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Welfare Work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences
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Welfare Work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences

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  • Robert Moffitt

Abstract

Work requirements in means-tested transfer programs have grown in importance in the U.S. and in some other countries. The theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximized. Here we consider a case where society is paternalistic and instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients. With this social welfare function, optimality of work requirements is possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements to some benefit recipients and not others. Numerical simulations show that the accuracy must be high for such optimality to occur. The simulations also show that earnings subsidies can be justified with the type of social welfare function used here.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Moffitt, 2005. "Welfare Work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive 534, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:534
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Ravallion, 2022. "On the Gains from Tradable Benefits‐in‐kind: Evidence for Workfare in India," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(355), pages 770-787, July.
    2. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Projective Paternalism," NBER Working Papers 26119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Richard Blundell, 2016. "Coase Lecture—Human Capital, Inequality and Tax Reform: Recent Past and Future Prospects," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 201-218, April.
    4. Yui Nakamura, 2014. "Cash Transfers for Poverty Alleviation Under Double Asymmetric Information Regarding Income and Productivity," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 71-79, March.
    5. Gelber, Alexander M. & Mitchell, Joshua W., 2009. "Taxes and Time Allocation: Evidence from Single Women," MPRA Paper 19148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Drenik, Andres & Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, 2018. "Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 77-102.
    7. Stefanie Behncke & Markus Frölich & Michael Lechner, 2009. "Targeting Labour Market Programmes - Results from a Randomized Experiment," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 145(III), pages 221-268, September.
    8. Mojsoska-Blazevski, Nikica & Petreski, Marjan & Petreska, Despina, 2013. "Increasing labour market activity of poor and female: Let’s make work pay in Macedonia," MPRA Paper 57228, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Mihai Alexandru Codreanu & Tom Waters, 2023. "Do work search requirements work? Evidence from a UK reform targeting single parents," IFS Working Papers W23/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    10. Martin Ravallion, 2021. "On the Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind," Working Papers gueconwpa~21-21-13, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    11. Craig Brett & Laurence Jacquet, 2011. "Workforce or Workfare?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3463, CESifo.
    12. Timothy F. Harris, 2018. "Do SNAP Work Requirements Work?," Upjohn Working Papers 19-297, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    13. Han, Jeehoon & Meyer, Bruce D. & Sullivan, James X., 2020. "Inequality in the joint distribution of consumption and time use," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    14. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2013. "The desirability of workfare in the presence of misreporting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(1), pages 71-88, February.
    15. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Yusuke Narita, 2011. "Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach," Working Papers 2011-018, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    16. Richard Blundell & Mike Brewer & Peter Haan & Andrew Shephard, 2009. "Optimal Income Taxation of Lone Mothers: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and Germany," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages 101-121, February.
    17. Rolf Aaberge & Lennart Flood, 2013. "U.S. versus Sweden. The effect of alternative in-work tax credit policies on labour supply of single mothers," Discussion Papers 761, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    18. Arthur Alik-Lagrange & Martin Ravallion, 2015. "Inconsistent Policy Evaluation: A Case Study for a Large Workfare Program," NBER Working Papers 21041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Timothy F. Harris, 2021. "Do Snap Work Requirements Work?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 72-94, January.
    20. Armando Barrientos & Juan Miguel Villa, 2013. "Antipoverty transfers and labour force participation effects," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series 18513, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    21. Alari Paulus, 2016. "The antipoverty performance of universal and means-tested benefits with costly take-up," ImPRovE Working Papers 16/12, Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy, University of Antwerp.
    22. Ruggero Paladini, 2014. "Da Bentham alla tassazione ottimale," Public Finance Research Papers 2, Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome.
    23. Jesse Rothstein, 2009. "Is the EITC Equivalent to an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence," NBER Working Papers 14966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2011. "The Desirability of Workfare in the Presence of Misreporting," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275760, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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