency. And Biden’s own, I think, personal influence here is quite diminished. And we just—you know, if you can—I can’t predict what Trump policy really would be. I assume it would—he would—he would be less likely to be trying to restrain the Israelis. But so is the Biden administration. And maybe that is a Biden-Harris policy. I would say, though, you know, the enemy gets a vote. That is, it was Nasrallah who decided on October 8 I’m going to attack Israel. He didn’t have to make that decision. It’s the Iranians who decided, you know, in April and now again, let’s not use proxies. Let’s do a direct attack on Israel. So in a sense, Israel is on the escalatory ladder only because Iran has decided that that’s what they want.   I think the problem for the U.S. here is if we were not to respond we would really lose credibility. And I think the best example here is the Houthis. The Houthis have two-thirds closed the Suez Canal to traffic. And the United States is not really doing anything about it. Got this huge naval task force that is defending itself, that’s playing defense. The Israelis, in a certain sense, have done more in—you know, in two weeks than we’ve done in months. And this is not sitting well with the Navy or with CENTCOM, which has asked for more activity. That’s the Biden administration. Does that continue into a new administration? Because the Houthis are still going to be there blocking Suez Canal traffic. I think, hard to predict.  LABOTT: OK. We’ll take the next question. And a reminder, please share your name and affiliation.   OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Judith Goldstein.   LABOTT: Judy, are you muted?   Q: I’m muted. But I didn’t ask for a question, so I think you should pass on to somebody who has a question ready.   LABOTT: OK. OK. Maybe we’ll come back to you. Next question.   OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Selina Wang.  Q: Hi. This is Selina with ABC News.   I just wonder if you could elaborate a little bit more on Biden’s diminished influence here, and what influence, if any, he has. I know, Elliott, you mentioned before that the Israelis believe he gave bad advice. And then, secondly, we’re just learning from an Israeli official that the response to Iran’s attack will be significant and come fast. What is your prediction on what that response could actually look like?  LABOTT: Steve, you were—Steven, you were just there. So why don’t you let us—why don’t you take that one?  COOK: Well, I think—I think Elliott is right. President Biden has diminished influence over Israel. But I think we overestimate his influence to begin with. I think that when he went to Israel last October, he thought he was buying himself a significant amount of influence. And perhaps the Israelis misinterpreted—or he misinterpreted what he was doing, because the Israelis saw this as essentially a green light. But again, I think over a period of time the Israelis have come to believe that the administration has not given them good advice, that they are determined, as they said on October 8 and 9 and 10, to change the rules of the game. That they would not live—return to a situation in which they had to live under the threat of Hamas, and now obviously also Hezbollah.   And I think, in addition, it’s important to recognize that as the Israelis have turned the page on Hamas and have turned their sights on Hezbollah and Iran, that it’s actually an easier political thing for the president to do, especially this president. Essentially, the Israelis are fighting Iran. And there are certainly civilians who are caught in the crossfire, but not in the same way that they have in the Gaza Strip. And even those members of the Democratic Party who have moved in this way to be quite critical of the Israelis over their operations in Gaza have been quite mute over what the Israelis have done, if not supportive of what the Israelis have done, with Hezbollah, given Hezbollah’s bloody record with the United—in spilling American blood. And the fact that it is the crown jewel of the axis of resistance, a designated terrorist organization.   So I think that there’s not that much advice to give, and that the administration’s policy has been that a strike on Israel would be met with a severe response. So I don’t think that there’s a tremendous amount of effort being put into necessarily restrain the Israelis from responding. I think it’s—the question is what the what the target list will be. And as to the follow-up on that, I think the Israelis have a long list. And to the extent that they want to make a point and go way up the escalatory ladder in order to reestablish their deterrence, I wouldn’t—just as an observer—I wouldn’t really rule much out.  LABOTT: OK. Do we have any more questions?  OPERATOR: At this time there are no questions in the queue.   LABOTT: OK. All right. We’re going to keep talking. And if you have a question, remember to raise your hand and unmute the button, and name and affiliation.  Ray, what happens now in Lebanon? I mean, talk about the destabilization there. Can this all reignite these kind of cross sectarian movements that we saw in 2019? How does—you know, with Hezbollah facing these kinds of devastating losses can we see this—you know, these factions splintering? How does this change Iran’s calculation with Hezbollah? You said that they would, you know, try to reconstitute. But does this power vacuum lead to internal factionalism that might affect Syria? And then, you know, obviously makes Iran a little bit more—a little bit more vulnerable.  TAKEYH: I’m prepared to yield to Elliott, if he wanted to say something, but—  LABOTT: Elliott, do you want to follow up?  ABRAMS: I just want to follow up on Steve and really go back to Selina’s question. Two things. One, why does President Biden have diminished influence? One, because he’s a lame duck. We’re approaching the U.S. election. Two, because, candidly, this is the Joe Biden of the Trump-Biden debate. He has diminished influence everywhere. He had diminished influence at the U.N. General Assembly in New York. So this certainly plays out with Israel.   As to the target list, I’m with Steve. I think nothing’s off the list, but they need to decide, the Israelis. Political target, of the sort of—the sort of thing they did in Beirut. Military target, hit bases. For example, try to knock out locations where missiles are produced. Nuclear target, do they actually want to go for one of the nuclear—one of the nuclear sites? They gave a warning of this in April. Remember when they hit back, they hit the Russian-supplied air defense system around Natanz, if I remember correctly. That was a message to Iran, we can get through. So maybe they try that at this point. They do have a long list, but I think that is the discussion. Agreeing with Steve, that’s the discussion now with the U.S., what’s the target?  TAKEYH: I’ll just say, very briefly, how diminished Hezbollah is in the public imagination of the region. In 2006, it was viewed as a sort of an Arab force that resisted Israel with some degree of success. But then Hezbollah became involved in the Syrian civil war, where it was complicit in slaughtering hundreds of thousands of Sunnis at the behest of Iran. Nasrallah, as Elliott said about an incursion into Israel, he didn’t have to do that, but he did. And how unpopular Hezbollah is within the Iranian public opinion today. It is diminished because it’s viewed as an auxiliary force of a repressive regime. And there are some rumors that Hezbollah fighters were actually participating in the suppression of the Women’s Life Freedom Movement. I tend to be skeptical of that, but nevertheless the fact that that story has gained currency in the popular imagination reflects how diminished Hezbollah has become.   So Nasrallah is not the same figure he was today as he was in 2016. He’s a much more divisive figure. He was a much more divisive figure. So in that particular sense, Hezbollah has diminished its political fortunes, its standing in the region, and now, of course, its capabilities. The Iranians will try to rebuild it, will try to give it money, will try to revive it and revitalize it. But it’ll be a long-term project, and arguably a rather unsuccessful one because Hezbollah may never actually get to the peak of its power and popularity that it was before the 2006 war.  LABOTT: Farah, do you want to pick up on—  ABRAMS: One thing to add on that—  LABOTT: Go ahead, Elliott.  ABRAMS: One thing about Lebanon, one way of measuring this, for two years Lebanon has had no president. It has had no president because Hezbollah has blocked the selection of a president. It’ll be very interesting to watch the next, you know, say, nine months till next summer. Does Lebanon get a president? And my bet is, yes, because of the diminished power of Hezbollah.  LABOTT: Farah, you want to pick up on that? You’re muted. You’re muted, Farah.  PANDITH: I don’t know why that keeps happening. I was going to echo what Elliott said, but I would like to say this: The predictive—our predictive imagination about who the next generation of leaders are going to be is not sharp. And what we need to remember is that influencers from millennials and Gen Z will come from their peer group. And we don’t yet know how that’s going to manifest.   LABOTT: Good point.  PANDITH: So I think that that’s an important thing to consider.   LABOTT: Yeah. That’s a great point.   Steve, we haven’t really talked about Gaza. Why don’t you—you were—again, you were, you know, just in the region. Talk to us about, you know, the situation on the ground there, and what—you know, we really don’t have any answer still to who’s going to run Gaza, how are we rebuilding Gaza? You know, with everything that’s happened over the last month, I think attention not just in the public but also in the administration has moved towards trying to cool this situation in the North. Bring us back to Israel and the territories, and the future of Gaza. And then if I might kind of broaden that, the West Bank is still kind of bubbling under but, you know, it really hasn’t exploded yet. What do you think of that, and how that could affect neighboring Jordan?  COOK: Yeah. It’s a lot of questions in a short period of time, but I’ll do my best to just give you a flavor of it. You know, when it comes to Gaza I think I articulated the Israeli perspective, which is that it’s time to turn the page. Hamas is not gone, but it’s certainly broken, and it cannot threaten Israel in this way that it did on October 7. But in order to ensure that that doesn’t happen, the Israelis will stay in Gaza along the Netzarim Corridor, which is this east-west axis that bisects the Gaza Strip into north and south, and possibly on the Philadelphi corridor, although that is very contentious with Egypt because it violates a 2005 accord between Egypt and Israel, governing Israeli forces in the management of the border between Egypt and Gaza.   But, nevertheless, what’s going to happen in Gaza is much closer to the status quo in Gaza than some new kind of revitalized Palestinian Authority taking over and an international force coming in to provide security and reconstruction. I think what’s going to happen is that the IDF is going to ring Gaza with military force, establish a broader security zone there, retain for itself the freedom to go in and conduct counterterrorist operations—as they have been doing on the West Bank. Which brings me to the West Bank. Which is, you know, there have been ongoing and continuous Israeli security operations in the West Bank in Jenin and elsewhere, in order to prevent that explosion that everybody is worried about.   And it is ongoing and continuous. And it will be. And I think that the Israeli perspective is, it’s about time. And, again, I go back—I keep going back to October 8, 9, and 10, when the Israelis said: We’re changing the rules of the road. We’re changing the equation here.  LABOTT: In the entire region.  COOK: In the entire region. And you had to take—and that’s happening. And it was important to take them seriously then. And I’m not sure, getting back to the U.S., whether the Biden administration understood that this wasn’t just rhetoric, that the Israelis really were determined, given the nature of the attack on October 7, to change the rules, and that they wouldn’t live with Hezbollah up on its border, with Hamas up on its border, under the threat of Iran’s axis of resistance. And they’re going about changing that equation in the West Bank is one of those. There are tremendous risks to Israel there. But so far, at least beginning in the last three weeks, they have gained—they have gained the advantage.   LABOTT: OK, we have a—we have a last question. But I’m just going to ask Elliott for a very quick follow, if you want to follow up. And then we’re going to take our last question, and we’re going to finish up.   ABRAMS: Go ahead.   LABOTT: OK. Let’s get that last question in.   OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question from Christina Bouri.   Q: Hello. Thank you, all. I am a research associate in Middle East studies here at CFR.   And I just kind of wanted to raise a question but begin it with a comment. So we saw recently a sitting U.S. senator making a pretty Islamophobic comment in a hearing. And among many people my age, in the age range between eighteen to thirty-five, that wasn’t obviously perceived well, given that it’s been a year and still are seeing—regardless of what the numbers are on the ground—still seeing innocent children, women being killed in Gaza, and now that is spreading to Lebanon. I wonder how you see that playing out when you look at Islamophobia, anti-Arab sentiment, which has been discussed, how that’s going to play out, as we’ve been seeing a lot in the news, in the upcoming election? Because you have been seeing a rise in either the uncommitted vote or votes that might be going towards, for example, Jill Stein among that community in the United States.  LABOTT: Good question. Thanks. Farah, you want to take that one?  PANDITH: (Off mic)—going to have a problem with this Zoom.  Christina, thank you for raising that really important question. I think that there’s going to be a continued drumbeat of hate across the board, whether it’s antisemitic hate, anti-Arab hate, anti-Muslim hate. It isn’t going away. The statistics are showing that across the world. And importantly in our country, as you just outlined, you’re seeing people respond to images that are very hard to see on the ground in Gaza, with the death of civilians. And also, I want to be really clear, that as we—as we were seeing that that conversation that’s being played out in the political arena, obviously CFR is a nonpartisan organization. So I am—I’m trying to be, you know, very clear about this.   In the middle of the—of this very complex moment, five weeks before the election, you just talked about the fact that there is an uncommitted movement, but at the same time there are American Muslim organizations like Emgage and others who have—who have supported Harris as the candidate. So it is a complex environment domestically, but it is echoing things that you are seeing and conversations that you are experiencing with America—with Muslim communities in Europe. And I think that’s a very interesting component to what’s happening domestically. There’s a bridge of conversation that’s very similar. And I think that’s important to outline.  LABOTT: OK. Listen, we—Steven had to run. Elliott, I’m just going to ask you very quickly, we really didn’t talk about Netanyahu. You know, he’s got—had a lot of ups and downs, you know, since—over the last year. Does he live another day? He seems to be getting a lot more support.  ABRAMS: Yeah. You know, the conventional wisdom in October-November last year was, boy, is he finished. He’s done. But he didn’t agree with that. And—  LABOTT: He never does.  ABRAMS: He never does. And he’s still there. And he’s just reinforced his coalition with, I think, four more members. And his polls have gotten a little better now. Well, why? Obviously, the last few weeks. Victory has enhanced his position. I believe that Israel will have to have an election next year. And I would say, do not count Netanyahu out. Polls rise and fall. His coalition doesn’t have enough votes. His coalition does have enough votes. But it’s been one of the most amazing comebacks from last October and November that I think we’ve ever seen in a democratic political system.  LABOTT: OK. Well, this was—we could go on for another hour, honestly. This was an amazing panel. I want to thank my wonderful guests, Steven Cook, Ray Takeyh, Elliott Abrams, and Farah Pandith. Thank you to all of you in the media and others for tuning in. And thank you to CFR for setting up this very timely briefing. We have so much information on our website from our scholars. We are on TikTok. We are on social media. So any young people out there, you can find your information—if you’re looking to TikTok for your information, you can find us there. Thanks, everyone. And we hope to see you again next time. Bye-bye.  (END) 

As the one-year anniversary of the October 7 attacks approaches, panelists discuss U.S. policy options regarding the Israel-Hamas conflict, including the administration’s proposed peace deal and the ramifications of the upcoming U.S. presidential election.