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The desirability of workfare in the presence of misreporting
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The desirability of workfare in the presence of misreporting

Author

Listed:
  • Tomer Blumkin
  • Yoram Margalioth
  • Efraim Sadka

Abstract

In this paper we demonstrate that in addition to its acknowledged screening role, workfare—namely, introducing work (or training) requirements for welfare eligibility in means-tested programs—also serves to mitigate income misreporting by welfare claimants. It achieves this goal by effectively increasing the marginal cost of earning extra income in the shadow economy for claimants who satisfy the work requirement. We show that when misreporting is sufficiently prevalent, supplementing a means-tested transfer system with work requirements is socially desirable. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2013. "The desirability of workfare in the presence of misreporting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(1), pages 71-88, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:20:y:2013:i:1:p:71-88
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9215-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Craig Brett & Laurence Jacquet, 2015. "Workforce or workfare? The optimal use of work requirements when labour is supplied along the extensive margin," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(5), pages 1855-1882, December.
    2. Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2009. "Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 111-145, January.
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8812 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8812 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Pierre Cahuc & Yann Algan, 2009. "Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 111-145, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Workfare; Welfare; Means-testing; Misreporting; Utility maintenance; D6; H2; H5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

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